# Round 2—Neg vs Emory JS

## 1NC

### 1nc 1

#### Surrender is not topical—it’s a declaration to an opposing party, independent of any legal restriction—topical version is just to repeal the AUMF

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“Finally, consistent with the laws of armed conflict and U.S. military doctrine, the U.S. forces were prepared to capture bin Laden if he had surrendered in a way that they could safely accept. The laws of armed conflict require acceptance of a genuine offer of surrender that is clearly communicated by the surrendering party and received by the opposing force, under circumstances where it is feasible for the opposing force to accept that offer of surrender. But where that is not the case, those laws authorize use of lethal force against an enemy belligerent, under the circumstances presented here.”

This statement is important and useful. This is the international law standard in the laws of war for surrender, and it is the standard applied in operational law by US JAG in operations in Afghanistan on a regular basis – in conventional operations as well as special operations. I had some fears that, in order to present what was apparently a marvelously clean operation in terms of targeting and collateral damage in its most favorable light, the administration might be tempted to raise the bar on the law of surrender. It is an act in the law of war that is much more fraught and difficult in many circumstances than it might appear. But the Legal Adviser has stated the law as it is, and as it is operationally applied by US forces on a regular basis. I welcome the Legal Adviser’s statement, and, with the additional statement on surrender, believe that it covers the major jus in bello legal issues in the Bin Laden raid.

The statement does not directly address jus ad bellum issues – the question of whether the use of force was lawful, particularly in crossing the border into Pakistan to carry out the raid. The administration has asserted, in keeping with longstanding US views of international law, that sovereignty is not a bar, other things equal, where a state is unwilling or unable to deal with terrorists in its territory. In addition, this being a defense of the OBL operation, it did not address questions of targeted killing in general – apart from the general considerations given in the 2010 address – but offered only a defense in this particular case.

#### Vote neg:

#### 1. Ground—external enforcement measures bypass core neg gorund and comparative lit on actual restrictions while inflating solvency—independent voter for object fiat.

#### 2. Predictability—blurring mechanisms makes them a conditional moving target, which un-limits the topic.

Ospecs a voter issue fairness

### 1nc 2

#### Next off is Apocalypse Meow—

#### The 1AC’s descriptions of an apocalypse depoliticize the human and violence against the nonhuman body—naturalizes oppressive structures

**Collard 13**—Geography Department at the University of British Columbia [modified for ableist language, modifications denoted by brackets]

(Rosemary-Claire, “Apocalypse Meow”, Capitalism Nature Socialism, 24:1, 35-41, dml)

It is an easy point to make, that apocalypse is **defined in** almost totally human terms. Although environmental apocalypticism is tied to **statistics about species loss** and habitat destruction, it is only really an apocalypse **once human beings** (**and capitalist production** for that matter) **are under threat**. Occasionally nonhuman species deemed extraordinary in some manner (usually in the degree to which either they are most ‘‘like us’’ or useful to us) may enter into the apocalyptic calculus\* dolphins that can recognize themselves in the mirror, chimpanzees that use tools. This is further evidence of apocalypticism’s anthropocentrism. Leftist critiques of apocalyptic narratives, while not necessarily incompatible with the previous point, have focused instead on **these narratives’ depoliticizing tendencies**. Swyngedouw (2010a; 2011) locates apocalypse within a general trend toward environmental populism and ‘‘post-politics,’’ a political formation **that** forecloses the political**, preventing the politicization of particulars** (Swyngedouw 2010b). He argues that populism never assigns proper names to things, signifying (following Rancie`re) an erosion of politics and ‘‘genuine democracy . . .[which] is a space where the unnamed, the uncounted, and, consequently, un-symbolized become named and counted’’ (Swyngedouw 2011, 80). Whereas class struggle was about naming the proletariat, and feminist struggles were named through ‘‘woman’’ as a political category, a defining feature of post-politics is **an** ambiguous **and** unnamed **enemy or target of concern**. As Swyngedouw (2010b; 2011) contends, the postpolitical condition **invokes a common predicament and the need for common humanity-wide action**, with ‘‘human’’ and ‘‘humanity’’ vacant signifiers and homogenizing subjects in this politics. I return to this idea soon. Over a decade earlier, Katz (1995) also argues that ‘‘apocalypticism is politically ~~disabling’’~~ [debilitating] (277). She writes: ‘‘contemporary problems are so serious that **rendering them apocalyptic** obscures their political ecology\*their sources, their political, economic and social dimensions’’ (278). Loathe to implicate ‘‘human nature’’ as one of these sources, Katz instead targets global capitalism, which is ‘‘premised on a series of socially-constructed differences that, in apocalyptic visions, take a universal character: man/woman; culture/nature; first world/third world; bourgeoisie/working class’’ (279). Towards the end of her short chapter, she remarks that ‘‘human beings are simultaneously different from and of a piece with bees’’ (280), calling subsequently for ‘‘a usable environmental politics [that] takes seriously the political responsibility implied by the difference between people and bees’’ (280). There is so much to agree with here. But Katz misses a big binary in her list: human/animal. On the other hand, she clearly if implicitly recognizes not only the productiveness of this binary and its role in environmental politics (the humans and the bees), but also the attention it deserves. The question then remains: Although according to Katz, apocalyptic politics underplays if not entirely ignores the production process, is this inherent to apocalypticism, or is there potential to train apocalypticism onto production, particularly of the human and the human/animal binary? **Neither a natural order, nor a pre-given subject position, nor a category that exists beyond politics, the human is rather** an intensely political categorywhose ongoing production is rife with violence, contestation, and hierarchy. The central mode of this production is the human/animal binary that Haraway (2008, 18) says ‘‘flourishes, lethally, in the entrails of humanism.’’ This binary is **continually** re-made **and** re-authorized **politically**, legally, scientifically, religiously, and so on. It is **the product of particular** epistemologies**,** ontologies**, and** power relations, and it also produces these same structures. The spatial, material and discursive inclusion and exclusion of animals construct the human/animal binary. Materially, animals are included in the ‘‘human’’ project as laborers, food, clothing, and so on, but are **excluded from life itself** should their dead bodies be of economic value. Animals work for us, for free, and are largely ‘‘disposable workers’’ in a manner similar to and different from the ‘‘disposable women’’ Wright (2006) observes are fundamental to the workings of capital and labor in Mexican maquiladoras. The similarity lies in how both animal laborers and these women factory workers are devalued as laborers, and this devaluing of their labor actually **contributes to the formation of value in the commodities and capital of the production network**. They are different in that of course the women are still paid\*albeit marginally\*and their labor is recognized as labor. Animals do not just labor for free. They also die for profit and power. The most obvious example of industrial meat production aside, **capitalism and the liberal state** derive significant profits **from the ability to kill**\*often in mass numbers\*wild **animals**. Killing wolves, bears, cougars, and other animals has been a predominant colonial project, with bounty often the first laws passed in the colonies. Not only domesticated but also wild animals have played and continue to play a central role, materially and symbolically, in capitalism and the formation of the nation state, as symbols, commodities, and spectacle. Discursively **animals found the human subject by virtue of their exclusion**: the human is what is not animal. This is **a juridicopolitical, ethical exclusion** that is always at the same time an inclusion. The human thus **appears to be a neurological or biophysiological product** rather than **a result of** specific histories**,** geographies**, and** social relations, between humans and also humans and animals. Certainly particular socio-natural properties do become essential to a thing’s power and geopolitical centrality (think opposable thumbs, cerebral cortexes, bipedalism, and so on). But as Huber (2011, 34, emphasis added) argues in the context of oil, ‘‘biophysical capacities are **only realizable through particular uneven social relations** of culture, history, and power.’’ Specific conditions and relations produce the human, which is entirely different than saying that humans are the same as each other or as other animals. Their differences should not be disregarded for a host of reasons, not the least of which is the political struggle various groups have made to claim both difference and not being animals. It is not my aim to ignore, then, the particularities of the human species, although I would emphasize that these particularities are not universal and are increasingly being shown to be far less particular than we imagined.

#### Voting neg means getting naked in front of our pets—use the ballot to express solidarity with the nonhuman through allowing for an apocalypse of the human subject—the debate round is uniquely emancipatory but the perm removes that potential

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(Rosemary-Claire, “Apocalypse Meow”, Capitalism Nature Socialism, 24:1, 35-41, dml)

While what counts as human shifts dramatically in time and space, what remains for the most part constant is **the animal outside that founds this category**. These are not meaningless exclusions, and in the context of environmental politics, of course, they have especially pronounced momentum and significance. The naturalization of a superior, distinct species category **enables systematically and casually inflicted death and suffering** on an inconceivable scale. What is outside the ‘‘human’’ is far more ‘‘killable,’’ like Haraway says, more easily ‘‘noncriminally put to death,’’ says Derrida, more ‘‘precarious’’ for Butler. Although Butler’s extensive work on the politics of the human has been criticized for anthropocentrism, in a recent interview (Antonello and Farneti 2009), she questions what it might mean to **share conditions of vulnerability and precariousness** with animals and the environment, and suggests it undoes **‘‘the very conceit of anthropocentrism**.’’ Such an undoing is precisely what I advocate. While an entrenched and powerful category, **the human is also** changeable **and** fluid. As Derrida (2008, 5) says, ‘‘the list of what is ‘proper’ to man always forms a configuration, from the first moment. For that very reason, it can never be limited to a single trait and is never closed.’’ The human’s contingencies, dependencies and destructive, homogenizing effects should be front and center in environmental politics. To show its strangeness is to show that it could be otherwise. Ultimately, **we might have to reconfigure subjectivity’s contours and topographies**, allow for an apocalypse of the human subject. We might have to get naked in front of our pets. ‘‘A true political space,’’ writes Swyngedouw (2010b, 194), ‘‘is always a space of contestation for those who are not-all, who are uncounted and unnamed.’’ This true political space necessarily includes\*if only by virtue of their exclusion\*animals, the ‘‘constitutive outside’’ of humanity itself. How we respond to this dynamic **ought to be a central question** of critical scholarship and philosophizing. To be a philosopher, says Deleuze in the ‘‘A for Animal’’ entry to the ‘‘abecedary’’ (L’abe´ce´daire de Gilles Deleuze 1989), ‘‘is to write in the place of animals that die.’’ This is still an imperfect way of describing my objective (for one thing, I am also interested in animals that are still alive), but it is an improvement over being a ‘‘spokesperson’’ for animals, which are often characterized as speechless and may be rendered more so having spokespeople appointed to speak on their behalf. To write in the place of animals that die seems a preferable, though still fraught, characterization. This paper is therefore written in the place of those uncounted and unnamed non-subjects of political space, the animals that die, the nonhumans, the hundreds of millions of animals that are ‘‘living out our nightmares’’ (Raffles 2010, 120): injected, tested, prodded, then discarded. **We have** denied**,** disavowed**, and** misunderstood **animals**. They are refused speech, reason, morality, emotion, clothing, shelter, mourning, culture, lying, lying about lying, gifting, laughing, crying\*the list has no limit. But ‘‘who was born first, before the names?’’ Derrida (2008, 18) asks. ‘‘Which one saw the other come to this place, so long ago? Who will have been the first occupant? Who the subject? Who has remained the despot, for so long now?’’ Some see identifying this denial as a side-event, inconsequential, even sort of silly. The belief in human superiority is firmly lodged and dear to people’s hearts and senses of themselves. It also seems a daunting task, not a simple matter of inserting the excluded into the dominant political order, which as Zˇ izˇek (1999) writes, neglects how **these very subversions and exclusions are the order’s condition of being**. But if the political is precisely, as Swyngedouw (2010b) suggests, the expansion of a specific issue into a larger universal demand against ‘‘those in power’’ (an elevation he argues is precluded by the post-political, **which** **reduces an issue to a** particular**,** contained**, and** very specific **demand**), then perhaps the universal demand we need to mobilize in the Left is humanity itself. We need to write in the place of animals that die, in the sense that our politics must undertake not only a re-writing of our histories of oppression, our constitutions, our global agreements (and who and what are included in them), but also, necessarily, **a radical reconfiguring of how subjects are positioned in relation to each other**. The human can in fact serve as the named subject of this political effort, perhaps most aptly in environmental struggles. Like Braidotti (2008, 183) argues, ‘‘sustainability is about decentering anthropocentrism.’’ It is about an ‘‘egalitarianism . . .that displaces both the old-fashioned humanistic assumption that ‘man’ is the measure of all things and the anthropocentric idea that the only bodies that matter are human’’ (183). In tackling the human category, I believe the Left **would not only be more relevant, but also could bring a** transformative sensibility **to an environmental politics** that often seems to want to blame ‘‘humankind’’ but **fails to consider precisely how this material and symbolic category remains untroubled in such misanthropy.**

### 1nc 3

#### Rather than playing the role of the policy maker, embrace the role of the suicide bomber and play with the supposedly fixed idealizations of what makes life *life* and death *really death*

Mbembe 03. Achille Mbembe, senior researcher at the Institute of Social and Economic Research at the University of the Witwatersrand, “Necropolitics,” Public Culture 15(1): pg. 38

How does the notion of play and trickery relate to the “suicide bomber”? There is no doubt that in the case of the suicide bomber the sacrifice consists of the spectacular putting to death of the self, of becoming his or her own victim (self-sacrifice). The self-sacrificed proceeds to take power over his or her death and to approach it head-on. This power may be derived from the belief that the destruction of one’s own body does not affect the continuity of the being. The idea is that the being exists outside us. The self-sacrifice consists, here, in the removal of a twofold prohibition: that of self-immolation (suicide) and that of murder. Unlike primitive sacrifices, however, there is no animal to serve as a substitute victim. Death here achieves the character of a transgression. But unlike crucifix- ion, it has no expiatory dimension. It is not related to the Hegelian paradigms of prestige or recognition. Indeed, a dead person cannot recognize his or her killer, who is also dead. Does this imply that death occurs here as pure annihilation and nothingness, excess and scandal?

Whether read from the perspective of slavery or of colonial occupation, death and freedom are irrevocably interwoven. As we have seen, terror is a defining feature of both slave and late-modern colonial regimes. Both regimes are also specific instances and experiences of unfreedom. To live under late modern occu- pation is to experience a permanent condition of “being in pain”: fortified struc- tures, military posts, and roadblocks everywhere; buildings that bring back painful memories of humiliation, interrogations, and beatings; curfews that imprison hundreds of thousands in their cramped homes every night from dusk to day- break; soldiers patrolling the unlit streets, frightened by their own shadows; chil- dren blinded by rubber bullets; parents shamed and beaten in front of their fami- lies; soldiers urinating on fences, shooting at the rooftop water tanks just for fun, chanting loud offensive slogans, pounding on fragile tin doors to frighten the chil- dren, confiscating papers, or dumping garbage in the middle of a residential neigh- borhood; border guards kicking over a vegetable stand or closing borders at whim; bones broken; shootings and fatalities—a certain kind of madness.78

In such circumstances, the discipline of life and the necessities of hardship (trial by death) are marked by excess. What connects terror, death, and freedom is an ecstatic notion of temporality and politics. The future, here, can be authen- tically anticipated, but not in the present. The present itself is but a moment of vision—vision of the freedom not yet come. Death in the present is the mediator of redemption. Far from being an encounter with a limit, boundary, or barrier, it is experienced as “a release from terror and bondage.”79 As Gilroy notes, this pref- erence for death over continued servitude is a commentary on the nature of free- dom itself (or the lack thereof). If this lack is the very nature of what it means for the slave or the colonized to exist, the same lack is also precisely the way in which he or she takes account of his or her mortality. Referring to the practice of individual or mass suicide by slaves cornered by the slave catchers, Gilroy sug- gests that death, in this case, can be represented as agency. For death is precisely that from and over which I have power. But it is also that space where freedom and negation operate.

#### The aff’s call for salvation betrays an obsessive drive towards infinity – humanity subjugates itself to a calculative rationality which bleaches the value from life in favor of hollow promises of immortality – vote negative to engage in orgiastic sacrifice of the 1AC – this is critical to reclaiming the transgressive beauty of existence

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(Jeremy, “The Remains of God: Bataille/Sacriﬁce/Community”, Culture, Theory and Critique, 52:2-3, 127-144, dml)

Bataille argues that the divide between the sacred and the profane arises in conjunction with the advent of labour. He relates labour to the establishment of the subject/object dichotomy in human consciousness, suggesting that ‘the positing of the object [or the “thing”], which is not given in animality, occurs in the human use of tools’ (Bataille 1992a: 27). Subordinated to the one who uses it, a tool is assigned a utility, a telos beyond its immediate existence, and thus takes its place within a newly emergent sphere of ‘discontinuous’ objects that now includes oneself and others. ‘With work’, Michel Surya has written, ‘~~mankind~~ discovered ends . . . . And all ends are a calculation speculating on the beneﬁts of the future, . . . all ends separate humanity from itself’ (2002: 383). With the rise of self-consciousness, of oneself as a separate, distinct individual, also comes the fear of death and the corresponding desire for durable, even eternal, existence. Subjugated to mortal anxiety, ‘~~man~~ becomes a thing’; gripped by the fear of death and the yearning to endure, humans are rendered servile – relegated, like tools, to the world of instrumental utility (Bataille 1993: 218).

The desire for durable – even eternal – existence is thus vouchsafed to instrumental reason. Bataille identiﬁes the realm of instrumental reason with the sphere of the profane; it is the realm of discontinuous objects and individuals. The sacred, on the other hand, is characterised by a sense of intimacy; it is the sphere of continuity, which objects, in their distinct forms, transcend. For Bataille, then, ‘existence is profane when it lives in the face of transcendence; it is sacred when it lives in immanence’, or continuity (Hollier 1998: 65).

Bataille’s critique of communism devolves on this line of distinction. The positing of the essence of humans as producers in communism is tantamount to relinquishing the possibility of sovereignty. Following a Hegelian schema, Bataille argues that work necessarily subjugates one to some telos, some future aim or goal that defers experience of the present moment under the ‘domination of labor’ (1993: 177). 4 One’s instincts must be renounced, and enjoyment put off, in the interest of maintaining the order that helps guarantee survival. Work is always dedicated, in other words, to the aim of preservation of the individual, the community, and the species; it attempts to guarantee the future, to secure durability.

The anxious desire for durability corresponds to a demeaning substantialisation of the sacred. According to Bataille, genuine sacrality is not a ‘substantial reality’, but is, on the contrary, ‘an element characterized by the impossibility of its enduring’ (Bataille 1985: 241). The ascendancy of reason, the fear of death, and the will to securing the future bring about a corresponding elevation of these profane concerns to the status of the ‘right’ sacred. Indeed, the profane world of utility is projected into an idea of God as a substantial and eternal being, transcending the sacred world of immanence and the lethal forces of time. It is for this reason that Bataille characterises the personal God as the ‘hypostasis of work’ and the ‘profanity of this world’ (1994: 82; Surya 2002: 384). ‘God’, Bataille claims, is ‘the end of things, is caught up in the game that makes each thing the means of another. In other words, God . . . becomes a thing insofar as he is named, a thing, put on the plane with all other things’ (1993: 383).

Within Bataille’s thought, then, God is an expression of the fear of death and the corresponding will to shore up one’s individual self, attempting to procure, through reasoned calculations that would secure the future, a sense of enduringness, eternity. In making God the elevated ﬁgure of reason, duration, and eternity, Christianity, claims Bataille, ‘made the sacred substantial’ – a mere thing (1985: 242). God becomes an expression not of the sacred, but rather a ‘tenacious obsession with the lastingness’ of our individual selves (Bataille 1986: 16). Understood this way, God represents an impediment to what Bataille refers to as communication, the intimacy afforded by the dissolution of the self in experiences of sovereign expenditure. It is thus this ‘God of reason’ – the God of salvation, of enduring forms, of eternal life – that must be the victim of an ‘incessant sacriﬁce’ that will restore sovereignty (Bataille 1988: 88; 1993: 378).

Bataille’s theory of sacriﬁce illuminates this point. According to Bataille, the victim of a sacriﬁce is always something subjected to the ‘domination of labor’ – rendered a mere thing. The sacriﬁcial object, whether human or animal, is drawn out ‘of the world of utility’ and restored to the realm of the sacred, for sacriﬁce annuls an object’s ‘ties of subordination’. Although sacriﬁce destroys the object it renders sacred, its aim is not mere obliteration. Bataille makes the crucial point that ‘the destruction that sacriﬁce is intended to bring about is not annihilation. The thing – only the thing – is what sacriﬁce means to destroy in the victim’ (1992a: 43). This is to say that in being destroyed, what had been made servile, an instrument or tool within the realm of utility and reason, is rendered useless. In this sense, then, death is the realm of the sacred, of immanence, for it is in death that the boundaries that delineate and separate objects in the world are temporarily transgressed, destroyed, thus returning those objects to the intimate domain of continuity.

The contagious force of sacriﬁce is such that its lethal effects extend from the victim to those who witness its immolation. Bataille argues that in sacriﬁcial rituals, the consecrated sphere promotes a sense of heightened attention by which the participants in the ritual identify with the victim being put to death. At the moment that the throat of a sacriﬁcial animal is slashed, for example, the witnesses to the sacriﬁce likewise undergo an experience ‘on the level of death’; their sense of enclosed subjectivity is, for a time, ruptured, and intimacy is restored in an experience of deep communication. ‘The individual identiﬁes with the victim in the sudden movement that restores it to immanence (to intimacy)’; he undergoes a ﬂeeting experience of dissolution in the realm of the sacred.

#### Their model of resistance defeats itself when it mirrors sovereign violence by maintaining bare life as an object of resistance just as it is an object of violence—the only solution is for bare life to become absolutely and immediately political on its own terms

Amoore and Hall 13. Louise Amoore, professor of geography at the University of Durham, and Alexandra Hall, professor of politics at the University of York, “The clown at the gates of the camp: Sovereignty, resistance and the figure of the fool,” Security Dialoge 44(2) pg. 95

It is our contention, and following Jenny Edkins’ (2007) subtle reading of Agamben, that the phi- losopher himself suggests a way out of the political impasse conjured by his vision of sovereign power. Rendering bare life as ‘form-of-life’, Agamben imagines a being without definitive identity or claim in the world. This, he describes, is a being ‘which is only its own bare existence’ and which ‘being its own form remains inseparable from it’ and ‘over which power no longer seems to have any hold’ (Agamben, 1998: 188). Like the ‘whatever being’ that Agamben refers to in the Coming Community, this is a being that does not make any settled claim for identity or recognition. It is this very lack of identity and lack of definitive demand that constitutes a ‘threat the State cannot come to terms with’ (Agamben 1993: 85). Sovereign power, Agamben (1993: 85–86) reminds us, can recognize and deal with any claim for identity, and yet it cannot tolerate ‘that singularities form a community without affirming an identity’. As Jenny Edkins and Veronique Pin-Fat (2004: 13) suggest, the grammar of sovereign power is not effectively contested by counter identity claims, for such actions merely fight over ‘where the lines are drawn’. Instead, it is by neither refusing nor accepting the biopolitical distinctions that sovereign power seeks to draw that its logic may be interrupted.4 Agamben’s discussions of whatever being and form-of-life point to a space for political action, contestation and resistance that is produced within, and forms an intrinsic part of, sovereign power, one that that is frequently occluded in discussions of homo sacer. Bare life has the potential to become ‘explicitly and immediately political’ (Agamben, 1998: 153) – as Edkins (2007: 86) has it, bare life is the constitutive outside of sovereignty that may also form ‘the element that threatens its disruption from within’.

Notwithstanding the important absence of any representable identity in whatever being, ques- tions do remain as to the specific nature of such forms of being. Precisely what kinds of subjectiv- ity are problematic for sovereign power? What kinds of life fail to be comfortably identifiable within the conditions set out by sovereign power? What might the practices and actions of these forms-of-life of a coming politics look like? The refugee has frequently been invoked as a figure who embodies the threatening ‘outside’ of sovereign political life (Agamben, 1995; Edkins and Pin Fat, 2004; Nyers, 2006; Tyler, 2006). Yet, the way in which the ‘bare’ refugee becomes implicated in attempts to oppose sovereign power via rights and humanitarianism frequently replicates sover- eign power’s own grasp of bare life. In other words, bare life becomes the object or subject of sovereign power and also the object and subject of efforts to oppose it (Agamben, 1998: 133; Edkins, 2007: 75). As Edkins (2007: 75) puts the problem, ‘a coming politics, if it is to be other than a sovereign politics, cannot be a form of identity or social movement politics’. Sovereign power cannot be countered by a politics that seeks to draw lines differently, but that still persists in the act of declaring unities and drawing distinctions.

#### Their privileged position within the academy renders them the critical intellectual counterinsurgency, worse than the status quo because the 1ac can be held up as an example of the neutrality of debate, allowing more radical theories to be disregarded as “unprofessional.”

Harney and Moten 13. Stefano Harney, Professor of Strategic Management Education at the Lee Kong Chian School of Business, Singapore Management University and a co-founder of the School for Study and Fred Moten, Helen L. Bevington Professor of Moden Poetry, “Politics Surrounded,” The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and Black Study, pg. 29

Introducing this labor upon labor, and providing the space for its de- velopment, creates risks. Like the colonial police force recruited un- wittingly from guerrilla neighborhoods, university labor may harbor refugees, fugitives, renegades, and castaways. But there are good rea- sons for the university to be confident that such elements will be ex- posed or forced underground. Precautions have been taken, book lists have been drawn up, teaching observations conducted, invitations to contribute made. Yet against these precautions stands the immanence of transcendence, the necessary deregulation and the possibilities of criminality and fugitivity that labor upon labor requires. Maroon communities of composition teachers, mentorless graduate students, adjunct Marxist historians, out or queer management professors, state college ethnic studies departments, closed-down film programs, visa- expired Yemeni student newspaper editors, historically black college sociologists, and feminist engineers. And what will the university say of them? It will say they are unprofessional. This is not an arbitrary charge. It is the charge against the more than professional. How do those who exceed the profession, who exceed and by exceeding es- cape, how do those maroons problematize themselves, problematize the university, force the university to consider them a problem, a dan- ger? The undercommons is not, in short, the kind of fanciful com- munities of whimsy invoked by Bill Readings at the end of his book. The undercommons, its maroons, are always at war, always in hiding.

The maroons know something about possibility. They are the condi- tion of possibility of the production of knowledge in the university – the singularities against the writers of singularity, the writers who write, publish, travel, and speak. It is not merely a matter of the secret labor upon which such space is lifted, though of course such space is lifted from collective labor and by it. It is rather that to be a critical academic in the university is to be against the university, and to be against the university is always to recognize it and be recognized by it, and to institute the negligence of that internal outside, that unas- similated underground, a negligence of it that is precisely, we must insist, the basis of the professions. And this act of being against al- ways already excludes the unrecognized modes of politics, the beyond of politics already in motion, the discredited criminal para-organiza- tion, what Robin Kelley might refer to as the infrapolitical field (and its music). It is not just the labor of the maroons but their prophetic organization that is negated by the idea of intellectual space in an organization called the university. This is why the negligence of the critical academic is always at the same time an assertion of bourgeois individualism.

Such negligence is the essence of professionalization where it turns out professionalization is not the opposite of negligence but its mode of politics in the United States. It takes the form of a choice that excludes the prophetic organization of the undercommons – to be against, to put into question the knowledge object, let us say in this case the university, not so much without touching its founda- tion, as without touching one’s own condition of possibility, with- out admitting the Undercommons and being admitted to it. From this, a general negligence of condition is the only coherent position. Not so much an antifoundationalism or foundationalism, as both are used against each other to avoid contact with the undercom- mons. This always-negligent act is what leads us to say there is no distinction between the university in the United States and profes- sionalization. There is no point in trying to hold out the university against its professionalization. They are the same. Yet the maroons refuse to refuse professionalization, that is, to be against the uni- versity. The university will not recognize this indecision, and thus professionalization is shaped precisely by what it cannot acknowl- edge, its internal antagonism, its wayward labor, its surplus. Against this wayward labor it sends the critical, sends its claim that what is left beyond the critical is waste.

But in fact, critical education only attempts to perfect professional education. The professions constitute themselves in an opposition to the unregulated and the ignorant without acknowledging the unreg- ulated, ignorant, unprofessional labor that goes on not opposite them but within them. But if professional education ever slips in its labor, ever reveals its condition of possibility to the professions it supports and reconstitutes, critical education is there to pick it up, and to tell it, never mind – it was just a bad dream, the ravings, the drawings of the mad. Because critical education is precisely there to tell professional education to rethink its relationship to its opposite – by which criti- cal education means both itself and the unregulated, against which professional education is deployed. In other words, critical education arrives to support any faltering negligence, to be vigilant in its negli- gence, to be critically engaged in its negligence. It is more than an ally of professional education, it is its attempted completion.

A professional education has become a critical education. But one should not applaud this fact. It should be taken for what it is, not pro- gress in the professional schools, not cohabitation with the Univer- sitas, but counterinsurgency, the refounding terrorism of law, coming for the discredited, coming for those who refuse to write off or write up the undercommons.

#### The 1ac is a standard liberal strategy to abjure all violence, itself an act of violence, that only seeking an ethics of self-sacrifice can resolve

Pugliese 10. Joseph Pugliese, Research Director of the Department of Media, Music, Communication and Cultural Studies at Macquarie University, “Necroethics of Terrorism,” Law Critique (2010) 21: pg. 228

It is precisely liberalism’s dogged refusal to acknowledge its investment in these relations of imperial violence that has marked, for me, the reception of this essay at the various conferences at which I have presented it. Aside from a few exceptions, the programmatic response to this paper has been violently to object to the possibility that I was attempting to valorise a particular form of violence—when, in fact, I am attempting to address the urgent need to assume responsibility for various forms of disavowed violence constitutive of the liberal democratic state. These recursive disavowals must, in fact, be seen as infrastructural to the operation of the liberal democratic state: ‘As a political theory’, writes Beatrice Hanssen (1997, p. 240), ‘liberalism abjures all forms of violence that surpass the boundaries of individual self-defense or the legitimate monopoly of violence that the liberal democratic state exercises’. Apparently testing the very limits of liberal ‘tolerance’ (with all its moralising, paternal and disavowed asymmetries of power), I was repeatedly told by a number of well-intentioned speakers that the only solution to violence was to valorise absolute non-violence: to which I respond, citing Derrida’s (1985, p. 148) trenchant critique of this binary, that the ‘very elocution of nonviolent metaphysics is its first disavowal’ and that, from the western context from which I write, this ethical demand for the ‘avowal of violence is the least possible violence, the only way to repress the worst violence’. And I interlace here Levinas’ critique of the ‘imperialism of the same’ and Mehta’s critique of ‘imperial eschatology’ with Derrida’s (1985, p. 130) deconstruction of a ‘messianic imperialism’ that disavows its own violence: ‘But here and now (in a present in general) ... an end cannot be stated, eschatology is not possible, except through violence. This infinite passage through violence is what is called history. To overlook the irreducibility of this last violence’ is to risk ‘the worst violence’ by refusing to ‘pose the question of responsibility’ for the disavowed violence of one’s own discourse/practice.

Levinas’ critique of the west’s concept of freedom resonates acutely with the very exercise of this freedom within the violent context of the imperial war in Iraq. It is in this violent theatre of war that freedom is disclosed to be ‘murderous and usurpatory in its very exercise’.12 Transposed to the geopolitical context of the west, Levinas (1987, p. 57) discloses how ‘The very spontaneity of freedom is not put into question—such seems the dominant tradition of Western philosophy.... Only the limitation of freedom would itself be tragic or scandalous.’ Since both the 9/11 attacks and the London 7/7 bombings, it has been precisely the limitations that have now been imposed on freedom that have registered in the west as ‘tragic’ and ‘scandalous’ in delimiting a spontaneity of freedom, purchased, as must be underscored, at the expense of so many of the west’s others (Iraq, Afghanistan). I cite here Sheik Mohammed Bashir’s Friday prayers, delivered in Baghdad in the midst of the carnage that is unfolding there, in which he graphically reorients the west’s understanding of freedom:

It was discovered that freedom in this land [Iraq] is not ours. It is the freedom of the occupying soldiers in doing what they like ... abusing women, children, men, and the old men and women whom they have arrested randomly and without any guilt. No one can ask them what they are doing, because they are protected by their freedom.... No one can punish them, whether in our country or their country. They expressed the freedom of rape, the freedom of nudity and the freedom of humiliation. (cited in Danner 2005, p. 26)

Situated in this context, the explosive acts of counter-violence unleashed by the London suicide bombers expose the occluded structures mobilised by the liberal democratic state through which it legitimates its epistemic, institutional and military violence and through which it monopolises the exercise of violence, such as in the murderous politics of imperial war in Iraq.13 The western declarations of law that follow these acts of terror, post-9/11 and 7/7, will ensure the preservation of law itself through regimes of unjust imprisonment, extraordinary renditions, torture and murder.14

#### Be ready to destroy everything.

Burroughs 88. William S. Burroughs, *Western Lands* 1988

Scientists always said there is no such thing as a soul. Now they are in a position to prove it. Total Death. Soul Death. It’s what the Egyptians called the Second and Final Death. This awesome power to destroy souls forever is now vested in farsighted and responsible men [people] in the State Department, the CIA, and the Pentagon.

Governments fall from sheer indifference. Authority figures, deprived of the vampiric energy they suck off their constituents, are seen for what they are: dead empty masks manipulated by computers. And what is behind the computers? Remote control. Of course. Don't intend to be here when this shithouse goes up. Nothing here now but the recordings. Shut them off, they are as radioactive as an old joke.  
Look at the prison you are in, we are all in. This is a penal colony that is now a Death Camp. Place of the Second and Final Death.  
Desperation is the raw material of drastic change. Only those who can leave behind everything they have ever believed in can hope to escape.

#### Rather than surrendering the war on terror, we surrender our bodies.

Mbembe 06. Achille Mbembe, senior researcher at the Institute of Social and Economic Research at the University of the Witwatersrand, “Faces of Freedom: Jewish and Black Experiences,” Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies, 7:3, pg. 296

This inability of western power to reflect critically on itself in relation to the cruelty it inflicts upon the other, this proclivity to shed other people’s blood in the name of ‘civilization’, ‘freedom’ and ‘humanitarianism’, this inability of the west to come to terms with the unreason that informs its own understanding of reason: this has been at the heart of black criticism of modernity. Black criticism argues against the fact that, in their drive for sovereign mastery over the world, western powers mask a particularism that is characteristically formulated in terms of universalist values. Yet it is a universalism that is premised on a racist conception of what constitutes the human. But what is absolute sovereignty if not the attempt to wield, in the same gesture, the combined powers of reason and unreason? What is the sovereign drive for mastery if not a death drive?

Black imaginations of freedom emerge as a response to this death drive that masks itself under the guise of ‘civilization’ and ‘humanitarianism’. This is why these imaginations are almost always intertwined with narratives of bondage, exile, and captivity. Whether it takes the form of slavery or that of racial colonialism, bondage always rests, at least partly, on the power to arrogate another human being’s labour without his or her consent. In turn, the appropriation, without consent, of the work of another human being makes it well nigh impossible for the latter to take care of himself or herself.

That is why in many black narratives of freedom, liberty is imagined first and foremost as the recovery of the capacity to once again take care of oneself, a capacity which, in the political parlance of the twentieth century, is defined as ‘the right to self-determination’, of which African nationalisms are a manifestation.

But even more important in the calculus of freedom is self-ownership. Indeed, racism is the operation through which one is asked to surrender one’s body, one’s humanity, and be disowned of oneself. This is not a purely economistic process in the sense that in slavery, for example, the black person becomes the human property of someone else. To be disowned of oneself also means to have been dishonoured and shamed, as Fanon showed not so long ago. This is the reason why the discourse of freedom in modern black imagination is so much about recovery. To be sure, this has to do with the recovery of a set of properties in the real material world: mainly the end of economic exploitation and the enjoyment of the fruits of one’s own labour.

### case

**Vote them down for the gendered language in their patton and grieder cards**

**Kleinman 2007** - teaches in the Department of Sociology at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill (March 12, Sherryl, “ Why Sexist Language Matters ” http://www.alternet.org/story/48856/?page=entire)

I'm not referring to such words as "bitch," "whore" and "slut." What I focus on instead are words that students consider just fine: male (so-called) generics. Some of these words refer to persons occupying a position: postman, chairman, freshman, congressman, fireman. Other words refer to the entire universe of human beings: "mankind" or "he." Then we've got manpower, manmade lakes and "Oh, man, where did I leave my keys?" There's "manning" the tables in a country where children learn that "all men are created equal." The most insidious, from my observations, is the popular expression "you guys." Please don't tell me it's a regional term. I've heard it in the Triangle, New York, Chicago, San Francisco and Montreal. I've seen it in print in national magazines, newsletters and books. And even if it were regional, that doesn't make it right. I'll bet we can all think of a lot of practices in our home regions that we'd like to get rid of.

I sound defensive. I know. But that's because I've so often heard (and not only from students) ... What's the big deal? Why does all this "man-ning" and "guys-ing" deserve a place in my list of items of gender inequality and justify taking up inches of space in the newsletter of a rape crisis center?

Because male-based generics are another indicator -- and more importantly, a reinforcer -- of a system in which "man" in the abstract and men in the flesh are privileged over women. Some say that language merely reflects reality and so we should ignore our words and work on changing the unequal gender arrangements that are reflected in our language. Well, yes, in part.

It's no accident that "man" is the anchor in our language and "woman" is not. And of course we should make social change all over the place. But the words we use can also reinforce current realities when they are sexist (or racist or heterosexist). Words are tools of thought. We can use words to maintain the status quo or to think in new ways -- which in turn creates the possibility of a new reality. It makes a difference if I think of myself as a "girl" or a "woman"; it makes a difference if we talk about "Negroes" or "African-Americans." Do we want a truly inclusive language or one that just pretends?

**The 1ac has a bad case of mind/body dualism—Lifton’s totalizingly psychological understanding of all politics reifies concrete divisions between the mind and body which creates a racialized understanding of what is human**

**Pfeifer 09** – (Mar. 2009, Theresa H. Pfeifer, PhD student in sociology at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, master’s degree in communication studies, “Deconstructing Cartesian Dualisms of Western Racialized Systems,” Journal of Black Studies, Volume 39, Number 4, March 2009, 528-547, Sage Pub DH)

As such, corporeal ontology reflects the second sense of the term as it relates to the reality or existence of the political body and concerns the relationship or interaction between the mind and the body within the human subject. Claims to the relative significance of mental and bodily factors are thus founded on ontological assumptions as to the nature of social and political reality. Mind-body dualism is problematic as it is difficult (or perhaps impossible) to explain how the mind could interact with the body if such a dualism is maintained (see Ryle, 1949; Carruthers, 1986). Essentially, what we are concerned with here is the relationship between the mental and the bodily, or the extent to which the mental shapes and is shaped by the bodily within the human subject. Indeed, Descartes does not seem to have been able to come up with a satisfactory answer to this question and it raises a number of other awkward questions: if minds and bodies are separate substances, how are they connected in the human subject? Why did minds and bodies become connected? Indeed, what role is played in the causation of bodily movements by the mental? Do souls become detached from bodies? Do all people have immaterial minds? When we are not thinking, do we cease to exist?

However, we should be clear about the nature of ontology and understand that ontological issues cannot be resolved empirically (Hay, 2005). Interactionism is an ontological issue of the relationship between body and mind, not a problem in which there can be a definite solution. The problem with mind-body dualism is that it does not even address the issue of interaction as it assumes that mind and body are independent entities and does not focus on their relationship, merely their differences. Mind-body dualism is thus an ontological short cut, a way of surpassing ontological reflection. It is an abstraction that is unable and has not attempted to deal with concrete issues of the interaction between mind and body within human existence, yet is accepted heedlessly by most of social and political science and thus operates ontologically.

Contemporary social science literature has demonstrated that there are substantive political consequences emanating from a subscription to ‘mind-body dualism’. These consequences include sexist, ethnocentric and racist assumptions made on the basis of anatomical physical differences, resulting in the exclusion of women and ‘other’ races from politics and public life by Western social science.18 Women and non-whites were associated with nature and the body, rather than culture and the mind, and hence had a pre-social, primitive or sub-social status (Davis, 1997, p. 5). Some of these arguments were used to justify imperialist ventures on the grounds that the ‘civilised’ had a duty to ‘enlighten’ the ‘barbaric savage’.19 Other arguments have been instrumental in justifying women's exclusion from higher education (see Bloom, 1987), and, more recently, exoneration from murder due to their ‘raging’ hormones (Davis, 1997, p. 5).

By prioritising the mind in the dualism, (dominant) modernist philosophy and social science have thus controlled the parameters of what constitutes knowledge of the human subject and they monitor the extent and kind of discourses that are allowed to circulate. The point here is that mind-body dualism operates at an ontological, epistemological and methodological level to exclude the body from political analysis. This, in itself, perhaps should be a matter for political analysis.

Further to this, the notion of mind-body dualism is clearly connected to the idea of bodily self-surveillance à la Foucault via the notion of the body as a ‘possession of the self’. This connection can be illustrated by some examples of our experience or ways of being with our bodies. For instance, the person who cuts their body asserts undeniably that there is a self that has power to discipline, control or police that body. In this way, body modifications of any kind seem to involve crude manifestations of body-mind dualism: a disciplining of, or sometimes an attack on, the body by the self.

Unfortunately, the attempt to control or to survey the body by the self (through adhering to mind-body dualism) often results in the reverse. Indeed, the act of self-mutilation is a particularly sad example, as mental anguish is effectively swapped for bodily pain. The subject finds temporary release in the physical pain, yet the mental anguish is not, or, only momentarily, alleviated.20 Equally, in the case of the development of anorexia nervosa, mental anguish is often exchanged for hunger as the subjects find an element of comfort in the ability to control or police their own body. However, what started as control quickly gets out of control: mind-body dualism is reversed, and the anorexia begins to control the subject. Estimates of mortality rates vary, but some figures suggest that between 6 and 10 per cent of sufferers die as a result of anorexia (Buckroyd, 1996, p. 6). Subscribing to mind-body dualism seems to provide the severe victimisation of body of the type mentioned by Kundera in the opening paragraph of this article – seriously limiting the way we live our lives.

## 2NC

### suicide bomber

No cards

## 1NR

### meow

#### recognizing and resolving this is an ethical priority and only the alt solves the aff—star this card

**Swyngedouw 13**—Professor of Geography at the University of Manchester

(Erik, “Apocalypse Now! Fear and Doomsday Pleasures”, Capitalism Nature Socialism, 24:1, 9-18, dml)

Against this cynical stand, the third, and for me proper, leftist response to the apocalyptic imaginary is twofold and cuts through the deadlock embodied by the first two responses. To begin with, the revelatory promise of the apocalyptic narrative **has to be fully rejected**. In the face of the cataclysmic imaginaries **mobilized to assure that the apocalypse will NOT happen** (if the right techno-managerial actions are taken), the only reasonable response is ‘‘Don’t worry (Al Gore, Prince Charles, many environmental activists . . ..), you are really right, **the environmental apocalypse** WILL not only happen, it has already happened**,** IT IS ALREADY HERE**.**’’ **Many are** already living **in the post-apocalyptic interstices of life,** whereby the fusion of environmental transformation and social conditions, render life ‘‘bare.’’ The fact that the socio-environmental imbroglio has already passed the point of no return has to be fully asserted. The socio-environmental Armageddon is already here for many; it is not some distant dystopian promise mobilized to trigger response today. Water conflicts, struggles for food, environmental refugees, etc. testify to the socio-ecological predicament that choreographs everyday life for the majority of the world’s population. Things are already too late; they have always already been too late. There is no Arcadian place, time, or environment to return to, no benign socio-ecological past that needs to be maintained or stabilized. Many already live in the interstices of the apocalypse, albeit a combined and uneven one. **It is only within** **the realization of** the apocalyptic reality of the now **that a new politics might emerge**. The second gesture of a proper leftist response is to **reverse the order between** the universal **and** the particular that today dominates the catastrophic political imaginary. This order maintains that salvaging the particular historical-geographical configuration we are in depends on re-thinking and re-framing the humanenvironment articulation in a universal sense. We have to change our relationship with nature so that capitalism can continue somehow. Not only does this argument to preserve capitalism **guarantee the prolongation of the combined and uneven apocalypse of the present**, it forecloses considering fundamental change **to the actually existing unequal forms** of organizing the society-environment relations. Indeed, the apocalyptic imaginary is one that generally still holds on to a dualistic view of nature and culture. The argument is built on the view that humans have perturbed the ecological dynamic balance in ways inimical to human (and possibly non-human) long-term survival, and the solution consists broadly in bringing humans (in a universal sense) back in line with the possibilities and constraints imposed by ecological limits and dynamics. A universal transformation is required in order to maintain the present. And this can and should be done through managing the present particular configuration. This is the message of Al Gore or Prince Charles and many other environmental pundits. A left socio-environmental perspective has to insist that we need to transform this universal message into a particular one. The historically and geographically specific dynamics of capitalism have banned an external nature radically to a sphere beyond earth. On earth, there is no external nature left. It is from this particular historical-geographical configuration that **a radical politics of transformation has to be** thought **and** practiced. Only through thetransformation of the particular socio-ecological relations of capitalism can a generic egalitarian, free, and common re-ordering of the human/non-human imbroglios be forged. Those who already recognized the irreversible dynamics of the socio-environmental imbroglio that has been forged over the past few centuries coined a new term to classify the epoch we are in. ‘‘Welcome to the Anthropocene’’ became a popular catch-phrase to inform us that we are now in a new geological era, one in which humans are co-producers of the deep geological time that hitherto had slowly grinded away irrespective of humans’ dabbling with the surface layers of earth, oceans, and atmosphere. Noble prize-winning chemist Paul Crutzen introduced ‘‘the Anthropocene,’’ coined about a decade ago as the successor name of the Holocene, the relatively benign geo-climatic period that allegedly permitted agriculture to flourish, cities to be formed, and humans to thrive (Crutzen and Stoermer 2000). Since the beginning of industrialization, so the Anthropocenic argument goes, humans’ increasing interactions with their physical conditions of existence have resulted in a qualitative shift in geo-climatic acting of the earth system. The Anthropocene is nothing else than the geological name for capitalism WITH nature. Acidification of oceans, biodiversity transformations, gene displacements and recombinations, climate change, big infrastructures effecting the earth’s geodetic dynamics, among others, resulted in knotting together ‘‘natural’’ and ‘‘social’’ processes such that humans have become active agents in co-shaping earth’s deep geological time. Now that the era has been named as the Anthropocene, we can argue at length over its meaning, content, existence, and possible modes of engagement. Nonetheless, it affirms that humans and nature are co-produced and that the particular historical epoch that goes under the name of capitalism forged this mutual determination. The Anthropocene is just another name for insisting on Nature’s death. This cannot be unmade, however hard we try. The past is forever closed and the future\* including nature’s future\*is radically open, up for grabs. Indeed, the affirmation of the historical-geographical co-production of society WITH nature radically politicizes nature, makes nature enter into the domain of contested socio-physical relations and assemblages. **We cannot escape ‘‘producing nature’’**; rather, it forces us to make choices about what socio-natural worlds we wish to inhabit. It is from this particular position, therefore, that the environmental conundrum ought to be approached so that a qualitative **transformation of BOTH society AND nature has to be envisaged**. This perspective moves the gaze from thinking through a ‘‘politics of the environment’’ to ‘‘politicizing the environment’’ (Swyngedouw 2011; 2012). The human world is now an active agent in shaping the non-human world. This extends the terrain of the political to domains hitherto left to the mechanics of nature. The non-human world becomes ‘‘enrolled’’ in a process of politicization. **And that is precisely what needs to be** fully endorsed. The Anthropocene opens up a terrain whereby different natures can be contemplated and actually co-produced. And the struggle over these trajectories and, from a leftist perspective, the process of the egalitarian socio-ecological production of the commons of life is precisely what our politics are all about. **Yes, the apocalypse is** already here**, but do not despair,** **let us fully endorse the** emancipatory possibilities **of apocalyptic life**. Perhaps we should modify the now over-worked statement of the Italian Marxist Amadeo Bordiga that ‘‘if the ship goes down, the first-class passengers drown too.’’ Amadeo was plainly wrong. Remember the movie Titanic (as well as the real catastrophe). A large number of the first-class passengers found a lifeboat; the others were trapped in the belly of the beast. Indeed the social and ecological catastrophe we are already in is not shared equally. While the elites fear both economic and ecological collapse, the consequences and implications are highly uneven. The elite’s fears are indeed only matched by the actually existing socio-ecological and economic catastrophes many already live in. The apocalypse is combined and uneven. **And it is within this reality that** political choices have to be made andsides taken**.**

#### it’s mutually exclusive

**Taylor 98**

Prue **Taylor**, Senior Lecturer of law and a founding member of the New Zealand Centre for Environmental Law at the University of Auckland,**1998**

[An Ecological Approach to International Law: Responding to the Challenges of Climate Change (Hardcover) p. 39-42, 45-48]

The question 'are ecocentric ethics really necessary?' is frequently asked. Could we not, for example, achieve our environmental goals by more rigorous environmental legislation? Obviously much could be improved as a consequence of tighter controls, but two important limitations would remain. First, the question of 'how clean is clean' would continue to be answered solely by reference to human needs and standards. Thus water quality would he determined by interests such as human welfare, recreation needs and aesthetic values. The interests of nature and the needs of fully functioning ecosystems, which full below a human‑centred threshold, would be left unprtxected. By taking into account a much larger and more complex set of ecocentrically determined interests, tougher environmental standards would he achieved.217 Second, as Bosselmann points out, decision‑makers would not be able to make the important paradigm jump to protecting nature for its own sake. Worse, in cases where decision‑makers felt morally committed to such a jump, they would be forced to find constrained logic to justify their decisions. The variety of ethical approaches to environmental decision‑making has raised the question of moral pluralism. Stone, for example, has suggested that situations can be resolved according to either anthropocentric or ecocentric views depending on the nature of the problem. Thus decision makers are able to switch from one value system to another. Such a process is rejected by commentators such as 3. Baird Callicott who believes that ecocentric ethics are 'not only a question of better rational arguments but the expres­sion of a fundamentally changed attitude to nature. Callicott reminds Stone that anthropocentric attitudes and ecocencric ethics represent quite different paradigms. That in reality **people do not follow anthropocentric attitudes in the morning, only to switch to ecocentric ethics after lunch**. In the context of New Zealand's primary environmental legislation, this debate is currently being worked through in practice. The Resource Management Act 1991 (1RMA') is guided by 'sustainable management', a concept which is defined in both anthropocentric and ecocentric terms, leaving room for tension between the supporters of alternative approaches." 221 To date the RMA has been largely dominated by anthropocenisic interests due to a failure by key authorities, such as the Environment Court and local govern‑ ment, to make the significant changes in attitude required by the Act's ecocentric principles. It has been suggested that this tension, evident in implementation of the RMA, can only be resolved by an interpretation of sustainable management' which is ecological.

#### The Moze evidence is a link—here’s a card from it

Moze 7—Mary Beth, Ph.D. in Personal Development and Transformation [“Surrender: An Alchemical Act in Personal Transformation,” *Journal of Conscious Evolution*, http://www.cejournal.org/GRD/Surrender.pdf]

Another pool of literature on surrender focuses on psychotherapy. While it can be argued that the subject of surrender is first alluded to i n the work of Freud (Wallace, 2001), Hidas (1981) is the first to mention surrender specifical ly in relationship to psychotherapy. Hidas concentrates on transpersonal psychological theory and distinguishing the role that surrender plays at the deepest levels of psychological and sp iritual work. After Hidas, other authors such as Knoblauch and Falconer (1986), Viorst (1998), and H art (2000) provide a meager trail that historically speaks about surrender, the ego, and p sychotherapy. The smattering of literature that addresses surrender in relation to the ego is ironi c, since the ego is a key player in the art of surrender. This continues to reveal that surrender has yet to establish itself as a distinct subject i n the field of psychology and human development. It c ould be that the term surrender is couched in other acronyms such as detachment, but at this poin t in time there does not seem to be one term that is used to define the moment when the ego rele ases an attachment. Per chance surrender will become that term.