# Round 1—Neg vs KCKCC FG

## 1NC

### deleuze

**It is in vain that we say what we see in the law; what we see never resides in what we say… There is never just one law—it is a mixture of forms of expression (such as delinquency) and forms of content, (such as prisons), in reciprocal presupposition**

**Deleuze and Guattari ’80.** Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 10,000 B.C.: THE GEOLOGY OF MORALS

Signifier enthusiasts take an oversimplified situation as their implicit model: word and thing. From the word they extract the signifier, and from the thing a signified in conformity with the word, and therefore subjugated to the signifier. They operate in a sphere interior to and homogeneous with language. Let us follow Foucault in his exemplary analysis, which, though it seems not to be, is eminently concerned with linguistics. Take a thing like the prison: the prison is a form, the "prison-form"; it is a form of content on a stratum and is related to other forms of content (school, barracks, hospital, factory). This thing or form does not refer back to the word "prison" but to entirely different words and concepts, such as "delinquent" and "delinquency," which express a new way of classifying, stating, translating, and even committing criminal acts. "Delinquency" is the form of expres- sion in reciprocal presupposition with the form of content "prison." Delin- quency is in no way a signifier, even a juridical signifier, the signified of which would be the prison. That would flatten the entire analysis. More- over, the form of expression is reducible not to words but to a set of state-ments arising in the social field considered as a stratum (that is what a regime of signs is). The form of content is reducible not to a thing but to a complex state of things as a formation of power (architecture, regimenta-tion, etc.). We could say that there are two constantly intersecting multipli- cities, "discursive multiplicities" of expression and "nondiscursive multi- plicities" of content. It is even more complex than that because the prison as a form of content has a relative expression all its own; there are all kinds of statements specific to it that do not necessarily coincide with the state- ments of delinquency. Conversely, delinquency as a form of expression has an autonomous content all its own, since delinquency expresses not only a new way of evaluating crimes but a new way of committing them. Form of content and form of expression, prison and delinquency: each has its own history, microhistory, segments. At most, along with other contents and expressions, they imply a shared state of the abstract Machine acting not at all as a signifier but as a kind of diagram (a single abstract machine for the prison and the school and the barracks and the hospital and the factory ...). Fitting the two types of forms together, segments of content and segments of expression, requires a whole double-pincered, or rather double-headed, concrete assemblage taking their real distinction into account. It requires a whole organization articulating formations of power and regimes of signs, and operating on the molecular level (societies char- acterized by what Foucault calls disciplinary power).29 In short, we should never oppose words to things that supposedly correspond to them, nor signifiers to signifieds that are supposedly in conformity with them. What should be opposed are distinct formalizations, in a state of unstable equi- librium or reciprocal presupposition. "it is in vain that we say what we see; what we see never resides in what we say." As in school: there is not just one writing lesson, that of the great redundant Signifier for any and all signifieds. There are two distinct formalizations in reciprocal presupposi- tion and constituting a double-pincer: the formalization of expression in the reading and writing lesson (with its own relative contents), and the formalization of content in the lesson of things (with their own relative expressions). We are never signifier or signified. We are stratified.

**We are speaking of a new regime of control, one that relies on rendering all politics open and comprehensible based on a segmented Cartesian subject: you will be subjectified *or else.* We propose a model of thinking judging that is de-personalized, de-subjectified…an asubjective affect. Voting aff is an experiment with subjectivity: Know neither where you start nor where you end.**

**Deleuze and Guattari ’80.** Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 587 B.C.-A.D. 70: ON SEVERAL REGIMES OF SIGNS

Things are even more complicated than we have let on. Subjectification assigns the line of flight a positive sign, it carries deterritorialization to the absolute, intensity to the highest degree, redundancy to a reflexive form, etc. But it has its own way of repudiating the positivity it frees, or of relativizing the absoluteness it attains, without, however, falling back to the preceding regime. In this redundancy of resonance, the absolute of con- sciousness is the absolute of impotence and the intensity of passion, the heat of the void. This is because subjectification essentially constitutes finite linear proceedings, one of which ends before the next begins: thus the cogito is always recommenced, a passion or grievance is always recapitu- lated. Every consciousness pursues its own death, every love-passion its own end, attracted by a black hole, and all the black holes resonate together.

Thus subjectification imposes on the line of flight a segmentarity that is forever repudiating that line, and upon absolute deterritorialization a point of abolition that is forever blocking that deterritorialization or diverting it. The reason for this is simple: forms of expression and regimes of signs are still strata (even considered in themselves, after abstracting forms of content); subjectification is no less a stratum than signifiance.

The principal strata binding human beings are the organism, signifiance and interpretation, and subjectification and subjection. These strata to- gether are what separates us from the plane of consistency and the abstract machine, where there is no longer any regime of signs, where the line of flight effectuates its own potential positivity and deterritorialization its absolute power. The problem, from this standpoint, is to tip the most favor- able assemblage from its side facing the strata to its side facing the plane of consistency or the body without organs. Subjectification carries desire to such a point of excess and unloosening that it must either annihilate itself in a black hole or change planes. Destratify, open up to a new function, a diagrammatic function. Let consciousness cease to be its own double, and passion the double of one person for another. Make consciousness an experimentation in life, and passion a field of continuous intensities, an emission of particles-signs. Make the body without organs of conscious- ness and love. Use love and consciousness to abolish subjectification: "To become the great lover, the magnetizer and catalyzer ... one has to first experience the profound wisdom of being an utter fool."31 Use the / think for a becoming-animal, and love for a becoming-woman of man. Desub-jectify consciousness and passion. Are there not diagrammatic redundancies distinct from both signifying redundancies and subjective redundancies? Redundancies that would no longer be knots of arborescence but resumptions and upsurges in a rhizome? Stammer language, be a foreigner in one's own tongue:

do domi not passi do not dominate

do not dominate your passive passions not

do devouring not not dominate

your rats your rations your rats rations not not. . .32

**This process is enacted through power centers, social organs which turn lines into segements: the way the prison first and foremost *indefinitely detains* the body’s flows *by writing identity onto it*, scripting its content by erecting violent regimes of form: you must signify as a subject *or else*.**

**Deleuze and Guattari ’80.** Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 1933: MICROPOLITICS AND SEGMENTARITY 208-231

This is not surprising since the texture lies between the line of overcoding with rigid segments and the ultimate quantum line. It continu- ally swings between the two, now channeling the quantum line back into the segmented line, now causing flows and quanta to escape from the seg- mented line. This is the third aspect of power centers, or their limit. For the only purpose these centers have is to translate as best they can flow quanta into line segments (only segments are totalizable, in one way or another). But this is both the principle of their power and the basis of their impo- tence. Far from being opposites, power and impotence complement and reinforce each other in a kind of fascinating satisfaction that is found above all in the most mediocre Statesmen [statespeople], and defines their "glory." For they extract glory from their shortsightedness, and power from their impotence, because it confirms that there is no choice. The only "great" Statesmen are those who connect with flows, like pilot-signs or particles-signs, and who emit quanta that get out of the black holes: it is not by chance that these men encounter each other only on lines of flight, in the act of drawing them, sounding them out, following them, or forging ahead of them, even though they may make a mistake and take a fall (Moses the Hebrew, Genseric the Vandal, Genghis the Mongol, Mao the Chinese . . .). But there is no Power regulating the flows themselves. No one dominates the growth of the "monetary mass," or money supply. If an image of the master or an idea of the State is projected outward to the limits of the universe, as if something had domination over flows as well as segments, and in the same manner, the result is a fictitious and ridiculous representation. The stock exchange gives a better image of flows and their quanta than does the State. Capitalists may be the masters of surplus value and its distribution, but they do not dominate the flows from which surplus value derives. Rather, power centers function at the points where flows are converted into seg- ments: they are exchangers, converters, oscillators. Not that the segments themselves are governed by a decision-making power. We have seen, on the contrary, that segments (classes, for example) form at the conjunction of masses and deterritorialized flows and that the most deterritorialized flow determines the dominant segment; thus the dollar segment dominates cur- rency, the bourgeoisie dominates capitalism, etc. Segments, then, are themselves governed by an abstract machine. But what power centers gov- ern are the assemblages that effectuate that abstract machine, in other words, that continually adapt variations in mass and flow to the segments of the rigid line, as a function of a dominant segment and dominated seg- ments. Much perverse invention can enter into the adaptations.

This is the sense in which we would speak, for example, of banking power (the World Bank, central banks, credit banks): if the flow of financing-money, or credit money, involves the mass of economic transac- tions, what banks govern is the conversion of the credit money that has been created into segmentary payment-money that is appropriated, in other words, coinage or State money for the purchase of goods that are themselves segmented (the importance of the interest rate in this respect). What banks govern is the conversion between the two kinds of money, and the conversion of the segments of the second kind into any given good.27 The same could be said of every central power. Every central power has three aspects or zones: (1) its zone of power, relating to the segments of a solid rigid line; (2) its zone of indiscernibility, relating to its diffusion throughout a microphysical fabric; (3) its zone of impotence, relating to the flows and quanta it can only convert without being able to control or define. It is always from the depths of its impotence that each power center draws its power, hence their extreme maliciousness, and vanity. Better to be a tiny quantum flow than a molar converter, oscillator, or distributor! Returning to the example of money, the first zone is represented by the public central banks; the second by the "indefinite series of private rela- tions between banks and borrowers"; the third by the desiring flow of money, whose quanta are defined by the mass of economic transactions. It is true that the same problems are reformulated at the level of these very transactions, in relation to other power centers. But the first zone of the power center is always defined by the State apparatus, which is the assem- blage that effectuates the abstract machine of molar overcoding; the sec- ond is defined in the molecular fabric immersing this assemblage; the third by the abstract machine of mutation, flows, and quanta.

**We have mapped four dangers of the status quo and current resistance activity: Fear—the loss of organization systems we cling to. Clarity—we are the knights; we have a mission. Power—the end of mutations, the overcoding of lines of flight. Disgust—the longing to kill and to die, the Passion of abolition in which suicide is presented as the greatest goal, total and final death.**

**Deleuze and Guattari ’80.** Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 1933: MICROPOLITICS AND SEGMENTARITY 208-231

We cannot say that one of these three lines is bad and another good, by nature and necessarily. The study of the dangers of each line is the object of pragmatics or schizoanalysis, to the extent that it undertakes not to repre- sent, interpret, or symbolize, but only to make maps and draw lines, mark- ing their mixtures as well as their distinctions. According to Nietzsche's Zarathustra and Castaneda's Indian Don Juan, there are three or even four dangers: first, Fear, then Clarity, then Power, and finally the great Disgust, the longing to kill and to die, the Passion for abolition.28 We can guess what fear is. We are always afraid of losing. Our security, the great molar organi- zation that sustains us, the arborescences we cling to, the binary machines that give us a well-defined status, the resonances we enter into, the system of overcoding that dominates us—we desire all that. "The values, morals, fatherlands, religions and private certitudes our vanity and self-compla- cency generously grant us are so many abodes the world furnishes for those who think on that account that they stand and rest amid stable things; they know nothing of the enormous rout they are heading for... in flight from flight."29 We flee from flight, rigidify our segments, give ourselves over to binary logic; the harder they have been to us on one segment, the harder we will be on another; we reterritorialize on anything available; the only segmentarity we know is molar, at the level of the large-scale aggregates we belong to, as well as at the level of the little groups we get into, as well as at the level of what goes on in our most intimate and private recesses. Every- thing is involved: modes of perception, kinds of actions, ways of moving, life-styles, semiotic regimes. A man comes home and says, "Is the grub ready?", and the wife answers, "What a scowl! Are you in a bad mood?": two rigid segments in confrontation. The more rigid the segmentarity, the more reassuring it is for us. That is what fear is, and how it makes us retreat into the first line.

The second danger, Clarity, seems less obvious. Clarity, in effect, con- cerns the molecular. Once again, everything is involved, even perception, even the semiotic regime, but this time on the second line. Castaneda illus- trates, for example, the existence of a molecular perception to which drugs give us access (but so many things can be drugs): we attain a visual and sonorous microperception revealing spaces and voids, like holes in the molar structure. That is precisely what clarity is: the distinctions that appear in what used to seem full, the holes in what used to be compact; and conversely, where just before we saw end points of clear-cut segments, now there are indistinct fringes, encroachments, overlappings, migrations, acts of segmentation that no longer coincide with the rigid segmentarity. Every- thing now appears supple, with holes in fullness, nebulas in forms, and flut- ter in lines. Everything has the clarity of the microscope. We think we have understood everything, and draw conclusions. We are the new knights; we even have a mission. A microphysics of the migrant has replaced the macrogeometry of the sedentary. But this suppleness and clarity do not only present dangers, they are themselves a danger. First, supple segmen- tarity runs the risk of reproducing in miniature the affections, the affecta- tions, of the rigid: the family is replaced by a community, conjugality by a regime of exchange and migration; worse, micro-Oedipuses crop up, microfascisms lay down the law, the mother feels obliged to titillate her child, the father becomes a mommy. A dark light that falls from no star and emanates such sadness: this shifting segmentarity derives directly from the most rigid, for which it is indirect compensation. The more molar the aggregates become, the more molecular become their elements and the relations between their elements: molecular man for molar humanity. One deterritorializes, massifies, but only in order to knot and annul the mass movements and movements of deterritorialization, to invent all kinds of marginal reterritorializations even worse than the others. But above all, supple segmentarity brings dangers of its own that do not merely reproduce in small scale the dangers of molar segmentarity, which do not derive from them or compensate for them. As we have seen, microfascisms have a spe- cificity of their own that can crystallize into a macro fascism, but may also float along the supple line on their own account and suffuse every little cell. A multitude of black holes may very well not become centralized, and acts instead as viruses adapting to the most varied situations, sinking voids in molecular perceptions and semiotics. Interactions without resonance. Instead of the great paranoid fear, we are trapped in a thousand little mono- manias, self-evident truths, and clarities that gush from every black hole and no longer form a system, but are only rumble and buzz, blinding lights giving any and everybody the mission of self-appointed judge, dispenser of justice, policeman, neighborhood SS man. We have overcome fear, we have sailed from the shores of security, only to enter a system that is no less concentricized, no less organized: the system of petty insecurities that leads everyone to their own black hole in which to turn dangerous, possess- ing a clarity on their situation, role, and mission even more disturbing than the certitudes of the first line.

Power (Pouvoir) is the third danger, because it is on both lines simultane-ously. It stretches from the rigid segments with their overcoding and reso- nance to the fine segmentations with their diffusion and interactions, and back again. Every man of power jumps from one line to the other, alternat- ing between a petty and a lofty style, the rogue's style and the grandiloquent style, drugstore demagoguery and the imperialism of the high-ranking gov- ernment man. But this whole chain and web of power is immersed in a world of mutant flows that eludes them. It is precisely its impotence that makes power so dangerous. The [hu]man of power will always want to stop the lines of flight, and to this end to trap and stabilize the mutation machine in the overcoding machine. But he can do so only by creating a void, in other words, by first stabilizing the overcoding machine itself by containing it within the local assemblage charged with effectuating it, in short, by giving the assemblage the dimensions of the machine. This is what takes place in the artificial conditions of totalitarianism or the "closed vessel."

But there is a fourth danger as well, and this is the one that interests us most, because it concerns the lines of flight themselves. We may well have presented these lines as a sort of mutation or creation drawn not only in the imagination but also in the very fabric of social reality; we may well have attributed to them the movement of the arrow and the speed of an absolute—but it would be oversimplifying to believe that the only risk they fear and confront is allowing themselves to be recaptured in the end, letting themselves be sealed in, tied up, reknotted, reterritorialized. They them- selves emanate a strange despair, like an odor of death and immolation, a state of war from which one returns broken: they have their own dangers distinct from the ones previously discussed. This is exactly what led Fitzgerald to say: "I had a feeling that I was standing at twilight on a deserted range, with an empty rifle in my hands and the targets down. No problem set—simply a silence with only the sound of my own breathing. ... My self-immolation was something sodden-dark."30 Why is the line of flight a war one risks coming back from defeated, destroyed, after having destroyed everything one could? This, precisely, is the fourth danger: the line of flight crossing the wall, getting out of the black holes, but instead of connecting with other lines and each time augmenting its valence, turning to destruction, abolition pure and simple, the passion of abolition. Like Kleist's line of flight, and the strange war he wages; like suicide, double sui- cide, a way out that turns the line of flight into a line of death.

We are not invoking any kind of death drive. There are no internal drives in desire, only assemblages. Desire is always assembled; it is what the assemblage determines it to be. The assemblage that draws lines of flight is on the same level as they are, and is of the war machine type. Muta- tions spring from this machine, which in no way has war as its object, but rather the emission of quanta of deterritorialization, the passage of mutant flows (in this sense, every creation is brought about by a war machine). There are many reasons to believe that the war machine is of a different ori- gin, is a different assemblage, than the State apparatus. It is of nomadic ori- gin and is directed against the State apparatus. One of the fundamental problems of the State is to appropriate this war machine that is foreign to it and make it a piece in its apparatus, in the form of a stable military institu- tion; and the State has always encountered major difficulties in this. It is precisely when the war machine has reached the point that it has no other object but war, it is when it substitutes destruction for mutation, that it frees the most catastrophic charge. Mutation is in no way a transformation of war; on the contrary, war is like the fall or failure of mutation, the only object left for the war machine after it has lost its power to change. War, it must be said, is only the abominable residue of the war machine, either after it has allowed itself to be appropriated by the State apparatus, or even worse, has constructed itself a State apparatus capable only of destruction. When this happens, the war machine no longer draws mutant lines of flight, but a pure, cold line of abolition. (Later, we will propose a theory of the complex relation between the war machine and war.)31

This brings us back to the paradox of fascism, and the way in which fas- cism differs from totalitarianism. For totalitarianism is a State affair: it essentially concerns the relation between the State as a localized assem- blage and the abstract machine of overcoding it effectuates. Even in the case of a military dictatorship, it is a State army, not a war machine, that takes power and elevates the State to the totalitarian stage. Totalitarianism is quintessentially conservative. Fascism, on the other hand, involves a war machine. When fascism builds itself a totalitarian State, it is not in the sense of a State army taking power, but of a war machine taking over the State. A bizarre remark by Virilio puts us on the trail: in fascism, the State is far less totalitarian than it is suicidal. There is in fascism a realized nihil- ism. Unlike the totalitarian State, which does its utmost to seal all possible lines of flight, fascism is constructed on an intense line of flight, which it transforms into a line of pure destruction and abolition. It is curious that from the very beginning the Nazis announced to Germany what they were bringing: at once wedding bells and death, including their own death, and the death of the Germans. They thought they would perish but that their undertaking would be resumed, all across Europe, all over the world, throughout the solar system. And the people cheered, not because they did not understand, but because they wanted that death through the death of others. Like a will to wager everything you have every hand, to stake your own death against the death of others, and measure everything by "deleometers." Klaus Mann's novel, Mephisto, gives samplings of entirely ordinary Nazi speeches and conversations: "Heroism was something that was being ruled out of our lives. . . . In reality, we are not marching forward, we are reeling, staggering. Our beloved Fiihrer is dragging us toward the shades of darkness and everlasting nothingness. How can we poets, we who have a special affinity for darkness and lower depths, not admire him? . . . Fires blazing on the horizon; rivers of blood in all the streets; and the fren- zied dancing of the survivors, of those who are still spared, around the bod- ies of the dead!"32 Suicide is presented not as a punishment but as the crowning glory of the death of others. One can always say that it is just a matter of foggy talk and ideology, nothing but ideology. But that is not true. The insufficiency of economic and political definitions of fascism does not simply imply a need to tack on vague, so-called ideological determinations. We prefer to follow Faye's inquiry into the precise formation of Nazi state- ments, which are just as much in evidence in politics and economics as in the most absurd of conversations. They always contain the "stupid and repugnant" cry, Long live death!, even at the economic level, where the arms expansion replaces growth in consumption and where investment veers from the means of production toward the means of pure destruction. Paul Virilio's analysis strikes us as entirely correct in defining fascism not by the notion of the totalitarian State but by the notion of the suicidal State: so-called total war seems less a State undertaking than an undertaking of a war machine that appropriates the State and channels into it a flow of abso- lute war whose only possible outcome is the suicide of the State itself. "The triggering of a hitherto unknown material process, one that is limitless and aimless. . . . Once triggered, its mechanism cannot stop at peace, for the indirect strategy effectively places the dominant powers outside the usual categories of space and time. . . . It was in the horror of daily life and its environment that Hitler finally found his surest means of governing, the legitimation of his policies and military strategy; and it lasted right up to the end, for the ruins and horrors and crimes and chaos of total war, far from discharging the repulsive nature of its power, normally only increase its scope. Telegram 71 is the normal outcome: If the war is lost, may the nation perish. Here, Hitler decides to join forces with his enemies in order to complete the destruction of his own people, by obliterating the last remaining resources of its life-support system, civil reserves of every kind (potable water, fuel, provisions, etc.)."33 It was this reversion of the line of flight into a line of destruction that already animated the molecular focuses of fascism, and made them interact in a war machine instead of res- onating in a State apparatus. A war machine that no longer had anything but war as its object and would rather annihilate its own servants than stop the destruction. All the dangers of the other lines pale by comparison.

**For thi**s reason you ought to be ready to destroy everything, or as Bill Burroughs explains,

Burroughs 88. William S. Burroughs, *Western Lands*1988

Scientists always said there is no such thing as a soul. Now they are in a position to prove it. Total Death.Soul Death. It’s what the Egyptians called the Second and Final Death. This awesome power to destroy souls forever is now vested in farsighted and responsible men [people] in the State Department, the CIA, and the Pentagon.

Governments fall from sheer indifference. Authority figures, deprived of the vampiric energy they suck off their constituents, are seen for what they are: dead empty masks manipulated by computers. And what is behind the computers? Remote control. Of course. Don't intend to be here when this shithouse goes up.Nothing here now but the recordings. Shut them off, they are as radioactive as an old joke.Look at the prison you are in,we are all in. This is a penal colony that is now a Death Camp. Place of the Second and Final Death.

**We are the movement of metamorphoses come to sweep up assemblages: we are only substance, we are never formed. Metamorphoses is a never ending process of constant flux that ebbs and flows, never allowing itself to be rendered concrete.**

**Deleuze and Guattari ’80.** Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus*.* NOVEMBER 20, 1923: POSTULATES OF LINGUISTICS p 108-9

If we consider the other aspect of the order-word, flight rather than death, it appears that variables are in a new state, that of continuous varia- tion. An incorporeal transformation is still attributed to bodies, but it is now a passage to the limit: that is the only way, not to eliminate death, but to reduce it or make it a variation itself. This movement pushes language to its own limits, while bodies are simultaneously caught up in a movement of metamorphosis of their contents or a process of exhaustion causing them to reach or overstep the limit of their figures. This is an appropriate place to bring up the opposition between minor sciences and major sciences: for example, the tendency of the broken line to become a curve, a whole opera- tive geometry of the trait and movement, a pragmatic science of placings-in-variation that operates in a different manner than the royal or major science of Euclid's invariants and travels a long history of suspicion and even repression (we will return to this question later).47 The smallest interval is always diabolical: the master of metamorphoses is opposed to the invariant hieratic king. It is as though an intense matter or a continuum of variation were freed, here in the internal tensors of language, there in the internal tensions of content. The idea of the smallest interval does not apply to figures of the same nature; it implies at least a curve and a straight line, a circle and a tangent. We witness a transformation of substances and a dissolution of forms, a passage to the limit or flight from contours in favor of fluid forces, flows, air, light, and matter, such that a body or a word does not end at a precise point. We witness the incorporeal power of that intense matter, the material power of that language. A matter more immediate, more fluid, and more ardent than bodies or words. In continuous variation the relevant distinction is no longer between a form of expression and a form of content but between two inseparable planes in reciprocal presupposition. The relativity of the distinction between them is now fully realized on the plane of consistency, where the assemblage is swept up by a now absolute deterritorialization. Absolute, however, does not mean undifferentiated: differences, now "infinitely small," are constituted in a single matter serving both for expression as incorporeal power and for content as limitless corporeality. The relation of presupposition between variables of content and expression no longer requires two forms: the placing-in-variation of the variables instead draws the two forms together and effects the conjunction of cutting edges of deterritorialization on both sides; this occurs on the plane of a single liberated matter that contains no figures, is deliberately unformed, and retains in expression and in content only those cutting edges, tensors, and tensions. Gestures and things, voices and sounds, are caught up in the same "opera," swept away by the same shifting effects of stammering, vibrato, tremolo, and overspilling. A syn- thesizer places all of the parameters in continuous variation, gradually making "fundamentally heterogeneous elements end up turning into each other in some way." The moment this conjunction occurs there is a com- mon matter. It is only at this point that one reaches the abstract machine, or the diagram of the assemblage. The synthesizer has replaced judgment, and matter has replaced the figure or formed substance. It is no longer even appropriate to group biological, physicochemical, and energetic intensi- ties on the one hand, and mathematical, aesthetic, linguistic, informa- tional, semiotic intensities, etc., on the other. The multiplicity of systems of intensities conjugates or forms a rhizome throughout the entire assem- blage the moment the assemblage is swept up by these vectors or tensions of flight. For the question was not how to elude the order-word but how to elude the death sentence it envelops, how to develop its power of escape, how to prevent escape from veering into the imaginary or falling into a black hole, how to maintain or draw out the revolutionary potentiality of the order-word.

**The battle for the public sphere is over—we lost. Formal politics are dead, strategies for liberation NEVER BEAT the subliminal seduction of the contemporary political. Perceptibility precedes destruction**

**The Invisible Committee, ‘7** [an anonymous group of French professors, phd candidates, and intellectuals, in the book “The Coming Insurrection” published by Semiotext(e) (attributed to the [Tarnac Nine](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tarnac_Nine) by the French police), <http://tarnac9.noblogs.org/gallery/5188/insurrection_english.pdf>]

Whatever angle you look at it from, **there's no escape from the present. That's** not the least of its virtues. For those who want absolutely to have hope, it knocks down every support. Those who claim to have solutions are proven wrong almost immediately. It's understood that now everything can only go from bad to worse. "There's no future for the future" is the wisdom behind an era that for all its appearances of extreme normalcy has come to have about the consciousness level of the first punks. The sphere of political representation is closed. From left to right, it's the same nothingness acting by turns either as the big shots or the virgins, the same sales shelf heads, changing up their discourse according to the latest dispatches from the information service. Those who still vote give one the impression that their only intention is to knock out the polling booths by voting as a pure act of protest. And we've started to understand that in fact it’s only against the vote itself that people go on voting. Nothing we've seen can come up to the heights of the present situation; not by far. By its very silence, the populace seems infinitely more 'grown up' than all those squabbling amongst themselves to govern it do. Any Belleville chibani 1 is wiser in his chats than in all of those puppets’ grand declarations put together. The lid of the social kettle is triple-tight, and the pressure inside won’t stop building. The ghost of Argentina’s Que Se Vayan Todos 2 is seriously starting to haunt the ruling heads. The fires of November 2005 will never cease to cast their shadow on all consciences. Those first joyous fires were the baptism of a whole decade full of promises. The media’s “suburbs vs. the Republic” myth, if it’s not inefficient, is certainly not true. The fatherland was ablaze all the way to downtown everywhere, with fires that were methodically snuffed out. Whole streets went up in flames of solidarity in Barcelona and no one but the people who lived there even found out about it. And the country hasn’t stopped burning since. Among the accused we find diverse profiles, without much in common besides a hatred for existing society; not united by class, race, or even by neighborhood. What was new wasn’t the “suburban revolt,” since that was already happening in the 80s, but the rupture with its established forms. The assailants weren’t listening to anybody at all anymore, not their big brothers, not the local associations assigned to help return things to normal. No “SOS Racism which only fatigue, falsification, and media omertà 4 could feign putting an end. The whole series of nocturnal strikes, anonymous attacks, wordless destruction, had the merit of busting wide open the split between politics and the political. No one can honestly deny the obvious weight of this assault which **made no demands**, and had no message other than a threat which had nothing to do with politics. But you’d have to be blind not to see what is **purely political** about this **resolute negation of politics,** and you’d certainly have to know absolutely nothing about the autonomous youth movements of the last 30 years. Like abandoned children we burned the first baby toys of a society that deserves no more respect than the monuments of Paris did at the end of Bloody Week 5 -- and knows it. There’s **no social solution** to the present situation. First off because the vague aggregate of social groupings, institutions, and individual bubbles that we designate by the anti-phrase “society” has no substance, because there’s no language left to express common experiences with. It took a half-century of fighting by the Lumières to thaw out the possibility of a French Revolution, and a century of fighting by work to give birth to the fearful “Welfare State.” Struggles creating the language in which the new order expresses itself. Nothing like today. Europe is now a de-monied continent that sneaks off to make a run to the Lidl 6 and has to fly with the low-cost airlines to be able to keep on flying. **None of the “problems” formulated in the social language are resolvable**. The “retirement pensions issue,” the issues of “precariousness,” the “youth” and their “violence” can only be kept in suspense as long as the ever more surprising “acting out” they thinly cover gets managed away police-like. No one’s going to be happy to see old people being wiped out at a knockdown price, abandoned by their own and with nothing to say. And those who’ve found less humiliation and more benefit in a life of crime than in sweeping floors will not give up their weapons, and prison won’t make them love society. The rage to enjoy of the hordes of the retired will not take the somber cuts to their monthly income on an empty stomach, and will get only too excited about the refusal to work among a large sector of the youth. And to conclude, no guaranteed income granted the day after a quasi-uprising will lay the foundations for a new New Deal, a new pact, and a new peace. The social sentiment is rather **too evaporated** for all that. As their solution, they’ll just never stop putting on the pressure, to make sure nothing happens, and with it we’ll have more and more police chases all over the neighborhood. The drone that even according to the police indeed did fly over Seine-Saint-Denis 7 last July 14 th is a picture of the future in much more straightforward colors than all the hazy images we get from the humanists. That they took the time to clarify that it was not armed shows pretty clearly the kind of road we’re headed down. The country is going to be cut up into ever more air-tight zones. Highways built along the border of the “sensitive neighborhoods” already form walls that are invisible and yet able to cut them off from the private subdivisions. Whatever good patriotic souls may think about it, the management of neighborhoods “by community” is most effective just by its notoriety. The purely metropolitan portions of the country, the main downtowns, lead their luxurious lives in an ever more calculating, ever more sophisticated, ever more shimmering deconstruction. They light up the whole planet with their whorehouse red lights, while the BAC 8 and the private security companies’ -- read: militias’ -- patrols multiply infinitely, all the while benefiting from being able to hide behind an ever more disrespectful judicial front. The catch-22 of the present, though perceptible everywhere, is denied everywhere. Never have so many psychologists, sociologists, and literary people devoted themselves to it, each with their own special jargon, and each with their own specially missing solution. It’s enough just to listen to the songs that come out these days, the trifling “new French music,” where the petty-bourgeoisie dissects the states of its soul and the K’1Fry mafia 9 makes its declarations of war, to know that this coexistence will come to an end soon and that a decision is about to be made. This book is signed in the name of an imaginary collective. Its editors are not its authors. They are merely content to do a little clean-up of what’s scattered around the era’s common areas, around the murmurings at bar-tables, behind closed bedroom doors. They’ve only determined a few necessary truths, whose universal repression fills up the psychiatric hospitals and the painful gazes. They’ve made themselves scribes of the situation. It’s the privilege of radical circumstances that justice leads them quite logically to revolution. It’s enough just to say what we can see and not avoid the conclusions to be drawn from it.

**To make micropolitics visible is to coopt it by giving resistance an object – this understanding allows resistance to be framed, to be declared a failure and prevents the immanence of imperceptible politics from coalescing around mundane practices and habitudes of existence**

**Tsianos et al. ‘8** Vassilis, teaches sociology at the University of Hamburg, Germany, Dimitris Papadopoulos teaches social theory at Cardiff University, Niamh Stephenson teaches social science at the University of New South Wales. “Escape Routes: Control and Subversion in the 21st Century” Pluto Press

In this sense **imperceptible politics does not necessarily differ from or oppose other prevalent forms of politics, such as state-oriented politics, micropolitics, identity politics, cultural and gender politics, civil rights movements, etc**. And indeed **imperceptible politics connects with all these various forms of political engagement and intervention in an opportunistic way: it deploys them to the extent that they allow the establishment of spaces outside representation**; that is, spaces which do not primarily focus on the transformation of the conditions of the double-R axiom (rights and representation) but on the insertion of new social forces into a given political terrain. In the previous chapter we called this form of politics outside politics: the politics which opposes the representational regime of policing. Imperceptibility is the everyday strategy which allows us to move and to act below the overcoding regime of representation. **This everyday strategy is inherently anti-theoretical; that is, it resists any ultimate theorisation, it cannot be reduced to one successful and necessary form of politics** (such as state-oriented politics or micropolitics, for example). **Rather, imperceptible politics is genuinely empiricist, that is it is always enacted as ad hoc practices which allow the decomposition of the representational strategies in a particular field and the composition of events which cannot be left unanswered by the existing regime of control. If imperceptible politics resists theorisation and is ultimately empiricist, what then are the criteria for doing imperceptible politics? There are** three **dimensions which characterise imperceptible politics: objectlessness,** totality, **trust**. **Firstly, imperceptible politics is objectless, that is it performs political transformation without primarily targeting a specific political aim (such as transformation of a law or institution, or a particular claim for inclusion**, etc). **Instead imperceptible politics proceeds by materialising its own political actions through contagious and affective transformations.** **The object of its political practice is its own practices. In this sense, imperceptible politics is non-intentional - and therein lies its difference from state-oriented politics or the politics of civil rights movements**, for example - **it instigates change through a series of everyday transformations which can only be codified as having a central political aim or function in retrospect**. Secondly, imperceptible politics addresses the totality of an existing field of power. This seems to be the difference between imperceptible politics and micropolitics or other alternative social movements: imperceptible politics is not concerned with containing itself to a molecular level of action; it addresses the totality of power through the social changes which it puts to work in a particular field of action. The distinction between molar and molecular (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 275) has only analytical significance from the perspective of imperceptible politics. In fact imperceptible politics is both molar and molecular, because by being local situated action it addresses the whole order of control in a certain field. Imperceptible politics is located at the heart of a field of power and at the same time it opens a way to move outside this field by forcing the transformation of all these elements which are constitutive of this field. In this sense, imperceptible politics is a driving force which is simul­taneously both present and absent. We described this in the previous chapter by exploring the importance of speculative figurations for the practice of escape. On the everyday level of escape (a level we called in this chapter imperceptible politics) speculative figuration can be translated into trust. This is the third characteristic of **imperceptible politics**; it **is driven by a firm belief in the importance and truthfulness of its actions, without seeking any evidence for, or conducting any investigation into its practices. This is trust. Imperceptible politics is driven by trust in something which seems to be absent from a particular situation. Imperceptible politics operates around a void, and it is exactly the conversion of this void into everyday politics that becomes the vital force for imperceptible politics.**

**The 1AC activist stance commodifies the experiences of the oppressed they claim to speak for -- this renders their political act meaningless and creates a destructive model of dissent that depends upon authoritarian institutions and imprisons the rhetorical value of the 1AC via commodification that denies the dignity of the represented**

**James ‘3** Joy, Professor of Africana Studies @ Brown “Academia, activism, and imprisoned intellectuals.” http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Academia,+activism,+and+imprisoned+intellectuals.-a0133368005

Activism is as multidimensional in its appearances as the academy; as academia's alter ego, or problematic twin, it also reflects the best and worst tendencies of the marketplace. When structured by the market, activism is not inherently infused with responsible behavior or compassion. In its push for productivity--more rallies, demos, conferences, meetings--it can lose sight of effective strategies, community, and the importance of young activists exercising decision-making power. To value one's presence, i.e., just showing up for work, class, or demonstrations, over one's preparedness to fully participate in transformational acts is a feature of the crass market (where volume or quantity of a product register more than quality or utility). Likewise, **expectations for unquestioning obedience to managerial elites--whether radical instructor or organizer--are also features of the market found in activism and academia. Thus, beyond confronting the social crises and military and ideological wars enacted by the state, we are disturbed, destabilized, and therefore challenged by the commodification of our own educational sites and political movements. The marketplace--as the dominant metaphor and construct--influences our consciousness and regulates our lives to shape both academia and activism. Conformity and compliance, rebellion and resistance, are often channeled through and structured by markets that turn intellect and action into objects for trade and barter in competition for status and acquisition, while making our ideals (freedom and justice) and their representatives (prisoners of resistance) into commodities.** Through books, videos, and CDs, political representations are purchased and circulated with the intent of creating greater demand not only for the "product," but also for social justice, release campaigns, opposition to expanding police and military powers, and executions and state violence. For the imprisoned, the possibility of release, or at least remembrance, mitigates their social death in prison (or physical death, as in the cases of MOVE's [Merle](http://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/merle) Africa and former Black Panther Albert Nuh Washington). Academics and activists use the market to highlight the human rights abuses and conditions of the imprisoned, the 2.5 million people locked in U.S. penal institutions, and the perpetuation of torture and slavery through the Thirteenth Amendment. **The irony is that commodification is another form of containment. Although Harlow advocates the "activist counterapproach" to consumption, not all activism provides an alternative. Some of it re-inscribes the competition, opportunism, disciplinary mechanisms, and demands for institutional loyalty that characterize the marketplace**. Activism or activists, like academia and academics, have their own forms of commerce. **At their weakest and most problematic points, they share, in their respective sites,** [**careerism**](http://www.thefreedictionary.com/careerism)**, appropriation, and the assertion of "authoritative" voices. For instance, the "political prisoner-as-icon" can be deployed to minimize or silence external and internal critiques. Editors, translators, and advocates can wield iconic power as surrogates (and in surreal fashion use that proxy against the incarcerated themselves). The structural position that the non-incarcerated possess, a quite valuable commodity, permits the appropriation of voice and new forms of dependencies.** Perhaps, the imprisoned use self-censorship not only as a shield against their guards (as Marilyn Buck describes in On Self-Censorship), but also as armor against their allies. Political prisoners have strategies to counter "free" progressives, given that in the social death of the prisoner rebel, the state is not the only entity that has the ability to capitalize on or [cannibalize](http://www.thefreedictionary.com/cannibalize) captive bodies. If indeed the political prisoner or imprisoned intellectual can be either "freed" or frozen in academic and/or activist discourse and productivity, then it is essential that academics-activists, students-scholars, directly communicate with political prisoners, as openly as possible given the structural disparities.

**Their arguments about personal agency are ultimately conservative and de-politicizing – arguments for localizing activism within the purview of social location are the equivalent of privatizing social change, creating us as dependent on the necessity of their advocacy. The more successful their strategy is the more damage it does by making institutions necessary to our understanding of social change**

**Hershock '99**, East-West Center, 1999.  [“Changing the way society changes”, *Journal of Buddhist Ethics*, 6, 154; <http://jbe.gold.ac.uk/6/hershock991.html>]

The trouble is that, like other technologies biased toward control, the more successful legislation becomes, the more it renders itself necessary. Because it aims at rigorous definition -- at establishing hard boundaries or limits -- crossing the threshold of legislative utility means creating conditions under which the definition of freedom becomes so complex as to be self-defeating. Taken to its logical end, legally-biased social activism is thus liable to effect an infinite density of protocols for maintaining autonomy, generating a matrix of limits on discrimination that would finally be conducive to what might be called "axiological entropy" -- a state in which movement in any direction is equally unobstructed *and* empty of dramatic potential. Contrary to expectations, complete "freedom of choice" would not mean the elimination of all impediments to meaningful improvisation, but rather an erasure of the latter's conditions of possibility. The effectiveness and efficiency of "hard," control-biased technologies depend on our using natural laws -- horizons of possibility -- as fulcrums for leveraging or dictating changes in the structure of our circumstances. Unlike improvised contributions to changes taking place in our situation, dictating the terms of change effectively silences our situational partners. Technological authority thus renders our circumstances mute and justifies ignoring the contributions that might be made by the seasons or the spiritual force of the mountains to the meaning -- the direction of movement -- of our ongoing patterns of interdependence. With the "perfection" of technically-mediated control, our wills would know no limit. We would be as gods, existing with no imperatives, no external compulsions, and no priorities. We would have no reason to do one thing first or hold one thing, and not another, as most sacred or dear. Such "perfection" is, perhaps, as fabulous and unattainable as it is finally depressing. Yet the vast energies of global capital are committed to moving in its direction, for the most part quite uncritically. The consequences -- as revealed in the desecration and impoverishing of both 'external' and 'internal' wilderness (for instance, the rainforests and our imaginations) -- are every day more evident. The critical question we must answer is whether the "soft" technologies of legally-biased and controlled social change commit us to an equivalent impoverishment and desecration. The analogy between the dependence of technological progress on natural laws and that of social activism on societal laws is by no means perfect. Except among a scattering of philosophers and historians of science, for example, the laws of nature are not viewed as changeable artifacts of human culture. But for present purposes, the analogy need only focus our attention on the way legal institutions -- like natural laws -- do not prescriptively determine the shape of all things to come, but rather establish generic limits for what relationships or states of affairs are factually admissible. Laws that guarantee certain "freedoms" necessarily also prohibit others. Without the fulcrums of *unallowable* acts, the work of changing a society would remain as purely idealistic as using wishful thinking to move mountains. Changing legal institutions at once forces and enforces societal reform. By affirming and safeguarding those freedoms or modes of autonomy that have come to be seen as generically essential to 'being human', a legally-biased social activism cannot avoid selectively limiting the ways we engage with one another. The absence of coercion may be a basic aim of social activism, but if our autonomy is to be guaranteed both fair and just, its basic strategy must be one of establishing non-negotiable constraints on how we co-exist. Social activism is thus in the business of striking structural compromises between its ends and its means -- between particular freedoms and general equality, and between practical autonomy and legal anonymity. By shifting the locus of freedoms from unique persons to generic citizens -- and in substantial sympathy with both the Platonic renunciation of particularity and the scientific discounting of the exceptional and extraordinary -- social activist methodology promotes dramatic anonymity in order to universally realize the operation of 'blind justice'. Much as hard technologies of control silence the contributions of wilderness and turn us away from the rewards of a truly joint improvisation of order, the process of social activism reduces the relevance of the always unique and unprecedented terrain of our interdependence. This is no small loss. The institutions that guarantee our generic independence effectively pave over those vernacular relationships through which our own contributory virtuosity might be developed and shared -- relationships out of which the exceptional meaning of our immediate situation might be continuously realized. In contrast with Buddhist emptiness -- a practice that entails attending to the mutual relevance of all things -- both the aims and strategies of social activism are conducive to an evacuation of the conditions of dramatic virtuosity, a societal depletion of our resources for meaningfully improvised and liberating intimacy with all things.

## 1NR

### deleuze

**INCLUDING ANY ELEMENT of the political strategy of the 1AC ONLY RISKS short-circuiting the radical potential of the alternative by making protest visible. imperceptibility is a precondition for freedom of action**

**The Invisible Committee, ‘7** [an anonymous group of French professors, phd candidates, and intellectuals, in the book “The Coming Insurrection” published by Semiotext(e) (attributed to the [Tarnac Nine](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tarnac_Nine) by the French police), <http://tarnac9.noblogs.org/gallery/5188/insurrection_english.pdf>]

**Stay invisible.** Put anonymity on the offense. In a demonstration, a unionist pulls the mask off an anonymous protester who had just broken a window: “Assume responsibility for what you’re doing instead of hiding yourself.” To be visible is to be out in the open – that is, above all **to be vulnerable**. When the leftists of all nations continually make their cause more “visible” – whether that of the **homeless**, of **women**, or of **immigrants** – in the hope that it will get taken care of, they’re doing **exactly the opposite** of what they ought to. To not be visible, but rather to turn to our advantage the anonymity we’ve been relegated to, and with conspiracies, nocturnal and/or masked actions, to make it into an unassailable attack-position. The fires of November 2005 offer a model. No leader, no demands, no organization, but words, gestures, complicities. To be nothing socially is **not** a **humiliating** condition, the source of some tragic lack of recognition (to be recognized: but by who?), **but on the contrary is the precondition for maximum freedom of action.** Not signing your name to your crimes, but only attaching some imaginary acronym – people still remember the ephemeral BAFT (Tarterets AntiCop Brigade) – is a way to preserve that freedom. Obviously, one of the regime’s first defensive maneuvers was to create a “suburban slum” subject to treat as the author of the “riots of November 2005.” Just take a look at the ugly mugs of those who are someone in this society if you want help understanding the joy of being no one.

**ONLY a politics which refuses the trap of political representation has the possibility of emancipation -- this is a prior question and STARTING POINT is key**

**Tsianos et al. ‘8** Vassilis, teaches sociology at the University of Hamburg, Germany, Dimitris Papadopoulos teaches social theory at Cardiff University, Niamh Stephenson teaches social science at the University of New South Wales. “Escape Routes: Control and Subversion in the 21st Century” Pluto Press

**To escape policing and start doing politics necessitates dis-identi- fication - the refusal of assigned, proper places for participation in society.** As indicated earlier, **escape functions** not as a form of exile, nor as mere opposition or protest, but **as an interval which interrupts everyday policing** (Ranciere, 1998). **Political disputes - as distinct from disputes over policing - are not concerned with rights or repre­sentation or with the construction of a majoritarian position in the political arena. They are not even disputes over the terms of inclusion or the features of a minority. They occur prior to inclusion,** beyond the terms of the double-R axiom, **beyond the majority-minority duality.** They are disputes over the existence of those who have no part (and in this sense they are disputes about justice in a Benjaminian sense of the word, Benjamin, 1996a). **Politics arises from the emergence of the miscounted, the imperceptible, those who have no place within the normalising organisation of the social realm. The refusal of represen­tation is a way of introducing the part which is outside of policing, which is not a part of community, which is neither a minority nor intends to be included within the majority. Outside politics is the way to escape the controlling and repressive force of** contemporary politics (that is of **contemporary policing); or else it is a way to change our senses, our habits, our practices in order to experiment together with those who have no part, instead of attempting to include them into the current regime of control. This emergence fractures normalising, police logic. It refigures the perceptible, not so that others can finally recognise one's proper place in the social order, but to make evident the incommensurability of worlds, the incommensurability of an existing distribution of bodies and subjectivities with the principle of equality.** **Politics is a refusal of representation. Politics happens beyond, before representation.** Outside politics is the materialisation of the attempt to occupy this space outside the controlling force of becoming majoritarian through the process of representation. **If we return to our initial question of how people contest control, then we can say that when regimes of control encounter escape they instigate processes of naming and representation. They attempt to reinsert escaping subjectivities into the subject-form. Outside politics arises as people attempt to evade the imposition of control through their subsumption into the subject-form. This is not an attempt simply to move against or to negate representation.** Nor is it a matter of introducing pure potential and imagination in reaction to the constraining power of control. **Rather, escape is a constructive and creative movement - it is a literal, material, embodied movement towards something which cannot be named, towards something which is fictional.** Escape is simultaneously in the heart of social transformation and outside of it. Escape is always here because it is non-literal, witty and hopeful.

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**New tools of subversion are emerging, but they have not crystallised, they are ungraspable**. This describes our encounter with imperceptible politics; it is not simply situated in our present conditions of postliberal sovereignty. Of course, **imperceptible politics is demanded by our situatedness.** But at the same time, it is imaginary and outside of the present historical chronotope. It is only possible to work on the real conditions of the present by invoking imaginaries which take us beyond the present. **And this trajectory away from the present is achieved by working in time, by intensifying the present. Imperceptible politics works with the present. Time is fractured and non-synchronous - the historical present can be understood both as containing residues of the past and as anticipating the future** (Marvakis, 2005; Bloch, 1986). Yet it is impossible to identify either the past or the future by moving backwards or forwards in time. Neither move is possible. **Time forces us to work in the present, by training our senses to examine what appears evident as well as what is absent. This sensibility enables us to perceive and imagine things and ourselves in unfamiliar ways, to follow open trajectories.** **Time contains both experiences of the world which have been rendered invisible and the seeds of experience which maybe possible to realise** (Santos, 2003). **Imperceptible politics can be neither perceived nor conducted from a transcendent perspective; that is, elaborating a 'metaphysics of the present'** (as criticised in Adam, 1995) **can reveal nothing of the mode of engagement with the present we are describing. This engagement entails experiencing time in a subjective and embodied way, being forced to transform ourselves in order to deal with this current predicament of resistance.** **Situated in the present historical regime of control, imperceptible politics involves remaking the present by remaking our bodies: the ways we perceive, feel, act. Imperceptible politics transforms our bodies. Loving the present, existing in the present, imperceptible politics is practised in the present.** **It works with social reality in the most intimate and immanent ways, recalling the whole history and practice of escape, as we described earlier, and rethinking it anew.** **Doing imperceptible politics entails the refusal to use our perceptual and action systems as instruments for representing the current political conditions of resistance.** It functions through diffraction rather than reflection (Haraway, 1997, 1991c): diffraction creates 'effects of connection, of embodiment, and of responsibility for an imagined elsewhere that we may yet learn to see and build here' (Haraway, 1992, p. 295). In this sense **imperceptible politics is more concerned with changing the very conditions of perception and action than with changing what we see.** **Only such bodily, lived transformations are sufficient for interrupting the pervasive sensibilities being shaped by sovereign powers.**

#### Apologizing for previous action is sufficient – it is a form of self-punishment that will carry on forever

**Tavuchis 91**. (Nicholas, Senior Scholar in the Department of Sociology @ University of Manitoba. Mea Culpa: A Sociology of Apology and Reconciliation pg. 8)

In these admittedly general terms, then, apology expresses itself as the exigency of a painful re- membering, literally of being mindful again, of what we were and hadas members and, at the same time, what we have jeopardized or lost by virtue of our offensive speech or action. And it is only by personally acknowledging ultimate responsibility, expressing genuine sorrow and regret, and pledging henceforth (implicitly or explicitly) to abide by the rules, that the offender simultaneously recalls and is re-called to that which binds. As shared mementos, apologies require much more than admission or confession of the unadorned facts of wrongdoing or deviance. They constitute--in their most responsible, authentic, and, hence, vulnerable expression---a form of self-punishment that cuts deeply because we are obliged to retell, relive, and seek forgiveness for sorrowful events that have rendered our claims to membership in a moral community suspect or defeasible. So it is that the call for an apology always demands and promises more than it seems to. As anyone who has ever apologized in these circumstances well knows, the act is always arduous and painful, whether done voluntarily or at the urging of others. And yet, when this secular rite of expiation is punctiliously performed, and the remorseful admission of wrongdoing is converted into a gift that is accepted and reciprocated by forgiveness, our world is transformed in a way that can only be described as miraculous. All the more so because the gesture itself reiterates the reality of the offense while superseding it.

#### Apologies solve – it is a recognition of wrongdoing and an assurance that the action will not be committed again

**Tavuchis 91**. (Nicholas, Senior Scholar in the Department of Sociology @ University of Manitoba. Mea Culpa: A Sociology of Apology and Reconciliation pg. 13)

Putting aside, for the moment, what members are expected to know at different stages of their moral careers, differential commitment to rules, local definitions of venial and capital offenses, the social units involved, etc., we may provisionally note that apologies have to do with an ineluctable reality of human interaction--the possibility of transgression by word or deed. 10 Because, as suggested earlier, they simultaneously represent (and reenact) consummated infractions and attempts to reclaim membership, they unequivocally enunciate the existence and force of shared assumptions that authorize existing social arrangements and demarcate moral boundaries. That is to say, we not only apologize to someone but also for something. The analytical focus of the former is on actors, agents, and social relationships; the latter, by contrast, directs attention to rules and meta-rules, that is, rules about rules. 11 Needless to say, both perspectives must be considered in developing a valid account of apology. Genuine apologies, from all that has been said, may be taken as the symbolic foci of secular remedial rituals that serve to recall and reaffirm allegiance to codes of behavior and belief whose integrity has been tested and challenged by transgression, whether knowingly or unwittingly. An apology thus speaks to an act that cannot be undone but that cannot go unnoticed without compromising the current and future relationship of the parties, the legitimacy of the violated rule, and the wider social web in which the participants are enmeshed. This latter point, the transpersonal implications, will be discussed more thoroughly as our formulation unfolds, but merits at least passing comment here because apologies tend to be associated with interpersonal or intimate bonds that exclude others.

#### Their criticism of our language is the wrong starting point—it’s not what language means, but the referent

**Strathausen 10 (**Carsten Strathausen is Associate Professor of German and English at the University of Missouri. His first book was *The Look of Things: Poetry and Vision around 1900* (University of North Carolina Press, 2003). Carsten is the editor of *A Leftist Ontology* (University of Minnesota Press, 2009), and the translator of Boris Groys' *Under Suspicion: A Phenomenology of the Media* (forthcoming 2011, Columbia University Press). He has also published numerous essays on culture, philosophy, and intellectual history and is currently completing a book project on *The Aesthetics of New Media*, “Epistemological Reflections on Minor Points in Deleuze”, Theory and Event Volume 13, Issue 4, dml)

For Deleuze, language does not represent or signify ideas or things, but expresses them. Expression works by creating ever-new lines and new divisions through the use of medial terms (like sense or event) that split up already existing connections (like that between language and things). Since these mediators are "indifferent to all opposites" (LS 35), they serve to liberate the movement that was arrested in-between a given binary. Mediators enable Deleuze not only to break up his terms, but also to fold one into another or to cross any one of them with any (or all) of the others. This process literally enlivens the space of the extended middle: it yields two (or three, as DeLanda argues) ontological dimensions of Being traversed by three different lines of flight (primary, molecular, and molar line); it produces three orders of language (the primary order of "affections of the body," the secondary order of "the event of sense," and, finally, "the tertiary order of the proposition," the third of which—the proposition—again subdivides into "three distinct relations" (denotation, manifestation, and signification) to which Deleuze then adds a fourth relation (sense); there are, furthermore, two basic kinds of cinematic images (movement-image and time-image), the former of which sub-divides into three distinct varieties (perception-image, action-image, affection-image), etc.[13](http://muse.jhu.edu.floyd.lib.umn.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v013/13.4.strathausen.html" \l "f13) This quasi-infinite addition and division of medial terms is most obvious in Deleuze's concept of "double articulation," which denotes the two-fold process that constitutes the different strata of the actual (that is, the existing world of qualified and extended individuals). Deleuze famously argues that each stratum or assemblage is defined by its "substance" (i.e., that which occupies space or is extended in space) and by the "form" or "structure" of this substance (i.e., that which endows substance with specific qualities). So, the substance of a given stratum is some actualized and formed matter as opposed to the pure matter-energy that constitutes the plane of consistency (that is, the virtual). But Deleuze then introduces yet another distinction between two more terms—content and expression—and argues that each of them comprises a full set of the previous two (form and substance). In other words, "each articulation is already… double" (ATP 44). This means that expression comprises not only form, but also substance, and that content comprises not only substance, but also form. The duplication of content and expression allows Deleuze to distinguish between the "form of expression" and the "substance of expression"; conversely, he refers to the "substance of content" and to the "form of content." As Deleuze himself points out, this process of differentiation is infinite. It gives rise to an endless nexus of interrelating substances and forms, contents and expressions at numerous intermediate levels within and in between strata. "Content and expression," Deleuze writes, "not only vary from one stratum to another, but intermingle, and within the same stratum multiply and divide ad infinitum" (ATP 44). This leads to a "multiplicity of double articulations affecting both expression and content" (ATP 45), because "each stratum serves as a substratum for another stratum" (ATP 72), and because "forms of expression and regimes of signs are still *strata* (even considered in themselves, after abstracting forms of content)" (ATP 134). Every articulation, in other words, unfolds and multiplies across, above, and below the stratum. It is by means of this infinite movement of augmentation and differentiation—by means of this "*extra-Being*" that *is*univocal Being itself (LS 180)—that Deleuze thinks through and beyond the dualisms inherent in language. Faced with the perennial critique that his philosophy merely replaces traditional binaries (organic/non-organic; mind/body; signifier/signified) with new binaries (virtual/actual; smooth/striated; minor/major, etc), and that his entire ontology juxtaposes "good" processes of deterritorialization with "bad" processes of re-territorialization,[14](http://muse.jhu.edu.floyd.lib.umn.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v013/13.4.strathausen.html" \l "f14) Deleuze responds: "We must speak like everyone else, we must pass through dualisms, 1-2, or even 1-2-3…. We must pass through [passer par] dualisms because they are in language, it's not a question of getting rid of them, but we must fight against them, invent stammering…." (D 34).[15](http://muse.jhu.edu.floyd.lib.umn.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v013/13.4.strathausen.html" \l "f15) To stammer is to interrupt the flow of words; it is to add and insert new elements (words, syllables, sounds) in between the "right" ones. Stammering delays the construction of meaning, and one might well say that Deleuze's entire philosophy stutters: it stretches each line of thought by inserting new terms and adding new lines *ad infinitum*. As he thinks along these lines of infinite relations and twisting singularities, Deleuze does more than just map the world. He actualizes it. His thought creates the assemblages through which it thinks. By contrast, signification—and, above all, linguistic signification—falsely assumes that some points and lines are only meant to "signify" others. The lines that form words, or the airwaves that carry sound, are said to "represent" a certain content and "symbolize" a certain referent—as if their sole purpose were to dissolve themselves within and through this signifying function, as if lines and points themselves did not matter *as such*—namely *precisely as* the lines and points they actually are. This view, Deleuze argues, not only disregards the numerous folds and multiplicities that intervene betweencontent and expression, but also overlooks the double articulation that inheres *within* them. As demonstrated above, linguistic expression, like all other things, has its own unique substance—"fundamentally vocal substance, which brings into play various organic elements: not only the larynx, but the mouth and lips, and the overall motoricity of the face" (ATP 61). Once we realize that the (assemblage of the) face is the substance of expression, the linguistic/semiotic model of signification ceases to function. For how could this substance—our mouth, lips, saliva, enzymes, nerves—ever "signify" or "represent" a particular form of content like "prison"?[16](http://muse.jhu.edu.floyd.lib.umn.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v013/13.4.strathausen.html" \l "f16) This becomes possible only if we confuse articulation with signification, which cuts off both "content" and "signification" from their constitutive multiplicities and reductively equates them with "signified" and "signifier" respectively. It is this inherent reductionism of (Saussurian) linguistics that Deleuze rejects as imperialist and "despotic" (ATP 68). This is not to deny that language "exists" and "functions" as a form of expression (i.e., as a regime of signs or a semiotic system) in a given stratum. Rather, the crucial question is how it functions and what effects it is able to achieve. In this sense, Deleuze's understanding and use of language could not be more different not only from traditional hermeneutics and analytical philosophy, but also from deconstruction. Deleuze's philosophy, unlike Derrida's, is really *not* about language or about signification. It is about what happens above and beneath language—outside of it, yet still related to it. Deleuze's highest praise is reserved for authors like Kafka or Artaud who invent a foreign language within their own. The goal of the writer, according to Deleuze, is to make language "stutter" and effect "a straining of one's whole language toward something outside it" (N 140). Likewise, Deleuze encourages all readers "to break open words and sentences… and find what's uttered in them" (N 96). For Deleuze, expression is ultimately a matter of pressure, for what "strains" language beyond its limits of stratification is the interplay of creative forces language must seek—and fail—to express. Deleuze thus removes language from its philosophical pedestal as the privileged "ground" or "horizon" or "medium" of both knowledge and being. At a time when the "linguistic turn" was in full swing throughout the humanities, Deleuze bluntly declared: "I don't personally think th[at] linguistics is fundamental" (N 28). He realized that philosophers' obsessive focus on language cuts short the infinite potentiality of non-linguistic forms of expression such as dance, gestures, rituals etc., all of which are *significant* even though they are not *signifying*.[17](http://muse.jhu.edu.floyd.lib.umn.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v013/13.4.strathausen.html" \l "f17) For Deleuze, the significance of language, like that of other things, resides in its function, which, in turn depends upon the interaction of words with the unrepresentable forces of the virtual and the innumerous strata it actualizes. While it would be misleading to say that Deleuze materializes language, because the sense of language remains immaterial, it is nonetheless true that Deleuze *ontologizes* language: he literally bloats the process of signification until it bursts and spills over to the outside. When that happens, language becomes different from itself: it changes from major to minor, begins to stutter or simply falls silent. It no longer signifies, but matters all the more. Deleuze's ontologization of language means that all statements, even meaningless ones, affect the state of affairs surrounding them. It also means that the meaning and function of sentences, propositions, and words necessarily changes with every new assemblage they encounter. To read Deleuze is to confront a plethora of interrelated and idiosyncractic concepts whose meaning shifts and slides depending on the (philosophical, scientific, aesthetic, socio-political…) context in which they are made to function. Put differently, Deleuze's ontology cannot and will not operate with a strictly defined nomenclatura comprised of stable, identifiable, scientific-analytical terms. Rather, Deleuzian concepts (percepts, affects) are themselves assemblages or multiplicities. "Concepts are events" (WIP 36); they are "the contour, the configuration, the constellation of an event to come" (WIP 32f.). The Deleuzian concept is a "*linking*" (WIP 91), and although this linking exists independently from the points it connects and the relations it actualizes, it nonetheless functions differently with respect to each and every link it establishes. Given Deleuze's ontologizing view of language, it is hardly surprising to find that all of his major texts create a specific terminology. As Deleuze thinks through another philosopher, he literally engenders a different being of the virtual—as substance (Spinoza), as fold (Leibniz), as élan vital (Bergson), as the will to power (Nietzsche)—and each of his books calls the virtual by a different name: the body without organs (AO), the plane of immanence, (WIP), the plane of consistency (ATP), a life (Immanence), etc. In DeLanda's view, however, all these terms are "near synonyms" ([DeLanda 2002, 203](http://muse.jhu.edu.floyd.lib.umn.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v013/13.4.strathausen.html#b29)), because what really matters to Deleuze are "the referents of these labels, not the labels themselves" ([DeLanda 1997, 330](http://muse.jhu.edu.floyd.lib.umn.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v013/13.4.strathausen.html#b28)), Hence, the "label itself is immaterial and insignificant," DeLanda claims ([1997, 260](http://muse.jhu.edu.floyd.lib.umn.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v013/13.4.strathausen.html" \l "b28)), because Deleuze's various concepts for the virtual all express the same Being, the same One-All. What *matters*, DeLanda argues, are not "Deleuze's words" but "Deleuze's world" ([2002, 5](http://muse.jhu.edu.floyd.lib.umn.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v013/13.4.strathausen.html" \l "b29)). Yet this strict separation of word and referent hardly coincides with Deleuze's own view of things. "Being is the same for everything about which it is said" precisely because "Being cannot be said without also occurring" (LS 179). Deleuzian concepts, in other words, are not just arbitrary labels that function referentially, as DeLanda suggests. For if this were so, language would fall back upon the traditional plane of linguistic signification and thus effectively reinstate the very Saussurian theory of referential meaning Deleuze so vehemently rejected. Rather than mere labels, Deleuzian concepts are real entities in their own right. They literally create the object of which they speak. The Deleuzian concept "poses itself in itself—it is a self-positing" (WIP 11).[18](http://muse.jhu.edu.floyd.lib.umn.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v013/13.4.strathausen.html" \l "f18) Nobody, I think, has expressed the self-positing power of Deleuzian cocepts more eloquently than Jean-Luc Nancy. Nancy refers to Deleuze's concepts neither as concepts nor as labels, but as the power of naming. Deleuze's philosophy, Nancy claims, "is a philosophy of naming and not of discourse" (111). Nancy's use of the gerund makes a crucial point: the concept is not just a name, but a process of naming; it is not just an index, but a device for *indexing* and for "effectuating [being] differently" (111): For him, to create a concept is not to draw the empirical under a category: but to construct a universe of its own, an autonomous universe, an *ordo et connexio* which does not imitate the other, which does not represent it or signify it, but which effectuates it in its own way. The Deleuzian concept is a grapping machine, a machine that directs your thoughts—as if they were hands—over the flow of the virtual so it can swoop down and pull out this or that thing into a newly formed assemblage. Concepts create this or that by actualizing new entities from the stream of the virtual into the extended world of stratification: "It is in this sense that thinking and being are said to be one and the same" (WIP 38). Language, for Deleuze, does not represent the world, but acts upon it.[19](http://muse.jhu.edu.floyd.lib.umn.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v013/13.4.strathausen.html" \l "f19) How exactly does this work? How can we think this relationship between language and things, word and world in Deleuze's cosmology? Deleuze explores a number of different possibilities throughout his oeuvre, all based on his categorical rejection of the linguistic/semiotic model of signification. His first model pertains to what he calls "order-words"—words that effect and shape the particular situation in which they happen to occur. Order-words function on the actual level of stratification, because they serve to limit, retrain, and arrest movement. Yet language, like all other forms of expression, is also able to connect to the virtual plane of consistency. Language gives rise to events, articulates new sense and develops new forms of expression—precisely by becoming minor, by stuttering, or by falling silent. Order-words alone cannot account for this potentiality of language.