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#### Introducing “armed forces” only refers to human troops, not weapons systems

**Lorber, 13** - J.D. Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School, Ph.D Candidate, Duke University Department of Political Science (Eric, “Executive Warmaking Authority and Offensive Cyber Operations: Can Existing Legislation Successfully Constrain Presidential Power?” 15 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 961, January, lexis)

As is evident from a textual analysis, n177 an examination of the legislative history, n178 and the broad policy purposes behind the creation of the Act, n179 [\*990] "armed forces" refers to U.S. soldiers and members of the armed forces, not weapon systems or capabilities such as offensive cyber weapons. Section 1547 does not specifically define "armed forces," but it states that "the term "introduction of United States Armed Forces' includes the assignment of members of such armed forces to command, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany the regular or irregular military forces of any foreign country or government." n180 While this definition pertains to the broader phrase "introduction of armed forces," the clear implication is that only members of the armed forces count for the purposes of the definition under the WPR. Though not dispositive, the term "member" connotes a human individual who is part of an organization. n181 Thus, it appears that the term "armed forces" means human members of the United States armed forces. However, there exist two potential complications with this reading. First, the language of the statute states that "the term "introduction of United States Armed Forces' includes the assignment of members of such armed forces." n182 By using inclusionary - as opposed to exclusionary - language, one might argue that the term "armed forces" could include more than members. This argument is unconvincing however, given that a core principle of statutory interpretation, expressio unius, suggests that expression of one thing (i.e., members) implies the exclusion of others (such as non-members constituting armed forces). n183 Second, the term "member" does not explicitly reference "humans," and so could arguably refer to individual units and beings that are part of a larger whole (e.g., wolves can be members of a pack). As a result, though a textual analysis suggests that "armed forces" refers to human members of the armed forces, such a conclusion is not determinative.

An examination of the legislative history also suggests that Congress clearly conceptualized "armed forces" as human members of the armed forces. For example, disputes over the term "armed forces" revolved around who could be considered members of the armed forces, not what constituted a member. Senator Thomas Eagleton, one of the Resolution's architects, proposed an amendment during the process providing that the Resolution cover military officers on loan to a civilian agency (such as the Central [\*991] Intelligence Agency). n184 This amendment was dropped after encountering pushback, n185 but the debate revolved around whether those military individuals on loan to the civilian agency were still members of the armed forces for the purposes of the WPR, suggesting that Congress considered the term to apply only to soldiers in the armed forces. Further, during the congressional hearings, the question of deployment of "armed forces" centered primarily on past U.S. deployment of troops to combat zones, n186 suggesting that Congress conceptualized "armed forces" to mean U.S. combat troops.

The broad purpose of the Resolution aimed to prevent the large-scale but unauthorized deployments of U.S. troops into hostilities. n187 While examining the broad purpose of a legislative act is increasingly relied upon only after examining the text and legislative history, here it provides further support for those two alternate interpretive sources. n188 As one scholar has noted, "the War Powers Resolution, for example, is concerned with sending U.S. troops into harm's way." n189 The historical context of the War Powers Resolution is also important in determining its broad purpose; as the resolutions submitted during the Vietnam War and in the lead-up to the passage of the WPR suggest, Congress was concerned about its ability to effectively regulate the President's deployments of large numbers of U.S. troops to Southeast Asia, n190 as well as prevent the President from authorizing troop incursions into countries in that region. n191 The WPR was a reaction to the President's continued deployments of these troops into combat zones, and as such suggests that Congress's broad purpose was to prevent the unconstrained deployment of U.S. personnel, not weapons, into hostilities.

This analysis suggests that, when defining the term "armed forces," Congress meant members of the armed forces who would be placed in [\*992] harm's way (i.e., into hostilities or imminent hostilities). Applied to offensive cyber operations, such a definition leads to the conclusion that the War Powers Resolution likely does not cover such activities. Worms, viruses, and kill switches are clearly not U.S. troops. Therefore, the key question regarding whether the WPR can govern cyber operations is not whether the operation is conducted independently or as part of a kinetic military operation. Rather, the key question is the delivery mechanism. For example, if military forces were deployed to launch the cyberattack, such an activity, if it were related to imminent hostilities with a foreign country, could trigger the WPR. This seems unlikely, however, for two reasons. First, it is unclear whether small-scale deployments where the soldiers are not participating or under threat of harm constitute the introduction of armed forces into hostilities under the War Powers Resolution. n192 Thus, individual operators deployed to plant viruses in particular enemy systems may not constitute armed forces introduced into hostilities or imminent hostilities. Second, such a tactical approach seems unlikely. If the target system is remote access, the military can attack it without placing personnel in harm's way. n193 If it is close access, there exist many other effective ways to target such systems. n194 As a result, unless U.S. troops are introduced into hostilities or imminent hostilities while deploying offensive cyber capabilities - which is highly unlikely - such operations will not trigger the War Powers Resolution.

#### Voting issue – they explode the topic, including weapons systems turns this topic into an arms control topic – nuclear weapons, space weaponization, or the CWC and BWC could all be their own topics. Their interpretation makes being negative impossible

### 1nc politics

#### Obama’s pressuring the GOP with a strong display of Presidential strength and staying on message – the GOP will blink

**Dovere, 10/1/13** (Edward, Politico, “Government shutdown: President Obama holds the line”

<http://www.politico.com/story/2013/10/government-shutdown-president-obama-holds-the-line-97646.html?hp=f3>)

President Barack Obama started September in an agonizing, extended display of how little sway he had in Congress. He ended the month with a display of resolve and strength that could redefine his presidency. All it took was a government shutdown. This was less a White House strategy than simply staying in the corner the House GOP had painted them into — to the White House’s surprise, Obama was forced to do what he so rarely has as president: he said no, and he didn’t stop saying no. For two weeks ahead of Monday night’s deadline, Obama and aides rebuffed the efforts to kill Obamacare with the kind of firm, narrow sales pitch they struggled with in three years of trying to convince people the law should exist in the first place. There was no litany of doomsday scenarios that didn’t quite come true, like in the run-up to the fiscal cliff and the sequester. No leaked plans or musings in front of the cameras about Democratic priorities he might sacrifice to score a deal. After five years of what’s often seen as Obama’s desperation to negotiate — to the fury of his liberal base and the frustration of party leaders who argue that he negotiates against himself. Even his signature health care law came with significant compromises in Congress. Instead, over and over and over again, Obama delivered the simple line: Republicans want to repeal a law that was passed and upheld by the Supreme Court — to give people health insurance — or they’ll do something that everyone outside the GOP caucus meetings, including Wall Street bankers, seems to agree would be a ridiculous risk. “If we lock these Americans out of affordable health care for one more year,” Obama said Monday afternoon as he listed examples of people who would enjoy better treatment under Obamacare, “if we sacrifice the health care of millions of Americans — then they’ll fund the government for a couple more months. Does anybody truly believe that we won’t have this fight again in a couple more months? Even at Christmas?” The president and his advisers weren’t expecting this level of Republican melee, a White House official said. Only during Sen. Ted Cruz’s (R-Texas) 21-hour floor speech last week did the realization roll through the West Wing that they wouldn’t be negotiating because they couldn’t figure out anymore whom to negotiate with. And even then, they didn’t believe the shutdown was really going to happen until Saturday night, when the House voted again to strip Obamacare funding. This wasn’t a credible position, Obama said again Monday afternoon, but rather, bowing to “extraneous and controversial demands” which are “all to save face after making some impossible promises to the extreme right wing of their political party.” Obama and aides have said repeatedly that they’re not thinking about the shutdown in terms of political gain, but the situation’s is taking shape for them. Congress’s approval on dealing with the shutdown was at 10 percent even before the shutters started coming down on Monday according to a new CNN/ORC poll, with 69 percent of people saying the House Republicans are acting like “spoiled children.” “The Republicans are making themselves so radioactive that the president and Democrats can win this debate in the court of public opinion” by waiting them out, said Jim Manley, a Democratic strategist and former aide to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid who has previously been critical of Obama’s tactics. Democratic pollster Stan Greenberg said the Obama White House learned from the 2011 debt ceiling standoff, when it demoralized fellow Democrats, deflated Obama’s approval ratings and got nothing substantive from the negotiations. “They didn’t gain anything from that approach,” Greenberg said. “I think that there’s a lot they learned from what happened the last time they ran up against the debt ceiling.” While the Republicans have been at war with each other, the White House has proceeded calmly — a breakthrough phone call with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani Friday that showed him getting things done (with the conveniently implied juxtaposition that Tehran is easier to negotiate with than the GOP conference), his regular golf game Saturday and a cordial meeting Monday with his old sparring partner Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. White House press secretary Jay Carney said Monday that the shutdown wasn’t really affecting much of anything. “It’s busy, but it’s always busy here,” Carney said. “It’s busy for most of you covering this White House, any White House. We’re very much focused on making sure that the implementation of the Affordable Care Act continues.” Obama called all four congressional leaders Monday evening — including Boehner, whose staff spent Friday needling reporters to point out that the president hadn’t called for a week. According to both the White House and Boehner’s office, the call was an exchange of well-worn talking points, and changed nothing. Manley advised Obama to make sure people continue to see Boehner and the House Republicans as the problem and not rush into any more negotiations until public outrage forces them to bend. “He may want to do a little outreach, but not until the House drives the country over the cliff,” Manley said Monday, before the shutdown. “Once the House has driven the country over the cliff and failed to fund the government, then it might be time to make a move.” The White House believes Obama will take less than half the blame for a shutdown – with the rest heaped on congressional Republicans. The divide is clear in a Gallup poll also out Monday: over 70 percent of self-identifying Republicans and Democrats each say their guys are the ones acting responsibly, while just 9 percent for both say the other side is. If Obama is able to turn public opinion against Republicans, the GOP won’t be able to turn the blame back on Obama, Greenberg said. “Things only get worse once things begin to move in a particular direction,” he said. “They don’t suddenly start going the other way as people rethink this.”

#### **Having to defend authority derails the current agenda**

Kriner 10 Douglas L. Kriner (assistant professor of political science at Boston University) “After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War”, University of Chicago Press, Dec 1, 2010, page 68-69.

While congressional support leaves the president’s reserve of political capital intact, congressional criticism saps energy from other initiatives on the home front by forcing the president to expend energy and effort defending his international agenda. Political capital spent shoring up support for a president’s foreign policies is capital that is unavailable for his future policy initiatives. Moreover, any weakening in the president’s political clout may have immediate ramifications for his reelection prospects, as well as indirect consequences for congressional races.59 Indeed, Democratic efforts to tie congressional Republican incumbents to President George W. Bush and his war policies paid immediate political dividends in the 2006 midterms, particularly in states, districts, and counties that had suffered the highest casualty rates in the Iraq War. 60 In addition to boding ill for the president’s perceived political capital and reputation, such partisan losses in Congress only further imperil his programmatic agenda, both international and domestic. Scholars have long noted that President Lyndon Johnson’s dream of a Great Society also perished in the rice paddies of Vietnam. Lacking the requisite funds in a war-depleted treasury and the political capital needed to sustain his legislative vision, Johnson gradually let his domestic goals slip away as he hunkered down in an effort first to win and then to end the Vietnam War. In the same way, many of President Bush’s highest second-term domestic proprieties, such as Social Security and immigration reform, failed perhaps in large part because the administration had to expend so much energy and effort waging a rear-guard action against congressional critics of the war in Iraq.61 When making their cost-benefit calculations, presidents surely consider these wider political costs of congressional opposition to their military policies. If congressional opposition in the military arena stands to derail other elements of his agenda, all else being equal, the president will be more likely to judge the benefits of military action insufficient to its costs than if Congress stood behind him in the international arena.

#### That takes Obama off-message – it undermines his constant pressure on the GOP

**Milbank, 9/27/13** – Washington Post Opinion Writer (Dana, “Obama should pivot to Dubya’s playbook” Washington Post, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/dana-milbank-obama-should-try-pivoting-to-george-bushs-playbook/2013/09/27/c72469f0-278a-11e3-ad0d-b7c8d2a594b9_story.html>)

If President Obama can stick to his guns, he will win his October standoff with Republicans. That’s an awfully big “if.” This president has been consistently inconsistent, predictably unpredictable and reliably erratic. Consider the events of Thursday morning: Obama gave a rousing speech in suburban Washington, in defense of Obamacare, on the eve of its implementation. “We’re now only five days away from finishing the job,” he told the crowd. But before he had even left the room, his administration let slip that it was delaying by a month the sign-up for the health-care exchanges for small businesses. It wasn’t a huge deal, but it was enough to trample on the message the president had just delivered. Throughout his presidency, Obama has had great difficulty delivering a consistent message. Supporters plead for him to take a position — any position — and stick with it. His shifting policy on confronting Syria was the most prominent of his vacillations, but his allies have seen a similar approach to the Guantanamo Bay prison, counterterrorism and climate change. Even on issues such as gun control and immigration where his views have been consistent, Obama has been inconsistent in promoting his message. Allies are reluctant to take risky stands, because they fear that Obama will change his mind and leave them standing alone. Now come the budget showdowns, which could define the rest of his presidency. Republican leaders are trying to shift the party’s emphasis from the fight over a government shutdown to the fight over the debt-limit increase, where they have more support. A new Bloomberg poll found that Americans, by a 2-to-1 margin, disagree with Obama’s view that Congress should raise the debt limit without any conditions. But Obama has a path to victory. That poll also found that Americans think lawmakers should stop trying to repeal Obamacare. And that was before House Republicans dramatically overplayed their hand by suggesting that they’ll allow the nation to default if Obama doesn’t agree to their laundry list of demands, including suspending Obamacare, repealing banking reforms, building a new oil pipeline, easing environmental regulations, limiting malpractice lawsuits and restricting access to Medicare. To beat the Republicans, Obama might follow the example of a Republican, George W. Bush. Whatever you think of what he did, he knew how to get it done: by simplifying his message and repeating it, ad nauseam, until he got the result he was after. Obama instead tends to give a speech and move along to the next topic. This is why he is forever making “pivots” back to the economy, or to health care. But the way to pressure Congress is to be President One Note. In the debt-limit fight, Obama already has his note: He will not negotiate over the full faith and credit of the United States. That’s as good a theme as any; it matters less what the message is than that he delivers it consistently. The idea, White House officials explained to me, is to avoid getting into a back-and-forth over taxes, spending and entitlement programs. “We’re right on the merits, but I don’t think we want to argue on the merits,” one said. “Our argument is not that our argument is better than theirs; it’s that theirs is stupid.” This is a clean message: Republicans are threatening to tank the economy — through a shutdown or, more likely, through a default on the debt — and Obama isn’t going to negotiate with these hostage-takers. Happily for Obama, Republicans are helping him to make the case by being publicly belligerent. After this week’s 21-hour speech on the Senate floor by Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Tex.), the publicity-seeking Texan and Sen. Mike Lee (R-Utah) objected to a bipartisan request to move a vote from Friday to Thursday to give House Republicans more time to craft legislation avoiding a shutdown. On the Senate floor, Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) accused them of objecting because they had sent out e-mails encouraging their supporters to tune in to the vote on Friday. The Post’s Ed O’Keefe caught Cruz “appearing to snicker” as his colleague spoke — more smug teenager than legislator. Even if his opponents are making things easier for him, Obama still needs to stick to his message. As in Syria, the president has drawn a “red line” by saying he won’t negotiate with those who would put the United States into default. If he retreats, he will embolden his opponents and demoralize his supporters.

#### It consumes his capital, undermines Dem unity and breaches debt ceiling

**Lillis, 9/7/13** (Mike, The Hill, “Fears of wounding Obama weigh heavily on Democrats ahead of vote”

Read more: http://thehill.com/homenews/house/320829-fears-of-wounding-obama-weigh-heavily-on-democrats#ixzz2gWiT9H8u

The prospect of wounding President Obama is weighing heavily on Democratic lawmakers as they decide their votes on Syria. Obama needs all the political capital he can muster heading into bruising battles with the GOP over fiscal spending and the debt ceiling. Democrats want Obama to use his popularity to reverse automatic spending cuts already in effect and pay for new economic stimulus measures through higher taxes on the wealthy and on multinational companies. But if the request for authorization for Syria military strikes is rebuffed, some fear it could limit Obama's power in those high-stakes fights. That has left Democrats with an agonizing decision: vote "no" on Syria and possibly encourage more chemical attacks while weakening their president, or vote "yes" and risk another war in the Middle East. “I’m sure a lot of people are focused on the political ramifications,” a House Democratic aide said. Rep. Jim Moran (D-Va.), a veteran appropriator, said the failure of the Syria resolution would diminish Obama's leverage in the fiscal battles. "It doesn't help him," Moran said Friday by phone. "We need a maximally strong president to get us through this fiscal thicket. These are going to be very difficult votes."

#### Economic collapse

**Davidson, 9/10/13** – co-founder of NPR’s Planet Money (Adam, “Our Debt to Society” New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/magazine/our-debt-to-society.html?pagewanted=all>)

If the debt ceiling isn’t lifted again this fall, some serious financial decisions will have to be made. Perhaps the government can skimp on its foreign aid or furlough all of NASA, but eventually the big-ticket items, like Social Security and Medicare, will have to be cut. At some point, the government won’t be able to pay interest on its bonds and will enter what’s known as sovereign default, the ultimate national financial disaster achieved by countries like Zimbabwe, Ecuador and Argentina (and now Greece). In the case of the United States, though, it won’t be an isolated national crisis. If the American government can’t stand behind the dollar, the world’s benchmark currency, then the global financial system will very likely enter a new era in which there is much less trade and much less economic growth. It would be, by most accounts, the largest self-imposed financial disaster in history. Nearly everyone involved predicts that someone will blink before this disaster occurs. Yet a small number of House Republicans (one political analyst told me it’s no more than 20) appear willing to see what happens if the debt ceiling isn’t raised — at least for a bit. This could be used as leverage to force Democrats to drastically cut government spending and eliminate President Obama’s signature health-care-reform plan. In fact, Representative Tom Price, a Georgia Republican, told me that the whole problem could be avoided if the president agreed to drastically cut spending and lower taxes. Still, it is hard to put this act of game theory into historic context. Plenty of countries — and some cities, like Detroit — have defaulted on their financial obligations, but only because their governments ran out of money to pay their bills. No wealthy country has ever voluntarily decided — in the middle of an economic recovery, no less — to default. And there’s certainly no record of that happening to the country that controls the global reserve currency. Like many, I assumed a self-imposed U.S. debt crisis might unfold like most involuntary ones. If the debt ceiling isn’t raised by X-Day, I figured, the world’s investors would begin to see America as an unstable investment and rush to sell their Treasury bonds. The U.S. government, desperate to hold on to investment, would then raise interest rates far higher, hurtling up rates on credit cards, student loans, mortgages and corporate borrowing — which would effectively put a clamp on all trade and spending. The U.S. economy would collapse far worse than anything we’ve seen in the past several years.

#### Nuclear war

**Friedberg and Schoenfeld 8**

[Aaron, Prof. Politics. And IR @ Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School and Visiting Scholar @ Witherspoon Institute, and Gabriel, Senior Editor of Commentary and Wall Street Journal, “The Dangers of a Diminished America”, 10-28, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122455074012352571.html>]

Then there are the dolorous consequences of a potential collapse of the world's financial architecture. For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system. The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be possible in the future? Meanwhile, traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and Islamic terrorist affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos. Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise also give cause for concern. If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum. The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk. In such a scenario there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade and finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become ever more reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability. The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors even harder than they will rock us. The dramatic free fall of the Russian stock market has demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices, now driven down by the global slowdown. China is perhaps even more fragile, its economic growth depending heavily on foreign investment and access to foreign markets. Both will now be constricted, inflicting economic pain and perhaps even sparking unrest in a country where political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders of these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures.

### 1nc uniqueness cp

#### Counterplan: The United States Congress should pass a statute committing the United States to a declaratory no first use policy in outer space. The United States Federal Government should fully fund any necessary military capabilities in outer space.

#### The counterplan creates uniqueness for spacemil good and checks perception of aggression.

### 1nc executive cp

#### COUNTERPLAN: The President of the United States should issue an Executive Order committing the executive branch to Solicitor General representation and advance consultation with the Office of Legal Counsel over decisions regarding the introduction of weapons into outer space. The Department of Justice officials involved should counsel against introducing weapons into space and call for adherence to the Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects. The Executive Order should also require written publication of Office of Legal Counsel opinions and declare that the Executive Branch will consent to be bound by those treaties.

#### Executive pre-commitment to DOJ advice solves the aff

**Pillard 2005** – JD from Harvard, Faculty Director of Supreme Court Institute at Georgetown University Law Center, former Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the DOJ (February, Cornelia T., Michigan Law Review, 103.4, “The Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands”, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 676-758, http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/189/)

V. ENABLING EXECUTIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM

The courts indisputably do not and cannot fully assure our enjoyment of our constitutional rights, and it is equally clear that the federal executive has an independent constitutional duty to fulfill the Constitution's promise. Executive constitutionalism seems ripe with promise. Yet, it is striking how limited and court-centered the executive's normative and institutional approaches to constitutional questions remain.

One conceivable way to avoid the pitfalls of court-centric executive lawyering on one hand and constitutional decisions warped by political expedience on the other would be to make the Solicitor General and Office of Legal Counsel - or perhaps the entire Department of Justice - as structurally independent as an independent counsel or independent agency.207 Making the SG and OLC independent in order to insulate them from politics presumably would alleviate the "majoritarian difficulty" resulting from their service to elected clients. Promoting fuller independence in that sense does not, however, appear to be clearly normatively attractive, constitutionally permissible, nor particularly feasible. In all the criticism of our current constitutionalism, there is little call for an SG or OLC that would act, in effect, as a fully insulated and jurisprudentially autonomous constitutional court within the executive branch, operating with even less transparency and accountability than the Supreme Court. Moreover, as a practical matter it would be complex and problematic to increase the independence of the SG and OLC. The federal government faces Article II obstacles to formally insulating executive lawyers from politics and institutional pressures, and the president and his administration likely would be less amenable to guidance from such unaccountable lawyers.208

The challenge, rather, is to draw forth from the executive a constitutional consciousness and practice that helps the government actively to seek to fulfill the commitments of the Constitution and its Bill of Rights, interpreted by the executive as guiding principles for government. Adjustments to executive branch constitutional process and culture should be favored if they encourage the executive to use its experience and capacities to fulfill its distinctive role in effectuating constitutional guarantees. There is transformative potential in measures that break ingrained executive branch habits of looking to the Constitution only as it is mediated through the courts, and of reflexively seeking, where there is no clear doctrinal answer, to minimize constitutional constraint. It is difficult fully to imagine what kinds of changes would best prompt executive lawyers and officials to pick up constitutional analysis where the courts leave off, and to rely on the Constitution as an affirmative, guiding mandate for government action; what follows are not worked-out proposals, but are meant to be merely suggestive.

A. Correcting the Bias Against Constitutional Constraint

As we have seen, the SG's and OLC's default interpretive approach to individual rights and other forms of constitutional constraints on government is to follow what clear judicial precedents there are and, where precedents are not squarely to the contrary, to favor interpretations that minimize constitutional rights or other constitutional obligations on federal actors. Those court-centered and narrowly self-serving executive traditions produce a systematic skew against individual rights.

1. Encourage Express Presidential Articulation of Commitment to Constitutional Rights

To the extent that a president articulates his own rights-protective constitutional vision with any specificity, he ameliorates the tension his constitutional lawyers otherwise face between advancing individual rights and serving their boss's presumed interest in maximum governing flexibility. Case or controversy requirements and restrictions against courts issuing advisory opinions do not, of course, apply to the executive's internal constitutional decisionmaking, and presidents can better serve individual rights to the extent that they expressly stake out their constitutional commitments in general and in advance of any concrete controversy."° When the president takes a stand for advancing abortion rights, property rights, disability rights, "charitable choice," a right to bear arms, or full remediation of race and sex discrimination, he signals to his lawyers that they should, in those areas, set aside their default bias in favor of preserving executive prerogative, even if it requires extra executive effort or restraint to do so.

If presented in a concrete setting with a choice between interpreting and applying the Constitution in fully rights-protective ways or sparing themselves the effort where Supreme Court precedent can be read not to require it, government officials typically default to the latter course without considering whether they might thereby be giving short shrift to a constitutional duty. A president's stated commitment to protection of particular rights, however, flips the default position with respect to those rights, acting as a spur to executive-branch lawyers and other personnel to work to give effect to constitutional rights even where, for a range of institutional reasons, the courts would not. A president is thus uniquely situated to facilitate full executive-branch constitutional compliance by precommitting himself to a rights-protective constitutional vision, and thereby making clear that respect for constitutional rights is part of the executive's interest, not counter to it.

#### Aff spills over to destabilize all key powers

**Heder, 10 –** JD, Brigham Young (Adam, “THE POWER TO END WAR: THE EXTENT AND LIMITS OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER” 41 St. Mary's L. J. 445, lexis)

This constitutional silence invokes Justice Rehnquist's oft-quoted language from the landmark "political question" case, Goldwater v. Carter. n121 In Goldwater, a group of senators challenged President Carter's termination, without Senate approval, of the United States' Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan. n122 A plurality of the Court held, n123 in an opinion authored by Justice Rehnquist, that this was a nonjusticiable political question. n124 He wrote: "In light of the absence of any constitutional provision governing the termination of a treaty, ... the instant case in my view also "must surely be controlled by political standards.'" n125 Notably, Justice Rehnquist relied on the fact that there was no constitutional provision on point. Likewise, there is no constitutional provision on whether Congress has the legislative power to limit, end, or otherwise redefine the scope of a war. Though Justice Powell argues in Goldwater that the Treaty Clause and Article VI of the Constitution "add support to the view that the text of the Constitution does not unquestionably commit the power to terminate treaties to the President alone," n126 the [\*475] same cannot be said about Congress's legislative authority to terminate or limit a war in a way that goes beyond its explicitly enumerated powers. There are no such similar provisions that would suggest Congress may decline to exercise its appropriation power but nonetheless legally order the President to cease all military operations. Thus, the case for deference to the political branches on this issue is even greater than it was in the Goldwater context.

Finally, the Constitution does not imply any additional powers for Congress to end, limit, or redefine a war. The textual and historical evidence suggests the Framers purposefully declined to grant Congress such powers. And as this Article argues, granting Congress this power would be inconsistent with the general war-powers structure of the Constitution. Such a reading of the Constitution would unnecessarily empower Congress and tilt the scales heavily in its favor. Moreover, it would strip the President of his Commander in Chief authority to direct the movement of troops at a time when the Executive's expertise is needed. n127 And fears that the President will grow too powerful are unfounded, given the reasons noted above. n128 In short, the Constitution does not impliedly afford Congress any authority to prematurely terminate a war above what it explicitly grants. n129

[\*476] Declaring these issues nonjusticiable political questions would be the most practical means of balancing the textual and historical demands, the structural demands, and the practical demands that complex modern warfare brings. Adjudicating these matters would only lead the courts to engage in impermissible line drawing - lines that would both confuse the issue and add layers to the text of the Constitution in an area where the Framers them-selves declined to give such guidance.

#### That's key to Presidential effectiveness—keeping authority is key—the impact is extinction

**Baker, 7 -** Chief Judge to the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, former Special Assistant to the President and Legal Advisor to the National Security Council (James, IN THE COMMON DEFENSE: NATIONAL SECURITY LAW FOR PERILOUS TIMES, p. 307-309)

This book has considered national security law and process in the context of four security threats. First is the threat of attack by nonstate and statesponsored or supported actors using terrorist means. Overseas, this threat is realized on a daily basis. Within the United States the threat is continuous, but intermittent. The threat of high-explosive attack, like car and truck bombs, targeted suicide bombings, or the sabotage of aircraft, is most likely to materialize. The threat of catastrophic attack with nuclear weapons has the greatest potential impact on our way of life and in terms of human cost. It is in relation to this threat in particular that we need to evaluate and test national security law and process, both because of the potential consequence and because of the focus the enemy has placed on this means of attack. Second, U.S. constitutional values may ebb and wane in an endless conflict against state and nonstate actors engaged in acts of terrorism or posing the threat of terrorism. In light of the interminable nature of this threat, assertions of presidential authority made in extremis may become embedded in U.S. practice and law without a corresponding application of checks and balances. Left outside the reach of effective and independent mechanisms of appraisal, broad assertions of executive authority may in time diminish both the principles of law that define American life as well as the physical security at which they are directed. Third, sincere policy differences, as well as those that are politically inspired, regarding the nature of the terrorist threat and the corresponding measure of response may result in a zero-sum compromise; that is, a diminution of security or a diminution of law, rather than contextual formulas that advance both at once. If the executive needs broad and rapid authority to engage in intelligence collection – as it does – the better course is not to limit the authority, for fear of misuse, but to increase the opportunities for meaningful internal and external appraisal. Such appraisal will deter misuse, but as importantly, encourage effective use. In this enduring conflict we may exhaust our resources or our principles in a manner that leaves us unwilling or unable to effectively address this century’s other certain crises, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to unreliable state actors, the advent of pandemic disease, and environmental degradation and change. This book has focused on the threat of terrorist attack because this is the threat that today drives the legal debate about the president’s constitutional authority. More generally, it drives the purpose and meaning of national security law. It will continue to do so. It is also the threat with the greatest potential to transform U.S. national security, in both a physical and a values sense. The importance of addressing other issues, such as conflict in the Middle East, totalitarian regimes, or pandemic disease, must not be overlooked. Each bears the potential to spiral beyond control resulting in catastrophe at home and overseas. Each of these issues warrants full consideration of the national security instruments and processes described in this book. In each context, law and national security lawyers may contribute to national security in multiple ways. First, the law provides an array of positive or substantive instruments the president may wield to provide for security. Second, the law provides procedural mechanisms offering opportunities to consider, validate, appraise, and improve policy, as well as ensure its lawful execution. These mechanisms include the horizontal separation of constitutional powers at the federal level, and the vertical separation of powers between the federal government and state government. They are found as well in statute and in internal executive directive. The most effective means of appraisal are often found through informal practice. Informal contact allows participants to speak with a freedom not permitted or not often found when bearing the institutional mantle of an office or branch of government. Consider the difference in reaction between the counsel that sits down with the policymaker for a discussion and the counsel who requests the policymaker to put down in a memorandum everything that occurred. With informal practice the role of personality and friendship can serve to facilitate information exchange and the frank exchange of views. Third, in the international context, law provides mechanisms to achieve U.S. national security objectives. This is evident in the context of maritime security, where U.S. law is pegged to an international framework, and effective security requires international as well as domestic participation. In the area of intelligence integration, bilateral and multilateral agreements, like the PSI and bilateral aviation agreements, provide essential mechanisms for identifying intelligence, sharing intelligence, and acting on intelligence. Fourth, the law reflects and projects American values of democracy and liberty. Values are silent force multipliers as well as positive national security tools. As Lawrence Wright, the author of The Looming Tower, and others argue, jihadists like Osama Bin Laden offer no programs or policies for governance, no alternative to Western democracy. They offer only the opportunity for revenge. Rule of law is the West’s alternative to jihadist terrorism. Law, and respect for law, offers the structure of democracy, the opportunity for individual fulfillment regardless of sex, race, or creed, and a process for the impartial administration of justice. Sustained commitment to the rule of law in practice and perception will serve as a positive national security tool in curtailing recruitment of the next wave and generation of jihadists. But law, like homeland security, is an incremental endeavor. It is dependent on sustained action, not rhetoric, and perceptions can be swept aside in a few ill-chosen moments. Law, like this conflict, requires sustained sacrifice and sustained support. Thus, divisive legal arguments should be eschewed, unless they are essential to security and there are no alternative means to accomplish the same necessary security end.

### Weaponization

#### Weaponization inevitable globally

Bridge 12-10 – Robert Bridge, writer for RT, December 10th, 2012, "Space militarization: Coming to a galaxy near you" rt.com/politics/space-militarization-us-russia-699/print/

The United States is moving toward the militarization of space and this will change the face of war in the near future, an academician with the Russian Academy of Engineering Sciences has warned.¶ Judging by recent developments, **the idea of** formidable space weapons **prowling the last frontier is no longer limited to the realm of science fiction**.¶ The US has published tactical guidelines over the past three years on the use of force in outer space, while systems that may be used as orbiting weapons are undergoing rigorous test flights, said Yuri Zaitsev, Academic Advisor with the Russian Academy of Engineering Sciences.¶ In a security document released in October, the US Department of Defense (DoD) said that its space-related activities are designed to “maintain and enhance the national security advantages afforded by the use of outer space.”¶ Among its numerous stated objectives, the DoD report said it is US policy to “proactively seek opportunities to cooperate with allies and selected international partners in developing space architectures and in **designing, acquiring, and** operat**ing military space systems**.”¶ Zaitsev said that America’s push to militarize space may include the use of both nuclear and conventional weapons, which could have dangerous and dramatic implications for future warfare.¶ "**The** U**nited** S**tates, as well as some other leading powers, is attempting to gain supremacy** in [space],” Zaitsev explained. “This will enable their aerospace operations at the very beginning of a war to initiate strikes on strategic facilities throughout the [targeted] country.”¶ **During this year’s UN General Assembly, the US conspicuously refused to support a resolution to halt the militarization of space.**¶ In a vote on a resolution titled ‘Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space,’ 169 member-states, including the Russian Federation, voted in favor of the draft resolution stating, “[The] exploration and use of space…shall be for peaceful purposes…carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development.”¶ Only **the United States and Israel abstained from voting on the document**, rendering it effectively toothless.¶ Washington’s refusal to cede control of space likely stems from its increasing reliance on space-based systems: An estimated 90 percent of the US Military reportedly uses or depends on space-based systems.¶ The Russian academic referred the shock over China’s successful targeted destruction of an old orbiting weather satellite in 2007.¶ "The Americans were frightened by the Chinese tests of anti-satellite weapons,” Zaitsev said. “It is quite possible that the US may soon initiate negotiations on anti-satellite systems."¶ Zaitsev also said that the United States and its allies may attempt to regulate space activity to its advantage.¶ "The United States and the European Union are working out a draft code of conduct in outer space," he said. "This document may regulate space activity in the interests of the United States and its allies and may discriminate [against] other states, including Russia.”¶ “**Russia and China are unlikely to sign this document, which means** military confrontation in outer space will intensify**,”** Zaitsev warned.

#### No arms race

Lopez 12 – Laura Delgado Lopez, expert at the Institute for Global Environmental Studies, Arlington, Virginia, master's degree in international science and technology from George Washington University, 2009 Truman Scholar and a Northrop Grumman Fellow at GWU's Space Policy Institute, bachelor's in political science, March 6th, 2012, "Predicting an Arms Race in Space: Problematic Assumptions for Space Arms Control" [www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14777622.2012.647391](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14777622.2012.647391)

**Referring to the history of the nuclear arms race, as space doves often do, is misleading**. The Soviet Union and the United States did race to build up their nuclear arsenals, but that was because they could, both technologically and economically. Interestingly, while both lawful 43 and potentially illegal transfers of nuclear technology have taken place, the list of countries with known or suspected nuclear technology is still relatively small. 44 Moreover, it would be open to debate whether those countries that possess the knowledge of how to build nuclear weapons are currently immersed in a race to build up their arsenals in response to that of other countries. It is probable that limited proliferation may be a sign of the success of an efficient arms control regime, but it is nevertheless evident that adequate resources are a necessary prerequisite for an arms race**.**¶ **In the case of** space weapons**, the** conditions are even harsher**.** The incredible cost not only to develop and launch these systems, but to maintain them has been a major impediment to their development. Brilliant Pebbles, arguably the most cost-effective U.S. space-based missile defense program, which would also amount to an ASAT weapon, still amounted to a price tag of between $11 and $16 billion, expended over a 20-year period. 45 Would a country such as Pakistan, which ranks twenty-eighth in the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency’s World Factbook Gross Domestic Product comparison, be able to raise the kind of resources necessary for racing other countries in space? It is more probable that countries such as China and Russia would be able to compete if they so chose, 46 but **the idea of a worldwide space arms race can still not be sustained**. And therein lies the biggest issue that space doves fail to address in their arguments about an inevitable space race: resources. The perception of a threat and the political will to meet it are not enough to warrant the kind of worldwide conditions they are so quick to describe.¶ When space doves bring up the question of resources, they point to ‘‘asymmetric challenges from those who could not afford to be participants in the race itself.’’ 47 This situation might encourage, for instance, nuclear proliferation or the build-up of chemical or biological weapons. In fact, Nancy Gallagher argues that the United States rightly denies the existence of an arms race in space ‘‘only in the narrow sense that there is not, and probably will not be, a Cold War style ‘space arms race,’ i.e., an action-reaction dynamic between peer competitors,’’ but that doing so ignores the danger of ‘‘asymmetric reactions.’’ 48¶ Space doves thus seem to acknowledge that measures to regain or sustain stability in the international system do not always manifest themselves in the same way because power can take many forms. In proposing his concept of ‘‘soft power’’ as a legitimate tool for the United States to exert international influence, Joseph Nye explained that in a world of increased political complexity, the traditional ways to employ force are too costly, and thus ‘‘other instruments such as communications. . . and manipulation of interdependence have become more important.’’ 49¶ But this contention clearly **invalidates the inevitability of an arms race in space**. If countries do not respond in kind, then there is no race to speak of, and the inevitability argument breaks down. Gallagher’s statement thus seems contradictory: if a space race is not an ‘‘action-reaction dynamic between peer-competitors,’’ then what do space doves mean with an arms race? Why must it be avoided?¶ **This issue also raises a more** important problem: causality. **Unless other countries explicitly state that their asymmetric build-up is a direct response to U.S. deployment of space weapons, then** this link cannot be established**.** Even considering the timing sequence of deployment and the projected build-up—which would be difficult considering it takes years to develop, launch, and deploy space systems—**it would be simplistic to assume that other motivators for international behavior are not at work.**

#### No space war – deterrence checks

Klein 12 – CDR John J. Klein, USN (BS, Georgia Institute of Technology; MS, Naval Postgraduate School; MA, Naval War College), is assistant air officer (“miniboss”) aboard the USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74). He has served as maintenance officer, Sea Control Squadron 24 (VS‑24); test and evaluation project officer, Naval Force Aircraft Test Squadron (VX-20); naval flight officer under instruction, US Naval Test Pilot School; tactical development and evaluation officer (VS-24); and maintenance branch officer, Sea Control Squadron 28 (VS‑28). Commander Klein is the author of several journal articles and the book Space Warfare: Strategy, Principles and Policy (London: Routledge, 2006). March 6th, 2012, Astropolitics: The International Journal of Space Politics & Policy, "The Influence of Technology on Space Strategy," [www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14777622.2012.651700](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14777622.2012.651700)

Fourth, advanced space-based technology and weapons systems can have a stabilizing effect on the international community. As was the case with nuclear weapons during the Cold War, if a weapons system poses a large enough threat to two or more adversaries, its potential use can cause state leaders to avoid direct confrontation. This is not to suggest that future space-based weapons will eliminate tensions among competing states, nations, or groups, but **weapons can provide a stabilizing influence at times.**

#### Arms control fails—verifiability, dual purpose, and latency

**O’Hanlon 11** (Michael, Senior Fellow @ Brookings, Looks like Evan McCarty, “Chapter 21: Balancing U.S. Security Interests in Space,” Part of “Toward a Theory of Spacepower,” Edited by Charles Lutes and Peter Hays, National Defense University Press, <http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/spacepower/spacepower.pdf>, EMM)

One type of arms control accord on activities in space would be quite comprehensive, calling for no testing, production, or deployment of ASATs of any kind, based in space or on the ground, at any time; no Earth-attack weapons stationed in space, ever; and formal, permanent treaties codifying these prohibitions. These provisions are in line with those in proposals made by the Chinese and Russian delegations to the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. They also are supported by some traditional arms control proponents who argue that space should be a sanctuary from weaponization and that the Outer Space Treaty already strongly suggests as much.14

These provisions suffer from three main flaws. To begin, it is difficult to be sure that other countries' satellite payloads are not ASATs. This is especially true in regard to microsatellites, which are hard to track. Some have proposed inspections of all payloads going into orbit, but this would not prevent a "breakout," in which a country on the verge of war would simply refuse to continue to abide by the provisions. Since microsats can be tested for maneuverability without making them look like ASATs and are being so tested, it will be difficult to preclude this scenario. A similar problem arises with the idea of banning specific types of experimentation, such as outdoor experiments or flight testing.15 A laser can be tested for beam strength and pointing accuracy as a ballistic missile defense device without being identified as an ASAT. A microsat can be tested for maneuverability as a scientific probe, even if its real purpose is different, since maneuvering microsats capable of colliding with other satellites may have no visible features clearly revealing their intended purpose. Bans on outdoor testing of declared ASAT devices would do little to impede their development.

Second, more broadly, it is not possible to prevent certain types of weapons designed for ballistic missile defense from being used as ASATs. This is in essence a problem of verification. However, the issue is less of verification per se than of knowing the intent of the country building a given system—and ensuring that its intent never changes. The latter goals are unrealistic. Some systems designed for missile defense have inherent ASAT capabilities and will retain them, due to the laws of physics, regardless of what arms control prohibitions are developed, and countries possessing these systems will recognize their latent capabilities.16 For example, the American midcourse missile defense system and the airborne laser would both have inherent capabilities against low Earth orbit (LEO) satellites, if given good information on a satellite's location—easy to obtain—and perhaps some software modifications. The United States could declare for the time being that it will not link these missile defense systems to satellite networks or give them the necessary communications and software capabilities to accept such data. But such restraints, while currently worthwhile as informal, nonbinding measures, are difficult to verify and easy to reverse. Thus, no robust, long-term formal treaty regime should be based on them. Indeed, the problem goes beyond missile defense systems. Even the space shuttle, with its ability to maneuver and approach satellites in low Earth orbit, has inherent ASAT potential. So do any country's nuclear weapons deployed atop ballistic missiles. Explicit testing in ASAT modes can be prohibited, but any prohibition could have limited meaning.

#### We’re winning now—the aff wrecks deterrence

**Kitfield 10**-Senior Correspondent @ The National Journal, writer for Air Force Magazine, B.A. Journalism, University of Georgia, distinguished writer on defense, national security, and foreign policy, author of two books on national security, [James, Air Force Magazine, “Crowded Congested Space” August 2010, <http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2010/August%202010/0810space.aspx>]

In the “commons” above Earth, US military forces must deal with junk and potential predators. Last year, an Iridium communications satellite unexpectedly went dead. US military space analysts soon discovered it had smashed into a defunct Russian Cosmos satellite, a collision that destroyed both spacecraft and created a large and dangerous debris field in space. That incident followed another worrisome event. In January 2007, China successfully tested an anti-satellite missile against one of its own defunct satellites. That attack, a direct hit, created 150,000 pieces of space clutter—not all of it even visible to US space operators. Both events reveal that the global commons of space—which the United States has long dominated and has increasingly used as leverage to achieve a decisive military edge—is increasingly crowded and contested. There have been years of warnings that US space dominance is in peril. It is now safe to assume that, in a future war, the military will not have unhindered access to the space-based capabilities that create numerous US combat advantages. Potential adversaries aren’t just aware of how heavily the US relies on space. They already have the means to compete and to challenge US operations there. Today, many commanders view space dominance as vital to warfare in the Information Age. "Certainly in the air world, in the ISR [intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance] world, and most especially in the space world, [there is] competition out there, [and the] competition is getting better," said Lt. Gen. Larry D. James, commander of 14th Air Force at Vandenberg AFB, Calif. "Multiple nation-states now have space launch capability, have ISR capability, [and] have intelligence capability from space, so we’ve got to continue to raise our game to make sure we are still the best." As a recent report by the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) noted, it is increasingly clear that a military able to effectively use space has tremendous advantages through rapid globe-spanning communications, broad and sophisticated surveillance and intelligence-gathering capability, and accurate force positioning, operations timing, and precision targeting abilities. "Put in military terms, the space commons offers distinct and significant advantages in command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C3ISR), maneuverability, and firepower," noted report author Eric Sterner. "As the United States has been the world’s leading innovator in the use of space for military purposes, this development is largely a story of American innovation." Given the game-changing advantages that the United States reaps from its dominance of space, it was inevitable that other countries would also seek to exploit space for their own uses, both military and commercial. Today, nine countries, plus the European Space Agency member states, have the ability to independently place satellites into orbit, and virtually any country or nonstate actor can access satellite technology by buying time on commercial satellites. As the US military’s dependence on space systems has grown exponentially in recent years, however, so has a growing sense of unease among military commanders concerned about the vulnerability of those assets. In 2001, the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization released a report that predicted that future warfare in space was a "virtual certainty," and it proposed that the United States [should] begin to develop the means both to deter and defend against attacks on its space assets, and to mount offensive operations to deny the use of space to potential adversaries. To do otherwise, the commission warned, would invite a "space Pearl Harbor." US officials confirmed in 2006 that China had successfully "painted" a US satellite with a laser. China’s January 2007 test of the direct-ascent, anti-satellite SC-19 missile greatly heightened those concerns. And a recent Pentagon report on China’s military modernization revealed that China is developing other anti-satellite systems, to include ground-based lasers designed to blind sensitive satellite optics. China is also reportedly developing microsatellites crafted to act as "space mines," which could loiter in space until given the signal to destroy other satellites. At present, US officials say they are uncertain whether China has already launched such "parasite" satellites. "In today’s world, ... there are a lot of folks launching a lot of satellites, some of them very small," and we have a lot of work to do in terms of knowing "what their mission is, ... what the intent of the owner is," and whether they represent a threat, said James. That really gets into the intelligence world more than the tracking world, but, "frankly, we have a long way to go" in achieving that space situational awareness. According to the CNAS report, China has identified American dependence on space as an asymmetric vulnerability to exploit. "China is developing robust capabilities to operate in space and deny its adversaries the use of space during a time of crisis or conflict," the report concluded.

#### Turns case—creates entry barriers to weaponizing

Dolman 10 (Everett, PhD and Professor of Comparative Military Studies @ US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies and Recipient of Central Intelligence’s Outstanding Intelligence Analyst Award, “The Case for Weapons in Space: A Geopolitical Assessment,” September, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf\_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per\_id=1532576, EMM)

This is the context in which the world now exists. The relatively stable global hegemony of US dominance since 1945, punctuated by limited wars and shifting balances of opposition, has relied on technology-dominant global power projection. Today, that technology is wholly integrated and inextricable from space support, and no state relies more on space power for its economic and security well-being than the US. Any effort to deny space capabilities would be a direct challenge to its hegemonic power, and the United States must confront the usurper or abdicate its leadership position. To be sure, China’s increasing space emphasis and its cultural antipathy to military transparency suggests that a serious attempt at seizing control of space is in the works. A lingering fear is the sudden introduction of an unknown capability (call it Technology X) that would allow a hostile state to place multiple weapons into orbit quickly and cheaply. The advantages gained from controlling the high ground of space would accrue to it as surely as to any other state, and the concomitant loss of military power from the denial of space to America’s already-dependent military forces could cause the immediate demise of the extant international system. The longer the United States dithers on its military responsibilities, the more likely a potential opponent could seize low-earth orbit before America is able to respond. And in such circumstances, the US certainly would respond. Conversely, if America were to weaponize space, it is not at all sure that any other state or group of states would find it rational to counter in kind. The entry cost to provide the necessary infrastructure is still too high—hundreds of billions of dollars, at minimum. The years of investment needed to achieve a comparable counter-force capability—essentially from scratch—would provide more than ample time for the United States to entrench itself in space and readily counter preliminary efforts to displace it. The tremendous effort in time and resources would be worse than wasted. Most states, if not all, would opt not to counter US deployments directly. They might oppose American interests with asymmetric balancing, depending on how aggressively it uses its new power, but the likelihood of a hemorrhaging arms race in space should the United States deploy weapons first—at least for the next few years—is remote. This reasoning does not dispute the fact that US deployment of weapons in outer space would represent the addition of a potent new military capacity, one that would assist in extending the current period of American hegemony well into the future. Clearly this would be intimidating, and America must expect severe condemnation and increased competition in peripheral areas. But such an outcome is less threatening than another, particularly non-liberal authoritarian state doing so, as the necessity of a response in kind is compelling. Placement of weapons in space by the United States would be perceived correctly as an attempt at continuing American hegemony. Although there is obvious opposition to the current international balance of power, the majority of states seem to regard it as at least tolerable. A continuation of the status quo is thus minimally acceptable, even to states working toward its demise. As long as the United States does not employ its power arbitrarily, the situation would be bearable initially and grudgingly accepted over time. Mirror-imaging does not apply here. An attempt by China to dominate space would be part of an effort to break the land-sea-air dominance of the United States in preparation for a new international order. Such an action would challenge the status quo, rather than seek to perpetuate it. This would be disconcerting to nations that accept, no matter how grudgingly, the current international order—including the venerable institutions of trade, finance, and law that operate within it—and intolerable to the United States. As leader of the current system, the United States could do no less than engage in a perhaps ruinous space arms race, save graciously decide to step aside and accept a diminished world status. Seizing the initiative and securing low-Earth orbit now, while the United States is dominant in space infrastructure, would do much to stabilize the international system and prevent an arms race in space. The enhanced ability to deny any attempt by another nation to place military assets in space and to readily engage and destroy terrestrial anti-satellite capacity would make the possibility of large-scale space war or military space races less likely, not more. Why would a state expend the effort to compete in space with a superpower that has the extraordinary advantage of holding securely the highest ground at the top of the gravity well? So long as the controlling state demonstrates a capacity and a will to use force to defend its position, in effect expending a small amount of violence as needed to prevent a greater conflagration in the future, the likelihood of a future war in space is remote.

#### Multilat fails—global governance

**Langenhove, 11** – Luk Van, Director of the Comparative Regional Integration Studies Institute of the United Nations University (“Multilateralism 2.0: The transformation of international relations,” UN University, 5/31/11, http://unu.edu/publications/articles/multilateralism-2-0-the-transformation-of-international-relations.html)**Red**

Two major developments are currently transforming the multilateral system. The first is the trend towards multi-polarity as expressed by the rising number of states that act as key players. There have been times when only a few or even one player dominated the geopolitical game. But today it seems that several states are becoming dominant players as global or regional actors. The (voting) behavior of the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) in the UN and their presence in the G20 illustrates this trend. The second development, meanwhile, is that new types of actors are changing the nature of the playing multilateral field. Regions with statehood properties are increasingly present in the area of international relations. Since 1974, the European Union (EU) for instance has been an observer in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). But on 3 May 2011, UNGA upgraded the EU’s status by giving it speaking rights. And that same resolution opens the door for other regional organizations to request the same speaking rights. Undoubtedly, this is what is what will happen in the near future. But as stated by some UN members in discussions on this resolution, this could unbalance the ‘one state, one vote’ rule within the UN. On the other hand, this opening towards regional organizations brings with it new opportunities. Together these two developments illustrate that multilateralism is no longer only a play between states: various regions as well as other actors are present and are profoundly changing the multilateral game. **But thinking about multilateralism is still very much based upon the centrality of states**: they are regarded as the constitutive elements of the multilateral system and it is their interrelations that determine the form and content of multilateralism. This implies that international politics is regarded as a closed system in at least two ways: firstly, it spans the whole world; and, secondly, there are huge barriers to enter the system. Many authors have pointed to all kinds of dys-functions such as the complexity of the UN system with its decentralized and overlapping array of councils and agencies, or to the divides between developed and developing countries. The emergence of truly global problems such as climate change, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and many others have indeed **led to an increasing paradox** of governance. As Thakur and Van Langenhove put it in Global Governance (2006, 12:3) “[t]he policy authority for tackling global problems still belong to the states, while the sources of the problems and potential solutions are situated at transnational, regional or global level”. As such the building blocks of multilateralism, the states, seem to be **less and less capable of dealing with the challenges** of globalization. But because the multilateral world order is so dependent on the input of states, **multilateralism itself is not functioning well.** From an open to a closed system One way to capture the above-mentioned developments is to use the metaphor of ‘multilateralism 2.0’ in order to stress how the playing field and the players in multilateralism are changing. The essence of the Web 2.0 metaphor is that it stresses the emergence of network thinking and practices in international relations, as well as the transformation of multilateralism from a closed to an open system. In multilateralism 1.0 the principle actors in the inter-state space of international relations are states. National governments are the ‘star players’. Intergovernmental organizations are only dependent agents whose degrees of freedom only go as far as the states allow them to go. The primacy of sovereignty is the ultimate principle of international relations. In contrast, in multilateralism 2.0, there are players other than sovereign states that play a role and some of these players challenge the notion of sovereignty. Regions are one such type of actor. Conceived by states, other players can have statehood properties and as such aim to be actors in the multilateral system. Regional organizations especially are willing and able to play such a role. But sub-national regions as well increasingly have multilateral ambitions as demonstrated by their efforts towards para-diplomacy. As a result ‘international relations’ is becoming much more than just inter-state relations. Regions are claiming their place as well. This has major consequences for how international relations develop and become institutionalized, as well as for how international relations ought to be studied. What was once an exclusive playing ground for states has now become a space that states have to share with others. It is a fascinating phenomenon: both supra- and sub-national governance entities are largely built by states and can therefore be regarded as ‘dependent agencies’ of those states. However, once created, these entities start to have a life of their own and are not always totally controllable by their founding fathers. These new sub- and supra-entities are knocking on the door of the multilateral system because the have a tendency to behave ‘as if’ they were states. This actorness gives them, at least in principle, the possibility to position themselves against other actors, including their founding fathers! All of this has weakened the Westphalian relation between state and sovereignty. ‘One state, one vote’ Organizing multilateralism in a state-centric would only be possible if all states are treated as equal. This means that irrespective of the differences in territorial size, population size, military power or economic strength, all states have the same legal personality. Or in other words, the Westphalian principle of sovereign equality means working with the principle of ‘one state, one vote’, although it is universally acknowledged that this principle does not correspond to the reality. In multilateralism 2.0 this could be balanced through a more flexible system that compares actors in terms of certain dimensions (such as economic power) regardless of the type of actors they are. In other words, one can for instance compare big states with regions or small states with sub-national regions. This allows not only a more flexible form of multilateralism. It could perhaps also lead to a more just system with a more equal balance of power and representation. Within the present multilateral system, the UN occupies a major position. But, in order to adapt to the emerging ‘mode 2.0’ of multilateralism, it needs to open up to regions. This is a problem, as the UN is a global organization with sovereign states as members. Indeed, the way the UN is organized, only sovereign states, the star players, can be full members (see Article four of the UN Charter). Even though the EU was granted speaking rights, it was not granted voting rights. Chapter VIII of the Charter also mentions the possibility of cooperation with regional organizations and right from its conception there have been attempts to go beyond a state-centric approach. However, for many years now, the UN has struggled with the question of what place supra-national regional organizations should and could take in achieving UN goals. On one end of the spectrum is the position that regionalism blocks the necessary global and universal approach needed to solve the problems of today. At the other end there is the position that regionalism can serve the overall goals of the UN. Obviously, the question is not only a philosophical one. Rather, it is also about power of institutions. Are regional organizations weakening the UN or can they be considered as allies of the UN in dealing with supra-national problems? Further recognition required The key issue in relation to any institutional reform aimed at reinforcing multilateralism is how to create a balance of power among UN members and a balance of responsibilities and representation for the people of our planet. **Such a complex set of balances cannot be found if reform propositions continue to be based upon states as the sole building blocks of multilateralism. A radical rethinking is needed**, which recognizes that, next to states, world regions based upon integration processes between states have to play a role in establishing an effective multilateralism. Today’s reality is that, next to states, world regions are becoming increasingly important tools of global governance. There needs to be, however, a lot of creative and innovative thinking based upon careful analysis of the regional dimensions of ongoing conflicts and of existing cooperation between the UN and regional organizations. The upgrading of the EU’s status in the UN is an important step forward. But it is not enough. Other regional organizations such as the African Union, ASEAN or the League of Arab States should follow. And next to speaking rights, collaboration between the UN and regional organizations needs to be further developed. This is the only way to increase regional ownership of what the UN and its Security Council decide. As a matter of fact, this recently happened with the UNSC resolution 1973 regarding Libya: explicit reference is made to the African Union, the League of Arab States and the Organization of Islamic Conference. Moreover, the League of Arab States’ members are requested to act in the spirit of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter in implementing the resolution. Reviving Chapter VIII seems to be a promising way to combine global concerns with local (regional) legitimacy and capacity to act. The challenge is that in line with the complexity of the emerging new world order, any proposal to rethink multilateralism in such a way that it incorporates regionalism needs to be flexible. A simplistic system of regional representations that replace the national representations will not work. And not only the UN, but also the regional organizations themselves need to adjust to the reality of multilateralism 2.0. In this respect it remains to be seen to what extent the EU Member States will allow the EU to speak with one vision. And above all, in order to become politically feasible, the idea of a multi-regional world order needs to be supported and promoted by civil society. As long as this is not the case, **old habits and organizational structures will not change, and the world will not become a more secure place to live in.**

#### Pandemics unlikely and no extinction

Ridley **12** [8/17, Matt Ridley, columnist for The Wall Street Journal and author of The Rational Optimist: How Prosperity Evolves, “Apocalypse Not: Here’s Why You Shouldn’t Worry About End Times,” http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2012/08/ff\_apocalypsenot/all/]

#### The emergence of AIDS led to a theory that other viruses would spring from tropical rain forests to wreak revenge on humankind for its ecological sins. That, at least, was the implication of Laurie Garrett’s 1994 book, The Coming Plague: Newly Emerging Diseases in a World Out of Balance. The most prominent candidate was Ebola, the hemorrhagic fever that starred in Richard Preston’s The Hot Zone, published the same year. Writer Stephen King called the book “one of the most horrifying things I’ve ever read.” Right on cue, Ebola appeared again in the Congo in 1995, but it soon disappeared. Far from being a harbinger, HIV was the **only new tropical virus to go pandemic in 50 years**.¶ In the 1980s British cattle began dying from mad cow disease, caused by an infectious agent in feed that was derived from the remains of other cows. When people, too, began to catch this disease, predictions of the scale of the epidemic quickly turned terrifying: Up to 136,000 would die, according to one study. A pathologist warned that the British “have to prepare for perhaps thousands, tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands, of cases of vCJD [new variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, the human manifestation of mad cow] coming down the line.” Yet the total number of deaths so far in the UK has been 176, with just five occurring in 2011 and none so far in 2012.¶ In 2003 it was SARS, a virus from civet cats, that ineffectively but inconveniently led to quarantines in Beijing and Toronto amid predictions of global Armageddon. SARS subsided within a year, after killing just 774 people. In 2005 it was bird flu, described at the time by a United Nations official as being “like a combination of global warming and HIV/AIDS 10 times faster than it’s running at the moment.” The World Health Organization’s official forecast was 2 million to 7.4 million dead. In fact, by late 2007, when the disease petered out, the death toll was roughly 200. In 2009 it was Mexican swine flu. WHO director general Margaret Chan said: “It really is all of humanity that is under threat during a pandemic.” The outbreak proved to be a normal flu episode.¶ The truth is, **a new global pandemic is growing less likely, not more**. Mass migration to cities means the opportunity for viruses to jump from wildlife to the human species has not risen and has possibly even declined, despite media hype to the contrary. Water- and insect-borne infections—generally the most lethal—are declining as living standards slowly improve. It’s true that casual-contact infections such as colds are thriving—but only by being

#### Multiple alt causes

**Grant, 12** – Charles, director of the Center for European Reform (“Multilateralism à la Carte,” NYT, 4/16/12, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/17/opinion/multilateralism-a-la-carte.html?\_r=0)**Red**

Many problems cannot be solved without international cooperation, yet “multilateralism” — the system of international institutions and rules intended to promote the common good — **appears to be weakening.** The G-20 has become a talk shop; the Doha round of trade liberalization is moribund; the U.N. climate change talks have achieved very little. We seem to be moving toward a world of balance-of-power politics, competing alliances and unilateral actions. One reason for these trends is that Europe, always the biggest supporter of international institutions, is economically, diplomatically and militarily weak; another is that the United States has over the past 20 years become relatively weaker and more prone to unilateralism. A third reason is that the emerging and re-emerging powers — Russia and China in particular — tend to be cynical about international institutions: They see them as Western creations that promote Western interests, though they use them when it suits their purposes. Both implacably opposed to American hegemony, Russia and China are willing to deploy their vetoes on the Security Council to **thwart U.S. objectives.** Their strong attachment to state sovereignty makes them allergic to humanitarian intervention, as they made clear when vetoing Security Council resolutions that would have criticized the Syrian regime for killing protesters. Russia and China both think that power matters more than rules in international relations. They like “concert diplomacy” — informal gatherings that give great powers status, such as the six-party talks dealing with both the Iranian and North Korean nuclear problems. They are more wary of rules-based institutions, which may allow small countries to block the wishes of big ones. But the two countries do not always think alike on global governance. Russia takes security institutions and proliferation regimes seriously. Unlike China, it has ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and joined both the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Proliferation Security Initiative (a club that tries to stop illicit transfers of weapons of mass destruction). China has never signed any arms control treaty that limits conventional or nuclear weapons. China is also slacker than Russia at enforcing proliferation regimes: Its companies sell dual-use equipment to Iran, North Korea and Pakistan, as well as nuclear reactors to Pakistan. But the picture is very different on economic governance. Here, Russia has been slow to sign up to rules: It is now joining the World Trade Organization after 18 years of negotiations. It stands on the sidelines of U.N. climate change talks despite being the world’s fourth-biggest emitter of carbon. It is passive in forums on financial regulation. China, by contrast, is actively engaged in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. It accepts rulings against it by W.T.O. dispute-settlement panels. And though China has been reluctant to accept binding limits on carbon emissions, its views are evolving: Last December, in Durban, it agreed that by 2020 there should be a carbon emissions regime “with legal force.” Economics and history explain these differences. As the world’s biggest exporter of manufactured goods, China needs global rules on trade. Knowing that its renminbi will eventually become a world currency, China takes a keen interest in international financial rules. Russia exports mainly oil and gas, for which there is no global regime. In the field of security, China is a rising power, increasingly confident of its newfound strength, so it is unwilling to be shackled by international rules on armaments. Russia, though in some respects a declining power, retains a huge nuclear arsenal. It sees arms control treaties as a means of protecting its status. In the long term, will Russia and China do more to strengthen or to undermine the multilateral system? That will depend, in part, on how successfully the two countries rebalance their economies. Russia must build up manufacturing and service industries, depend less on oil and gas exports, and create a business environment that encourages foreign investment. China needs to boost consumption and curb investment. It should create a credit system that benefits individuals, small enterprises and the private sector, rather than just state-owned enterprises. Powerful vested interests in both oppose reform: in Russia, some of the leadership clans and natural resource companies; in China, some sections of the Communist Party and the state-owned enterprises. Rebalancing would curb the power and incomes of elites in both countries. If the rulers in Moscow and Beijing succeed in transforming their economies, laying the basis for sustained growth, they will become more confident in engaging with international institutions and other powers. But if these countries fail to make a smooth adjustment and suffer from slower growth and the consequent social unrest, their regimes will be prone to insecurity, nationalist sentiment and paranoia toward the West. **Global governance would certainly suffer.** So Russia’s and China’s attempts to reform matter hugely for the international system.

#### Too late to solve warming

Dye, 10/26/12 (Lee, “It May Be Too Late to Stop Global Warming,” ABC News, http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/late-stop-global-warming/story?id=17557814#.UI4EpcU8CSo)Red

Here's a dark secret about the earth's changing climate that many scientists believe, but few seem eager to discuss: It's **too late to stop** global **warming.** Greenhouse gasses pumped into the planet's atmosphere will continue to grow even if the industrialized nations cut their emissions down to the bone. Furthermore, the severe measures that would have to be taken to make those reductions stand about the same chance as that proverbial snowball in hell. Two scientists who believe we are on the wrong track argue in the current issue of the journal Nature Climate Change that global warming is inevitable and it's time to switch our focus from trying to stop it to figuring out how we are going to deal with its consequences. "At present, governments' attempts to limit greenhouse-gas emissions through carbon cap-and-trade schemes and to promote renewable and sustainable energy sources are probably **too late to arrest the inevitable trend** of global warming," Jasper Knight of Wits University in Johannesburg, South Africa, and Stephan Harrison of the University of Exeter in England argue in their study. Those efforts, they continue, "have little relationship to the real world." What is clear, they contend, is a profound lack of understanding about how we are going to deal with the loss of huge land areas, including some entire island nations, and massive migrations as humans flee areas no longer suitable for sustaining life, the inundation of coastal properties around the world, and so on ... and on ... and on. That doesn't mean nations should stop trying to reduce their carbon emissions, because any reduction could lessen the consequences. But the cold fact is no matter what Europe and the United States and other "developed" nations do, it's not going to curb global climate change, according to one scientist who was once highly skeptical of the entire issue of global warming. "Call me a converted skeptic," physicist Richard A. Muller says in an op-ed piece published in the New York Times last July. Muller's latest book, "Energy for Future Presidents," attempts to poke holes in nearly everything we've been told about energy and climate change, except the fact that "humans are almost entirely the cause" of global warming. Those of us who live in the "developed" world initiated it. Those who live in the "developing" world will sustain it as they strive for a standard of living equal to ours. "As far as global warming is concerned, **the developed world is becoming irrelevant**," Muller insists in his book. **We could set an example by curbing our emissions**, and thus claim in the future that "it wasn't our fault," **but** about **the only thing that could stop it would be a complete economic collapse in** China and the rest of the world's **developing countries.** As they race forward, their industrial growth -- and their greenhouse gas emissions -- will outpace any efforts by the West to reduce their carbon footprints, Muller contends. "China has been installing a new gigawatt of coal power each week," he says in his Times piece, and each plant pumps an additional ton of gases into the atmosphere "**every second**." "By the time you read this, China's yearly greenhouse gas emissions will be double those of the United States, perhaps higher," he contends. **And that's not likely to change.** "**China is fighting poverty, malnutrition, hunger, poor health, inadequate education and limited opportunity. If you were the president of China, would you endanger progress to avoid a few degrees of temperature change?**" he asks. Muller suggests a better course for the West to take than condemning China for trying to be like the rest of us. Instead, we should encourage China to switch from coal to natural gas for its power plants, which would cut those emissions in half. "Coal," he writes, "is the filthiest fuel we have." **Meanwhile, the West waits for a silver bullet**, possibly a geo-engineering solution that would make global warming go away by reflecting sunlight back into space, or fertilizing the oceans so they could absorb more carbon dioxide, or something we haven't even heard about. **Don't expect it anytime soon.** It would take a bold, and perhaps foolish, nation to take over the complex systems that control the planet's weather patterns. That's sort of what we did beginning with the Industrial Revolution. Now we have to live with it. So maybe Knight and Harrison are right. It's time to pay more attention to how we are going to handle changes to our planet that seem inevitable. We can fight global warming and try to mitigate the consequences, but it isn't going to go away.

#### No extinction

**NIPCC 11**. Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change. Surviving the unprecedented climate change of the IPCC. 8 March 2011. http://www.nipccreport.org/articles/2011/mar/8mar2011a5.html

In a paper published in *Systematics and Biodiversity*, Willis *et al*. (2010) consider the IPCC (2007) "predicted climatic changes for the next century" -- i.e., their contentions that "global temperatures will increase by 2-4°C and possibly beyond, sea levels will rise (~1 m ± 0.5 m), and atmospheric CO2will increase by up to 1000 ppm" -- noting that it is "widely suggested that the magnitude and rate of these changes will result in many plants and animals going extinct," citing studies that suggest that "within the next century, over 35% of some biota will have gone extinct (Thomas *et al*., 2004; Solomon *et al*., 2007) and there will be extensive die-back of the tropical rainforest due to climate change (e.g. Huntingford *et al*., 2008)." On the other hand, they indicate that some biologists and climatologists have pointed out that "many of the predicted increases in climate have happened before, in terms of both magnitude and rate of change (e.g. Royer, 2008; Zachos *et al*., 2008), and yet biotic communities have remained remarkably resilient (Mayle and Power, 2008) and in some cases thrived (Svenning and Condit, 2008)." But they report that those who mention these things are often "placed in the 'climate-change denier' category," although the purpose for pointing out these facts is simply to present "a sound scientific basis for understanding biotic responses to the magnitudes and rates of climate change predicted for the future through using the vast data resource that we can exploit in fossil records." Going on to do just that, Willis *et al*. focus on "intervals in time in the fossil record when atmospheric CO2 concentrations increased up to 1200 ppm, temperatures in mid- to high-latitudes increased by greater than 4°C within 60 years, and sea levels rose by up to 3 m higher than present," describing studies of past biotic responses that indicate "the scale and impact of the magnitude and rate of such climate changes on biodiversity." And what emerges from those studies, as they describe it, "is evidence for rapid community turnover, migrations, development of novel ecosystems and thresholds from one stable ecosystem state to another." And, most importantly in this regard, they report "there is very little evidence for broad-scale extinctions due to a warming world." In concluding, the Norwegian, Swedish and UK researchers say that "based on such evidence we urge some caution in assuming broad-scale extinctions of species will occur due solely to climate changes of the magnitude and rate predicted for the next century," reiterating that "the fossil record indicates remarkable biotic resilience to wide amplitude fluctuations in climate."

#### Adaptation solves, warming is inevitable

**Thomas, 1/3/12** – Martyn, Vice-President (External Affairs) at Royal Academy of Engineering (“Environmental crisis demands big thinking,” The Guardian, http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2013/jan/03/environmental-crisis-demands-big-thinking)**Red**

Much of the CO² that will affect the climate this century **is already in the atmosphere.** Global warming will lead to further warming, through several mechanisms including the greater absorption of sunlight that you mention and the release of trapped methane and CO². Any attempt to stop the process would have to involve international agreement and action on an unprecedented scale because, even if Britain were able to stop producing CO² completely, the impact on the climate would be small. The actions necessary to halt or restrict climate change are politically impossible to deliver: massive investments in nuclear power worldwide, dramatic constraints on travel and other activities that burn fossil fuels, and much more. This could not be implemented even in Britain, let alone internationally. The debate about further runways in the south-east of England illustrates just how far British politicians are from understanding the global warming crisis. The speculative geoengineering "solutions" that have been proposed would be a high risk gamble with the planet and unlikely to succeed. We need instead to **accept that increased global warming is inevitable and plan on that basis.** Rather than policies reminiscent of King Canute, we need a mature recognition that sea levels will rise and that large parts of the world will become uninhabitable. When the worst happens, it will become clear that we should have acted now (or sooner) to build large-scale defences and to relocate vulnerable cities and communities to higher ground. If we started seriously planning to relocate London to somewhere safe, it would demonstrate a realistic understanding of the situation that would make it far easier to lead opinion nationally and internationally. Before long, talk of better insulation, electric vehicles, new runways and wind power will be seen for the minor considerations that they largely are. The solutions need to match the scale of the crisis you have rightly identified.

### Balancing

#### No counterbalancing – the US provides too many public goods

**Brooks and Wohlforth, 11 –** both professors of government at Dartmouth (Stephen G Brooks & William C Wohlforth (2011): Assessing the balance, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 24:2, 201-219

The world is dearly a different place for the United States due to the permissive systemic environment. And the flip side of the lack of tight systemic constraints on the United States is their presence for other powers. The system constrains other powers from counter-balancing and contending for global leadership, for example, as most major powers have done in the past and at least two-Russia and China-would likely do now if the international system's structure did not render it prohibitively costly. And that is not the only constraint that affects others. Because most other powers lack the material capacity to help redefine rules and provide public goods, international rules and norms constrain them far more than Washington. Moreover, the global economy constrains smaller powers far more than the United States. While other powers are constrained by America's outsized role in the global economy from using economic statecraft (for example, sanctions) against the United States, Washington uses them with impunity against others (albeit not always effectively).

#### Taiwan conflict won’t go nuclear

**Pike 11** – last modified 5/7/2011(John, manager, Global Security, China’s Options in the Taiwan Confrontation, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/taiwan-prc.htm)

China would almost certainly not contemplate a nuclear strike against Taiwan, nor would Beijing embark on a course of action that posed significant risks of the use of nuclear weapons. The mainland's long term goal is to liberate Taiwan, not to obliterate it, and any use of nuclear weapons by China would run a substantial risk of the use of nuclear weapons by the United States. An inability to control escalation beyond "demonstrative" detonations would cause utterly disproportionate destruction.

#### Blank impact is wrong – shifts alone don’t trigger the impact

**Goldstein 2011**, Professor IR at American University [Joshua S. Goldstein, Professor emeritus of international relations at American University, “Thing Again: War,” Sept/Oct 2011,

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/15/think\_again\_war?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full]

Nor do shifts in the global balance of power doom us to a future of perpetual war. While some political scientists argue that an increasingly multipolar world is an increasingly volatile one -- that peace is best assured by the predominance of a single hegemonic power, namely the United States -- **recent geopolitical history** suggests otherwise. Relative U.S. power and worldwide conflict have **waned in tandem** over the past decade. The exceptions to the trend, Iraq and Afghanistan, have been lopsided wars waged by the hegemon, not challenges by up-and-coming new powers. The best precedent for today's emerging world order may be the 19th-century Concert of Europe, a collaboration of great powers that largely maintained the peace for a century until its breakdown and the bloodbath of World War I.

#### U.S. hierarchy isn’t key to stability

**Kang, Ph.D., 3**—Professor at the University of Southern California, with appointments in both the School of International Relations and the Marshall School of Business, A.B. with honors from Stanford, Ph.D. from Berkeley, director of Korea studies at USC (David C., International Security 27.4 (2003) 57-85, “Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks”, Project MUSE, RBatra)

During this time Asia itself—sometimes defined as including China, India, Japan, and Russia and comprising perhaps half the world's population—had an occasional impact on the great powers, but it was never a primary focus. In the past two decades, however, Asia has emerged as a region whose economic, military, and diplomatic power has begun to rival and perhaps even exceed that of Europe. Its growing influence gives scholars a wonderful opportunity in the fields of international relations generally and Asian security specifically to produce increasingly rigorous and theoretically sophisticated work. Because Europe was so important for so long a period, in seeking to understand international relations, scholars have often simply deployed concepts, theories, and experiences derived from the European experience to project onto and explain Asia. **This approach is problematic at best**. Eurocentric ideas have yielded several mistaken conclusions and predictions about conflict and alignment behavior in Asia. For example, since the early 1990s many Western analysts have predicted dire scenarios for Asia, whereas many Asian experts have expressed growing optimism about the region's future. 4 It is an open question whether Asia, with its very different political economy, history, culture, and demographics, will ever function like the European state system. This is not to criticize European-derived theories purely because they are based on the Western experience: The origins of a theory are not necessarily relevant to its applicability. Rather these theories do a poor job as they are applied to Asia; what I seek to show in this article is that more careful attention to their application can strengthen the theories themselves.

In this article I make two claims about the levels of conflict and types of alignment behavior in Asia. First, I argue that the pessimistic predictions of Western scholars after the end of the Cold War that Asia would experience a period of increased arms racing and power politics has largely failed to materialize, a reality that scholars must confront if they are to develop a better understanding of Asian relations. Second, contrary to the expectations of standard formulations of realism, and although U.S. power confounds the issue, Asian states do not appear to be balancing against rising powers such as China. Rather they seem to be bandwagoning. [End Page 58]

I make these claims with great care. Asia is empirically rich and, in many ways, different from the West. Thus efforts to explain Asian issues using international relations theories largely derived inductively from the European experience can be problematic. Focusing exclusively on Asia's differences, however, runs the risk of essentializing the region, resulting in the sort of ori- entalist analysis that most scholars have correctly avoided. 5 I am not making a plea for research that includes a touch of realism, a dash of constructivism, and a pinch of liberalism. 6 The same social-scientific standards—falsifiability, generalizability, and clear causal logic—should apply in the study of Asian international relations as has been applied to the study of Europe. To achieve this, scholars must not dismiss evidence that does not fit their theories. Instead they must consider such evidence and sharpen their propositions so that they may be falsified.

Many of the criticisms that I make in this article could apply to other international relations theories such as liberalism or constructivism. I have chosen to focus on realist approaches because of their wide use in Western scholarship on Asia. In addition, determining which predictions emerge from which variant of realist theory is often the subject of heated debate; in particular, efforts to single out predictions that apply to Asia can be extremely frustrating. 7

I have three caveats: First, I am not claiming a priori that difference will triumph over similarity. Whether Asian and Western international relations are different is an open question, and in many cases scholars may conclude that there are no significant differences. Instead of ignoring or dismissing potential differences as unimportant, however, scholars should ask: Is this situation different? And if so, why? Such questions are likely to yield useful answers not only for scholars of international relations but also for those specializing in either security or Asian studies.

Second, scholarship on Asian international relations from all perspectives is increasingly theoretically rich and empirically sophisticated. Research from the realist and liberal schools has explored issues such as U.S.-China and U.S.-Japan relations, as well as the changing dynamics of the Japan-South [End Page 59] Korea-U.S. alliance. 8 Literature with a cultural or constructivist perspective has addressed topics including the formation of identity, prostitution and its relationship to U.S. overseas troop deployments, and antimilitarist sentiment in Japan. 9 More historically oriented work has emerged that challenges all of the prevailing paradigms. 10 Despite these encouraging trends, such work remains the exception rather than the norm.

Finally, the concept of "Asia" lends itself to highly problematic and often sweeping generalizations. The term "Asia" often refers to a geographic area that takes in Russia and Japan, encompasses the entire Pacific Ocean including Australia, and ranges as far west as India and Pakistan. These countries have different cultures, histories, political institutions, economies, geographic features, and climates. Accordingly, wherever possible I refer either to individual countries, to Northeast Asia (comprising Japan, China, the Korean Peninsula, and occasionally Russia), or to Southeast Asia (whose principal countries include Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam). This article does not cover South Asia (principally the countries of Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka). When I do refer to Asia as a whole, it is mainly to differentiate it from "the West." 11 [End Page 60]

This article is composed of three major sections. In the first section, I explain why the pessimistic predictions of the 1990s about a return of power politics to Asia have not materialized and why scholarship needs to acknowledge this fact. In the second section, I argue that the Chinese experience of the past two decades poses a challenge to realist theories. The third section argues that Asian countries balance differently from countries in the West. I conclude by discussing the tension between area studies and political science theorizing in the field of comparative politics. I argue that this tension is healthy because it forces both sides of the debate to sharpen their scholarship. The field of international relations can benefit from such a discussion, as well. Elevating the Asian experience to a central place in the study of international relations will provide an excellent opportunity to inject vitality into the stale paradigm wars that currently characterize the field.

Post-Cold War Pessimism over Asia

Following the end of the Cold War in 1991, some scholars in the West began to predict that Asia was "ripe for rivalry." 12 They based this prediction on the following factors: wide disparities in the levels of economic and military power among nations in the region; their different political systems, ranging from democratic to totalitarian; historical animosities; and the lack of international institutions. Many scholars thus envisaged a return of power politics after decades when conflict in Asia was dominated by the Cold War tension between the United States and the Soviet Union. In addition, scholars envisaged a return of arms racing and the possibility of major conflict among Asian countries, [End Page 61] almost all of which had rapidly changing internal and external environments. More specific predictions included the growing possibility of Japanese rearmament; 13 increased Chinese adventurism spurred by China's rising power and ostensibly revisionist intentions; 14 conflict or war over the status of Taiwan; 15 terrorist or missile attacks from a rogue North Korea against South Korea, Japan, or even the United States; 16 and arms racing or even conflict in Southeast Asia, prompted in part by unresolved territorial disputes. 17 [End Page 62]

More than a dozen years have passed since the end of the Cold War, yet none of these pessimistic predictions have come to pass. Indeed there has not been a major war in Asia since the 1978-79 Vietnam-Cambodia-China conflict; and with only a few exceptions (North Korea and Taiwan), Asian countries do not fear for their survival. Japan, though powerful, has not rearmed to the extent it could. China seems no more revisionist or adventurous now than it was before the end of the Cold War. And no Asian country appears to be balancing against China. In contrast to the period 1950-80, the past two decades have witnessed enduring regional stability and minimal conflict. Scholars should directly confront these anomalies, rather than dismissing them.

Social scientists can learn as much from events that do not occur as from those that do. The case of Asian security provides an opportunity to examine the usefulness of accepted international relations paradigms and to determine how the assumptions underlying these theories can become misspecified. Some scholars have smuggled ancillary and ad hoc hypotheses about preferences into realist, institutionalist, and constructivist theories to make them fit various aspects of the Asian cases, including: assumptions about an irrational North Korean leadership, predictions of an expansionist and revisionist China, and depictions of Japanese foreign policy as "abnormal." 18 Social science moves forward from the clear statement of a theory, its causal logic, and its predictions. Just as important, however, is the rigorous assessment of the theory, especially if predictions flowing from it fail to materialize. Exploring why scholars have misunderstood Asia is both a fruitful and a necessary theoretical exercise.

Two major problems exist with many of the pessimistic predictions about Asia. First, when confronted with the non-balancing of Asian states against China, the lack of Japanese rearmament, and five decades of non-invasion by North Korea, scholars typically respond: Just wait. This reply, however, is intellectually ambiguous. Although it would be unfair to expect instantaneous national responses to changing international conditions, a dozen years would seem to be long enough to detect at least some change. Indeed Asian nations have historically shown an ability to respond quickly to changing circumstances. The Meiji restoration in Japan in 1868 was a remarkable example of governmental response to European and American encroachment, and by 1874 [End Page 63] Japan had emerged from centuries of isolation to occupy Taiwan. 19 More recently, with the introduction of market reforms in late 1978, when Deng Xiaoping famously declared, "To get rich is glorious," the Chinese have transformed themselves from diehard socialists to exuberant capitalists beginning less than three years after Mao's death in 1976. 20 In the absence of a specific time frame, the "just wait" response is unfalsifiable. Providing a causal logic that explains how and when scholars can expect changes is an important aspect of this response, and reasonable scholars will accept that change may not be immediate but may occur over time. Without such a time frame, however, the "just wait" response is mere rhetorical wordplay designed to avoid troubling evidence.

A more rigorous response in the Chinese case would be to argue that conditions of balancing, not timing per se, are the critical factor. In this view, China's relatively slow military modernization and limited power projection capabilities suggest that its potential threat to other Asian countries is growing only slowly; thus the conditions necessary to produce costly all-out balancing efforts do not yet exist. Moreover, even though many of the conditions that theorists argue can lead to conflict do already exist in East Asia, the region has so far avoided both major and minor interstate conflict. Most significant, in less than two decades China has evolved from being a moribund and closed middle power to the most dynamic country in the region, with an economy that not only will soon surpass Japan's (if it has not already) but also shows many signs of continuing growth. This dramatic power transition has evoked hardly any response from China's neighbors. 21 By realist standards, China should be provoking balancing behavior, merely because its overall size and projected rate of growth are so high. [End Page 64]

Second, pessimistic predictions about Asia's future often suffer from incompletely specified evidentiary standards. **Scholars will frequently select evidence that supports their arguments and dismiss contradictory evidence as epiphenomenal**. For example, in his most recent book, John Mearsheimer argues that although Japan (and Germany) have "the potential in terms of population and wealth to become great powers...they depend on the United States for their security, and are effectively semi-sovereign states, not great powers." 22 This begs a number of questions: For instance, why define Japan, which has the second largest economy in the world, as "semi-sovereign"? Indeed why would such an economically advanced state ever allow itself to remain "semi-sovereign"? Mearsheimer's book is focused on building a theory of offensive realism, but the logic of offensive realism would lead to the conclusion that Japan should have rearmed long ago. The onus is on those predicting an increase in power politics in Asia to state clearly what evidence would falsify their arguments or challenge their assumptions, not to explain away objections or ignore contradictory evidence. A clearer explication of their hypotheses and the refutable propositions would be a genuine contribution to the field.

More than a dozen years after the end of the Cold War, much of Asia bears little resemblance to the picture painted by the pessimists. Although the years 1950-80 saw numerous armed conflicts, since then there has been no major interstate war in either Northeast or Southeast Asia. Countries do not fear for their survival in either area. In Northeast Asia, rivalry and power politics remain muted. Japan has not rearmed, China shows little sign of having revisionist tendencies, and North Korea has neither imploded nor exploded. Southeast Asia, as well, remains free of the kinds of arms races and power politics that some have expected. As Muthiah Alagappa writes, "Viewed through the ahistorical realist lens, the contemporary security challenges could indeed suggest that Asia is a dangerous place. But a comprehensive historical view would suggest otherwise. Although Asia still faces serious internal and international challenges, there are fewer challenges than before and most of the region's disputes and conflicts have stabilized." 23 The field of international relations would be better served if the pessimists not only admitted this reality but also asked why this might be the case. Because China has such an important [End Page 65] influence on Northeast, Southeast, and even South Asia, I offer the tentative outline of such an explanation in the following section.

China, Hierarchy, and Balancing

The most hotly debated of the pessimistic predictions about Asia concerns the rise of a revisionist China. After two decades of rapid economic growth, China appears poised to become a great power once again. Thus for Richard Betts, the question becomes: "Should we want China to get rich or not? For realists, the answer should be no, since a rich China would overturn any balance of power." 24 Concern over a revisionist and destabilizing China has only increased in the past decade, as its economy continues to grow and its military and technological capabilities further expand. 25

Yet concern over a strong China may be misplaced. **Historically, it has been Chinese weakness that has led to chaos in Asia. When China has been strong and stable, order has been preserved**. East Asian regional relations have historically been hierarchic, more peaceful, and more stable than those in the West. 26 Until the intrusion of the Western powers in the nineteenth century, East Asian interstate relations were remarkably stable, punctuated only occasionally by [End Page 66] conflict between countries. The system was based on Chinese military and economic power but was reinforced through centuries of cultural exchange, and the units in the system were sovereign states that had political control over recognized geographic areas. East Asian international relations emphasized formal hierarchy among nations while allowing considerable informal equality. With China as the dominant state and surrounding countries as peripheral or secondary states, as long as hierarchy was observed there was little need for interstate war. This contrasts sharply with the Western tradition of international relations, which has consisted of formal equality between nation-states, informal hierarchy, and near-constant interstate conflict. 27

In the nineteenth century, the traditional East Asian order was demolished as both Western and Asian powers (in particular, Japan) scrambled to establish influence in the region. After a century of tumult in Asia, the late 1990s saw the reemergence of a strong and confident China, the growing stabilization of Vietnam, and increasingly consolidated political rule around the region. Although realists and liberals have tended to view modern East Asia as potentially unstable, if the system is experiencing a return to a pattern of hierarchy, the result may be increased stability.

China in 2003 appears to be reemerging as the gravitational center of East Asia. From a historical perspective, a rich and strong China could again cement regional stability. However, a century of chaos and change, and the growing influence of the rest of the world (in particular the United States), would lead one to conclude that a Chinese-led regional system would not look like its historical predecessor. Indeed Chung-in Moon argues that the Westphalian notion of sovereignty holds sway in Asia, although he also admits that this is frequently compromised and often contested. 28

Even if a hierarchic system does not reemerge in East Asia, and even if countries in the region do not adopt Westphalian norms in their entirety, the question [End Page 67] of whether a more powerful China will be a revisionist or a status quo state remains. 29 Although the evidence is mixed, much in China's behavior points to Beijing's desire to stabilize the region. According to political scientist Xinbo Wu, "Both the political leadership and the Chinese public believe that... China must regain major-power status." 30 Wu also notes that China perceives the international environment in the past decade as less hostile, and even benign. At the same time, Beijing views its relationship with Washington as potentially the most troubling, believing that the United States is the primary constraint on Chinese maneuvering and influence in the region. 31 It is not clear, however, if China intends to challenge the United States for regional supremacy. For three decades, China has made a conscious decision to confine itself to a relatively modest second-strike nuclear force, although this could change depending on U.S. actions regarding missile defense. 32

Does China have territorial or ideological ambitions? The evidence so far suggests that although China has outstanding territorial disputes with a number of countries, it has neither revisionist nor imperial aims. First, China has shown a genuine desire to join the world community, perhaps best reflected in its considerable efforts to become a member of the World Trade Organization. Wu notes that "the PRC understands that the best way to defend its interest is to make its own voice heard in the rule-making process," 33 by joining influential regional and international institutions. This explains Chinese active participation in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN Regional Forum, and a number of other international institutions. 34 [End Page 68]

Second, in the past two decades China has resolved territorial disputes with Afghanistan, Burma, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, and Russia. More recently, it has resolved its disputes with Cambodia and Vietnam, renouncing support from the Khmer Rouge and embracing the Paris Peace Accords of 1991 that brought elections to Cambodia, and normalizing relations and delineating its border with Vietnam. 35 Jianwei Wang writes that "the fact that no war for territory has been fought in East Asia since the 1980s indicates a tendency to seek peaceful settlement of the remaining disputes." 36 On maritime disputes, Jean-Marc Blanchard notes that all Asian countries except Cambodia, North Korea, and Thailand have signed the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which has provided an institutional forum for parties to address disputes over fishing rights, trade routes, and other matters. 37

China does have unresolved territorial disputes over Taiwan, with ASEAN over the Spratly Islands, and with Japan over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands. 38 Many other Asian nations also have unresolved territorial issues, resulting from a century of regional change, not from Chinese revisionism.For example, Japan and Russia have yet to resolve their dispute over the Northern territories, nor have Japan and Korea resolved their dispute over Tokto Island. **Thus these territorial disputes by themselves are not an indicator of Chinese ambitions.**

Countries in East Asia are also deciding how to deal with China's growing economy. Japanese investment in China continues to expand, and Japanese companies are increasingly seeing their fortunes tied to the Chinese market. Japan runs a $27 billion trade deficit with China. 39 Forty thousand Taiwanese companies have investments in the mainland, employing 10 million people. The Taiwanese central bank estimates that total mainland investment is between [End Page 69] $40 and $50 billion. 40 Sixty percent of Taiwanese foreign direct investment went to China in 2001, despite rising political tensions. The capitalization of China's stock market is the largest in Asia except for Japan's, despite being just a decade old—larger than the capitalization of stock markets in Brazil, Hong Kong, India, Mexico, South Korea, or Taiwan. 41

The growing importance of China's economy in some ways parallels China's historical role. Historical precedents may not be tremendously helpful, however, in assessing whether hierarchy will reemerge in Asia, because other Asian nations' willingness to accept subordinate positions in a Sino-centric hierarchy will depend on beliefs about how a dominant China would behave in the future. Additionally, it is not clear if China is willing to make more adjustments to calm fears or further integrate into the globalized world. This possibility deserves serious investigation, however, and it could be a fruitful line of research. Because the evidence of Chinese revisionism over the past decade of rapid growth is limited at best, scholars should explore the possibility that China will be a stabilizing force in Northeast and Southeast Asia. One way in which East Asian relations may manifest themselves differently than realists expect concerns the issue of whether other nations in the region fear China's growing power and will seek to balance against it, or whether those nations will instead choose to bandwagon with it.

Balancing versus Bandwagoning and the Role of the United States

Contrary to the conventional wisdom, Northeast and Southeast Asian nations are not obviously balancing against China. Relying on variations of "mercantile realism," "soft balancing," and "reluctant realism," 42 however, scholars contend that this is likely to change in the future. Yet any argument that balancing may occur in Asia or that balancing has a different meaning in Asia is an admission that such countries are not acting as balance of power realists expect. [End Page 70] Although the issue of balancing is complicated by the presence of U.S. diplomatic, economic, cultural, and military power in Asia, it is still possible to make tentative assessments about the region. Instead of assuming that Asia will balance rising Chinese power, posing this as a question would be a more productive exercise. 43

Hierarchy can be global as well as regional, and the United States is clearly the dominant state both in the international order and in Asia. This has important implications for scholarly understanding of the region. As China continues on the path of economic growth and military modernization, the key question is whether the United States can or will allow China to resume its place atop the Asian regional hierarchy. As this section shows, the answer to this question is not obvious. It is difficult to predict the reaction of other Asian nations to the possibility of increased U.S.-Chinese confrontation as a result of continued Chinese economic and military growth. If, as realists expect, Asian nations do not balance against China, a U.S. attempt to form a balancing coalition with East Asian states to contain China could be highly problematic. In addition, **if the U**nited **S**tates **withdraws significantly from the region, Asia may not become the dangerous or unstable region that balance of power adherents would suggest**, because other nations may acquiesce to China's central position in Asia. 44

Discerning balancing behavior in Asia is especially difficult given the overwhelming dominance of U.S. power in the region. As argued by Michael Mastanduno and others, the conventional view is that by balancing China, the United States acts as a stabilizing force in the region. According to Mastanduno, "American power and presence have helped to keep traditional power rivals in the region from engaging in significant conflict and have reassured smaller states who have traditionally been vulnerable to major regional wars." 45 The U.S. alliance system in Northeast and Southeast Asia, as well as [End Page 71] the provision of naval facilities to the United States by Singapore and the Philippines, are manifestations of this balancing behavior. The implication is that there would be considerably more conflict in the region were the United States to pull back or otherwise reduce its military presence. 46

The ability of the United States to maintain regional peace and stability, however, **especially in Northeast Asia**, is an open question. As Alagappa notes, "**The claim that stability in Northeast Asia is predicated on the U.S. role rests on several controversial assertions**...that the United States checks China's growing power and influence, which is feared by other Asian states; [and] that nearly all countries trust and prefer the United States....[However,] containment of China does not appeal to many Asian states." 47 Although the United States still retains overwhelming power in the region, its scope is considerably smaller than it was at its height a quarter century ago. In addition, both East Asian and Southeast Asian countries have grown significantly stronger, richer, and generally more stable. This transition at least requires an explanation. That the United States plays an important security role in Asia is relatively uncontroversial. Whether some type of U.S. withdrawal would be deleterious for the region is far more questionable.

Mastanduno writes that U.S. hegemony in Asia is incomplete in many respects and functions more as a "holding operation." 48 And although Avery Goldstein argues that balancing does occur in Asia, he too suggests that its contribution to regional security is less clear. 49 The distribution of power and potential for conflict do not lead to obvious bipolarity or multipolarity. 50 Part of what makes understanding Asia so difficult is this complexity. Indeed some scholars have argued that underlying the core U.S. strategy is the belief that China's future behavior can be changed in a positive direction, through either democratization or integration into the global economy (or some combination of both), and that engagement is a policy tool toward that end. 51 [End Page 72]

Realism's Japan Problem

Japan's foreign policy provides perhaps the strongest evidence to date that balancing is not occurring in Asia as realist theories would predict. For the past twenty years, realists have consistently predicted that Japan would rearm, or at least become increasingly assertive in parallel with its growing economic power, but it has not. Although Japan is very powerful, it has not yet adopted the trappings of a great power. In contrast to realists who argue that power considerations will ultimately influence Japanese foreign policy, and in contrast to constructivists who argue that Japan's culture or domestic politics explain its foreign policy, 52 I offer another explanation.

Scholars have spent decades speculating about whether and when Japan might become a "normal" power. 53 This is the wrong question. Arguments about whether Japan is "normal" or "militant" essentialize the country and miss the point. Japan invaded other Asian states a century ago because the system in Asia was highly unstable and Japan sought to protect itself. In the current era, Japan has little to gain from challenging either a strong China or the United States, but much to lose by starting great power competition. Geography, population, and economics mean not only that Japan benefits from a strong international order, but also that it is relatively safe from military threats.

There are two major realist explanations for Japan's foreign policy behavior, both of which are often conflated in the literature. The first is the great power explanation, which holds that Japan is so rich and technologically advanced that it will soon want to become a great power once again (this is the "power maximization" hypothesis). Second is the umbrella (or "power satisfaction") explanation: According to this hypothesis, when U.S. forces withdraw from Japan, it will rearm and become a normal power. 54 [End Page 73]

These explanations are mutually incompatible: Japan cannot be a normal great power and yet be protected by the U.S. security umbrella. Of the two, the power maximization hypothesis is most easily falsified. Realists have no explanation for why Japan, the world's second-largest economy, has not sought to balance or challenge the United States (the world's largest power) or why Japan has not attempted to provide for its own security. As Waltz has written, "Countries with great power economics have become great military powers, whether or not reluctantly." 55 In addition to having the world's second largest economy, Japan is arguably the world's finest manufacturing nation and one of it most technologically sophisticated. Yet not only does Japan lack aircraft carriers, intercontinental missiles, and nuclear weapons, but it does not send troops abroad. In sum, Japan is hard to invade, but it also evinces almost no significant military or diplomatic strength. So although Japan is relatively strong, it has not rearmed to the extent it could, nor has it rearmed to the extent that a "great power" would (see Table 1).

In support of the great power explanation, Michael Desch offers evidence of Japanese supposed intentions: marginally increased defense spending, pursuit of a virtual nuclear deterrent, and growing nationalistic rhetoric from selected politicians. 56 Yet this evidence is speculative at best. The key is not the offhand remark of a right-wing politician, but rather that Japan could easily triple its defense budget and still spend only what other powers such as France and Germany do (Figure 1). In addition, Japan could modify its constitution, develop a nuclear arsenal, deploy intercontinental ballistic missiles, and build aircraft carriers. It could also forge a foreign policy independent from that of the United States and attempt to exert far more influence in diplomatic arenas. This would be convincing evidence that Japan is, or aspires to be, a great power. Discussion of Japan as a virtual, potential, or nascent power is simply an admission that Japan does not function as a typical realist nation-state. [End Page 74]

The U.S. umbrella explanation is also unconvincing, for at least two reasons. First, it does not explain why the second largest economic power in the international system would trust the world's only superpower to provide for its security. Threats arise through the mere existence of capabilities—intentions can always change for the worse. 57 As Robert Jervis writes, "Minds can be changed, new leaders can come to power, values can shift, new opportunities and dangers can arise." 58 A weak, peaceful country may alter its goals as it becomes stronger. Second, the umbrella explanation fails to account for why Japan did not doubt the U.S. commitment to its security in the past. Arguments about the U.S. umbrella implicitly assume that Japan is realist and would rearm if the United States departed the region. If this is true, and if there is no other factor that keeps Japanese foreign policy from becoming more assertive, then **Japan should have rearmed at least a decade ago**, when the Japanese economy was at its height and when Tokyo had many reasons to doubt the U.S. commitment to its defense.

A Japanese policymaker in 1985 might have concluded that, given the previous fifteen years or so of negative signals from Washington, the U.S. commitment to Japan was unlikely to endure. In 1969 President Richard Nixon had [End Page 75] called for "Asia for Asians" and began a major drawdown of U.S. troops and commitments to the region. 59 By 1985 **Japan had seen the U**nited **S**tates **abandon South Vietnam, withdraw recognition of Taiwan, and pull half of its troops out of South Korea**. In the mid-1980s U.S. concern over Japanese trading and economic policies was at its peak. This concern manifested itself in intense U.S. pressure on Japan to alter some of its economic agreements, among them the 1985 Plaza Accords that attempted to devalue the yen relative to the dollar, and the 1988 Structural Impediments Initiative that sought to force changes in Japan's domestic economic practices. 60 In addition, the United States had begun to pressure Japan over "burden sharing" and attempted to make the Japanese pay more for the U.S. troops already deployed. All these indicators [End Page 76] suggested that the United States would cease to be a reliable ally of Japan. In addition, Japanese economic growth was at its highest, national sentiment about Japan's future was increasingly optimistic, and Japan was by some measures a better technological and manufacturing country than the United States.

From a realist perspective, only the most naïve and myopic of leaders would focus solely on the present. Thus Japan has had ample reason to doubt the U.S. commitment to its defense. Yet in 1976 Tokyo pledged to keep defense spending at 1 percent of Japan's gross domestic product, which has essentially remained unchanged. In addition, Japanese leaders had little reaction to either the Vietnam or Taiwan pullouts by the United States. Further, in the mid-1980s there was no concomitant change in the policies of Japan's Self-Defense Forces. 61 Japan did not rearm despite real tensions with the United States in the 1980s, nor did it make any major changes in its foreign policy. 62

There is a third alternative concerning Japan's foreign policy, which I refer to as the hierarchic explanation. According to this explanation, Japan is a status quo secondary power that has not rearmed to the level it could because it has no need to, and because it has no intention of challenging either China or the United States for dominance in Asia. Japan does not fear for its survival, and it accepts the centrality of China in regional politics. The historical animosities and lingering mistrust over Japan for its colonial aggression in the late nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century are reasons sometimes cited for a fear of Japanese rearmament. In the late nineteenth century, Japan faced decaying and despotic Chinese and Korean monarchies, a significant regional power vacuum, and pressures from Western nations. Today the militaries of South Korea and China are well equipped, their economies are robust, and there is no threat of Western colonization. Thus it is unlikely that Japan needs or will seek to expand its diplomatic and military influence on the Asian landmass.

In addition to explaining the historical pattern of Japanese foreign policy, the hierarchic explanation generates a different set of questions about Japan's future. For example, could Japan tilt toward China? Could Japan see the United States as the real threat to its survival? If Washington were to pressure Tokyo to take sides in an increasingly acrimonious U.S.-China relationship, it is [End Page 77] not clear that Japan would antagonize a geographically proximate power for the sake of a tenuous alliance with a distant power. 63 In fact, there is evidence that Japan does not view its relationship with the United States as purely positive. There is also increasing evidence that the Japanese do not fear a strong China as much as they do a strong United States. A May 1995 Yomiuri Shimbun poll found that 26.6 percent of Japanese identified the United States as a security threat to their country, whereas only 21.3 percent identified China as a threat. 64 In countering the assumption that Japan has no choice but to rely on the United States, former Prime Minister Yashuiro Nakasone has said that "a worm can turn." 65 A more recent opinion poll by Asahi Shimbun in May 2001 found that 74 percent of the Japanese public opposed revision of article 9 of the constitution (which prohibits Japan from using force "as means of settling international disputes"). 66 And in a magazine article, politician Ozawa Ichiro, who makes no mention of China, does mention the need for multilateralism to protect Japan from "Anglo-Saxon principles." 67

As to whether Japan could tilt toward China, Ted Galen Carpenter writes, "[U.S.] officials who assume that a more active Japan will be an obedient junior partner of the United States are in for an unpleasant surprise. Tokyo shows signs of not only being more active on the security front, but also of being more independent of the United States. Nowhere is that trend more evident than with respect to policy toward China." 68 For example, Japan has made clear that it does not wish to be drawn into any conflict over the status of Taiwan. In fact, the United States cannot count on Japan to support or provide bases in the event of a China-Taiwan conflict. 69 Japanese cooperation with China is increasing [End Page 78] in other ways as well. Bilateral trade volume between Japan and China in 1997 amounted to $570 billion, fifty-two times greater than in 1972. China is now Japan's second-largest trading partner, and Japan ranks as China's largest trading partner. Moreover, China is the largest recipient of Japanese investment in Asia. 70

Japan is neither normal nor abnormal, militaristic nor pacifist. Its survival and economic health are best provided by a stable order. Neither China nor the United States threatens Japan militarily. Thus Japan has not seen fit to rearm extensively, despite its capacity to build aircraft carriers and nuclear weapons. 71 Furthermore, Japan has shown no signs of balancing against China.

South Korea, Vietnam, and Their Nonbalancing Behavior

Given the lack of evidence of Japanese balancing, might other countries in Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia—particularly South Korea and Vietnam—seek to balance China? First, if forced to choose between the United States and China, it is unclear which state either country would support. Second, **the importance of the U**nited **S**tates **in curtailing an Asian arms race may be overstated**. If the United States pulls out of the region, **China could take a greater role in organizing the system, and the countries of Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia would adjust—with order preserved.**

#### Unilateralism sustains primacy—states bandwagon for fear of rising powers—multilat decreases burden-sharing

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Understanding which of these choices—soft balancing against the hegemon or alignment with the hegemon—is more prevalent among second-tier states has significant ramifications for the endurance of American hegemony. The record of the 2001–2009 period indicates that a wide range of second-tier states not only aligned with the United States, they strengthened their security cooperation in a manner that extended the reach of the us military at a time when American foreign policy was widely seen as unilateral. 3 In addition, they did so by incurring certain costs that helped to spread the burden of maintaining the American hegemonic system. This pattern of alignment with the United States has implications for the endurance of American hegemony because states aligned with the United States may have more at stake in the maintenance of American hegemony than the United States itself. A smaller American naval presence in the Asia Pacific region, for example, may be seen as a relatively minor shift in the United States with some beneficial budgetary savings. In Vietnam, Australia, or the Philippines, however, such a shift could prompt a wholesale reevaluation of national defense policy and have costly implications. Therefore, second-tier states have an incentive to participate in activities that extend the endurance of American hegemony, even if they do not receive a formal security guarantee for their efforts.

This may have implications for American foreign policy. There are distinct policy recommendations flowing from the logic of those scholars and policy professionals who argue that a more proactive and unilateral foreign policy speeds the decline of American hegemony. The most important of these is that the United States should practice a policy of self-restraint that defers to international organizations, which would alleviate concerns about the current preponderance of the United States in the international system. 4 A policy of self-restraint would signal that the United States is not a threat to other major powers and preclude attempts at balancing. This policy would also help to set a norm for the behavior of future great powers and recognize the emerging reality of a multipolar world. 5 Another policy implication from this line of reasoning is that the United States should reduce its global military presence that both encourages balancing behavior by other states and speeds hegemonic decline by draining financial resources. 6

Yet, this policy of restraint may be precisely what would cause second-tier states to question the utility of their security relationship with the United States and move away from policies that help to maintain American hegemony. This could at least partially explain the trend of states moving to establish closer security relationships with the United States in the 2001–2009 period, when it was at its most proactive and least deferential to international organizations. States may logically conclude that a hegemon willing to project power regardless of international opinion will be likely to use its power in the defense of the hegemony that is in the interest of second-tier states. Second-tier states might be far less willing to contribute to the maintenance of American hegemony if the United States behaves in a manner that raises doubts as to the durability of its commitments or its willingness to use its power in the international arena. Thus, what would trigger a serious decline in the cooperation that helps to sustain American hegemony would be a self-imposed reduction in the ability of the United States to project power and an increased reluctance to use its power in support of its national interests.

#### The world is becoming plural, not multipolar—we can maintain unipolar leadership because challengers are regionally focused

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The theory that the world is moving from a unipolar order, dominated by the United States, to a multipolar distribution of power has led to a robust debate concerning the consequences of this change on the international order. However, the global power distribution is currently following a different pattern. Instead of what is conventionally addressed as a global unipolar to multipolar shift, in fact rising powers are mainly regional powers, not global ones, although they may have global reach. This pattern should be expected to continue in the near future and should be accounted for in order to make sound policy.

It follows that the movement away from a unipolar world should not be equated with one in which more global powers contend with each other; nor should it be equated with a world in which new powers take over from an old, declining power. Moreover, it should not be assumed that the world will be less ordered. Instead, to a significant extent, the change seems to be toward more regional autonomy, or increased devolution, and greater variety in the relationships between the United States and regional powers. These relationships may see regional powers serve as junior partners to the global power and assume some of the global power's regional responsibilities. Or these relationships may produce junior adversarial regional powers that seek greater relative regional control in defiance of the United States, but seek at most limited realignment of power on the global stage.

In the process of devolution, the increase in regional self-government and pluralism are much less challenging to the global power than [\*14] the redistribution of power implied by multipolarity. Indeed, as junior regional powers increasingly act as partners and assume regional responsibilities, they enable the global power to scale back its global commitments without losing much of its weight in international developments. Similarly, the desire for regional control among rising powers can be more readily accommodated than aspirations to challenge the United States as a global superpower.

It must be noted that the notion of devolution as used here is that of an ideal, n1 and as such there will be significant variation in its real-world instantiations. However, the process of devolution suggests a logical pattern of behavior for all actors involved, upon which various powers can construct a viable strategy.

While the movement from a uni- to a multipolar distribution of global power is considered by some to be "positive" and more supportive of international institutions, n2 others consider it as "negative" and likely to lead to confrontation between the declining power and the rising ones. n3 In truth, the move to a higher level of regional pluralism is a double-edged sword. The effect of the transformation depends on the particular accommodation pattern that develops between each regional power and the global power. As indicated previously, this pattern can vary from that of a junior partner to that of a regional antagonist.

Stated in other terms, if unipolarity is compared to hierarchy and multipolarity is compared to flat systems or networks, regional pluralism is analogous to increased subsidiarity.

Importantly, the accommodation pattern between the global superpower and regional powers is fundamentally different from the one between declining and rising global powers. In the former case, the regional powers do not seek to modify or replace the global rules or change the global distribution of public goods. Instead, they aim merely to gain local exemptions from the rules, variants in the ways they are applied, or increases in their share of distributed benefits. Superpowers may prove unwilling to accommodate such regional challenges and regional challengers may hold that they have been insufficiently accommodated. [\*15] However, such global/regional accommodations are, in general, easier to reach than the global/global accommodations between declining and rising global powers, and thus are less likely to lead to outright conflicts. With devolution, the central power yields, therefore risking much less when pluralism increases than when a transition from uni- to multipolarity takes place. This is one of the principle strengths of pluralism.

## 2nc

### 2nc impact extension

#### Studies

**Royal 10** – Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow.

First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modclski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin, 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fearon. 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner, 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown.

Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996. 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult  to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4

Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write:

The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89)

Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg. Hess. & Weerapana. 2004). which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions.

Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. 'Diversionary theory' suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1990, DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force.

In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.' This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

#### Economic decline causes global totalitarianism and turns the case

Tilford 8 — Earl Tilford, military historian and fellow for the Middle East and terrorism with The Center for Vision & Values at Grove City College, served as a military officer and analyst for the Air Force and Army for thirty-two years, served as Director of Research at the U.S. Army’s Strategic Studies Institute, former Professor of History at Grove City College, holds a Ph.D. in History from George Washington University, 2008 (“Critical Mass: Economic Leadership or Dictatorship,” Published by The Center for Vision & Values, October 6th, Available Online at http://www.visionandvalues.org/2008/10/critical-mass-economic-leadership-or-dictatorship/, Accessed 08-23-2011)

Nevertheless, al-Qaeda failed to seriously destabilize the American economic and political systems. The current economic crisis, however, could foster critical mass not only in the American and world economies but also put the world democracies in jeopardy.

Some experts maintain that a U.S. government economic relief package might lead to socialism. I am not an economist, so I will let that issue sit. However, as a historian I know what happened when the European and American economies collapsed in the late 1920s and early 1930s. The role of government expanded exponentially in Europe and the United States. The Soviet system, already well entrenched in socialist totalitarianism, saw Stalin tighten his grip with the doctrine of "socialism in one country," which allowed him to dispense with political opposition real and imagined. German economic collapse contributed to the Nazi rise to power in 1933. The alternatives in the Spanish civil war were between a fascist dictatorship and a communist dictatorship. Dictatorships also proliferated across Eastern Europe.

In the United States, the Franklin Roosevelt administration vastly expanded the role and power of government. In Asia, Japanese militarists gained control of the political process and then fed Japan's burgeoning industrial age economy with imperialist lunges into China and Korea; the first steps toward the greatest conflagration in the history of mankind ... so far ... World War II ultimately resulted. That's what happened the last time the world came to a situation resembling critical mass. Scores upon scores of millions of people died.

Could it happen again? Bourgeois democracy requires a vibrant capitalist system. Without it, the role of the individual shrinks as government expands. At the very least, the dimensions of the U.S. government economic intervention will foster a growth in bureaucracy to administer the multi-faceted programs necessary for implementation. Bureaucracies, once established, inevitably become self-serving and self-perpetuating. Will this lead to "socialism" as some conservative economic prognosticators suggest? Perhaps. But so is the possibility of dictatorship. If the American economy collapses, especially in wartime, there remains that possibility. And if that happens the American democratic era may be over. If the world economies collapse, totalitarianism will almost certainly return to Russia, which already is well along that path in any event. Fragile democracies in South America and Eastern Europe could crumble.

A global economic collapse will also increase the chance of global conflict. As economic systems shut down, so will the distribution systems for resources like petroleum and food. It is certainly within the realm of possibility that nations perceiving themselves in peril will, if they have the military capability, use force, just as Japan and Nazi Germany did in the mid-to-late 1930s. Every nation in the world needs access to food and water. Industrial nations -- the world powers of North America, Europe, and Asia -- need access to energy. When the world economy runs smoothly, reciprocal trade meets these needs. If the world economy collapses, the use of military force becomes a more likely alternative. And given the increasingly rapid rate at which world affairs move; the world could devolve to that point very quickly.

#### The shutdown means their modeling advantage fails

**Applebaum, 10/3/13 –** Washington Post Opinion Writer (Anne, “The GOP endangers democracy”http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/anne-applebaum-the-gop-endangers-democracy/2013/10/02/a2e46c92-2b78-11e3-8ade-a1f23cda135e\_story.html)

Obamacare is the law, as confirmed by the executive, legislative and judicial branches of our political system. A portion of one of those branches is not now legally or morally empowered to change that law by holding other parts of the government hostage, no matter how strongly its members or their constituents feel. So how is it possible that so many Americans, including some who have been elected to Congress, no longer understand this principle, which is fundamental to our political system and vital to the functioning of democracies? I repeAT: Democracy is not designed to reflect majority opinion. It is designed to filter majority opinion through legitimate institutions and to translate it, through agreed procedures, into policy.

Plenty of people outside the United States understand how strange this debate has become. A couple of days ago, an American Egyptian (@salamamoussa) tweeted that it was “Impressive how everyone in #US follows the law even in the face of extreme political vandalism by an irrational fringe. #Egypt.” I think he meant this comment ironically, but actually, he was right. In many parts of the world — Egypt, for example — members of the “irrational fringe” who tried to subvert the political system by overturning a law already confirmed by three branches of government would be called “insurgents” or “coup plotters,” and their behavior would lead to arrest, prison or worse.

But because Americans, even irrational Americans, no longer use violence to achieve their goals, and because this process is still — just barely — taking place within the boundaries of those institutions and because the protagonists still observe the language — if not always the spirit — of the law, the result is peaceful. That is indeed impressive. But it is a narrow achievement.

Americans are paying a high price for this week’s events. The cost of shutting down the federal government, for a few days or even a few weeks, pales in comparison to the damage done to the credibility of the United States abroad — and the credibility of democracy itself.

### 2nc key to economy

#### Hitting the ceiling causes an immediate recession from prioritization attempts – and subsequent collapse of confidence and economic catastrophe from default

**Krugman, 9/29/13** – Nobel Prize winning economist (Paul, “Rebels Without a Clue” New York Times,

<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/30/opinion/krugman-rebels-without-a-clue.html>

Still, a government shutdown looks benign compared with the possibility that Congress might refuse to raise the debt ceiling.

First of all, hitting the ceiling would force a huge, immediate spending cut, almost surely pushing America back into recession. Beyond that, failure to raise the ceiling would mean missed payments on existing U.S. government debt. And that might have terrifying consequences.

Why? Financial markets have long treated U.S. bonds as the ultimate safe asset; the assumption that America will always honor its debts is the bedrock on which the world financial system rests. In particular, Treasury bills — short-term U.S. bonds — are what investors demand when they want absolutely solid collateral against loans. Treasury bills are so essential for this role that in times of severe stress they sometimes pay slightly negative interest rates — that is, they’re treated as being better than cash.

Now suppose it became clear that U.S. bonds weren’t safe, that America couldn’t be counted on to honor its debts after all. Suddenly, the whole system would be disrupted. Maybe, if we were lucky, financial institutions would quickly cobble together alternative arrangements. But it looks quite possible that default would create a huge financial crisis, dwarfing the crisis set off by the failure of Lehman Brothers five years ago.

**It would be legitimate default—substitute measures wouldn’t reassure markets**

**Milstead 9-12** [David, Writer for the Globe and Mail, “The under-the-radar threat to U.S. stocks” Factiva]

Conventional wisdom holds that the chief risk to the high-flying U.S. stock market is “tapering,” the potential cutback of the Federal Reserve's bond-buying program. It's an understandable view, given how the Fed's monetary policy has propped up the country's economy for years by helping to keep long-term interest rates at ultra-low levels. But it's also wrong. The greatest immediate hazard to stocks isn't the direction the six governors of the Federal Reserve will take. It's what the 535 members of Congress will do in the coming weeks when faced with two budgetary issues that ought to be routine – but will likely be anything but. The first issue is approving a federal budget for the fiscal year that begins Oct. 1, or at least a resolution that will keep the government open in its absence. The second is authorizing a new, higher number for the U.S. government's borrowing before Washington hits its debt ceiling, once again, possibly by mid-October. In the absence of such a vote, the U.S. must simply stop spending – and, in essence, default on its debt. If this sounds familiar, it's because we went through a similar showdown two years ago, in the summer of 2011. Yet it's easy to forget now how that fiscal gridlock roiled the markets. In the first day of trading after Standard & Poor's downgraded U.S. debt in early August, the S&P 500 fell nearly 7 per cent. The day after, the index was nearly 19 per cent below the level of early July. The rhetoric suggests this fiscal showdown could inflict similar damage. Eighty House Republicans recently signed a letter urging their leadership to use any new government-funding bill to cut all necessary money for President Barack Obama's signature accomplishment, the Affordable Care Act, more popularly known as Obamacare. The Republican House leadership, it is said, does not support such a move. That's apparently because they prefer to make it part of the showdown over the debt ceiling. (The National Review, one of the U.S.'s leading conservative publications, reported Tuesday that Eric Cantor, the House Majority Leader, told Republicans they will be demanding a one-year delay of Obamacare in exchange for an increase in the debt ceiling.) Failing to raise the debt ceiling doesn't mean default, its opponents argue. The Treasury can just do a better job of “prioritizing,” paying the creditors while axing other expenses. In the absence of a higher debt ceiling, the U.S. could pay the interest on Treasury securities, and keep on footing the tab for Medicare and Medicaid, Social Security, national defence and a handful of aid programs, according to the Bipartisan Policy Centre. But, starting Oct. 15, it won't be able to afford the salaries of other federal workers, or perform functions like road construction and air traffic control, or run the federal court system. Ted Yoho, the improbably named Republican representative from Florida, said this about a failure to raise the debt ceiling, according to a recording of one of his summertime town hall meetings leaked to the Huffington Post: “So they say that would rock the market, capital would leave, the stock market would crash … I think our credit rating would do better.” Better, I think, to take the U.S. Treasury's position that the markets will view the U.S. picking and choosing which bills to pay as an admission it simply can't pay them all. Deputy secretary Neil Wolin said during the last debt-ceiling showdown, in 2011, that **it “would merely be default by another name**.” That, however, is the view from the reality-based community, rather than the deeply irrational, anti-intellectual element that has hijacked the Republican Party and turned ordinary budgetary procedure into a partisan brawl. The liberal economic writer Jonathan Chait recently wrote “the chaos and dysfunction have set in so deeply that Washington now lurches from crisis to crisis, and once-dull, keep-the-lights-on rituals of government procedure are transformed into white-knuckle dramas that threaten national or even global catastrophe.” And yet stocks seem to be priced as if Democrats, Republicans and President Obama will come together to work something out. There is great faith that the United States will overcome its challenges and take the right path in the end. Investors could suffer double-digit losses in the coming weeks if that faith is misplaced.

#### It would wreck all forms of business confidence

**Davis, 9/23/13** (Susan, USA Today, “Clock ticking on shutdown, with 'Obamacare' center stage;

GOP ties health care law to two budget deadlines” lexis)

However the stopgap spending bill is resolved, soon after it lurks a fiscal fight that holds greater consequences to the U.S. and global economies. "Shutting down the government is one bad thing, but you shut it down, you open it up again," said Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi, D-Calif., "Not lifting the debt limit is unleashing a torrent, a river of no return. It is beyond cataclysmic." The nation has never defaulted. Though the exact impacts are unclear, there is broad consensus among economists, financial markets and most lawmakers that it would upend the markets. "If you don't raise the debt limit in time, you will be opening an economic Pandora's Box. It will be devastating to the economy," Moody's economist Mark Zandi testified before a congressional panel last week. He explained the consequences: "Consumer confidence will sharply decline, investor confidence, business confidence. Businesses will stop hiring, consumers will stop spending, the stock market will fall significantly in value, borrowing costs for businesses and households will rise."

### AT: Unilateral executive action

#### Obama won’t do it and it wouldn’t solve

**Reuters, 9/30/13** (“White House says raising debt cap unilaterally would be suspect”

<http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/30/us-usa-fiscal-debtceiling-idUSBRE98T0XO20130930>)

(Reuters) - The White House on Monday rejected as lacking in credibility any steps by President Barack Obama to raise the country's debt ceiling on his own should Congress fail to do so before a mid-October deadline.

"Even if the president could ignore the debt ceiling, the fact that there is significant controversy around the president's authority to act unilaterally means that it would not be a credible alternative to Congress raising the debt ceiling and would not be taken seriously by the global economy and markets," White House spokesman Jay Carney told reporters.

### 2nc uniqueness wall

#### Obama is winning because he’s controlling the message through a consistent focus

**Diermeier, 10/4/13 -** IBM Distinguished Professor of Regulation and Competitive Practices at Northwestern's Kellogg School of Management; he also holds appointments in law and political science and directs Kellogg's Ford Motors Center for Global Citizenship (Daniel, “How a game theorist would solve the shutdown showdown” <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/10/04/how-a-game-theorist-would-solve-the-shutdown-showdown/>)

So looking at confrontations like the current one on the shutdown, and the coming one on the debt ceiling, one analogy I've heard people use is the game of chicken, where two cars are driving at each other and the first one to swerve away loses. Swerving is worse for you than not swerving, but if nobody swerves then you die. Similarly, John Boehner doesn't want to "swerve" (pass a clean continuing resolution or debt ceiling increase) and Obama doesn't want to "swerve" (sign a CR that defunds Obamacare, or sign a non-clean debt ceiling increase), but if neither swerves, then the shutdown continues and/or we default. Is that a fair analogy?

That's the most basic way to think about it. When we think about the Cuban missile crisis, it kind of has that flavor. You could also call it a war of attrition, which is a more dynamic version of that. Those are appropriate analogies to a certain extent, but what they're missing is the specific nature of the U.S. political system and how public opinion plays a critical role in how damaging it is to be intransigent. It's not helpful for understanding the structural reasons why this is happening.

The really critical question is whether the Republicans are going to stay together. There's a spectrum, of course, depending on your district and what your primaries will look like, from more extreme to more moderate, but they've been more able to maintain a level of party discipline that's unusual compared to the '60s, '70s and '80s. But at what point will the moderate Republicans peel off? Will they stay together, or will they feel so much backlash in their districts at this point, and hear from their constituencies, that the political calculus just doesn't work anymore? That, to me, is the big question.

To a large extent that will depend on how effective the Obama administration is in shifting public opinion. It depends on (a) how catastrophic they think breaching the debt ceiling is and (b) who they're blaming for that. So I think this bargaining game will be determined by how successful the two sides are in shifting public opinion.

Who do you think is doing better at managing that so far?

So far it's going better for the Obama administration. You have these incidents of people being unable to get into national parks or Arlington National Cemetery, the Army/Navy games jeopardized. There are things where people say, "Ooh this is very bad," or "This is crazy." These are important because they give salience to the issue. The sequester didn't have anything like that. There wasn't anything symbolic that really caught people's attention and gave a sense of, "This is really wrong. We need to stop this." These small things, though they're economically not very significant, can shift public opinion because they reinforce how serious this is.

#### Polling data and GOP budget proposals prove Obama is winning

**Chait, 10/4/13** – politics writer for New York Magazine (Jonathan, New York Magazine, “Yes, the White House Is ‘Winning’” <http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2013/10/yes-the-white-house-is-winning.html>

The shutdown news of the day so far is that a White House official boasted to The Wall Street Journal, “We are winning ... It doesn't really matter to us" how long the shutdown lasts "because what matters is the end result.” This is a sort of gaffe, partly true and partly false. The government shutdown has a non-zero-sum result, in that it hurts lots of Americans. It’s also a zero-sum contest between the parties. Now, one of the ways you win the zero-sum contest is by not declaring you’re winning the zero-sum contest and thus opening yourself to the charge of indifference to the negative-sum effects.

Still, it is true that the Obama administration is winning the zero-sum contest. One way to measure this is polling, which already shows movement toward the Democratic side. Another way to measure it is that Republicans, who have spent months refusing any budget deal, are suddenly desperate to make a budget deal. A flurry of Republican proposals have been leaked or floated by or to Politico, Jonathan Ward, and Republican adviser Yuval Levin.

Republicans are looking to make a budget deal now because they want to escape the political nightmare they’ve created for themselves. They blustered into a shutdown that corrodes their party brand and cracks the door to flip the House, which ought to be otherwise impregnable in a low-turnout midterm election. They can’t figure out how to back down without winning concessions the Democrats have no incentive to give them. Then they need to lift the debt ceiling, where they’ve raised even loftier expectations, and where the Democrats are even more determined not to be held hostage. Their only way out is to fold everything into a negotiation, give the Democrats something, and hold up whatever they win as a trophy that made it all worthwhile.

#### Syria problems are a distant memory - strength in the current fight gives him a major political edge

**O’Brien, 10/1/13 –** Political Reporter for NBC News (Michael, “Winners and losers of the government shutdown” <http://nbcpolitics.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/10/01/20763839-winners-and-losers-of-the-government-shutdown?lite>)

Nonetheless, after two-and-a-half years of standoffs and gridlock, the fact that a shutdown has finally come to pass — 17 days before Congress must also raise the debt ceiling, no less — could upend politics with unforeseen consequences for many of this fight's key players. Here is a look at some of the shutdown's winners and losers. Winners: President Barack Obama At the end of the day, Obama's signature domestic achievement — the Affordable Care Act — survived this fight intact. What's more, the president didn't have to offer any concessions in exchange for leaving his namesake "Obamacare" law alone. Unlike the 2011 debt-ceiling fight, when the administration agreed to the automatic spending cuts that would eventually form the basis of the sequester, this time the administration held the line and didn't yield much ground to Republicans. The developments mark a somewhat stunning turnaround for Obama's political fortunes over the last month. Just a few week's ago, the administration was struggling badly to win congressional approval for intervention in Syria — an initiative which had no less than Obama's second-term relevance riding on it. Now, Obama has dispensed with the Syria issue (for now) through diplomacy, and scored a major win over Republicans -- a rare victory, given the waning prospects for immigration reform or major gun control legislation during his presidency.

#### Pressure building in the GOP to have Boehner waive the Hastert rule

**Clift, 9/30/13** (Eleanor, “No Exit Plan for Boehner as Government Shutdown Begins” The Daily Beast,

<http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/09/30/no-exit-plan-for-boehner-with-clock-ticking-to-government-shutdown.html>

House Speaker John Boehner still can’t find an exit plan that can save the country from unnecessary grief, the Republican Party from what polls suggest is a losing tactic, and his job as leader. Conventional wisdom has it that Boehner is worried about his own skin, and that’s why he won’t support a “clean CR,” legislative speak for a continuing resolution to fund the government without attaching language to delay Obamacare. On Monday afternoon, with the ball back in Boehner’s court, President Obama came to the White House briefing room to issue yet another of his stern statements to Congress. “You don’t get to exact a ransom for doing your job,” he said, “or because there’s a law here you don’t like.” All it would take is Boehner working with Nancy Pelosi to get Democratic support for that clean CR. That would mean abandoning the so-called Hastert Rule, named after former House speaker Dennis Hastert, that no legislation is brought to the House floor without a majority of Republican votes. Boehner has violated the rule at least twice before, most recently to approve federal funds for the victims of Hurricane Sandy. “Has anybody asked Denny Hastert, does he think the Hastert Rule should be applied in this case?” asks Vin Weber, a former Republican congressman. “Shutting down government and not compromising is antithetical to Denny. He was a workhorse. The main criticism of him as speaker [is] he wasn’t enough of a show horse. This is not how he ever would have reacted.” Boehner is listening to a significant following within the GOP caucus who didn’t live through the 1995–96 shutdown and the damage it did to the Republican Party, Weber says. “He’s got to give time for pressure to build on the majority of the caucus to insist on a way out of this confrontation. Then it will be time to move. Maybe one more round,” Weber guesses. “Pressure is building in the Republican conference.” Until now, the pressure on Republicans has come from the right and from outside organizations such as Heritage Action, Americans for Prosperity, and the Club for Growth, demanding they not compromise. Now that the shutdown has become a reality, Republicans will hear from a broader slice of the American people. Weber has known Boehner for more than 20 years and says he expects the speaker to make his move and waive the Hastert Rule once his caucus cries uncle. “It’s a mistake to look at anything Boehner’s doing as a desperation move to keep the speakership,” says Weber. “He’s been speaker, and he doesn’t feel particularly threatened.” Boehner has history on his side: no speaker has ever been forcibly removed. If he loses the confidence of his caucus, he would likely step aside, as former speaker Newt Gingrich did after Republicans lost seats in the 1998 midterm elections. What is driving the speaker, say his allies, is holding the GOP conference together, coupled with concerns about who might succeed him in this hyperpartisan era, especially if that decision arises in the heat of the moment. “I think he worries about not just his own survival but the question of who would replace him, that it could be someone far more intransigent,” says Jack Pitney, a former Republican staffer who now teaches government at Claremont McKenna College. If the Hastert Rule, an invention of the 1990s, had been in effect when Ronald Reagan was president, Democratic Speaker Tip O’Neill would never have allowed key elements of the Reagan agenda to come to the floor with a majority of Democrats opposed, Pitney points out. Boehner may find a life raft in an unpopular 2.3 percent tax on medical devices that has garnered bipartisan support, or a Hail Mary pass to put members of Congress and their staffs onto Obamacare, but Obama appears to be in no mood to negotiate with a gun to his head, and for now, Boehner looks as if he’s flailing. “I doubt there is any way he comes out of this stronger,” says Pitney. “The best he can hope for is survival.”

### 2nc PC/Focus internal link

#### And capital is key to that effort – capital’s not just about bargaining – it’s about focus – the plan’s expenditure of capital prevents Obama from maintaining a consistent message on the debt ceiling – it means he’ll lose the ability to ask for favors

**Moore, 9/10/13 -** Guardian's US finance and economics editor.(Heidi, “Syria: the great distraction” The Guardian, <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/10/obama-syria-what-about-sequester>)

The country will crash into the debt ceiling in mid-October, which would be an economic disaster, especially with a government shutdown looming at the same time. These are deadlines that Congress already learned two years ago not to toy with, but memories appear to be preciously short. The Federal Reserve needs a new chief in three months, someone who will help the country confront its raging unemployment crisis that has left 12 million people without jobs. The president has promised to choose a warm body within the next three weeks, despite the fact that his top pick, Larry Summers, would likely spark an ugly confirmation battle – the "fight of the century," according to some – with a Congress already unwilling to do the President's bidding. Congress was supposed to pass a farm bill this summer, but declined to do so even though the task is already two years late. As a result, the country has no farm bill, leaving agricultural subsidies up in the air, farmers uncertain about what their financial picture looks like, and a potential food crisis on the horizon. The two main housing agencies, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, have been in limbo for four years and are desperately in need of reform that should start this fall, but there is scant attention to the problem. These are the problems going unattended by the Obama administration while his aides and cabinet members have been wasting the nation's time making the rounds on television and Capitol Hill stumping for a profoundly unpopular war. The fact that all this chest-beating was for naught, and an easy solution seems on the horizon, belies the single-minded intensity that the Obama White House brought to its insistence on bombing Syria. More than one wag has suggested, with the utmost reason, that if Obama had brought this kind of passion to domestic initiatives, the country would be in better condition right now. As it is, public policy is embarrassingly in shambles at home while the administration throws all of its resources and political capital behind a widely hated plan to get involved in a civil war overseas. The upshot for the president may be that it's easier to wage war with a foreign power than go head-to-head with the US Congress, even as America suffers from neglect. This is the paradox that President Obama is facing this fall, as he appears to turn his back on a number of crucial and urgent domestic initiatives in order to spend all of his meager political capital on striking Syria. Syria does present a significant humanitarian crisis, which has been true for the past two years that the Obama administration has completely ignored the atrocities of Bashar al-Assad. Two years is also roughly the same amount of time that key domestic initiatives have also gone ignored as Obama and Congress engage in petty battles for dominance and leave the country to run itself on a starvation diet imposed by sequestration cuts. Leon Panetta tells the story of how he tried to lobby against sequestration only to be told: Leon, you don't understand. The Congress is resigned to failure. Similarly, those on Wall Street, the Federal Reserve, those working at government agencies, and voters themselves have become all too practiced at ignoring the determined incompetence of those in Washington. Political capital – the ability to horse-trade and win political favors from a receptive audience – is a finite resource in Washington. Pursuing misguided policies takes up time, but it also eats up credibility in asking for the next favor. It's fair to say that congressional Republicans, particularly in the House, have no love for Obama and are likely to oppose anything he supports. That's exactly the reason the White House should stop proposing policies as if it is scattering buckshot and focus with intensity on the domestic tasks it wants to accomplish, one at a time.

#### The plan disrupts Obama’s attempt to prioritize the debt ceiling by consuming political capital

**Frumin, 9/21/13 –** reporter for MSNBC (Aliyah, “Bright prospects on foreign agenda; domestic in chaos” <http://tv.msnbc.com/2013/09/21/bright-prospects-for-obama-on-foreign-agenda-domestic-in-chaos/>)

Conservative strategist Keith Appell said having a full plate is just part of being president and his legacy is at risk because his number one priority of improving the economy has not been significantly addressed.

Fixing the economy, he said, could arguable be pegged to how much political capital he has on the issues Obama is currently facing (Syria, Iran, debt ceiling, gun control). “But certainly, if you’re talking about legacy, unless there is an overwhelming foreign policy situation like the Cold War, then it’s all about the economy.”

But Jeanne Zaino, a professor of political science at Iona College and of political campaign management at New York University said “Every time Obama tries to refocus on the economy, there’s these enormous crises that break out. You can just imagine how frustrating that can be and how it’s been difficult for him to prioritize.”

“It’s not only the amount he has on his plate. It’s that he doesn’t’ have the ability to get anything done without Congress,” she added.

### net benefit

#### Treaties cost capital

**VOETEN ’12** (Erik; 12/19, <http://themonkeycage.org/2012/12/19/why-has-the-obama-administration-secured-so-few-treaty-ratifications/>)

John Bellinger, the legal adviser for the State Department from 2005 to 2009, laments in this morning’s New York Times that the Obama administration has secured Senate approval for the fewest number of treaties of any President since World War II: The Obama administration has been slow to submit new treaties to the Senate, and only nine have been approved so far. In contrast, the George W. Bush administration secured Senate approval of 163 treaties over eight years. These included not only bilateral treaties but also multilateral agreements on many important subjects, including human rights, atmospheric and marine environmental protection, the laws of war and arms control. So why is it that a President who promised to be more multilateralist than his predecessor has failed on this score? One answer is that Presidents, including Obama, are increasingly relying on executive agreements, which do not require Senate approval (see this article by Jeffrey S. Peake, Glen S. Krutz, and Tyler Hughes). Another reason surely is, as Belinger puts it, that: [..] an increasing number of Republicans had come to view treaties in general (especially multilateral ones) as liberal conspiracies to hand over American sovereignty to international authorities. Yet Bellinger also argues that: It isn’t enough to blame Republican opposition to international agreements, which certainly has risen among the party’s senators in recent years. That trend only makes it more important that President Obama work harder to gain Senate support for treaties in his second term. The idea that it is indeed hard work to pass treaties is supported by a recent working paper by Judith Kelley and Jon Pevehouse. Passing a treaty isn’t a simple matter of tallying the votes. The Senate’s agree and consent process takes away legislative time and political capital that could be used for other, perhaps more valuable, legislation. This opportunity cost theory yields some interesting and counterintuitive hypotheses. Presidents should become less likely to advance treaties when their approval ratings are high and when their party controls the Senate because that is the time when they can pass more valuable legislation on domestic issues. Kelley and Pevehouse find strong support for these patterns in their analysis with data from 1967-2008. I suspect that Bellinger is correct that the Obama Administration could have persuaded a few Republicans to switch sides on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities if it had expended more time and capital on the treaty. This is not just about Republican opposition but also about priorities in the Obama Administration, which have, rightly or wrongly, been more on the domestic side.

### asteroids

**No extinction—tech solves**

**Coates 2009** – former adjunct professor at George Washington University, President of the Kanawha Institute for the Study of the Future and was President of the International Association for Impact Assessment and was President of the Association for Science, Technology and Innovation, M.S., Hon D., FWAAS, FAAAS, (Joseph F., Futures 41, 694-705, "Risks and threats to civilization, humankind, and the earth”, ScienceDirect, WEA)

The most likely hit from a modest sized asteroid does not leave us without recourse. There is active research now on how to influence and what to do when we are faced with an impending asteroid hit. Keep in mind that because of the astronomical distances, paths can be extremely closely calculated while the asteroid is still far away in time and space. We could send up spacecraft to intersect and act on the threatening asteroid. One concept being developed is the gravity tractor, a large machine that would not land on the asteroid, but would create a gravity situation in which the asteroid would slowly move to a slightly different track, enough of a move to take a path avoiding the earth.

The risk of a threatening impact is incredibly low – any dangerous objects are the ones that we can already track.

Schweickart & Graham ‘8 (Thomas, Council of American Ambarssadors, and Russell L., Chairman of the B612 Foundation. “NASA's Flimsy Argument for Nuclear Weapons” Scientific American Magazine, <http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=nasas-flimsy-argument-for-nuclear-weapons> February 08, 2007)

Nuclear explosives would be needed only for deflecting the largest NEOs, which are the least common and most easily detectable objects. Scientists are not concerned about a collision with an extremely large NEO—say, 10 kilometers in diameter—because all these objects have been discovered and none currently threatens Earth. Big things are easy for astronomers to find; the smaller objects are what we have to worry about./Of the estimated 4,000 NEOs with diameters of 400 meters or more—which includes all objects that might conceivably require nuclear explosives to divert them—researchers have so far identified about 1,500. And if NASA meets the search goals mandated by Congress, it will locate 98 percent of these objects and calculate 100-year projections of their orbits by 2020. As NASA continues to find big NEOs, the calculations of risk change accordingly. A decade ago, before astronomers began to systematically locate NEOs larger than 400 meters in diameter, they estimated that we faced a statistical risk of being struck by such an object once every 100,000 years. But now that researchers have identified and are tracking about 37 percent of these NEOs, the frequency of being hit by one of the remaining large objects has dropped to once in 160,000 years. Unless NASA finds a large NEO on an immediate collision course by 2020 (a very unlikely event), the frequency of a collision with one of the 80 still undiscovered objects (2 percent of 4,000) will drop to once every five million years.

**No evidence that asteroid strike would cause extinction—even if they did we have 40**

**million years to prepare**

**BENNETT 2010** (James, Prof of Economics at George Mason, *The Doomsday Lobby: Hype and Panic from Sputniks, Martians, and Marauding Meteors*, p. 144-145)

It should be noted that the Alvarez et al. hypothesis was not universally accepted. As Peter M. Sheehan and Dale A. Russell wrote in their paper “Faunal Change Following the Cretaceous–Tertiary Impact: Using Paleontological Data to Assess the Hazards of Impacts,” published in Hazards Due to Comets & Asteroids (1994), edited by Tom Gehrels, “many paleontologists resist accepting a cause and effect relationship” between the iridum evidence, the Chicxulub crater, and the mass extinction of 65 million years ago.15 For instance, Dennis V. Kent of the Lamont–Doherty Geological Observatory of Columbia University, writing in Science, disputed that a high concentration of iridium is necessarily “associated with an extraordinary extraterrestrial event” and that, moreover, “a large asteroid… is not likely to have had the dire consequences to life on the earth that they propose.”16 Briefly, Kent argues that the Alvarez team mistakenly chose the 1883 Krakatoa eruption as the standard from it extrapolated the effects of stratospheric material upon sunlight. Yet Krakatoa was too small a volcanic eruption from which to draw any such conclusions; better, says Kent, is the Toba caldera in Sumatra, remnant of an enormous eruption 75,000 years ago. (A caldera is the imprint left upon the earth from a volcanic eruption.) The volume of the Toba caldera is 400 times as great as that of Krakatoa – considerably closer to the effect that an asteroid impact might have. Yet the sunlight “attenuation factor [for Toba] is not nearly as large as the one postulated by Alvarez et al. for the asteroid impact.” Indeed, the Toba eruption is not associated with any mass extinctions, leading Kent to believe that “the cause of the massive extinctions is not closely related to a drastic reduction in sunlight alone.”17 Reporting in Science, Richard A. Kerr wrote that “Many geologists, paleontologists, astronomers, and statisticians… find the geological evidence merely suggestive or even nonexistent and the supposed underlying mechanisms improbable at best.” Even the iridium anomalies have been challenged: Bruce Corliss of the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute argues that the major extinctions associated with the K–T event were not immediate and catastrophic but “gradual and apparently linked to progressive climate change.”18 Others argue that a massive volcanic event predating the Alvarezian killer asteroid created an overwhelming greenhouse effect and set the dinosaurs up for the knockout punch. A considerable number of scientists believe that gradually changing sea levels were the primary cause of the K–T Extinction. If either of these hypotheses is true – and a substantial number of geologists hold these positions — then the “killer asteroid” is getting credit that it does not deserve. Even if the K–T Extinction was the work of a rock from space, the Alvarez team credits a “probable interval of 100 million years between collisions with 10-km-diameter objects.”19 The next rendezvous with annihilation won’t be overdue for about 40 million years. We have time.

### 2nc unilat key

#### Unilateralism spurs greater burden sharing – makes heg sustainable

**Seldena, 13** – assistant professor of political science at the University of Florida (Zachary, “Balancing Against or Balancing With? The Spectrum of Alignment and the Endurance of American Hegemony” Security Studies Volume 22, Issue 2, 2013, Taylor and Francis)

During the 2001–2009 period when American foreign policy was internationally unpopular and perceived as unilateral, many states strengthened their security cooperation with the United States and facilitated the reach of the us military. This behavior spans a range of actions along a spectrum from reaffirming traditional alliances to far more subtle forms of alignment. This pattern is in large part driven by the actions of regional powers such as Russia and China whose rising power pushes neighboring states to seek the assurance of the United States, and it has distinct implications for the endurance of American hegemony. As those regional powers seek to expand their influence, secondary states may increase their contributions to the maintenance of American hegemony, thus helping to extend it well into the future. They are less prone to do so, however, if the United States follows a strategy of restraint that calls into question its willingness to defend its hegemony. Therefore, a policy focused on maintaining American military preeminence and the demonstrated willingness to use it may be what sustains the cooperation from second-tier states that helps to maintain American hegemony.

### verifiable

#### It’s verifiable

Pindjak 10 – PhD Candidate @ Pitt

(Peter, “The Ultimate High Ground and Space Arms Control,” http://oilprice.com/Geopolitics/International/The-Ultimate-High-Ground-And-Space-Arms-Control.html)

Meanwhile, at the 2008 Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, China and Russia introduced an actual space arms control treaty entitled the Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT). The treaty bans placement of any type of weapons in outer space, but it allows for deployment of ground-, sea- and air-based ASAT systems as an inherent right of self-defense embodied in Article 51 of the UN Charter. ¶ At first, this provision may appear bizarre, but in fact, the treaty strives to curtail a prospective arms race in space, while imposing no limits on defensive programs such as ballistic missile defense. In the US, missile defense has become a strong bi-partisan effort that could hardly be restrained by an outside party; however, sacrificing deployment of space-based missile defense elements with destructive power – such as kinetic interceptors and high-power lasers – in exchange for a comprehensive weapons placement ban in outer space might be a reasonable tradeoff.¶ Although the previous administration responded to the PPWT proposal rather unwillingly, the Obama administration’s change of negative vote to abstention for the PAROS resolution signifies a change. Obama has no interest in reviving an arms race. Indeed, arms control and disarmament are high on his agenda. Having just signed the New START Treaty that currently awaits ratification in the Senate, one may expect his genuine effort to engage in the PPWT negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament.¶ But Obama will have to confront political opposition. Missile defense advocates will argue that space is the best domain for pursuing boost phase intercept initiatives, and prompt global strike proponents will assert that orbital weapons will give the US an unmatched military capability greatly enhancing its national security.¶ Some arms control critics have already pointed out that the PPWT would be unverifiable. But one must remember that the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, which bans the “placement” of WMDs in outer space and on celestial bodies, includes no verification mechanism and has been known to work well. It appears that it is rather the intrinsic peer-pressure of signatories not to violate an international treaty of strategic importance that provides for a strong guarantee of compliance.¶ After all, the sophisticated US Space Situational Awareness (SSA) system would certainly be capable of detecting most if not all prospective attacks originating from hostile spacecraft. While the “placement” of weapons in outer space would continue to be unverifiable, a violation of the PPWT would most likely be detected by the US and also by Russia and China as they continue to improve their space surveillance capabilities.

#### That takes out the aff

**Forden 2007** – writer for Arms Control Today (Geoffrey, “After China's Test: Time For a Limited Ban on Anti-Satellite Weapons. Arms Control Today, April 2007, <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_04/Forden>**)**

Missile defenses also pose an obstacle to making diplomatic progress on ASAT weapons systems. The United States believes these defenses are critical to protecting itself from attacks by rogue states, but China fears they could also be used to deter it in any conflict with the United States, such as over Taiwan.[[**10**](http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_04/Forden.asp#Note10)] In recent years, China, at first alone but later with Russia, has made several proposals to the United Nation's Conference on Disarmament on possible elements for a future treaty banning the weaponization of space. At times, the proposals have taken in all U.S. missile defenses, not merely U.S. consideration of deploying space-based interceptors.

Beijing 's and Moscow 's June 2001 proposal, for example, required signatories not to “test, deploy or use in outer space any weapons, weapon systems, or their components.”[[**11**](http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_04/Forden.asp#Note11)] As part of the proposed treaty, a list of definitions was offered that included defining outer space as starting at an altitude of 100 kilometers and a weapon as any device or facility that could “strike, destroy or disrupt directly the normal functions of a target.” These definitions are hardly controversial, but they would ban the United States from even testing its current defense shield, which is supposed to strike and destroy an incoming warhead at altitudes far higher than 100 kilometers.

#### Arms control treaties are unenforceable, destroy heg and deterrence and don’t solve motives of adversaries

**Kueter and Plieninger 2005** -- \*president of the George C. Marshall Institute, a Washington-based nonprofit organization that specializes in national security and environmental issues, AND \*\* executive research analyst at the institute (Jeff, Andrew, “Saving Space:Securing our Space Assets.” Marshall Institute, http://www.marshall.org/pdf/materials/318.pdf)

Russia and China clearly see a role for an international framework to govern space. Arms control advocates are using the renewed interest in space issues to repeat the mantra that the United States is hell-bent on deploying weapons, that such actions are dangerous and unnecessary and that only a treaty can restrain our aggressive tendencies. Fortunately, all these claims are flat wrong. Too many of the arguments demanding that our country pre-emptively and unilaterally disarm itself in space sound very much like old Cold War ideologies recycled for the target du jour.

It has long been a favorite tactic to thoroughly radicalize the very doctrine of the Armed Forces designed to protect our country. Caution is somehow transformed into reckless abandon; preparedness into aggressive posturing.

Lastly, the United States should resist calls for a new international treaty prohibiting the deployment of weapons in space, as Russia and China demand. **Such a treaty is unenforceable and compliance to its structures virtually unverifiable.**

The ignominious record of enforcing and verifying treaties prohibiting activities on Earth is proof enough to give pause to any conversation about a treaty governing activities in space. A treaty also would fail to address the chief reason an adversary would seek access to space in the first place – namely, the potential for inflicting a crippling blow against U.S. military and economic might by decapitating our surveillance and communications abilities.

Instead, a treaty would eliminate the U.S.’s ability to defend against or deter such threats by precluding the necessary development of space systems and doctrine.

Treaty proponents and arms controllers contend that the technological sophistication of the United States would allow for quick reaction against any other nation deploying weapons to space. While the United States has few peers today in space operations,

the ease of putting systems into space is greatly overestimated by this view.

## 1nr

### warming

#### Domestic problems undercut both Chinese and U.S. action

**Hale, 11** - PhD Candidate in the Department of Politics at Princeton University and a Visiting Fellow at LSE Global Governance, London School of Economics (Thomas, “A Climate Coalition of the Willing,” Washington Quarterly, Winter,http://www.twq.com/11winter/docs/11winter\_Hale.pdf

Intergovernmental efforts to limit the gases that cause climate change have all but failed. After the unsuccessful 2010 Copenhagen summit, and with little progress at the 2010 Cancun meeting, it is hard to see how major emitters will agree any time soon on mutual emissions reductions that are sufficiently ambitious to prevent a substantial (greater than two degree Celsius) increase in average global temperatures.

It is not hard to see why. No deal excluding the United States and China, which together emit more than 40 percent of the world’s greenhouse gases (GHGs), is worth the paper it is written on. But domestic politics in both countries effectively block ‘‘G-2’’ leadership on climate. In the United States, the Obama administration has basically given up on national cap-and-trade legislation. Even the relatively modest Kerry-Lieberman-Graham energy bill remains dead in the Senate. The Chinese government, in turn, faces an even harsher constraint. Although the nation has adopted important energy efficiency goals, the Chinese Communist Party has staked its legitimacy and political survival on raising the living standard of average Chinese. Accepting international commitments that stand even a small chance of reducing the country’s GDP growth rate below a crucial threshold poses an unacceptable risk to the stability of the regime. Although the G-2 present the largest and most obvious barrier to a global treaty, they also provide a convenient excuse for other governments to avoid aggressive action. Therefore, the international community should not expect to negotiate a worthwhile successor to the Kyoto Protocol, at least not in the near future.

### topicality

#### Lloyd doesn’t apply – it merely says that the Air Force has a space team – it is about a single element of the Air Force, which the plan text doesn’t mandate

#### The solvency mechanism for the plan proves they are broader than just the air force space team, allows them garner unfair strageic benefit while skirting neg offense

#### Still links to our offense – including weapon systems in the definition makes the topic unmanageable – allowing things under the jurisdiction of parts of the armed forces allows nukes and causes a massive topic shift

#### Lloyd is outdated, from 99 – where Lorber is a comprehensive definition from 2013

#### Doesn’t defined “armed forces”, just “forces” – the terms are distinct – that’s 1nc Lorber – armed forces is a term of art in the rez – proves you don’t meet your counter interp – vote neg on jurisdiction

#### Links to our limits offense – their evidence concedes that the plan is “other forces” not, forces and that it includes stuff like satellites – creates a whole new topic

**US Defense Report 3**

(RESOURCES ALLOCATED TO MISSION AND SUPPORT ACTIVITIES, http://www.iwar.org.uk/military/resources/us-defense-report/2003/14\_Appendix\_Resources\_Allocated.pdf)

Section 113(l) of Title 10, United States Code, requires the Department of Defense¶ (DoD) to identify resources allocated to mission and support activities in each of the five¶ preceding fiscal years. In response to that requirement, Appendix C provides year-byyear comparisons of: ¶ • DoD funding (in constant dollars) allocated to forces and infrastructure (Table ¶ C-1).1¶

\*\*\*footnote inserted\*\*\*

FORCE CATEGORIES¶ • Expeditionary Forces. Operating forces designed primarily for nonnuclear ¶ operations outside the United States. Includes combat units (and their organic¶ support) such as divisions, tactical aircraft squadrons, and aircraft carriers. ¶ • Deterrence and Protection Forces. Operating forces designed primarily to deter ¶ or defeat direct attacks on the United States and its territories. Also includes¶ those agencies engaged in U.S. international policy activities under the direct ¶ supervision of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. ¶ • Other Forces. Includes most intelligence, space, and combat-related command, ¶ control, and communications programs, such as cryptologic activities, satellite ¶ communications, and airborne command posts.

#### Also includes cyberspace which proves a topic coherence da if their interpretation is correct, then including ‘offensive cyber operations’ in the topic would be redundant and unnecessary, since cyber command falls under the uniformed services – this means their interpretation isn’t predictable

**USSTRATCOM, 13** (“U.S. Cyber Command” current as of August, http://www.stratcom.mil/factsheets/Cyber\_Command/)

USCYBERCOM is a sub-unified command subordinate to U. S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). Service elements include: Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER); Air Forces Cyber (AFCYBER); Fleet Cyber Command (FLTCYBERCOM); and Marine Forces Cyber Command (MARFORCYBER). The Command is also standing up dedicated Cyber Mission Teams to accomplish the three elements of our mission.

#### Restrictions on war powers could include restrictions on any weapons system – nuclear weapons, land mine bans, cluster bombs, chemical weapons – it’s why we need a ‘human’ limit

**Lobel, 8** - Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh Law School (Jules, “Conflicts Between the Commander in Chief and Congress: Concurrent Power over the Conduct of War” 392 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:391, <http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2012/04/69.3.lobel_.pdf>)

The third theory—based on the distinction between general rules and specific tactics—also has surface appeal, but is unworkable when applied to specific issues because the line between policy and tactic is too amorphous and hazy to be useful in real world situations. For example, how does one decide whether the use of waterboarding as a technique of interrogation is a policy or specific tactic? Even if it is arguably a specific tactic, Congress could certainly prohibit that tactic as antithetical to a policy prohibiting cruel and inhumane treatment. So too, President Bush’s surge strategy in Iraq could be viewed as a tactic to promote a more stable Iraq, or as a general policy which Congress should be able to limit through use of its funding power. Congress can limit tactical decisions to use particular weapons such as chemical weapons, nuclear weapons, or cluster bombs by forbidding the production or use of such weapons, or simply refusing to fund them.42 Congress could also, however, enact more limited and specific restrictions to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons or land mines in a particular conflict or even a particular theater of war. Indeed, most specific tactics could be permitted or prohibited by a rule. In short, the distinctions between strategies and tactics, rules and detailed instructions, or policies and tactics are simply labels which are virtually indistinguishable. Labeling an activity with one of these terms is largely a distinction without a difference. Accordingly, these labels are not helpful to the real problem of determining the respective powers of Congress and the President.43

#### Ground – troops are the true controversy:

Lorber, JD University of Pennsylvania, January 2013

(Eric, “Executive Warmaking Authority and Offensive Cyber Operations: Can Existing Legislation Successfully Constrain Presidential Power?” 15 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 961, Lexis)

The broad purpose of the Resolution aimed to prevent the large-scale but unauthorized deployments of U.S. troops into hostilities. n187 While examining the broad purpose of a legislative act is increasingly relied upon only after examining the text and legislative history, here it provides further support for those two alternate interpretive sources. n188 As one scholar has noted, "the War Powers Resolution, for example, is concerned with sending U.S. troops into harm's way." n189 The historical context of the War Powers Resolution is also important in determining its broad purpose; as the resolutions submitted during the Vietnam War and in the lead-up to the passage of the WPR suggest, Congress was concerned about its ability to effectively regulate the President's deployments of large numbers of U.S. troops to Southeast Asia, n190 as well as prevent the President from authorizing troop incursions into countries in that region. n191 The WPR was a reaction to the President's continued deployments of these troops into combat zones, and as such suggests that Congress's broad purpose was to prevent the unconstrained deployment of U.S. personnel, not weapons, into hostilities.