## \*\*2AC\*\*

**Two-thousand years of history prove**

William **Wohlforth 8** Daniel Webster Professor of Government, Dartmouth. BA in IR, MA in IR and MPhil and PhD in pol sci, Yale, Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War, October 2008, World Politics Vol. 61, Iss. 1; pg. 28, 31 pgs, Proquest

Despite increasingly compelling findings concerning the importance of status seeking in human behavior, research on its connection to war waned some three decades ago.38 Yet **empirical studies of the relationship between** both systemic and dyadic **capabilities distributions and war have continued to cumulate. If the relationships implied by the status theory run afoul** of well-established patterns or general historical findings, **then there is little reason to continue investigating them. The clearest empirical implication** of the theory **is that** status **competition is unlikely to cause great power military conflict in unipolar systems. If status competition is an important contributory cause of great power war, then,** ceteris paribus, **unipolar systems should be markedly less war-prone** than bipolar or multipolar systems. And this appears to be the case. As Daniel Geller notes **in a review of the empirical literature: "The only polar structure that appears to influence conflict probability is unipolarity."**39 In addition, a larger number of studies at the dyadic level support the related expectation that narrow capabilities gaps and ambiguous or unstable capabilities hierarchies increase the probability of war.40 These studies are based entirely on post-sixteenth-century European history, and most are limited to the post-1815 period covered by the standard data sets. Though the systems coded as unipolar, near-unipolar, and hegemonic are all marked by a high concentration of capabilities in a single state, these studies operationalize unipolarity in a variety of ways, often very differently from the definition adopted here. **An ongoing collaborative project looking at ancient interstate systems over** the course of **two thousand years suggests** **that** **historical systems** **that come closest to** the definition of unipolarity used here **exhibit precisely the** **behavioral** **properties implied by the theory**. 41 As David C. Kang's research shows, the **East Asian system between 1300 and 1900 was** an unusually stratified **unipolar** structure, **with** an economic and militarily dominant **China interacting with** a small number of geographically proximate, clearly weaker East Asian **states**.42 Status politics existed, but actors were channeled by elaborate cultural understandings and interstate practices into clearly recognized ranks. **Warfare was exceedingly rare, and the major outbreaks occurred precisely when the theory would predict: when China's capabilities waned**, reducing the clarity of the underlying material hierarchy and increasing status dissonance for lesser powers. Much more research is needed, but initial exploration of other arguably unipolar systems-for example, Rome, Assyria, the Amarna system-appears consistent with the hypothesis.43 Status Competition and Causal Mechanisms **Both theory and evidence demonstrate convincingly that competition for status is a driver of human behavior, and social** identity **theory** and related literatures **suggest** the **conditions under which it might come to the fore in great power relations.** Both the systemic and dyadic findings presented in large-N studies are broadly consistent with the theory, but they are also consistent with power transition and other rationalist theories of hegemonic war.

### Terror: A2 “Mueller”

**Mueller’s wrong—Cherry Picks his arguments**

Hugh **Gusterson**, February 20**11**, Anthropologist on Nuclear Culture, International Security and Anthropology of Science at George Mason University “Atomic Escapism” American Scientist, Volume 99, Number 1, pg.72 Lexis

**Reading John Mueller’s Atomic Obsession is like going through the looking glass with Alice.** Examining the conventional wisdom about nuclear weapons from the other side of the looking glass, Mueller tells us that their destructiveness has been exaggerated; that the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were of marginal importance in ending World War II; that “nuclear weapons have been of little historic consequence,” and that the United States and the Soviet Union would not have gone to war even in the absence of nuclear deterrence; that arms-control treaties are usually a waste of time and effort; that the dangers of nuclear proliferation are greatly exaggerated; that sanctions aimed at stopping countries from seeking nuclear weapons make it more likely that they will pursue them; and, finally, that “the likelihood a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be vanishingly small.”¶ **In arguing against atomic “alarmism” and the inclination “to wallow in a false sense of insecurity,” Mueller has something to annoy everyone**. Conservatives can take umbrage at his arguments that the bombing of Hiroshima was unnecessary to end World War II and that the Cold War nuclear buildup was not needed to deter the Soviets. Liberals can be upset by the claim that arms-control treaties are pointless and sometimes even counterproductive.¶ The challenge in reading Mueller’s book is to separate insights that are deviant but useful (some of his deconstructions of the conventional wisdom are genuinely insightful) from arguments that are deviant because they are exaggerated, misshapen or just plain wrong. Many of Mueller’s sharp-edged points about the hyping of the dangers of nuclear proliferation and terrorism fall into the first (insightful) category, but his critiques of arms control and his apparent smugness about all nuclear dangers belong in the latter.¶ Mueller argues that liberals and conservatives have joined in exaggerating the danger and importance of nuclear weapons; they have used our fears over the years to justify unnecessary weapons programs and arms-control negotiations, a counterproductive invasion of Iraq, and now bloated counterterrorism initiatives. **He builds his argument atop an exercise in counterfactual history, maintaining that nuclear weapons were unnecessary to keep the peace during the Cold War, because both superpowers would have been deterred from war anyway by memories of the carnage of World War II, and because the Soviet Union was too risk-averse to chance an invasion of Europe**. (**He does not ask whether Soviet nuclear weapons might have deterred the United States from starting a war with the Soviets**.) **Those who know Cold War history in its rich complexity will be infuriated by the simplifications, omissions and blithe assumptions in this exercise in intellectual casuistry, which brings to mind not the work of a scholar seriously weighing evidence, but the efforts of a high-school debate team to push a contrived point of view as far as possible.¶** The most original, incisive and interesting part of the book is the last third, in which Mueller slashes through the hype that guides much public discourse and policymaking about the risk of nuclear terrorism. He points out that a foreign government is unlikely to give a nuclear weapon to a terrorist group because of the danger that, as supplier, that country would invite retaliation against itself. He also uses the writings of several nuclear scientists, including the former Los Alamos division leaders Carson Mark and Steve Younger, to argue that it would be prohibitively difficult for a small terrorist group that lacked state sponsorship to acquire the subtle engineering knowledge needed to overcome the technical challenges involved in turning black-market nuclear material into a workable nuclear weapon. Many scientific experts not cited here by Mueller would take issue with that argument. And having read one of the articles that Mueller does cite—“Can Terrorists Build Nuclear Weapons?,” by J. Carson Mark and others (1987)—I am of the opinion that it does not, in fact, support Mueller’s argument. Furthermore**, in dismissing the case for a terrorist nuclear threat, Mueller does not adequately address the possibility that a terrorist group seeking a bomb might have access to a scientist with nuclear-weapons experience from another state as an adviser or team member.** Still, by pointing out the importance of tacit and esoteric knowledge to the success of such an endeavor**, Mueller is making an important challenge to glib assumptions about the ease with which a terrorist group, even if it had access to uranium and plutonium, might be able to make a bomb.¶** **Mueller fails to discuss another possibility:** that **a rogue element within a state, not the state leadership itself, might sell an intact nuclear weapon to which it has access**. **This scenario is far from speculative**: After the fall of the Berlin wall, a Soviet soldier guarding nuclear weapons in East Germany offered to sell an atomic warhead to the antinuclear organization Greenpeace; Greenpeace wanted to buy the weapon and display it to show the dangers of nuclear proliferation. They were arranging payment and transportation when the warhead in question was abruptly removed from East Germany by the Soviets. It is, sadly, all too typical of Mueller’s style of argument that he makes his case with copious references to any literature that supplies evidence supporting his point of view, but he ignores inconvenient facts and arguments.¶ We see something similar **in Mueller’s discussion of arms-control treaties**. He **regards such treaties as bureaucratically unwieldy and argues that states often only agree to them when they involve no real sacrifice or merely codify what the state already intended to do**. **He bases this argument largely on a discussion of the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, which forced nuclear testing underground but did nothing to curtail the nuclear arms race, and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Agreement (SALT I), which limited missiles but not the newly miniaturized warheads packed several to a missile, which were the real problem.¶** **Mueller has cherry-picked his treaties here. Why not discuss the Outer Space Treaty, which preempted a nuclear arms race in space?** And what about the 1988 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which eliminated an entire category of nuclear weapons from Europe, much to the chagrin of hardliners in both superpowers? Above all, **why not discuss the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty (the existence of which, astonishingly, is never mentioned in Mueller’s book)?** The ABM Treaty was widely seen by arms-control advocates as having headed off an expensive and destabilizing race between offensive and defensive weapons during the Cold War.¶ The strengths and weaknesses **of Mueller’s argument collide most jarringly in his discussion of nuclear proliferation.** **He is entertaining when he catalogs decades of dire predictions from experts about a coming cascade of countries crossing the nuclear threshold—predictions that have failed to come true, although this has not deterred contemporary pundits from re-sounding the alarm.** And we need to think seriously about his argument that sanctions intended to deter nuclear proliferation killed hundreds of thousands of civilians in Iraq and North Korea while increasing the attractiveness of nuclear weapons to the paranoid leaders of those countries; the remedy may be worse than the disease.¶ But **surely Mueller goes too far, and his polemical casuistry becomes dangerous, when he argues that sanctions and treaties are largely unnecessary because most countries have freely eschewed proliferation, recognizing that nuclear weapons are “militarily useless, and a spectacular waste of money and scientific talent.”** Although he is surely right that nuclear weapons are overrated and often fail to bring the bargaining power and military strength their owners seek, some countries (whether because they are in a bad neighborhood or have a bad regime) have spared no expense to seek them. **And when a country acquires them, this puts pressure on rivals and neighbors to seek them too** (as Pakistan did in response to India, for example). **There can be a collective logic that forces individual countries to make choices they would rather not. The importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, for which Mueller shows so little respect, is that it releases countries from the prisoner’s dilemma here: The treaty and its inspection provisions give confidence to countries who want to eschew nuclear weapons as long as they can be sure that their rivals do so too**. This is why Brazil and Argentina both joined the treaty regime in the 1990s, for instance.¶ In short, **Mueller has a gimlet eye for hype about nuclear weapons but is blind to their very real dangers. His book, which should sport a “don’t-worry-be-happy” smiley face rather than a scrawled atom on the cover, counsels us in its final sentence that we are not in danger and should “sleep well**.” **Mueller seems to assume that, because there has not yet been an accidental nuclear war, because terrorists have not yet exploded a nuclear weapon, and because no country has used nuclear weapons since the United States bombed Nagasaki, we are safe**. Presumably BP executives talked the same way about the safety of deep-water drilling before April 20, 2010; Soviet engineers talked the same way about the safety of their nuclear reactors before April 26, 1986; and NASA engineers talked the same way about the safety of shuttle launches at low temperatures before January 28, 1986. **In regard to nuclear weapons, we have** arguably **been lucky**. **There have been several incidents in which U.S. planes carrying nuclear weapons have crashed or burned.** In 1995 the Soviets mistook a Norwegian weather rocket for a U.S. nuclear attack, and Boris Yeltsin found himself staring into the nuclear briefcase as his aides told him he might only have a few minutes to launch Russian nuclear weapons. And we now know that in the early years of the Cold War, there were senior U.S. military officers who wanted to preemptively attack the Soviet Union.¶ Mueller mocks those who warn of events that are possible but have not happened. “There is a ‘genuine possibility,’” he says, “that Osama bin Laden could convert to Judaism, declare himself to be the Messiah, and fly in a gaggle of Mafioso hit men from Rome to have himself publicly crucified.”¶ **If only nuclear disaster were that unlikely.**

**Bagram Addon: 2AC**

**Detentions at Bagram will prevent post-2014 Afghanistan troop presence**

**Sisk 13** (Richard, 1-4-13, "Afghan Jail a 'Tougher Problem Than Guantanamo'" Military.com) www.military.com/daily-news/2013/01/04/afghan-jail-a-tougher-problem-than-guantanamo.html

**With more than five times the** number of **prisoners than** the detention facility on **Guantanamo** Bay, **the U.S. jail next to Bagram Airfield is** just one of many factors **affecting the degree to which U.S. forces remain in Afghanistan after 2014.** President Obama and Afghan President Hamid Karzai will meet next week in the White House to discuss the fate of the prison, the pace of America’s withdrawal, and the size of the U.S. presence in Afghanistan after 2014. “The first thing is to establish how many will stay in Afghanistan” after 2014, said George Little, the chief Pentagon spokesman. Karzai has warned that he will not approve a troop agreement unless all Afghans in U.S. custody are turned over to his jurisdiction. A complicating factor is the U.S. custody of suspects who allegedly committed insider attacks against allied troops. These attackers, who often posed as Afghan police officers and soldiers, killed U.S. and allied troops at a record rate in 2012. The number of prisoners detained at the high-security, $60 million detention facility is a tightly protected figure. Afghan officials, prison administrators, International Security Assistance Force spokesmen, and senior Pentagon officials all have repeatedly declined comment in recent weeks on how many are held at the facility located next to Bagram Airfield. U.S. Combined Joint Interagency Task Force 435 is the unit assigned to run the detention facility. “As a matter of operational security, we do not discuss numbers of detainees transferred or currently held by CJIATF 435 or U.S. Forces,” said Col. Thomas Collins, an ISAF spokesman in Kabul. However, President Obama discussed the numbers in December. In one of his required periodic reports to Congress under the War Powers Act , Obama wrote on Dec. 14 that “United States Armed Forces are detaining in Afghanistan approximately 946 individuals under the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (Public Law 107-40) as informed by the law of war.” The vast majority of the 946 are detained by CJIATF 435. A small number of recently captured prisoners are kept at local commands until they can be transferred to the detention facility next to Bagram I n the Parawan province. Obama’s report did not state whether the prisoners were captured on the battlefield or were taken into custody for other reasons. “We do not talk about individual detainees and we do not discuss the provenance” of the prisoners’ presence in custody, said Lt. Col. Todd Brasseale, a Pentagon spokesman. Since 2005, Karzai has demanded that prisoners held by the U.S. and the NATO coalition be turned over to Afghan jurisdiction -- with the exception of foreign nationals who were captured in military operations. About one-third of the 946 in Parwan are thought to be foreign nationals, mostly Pakistani but also Yemenis and Saudis, Brasseale said. Karzai has said that he does not want custody of the foreign nationals. In November, Karzai called for "urgent actions” by the U.S. to release the prisoners in Parawan to his control. He said in a statement that the U.S. did not "have the right to run prisons and detain Afghan nationals in Afghanistan." **Karzai threatened to cancel the already difficult negotiations on a post-2014 presence for U.S. forces. A main sticking point to those negotiations involves “status of forces” -- whether U.S. troops in the residual force would be immune from Afghan law.** Iraq’s refusal to provide immunity forced the U.S. to remove military forces from Iraq. Karzai’s spokesman, Aimal Faizi, has said that **more than 70 detainees held by the U.S. under “administrative detention” have already been cleared of wrongdoing by Afghan courts. He said the U.S. had no justification for continuing to hold them since administrative detention was not recognized under Afghan law. "There are some prisoners found innocent by the court who are still in custody,” Faizi said.** “This act is a serious breach of a memorandum of understanding." The U.S. has not faced the same issue at Guantanamo, where the host nation of Cuba has not claimed jurisdiction of the alleged terrorists held on the naval base. Under U.S. court rulings and acts of Congress, many of the 166 prisoners at Naval Station Guantanamo Bay have been cleared to return to their own countries or to a third-party nation willing to take them pending agreements on their continued monitoring and detention. The rest of the prisoners at Gitmo, where the first 20 captives in the war on terror arrived in January 2002, can be tried before a military commission. There is no such prospect for the prisoners next to Bagram. “We have never held a military commission in Afghanistan and we don’t expect there will be one,” Brasseale said. A senior Pentagon official, speaking on background, said “our goal, eventually, is to turn all of the prisoners over” to the Afghans, but the official added that “there is not a mechanism currently in place” for achieving the goal. The Parwan prisoner impasse has left the U.S. in a legal and political bind under international law, the Geneva Conventions and the law of armed conflict, said Gary Solis, a former Marine Corps Judge Advocate General. “We are simply disregarding agreements with the Afghans,” said Solis, an adjunct professor at Georgetown University who also teaches the law of war at West Point. “There is no guidebook for this, no precedent for this situation.” For years, Parwan was a key factor in U.S. worldwide intelligence gathering operations, as interrogators grilled insurgents captured on the battlefield for information on Al Qaeda and the war on terror. In August 2009, Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal, then the coalition commander as head of the International Security Assistance Force, said Parwan was at risk of becoming a “strategic liability” for the U.S. McChrystal said the extrajudicial detentions at Bagram were eroding Afghan support for the allies. Under a Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S. and the Afghan governments reached last March, the U.S. was to have turned over all of the prisoners in September. This led to an awkward change of command ceremony at Parwan on Sept. 9, which Army Lt. Gen. Keith Huber, commander of CJIATF 435, declined to attend. The U.S. transferred about 3,000 prisoners to the Afghans. The U.S. held back more than 50 who were captured before March along with hundreds of others captured by U.S. forces between March and September. The Memorandum of Understanding called for the U.S. to turn over the entire Parwan jail to the Afghans, but the U.S. retained a section closed off to the Afghans. In the dispute over control of the Parwan facility, the U.S. stance has been that the Afghans might not be ready to manage the jail and that the corrupt Afghan justice system might hold trials that would result in the release of dangerous prisoners. In its latest “Report on Progress and Security and Stability in Afghanistan” to Congress last month, the Defense Department said “the Afghan judicial system continues to face numerous challenges.” The system is riddled with “systemic corruption at all levels resulting in a lack of political will to pursue prosecutions against many politically connected individuals,” the Defense Department report said. U.S. and Afghan officials declined comment on whether suspects in insider attacks by Afghan soldiers and police on coalition forces that have killed at least 62 allied troops last year were being held back for fear they would be turned loose. Several field commands said perpetrators in the attacks had been sent to Parwan. One such suspect was a 15-year-old boy allegedly working for the Taliban. A Marine spokesman said the boy had been sent to Parwan after he killed three Marines in southwestern Helmand province in August. According to the Long War Journal, at least 22 suspects in insider attacks have been captured, but U.S. and Afghan officials declined comment on their status. “No one is ever charged with anything so it’s difficult to know what they’re being held for” at Parwan, where prisoners “are not afforded even the minimal protections that the people at Guantanamo have,” said Heather Barr, a researcher in Kabul for Human Rights Watch, an independent advocacy group. Barr said she had attended sessions of the Detention Review Boards set up by the U.S. to determine the status of the prisoners, but the boards have never led to specific charges against prisoners. “We know of only one case that has gone to trial,” Barr said, and that case involved a prisoner, Abdul Sabor, who was captured by the French and handed over to the Afghans. Sabor, who allegedly killed five French troops in an insider attack last January, has been sentenced to death and his case is now under appeals in the Afghan courts, Barr said. Barr said the U.S. was “trying to bully the Afghans into setting up an administrative detention system” for high value prisoners that would allow them to be held indefinitely without the risk of a trial that might set them free. “The Afghan government has said it’s not going to do administrative detention, it’s unconstitutional under Afghan law,” Barr said. British officials have argued against transferring prisoners to the Afghans. In a November letter to Parliament, British Defense Secretary Phillip Hammond wrote that he was canceling future transfer of insurgents captured by British forces to the Afghans on grounds that they might be tortured. “There are currently reasonable grounds for believing that UK-captured detainees who are transferred to Lashkar Gah would be at real risk of serious mistreatment," Hammond said in a reference to the Afghan-run jail in the southwestern Helmand province capital of Lashkar Gah. U.S. Congressional leaders have expressed concerns that Afghan prisoners who still pose a threat might be released. In an August statement, Rep. Howard McKeon (R-Calif.), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, cited the release of a “high-value terrorist” by Iraq over U.S. objections. “We call upon the President and Secretary of Defense (Leon) Panetta to extend all efforts to ensure that this tragic mistake is not repeated with terrorists currently in U.S. custody in Afghanistan,” McKeon said. **The central question on the Afghan prisoner issue was whether “the U.S. courts are going to take notice of what’s going on in Afghanistan” as they did in setting minimal habeas corpus rights on the charges against prisoners in Guantanamo, said** Donald **Huber**, a former Navy judge advocate general and now dean of the South Texas College of Law.

**Withdrawal causes Afghan instability and terror**

**Curtis 13** (Lisa, senior research fellow, 7-10-13, "Afghanistan: Zero Troops Should Not Be an Option" Heritage Foundation) www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/07/afghanistan-zero-troops-should-not-be-an-option

The Obama Administration is considering **leaving no U.S. troops behind in Afghanistan after it ends its combat mission** there **in 2014**. This **would undermine U.S. security interests**, as it would **pave the way for the Taliban to regain influence in Afghanistan and ~~cripple~~ [badly hurt]** the U.S. ability to conduct **counterterrorism missions** in the region. President **Obama instead should commit the U.S. to maintaining a robust troop presence** (at least 15,000–20,000) in Afghanistan after 2014 in order to train and advise the Afghan troops and conduct counterterrorism missions as necessary. **The U.S. should** also **remain** diplomatically, politically, and financially **engaged** in Afghanistan in order to sustain the gains made over the past decade **and ensure that the country does not again serve as a sanctuary for international terrorists intent on attacking the U.S.** Flaring Tensions Fuel Poor Policy Decisions Tensions between the Obama and Karzai administrations have escalated in recent months. The U.S. Administration blundered in its handling of the opening of a Taliban political office in Doha in mid-June. In sending a U.S. delegation to Doha to meet with the Taliban leadership without the presence of the Afghan government, the Taliban appeared to be achieving its long-sought objective of cutting the Karzai administration out of the talks. The Taliban also scored a public relations coup by raising the flag associated with its five-year oppressive rule in front of the office. The episode angered Afghan President Hamid Karzai to the point that he pulled out of the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) talks with the U.S., thus fulfilling another Taliban goal of driving a wedge between the U.S. and Afghan governments. Karzai’s opposition to the U.S. talking unilaterally with the Taliban is understandable, but his decision to pull out of the BSA talks is misguided, since maintaining an international troop presence post-2014 is essential to the stability of the Afghan state and the ability of Afghan forces to protect against the use of its territory for international terrorism. The BSA talks are necessary to forge an agreement on a post-2014 U.S. troop presence. If the White House is publicizing its consideration of the zero-troop option to try to pressure the Karzai administration, it also is misguided in its negotiating tactics. The Afghans already believe the U.S. is likely to cut and run, similar to the way Washington turned its back on the Afghans over two decades ago when the Soviets conceded defeat and pulled out of the country. The Obama Administration’s failure to reach agreement with the Iraqi government on the terms for a residual U.S. force presence there highlights the White House’s poor track record in managing these kinds of negotiations. Taliban Talks a Masquerade The Taliban leadership has shown no sign that it is ready to compromise for peace in Afghanistan. The Taliban has refused to talk directly with the Karzai government, calling it a puppet of the U.S., and has shown little interest in participating in a normal political process. The Taliban appears to believe that it is winning the war in Afghanistan and simply needs to wait out U.S. and NATO forces. The insurgent leaders’ only motivation for engaging with U.S. officials appears to be to obtain prisoner releases and to encourage the U.S. to speed up its troop withdrawals. The Taliban has already scored tactical points through the dialogue process by playing the U.S. and Afghans off one another and establishing international legitimacy with other governments. Moreover, the Taliban has not tamped down violence in order to prepare an environment conducive to talks. In fact, in recent weeks Taliban insurgents have stepped up attacks. In early June, for instance, insurgents conducted a suicide attack near the international airport in Kabul, and two weeks later they attacked the Afghan presidential palace. Perseverance Required to Achieve U.S. Objectives As difficult as the job may be, it is essential that the U.S. remain engaged in Afghanistan. It would be shortsighted to ignore the likely perilous consequences of the U.S. turning its back on this pivotal country from where the 9/11 attacks originated. Moving forward, the U.S. should: Lay its cards down on the number of troops it plans to leave in Afghanistan post-2014. The White House should commit to keeping a fairly robust number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan over the next several years. Former U.S. Central Command chief General James Mattis made clear in recent remarks to Congress that he hoped the U.S. would leave behind around 13,500 troops and that other NATO nations would leave an additional 6,500 troops.[1] This would bring a total of around 20,000 international forces stationed in Afghanistan beyond 2014 to help with training and advising the Afghan forces. Encourage continued strengthening of the democratic process in the country rather than rely on the false hope of political reconciliation with the Taliban. The Taliban believe they will win the war in Afghanistan without compromising politically and through violent intimidation of the Afghan population, especially when U.S. and coalition troops are departing. Taliban leaders appear unmotivated to compromise for peace and indeed are stepping up attacks on the Afghan security forces and civilians. The White House should focus on promoting democratic processes and institutions that will directly counter extremist ideologies and practices. Integral to this strategy is supporting a free and fair electoral process next spring both through technical assistance and regular and consistent messaging on the importance of holding the elections on time. Further condition U.S. military aid to Pakistan on its willingness to crack down on Taliban and Haqqani network sanctuaries on its territory. There continues to be close ties between the Pakistani military and the Taliban leadership and its ally, the Haqqani network, which is responsible for some of the fiercest attacks against coalition and Afghan forces. In early June, the U.S. House of Representatives approved language in the fiscal year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act that conditions reimbursement of Coalition Support Funds (CSF) pending Pakistani actions against the Haqqani network. Hopefully, the language will be retained in the final bill. The U.S. provides CSF funds to reimburse Pakistan for the costs associated with stationing some 100,000 Pakistani troops along the border with Afghanistan. Pakistan has received over $10 billion in CSF funding over the past decade. Avoid Repeating History **The U.S. should not repeat the same mistake it made 20 years ago by disengaging abruptly from Afghanistan, especially when so much blood and treasure has been expended in the country over the past decade. There is a genuine risk of the Taliban reestablishing its power base and facilitating the revival of al-Qaeda in the region if the U.S. gives up the mission in Afghanistan.** While frustration with Karzai is high, U.S. officials should not allow a troop drawdown to turn into **a rush for the exits** that **would lead to greater instability in Afghanistan and** thus **leave the U.S. more vulnerable to the global terrorist threat.**

**Global nuclear war**

**Morgan 07** (Stephen J., Political Writer and Former Member of the British Labour Party Executive Committee, “Better another Taliban Afghanistan, than a Taliban NUCLEAR Pakistan!?”, 9-23, http://www.freearticlesarchive .com/article/\_Better\_another\_Taliban\_Afghanistan\_\_than\_a\_Taliban\_NUCLEAR\_Pakistan\_\_\_/99961/0/)

However events may prove him sorely wrong. Indeed, his policy could completely backfire upon him. **As the war intensifies,** he has no guarantees that **the current autonomy may** yet **burgeon into a separatist movement**. Appetite comes with eating, as they say. Moreover, should the Taliban fail to re-conquer al of Afghanistan, as looks likely, but captures at least half of the country, then **a Taliban Pashtun caliphate** could be established which **would act as a magnet to separatist Pashtuns in Pakistan**. Then, **the** likely **break up of Afghanistan** along ethnic lines, **could**, indeed, **lead** the way **to the break up of Pakistan, as well**. Strong centrifugal forces have always bedevilled the stability and unity of **Pakistan**, and, in the context of the new world situation, the country **could be faced with civil wars and** popular **fundamentalist uprisings**, probably **including a** military-fundamentalist **coup** d’état. Fundamentalism is deeply rooted in Pakistan society. The fact that in the year following 9/11, the most popular name given to male children born that year was “Osama” (not a Pakistani name) is a small indication of the mood. Given the weakening base of the traditional, secular opposition parties, conditions would be ripe for a coup d’état by the fundamentalist wing of the Army and ISI, leaning on the radicalised masses to take power. Some form of radical, military Islamic regime, where legal powers would shift to Islamic courts and forms of shira law would be likely. Although, even then, this might not take place outside of a protracted crisis of upheaval and civil war conditions, mixing fundamentalist movements with nationalist uprisings and sectarian violence between the Sunni and minority Shia populations. The nightmare that is now Iraq would take on gothic proportions across the continent. The prophesy of **an arc of civil war** over Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq **would spread to south Asia, stretching from Pakistan to Palestine, through Afghanistan into Iraq and up to the Mediterranean** coast. **Undoubtedly, this would** also **spill over into India** both with regards to the Muslim community and Kashmir. **Border clashes**, terrorist attacks, sectarian pogroms and insurgency **would break out. A** new war, and possibly **nuclear war**, between Pakistan and India **could no be ruled out**. Atomic Al Qaeda Should Pakistan break down completely, a Taliban-style government with strong Al Qaeda influence is a real possibility. **Such deep chaos would**, of course, **open a “Pandora's box” for** the region and **the world**. With the possibility of unstable clerical and military fundamentalist elements being in control of the Pakistan nuclear arsenal, not only their use against India, but Israel becomes a possibility, as well as the acquisition of nuclear and other deadly weapons secrets by Al Qaeda. Invading Pakistan would not be an option for America. Therefore **a nuclear war** would now again become a real strategic possibility. This would bring a shift in the tectonic plates of global relations. It **could usher in a new Cold War with China and Russia pitted against the US**.

### T

#### 1. We meet – NDAA provides authority, we restrict that

Martin Scheinin, Professor, International Law, “Should Human Rights Take a Back Seat in Wartime?” REAL CLEAR WORLD, interviewed by Casey L. Coombs, 1—11—12, [www.realclearworld.com/articles/2012/01/11/national\_defense\_authorization\_act\_scheinin\_interview-full.html](http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2012/01/11/national_defense_authorization_act_scheinin_interview-full.html), accessed 8-21-13.

The NDAA builds upon the well-established rule in international humanitarian law (law of armed conflict) that during an international armed conflict combatants, i.e. soldiers of one of the states involved in the war, can be detained as prisoners of war until the end of hostilities. When there is an international armed conflict and when someone is a combatant, then such detention does not amount to arbitrary detention that would violate international human rights law. The NDAA extends the possibility - even presumption - of indefinite detention to terrorism, far beyond genuine situations of international or even non-international armed conflict. And it extends indefinite detention to persons who are not combatants, or analogously situated persons in a non-international armed conflict. For instance, persons who are held to have provided substantial support to terrorism would be subject to indefinite detention. This approach has no support in the laws of war and will unavoidably result in what human rights law considers arbitrary detention and hence a violation of international treaties legally binding upon the United States, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

2. **Restricting authority requires reducing the permission to act**

**Taylor**, 19**96**  (Ellen, 21 Del. J. Corp. L. 870 (1996), Hein Online)

The term authority is commonly thought of in the context of the law of agency, and the Restatement (Second) of Agency defines both power and authority.'89 **Power refers to an agent's** ability or **capacity to produce a change** in a legal relation (whether or not the principal approves of the change), **and authority refers to the power given (permission granted) to the agent** by the principal to affect the legal relations of the principal; **the distinction is between what the agent can do and what the agent may do**.

**Presidential authority comes from congress or the constitution**

NAME: Laura A. **Cisneros 12**\* BIO: \* Associate Professor, Golden Gate University School of Law. Copyright (c) 2012 West Virginia Law Review West Virginia Law Review Winter, 2012 West Virginia Law Review 115 W. Va. L. Rev. 577 LENGTH: 33396 words ARTICLE: YOUNGSTOWN SHEET TO BOUMEDIENE: A STORY OF JUDICIAL ETHOS AND THE (UN)FASTIDIOUS USE OF LANGUAGE. Lexis

At this point, it is helpful to take a step back and examine some text that occurs earlier in the Medellin opinion. **Roberts prefaced his recitation** of Jackson's tripartite framework **by reaffirming Justice Black's now-classic formula for discerning the legal sources of presidential power:** "**The President's authority to act, as with the exercise of any governmental power, "must stem** [\*622] **either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution** itself.'" n200 Here, Roberts is structuring his opinion so as to maximize its rhetorical thrust and display its legal pedigree. Not only does he quote Justice Black's "first principle" of presidential authority from Youngstown, he also cites to Dames & Moore as additional legal support. With a simple string citation, Roberts places Dames & Moore, a decision battered by commentary critical of its expansive allowance of presidential power, n201 on equal footing with Youngstown, a decision viewed as one of the bulwarks against executive excesses. This is quite a balancing act, but one with a distinct purpose. By treating Dames & Moore as equal to and consistent with Youngstown, Roberts lays the groundwork for accepting Dames & Moore's use of the congressional acquiescence doctrine as a graft upon both Black's majority opinion and Jackson's concurrence in the earlier case.

#### 4. Prefer reasonability—the extent of war powers is hotly debated

NAME: David J. Barron and Martin S. Lederman 08 (David- Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. Martin- Visiting Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center ARTICLE: THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF AT THE LOWEST EBB - FRAMING THE PROBLEM, DOCTRINE, AND ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING Copyright (Harvard Law Review January, 2008 121 Harv. L. Rev. 689, Lexis.

That is not to say the scope of these inherent or independent war powers is determinate or uncontested. There remains a great deal of debate about the particulars of the President's independent war powers, and some of the specific questions (such as, especially, the power to initiate large-scale military engagements without prior legislative approval) are very important. For present purposes, however, there is no need to identify the exact list of the President's independent war powers - something that the constitutional text, in any event, can hardly be thought to do. Our interest instead is in determining whether the text has anything to say regarding the analytically distinct question of the extent to which these substantive executive war powers are subject to statutory regulation. On this question, the text is largely unhelpful. To be sure, one might conclude that the use of the root "command," when combined with the word "chief," suggests that the President's substantive powers are necessarily preclusive of statutory limitation. It might be thought [\*771] that a statutory directive or limitation is itself in some sense a "command" to the armed forces. But this reading of the text of Article II would beg a host of difficult questions. As an initial matter, such an interpretation offers no convincing account of what it means to "command." If the Commander in Chief is bound to act in conformity with statutory requirements concerning his use of troops in the field, it is not clear whether such statutes would infringe his power to command, or instead simply define that power. n258 A preclusive reading of the Commander in Chief Clause also fails to grapple with the fact that the text of Article I is rife with express references to the congressional role with respect to the army, navy, and militia, including specific war powers. n259 If the words of the Commander in Chief Clause were construed to give the President an illimitable power to establish the modes and means of waging war, they would render trivial these extensive Article I powers or, at most, read them merely to give the legislature the power to adopt advisory regulations that the President would be free to disregard at his discretion. n260 The potential for conflict between the overlapping textual authorities of the political departments is in this respect potentially instructive as to how best to construe the war powers provisions of Articles I and II - namely, in a manner consistent with the approach the Supreme Court has adopted in its modern doctrine. The Court has largely embraced [\*772] Justice Jackson's framework in Youngstown, in which the Commander in Chief Clause of Article II confers independent war powers that are subject to statutory limitations in an unspecified range of circumstances. This approach does not treat the text as resolving which branch possesses the ultimate power in a case of a conflict over the control of warfare. It assumes that such conflicts between the Article I and Article II war powers may well arise and that their resolution must be based on appeals to something other than the text of the Constitution itself. In other words, the text is probably best construed to make clear that both branches come to the table with plausible claims to authority, but it is impossible to tell from the words of the document alone which one, if either, has a conclusive argument for primacy.

**Mignolo K: 2AC**

**Their criticism ignores the liberatory potential of western thought. The perm solves best by allowing strategic movement in and out of western thought-Latin America proves.**

**Alcoff 07**

(Linda Martín Alcoff, Syracuse University, CR: The New Centennial Review, Volume 7, Number 3, Winter 2007, Mignolo’s Epistemology of Coloniality, Project Muse)

But I would press Mignolo on two points. The first concerns his notion of truth. **Mignolo rejects the project of reclaiming epistemology and advocates for the shift to gnoseology, because he sees epistemology as fundamentally a project that is pursuant of truth, and because he sees truth as necessarily imperial, territorial, and denotative. But it is difficult to interpret Mignolo’s own project in any way other than as a project concerned with truth and with** [End Page 97] **the way in which the colonial systems of knowing inhibited and precluded both the understanding and the identification of truth.** The denotative approach might have limited application to the shift he has in mind, but there is still an epistemically based normative distinction operating in his critique of the coloniality of power.¶ Take for example Mignolo’s use of Glissant’s concept of diversality, a concept he contrasts to universality but also to plurality in which alternatives are not in active integration or interaction. Diversality maps differences as coconstitutive and as potentially integrated, in the way that a bicultural identity can shift between multiple frames of reference without collapsing the differences but also without organizing them into hierarchies. As opposed to imperial resolutions, Glissant wants to maintain the fundamental ambiguity of colonial identity, that doubled reality that is alive to more than one “here and now.” This is not merely an ethically or politically motivated alternative to universality, I want to suggest, but a metaphysically motivated one. It is an alternative model for conceptualizing subjectivity and knowledge that might make sense of the existence of many worlds as well as to make visible their interrelationality and connectedness. This surely has political advantages, but it also can make possible an advance in descriptive adequacy for pluritopic horizons.¶ Thus I would **contest Mignolo’s claim that truth is out of the picture. And I would argue against the shift from epistemology to gnoseology** (rather than redefining epistemology) if it is mainly motivated by a desire to dispense with truth. However, what is important here is not the word we use for the project so much as retaining the normative epistemic content to the project of critique and reconstruction that Mignolo and other postcolonialists want to pursue. If gnoseology can retain the critical and normative dimensions that aim to improve our understanding of truth, as well as the more inclusive aims in regard to forms of knowing, then I am on board.¶ I think there is a similar issue with regard to Mignolo’s treatment of identity and difference, and which relates to the question I raised earlier concerning the metaphysical status of the colonial difference. On the one hand, Mignolo resists the reification of difference and thus emphasizes how difference is constituted by coloniality. This could lead a reader to imagine [End Page 98] that for Mignolo, difference a mere epiphenomenon of coloniality. But this is not his view. The colonial difference is for him a source of critical knowledge because its content conflicts with dominant knowledges. Thus, difference is constituted only in part by colonialism: its value and meaning is interpretively constitutued by colonialism, but this is not all there is to the colonial difference. In other words, it has metaphysical status.¶ Mignolo’s ambivalence about making this explicit is related to his ambivalence about identity. On the one hand he shies away from identity politics, but then again he articulates a form of it when he makes such claims as “for those whom colonial legacies are real (i.e. they hurt), that they are more (logically, historically, and emotionally) inclined than others to theorize the past in terms of coloniality” (2000b, 115). The concepts of identity and of identity politics are also assumed in the ongoing project that he defines as “shifting the geography of reason,” that is, both to motivate the shift and demarcate its direction. So I would like to see Mignolo work through more precisely and clearly how he is understanding the concepts of truth and of identity.¶ Let me end with a point that underscores the significance of Mignolo’s overall project. **The discourse of national independence in Latin America, much more so than of African liberation discourses, was marked in no small measure by its acceptance of a Eurocentric frame. Leading thinkers such as Sarmiento and Alberdi did not contest the modernist macro-narrative except to the extent it excluded them.** The significance of Mignolo’s work, for me, is the extent of his commitment to contest the status of Eurocentric metanarratives and refuse the gambit that might work for white male elites in Latin America but not for anyone else. In attempting to think beyond the house of modernity, Mignolo has truly built a house of many rooms.

**Don’t buy their claims about the inaccuracy of western thought- The very nature of how we live proves we should at least accept objective knowledge.**

Andrew **Uduigwomen**, Professor of Religious Studies and Philosophy, University of Calabar, “Philosophical Objections to the Knowability of Truth: Answering Postmodernism,” QUODLIBET JOURNAL, v 7 n 2, April-June 20**05**, http://www.quodlibet.net/articles/uduigwomen-postmodernism.shtml.

From the forgoing discussion, it is clear that objective truth is possible. **Truth exists in nature independent of our objective minds or what we individually hold or believe to be truth. Reality is what exists in nature and truth is simply our reflection or estimation of this pre-existing reality, which every body tends to agree with** (Uduigwomen, 145). **Truth as correspondence emphasizes the extra-mental reference of what is thought or said. To provide this point of reference for universal (as distinct from particular) truths, the medievals spoke of ontological truth, that is, the objective reality of ideal universal architypes as distinct from particulars**, which exemplify them. Thus, to speak of justice or of human nature is to refer to their ideal forms, rather than to offer empirical generations or mental abstractions. The medievals went as far as locating these universals in the mind of God-the ultimate theistic referent for truth (Ferguson et al, 695-696). **The implication of all this is that truth is objective rather than perspectival or relative. No one can** function or **live** very **long if he consistently acted as though truth were relative rather than objective**. In fact, **a person who lives by a perspectival view of truth concerning his moral activities is a potential danger to himself and to humanity.** He can issue bounce cheques simply because ‘to him’ he has money in the account, take hard drugs which ‘to him’ are refreshing, get knocked down by a lorry which ‘to him’ is not moving. Thus, a person who wants to function and live effectively in the world cannot do without some sense of truth’s objective correspondence to reality. Objective knowledge is possible. Though we sometimes make mistakes in our judgment and sometimes change our minds upon discovering that our earlier judgments were not true, this is not enough to relegate our beliefs to the status of private opinion. The only thing worth believing, living for and dying for is the truth. While Christians may appreciate elements of truth found in other religions, they need not open their minds to every religious claim, since they are not under any obligation to embrace religious relativism.

#### Western rationality is objective—it’s not inherently “western”

**Windschuttle, ’02** [Keith, Writer, Historian, and editor of Quadrant Magazine, January, “The Cultural War on Western Civilization,” *The New Criterion*, http://www.discoverthenetworks.org/guideDesc.asp?catid=127&type=issue]

Western knowledge is culturally relative: Despite the overwhelming success of the scientific methods developed in Europe from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, the critics of Western culture still insist that truth is relative. Western knowledge is only one kind of knowledge and Western methodologies are only one of the "ways of knowing". There are a number of sources of this cognitive relativism but the most popular is that of the French Nietzschean theorist, Michael Foucault, who argues that truth and objectivity are Western conceits. All knowledge is bound by culture, he claims. Within each culture, knowledge is generated for political purposes. Hence, Western knowledge is politically beholden to the powerful. To signify this interconnectivity, Foucault calls it "power/knowledge". This is a congenial argument for postcolonial historians. They believe that Western empirical methods were among the forces that subjugated the Orient, so they regard empiricism and its quest for objective knowledge as a form of imperialism. This is why they are so enamoured of the subjective hermeneutics, or literary interpretations, that prevail in postmodernism and cultural studies. Objectivity equals domination; subjectivism equals intercultural equality and respect. If taken seriously, this means that science can no longer be regarded as a universal method for discovering truths. Moreover, it means that any reasonably coherent doctrine or body of beliefs can produce "truths" of its own. Science is thus reduced to one belief system among many. This view is especially popular within the fields of cultural studies and the sociology of knowledge where science is invariably termed "Western science", in order to differentiate it from its ostensible competitors.... The truth is that **the scientific method developed by the West is a universal method and its success is sufficient to refute any theory about the relativism of truth. Western science makes genuine discoveries. Western knowledge works, and none of the others do with remotely the same effectiveness. To say this, however, is not to be ethnocentric. Western knowledge has nothing whatever to do with racism, or the elevation of one segment of humanity over another. It endorses a style of knowledge and its implementation, not any particular race of people or ethnic group. This style of knowledge** did, of course, have to emerge somewhere and at some time, and to this extent it certainly has links with the Western intellectual tradition. It **emerged in this social context, but it is clearly accessible to people of any background. Far from being bound by Western culture, Western science belongs to the whole of humanity**.

**Focusing on international institutions is key to transition to a new democratic liberal order—the alt causes genocide and nuclear war**

**Shaw**, Professor of International Relations and Politics at the University of Sussex, **’99** (Martin, November 9, “The unfinished global revolution: Intellectuals and the new politics of international relations”

**The new politics of international relations require us**, therefore, **to go beyond** the **antiimperialism of the intellectual left as well as of the semi-anarchist traditions of the academic discipline**. We need to recognise three **fundamental** truths: First, in the twenty-first century **people struggling for democratic liberties across the non-Western world are likely to make constant demands on our solidarity**. Courageous academics, **students and** other **intellectuals will be in the forefront of these movements**. They deserve the unstinting support of intellectuals **in the West**. Second, the old international thinking in which democratic movements are seen as purely internal to states no longer carries conviction – despite the lingering nostalgia for it on both the American right and the anti-American left. **The idea that global principles can and should be enforced worldwide is firmly established in the minds of hundreds of millions of people**. This consciousness will a powerful force in the coming decades. Third, **global state-formation is a fact. International institutions are being extended, and they have a symbiotic relation with the major centre of state power**, the increasingly internationalised Western conglomerate. **The success of the global-democratic revolutionary wave depends** first on how well it is consolidated in each national context – but second, **on how thoroughly it is embedded in international networks of power, at the centre of which, inescapably, is the West**. From these political fundamentals, strategic propositions can be derived. First, **democratic movements cannot regard** non-governmental organisations and **civil society as ends in themselves. They must aim to civilise** local **states, rendering them open, accountable and pluralistic, and curtail the arbitrary and violent exercise of power**. Second, **democratising local states is not a separate task from integrating them into global** and often Western-centred **networks**. **Reproducing isolated local centres of power carries with it classic dangers of states as centres of war.** **Embedding global norms and integrating new state centres with global institutional frameworks are essential to the control of violence**. (To put this another way, the proliferation of purely national democracies is not a recipe for peace.) Third, while the global revolution cannot do without the West and the UN, neither can it rely on them unconditionally. **We need** these **power networks, but we need to tame them**, too, **to make their** messy **bureaucracies** enormously **more accountable and sensitive to** the needs of **society** worldwide. **This will involve** the kind of ‘**cosmopolitan democracy’** argued for by David Held80 and campaigned for by the new Charter 9981. **It will** also **require us to advance a global social-democratic agenda, to address** the literally catastrophic scale of **world social inequalities**. Fourth, **if we need the global-Western state, if we want to democratise it and make its institutions friendlier to global peace and justice, we cannot be indifferent to its strategic debates. It matters to develop robust peacekeeping as a strategic alternative to bombing our way through zones of crisis. It matters that international intervention supports pluralist structures, rather than ratifying Bosnia-style apartheid**. Likewise, **the internal politics of Western elites matter. It makes a difference to halt the regression to isolationist nationalism in American politics**. It matters that the European Union should develop into a democratic polity with a globally responsible direction. It matters that the British state, still a pivot of the Western system of power, stays in the hands of outward-looking new social democrats rather than inward-looking old conservatives. **As political intellectuals in the West**, we need to have our eyes on the ball at our feet, but we also need to raise them to the horizon. **We need to grasp the historic drama that is transforming worldwide relationships between people and state**, as well as between state and state. **We need to think about how the turbulence of the global revolution can be consolidated in democratic, pluralist, international networks of both social relations and state authority**. We cannot be simply optimistic about this prospect. Sadly, it will require repeated violent political crises to push Western governments towards the required restructuring of world institutions.82 What I have outlined tonight is a huge challenge; but **the alternative is to see the global revolution splutter into defeat, degenerate into new genocidal wars, perhaps even nuclear conflicts. The practical challenge for all concerned citizens**, and the theoretical and analytical challenges for **students of international relations and politics, are intertwined**.

**We control uniqueness—violence is decreasing due to the unipolar system**

**Drezner 05** (Daniel, 5-25-05, "GREGG EASTERBROOK, WAR, AND THE DANGERS OF EXTRAPOLATION" www.danieldrezner.com/archives/002087.html

Via Oxblog's Patrick Belton, I see that Gregg Easterbrook has a cover story in The New Republic entitled "The End of War?" It has a killer opening: Daily explosions in Iraq, massacres in Sudan, the Koreas staring at each other through artillery barrels, a Hobbesian war of all against all in eastern Congo--combat plagues human society as it has, perhaps, since our distant forebears realized that a tree limb could be used as a club. But here is something you would never guess from watching the news: **War has entered a cycle of decline. Combat in Iraq** and in a few other places **is an exception to a significant global trend** that has gone nearly unnoticed--namely that, **for about 15 years, there have been steadily fewer armed conflicts worldwide**. In fact, it is possible that **a person's chance of dying because of war has**, in the last decade or more, **become the lowest in human history.** Is Easterbrook right? He has a few more paragraphs on the numbers: The University of Maryland studies find the number of wars and armed conflicts worldwide peaked in 1991 at 51, which may represent the most wars happening simultaneously at any point in history. Since 1991, the number has fallen steadily. There were 26 armed conflicts in 2000 and 25 in 2002, even after the Al Qaeda attack on the United States and the U.S. counterattack against Afghanistan. By 2004, Marshall and Gurr's latest study shows, the number of armed conflicts in the world had declined to 20, even after the invasion of Iraq. All told, there were less than half as many wars in 2004 as there were in 1991. Marshall and Gurr also have a second ranking, gauging the magnitude of fighting. This section of the report is more subjective. Everyone agrees that the worst moment for human conflict was World War II; but how to rank, say, the current separatist fighting in Indonesia versus, say, the Algerian war of independence is more speculative. Nevertheless, the Peace and Conflict studies name 1991 as the peak post-World War II year for totality of global fighting, giving that year a ranking of 179 on a scale that rates the extent and destructiveness of combat. By 2000, in spite of war in the Balkans and genocide in Rwanda, the number had fallen to 97; by 2002 to 81; and, at the end of 2004, it stood at 65. This suggests the extent and intensity of global combat is now less than half what it was 15 years ago. Easterbrook spends the rest of the essay postulating the causes of this -- the decline in great power war, the spread of democracies, the growth of economic interdependence, and even the peacekeeping capabilities of the United Nations. Easterbrook makes a lot of good points -- most people are genuinely shocked when they are told that **even in a post-9/11 climate, there has been a steady and persistent decline in wars and deaths from wars.** That said, what bothers me in the piece is what Easterbrook leaves out. First, he neglects to mention **the biggest reason for why war is on the decline -- there's a global hegemon called the U**nited **S**tates right now. Easterbrook acknowledges that "the most powerful factor must be the end of the cold war" but he doesn't understand why it's the most powerful factor. Elsewhere in the piece he talks about the growing comity among the great powers, without discussing the elephant in the room: **the reason the "great powers" get along is that the U**nited **S**tates **is much, much more powerful than anyone else.** If you quantify power only by relative military capabilities, the U.S. is a great power, there are maybe ten or so middle powers, and then there are a lot of mosquitoes. [If the U.S. is so powerful, why can't it subdue the Iraqi insurgency?--ed. Power is a relative measure -- the U.S. might be having difficulties, but no other country in the world would have fewer problems.] Joshua Goldstein, who knows a thing or two about this phenomenon, made this clear in a Christian Science Monitor op-ed three years ago: We probably owe this lull to the end of the cold war, and to a unipolar world order with a single superpower to impose its will in places like Kuwait, Serbia, and Afghanistan**. The emerging world order is not exactly benign – Sept. 11 comes to mind** – and Pax Americana delivers neither justice nor harmony to the corners of the earth. **But a unipolar world is inherently more peaceful than the bipolar one where two superpowers fueled rival armies around the world.** The long-delayed "peace dividend" has arrived, like a tax refund check long lost in the mail. The difference in language between Goldstein and Easterbrook highlights my second problem with "The End of War?" Goldstein rightly refers to the past fifteen years as a "lull" -- a temporary reduction in war and war-related death. **The flip side of U.S. hegemony being responsible for the reduction of armed conflict is what would happen if U.S. hegemony were to ever fade away.** Easterbrook focuses on the trends that suggest an ever-decreasing amount of armed conflict -- and I hope he's right. But I'm enough of a realist to know that **if the U.S. should find its primacy challenged** by, say, a really populous non-democratic country on the other side of the Pacific Ocean, all best about the utility of **economic interdependence, U.N. peacekeeping, and** the spread of **democracy are right out the window.**

**Heg decreases structural violence—any alt dooms humanity to deprivation**

Thomas P.M. **Barnett 11,** Former Senior Strategic Researcher and Professor in the Warfare Analysis & Research Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College American military geostrategist and Chief Analyst at Wikistrat, worked as the Assistant for Strategic Futures in the Office of Force Transformation in the Department of Defense, September 12, 2011, “The New Rules: The Rise of the Rest Spells U.S. Strategic Victory,” World Politics Review, online: <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/9973/the-new-rules-the-rise-of-the-rest-spells-u-s-strategic-victory>

First the absurdity: A few of the most **over-the-top Bush-Cheney neocons did** indeed **promote a vision of U.S. primacy by which America shouldn't be afraid to wage war to keep other rising powers at bay. It was a nutty concept then, and it remains a nutty concept today.** But since it feeds a lot of major military weapons system purchases, especially for the China-centric Air Force and Navy, don't expect it to disappear so long as the Pentagon's internal budget fights are growing in intensity. ¶ **Meanwhile**, the Chinese do their stupid best to fuel this outdated logic by building a force designed to keep America out of East Asia just as their nation's dependency on resources flowing from unstable developing regions skyrockets. **With America's fiscal constraints now abundantly clear, the world's primary policing force is pulling back, while that force's implied successor is nowhere close to being able to field a similar power-projection capacity -- and never will be.** So with NATO clearly stretched to its limits by the combination of Afghanistan and Libya, **a lot of future fires in developing regions will likely be left to burn on their own**. We'll just have to wait and see how much foreign commentators delight in that G-Zero dynamic in the years ahead. ¶ That gets us to the original "insult": **the U.S. did not lord it over the world in the 1990s. Yes, it did argue for and promote the most rapid spread of globalization possible. But the "evil" of the Washington Consensus only yielded the most rapid growth of a truly global middle class that the world has ever seen**. Yes, we can, in our current economic funk, somehow cast that development as the "loss of U.S. hegemony," in that the American consumer is no longer the demand-center of globalization's universe. But this is without a doubt the most amazing achievement of U.S. foreign policy, surpassing even our role in World War II. ¶ **Numerous world powers served as global or regional hegemons before we came along, and their record on economic development was painfully transparent: Elites got richer, and the masses got poorer. Then America showed up after World War II and engineered an international liberal trade order**, one that was at first admittedly limited to the West. But **within four decades it went virally global, and now for the first time in history, more than half of our planet's population lives in conditions of modest-to-mounting abundance -- after millennia of mere sustenance**. ¶ You may choose to interpret this as some sort of cosmic coincidence, but **the historical sequence is undeniable: With its unrivaled power, America made the world a far better place**. ¶ That spreading wave of global abundance has reformatted all sorts of traditional societies that lay in its path. Some, like the Chinese, have adapted to it magnificently in an economic and social sense, with the political adaptation sure to follow eventually. Others, being already democracies, have done far better across the board, like Turkey, Indonesia and India. But there are also numerous traditional societies where that reformatting impulse from below has been met by both harsh repression from above and violent attempts by religious extremists to effect a "counterreformation" that firewalls the "faithful" from an "evil" outside world.¶ Does this violent blowback constitute the great threat of our age? Not really. As I've long argued, this "friction" from globalization's tectonic advance is merely what's left over now that great-power war has gone dormant for 66 years and counting, with interstate wars now so infrequent and so less lethal as to be dwarfed by the civil strife that plagues those developing regions still suffering weak connectivity to the global economy. ¶ **Let's remember what the U.S. actually did across the 1990s** after the Soviet threat disappeared. **It went out of its way to police the world's poorly governed spaces, battling rogue regimes and answering the 9-1-1 call repeatedly when disaster and/or civil strife struck vulnerable societies. Yes, playing globalization's bodyguard made America public enemy No. 1 in the eyes of its most violent rejectionist movements**, including al-Qaida, **but we made the effort because**, in our heart of hearts, **we knew that this is what blessed powers are supposed to do**. ¶ Some, like the Bush-Cheney neocons, were driven by more than that sense of moral responsibility. They saw a chance to remake the world so as to assure U.S. primacy deep into the future. The timing of their dream was cruelly ironic, for it blossomed just as America's decades-in-the-making grand strategy reached its apogee in the peaceful rise of so many great powers at once. Had Sept. 11 not intervened, the neocons would likely have eventually targeted rising China for strategic demonization. Instead, they locked in on Osama bin Laden. The rest, as they say, is history. ¶ The follow-on irony of **the War on Terror** is that its operational requirements **actually revolutionized a major portion of the U.S. military -- specifically the Army, Marines and Special Forces -- in such a way as to redirect their strategic ethos from big wars to small ones**. It also forged a new operational bond between the military's irregular elements and that portion of the Central Intelligence Agency that pursues direct action against transnational bad actors. The up-front costs of this transformation were far too high, largely because the Bush White House stubbornly refused to embrace counterinsurgency tactics until after the popular repudiation signaled by the 2006 midterm election. But **the end result is clear: We now have the force we actually need to manage this global era.¶ But,** of course, **that can all be tossed into the dumpster if we convince ourselves that our "loss" of hegemony was somehow the result of our own misdeed, instead of being our most profound gift to world history. Again, we grabbed the reins of global leadership and patiently engineered not only the greatest redistribution -- and expansion -- of global wealth ever seen, but also the greatest consolidation of global peace ever seen. ¶ Now, if we can sensibly realign our strategic relationship with the one rising great power, China,** whose growing strength upsets us so much, **then in combination with the rest of the world's rising great powers we can collectively wield enough global policing power to manage what's yet to come.** ¶ As always, **the choice is ours.**

**The impact to US imperialism is minimal—and other powers are worse, which turns the alt**

Victor Davis **Hanson 2**, Ph. D. in Classics, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, a Professor Emeritus at California University, Fresno, “A Funny Sort of Empire: Are Americans really so imperial?” National Review Online, November 27, 2002, http://www.victorhanson.com/articles/hanson112702.html,

It is popular now to talk of the American "empire." In Europe particularly there are comparisons of Mr. Bush to Caesar — and worse — and invocations all sorts of pretentious poli-sci jargon like "hegemon," "imperium," and "subject states," along with neologisms like "hyperpower" and "overdogs." But **if we really are imperial, we rule over a very funny sort of empire.** We do not send out proconsuls to reside over client states, which in turn impose taxes on coerced subjects to pay for the legions. Instead, American bases are predicated on contractual obligations — costly to us and profitable to their hosts. We do not see any profits in Korea, but instead accept the risk of losing almost 40,000 of our youth to ensure that Kias can flood our shores and that shaggy students can protest outside our embassy in Seoul. **Athenians, Romans, Ottomans, and the British wanted land and treasure and grabbed all they could ge**t when they could. **The United States hasn't annexed anyone's soil since the Spanish-American War** — a checkered period in American history that still makes us, not them, out as villains in our own history books. Most Americans are far more interested in carving up the Nevada desert for monster homes than in getting their hands on Karachi or the Amazon basin. **Puerto Ricans are free to vote themselves independence anytime they wish. Imperial powers order and subjects obey. But in our case, we offer the Turks strategic guarantees, political support** — and money — for their allegiance. France and Russia go along in the U.N. — but only after we ensure them the traffic of oil and security for outstanding accounts. **Pakistan gets debt relief that ruined dot-coms could only dream of; Jordan reels in more aid than our own bankrupt municipalities. If acrimony and invective arise, it's usually one-way: the Europeans, the Arabs, and the South Americans all say worse things about us than we do about them, not privately and in hurt, but publicly and proudly**. Boasting that you hate Americans — or calling our supposed imperator "moron" or "Hitler" — won't get you censured by our Senate or earn a tongue-lashing from our president, but is more likely to get you ten minutes on CNN. We are considered haughty by Berlin not because we send a Germanicus with four legions across the Rhine, but because Mr. Bush snubs Mr. Schroeder by not phoning him as frequently as the German press would like. **Empires usually have contenders that check their power and through rivalry drive their ambitions.** Athens worried about Sparta and Persia. Rome found its limits when it butted up against Germany and Parthia. The Ottomans never could bully too well the Venetians or the Spanish. Britain worried about France and Spain at sea and the Germanic peoples by land. In contrast, **the restraint on American power is not China, Russia, or the European Union, but rather the American electorate itself — whose reluctant worries are chronicled weekly by polls that are eyed with fear by our politicians. We**, not them, **stop us from becoming what we could.** The Athenian ekklesia, the Roman senate, and the British Parliament alike were eager for empire and reflected the energy of their people. In contrast, America went to war late and reluctantly in World Wars I and II, and never finished the job in either Korea or Vietnam. We were likely to sigh in relief when we were kicked out of the Philippines, and really have no desire to return. Should the Greeks tell us to leave Crete — promises, promises — we would be more likely to count the money saved than the influence lost. Take away all our troops from Germany and polls would show relief, not anger, among Americans. **Isolationism, parochialism, and self-absorption are far stronger in the American character than desire for overseas adventurism. Our critics may slur us for "overreaching," but our elites in the military and government worry that they have to coax a reluctant populace, not constrain a blood-drunk rabble.**

**Extinction outweighs—there is no recovering from it**

Anders **Sandberg** et al., James Martin Research Fellow, Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford University, "How Can We Reduce the Risk of Human Extinction?" BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, 9-9-**08**, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/how-can-we-reduce-the-risk-of-human-extinction, accessed 5-2-10.

**Such remote risks may seem academic in a world plagued by** immediate problems, such as global **poverty, HIV, and climate change. But as intimidating as these problems are, they do not threaten human existence**. In discussing the risk of nuclear winter, Carl Sagan emphasized the astronomical toll of human extinction: A nuclear war imperils all of our descendants, for as long as there will be humans. Even if the population remains static, with an average lifetime of the order of 100 years, over a typical time period for the biological evolution of a successful species (roughly ten million years), we are talking about some 500 trillion people yet to come. By this criterion, **the stakes are one million times greater for extinction** than for the more modest nuclear wars that kill "only" hundreds of millions of people.There are many other possible measures of the potential loss--including culture and science, **the evolutionary history of the planet, and the significance of the lives of all of our ancestors who contributed to the future of their descendants.** Extinction is the undoing of the human enterprise. **There is a discontinuity between risks that threaten 10 percent or even 99 percent of humanity and those that threaten 100 percent. For disasters killing less than all humanity, there is a good chance that the species could recover.** If we value future human generations, then reducing extinction risks should dominate our considerations**. Fortunately,** most measures to reduce these risks also improve global security against a range of lesser catastrophes, and thus deserve support regardless of how much one worries about extinction.

**US pursuit of imperialism inevitable**

**Kagan**, 1/24/20**11**, (Robert Kagan, [American](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States)historian, author and foreign policy commentator at the[Brookings Institution](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brookings_Institution)) ‘The Price of Power: The benefits of U.S. defense spending far outweigh the costs’, VOL. 16, NO. 18, <http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/price-power_533696.html?page=3>

In theory, the United States could refrain from intervening abroad. But, in practice, will it? Many assume today that the American public has had it with interventions, and Alice Rivlin certainly reflects a strong current of opinion when she says that “much of the public does not believe that we need to go in and take over other people’s countries.” That sentiment has often been heard after interventions, especially those with mixed or dubious results. It was heard after the four-year-long war in the Philippines, which cost 4,000 American lives and untold Filipino casualties. It was heard after Korea and after Vietnam. It was heard after Somalia. Yet **the reality has been that after each intervention, the sentiment against foreign involvement has faded, and the United States has intervened again. Depending on how one chooses to count, the United States has undertaken roughly 25 overseas interventions since 1898**:Cuba, 1898The Philippines, 1898-1902China, 1900Cuba, 1906Nicaragua, 1910 & 1912Mexico, 1914Haiti, 1915Dominican Republic, 1916Mexico, 1917World War I, 1917-1918Nicaragua, 1927World War II, 1941-1945Korea, 1950-1953Lebanon, 1958Vietnam, 1963-1973Dominican Republic, 1965Grenada, 1983Panama, 1989First Persian Gulf war, 1991Somalia, 1992Haiti, 1994Bosnia, 1995Kosovo, 1999Afghanistan, 2001-presentIraq, 2003-presentThat is one intervention every 4.5 years on average. Overall, **the United States has intervened or been engaged in combat somewhere in 52 out of the last 112 years, or roughly 47 percent of the time. Since the end of the Cold War**, it is true, **the rate of U.S. interventions has increased, with an intervention roughly once every 2.5 years and American troops intervening or engaged in combat in 16 out of 22 years, or over 70 percent of the time**, since the fall of the Berlin Wall.The argument for returning to “normal” begs the question: What is normal for the United States? The historical record of the last century suggests that it is not a policy of nonintervention. This record ought to raise doubts about the theory that American behavior these past two decades is the product of certain unique ideological or doctrinal movements, whether “liberal imperialism” or “neoconservatism.” **Allegedly “realist” presidents in this era have been just as likely to order interventions as their more idealistic colleagues**. George H.W. Bush was as profligate an intervener as Bill Clinton. He invaded Panama in 1989, intervened in Somalia in 1992—both on primarily idealistic and humanitarian grounds—which along with the first Persian Gulf war in 1991 made for three interventions in a single four-year term. Since 1898 the list of presidents who ordered armed interventions abroad has included William McKinley, Theodore Roose-velt, William Howard Taft, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush. **One would be hard-pressed to find a common ideological or doctrinal thread among them—unless it is the doctrine and ideology of a mainstream American foreign policy that leans more toward intervention than many imagine or would care to admit**.Many don’t want to admit it, and **the only thing as consistent as this pattern of American behavior has been the claim by contemporary critics that it is abnormal and a departure from American traditions.** The anti-imperialists of the late 1890s, the isolationists of the 1920s and 1930s, the critics of Korea and Vietnam, and the critics of the first Persian Gulf war, the interventions in the Balkans, and the more recent wars of the Bush years have all insisted that the nation had in those instances behaved unusually or irrationally. And yet the behavior has continued.To note this consistency is not the same as justifying it. The United States may have been wrong for much of the past 112 years. Some critics would endorse the sentiment expressed by the historian Howard K. Beale in the 1950s, that “the men of 1900” had steered the United States onto a disastrous course of world power which for the subsequent half-century had done the United States and the world no end of harm. But **whether one lauds or condemns this past century of American foreign policy—and one can find reasons to do both—the fact of this consistency remains.It would require not just a modest reshaping of American foreign policy priorities but a sharp departure from this tradition to bring about the kinds of changes that would allow the United States to make do with a substantially smaller force structure.**Is such a sharp departure in the offing? It is no doubt true that many Americans are unhappy with the on-going warfare in Afghanistan and to a lesser extent in Iraq, and that, if asked, a majority would say the United States should intervene less frequently in foreign nations, or perhaps not at **all. It may also be true that the effect of long military involvements in Iraq and Afghanistan may cause Americans and their leaders to shun further interventions at least for a few years—as they did for nine years after World War I, five years after World War II, and a decade after Vietnam. This may be further reinforced by the difficult economic times in which Americans are currently suffering. The longest period of nonintervention in the past century was during the 1930s, when unhappy memories of World War I combined with the economic catastrophe of the Great Depression to constrain American interventionism to an unusual degree and produce the first and perhaps only genuinely isolationist period in American history**.So are we back to the mentality of the 1930s? It wouldn’t appear so. There is no great wave of isolationism sweeping the country. There is not even the equivalent of a Patrick Buchanan, who received 3 million votes in the 1992 Republican primaries. Any isolationist tendencies that might exist are severely tempered by continuing fears of terrorist attacks that might be launched from overseas. Nor are the vast majority of Americans suffering from economic calamity to nearly the degree that they did in the Great Depression.Even if we were to repeat the policies of the 1930s, however, **it is worth recalling that the unusual restraint of those years was not sufficient to keep the United States out of war. On the contrary, the United States took actions which ultimately led to the greatest and most costly foreign intervention in its history. Even the most determined and in those years powerful isolationists could not prevent it**.Today there are a number of obvious possible contingencies that might lead the United States to substantial interventions overseas, notwithstanding the preference of the public and its political leaders to avoid them. **Few Americans want a war with Iran, for instance. But it is not implausible that a president—indeed, this president—might find himself in a situation where military conflict at some level is hard to avoid.** The continued success of the international sanctions regime that the Obama administration has so skillfully put into place, for instance, might eventually cause the Iranian government to lash out in some way—perhaps by attempting to close the Strait of Hormuz. Recall that Japan launched its attack on Pearl Harbor in no small part as a response to oil sanctions imposed by a Roosevelt administration that had not the slightest interest or intention of fighting a war against Japan but was merely expressing moral outrage at Japanese behavior on the Chinese mainland. Perhaps in an Iranian contingency, the military actions would stay limited. But perhaps, too, they would escalate. One could well imagine an American public, now so eager to avoid intervention, suddenly demanding that their president retaliate. Then there is the possibility that a military exchange between Israel and Iran, initiated by Israel, could drag the United States into conflict with Iran. Are such scenarios so farfetched that they can be ruled out by Pentagon planners?Other possible contingencies include a war on the Korean Peninsula, where the United States is bound by treaty to come to the aid of its South Korean ally; and possible interventions in Yemen or Somalia, should those states fail even more than they already have and become even more fertile ground for al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. And what about those “humanitarian” interventions that are first on everyone’s list to be avoided? Should another earthquake or some other natural or man-made catastrophe strike, say, Haiti and present the looming prospect of mass starvation and disease and political anarchy just a few hundred miles off U.S. shores, with the possibility of thousands if not hundreds of thousands of refugees, can anyone be confident that an American president will not feel compelled to send an intervention force to help?Some may hope that a smaller U.S. military, compelled by the necessity of budget constraints, would prevent a president from intervening. More likely, however, it would simply prevent a president from intervening effectively. This, after all, was the experience of the Bush administration in Iraq and Afghanistan. Both because of constraints and as a conscious strategic choice, the Bush administration sent too few troops to both countries. The results were lengthy, unsuccessful conflicts, burgeoning counterinsurgencies, and loss of confidence in American will and capacity, as well as large annual expenditures. Would it not have been better, and also cheaper, to have sent larger numbers of forces initially to both places and brought about a more rapid conclusion to the fighting? The point is, it may prove cheaper in the long run to have larger forces that can fight wars quickly and conclusively, as Colin Powell long ago suggested, than to have smaller forces that can’t. Would a defense planner trying to anticipate future American actions be wise to base planned force structure on the assumption that the United States is out of the intervention business? Or would that be the kind of penny-wise, pound-foolish calculation that, in matters of national security, can prove so unfortunate?The debates over whether and how the United States should respond to the world’s strategic challenges will and should continue. Armed interventions overseas should be weighed carefully, as always, with an eye to whether the risk of inaction is greater than the risks of action. And as always, these judgments will be merely that: judgments, made with inadequate information and intelligence and no certainty about the outcomes. No foreign policy doctrine can avoid errors of omission and commission. But **history has provided some lessons, and for the United States the lesson has been fairly clear: The world is better off, and the United States is better off, in the kind of international system that American power has built and defended.**

**Even if we can’t 100% prove our knowledge claims, we should act based on the best possible information**

Friedrich **Kratochwil**, 200**7**, Political Sciences @ European University Inst., “Of False Promises and Good Bets: a Plea for a Pragmatic Approach to Theory Building”, Journal of International Relations and Development

Here **pragmatism seems to hold some promise for several reasons. First, as its most basic level it does not begin with ‘things’ or with ‘reason’ or thought, but with ‘acting’** (prattein), **thereby preventing some false starts. Even if the most rigorous and secure system of thought turns out not to be contradiction free, this revolutionary realization does not prevent mathematicians from going on to solve problems and most of us have to act most of the time without having the privilege of basing our decisions on secure universally valid knowledge.** Thus, **the cure of the anxiety induced by radical doubt consists not of the discovery of absolute certainty, which is a phantasmagorical undertaking that is engendered by its equally fantastic starting point, since nobody begins with universal doubt** (e.g. Pierce 1868/1997)! **Rather, the remedy for this anxiety consists of the recognition of the unproductive nature of universal doubt. Letting go of unrealizable plans and notions that lead us down the road to delusional projects and acquiring instead the ability to ‘go on’ in spite of uncertainties and the unknown is probably the most valuable lesson to learn. Second, by giving up on the idea that warranted knowledge is generated through either logical demonstration or the representation of the world ‘out there’, a pragmatic starting point not only takes the always preliminary character of scientific knowledge seriously but it also accounts for cumulative knowledge in a more coherent fashion. If the world ‘out there’ were ready made only to be discovered, then scientific knowledge would have to be a simple accumulation of more and more true facts, leading us virtually automatically closer and closer to ‘the Truth’ conceived as the totality of all true statements.** Here Popper’s (1972) ‘Third World’ comes to mind and his first interpretation of scientific progress as the self-correcting process of conjectures and refutations. But as the history of science has suggested, scientific progress was characterized by conceptual revolutions and not only ‘normal’ science, quite aside from the embarrassing problem of what to do with all those parts of the ‘third world’ that turned out to be false after all, such as the indivisibility of atoms, ether, phlogiston, or what have you. Similarly misleading is the imagery of scientific progress as an ever closer approximation to ‘the Truth’ without, however, ever reaching it, thereby foxing the problem of revision. Obviously the image of approximation in Popper’s (1963: Chapter 10) verisimilitude argument draws its persuasiveness from the successive approximation of polygons in approaching the perimeter of a circle, when determining the enclosed area. But **if we have learned anything from the studies of various disciplines, then it is the fact that progress consists of being able to formulate new questions that could not even be asked previously**. Thus, whatever we think of Kuhn’s argument about ‘paradigms’, we have to recognize that in times of revolutionary change the bounds of sense are being revolutionized and we donot simply now know some more of the encircled area!9 **Third, pragmatism recognizes that science as a process of knowledge production is a social practice determined by rules in which scientists are not only constitutive for the definitions of problems (rather than simply lifting a veil over nature), they also debate questions that seem ‘undecidable’ and they have to ‘weigh’ the evidence, instead of being able to rely on the bi-valence principle of logic as an automatic truth finder** (Kratochwil 2007). To that extent, the critical element of the epistemological project is retained, only that the ‘court’ which Kant believed to be reason itself, consists of the practitioners themselves. Instead of applying the standards as suggested by the epistemological project and the unity of science position, each science provides its own court and judges the appropriateness of its own methods and practices

**No prior questions**

David **Owen** Professor of Social & Political Philosophy and Deputy Director, Centre for Philosophy and Value, University of Southhampton, “Re-Orientating International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning” MILLENIUM: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, 20**02**, p. 655-7.

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for **words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’**, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. **The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power** as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while **the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is** not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is **by no means** clear that it is, in contrast, wholly **dependent on these philosophical commitments**. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theoryto recognise **that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons** in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that**, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us.** In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because **prioritisation of ontology and epistemology** promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it **cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR**. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, **‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’** in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, **this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity.** The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and **prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one** theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the **theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right**. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so **a** potentially **vicious circle arises.**

**Their moral tunnel vision is complicit with the evil they criticize**

Jeffrey **Issac** (professor of political science at Indiana University) 20**02** Dissent, Spring, ebsco

As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an **unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility**. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but **it suffers** from **three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends**. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if **such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience** of their supporters; **(2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice**. This is why, from the standpoint of politics—as opposed to religion—pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and **(3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant**. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, **it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil**. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. **Moral absolutism** inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it **undermines political effectiveness**.

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Radical evil exists, its bad, ontological focus lets it happen

Steven B. **Smith**, Alfred Cowles Professor of Political Science and Master of Branford College, Yale University, READING LEO STRAUSS: POLITICS, PHILOSOPHY, JUDAISM, 20**06**, p. 130.

At another point, Strauss suggests that not historicism as such, but **Heidegger's virtually exclusive concern with Being blinded him to the real facts of tyranny.** His **subordination of political philosophy to fundamental ontology created its own forms of moral blindness. It was Heidegger's** own **curious "forgetfulness" of politics and the primacy of political philosophy that led him to minimize**, if not **deny** altogether, **the atrocities of the Holocaust**. For Heidegger, **the Holocaust remained fundamentally a consequence of technology, not a moral and political problem.**126 It was Heidegger's indifference to moral phenomena that Strauss ultimately finds inexcusable. In the final sentence of his reply to Kojeve [at last fully restored to the English edition), **Strauss attacks Heidegger for moral cowardice in the face of tyranny and for lacking the courage to face the consequences of his own philosophy.** Here Strauss makes common cause with Kojeve for their close attention to the primacy of the political: Hut we have always been constantly mindful of it [i.e., the relation between tyranny and philosophy|. For we both apparently turned away from Being to Tyranny because we have seen that those who lack the courage to face the issue of Tyranny, who, therefore et humiliter serviebant et superbe dominabantur, were forced to evade the issue of Being as well, precisely because they did nothing but talk of Being. Strauss seems to suggest here that **it was Heidegger's concern for Being, rather than beings, that led to his indifference to the fact of tyranny.** At issue is the very abstractness of Heidegger's articulation of the problem of Being. **The extreme artificiality of regarding human beings under the rubric of an anonymous historical Dasein could not but anesthetize him to the fate and suffering of actual historical persons.** 1 am not finally convinced that Heidegger's Nazi problem is intimately connected to his analysis of Being, but Strauss's critique enables us to see the high price of Heidegger's forgetfulness of the political.

**The world is getting better now because heg is peaceful**

Josh **Busby 12**, Assistant Professor of Public Affairs and a fellow in the RGK Center for Philanthropy and Community Service as well as a Crook Distinguished Scholar at the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law, <http://duckofminerva.blogspot.com/2012/01/get-real-chicago-ir-guys-out-in-force.html>

**Is Unipolarity Peaceful?** As evidence, **Monteiro provides metrics of the number of years during which great powers have been at war.** For the unipolar era since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been at war 13 of those 22 years or 59% (see his Table 2 below). Now, **I've been following** some of **the discussion by** and about Steven **Pinker** and Joshua Goldstein's [work](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/18/opinion/sunday/war-really-is-going-out-of-style.html?pagewanted=all) **that suggests the world is becoming more peaceful** **with** interstate wars and intrastate **wars becoming more rare**. I was struck by the graphic that Pinker used in a Wall Street Journal [piece](http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904106704576583203589408180.html) back in September that drew on the Uppsala Conflict Data, which shows a steep decline in the number of deaths per 100,000 people. **How do we square this account by Monteiro of a unipolar world that is not peaceful** (**with the U.S. at war during this period in Iraq twice, Afghanistan, Kosovo**) **and** **Pinker's account which suggests declining violence in the contemporary period**? **Where Pinker is focused on systemic outcomes, Monteiro's measure merely reflect years during which the great powers are at war**. Under unipolarity, there is only one great power so the measure is partial and not systemic. However, Monteiro's theory aims to be systemic rather than partial. In critiquing Wohlforth's early work on unipolarity stability, Monteiro notes: Wohlforth’s argument does not exclude all kinds of war. Although power preponderance allows the unipole to manage conflicts globally, this argument is not meant to apply to relations between major and minor powers, or among the latter (17). So presumably, **a more adequate test of the peacefulness or not of unipolarity** (at least for Monteiro) **is not the number of years the great power has been at** **war but whether the system as a whole is becoming more peaceful under unipolarity compared** to previous eras, including wars between major and minor powers or wars between minor powers and whether the wars that do happen are as violent as the ones that came before. Now, as Ross Douthat pointed [out](http://douthat.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/17/steven-pinkers-history-of-violence/), Pinker's argument isn't based on a logic of benign hegemony. It could be that even if the present era is more peaceful, unipolarity has nothing to do with it. Moreover, **Pinker may be wrong**. Maybe the world isn't all that peaceful. I keep thinking about the places I don't want to go to anymore because they are violent (Mexico, Honduras, El Salvador, Nigeria, Pakistan, etc.) As Tyler Cowen [noted](http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2011/10/steven-pinker-on-violence.html), the measure Pinker uses to suggest violence is a per capita one, which doesn't get at the absolute level of violence perpetrated in an era of a greater world population. **But, if my read of other** [**reports**](http://www.hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/20092010/graphs-and-tables.aspx) **based on Uppsala data is right, war is becoming more rare and less deadly** (though later [data](http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/charts_and_graphs/) suggests lower level armed conflict may be increasing again since the mid-2000s). The apparent violence of the contemporary era may be something of a presentist bias and reflect our own lived experience and the ubiquity of news media **.Even if the U.S. has been at war for the better part of unipolarity, the deadliness is declining, even compared with Vietnam, let alone World War II.** Does Unipolarity Drive Conflict? So**, I** kind of took **issue with the Monteiro's premise that unipolarity is not peaceful**. What about his argument that unipolarity drives conflict? Monteiro suggests that the unipole has three available strategies - defensive dominance, offensive dominance and disengagement - though is less likely to use the third. Like Rosato and Schuessler, Monteiro suggests because other states cannot trust the intentions of other states, namely the unipole, that minor states won't merely bandwagon with the unipole. Some "recalcitrant" minor powers will attempt to see what they can get away with and try to build up their capabilities. As an aside, in Rosato and Schuessler world, unless these are located in strategically important areas (i.e. places where there is oil), then the unipole (the United States) should disengage. **In Monteiro's world**, **disengagement would inexorably lead to instability and draw in the U.S. again** (though I'm not sure this necessarily follows), but neither defensive or offensive dominance offer much possibility for peace either since it is U.S. power in and of itself that makes other states insecure, even though they can't balance against it.

**\*\*Specific policy analysis is key to solving their imapcts**

**Ferguson**, Professor of Anthropology at Stanford, **11** (The Uses of Neoliberalism, Antipode, Vol. 41, No. S1, pp 166–184)

**If we are** seeking, as this special issue of Antipode aspires to do, **to link our critical analyses to the world of grounded political struggle—not only to interpret the world in various ways, but also to change it**—then **there is much to be said for focusing**, as I have here, **on mundane, real- world debates around policy and**

**politics, even if doing so inevitably puts us on the compromised and reformist terrain of** the possible, rather than the seductive high ground of revolutionary ideals and utopian desires. But I would also insist that there is more at stake in the examples I have discussed here than simply a slightly better way to ameliorate the miseries of the chronically poor, or a technically superior method for relieving the suffering of famine victims.¶ My point in discussing the South African BIG campaign, for instance, is not really to argue for its implementation. There is much in the campaign that is appealing, to be sure. But one can just as easily identify a series of worries that would bring the whole proposal into doubt. Does not, for instance, the decoupling of the question of assistance from the issue of labor, and the associated valorization of the “informal”, help provide a kind of alibi for the failures of the South African regime to pursue policies that would do more to create jobs? Would not the creation of a basic income benefit tied to national citizenship simply exacerbate the vicious xenophobia that already divides the South African poor,¶ in a context where many of the poorest are not citizens, and would thus not be eligible for the BIG? Perhaps even more fundamentally, is the idea of basic income really capable of commanding the mass support that alone could make it a central pillar of a new approach to distribution? The record to date gives powerful reasons to doubt it. So far, the technocrats’ dreams of relieving poverty through efficient cash transfers have attracted little support from actual poor people, who seem to find that vision a bit pale and washed out, compared with the vivid (if vague) populist promises of jobs and personalistic social inclusion long offered by the ANC patronage machine, and lately personified by Jacob Zuma (Ferguson forthcoming).¶ My real interest in the policy proposals discussed here, in fact, has little to do with the narrow policy questions to which they seek to provide answers. For what is most significant, for my purposes, is not whether or not these are good policies, but the way that they illustrate a process through which **specific governmental devices and modes of reasoning** **that we have become used to associating with a very particular** (and **conservative**) **political agenda** (“neoliberalism”) **may be in the process of being peeled away from that agenda, and put to very different uses. Any progressive who takes seriously the challenge** I pointed to at the start of this essay, the challenge **of developing new progressive arts of government, ought to find this turn of events of considerable interest**.¶ As Steven Collier (2005) has recently pointed out, it is important to question the assumption that there is, or must be, a neat or automatic fit between a hegemonic “neoliberal” political-economic project (however that might be characterized), on the one hand, and specific “neoliberal” techniques, on the other. Close attention to particular techniques (such as the use of quantitative calculation, free choice, and price driven by supply and demand) in particular settings (in Collier’s case, fiscal and budgetary reform in post-Soviet Russia) shows that the relationship between the technical and the political-economic “is much more polymorphous and unstable than is assumed in much critical geographical work”, and that neoliberal technical mechanisms are in fact “deployed in relation to diverse political projects and social norms” (2005:2).¶ As I suggested in referencing the role of statistics and techniques for pooling risk in the creation of social democratic welfare states, social technologies need not have any essential or eternal loyalty to the political formations within which they were first developed. Insurance rationality at the end of the nineteenth century had no essential vocation to provide security and solidarity to the working class; it was turned to that purpose (in some substantial measure) because it was available, in the right place at the right time, to be appropriated for that use. Specific ways of solving or posing governmental problems, specific institutional and intellectual mechanisms, can be combined in an almost infinite variety of ways, to accomplish different social ends. With social, as with any other sort of technology, it is not the machines or the mechanisms that decide what they will be used to do.¶ Foucault (2008:94) concluded his discussion of socialist government- ality by insisting that the answers to the Left’s governmental problems require not yet another search through our sacred texts, but a process of conceptual and institutional innovation. “[I]f there is a really socialist governmentality, then it is not hidden within socialism and its texts. It cannot be deduced from them. It must be invented”. But invention in the domain of governmental technique is rarely something worked up out of whole cloth. More often, it involves a kind of bricolage (Le ́vi- Strauss 1966), a piecing together of something new out of scavenged parts originally intended for some other purpose. As we pursue such a process of improvisatory invention, we might begin by making an inventory of the parts available for such tinkering, keeping all the while an open mind about how different mechanisms might be put to work, and what kinds of purposes they might serve. **If we can go beyond seeing** in “neoliberalism” **an evil essence** or an automatic unity, **and instead learn to see a field of specific governmental techniques, we may be surprised to find that some of them can be repurposed, and put to work in the service of political projects very different from those usually associated with that word. If so, we may find that the cabinet of governmental arts available to us is a bit less bare than first appeared, and that some rather useful little mechanisms may be nearer to hand than we thought**.

Most recent evidence proves nuclear winter causes extinction

Starr 12 **[Steven Starr - Director of the Clinical Laboratory Science Program at the University of Missouri-Columbia, Associate member of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, has been published by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, his writings appear on the websites of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies, Scientists for Global Responsibility, and the International Network of Scientists Against Proliferation, “What is nuclear darkness?,”** [**http://www.nucleardarkness.org/web/whatisnucleardarkness/**](http://www.nucleardarkness.org/web/whatisnucleardarkness/)**]**

**In a nuclear war, burning cities would create millions of tons of thick, black smoke**. **This smoke would rise above cloud level, into the stratosphere, where it would quickly spread around the planet. A large nuclear war would produce enough smoke to block** most **sunlight from reaching the Earth's surface. Massive absorption of warming sunlight by a global stratospheric smoke layer would rapidly create Ice Age temperatures on Earth**

. The cold would last a long time; NASA computer models predict **40% of the smoke would still remain in the stratosphere ten years after a nuclear war. Half of 1% of the explosive power of US-Russian nuclear weapons can create enough nuclear darkness to impact global climate**. 100 Hiroshima-size weapons exploded in the cities of India and Pakistan would put up to 5 million tons of smoke in the stratosphere . **The smoke would destroy much of the Earth's protective ozone layer and drop temperatures in the Northern Hemisphere to levels last seen in the Little Ice Age. Shortened growing seasons could cause up to 1 billion people to starve to death.** A large nuclear war could put 150 million tons of smoke in the stratosphere and make global temperatures colder than they were 18,000 years ago during the coldest part of the last Ice Age. Killing frosts would occur every day for 1-3 years in the large agricultural regions of the Northern Hemisphere. Average global precipitation would be reduced by 45%. Earth's ozone layer would be decimated. Growing seasons would be eliminated. **A large nuclear war would utterly devastate the environment and cause most people to starve to death . Deadly climate change, radioactive fallout and toxic pollution would cause already stressed ecosystems to collapse. The result would be a mass extinction event that would wipe out** many animals living at the top of the food chains - **including human beings.**

**U.S. still maintains a massive lead—the margin may have decreased, but will be able to maintain pre-eminence for a long time**

Robert J. **Lieber**, Professor, Government and International Affairs, Georgetown University, “Is American Decline Real?” SALON, 5—14—**12**, <http://www.salon.com/2012/05/14/is_american_decline_real/>,

Beyond material strengths, the **society** itself benefits **from a durable political system, rule of law**, vigorous **free press** and information media, and **a competitive and adaptable economy**, **as well** as strong traditions of **entrepreneurship and innovation, leadership** and critical mass **in new technology, and a history of resilience and flexibility** in overcoming adversity. **The declinist proposition** that America’s international primacy is collapsing as a result of the rise of other countries **should** also **be regarded with caution**. On the one hand, the United States does face a more competitive world, regional challenges, and some attrition of its relative degree of primacy. This process, or diffusion of power, is not exclusive to the post–Cold War era, but began at least four decades ago with the recovery of Europe and Japan from World War

II, the rise of the Soviet Union to superpower status, and the emergence of regional powers in Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa. Still, **in contrast to other great powers** that have experienced decline, **the U**nited **S**tates **has held a substantially more dominant position**. For example, Britain at the start of the twentieth century was already falling behind Germany and the United States, although it did manage to continue for half a century as head of a vast empire and commonwealth. Because of the enormous margin of power the United States possessed after the end of the Cold War, **it should be able to withstand erosion in its relative strength for some time to come without losing its predominant status**. While it is true that the weight of important regional powers has increased, many of these are allied or friendly. Those that are not (Iran, North Korea, Syria, and Venezuela) do not by themselves constitute serious balancing against the United States and its allies. Russia occupies an intermediate position, at times acting as a spoiler, but not an outright adversary. **China** presents a potentially more formidable challenge, notably through its growing economic might and the rapid expansion of its military capacity, but it **has not yet become a true peer competitor. In any case**, and despite the burden of a decade of war in the Middle East, **America continues to possess significant advantages in economic breadth and depth, science, technology, competitiveness, demography, force size, power projection, military technology, and** even in learning how to carry out effective **counterinsurgency, and thus retains the capacity to meet key objectives**. In sum, although the United States predominates by lesser margins, **it still remains a long way from being overtaken by peer competitor**s. However, given profound disagreements about policy, intense partisan rancor among political elites, growing social-class division, distrust of government, and deep disagreement about foreign commitments, nonmaterial factors could prove to be a greater impediment to staying power than more commonly cited indicators of economic problems and military overstretch. The United States retains the power and capacity to play a leading world role. **The ultimate questions about America’s future are likely to be those of policy and will**.

**Capitalism is resilient – it’ll bounce back**

**Foster 09** (JD, Norman B. Ture Senior Fellow in the Economics of fiscal policy – Heritage Foundation, "Is Capitalism Dead? Maybe," 3-11, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=101694302)

**Capitalism is down. It may even be out. But it's far from dead**. **Capitalism is extremely resilient. Why? Because here**, as in every democratic-industrial country around the world, **it has always had to struggle to survive against encroachments — both benign and malevolent — of the state. At the moment, capitalism is losing ground most everywhere. But when the economic crisis passes, capitalism and the freedoms it engenders will recover again, if only because freedom beats its lack.** It is said that the trouble with socialism is socialism; the trouble with capitalism is capitalists. The socialist economic system, inherently contrary to individual liberties, tends to minimize prosperity because it inevitably allocates national resources inefficiently. On the other

hand, a truly capitalist system engaged in an unfettered pursuit of prosperity is prone to occasional and often painful excesses, bubbles and downturns like the one we are now experiencing globally. When capitalism slips, governments step in with regulations and buffers to try to moderate the excesses and minimize the broader consequences of individual errors. Sometimes these policies are enduringly helpful. Severe economic downturns inflict collateral damage on families and businesses otherwise innocent of material foolishness. Not only are the sufferings of these innocents harmful to society, but they are also downright expensive. A little wise government buffering can go a long way. The trick, of course, is the wisdom part. A good example of a wise government buffer is deposit insurance at commercial banks. Without it, depositors would have withdrawn their funds en masse, leading to a rapid collapse of the banking system. It happened in years gone by. But today, deposits have flowed into the banking system in search of safety, helping banks staunch their many severe wounds. Yet for every example of helpful government intervention, there are many more that do more harm than good. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac leap to mind. These congressional creatures helped create, then inflate the subprime market. When that balloon popped, it triggered a global economic meltdown. The current financial crisis clearly has capitalism on its back foot**.** Government ownership of the largest insurance company, the major banks, and Fan and Fred are awesome incursions into private markets. But, as President Obama has underscored, these incursions are only temporary. **In time**, these **institutions** — even Fan and Fred — **will be broken up and sold in parts. It will leave government agents with stories to tell their grandkids, and taxpayers stuck with the losses**. **But the power of the state will again recede, and another new age of freedom and capitalism will arrive and thrive… until we repeat the cycle again sometime down the road.**

**The environment is invincible**

**Easterbrook 95, Distinguished Fellow, Fullbright Foundation (Gregg, A Moment on Earth pg 25)**

IN THE AFTERMATH OF EVENTS SUCH AS LOVE CANAL OR THE Exxon Valdez oil spill, every reference to the environment is prefaced with the adjective "fragile." "Fragile environment" has become a welded phrase of the modern lexicon, like "aging hippie" or "fugitive financier." But the notion of a fragile environment is profoundly wrong. Individual animals, plants, and people are distressingly fragile. **The environmentthat contains themis close to indestructible.The living environment of Earth has survived ice ages; bombardments of cosmic radiation more deadly than atomic fallout; solar radiation more powerful than the worst-case projection for ozone depletion; thousand-year periods of intense volcanism releasing global air pollution far worse than that made by any factory; reversals of the planet's magnetic poles; the rearrangement of continents; transformation of plain**

**s into mountain ranges and of seas into plains; fluctuations of ocean currents and the jet stream; 300-foot vacillations in sea levels; shortening and lengthening of the seasons caused by shifts in the planetary axis; collisions of asteroids and comets bearing far more force than man's nuclear arsenals; and the years without summer that followed these impacts.Yet hearts beat on, and petals unfold still.Were the environment fragile it would have expired many eons before the advent of the industrial affronts of the dreaming ape. Human assaults on the environment, though mischievous, are pinpricks compared to forces of the magnitude nature is accustomed to resisting.**