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## Contention 1: Representing NATO

#### The “scientific” and “objective” production of knowledge about NATO has become an institutionalized practice of story-telling: the narrative begins with NATO’s origins as an anti-communist block and proceeds through an episodic sequence justifying both its existence and its enlargement. These stories we tell and the representations they contain are self-referential—the discourse produces and is sustained by the strategies of knowledge which seek to explain them

Flockhart 2010 (Trine, Danish Institute for International Studies, Towards a Strong NATO Narrative: From a “Practice of Talking” to a “Practice of Doing”, <http://stockholm.sgir.eu/uploads/Flockhart%20NATO%20Practices.pdf>, July 17)

Narratives are more than simply “stories”. Narratives describe the history, purpose and achievements of a collective entity such as NATO, and they contribute in the process towards its unity and facilitate its continuous transformation. A strong narrative is a narrative, which supports ontological security by supporting the social identity of the agent in question and by being constitutive of identity. As self-identity is constructed vis-à-vis highly esteemed in-groups with the express purpose of maximizing self-esteem, strong narratives support the objective of maintaining or increasing the agent’s self-esteem. In order for an identity to have a degree of internal stability and social effectiveness (Williams and Neumann 2000:363), it must be supported by a narrative in which self-esteem is maintained and the experience of the past is reinterpreted and linked to the present through a process where past events are weaved into a single story thereby endowing the experience of time with meaning (Ezzy 1998:245). A narrative will cast all action in a sequential, linear and intentional mould, thereby creating a seamless linkage between doing (action and practice) and being (identity and knowledge)(Ciutâ 2002:192). To be able to do so, it is imperative that a narrative can be constructed which can portray the agent in a positive and self-supporting manner. If a strong narrative cannot be established, or if competing and diverging narratives coexist, then the likely result is to undermine and weaken the identity of the agent and thereby undermine ontological security. Narratives therefore are not unchanging. On the contrary, narratives are by definition in-process and unfinished, continuously made and remade as episodes happen (Ezzy 1998:247). Narratives can therefore appear chaotic and disordered for a time, but will soon settle into a new narrative or disintegrate. Although a narrative is actively constructed, it cannot be wholly fictive, but must continually integrate events which occur in the external world and sort them into an ongoing “story” about the self. As such there is only a limited repertoire of representations available which can be narrated and narratives cannot simply be fabricated at will(Somers and Gibson 1994:630). Furthermore the narrative must be seen by an external audience as based on real experience in order to remain legitimate and resonate with a wider audience. A narrative is therefore more than simply an agreed version of what to say about a specific topic. Such a fabricated narrative will .nevitably appear insincere and dishonest, which can only have detrimental effects on the legitimacy of the organization and the strength of the narrative. Rather than being simply a fabricated story, narratives are a combination of ‘knowledge management’, where knowledge is elicited and disseminated from past experience, and a collection of psychological processes generating and maintaining self-identity, memory and meaning-making. Narratives both construct and maintain identities, and once created appear solidified and are viewed as an account of an objective reality. The process of narrativity is inextricably connected to conceptions of the past, to identity constructions and to experience through action. I act because of who I am – but my actions also determine who I will become, defined through a narrative which in turn is a precondition for knowing what to do. The “doing” will in turn produce new narratives and hence new actions. The relationship is graphically illustrated in figure one. Past events and past experience are here conceptualized as a “storehouse of the past”. However, it is only through the use of narratives and through symbolic reconstruction of the past that historical events and practical experiences continuously have been extracted from “the storehouse” and used for identity and narrative construction purposes. In other words it is a reflexive recollection of the past that the continuity of the narrative in the present is ensured. Therefore although the past may consist of an endless collection of traces of past events and human experience (Jenkins 1995:10), history is different because it is a construction through retrospective interpretation of past actions and events, which produces the rationality and intentionality that is necessary for supporting a coherent idea set and a strategic framework.

#### And, this narrative actively creates the perception of a cohesive NATO community—without the Soviet threat to bind member states together, unity itself became the overriding goal of NATO

Williams and Neumann, 2000. (Michael and Iver, From Alliance to Security Community: NATO, Russia, and the Power of Identity, Millennium - Journal of International Studies 2000 29: 357)

The end of the Cold War presented the members of NATO with threats and challenges to their security which seemed to render obsolete many of the traditional structures and strategies of the Alliance and, in the eyes of many, to render obsolete the Alliance itself. Yet in contrast to these predictions of imminent discord, inexorable decline, and potential dissolution, NATO’s actual practices throughout the waning days of the Cold War and its immediate aftermath exhibited almost precisely the opposite of what the prophets of decline had predicted. Rather than fragmenting, the Alliance exhibited a cohesion and public commitment to continued co-operation that matched anything found during the supposedly unifying conflicts of the Cold War, and which certainly stands in marked contrast to the discord so characteristic of Alliance relations during the so-called ‘second Cold War’. How do we explain this cohesion? To begin with, the loss of the Soviet threat— the ‘other’ so often analysed in assessments of NATO’s identity and cohesion—did not mean that the Alliance was left without a threat.28 On the contrary, what was so unsettling to NATO in the immediate post-Cold War period was not only the oft declared uncertainty of the future or the indeterminacy of emerging NATO-Soviet relations (though each of these figures prominently), but rather the worry that the future would be marked by something that the NATO member states knew all too well: the return of their past conflicts.29 As Wæver put it, Europe’s ‘other’, the enemy image, is today to no very large extent ‘Islamic fundamentalism’, ‘the Russians’ or anything similar—rather Europe’s Other is Europe’s own past which should not be allowed to become its future.30 Seeing the role of NATO in terms of its institutional and symbolic power provides a series of insights into the persistence of the Alliance as a means of meeting this threat. NATO occupied a powerful symbolic position as a site where security could be authoritatively ‘spoken’ and collectively ascribed to by its members. The organisation was not simply a convenient venue providing an established and effective set of organisational routines and capabilities: its status was an integral aspect in the rearticulation of the relationship of its members, allowing them quite literally to speak security to themselves and to each other.31 The Alliance acted as a symbolic marker, a rhetorical touchstone through which the threat of fragmentation and the return of the past might be countered, and securing NATO from this threat—maintaining the organisation because its existence was a value in itself—became one of the central goals and political challenges of the Alliance. This was readily affirmed by the participants themselves. The Brussels Declaration of March 1988, for example, begins with the heading ‘A Time for Reaffirmation’, and indeed the first sections of the declaration are concerned not with the new strategic situation, but with reaffirmations of NATO solidarity. Having ‘come together to re-emphasise our unity’, the Allies declare that the foundations of NATO remain unchanged. ‘Our Alliance’, they state, ‘is a voluntary association of free and democratic equals, united by common interests and values. It is unprecedented in its scope and success. Our security is indivisible’.32 Such interpretations can themselves, of course, be seen as contributing to the very process they describe, and they are intended as such. As the past NATO Secretary- General Manfred Wörner noted in discussing the Brussels Declaration: The Declarations by the Heads of State and Government were not just proforma displays of unity, but powerful reaffirmations of our basic principles as the basis for moving forward with the Alliance’s agenda.33 And as he explicitly argued elsewhere with regard to the centrality of the Atlantic relationship: Without a North American commitment, European nations would lack the element of reassurance that has allowed them to integrate and overcome historical animosities. In the works of one commentator, the United States remains Europe’s ‘pacifier’. Europeans would be tempted to renationalize their defence policies and return to the fragile military pacts of the past.34 NATO’s insistent pledges of continuity and commitment act, in the words of Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell, as cognitive guidance systems, rules of procedure that actors employ flexibly and reflexively to assure themselves and those around them that their behaviour is reasonable. Far from being internalized in the personality system, the content of norms is externalized in accounts.35 Without the solidarity of the Soviet threat to allow disagreements while largely guaranteeing fundamental unity in response to that threat, unity in itself became a practical goal of NATO’s members, compelling them to ever-greater statements of commitment and solidarity. To work outside NATO was to risk breaking the unity that it embodied, and to risk bringing about the dissolution it symbolically opposed. The end of the Cold War did not yield greater freedom and flexibility in security relations for NATO’s members. On the contrary, it bound them ever more tightly within it, and with every success in keeping the Alliance together; those social pressures became more powerful, the bonds more secure, and the place of NATO increasingly central in the emerging security order.

#### NATO as a community is fully inscribed in the ideology of security—all NATO actions are measured against the backdrop of this grand narrative of security

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Narratives are not new to IR theory.1 Even if one considers 'narratives' to be simply an esoteric equivalent of 'stories', their relevance for the manner in which NATO's tribulations are accounted for is obvious. NATO's recent evolution is often represented as a sequence of strategic statecraft which forms a five-event narrative; 1) keep NATO; 2) engagement in Bosnia; 3) the launch of Partnership for Peace (PfP); 4) enlargement; 5) armed intervention in Kosovo.'' This is a story where the central character (NATO itself) proceeds in dramatic fashion through an episodic sequence which is usually referred to as 'shaping European security'. In narrative terms, this is the plot: the design, logic and dynamic of narrative,1 the common thread that marks and unites the actions that have articulated NATO's strategic response to the new European security environment. It is obvious that these crucial moments in NATO's and Europe's evolution involved decisions based on the assessment of the constraints and opportunities presented by the security environment, and a means-ends and cost evaluation. These are essential features of NATO's story because they rely on a definition of NATO as a military' alliance, with all the armoury of prescriptions and criteria of rationality stemming from such a definition. What is disputed is to what extent, or whether at all, these crucial decisions arc the correct result of what is normally called 'strategic statecraft'. As will be shown later, their representation as rational actions with clear sequentiality based on strategic motivation contains (and obscures) some embedded assumptions concerning 'what NATO is and does'. Thinking of NATO in terms of narrative-as-storyline is uncontroversial, and does not inherently lead to a different understanding of NATO's policies. In order to link the intuitive representation of a sequence of events as a 'story' to the complex realm of political interaction, one has to consider the constructive and transformative dimensions of narratives. Narratives tell actors what happens (they give meaning to specific events), how to behave (they give meaning to rules of behaviour), to what ends and in what context (they establish a teleology of action adequate to the previous elements). As such, narratives are intersubjective enterprises through which meaning is constructed, linking the project of action (the plot) with the context of action. They simultaneously. stabilize the meaningfulness and social predictability of interaction, and offer a vehicle for the transformation of knowledge, meaning and practice. This double role of the narrative is fulfilled through a continuous hcrmencutical process that 1 call a 'narrative shuttle\*, which produces accounts of linear evolutions 'by a complex moving back and forth between events and plot structure until both are fitted together".\* In this process, the meaning, rules and context of interaction are given a purpose and sense, continuously adapted to the intentions, expectations and serendipities that shape the daily conduct of actors." What this means for NATO is that its evolution in the European context is framed within an overall logic - its 'being a military alliance' and its 'doing security". From a narrativist and constructevist point of view, I will argue that 'security' constitutes the grand narrative of the European setting, providing rules and meaning for NATO's political actions and strategic movements, as well as for the other actors involved. The fundamental criterion of NATO's actions, strategic rationality, is formulated against the background of this grand narrative, which also makes reference to 'some ultimate originating principle or ultimate *telos\*10 -* NATO's 'origins', to which I will return below. The realm of continuity constituted by the grand narrative of 'security\* is simultaneously one of change, both in the context (the transformation of the Euro-Atlantic environment), and in the actions of the actors - the sometimes dramatic mutations in the policies of NATO and member/candidate stales. Permanence and change are thus mediated through continuous existence and action against the background of the apparently fixed 'grand narrative' of European security.1 The understanding of narrative as construction reveals the tensions and contradictions carried by the practices usually defined as strategic action or rational adaptation, and moves beyond the image of a linear evolution of NATO's identity and policy. Perhaps the fundamental tension within these actions, reflected in academic accounts as well as in NATO's official documents, refers to the problematic transition between NATO's past and present. This is further reflected in the links - prescribed or described - between NATO itself and the environment that enables and constrains its actions, and ultimately, between NATO's actions and its definition. By unpacking these interconnected tensions - rather than attempting a conventional analysis of NATO's interests and geopolitical mire - it should become more and more clear that the theory and practice of NATO hinge on the answer to the essential question identified at the beginning of the article, concerning "what NATO is and does'."

#### To become this security community, NATO has undergone a discursive metamorphosis: the idea that NATO is always already a security alliance assumes a linear, ahistorical development of identity

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The understanding of contemporary NATO as a security community implies at first sight a linear and unproblematic transition between past and present, bridging the temporal fracture between 'being' a morally neutral instrument of statecraft and 'doing' (that is, practising) shared identities and common interests. Nevertheless, the fracture persists within the transformed NATO, as shown by the tension between the consistency with which NATO is defined as a defensive military alliance in its official documents and by the member and candidate states, and the equally consistent understanding of NATO's practices as characteristic of a security community. In order to repair the fracture between NATO being and doing different things, the claim that NATO has become a security community is consolidated with the argument that in fact NATO has always been what it is today. The need for 'continuity and change"\* sees NATO's contemporary transformation as a 'return to the roots'. The fact that no specific threat was pointed at in The Washington Treaty (which did not mention the USSR as the enemy of the alliance) implies that threats themselves were ultimately not necessary for the existence of NATO. Consequently, it is argued that NATO has had *ab initio* the essential elements of a security community, and that its traditional military alliance features became prominent only later.'' Positions differ of course on whether 'what NATO has always been' is a military alliance designed to counter a specific large-scale military threat, or an alliance whose cohesion was given by a shared set of core values, an incipient community whose full potential was only obstructed by historical circumstances." Yet while mending the rupture between being and doing, this argument reopens the fracture between NATO's past and present and also brings to the fore a rift between NATO and its security environment. No matter if one does or doesn't like the Treaty's script at face value, one cannot discuss at the same time the role of the *new* NATO in the *new* European security selling, and argue that NATO is in fact returning to its *original* design. Apart from the problem identified so early by Deutsch -concerning NATO's adequacy as the vector of a European security community'\* - there is a deeper issue involved. The distinctive characteristic of a security community refers to a particular set of practices, to a particular manner of understanding security and the environment in which these practices are performed. Or, to argue that NATO has always been a security community means to negate the change in NATO's present environment, which is not characterized only by the absence of military threats, but also by the kind of perspective and practice promoted by the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and enlargement. This also means to negate the change in NATO itself, which is undeniable not only in the force structure and posture, but crucially, also in the manner in which NATO defines its role in contemporary Europe, change made possible by a new understanding of the meaning and practice of security. The continued relevance of some paragraphs of the Washington Treaty and other documents in which Cold War NATO states its vision of a peaceful and cooperative Euro-Atlantic security environment is indeed salutary and seems at first sight to vindicate the claims of a 'return to origins'. Yet this obscures the tact that the meaning of a 'cooperative' environment and of 'security' in the Europe of 1949 was entirely different from that of contemporary Europe. The origins of NATO are supposed to have been temporarily altered and muted by the historical anomaly represented by the Cold War (this in itself, *a* major blow to the neorealist structural explanation of NATO and the Cold War), as if the creation and performance of NATO could be - or could have been - conceived in isolation from its historical and strategic context then and now, with all the embedded understanding of alliances, alliance politics and security.

#### The ideology of security inherent in NATO politics makes extinction inevitable

Dillon 1996 (MICHAEL, SENIOR LECTURER IN POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF LANCASTER, THE POLITICS OF SECURITY, p. 24-25)

To put it crudely, and ignoring for the moment Heidegger’s so-called ‘anti-humanist’ (he thought ‘humanism’ was not uncannily human enough) hostility to the anthropocentrism of Western thought. [23](http://www.questia.com/read/103092871)As the real prospect of human species extinction is a function of how human being has come to dwell in the world, then human being has a pressing reason to reconsider, in the most originary way possible, notwithstanding other arguments that may be advanced for doing so, [24](http://www.questia.com/read/103092871)the derivation of its understanding of what it is to dwell in the world, and how it should comport itself if it is to continue to do so. Such a predicament ineluctably poses two fundamental and inescapable questions about both philosophy and politics back to philosophy and politics and of the relation between them: first, if such is their end, what must their origins have been? [**25**](http://www.questia.com/read/103092871)Second, in the midst of all that is, in precisely what does the creativity of new beginnings inhere and how can it be preserved, celebrated and extended? No matter how much we may want to elide these questions, or, alternatively, provide a whole series of edifying answers to them, human beings cannot ignore them, ironically, even if they remain anthropocentric in their concerns, if they wish to survive. Our present does not allow it. This joint regress of the philosophical and the political to the very limits of their thinking and of their possibility therefore brings the question of Being (which has been the question of philosophy, even though it has always been directed towards beings in the answers it has offered) into explicit conjunction with the question of the political once more through the attention it draws to the ontological difference between Being and beings, and emphasises the abiding reciprocity that exists between them. We now know that neither metaphysics nor our politics of security can secure the security of truth and of life which was their reciprocating raison d’être (and, raison d’état [26](http://www.questia.com/read/103092871)). More importantly, we now know that the very will to security— the will to power of sovereign presence in both metaphysics and modern politics—is not only a prime incitement to violence in the Western tradition of thought, and to the globalisation of its (inter)national politics, but also self-defeating; [**27**](http://www.questia.com/read/103092871)in that it does not in its turn merely endanger, but actually engenders danger in response to its own discursive dynamic. One does not have to be persuaded of the destinal sending of Being, therefore, to be persuaded of the profundity—and of the profound danger—of this the modern human condition.

#### The apocalyptic mindset pervades debate as well. Securitization parallels the narrative pleasure we get from reading impacts from nuclear war to the aliens. This process turns the subject, whether it be debaters or the American population, into apocalyptic bodies whose lives have meaning only insofar as they achieve ultimate health

Gomel 2000 [Elana, Head of English Dept @ Tel Aviv University, Winter, “The Plague of Utopias: Pestilence and the Apocalyptic Body”, Twentieth Century Literature Vol 46 http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_m0403/is\_4\_46/ai\_75141042]

In the secular apocalyptic visions that have proliferated wildly in the last 200 years, the world has been destroyed by nuclear wars, alien invasions, climatic changes, social upheavals, meteor strikes, and technological shutdowns. These baroque scenarios are shaped by the eroticism of disaster. The apocalyptic desire that finds satisfaction in elaborating fictions of the End is double-edged. On the one hand, its ultimate object is some version of the crystalline New Jerusalem, an image of purity so absolute that it denies the organic messiness of life. [1] On the other hand, apocalyptic fictions typically linger on pain and suffering. The end result of apocalyptic purification often seems of less importance than the narrative pleasure derived from the bizarre and opulent tribulations of the bodies being burnt by fire and brimstone, tormented by scorpion stings, trodden like grapes in the winepress. In this interplay between the incorporeal purity of the ends and the violent corporeality of the means the apocalyptic body is born. It is a body whose mortal sickness is a precondition of ultimate health, whose grotesque and excessive sexuality issues in angelic sexlessness, and whose torture underpins a painless--and lifeless--millennium. The apocalyptic body is perverse, points out Tina Pippin, unstable and mutating from maleness to femaleness and back again, purified by the sadomasochistic "bloodletting on the cross," trembling in abject terror while awaiting an unearthly consummation (122). But most of all it is a suffering body, a text written in the script of stigmata, scars, wounds, and sores. Any apocalypse strikes the body politic like a disease, progressing from the first symptoms of a large-scale disaster through the crisis of the tribulation to the recovery of the millennium. But of all the Four Horsemen, the one whose ride begins most intimately, in the private travails of individual flesh, and ends in the devastation of the entire community, is the last one, Pestilence. The contagious body is the most characteristic modality of apocalyptic corporeality. At the same time, I will argue, it contains a counterapocalyptic potential, resisting the dangerous lure of Endism, the ideologically potent combination of "apocalyptic terror", and "millennial perfection" (Quinby 2). This essay, a brief sketch of the poetics and politics of the contagious body, does not attempt a comprehensive overview of the historical development of the trope of pestilence. Nor does it limit itself to a particular disease, along the lines of Susan Sontag's classic delineation of the poetics of TB and many subsequent attempts to develop a poetics of AIDS. Rather, my focus is on the general narrativity of contagion and on the way the plague-stricken body is manipulated within the overall plot of apocalyptic millennialism, which is a powerful ideological current in twentieth-century political history, embracing such diverse manifestations as religious fundamentalism, Nazism, and other forms of "radical desperation" (Quinby 4--5). Thus, I consider both real and imaginary diseases, focusing on the narrative construction of the contagious body rather than on the precise epidemiology of the contagion. All apocalyptic and millenarian ideologies ultimately converge on the utopian transformation of the body (and the body politic) through suffering. But pestilence offers a uniquely ambivalent modality of corporeal apocalypse. On the one hand, it may be appropriated to the standard plot of apocalyptic purification as a singularly atrocious technique of separating the damned from the saved. Thus, the plague becomes a metaphor for genocide, functioning as such both in Mein Kampf and in Gamus's The Plague.[2] On the other hand, the experience of a pandemic undermines the giddy hopefulness of Endism. Since everybody is a potential victim, the line between the pure and the impure can never be drawn with any precision. Instead of delivering the climactic moment of the Last Judgment, pestilence lingers on, generating a limbo of common suffering in which a tenuous and moribund but all-embracing body politic springs into being. The end is indefinitely postponed and the disease becomes a metaphor for the process of living. The finality of mortality clashes with the duration of morbidity. Pestilence is poised on the cusp between divine punishment and ~~man~~made disaster. On the one hand, unlike nuclear war or ecological catastrophe, pandemic has a venerable historical pedigree that leads back from current bestsellers such as Pierre Quellette's The Third Pandemic (1996) to the medieval horrors of the Black Death and indeed to the Book of Revelation itself. On the other hand, disease is one of the central tropes of biopolitics, shaping much of the twentieth-century discourse of power, domination, and the body. Contemporary plague narratives, including the burgeoning discourse of AIDS, are caught between two contrary textual impulses: acquiescence in a (super) natural judgment and political activism. Their impossible combination produces a clash of two distinct plot modalities.

#### The notion of community that manifests itself in NATO is also mirrored within policy debate. Debate has evolved from an exclusive forum for future policymakers to an intellectual engagement that is ungrounded and constantly shifting. Yet, to maintain policy debate’s location as the intersection between competition and education, some participants continue to engage in rituals to produce absolute, prima facie issues that determine what is and isn’t productive debate

Secomb 2000 (Linnell, a lecturer in Gender Studies at the University of Sydney, “Fractured Community,” Hypatia – volume 15, Number 2, Spring 2000, pp. 138-9)

Despite these deficiencies within liberal Enlightenment universalism, Benhabib argues that a post-Enlightenment universalism is still viable. This, she suggests, would be "interactive not legislative, cognizant of gender difference not gender blind, contextually sensitive and not situation indifferent" (1992, 3). Benhabib proposes a universalist theory of community which attempts to overcome the problems of Enlightenment thinking. This vision of community involves a "a discursive, communicative concept of rationality"; "the recognition that the subjects of reason are finite, embodied and fragile creatures, and not disembodied cogitos or abstract unities of transcendental apperception"; and "a shift … from legislative to interactive rationality" (1992, 5–6). This reformulated universalist model of community would be founded on "a moral conversation in which the capacity to reverse perspectives, that is, the willingness to reason from the others' point of view, and the sensitivity to hear their voice is paramount" (1992, 8). Benhabib argues that this model does not assume that consensus can be reached but that a "reasonable agreement" can be achieved. This formulation of community on the basis of a conversation in which perspectives can be reversed, also implies a new understanding of identity and alterity. Instead of the generalized other, Benhabib argues that ethics, politics, and community must engage with the concrete or particular other. A theory that only engages with the generalized other sees the other as a replica of the self. In order to overcome this reductive assimilation of alterity, Benhabib formulates a univetsalist community which recognizes the concrete other and which allows us to view others as unique individuals (1992, 10). Benhabib's critique of universalist liberal theory and her formulation of an alternative conversational model of community are useful and illuminating. However, I suggest that her vision still assumes the desirability of commonality and agreement, which, I argue, ultimately destroy difference. Her vision of a community of conversing alterities assumes sufficient similarity between alterities so that each can adopt the point of view of the other and, through this means, reach a "reasonable agreement." She assumes the necessity of a common goal for the community that would be the outcome of the "reasonable agreement." Benhabib's community, then, while attempting to enable difference and diversity, continues to assume a commonality of purpose within community and implies a subjectivity that would ultimately collapse back into sameness. Moreover, Benhabib's formulation of community, while rejecting the fantasy of consensus, nevertheless privileges communication, conversation, and agreement. This privileging of communication assumes that all can participate in the rational conversation irrespective of difference. Yet this assumes rational interlocutors, and rationality has tended, both in theory and practice, to exclude many groups and individuals, including: women, who are deemed emotional and corporeal rather than rational; non-liberal cultures and individuals who are seen as intolerant and irrational; and minoritarian groups who do not adopt the authoritative discourses necessary for rational exchanges. In addition, this ideal of communication fails to acknowledge the indeterminacy and multiplicity of meaning in all speech and writing. It assumes a singular, coherent, and transparent content. Yet, as Gayatri Spivak writes: "the verbal text is constituted by concealment as much as revelation. … [T]he concealment is itself a revelation and visa versa" (Spivak 1976, xlvi). For Spivak, Jacques Derrida, and other deconstructionists, all communication involves conttadiction, inconsistency, and heterogeneity. Derrida's concept of différance indicates the inevitable deferral and displacement of any final coherent meaning. The apparently rigorous and irreducible oppositions that structure language, Derrida contends, are a fiction. These mutually exclusive dichotomies turn out to be interrelated and interdependent: their meanings and associations, multiple and ambiguous (Derrida 1973, 1976). While Benhabib's objective is clearly to allow all groups within a community to participate in this rational conversation, her formulation fails to recognize either that language is as much structured by miscommunication as by communication, or that many groups are silenced or speak in different discourses that are unintelligible to the majority. Minority groups and discourses are frequently ignored or excluded from political discussion and decisionmaking because they do not adopt the dominant modes of authoritative and rational conversation that assume homogeneity and transparency.

#### The concept of community connects to the worst genocides of the 20th century

Pavlich 2001 (Restorative justice and civil society By Heather Strang, John Braithwaite UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA, Professor of Law and Sociology PhD (Sociology) 1992 University of British Columbia, page 58-59, google books)

Indeed, the quest for a clearly defined community always contains the seeds of exclusionary parochialism that can lead, and has in die past led, to atrocious totalitarian exclusions. Let us not forget that the 'commu­nity' featured prominently in the diverse hierarchies established under the auspices of national socialist, apartheid and Stalinist calculations of solidarity (Anderson, 1991). Indeed, images of community have featured prominently among social calculations behind the most horrific cata­strophes of the twentieth century; the mass slaughters of nationalistic warfare, genocidal imperialisms, the gas chambers, ethnic cleansing, apartheid torture, and so the list goes on. Under certain circumstances, that is, the quest for community has proved more than capable of unleashing an obsession with member purity, xenophobia, and an extreme focus on excluding traces of the 'other', the 'strange', and so on. This reminder should put to rest the idea that imposing images of community over relations between people is an innocuous, or inherently positive, set of events. Of course, this is not to say that the calls for com­munity are necessarily disastrous either; rather inscribing notions of community over given modes of association is always silhouetted against dire threat of grave atrocities, some predictable and others unanticipated. And the task of critics is to outline the dangers of such perils wherever they may surface.

## Plan

#### The United States federal government should not fulfill any security commitments to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

## Contention 3: Re-presenting Communities

#### An examination of power relations is the only way to fully understand NATO—the plan resolves the limits of both neo-realist and social constructivist theories by creating connections between the past and present

Williams and Neumann, 2000. (Michael and Iver, From Alliance to Security Community: NATO, Russia, and the Power of Identity, Millennium - Journal of International Studies 2000 29: 357)

In order to explain NATO-Russian relations more fully, we argue that social constructivism must incorporate into its analyses a focus on the multiple sources and structures of social power.14 Our analysis proceeds in three parts. The first section elucidates briefly a theoretical position which stresses the role of narrative structures and relational processes in the construction of identities and suggests that these factors can be linked to a theory of action via what ‘new institutionalists’ have called a ‘logic of appropriateness’.15 We then link this position to a consideration of the form and exercise of symbolic power, a view that stresses the power which legitimate conceptions of identity have on what is understood as appropriate action by the actors concerned.16 Explanations of the NATO-Russia relations surrounding the enlargement process, we argue, need to be seen in the context of the relationship between their mutual identity reconstructions in the wake of the Cold War, the institutional dynamics and narrative resources involved, and the power relations they embody and express. In the second section, we examine the emergence of a narrative construction of NATO’s identity that provided a basis for the enlargement of the Alliance while at the same time countering objections that this process would inevitably involve the redrawing of dividing lines in Europe or provoke a threatening Russian reaction. The core of this process lay in the institutional mechanisms through which the Alliance was able to mobilise its long-standing identity as the expression and military guarantor of Western civilisation, as an organisation whose essential identity and cohesion was based upon common cultural and civilisational— particularly ‘democratic’—bonds, not primarily upon a shared military threat posed by the Soviet Union. This reconstructed identity provided a logic of continuity and action for the Alliance which not only offset claims that it had lost its meaning with the end of the demise of the Soviet Union, but also provided it with a motivating and legitimating vision of a new role: the consolidation of a ‘Western’ civilisation which had been illegitimately torn asunder by the Cold War. Rather than standing apart from a concern with threats and power, this discourse emerges in the context of a threat, and constitutes in itself a specific form of symbolic power.

#### Our specific examination of the operations of power is an effective critique—since power can only operate through structures of knowledge, exposing the foundations of systems of control disrupts them

Li, 2007 [professor of anthropology and senior cananda research chair in political economy and culture in Asia-Pacific at the Univ of Toronto. Tania Murray, The Will to Improve, pp. 25-26]

The value of a Gramscian approach, for my purposes, is the focus on how and why particular, situated subjects mobilize to contest their oppression. This was not a question elaborated by Foucault. Conversely, Foucault has the edge on explicit theorization of how power shapes the conditions in which lives are lived. Although Gramscians turn to the concept of hegemony for this purpose, Gramsci's formulations were nooriously enigmatic and fragmented. In her critical review of the use of Gramsci by anthropologists, Kate Crehan argues that the term hegemony for Gramsci "simply names the problem—that of how the power relations underpinning various forms of inequality are produced and reproduced."78 He used it not to describe a fixed condition, but rather as a way of talking about "how power is lived in particular times and places," always, he thought, an amalgam of coercion and consent.79 Foucault shared the concern to examine how power is lived but approached it differently. Gramsci understood consent to be linked to consciousness. Foucault understood subjects to be formed by practices of which they might be unaware, and to which their consent is neither given nor withheld. Further, Foucault highlighted the ways in which power enables as much as it constrains or coerces. It works through practices that are, for the most part, mundane and routine. Thus the binary that is compatible with a Gramscian analytic—people either consent to the exercise of power or they resist it—was not useful to Foucault."" I do not find it necessary to choose between Gramsci and Foucault on this point. Some practices render power visible; they trigger conscious reactions adequately described in terms such as resistance, accommodation, or consent. Other modes of power are more diffuse, as are peoples' responses to them. John Allen put this point eloquently when he observed that power "often makes its presence felt through a variety of modes playing across one another. The erosion of choice, the closure of possibilities, the manipulation of outcomes, the threat of force, the assent of authority or the inviting gestures of a seductive presence, and the combinations thereof."81 Powers that are multiple cannot be totalizing and seamless. For me this is a crucial observation. The multiplicity of power, the many ways that practices position people, the various modes "playing across one another" produce gaps and contradictions. Subjects formed in these matrices—subjects like Freddy-encounter inconsistencies that provide grist for critical insights. Further, powers once experienced as diffuse, or indeed not experienced as powers at all, can become the subject of a critical consciousness. Indeed, exposing how power works, unsettling truths so that they could be scrutinized and contested was as central to the political agenda of Foucault as it was for Gramsci.\*' Foucault did not elaborate on how such insights might become collective, although the connection is easily made. To the extent that practices of govern­ment form groups rather than isolated individuals, critical insight is poten­tially shared. One of the inadvertent effects of programs of improvement—the dam at LakeLindu, for example—is to produce social groups capable of identi­fying common interests and mobilizing to change their situation.8' Such col­lectivities have their own internal class, ethnic, and gender fractures. Their encounter with attempts to improve them forms the basis of their political ideas and actions. Scholars working in a Foucauldian mode have often ob­served the "strategic reversibility" of power relations, as diagnoses of deficien­cies imposed from above become "repossessed" as demands from below, backed by a sense of entitlement.84 Bringing insighls from Foucault and Gramsci together enables me to extend this observation, and to put the point more starkly: improvement programs may inadvertently stimulate a political challenge. The way they do this, moreover, is situated and contingent. Floods and diseases, topography, the variable fertility of the soil, prices on world markets, the location of a road—any of these may stimulate critical analysis by puncturing expert schemes and exposing their flaws.

#### This critique subverts the dominant ideology from within without devolving a paralyzing search for moral purity

Zizek 2008 Slavoj Zizek, professor at the University of Ljubljana, *Law and the Postmodern Mind*, p. 92

The dialectical tension between the vulnerability and invulnerability of the system also enables us to denounce the ultimate racist and/or sexist trick, that of "Two birds in the bush instead of a bird in the hand": when women demand simple equality, quasi-"feminists" often pretend to offer them "much more" (the role of the warm and wise "conscience of society" elevated above the vulgar everyday competition and struggle for domination... )the only proper answer to this offer, of course, is "No thanks! Better is the enemy of the good! We do not want more just equality!" Here, at least, the last lines in Now Voyager ("Why reach for the moon, when we can have the stars?") are wrong. It is homologous with the Native American who wants to become integrated into the predominant "white" society. And a politically correct progressive liberal endeavors to convince him that he is thereby renouncing his very unique prerogative. The authentic native culture and tradition- no thanks, simple equality is enough. 1 also wouldn't mind my part of consumerist alienation!... A modest demand of the excluded group for the full participation at the society's universal rights is much more threatening for the system than the apparently much more "radical" rejection of the predominant "social values" and the assertion of the superiority of one's own culture. For a true feminist, Otto Weininger's assertion that, although women are "ontologically false," lacking the proper ethical stature, they should be acknowledged the same rights as men in public life is infinitely more acceptable than the false elevation of women that makes them too good for the banality of men's rights. Finally, the point about inherent transgression is not that every opposition, every attempt at subversion, is automatically "co-opted." On the contrary, the very fear of being co-opted that makes us search for more and more "radical", "pure" attitudes, is the supreme strategy of suspension or marginalization. The point is rather that the true subversion is not always where it seems to be. Sometimes. a small distance is much more explosive for the system than an ineffective radical rejection. In religion, a small heresy can be more threatening than an outright atheism or passage to another religion; for a hard-line Stalinist, a Trotskyite is infinitely more threatening than a bourgeois liberal or a social democrat, as le Carre put it, one true revisionist in the central committee is worth more than a thousand dissidents outside it. It was easy to dismiss Gorbachev for aiming only at proving the system, making it more efficient- he nonetheless set in motion its disintegration. So one should also bear in mind the obverse of the inherent transgression: one is tempted to paraphrase Freud's claim from The Ego and the Id that man is not only much more immoral than he believes, but also much more moral than he knows- the system is not only infinitely more resistant than invulnerable than it may appear (it can co-opt apparently subversive strategies, they can serve as its support). It is also infinitely more vulnerable (a small revision etc. can have a larger unforeseen catastrophic consequences)

**Finally, we aren’t just a defense of policymaking – we problematize current politics and provide a new frame of action that can be used by policymakers or individuals to pursue different forms of change**

Cheeseman 96 (Graeme Cheeseman, Snr. Lecturer @ New South Wales, and Robert Bruce, 1996, Discourses of Danger & Dread Frontiers, p. 5-9)

This goal is pursued in ways which are still unconventional in the intellectual milieu of international relations in Australia, even though they are gaining influence worldwide as traditional modes of theory and practice are rendered inadequate by global trends that defy comprehension, let alone policy. The inability to give meaning to global changes reflects partly the enclosed, elitist world of profession security analysts and bureaucratic experts, where entry is gained by learning and accepting to speak a particular, exclusionary language. The contributors to this book are familiar with the discourse, but accord no privileged place to its ‘knowledge form as reality’ in debates on defense and security. Indeed, they believe that debate will be furthered only through a long overdue critical re-evaluating of elite perspectives. Pluralistic, democratically-oriented perspectives on Australia’s’ identity are both required and essential if Australia’s thinking on defense and security is to be invigorated. This is not a conventional policy book; nor should it be, in the sense of offering policy-makers and their academic counterparts sets of neat alternative solutions, in familiar language and format, to problems they pose. This expectation is itself a considerable part of the problem to be analyzed. It is, however, a book about policy, one that questions how problems are framed by policy-makers. It challenges the proposition that irreducible bodies of real knowledge on defense and security exist independently of their ‘context in the world’, and it demonstrates how security policy is articulated authoritatively by the elite keepers of that knowledge, experts trained to recognize enduring, universal wisdom. All others, from this perspective, must accept such wisdom to remain outside of the expert domain, tainted by their inability to comply with the ‘rightness’ of the official line. But it is precisely the official line, or at the least its image of the world, that needs to be problematised. If the critic responds directly to the demand for policy alternatives, without addressing this image, he or she is tacitly endorsing it. Before engaging in the policy debate the critics need to reframe the basic terms of reference tradition of democratic dialogue. More immediately, it ignores post-seventeenth century democratic traditions which insist that a good society must have within it some (it continues…) way of critically assessing its knowledge and the decisions based upon that knowledge which impact upon citizens of such a society. This is a tradition with a slightly different connotation in contemporary liberal democracies, which during the Cold War, were proclaimed different and superior to the totalitarian enemy precisely because they were institutional checks and balances upon power. In short, one of the major differences between ‘open societies’ and their (closed) counterparts behind the Iron Curtain was that the former encouraged the critical testing of the knowledge and decisions of the powerful and assessing them against liberal democratic principles. The latter tolerated criticism only on rare and limited occasions. For some, this represented the triumph of rational-scientific methods of inquiry and techniques of falsification. For others, especially since positivism and rationalism have lost much of their allure, it means that for society to become open and liberal, sectors of the population must be independent of the state and free to question its knowledge and power. One must be able to say ‘why’ to power and proclaim ‘no’ to power. Though we do not expect this position to be accepted by every reader, contributors to this book believe that critical dialogue is long overdue in Australia and needs to be listened to. For all its liberal democratic trappings, Australia’s security community continues to invoke closed monological narratives on defense and security. This book also questions the distinctions between policy practice and academic theory that informs conventional accounts of Australian security. One of its major concerns, particularly in chapters 1 and 2, is to illustrate how theory is integral to the practice of security analysis and policy prescription. The book also calls on policy-makers, academics and students of defense and security to think critically about what they are reading, writing and saying; to begin to ask, of their work and study, difficult and searching questions raised in other disciplines; to recognize, no matter how uncomfortable it feels, that what is involved in theory and practice is not the ability to identify a replacement for failed models, but a realization that terms and concepts – state sovereignty, balance of power, security, and so on – are contested and problematic, and that the world is indeterminate, always becoming what is written about it. Critical analysis which shows how particular kinds of theoretical presumptions can effectively exclude vital areas of political life from analysis has direct practical implications for policymakers, academics and citizens who face the daunting task of steering Australia through some potentially choppy international waters over the next few years. There is also much interest in the chapters for those struggling to give meaning to a world where so much that has long been taken for granted now demands imaginative, incisive reappraisal. The contributors, too, have struggled to find meaning, often despairing at the terrible human costs of international violence. This is why readers will find no single, fully formed panacea for the world’s ills in general, or Australia’s security in particular. There are none. Ever chapter, however in its own way, offers something more than is found in orthodox literature, often by exposing ritualistic Cold War defense and security mind-sets that are dressed up as new thinking. Chapters 7 and 9, for example, present alternative ways of engaging in security and defense practice. Others (chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, and 8) seek to alert policymakers, academics and students to alternative theoretical possibilities that might better serve an Australian community pursuing security and prosperity in an uncertain world. All chapters confront the policy community and its counterparts in the academy with a deep awareness of the intellectual and material constraints imposed by dominant traditions of realism, but they avoid dismissive and exclusionary terms which often in the past characterized exchanges between policy-makers and their critics. This is because, as noted earlier, attention needs to be paid to the words and the thought process of those being criticized. A close reading of this kind draws attention to underlying assumptions, showing they need to be recognized and questioned. A sense of doubt (in place of confident certainty) is a necessary prelude to a genuine search for alternative policies. First comes an awareness of the need for new perspectives, then specific polices may follow. As Jim George argues in the following chapter, we need to look not as much at contending policies as they are made for us but challenging ‘the discursive process which gives [favored interpretations of “reality”] their meaning and which direct [Australia’s] policy/analytical/ military responses’. This process is not restricted to the small, official defense and security establishment huddled around the US-Australian War Memorial in Canberra. It also encompasses much of Australia’s academic defense and security community located primarily though not exclusively within the Australian National University and the University College of the University of New South Wales. These discursive processes are examined in detail in subsequent chapters as authors attempt to make sense of a politics of exclusion and closure which exercises disciplinary power over Australia’s security community. They also question the discourse of ‘regional security’, ‘security cooperation’, ‘peacekeeping’ and ‘alliance politics’ that are central to Australia’s official and academic security agenda in the 1990s. This is seen as an important task especially when, as it revealed, the disciplines of International Relations and Strategic Studies are under challenge from critical and theoretical debates ranging across the social sciences and humanities; debates that are nowhere to be found in Australian defense and security studies. The chapters graphically illustrate how Australia’s public policies on defense and security are informed, underpinned, and. This book, then, reflects and underlines the importance of Antonio Gramsci and Edward Said’s ‘critical intellectuals’. The demand, tacit or otherwise, that the policy maker’s frame of reference be accepted as the only basis for discussion and analysis ignores a three thousand year old tradition commonly associated with (it continues…) Socrates and purportedly integral to the Western legitimized by a narrowly-based intellectual enterprise which draws strength from contested concepts of realism and liberalism, which in turn seek legitimacy through policy-making processes. Contributors ask whether Australia’s policy-makers and their academic advisers are unaware of broader intellectual debates. Or resistant to them, or choose not to understand them, and why? To summarize: a central concern of this book is to democratize the defense and security theory/practice process in Australia so that restrictions on debate can be understood and resisted. This is a crucial enterprise in an analytical/ policy environment dominated by particularly rigid variants of realism which have become so powerful and unreflective that they are no longer recognized simply as particular ways of constituting the world, but as descriptions of the real-as reality itself. The consequences of this (silenced) theory-as-practice may be viewed every day in the poignant, distressing monuments to analytical/policy metooism at the Australian (Imperial) War Memorial in Canberra and the many other monuments to young Australians in towns and cities around the country. These are the flesh and blood installments of an insurance policy strategy which, tragically, remains integral to Australian realism, despite claims of a new mature independent identity in the 1990s. This is what unfortunately, continues to be at stake in the potentially deadly debates over defense and security revealed in this book. For this reason alone, it should be regarded as a positive and constructive contribution to debate by those who are the targets of its criticisms.

### K: 2AC

#### The perm solves: the dispersal of power means we have to focus on these power relations at all levels—context should be the guiding principle in determining whether or not we entrench the system more than we use it

Jacques Derrida, Ecole des hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales Director of Studies, QUESTIONING ETHICS: CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN PHILOSOPHY, 1999, p. 74-5

What interests me in what Foucault says about power is not the claim that everything is power, or will to power, in society, but his proposition or assumption that there is no such thing as `the Power', and that today power is in fact dispersed and not concentrated in the form of the state. There are rather only micro-powers. This is a more useful approach, that is, not to rely on a homogeneous and centralized concept of power. From that point of view, I think this is the condition of a new politics, a new approach to politics. I think this is very necessary and useful. Nevertheless, my concern will be this one: of course we have to pay attention to micro-powers, to invisible or new forms of power, larger or smaller than the state, or foreign to the logic of the state. We should not, however, forget the state: the state is still very strong, the logic of the state is still very strong. It is today undergoing an unprecedented process. What one calls `globalization' or mondialization, the constitution of new powers in the form of capitalistic corporations, which are stronger than states and do not depend on states, relativizes the authority of states. Nevertheless, the international law, everything which rules the market today, is in the hands of so-called sovereign states; the international law, the United Nations, GATT and so on are today dependent on states. So the question of the state is not behind us. We have to pay attention to the two logics: on the one hand the deconstruction of the state, and on the other hand the survival of the state. I want to say that the state has both good aspects and bad aspects, and I mention among its bad aspects repression and authority. However, if we want to resist some forces in the world, economic forces for example, perhaps the good old state might be useful! So I am not for or against the state. It depends on the situation: in some contexts I am for the state, and in other contexts I am against the state, andI want to retain the right to decide depending on the context.

#### And, the context of the Aff means our permutation has 3 Net Benefits

#### 1. NATO: unequal capacity to engage in struggles means institutional analysis is more effective

Williams and Neumann, 2000. (Michael and Iver, From Alliance to Security Community: NATO, Russia, and the Power of Identity, Millennium - Journal of International Studies 2000 29: 357)

Different actors with different identities possess unequal capacities to engage in these struggles and to influence the structures of social knowledge through which practices are articulated. A central element in this process is the way in which organisations provide a locus for the accreditation of authoritative identities and for the articulation of claims. In security studies, this idea has most recently been articulated in the idea of security as a ‘speech act’. The basic idea is that, just as a certain social practice may become contested and thus ‘politicised’, a political issue may, by dint of a speech act, be made into a question of security policy, i.e. ‘securitized’.26 As Ole Wæver notes, however, this process involves more than a set of narrative or discursive structures; it is also intimately bound up with institutions: ‘security’, as he argues, ‘is articulated only from a specific place, by an institutional voice’.27 In the case at hand, NATO is the key site in the rearticulation of security and the securitization of culture.

#### 2. Foucault: the alternative separates the study of governmentality from how it is constituted and contested—only the permutation examines the intersections of government programs and the worlds they produce

Li, 2007 [professor of anthropology and senior research chair in political economy and culture in Asia-Pacific at the Univ of Toronto. Tania Murray, The Will to Improve, pp. 26-27]

Studies that draw their inspiration from Foucault tend to be anemic on the practice of politics.85 In Rose's *Powers of Freedom,* for example, discussion of politics is confined to the conclusion, "Beyond Government." There Rose argues thal "analysis of the forms of contestation might help us understand the ways in which something new is created, a difference is introduced into history in the form of a politics." This is not, he says, to "seek to identify particular agents of a radical politics—be they classes, races, or genders—or to distinguish once and for all the forces of reaction from those of progression in terms of fixed identities. Rather, one would examine the ways in which creativ­ity arises out of the situation of human beings engaged in particular relations of force and meaning, and what is made out of the possibilities of that loca­tion."\*"' I find this a very clear statement of a critical research agenda worthy of attention, but it is not one that Rose himself pursues. The reasons for this are both theoretical and melhodological. I have been arguing that the practice of politics is best examined through a Gramscian approach alert to the constellations of power in particular times and places, and the overdetermined, messy situations in which creativity arises. This is a research strategy fully compatible with the analytic of governmentality, as I will show. However, it is strategy Rose rejects, as he wants to separate studies of governmentalty from what he calls sociologies of rule-studies of the ways in which rule is actually accomplished, in all their complex­ity.\*17 To study government, he says, is not to start from "the apparently obvious historical or sociological questions: what happened and why. It is to start by asking what authorities of various sorts wanted to happen, in relation to prob­lems defined how, in pursuit of what objectives, through what strategies and techniques."\*" On similar grounds, Foucault argued that to study the geneal­ogy of an institutional complex such as incarceration is quite distinct from ethnographic study of the "witches' brew" of practices that actually transpire inside prisons.89 I agree that study of the rationale of governmental schemes and the study of social history are distinct kinds of inquiry, and they require distinct sets of tools. My point is that we should not privilege one over the other. Further, I argue that bringing them into dialogue offers insights into how programs of government are constituted and contested. Rather than conduct two separate analyses, I make the intersection of governmental programs with the world they would transform my principal subject in this book. To explain how I propose to examine that intersection, I turn now to a discussion of method.

#### 3. The State: Action is key in the context of security

Bilgin 2005 [Pinar, PhD International Politics, University of Wales, Aberystwyth, Department of International Relations Bilkent Univ., Regional Security in the Middle East, p. 60-61]

Admittedly, providing a critique of existing approaches to security, revealing those hidden assumptions and normative projects embedded in Cold War Security Studies, is only a first step. In other words, from a critical security perspective, self-reflection, thinking and writing are not enough in themselves. They should be compounded by other forms of practice (that is, action taken on the ground). It is indeed crucial for students of critical approaches to re-think security in both theory and practice by pointing to possibilities for change immanent in world politics and suggesting emancipatory practices if it is going to fulfil the promise of becoming a 'force of change' in world politics. Cognisant of the need to find and suggest alternative practices to meet a broadened security agenda without adopting militarised or zero-sum thinking and practices, students of critical approaches to security have suggested the imagining, creation and nurturing of security communities as emancipatory practices (Booth 1994a; Booth and Vale 1997). Although Devetak's approach to the theory/practice relationship echoes critical approaches' conception of theory as a form of practice, the latter seeks to go further in shaping global practices. The distinction Booth makes between 'thinking about thinking' and 'thinking about doing' grasps the difference between the two. Booth (1997:114) writes: Thinking about thinking is important, but, more urgently, so is thinking about doing…. Abstract ideas about emancipation will not suffice: it is important for Critical Security Studies to engage with the real by suggesting policies, agents, and sites of change, to help humankind, in whole and in part, to move away from its structural wrongs. In this sense, providing a critique of existing approaches to security, revealing those hidden assumptions and normative projects embedded in Cold War Security Studies, is only a first (albeit crucial) step. It is vital for the students of critical approaches to re-think security in both theory and practice.

#### Perm is key to understanding white supremacy—works on institutional and individual levels. Focus on the state is necessary to spill over into other areas

Goldberg 2002 (David Theo Goldberg, Director of the University of California Humanities Research; Professor of Comparative Literature and Professor of Criminology, Law and Society at the University of California, Irvine (UCI), and is a Fellow of the UCI Critical Theory Institute, 2002, The Racial State, p. 105-6, google books)

Racial rule is caught always in the struggle between subjection and citizenship, as Comaroff (1998: 329) characterizes the contradiction of colonialism (Cooper and Stoler 1997). In the case of racial governance, this (set of) tension(s) is "resolved" pragmatically though always con­tingently in different directions for racial rule naturalistically predicated than for the historicist. Under naturalist regimes - those defining their marginalized subjects as inherently inferior - this dilemma between social belonging and its conditions of enactment tends to be fashioned in terms of the terror of abject subjection, of physically threatened and imposed violence. This is a belonging conceived only as property relation, whether enslavement, debt peonage, coercive contractual work, or nominally waged labor. For historicist racial regimes, by contrast - those conceiving their racially identified subjects as historically differentiated in maturity and development - the tension is played out formatively in favor not principally of physical terror but rather the (never to be?) fulfilled promise of citizenship. Here social belonging does not privilege some form of property relation but the deferred longing for a common humanity ideologically fashioned. If for racial naturalism the inherently inferior could never qualify for citizenship, for racial historicism racial subjection was effected through the holy grail of legal citizenship and its attendant rights (Comaroff 1998: 339). Citizenship was a status and standing not only never quite (to be) reached for the racially immature but for whom the menu of rights was never quite (as) complete. Even within naturalist and historicist scope, the multiplicity of the dimensions as well as the variability in styles of rule imply that the modes of racial rule and regulation are never fixed, given, or singular, but multiple, shifting, site-specific, temporally and discursively defined. So subjection is internalized and to that extent seemingly self-designed and fashioned. The racial state, thus, could be said to strive for a racial subjection which, though usually perceived as externally imposed upon subjects, actually is self-fashioned and promoted. "Ra­cial subjection" seeks as such to turn imposition into self-assumption, assertive charge into autonomous, self-imposed choice, harness into hegemony. Thus, there is no clear-cut contrast between state and individual, between asserted institutional power and capillary govern-mentality. Foucault shows, in short, that the distinctions between the state as institutional power and power vested in and through the state of being, between "what is within the competence of the state and what is not, the public versus the private," are fictions of modern sociodiscursive formation (Foucault 1991: 103).

#### Our theory of power is a DA to the Alt—2 reasons

#### A. Performance

#### 1. *Judging* performance presumes a juridical model of power

Judith Butler, Professor of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature, UC Berkeley, Performativity and Performance, Ed. Parker and Sedgwick, 1995, p. 204

That words wound seems incontestably true, and that hateful, racist, misogynist, homophobic speech should be vehemently countered seems incontrovertibly right. But does understanding from where speech derives its power to wound alter our conception of what it might mean to counter that wounding power? Do we accept the notion that injurious speech is attributable to a singular subject and act? If we accept such a juridical constraint on thought - the grammatical requirements of accountability - as a point of departure, what is lost from the political analysis of injury when the discourse of politics becomes fully reduced to juridical requirements?? Indeed, when political discourse is collapsed into juridical discourse, the meaning of political opposition runs the risk of being reduced to the act of prosecution. How is the analysis of the discursive historicity of power unwittingly restricted when the subject is presumed as the point of departure for such an analysis? A clearly theological construction, the postulation of the subject as the causal origin of the performative act is understood to generate that which it names; indeed, this divinely empowered subject is one for whom the name itself is generative.

#### 2. Turns back all your State bad arguments

Campbell, 1998**.** (David, Professor of International Politics at the University of Newcastle in England. <http://calliope.jhu.edu/journals/theory_&_event/v002/2.1r_campbell.html>)

With her own rhetorical virtuosity and acute philosophical acumen, Butler sets out to interrogate the assumptions behind key arguments concerned with hate speech and the strategies to counter it. In so doing, she begins from a particular position sympathetic to those worried by hate speech in order to make a specific point that diverges from their normal position: That words wound seems incontestably true, and that hateful, racist, misogynist, homophobic speech should be vehemently countered seems incontrovertibly right. But does understanding from where speech derives its power to wound alter our conception of what it might mean to counter that wounding power? Do we accept the notion that injurious speech is attributable to a singular subject and act? If we accept such a juridical constraint on thought - the grammatical requirements of accountability - as a point of departure, what is lost from the political analysis of injury? Indeed, when political discourse is collapsed into juridical discourse, the meaning of political opposition runs the risk of being reduced to the act of prosecution (50). The collapse into juridical discourse, backed by the power of the state or specific agents of the state, is obvious in the scenes above, and Butler's anxiety about the minimalization of political opposition - particularly in the first case, where the dubious nature of the 'offence' diverts attention from racism more generally - appears fully justified. The question is, however, whether the nonjuridical and nonstate forms of agency and resistance Butler places her faith in are up to the task set for them. Let's leave that concern to hang for a bit. Let us first ask how it is that the dominant modes of dealing with hate speech appear universally juridical? In answering that question, Butler demonstrates well the way in which critically interpretative thought can combine a series of theoretical assumptions to demonstrate the limitations of prevalent discourses and alternative possibilities. In so doing, *Excitable Speech* is a powerful statement in response to those who would maintain that arguments imbued with the idea of a "modernity without foundations" (161) evacuate ethico-political concerns from our horizon. Those who argue that hate speech demands juridical responses assert that not only does the speech communicate, but that it constitutes an injurious act. This presumes that not only does speech act, but that "it acts upon the addressee in an injurious way" (16). This argumentation is, in Butler's eyes, based upon a "sovereign conceit" whereby speech wields a sovereign power, acts as an imperative, and embodies a causative understanding of representation. In this manner, hate speech constitutes its subjects as injured victims unable to respond themselves and in need of the law's intervention to restrict if not censor the offending words, and punish the speaker: This idealization of the speech act as a sovereign action (whether positive or negative) appears linked with the idealization of sovereign state power or, rather, with the imagined and forceful voice of that power. It is as if the proper power of the state has been expropriated, delegated to its citizens, and the state then rememerges as a neutral instrument to which we seek recourse to protects as from other citizens, who have become revived emblems of a (lost) sovereign power (82). Two elements of this are paradoxical. First, the sovereign conceit embedded in conventional renderings of hate speech comes at a time when understanding power in sovereign terms is becoming (if at all ever possible) even more difficult. Thus the juridical response to hate speech helps deal with an onto-political problem: "The constraints of legal language emerge to put an end to this particular historical anxiety [the problematisation of sovereignty], for the law requires that we resituate power in the language of injury, that we accord injury the status of an act and trace that act to the specific conduct of a subject" (78). The second, which stems from this, is that (to use Butler's own admittedly hyperbolic formulation) "the state produces hate speech." By this she means not that the state is the sovereign subject from which the various slurs emanate, but that within the frame of the juridical account of hate speech "the category cannot exist without the state's ratification, and this power of the state's judicial language to establish and maintain the domain of what will be publicly speakable suggests that the state plays much more than a limiting function in such decisions; in fact, the state actively produces the domain of publicly acceptable speech, demarcating the line between the domains of the speakable and the unspeakable, and retaining the power to make and sustain the line of consequential demarcation" (77). The sovereign conceit of the juridical argument thus linguistically resurrects the sovereign subject at the very moment it seems most vulnerable, and reaffirms the sovereign state and its power in relation to that subject at the very moment its phantasmatic condition is most apparent. The danger is that the resultant extension of state power will be turned against the social movements that sought legal redress in the first place (24)

**Social death epistemology wrong –effaces slave resistance**

**Brown** 200**9** – professor of history and of African and African American Studies specializing in Atlantic Slavery (Vincent, “Social Death and Political Life in the Study of Slavery,” http://history.fas.harvard.edu/people/faculty/documents/brown-socialdeath.pdf)

**African American history has grown from the kinds of people’s histories that emphasize a progressive struggle toward an ultimate victory over the tyranny of the powerful.** Consequently, studies that privilege the perspectives of the enslaved depend in some measure on the chronicling of heroic achievement, and historians of slave culture and resistance have recently been accused of romanticizing their subject of study.42 Because these scholars have done so much to enhance our understanding of slave life beyond what was imaginable a scant few generations ago, the allegation may seem unfair. Nevertheless, some of the criticisms are helpful. As the historian Walter Johnson has argued, **studies of slavery conducted within the terms of social history have often taken “agency**,” or the self-willed activity of choice-making subjects, **to be their starting point**.43 Perhaps it was inevitable, then, that many historians would find themselves charged with depicting slave communities and cultures that were so resistant and so vibrant that the social relations of slavery must not have done much damage at all. Even if this particular accusation is a form of caricature, it contains an important insight, that **the agency of the weak and the power of the strong have too often been viewed as simple opposites.** The anthropologist David Scott is probably correct to suggest that for most scholars, the power of slaveholders and the damage wrought by slavery have been “pictured principally as a negative or limiting force” that “restricted, blocked, paralyzed, or deformed the transformative agency of the slave.”44 In this sense, scholars who have emphasized slavery’s corrosive power and those who stress resistance and resilience share the same assumption. However, **the violent domination of slavery generated political action; it was not antithetical to it.If one sees** power as productive and **the fear of social death not as incapacity but as a generative force—a peril that motivated enslaved activity— a different image of slavery slides into view, one in which the object of slave politics is not simply the power of slaveholders, but the very terms and conditions of social existence.**

**Wilderson’s approach is reductionist and essentialist**

**Ellison 11** (Mary, PhD, Fellow, African American and Indian American history and culture, Keele University, “Review of: Red, White and Black: cinema and the structure of US antagonisms”

[http://rac.sagepub.com/content/53/2/100.full.pdf+html?rss=1, Acc](http://rac.sagepub.com/content/53/2/100.full.pdf+html?rss=1,%20Acc): 8/5/12, og)

These are two illuminating, but frustratingly flawed books. Their approaches are different, although both frequently quote Frantz Fanon and Jacques Lacan. Frank **Wilderson utilises the iconic theoreticians within the context of a study that concentrates on a conceptual ideology that, he claims, is based on a fusion of Marxism, feminism, postcolonialism and psychology**. He **uses a small number of independent films to illustrate his theories**. Charlene Regester has a more practical framework. She divides her book into nine chapters devoted to individual female actors and then weaves her ideological concepts into these specific chapters. Both have a problem with clarity. Regester uses less complex language than Wilderson, but still manages to be obtuse at times. **Wilderson starts from a position of using ontology and grammar as his main tools, but manages to consistently misuse or misappropriate terms** like fungible or fungibility. Wilderson writes as an intelligent and challenging author, but is often frustrating. Although **his language is complicated, his concepts are often oversimplified**. **He envisions every black person** in film **as a slavewho is suffering from irreparable alienation from any meaningful sense of cultural identity.** He believes that filmmakers, including black filmmakers, are victims of a deprivation of meaning that has been condensed by Jacques Lacan as a ‘wall of language’ as well as an inability to create a clear voice in the face of gratuitous violence. He cites Frantz Fanon, Orlando Patterson and Hortense Spiller as being among those theorists who effectively investigate the issues of black structural non-communicability. **His own attempts to define ‘what is black?’, ‘a subject?’, ‘an object?’, ‘a slave?’, seem bound up with limiting preconceptions**, **and he evaluates neither blackness nor the ‘red’ that is part of his title in any truly meaningful way.**

#### And, they will say they question how we constitute communities, but this logic relies on the belief that there is a community to be defined—THERE IS NO COMMUNITY—turns there policing arguments

Ridler et al. 2009 (Law and Critique © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009 Editors’ Introduction: ‘The Politics of the Border/The Borders of the Political’ Ben Golder1 , Victoria Ridler2 and Illan Rua Wall3 (1) Faculty of Law, University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW, 2052, Australia (2) School of Law, Birkbeck College, University of London, Malet Street, London, WC1E 7HX, UK (3) Department of Law, Oxford Brookes University, Headington Hill, Oxford, OX3 0BP, UK Published online: 31 March 2009

Contemporary discourses of national security and border protection are directed not simply at the exclusion of the unwanted other but also towards the production and regulation of political subjectivity within the polity. The border allows us to project a limit to the community and to create an ‘us’. Jean-Luc Nancy tells us that this process of the creation of a community of unity (what he calls ‘communion’) is a form of ‘mythic’ thought. Myth is that to which a political community appeals in order to found its existence as such and to perpetuate that existence as the intimate sharing of an identity or essence. The passage from the political to the sphere of politics occurs, then in myth, insofar as it is in myth that the existence of lived community is founded and perpetuated (James 2006, p. 196). Nancy rejects this attempt to enclose the community, claiming that the community exceeds any possible representation of it. If this is the case then the border, as that which attempts to define a unity of community, is to be resisted. Kafka’s short story, ‘The Great Wall of China’, presents us with an interruption of the mythic thought of community’s unity. As Peter Hutchings will later discuss, the story relates the building of the Great Wall of China through the eyes of one of its engineers. However, what begins as a simple tale quickly becomes something much more complex. We begin to see how the wall is in fact a technology of community. Because each of the very many engineers is periodically rotated around the country, the sense of the struggle for the wall creates the very sense of the community in unity. The wall operates in this order to enclose the community, much like in Benedict Anderson’s analysis newspapers allowed for the creation of a sense of nation by involving the readership in imagining all the other readers (Anderson 1991). However, this nation-building does not end there, because Kafka goes on to overturn or deconstruct this sense of an operative unity of the community. His short story ends with a number of allegorical tales. The one that matches our purpose here is that of the monarch. The size of the country implies that no province knows the name of the current Emperor: Thus, then do our people deal with departed emperors, but the living ruler they confuse among the dead. If once, only once in a man’s lifetime, an imperial official on his tour of the provinces should arrive by chance at our village, make certain announcements in the name of the government, scrutinize the tax lists… [when he mentions the name of the ruler] then a smile flits over every face…. Why, they think to themselves, he’s speaking of a dead man as if he were alive, this Emperor of his died long ago, the dynasty is blotted out, the good official is having his joke with us…. If from such appearances any one should draw the conclusion that in reality we have no Emperor, he would not be far from the truth (Kafka 1973, pp. 78–79). Kafka’s community, despite the projected unity that the wall brings, is ungovernable. The imagined unity of the mythic thought is exceeded in every moment by the community itself. Thus, the question of the territorial unity given by the projected space of the border is to be rejected. Community always exceeds its mythic representations. This use of the border is an excuse to create an oppressive unifying notion of communion. As we can see, the politics of the border are not only reducible to the exclusionary and governmental functions of managing and dividing populations, of casting out and rejecting, but also of shoring up and stabilising that which remains within the border. Beyond the question of the border’s inclusion/exclusion, we might also ask of the borders of the political. We are reminded of Jacques Rancière, who speaks to the centrality of borders to the concept of the political: To speak of the boundaries of the political realm would seem to evoke no precise or current reality. Yet legend invariably has the political begin at one boundary, be it the Tiber or the Neva, and end up at another, be it Syracuse or the Kilyma: riverbanks of foundation, island shores of refoundation, abysses of horror or ruin. There must surely be something of the essence in this landscape for politics to be so stubbornly represented within it. And we know that philosophy has played a signal part in this stubbornness. Its claims in respect of politics can be readily summed up as an imperative: to shield politics from the perils that are immanent to it, it has to be hauled on to dry land, set down on terra firma (Rancière 2007, p. 1). Politics begins and ends with a border because it is, at base, the problem of foundation. Rancière details the Platonic project as an anti-maritime polemic; that is, a move away from the sea in order to provide the solid ground of foundation. In Rancière’s idiolect this ‘solid foundation’, which Plato finds a distance of 80 stadia from the sea, is none other than the ‘distribution of the sensible’ of the ‘police’ order. For Rancière, the ‘police is not a social function but a symbolic constitution of the social. The essence of the police is neither repression nor even control over the living. Its essence is a certain manner of partitioning the sensible’ (Rancière 2001, pp. 6–7). The everyday politics of the police order is a process of counting, of managing who and what counts, and the manner in which they count.

#### 2. We have a specific sequencing argument: NATO’s politics of representation establishes a uniform Western identity in the face of fragmenting and liminal identities on the margins of order—only by problematizing the identity of NATO do the fractures of race become viable sites of contestation

Klein, 1990. (Bradley S., How the West was One: Representational Politics of NATO International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 3, Special Issue: Speaking the Language of Exile: Dissidence in International Studies (Sep., 1990), pp. 311-325)

The strategic/security enterprise is engaged in a politics of representation which helps constitute and delimit the identities of various peoples (Shapiro, 1988). Strategic studies celebrates the processes of modernity by reifying cultural construction into a completed historical act, enshrined as Western culture. But it is possible to acknowledge or recognize alternative ways of life within that Western space (Clifford and Marcus, 1986; Clifford, 1988). The exercise is a reminder of what, ethnographically speaking, the strategic equation excludes. For the ultimate question forestalled by modern Western strategy has been the one who or what "we" in "the West" are. In other words, the politics of strategy has to do with selecting this or that particular account of human life as dominant. Numerous forms of life are ruled out of the picture as inconsistent with the cultural claims of a singular, modern, progressive industrial order. There are many candidates for that liminal space which escapes Western "identity": Gypsies in Great Britain, those "Traveler" peoples whose caravans represent the last vestiges of freeholders dispossessed by enclosure movements; Balkan guest workers in West German cities, who are not eligible for service in the Bundeswehr but who occupy the kind of marginal work stations now deemed unacceptable by modern Europeans; Lapp reindeer herders, whose presence in the up- per reaches of Scandinavia hardly seems a contribution to NATO's Northern Flank; Native Indians in the Canadian Northwest, who now share space with the surveillance installations of NORAD; and the former colonial peoples of the British Empire now seeking refuge in the core. A whole series of marginal categorizations and boundaries could be enumerated, and they need not be limited to the ethnographic. Fractures of class, gender, and race-of partisan politics and religious identity-all demark potential sites of contestation within the Western Alliance. Yet these are unacknowledged, except as internal threats to the unit and "identity" of the West. NATO's representations of modern geopolitical space presuppose an unproblematic singular human identity which all members of the West either embody or aspire towards. This is, after all, what is worth dying for or, in the modern age of deterrence, worth voting monies for in order to "secure." The classical strategic tradition has always enshrined this singular Western space as beyond politics. Those who would disturb it tamper with "order" and Western "stability**."**

#### This means we solve better than the alternative

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A genealogical account of alliance defense policy explores the practices by which certain boundaries of political space became demarcated across Central Europe. It explores, as well, the forms of identity which came to prevail over other possible forms that Western politics-and global security practices-could have assumed. Such an analysis does not result in a singular master narrative, but rather in an open, internally differentiated set of practices in which elements of power are always in the process of being contestated and rearticulated (Foucault, 1977; Der Derian, 1987; Ashley, 1987, 1988, 1989).

### Util

#### Util is good

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As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics—as opposed to religion—pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.