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**Contention 1 is China Relations:**

**US-China relations are on the brink—simmering tensions could inhibit cooperation if not resolved**

**Gross 13** (Donald, senior associate at the Pacific Forum of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and former State Department official, 3-19-13, "Seizing the Opportunity to Improve US-China Relations" The Huffington Post) www.huffingtonpost.com/donald-gross/us-china-relations\_b\_2891183.html

**In his second term**, President Barack **Obama has a historic opportunity to improve U.S. relations with China.** Incoming President Xi **Jinping will welcome American overtures** and policies that assist China in addressing its serious domestic problems resulting from rapid economic development -- among them environmental degradation, severe economic inequality and a weak social safety net. **Without an improvement in U.S.-China relations**, however, **there exists a grave risk that simmering conflicts between the two countries could worsen considerably and lead to a new Cold War.** Heightened concerns in the United States, in recent days, about cyberattacks originating in China underscore this danger. A primary obstacle to sustaining stability and cooperation between the U.S. and China can be found in two fallacies that continue to unduly shape U.S. public opinion: 1) China and the United States are headed on a collision course toward inevitable war; and 2) China's economic rise is occurring at America's expense. A war with China is no more inevitable than was war with the Soviet Union. Thanks to farsighted political leaders, both Republican and Democratic, the United States reached arms control agreements with the USSR during the Cold War that curtailed the arms race in nuclear weapons, conventional forces and missile delivery systems. Through a process of negotiated mutual threat reduction, those agreements helped prevent a nuclear holocaust. In the case of China, of course, the U.S. faces far less of a security threat than it did from the Soviet Union. Today, America dwarfs China militarily in both nuclear and conventional forces. The U.S. nuclear arsenal now exceeds 5,000 warheads and includes approximately 450 ICBMs and 300 submarine-launched missile delivery systems. China possesses a "minimal deterrent" of about 240 warheads and up to 65 land-based ballistic missiles, according to Pentagon figures. On the conventional side, the U.S. similarly holds overwhelming superiority. To take just one example, the U.S. Navy deploys eleven aircraft carrier battle groups, each equipped with more than 55 advanced fighters and ground-attack aircraft. China, by contrast, has refurbished for training purposes a single Ukrainian-made carrier built in 1984 that it originally purchased as a floating casino. Despite this reality of American dominance, hawkish politicians, academics and journalists in the United States, over the past decade, have succeeded in hyping the Chinese threat to U.S. security. They typically exaggerate the dangers now posed by China's military forces and cite future, potential capabilities to give credence to their views. Almost always, hawks obscure several key aspects of the large disparity in military power between the two countries: the U.S. poses a far greater military threat to China than China does to the United States; the U.S. outspends China more than three to one on defense; and advanced U.S. military technology is highly likely to remain well ahead of China for the foreseeable future. The prognostications of China hawks have nevertheless increased the possibility that the widespread belief in a coming war with China could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. As each country "hedges" and ramps up preparations for war, its actions stimulate greater military modernization and more aggressive actions by the other side, magnifying the risk of conflict. On economic issues, American protectionists who press for measures to block or impede Chinese products, services and investments from entering the U.S. reinforce the widespread fallacy that China's rise is occurring at the expense of the United States. Just the opposite is true. China is today the largest growth market in the world for U.S. goods and services. Trade with China - the third-largest U.S. export market and leading market for agricultural products -- has aided America's recovery from the 2008 financial crisis. Looking to the future, the U.S. stands to benefit from billions of dollars in incoming Chinese investment that will reduce production costs for American companies and prices for American consumers, enhance consumer welfare, spur the development of innovative products, and most importantly, result in "in sourcing" -- the creation of hundreds of thousands more American jobs. Secretary of State John Kerry has emphasized the importance of U.S.-China cooperation. As Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he argued convincingly: "...the simple fact is that we need China, and China needs us. We have to get this relationship right. After all, we are talking about our connection to one-sixth of humanity. The most serious problems we face today, from nuclear proliferation to climate change, can't be solved alone. And, economically, our futures are deeply intertwined and will remain so." Kerry warns that "the tendency to demonize China, to consider it the next great threat, just isn't based in reality." He believes "there is incredible potential for cooperation, even as we have to deal with certain disagreements now." Despite Kerry's upbeat assessment, **security conflicts continue to create serious tensions between the U**nited **S**tates **and China.** In the East China Sea, China and Japan tangle almost daily over their legal claims to several uninhabited islands which Japan took from China in 1895 during the first Sino-Japanese War. Japan's continuing push for eever greater U.S. support could draw the United States into an armed skirmish with China for the first time since the Korean War -- even though the U.S. does not recognize Japanese sovereignty over the islands. In Northeast Asia, North Korea's provocative nuclear and missile tests heighten the risk of a new conflict on the Korean peninsula which could potentially lead to a confrontation between U.S. and Chinese forces. In the Taiwan Strait, **the dispute over Taiwan's political status remains fundamentally unresolved and could once again give rise to sharply increased tensions**, despite the courageous efforts of Taiwan's President Ma Ying-jeou to seek greater stability through cross-Strait economic cooperation.

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**Taiwan is the single most important obstacle to US-China cooperation—failure to handle this issue could break the whole endeavor**

**Wenzhao 09** (Tao, CASS Expert on US Affairs, 5-9-09, “Expert says Taiwan Relations Act "main obstacle" hindering Sino-US ties” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific – Political, Lexis)

Over the past 30 years, tremendous changes have taken place in the international situation, and **China-US relations have become** one of **the most important bilateral relations in the world. During their first meeting** in London recently, PRC President **Hu Jintao and** US President **Obama defined the relations of the two countries as positive, cooperative, and all-around relations**, thus pointing out the direction for the future development of bilateral relations under the present new situation. **Such being the case, the "Taiwan Relations Act" is increasingly out of tune with the general interest of China-US relations.** Cross-strait ties have also undergone tremendous changes over the past three decades. Having gone through repeated tests of strength with "Taiwan independence" forces, the idea of easing the tense situation across the strait and improving cross-strait ties has finally gained an upper hand on the island. The improvements achieved in cross-strait ties have become the focus of world attention over the past year, leading to an unprecedented favourable situation in cross-strait exchanges. Ever since he assumed office, US President Obama has repeatedly expressed welcome for improvements in cross-strait relations. However, the "Taiwan Relations Act" is totally out of tune with the peaceful development in cross-strait ties. Out of Tune With the General Interest Thanks to the development **over the past 30 years, China-US relations have made great leaps forward** in both depth and breadth; **however, it is also a fact that strategic worries and misgivings still exist between the two countries.** To the United States, the biggest misgiving is how a stronger China is going to use its power, as the United States worries that a rising China will challenge the US position in East Asia and the whole world. **Many Chinese**, including many scholars, **hold the view that to the U**nited **S**tates, **the most favourable situation is to maintain the present cross-strait situation of peace without unification** for a long period of time. **One main ground for such a worry lies with the existence of the "Taiwan Relations Act."** This author has long believed that there are many facets to China-US ties, yet each of these different facets has different importance to the relations of the two countries**. If there was an issue in China-US relations that could overturn the entire China-US relations once handled improperly, that issue would have to be the issue of Taiwan.** The reason for this also lies with the existence of the "Taiwan Relations Act." **Therefore, the "Taiwan Relations Act" is indeed a major obstacle that hinders the two countries from enhancing mutual trust and further improving bilateral ties.** The author believes that along with the development of China-US relations and cross-strait ties, more and more people in the United States will come to see that **the "Taiwan Relations Act" is both useless and harmful, and it would** then **be** the **time for the "Taiwan Relations Act" to die a natural death.**

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**Taiwan is the most likely relations flashpoint**

Joseph S. **Nye**, former US assistant secretary of defense and chairman of the US National Intelligence Council, Professor @ Harvard, 1-11-20**08**, The Fear Factor in US-China Relations, p. www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-fear-factor-in-us-china-relations

**Maintaining good US-China relations will be a key determinant of global stability** in this century.¶ Perhaps the greatest threat to the bilateral relationship is the belief that conflict is inevitable. Throughout history, whenever a rising power creates fear among its neighbors and other great powers, that fear becomes a cause of conflict. In such circumstances, seemingly small events can trigger an unforeseen and disastrous chain reaction. ¶ Today, **the greatest prospect of a destabilizing incident lies in** the complex relationships across the **Taiwan** Strait. China, which regards Taiwan as an integral part of its territory that has sheltered behind the US navy since the days of the Chinese civil war, vows that any Taiwanese declaration of independence will be met by force.¶ The US does not challenge China’s sovereignty, but it wants a peaceful settlement that will maintain Taiwan’s democratic institutions. In Taiwan itself, there is a growing sense of national identity, but a sharp division between pragmatists of the “pan-blue alliance,” who realize that geography will require them to find a compromise with the mainland, and the ruling “pan-green alliance,” which aspires in varying degrees to achieve independence.¶ The two sides in Taiwan will face off in a presidential election on March 22. Current polls suggest that former Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-jeou of the Kuomintang (KMT) leads Frank Hsieh of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). But some observers fear that the incumbent DPP President Chen Shui-bian will seek a pretext to prevent a defeat for the pro-sovereignty camp. He is currently advocating a referendum on whether Taiwan should join the United Nations, which China views as provocative. Chen replies that it is China “that is acting provocatively today.”¶ America is clearly concerned. Recently, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told a news conference that “we think that Taiwan’s referendum to apply to the UN under the name ‘Taiwan’ is a provocative policy. It unnecessarily raises tensions in the Taiwan Strait and it promises no real benefits for the people of Taiwan on the international stage.” She also reiterated the administration policy opposing “unilateral threat by either side to change the status quo.”¶ The same day, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates criticized China for unexpectedly curtailing American ship visits to Chinese ports because of American arms sales to Taiwan. According to Gates, he had told Chinese officials that American arms sales were consistent with past policy and that “as long as they continued to build up their forces on their side of the Taiwan Strait, we would continue to give Taiwan the resources necessary to defend itself.” Gates added, however, that despite China’s rising defense budget, “I don’t consider China an enemy, and I think there are opportunities for continued cooperation in a number of areas.”¶ In principle, the Taiwan issue need not lead to conflict. With increasing change in China and growing economic and social contacts across the strait, it should be possible to find a formula that allows the Taiwanese to maintain their market economy and democratic system without a placard at the UN.¶ Thus far, the US has tried to allow for this evolution by stressing two bright lines: no independence for Taiwan and no use of force by China. But, given the danger of incidents that could grow out of political competition in Taiwan or growing impatience in the Peoples’ Liberation Army on the mainland, the US would be wise to encourage more active contacts and negotiations by the two sides.¶ **The US has a broad national interest in maintaining good relations with China**, as well as a specific human rights interest in protecting Taiwan’s democracy. **The US does not have a national interest in helping Taiwan** become a sovereign country with a seat at the UN, and efforts by some Taiwanese to do so present the greatest danger of a miscalculation that could create enmity between the US and China. Already**, some Chinese suspect the US of seeking an independent Taiwan as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” for use against a future Chinese enemy**. They are wrong, but **such suspicions can feed a climate of enmity**.¶ **If America treats China as an enemy today, it will ensure future enmity**. While we cannot be sure how China will evolve, it makes no sense to foreclose the prospect of a better future. America’s current policy combines economic integration with a hedge against future uncertainty. The US-Japan security alliance means China cannot play a “Japan card.” But, while such hedging is natural in world politics, modesty is important for both sides. **If the overall climate is one of distrust, what looks like a hedge** to one side **can look like a threat to the other**.

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**Scenario 1: North Korea**

**Korean peninsula is on the brink of war—miscalc is increasingly likely**

**DeTrani 13** (Joseph, president of the Intelligence and National Security Alliance, a nonprofit organization, Special Envoy for Six Party Talks with North Korea from 2003-2006, 3-26-13, "China can defuse North Korea time-bomb" Asia Times Online) www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/KOR-01-260313.html

**North Korea's missile launch and nuclear test** last month and the resultant UN Resolution sanctioning the country **opened a dangerous chapter in relations with North Korea and its young, new leader. In rapid succession, North Korea has escalated tension exponentially, with threats to pre-emptively strike the US with nuclear weapons; with a decision to scrap the 1953 armistice that ended the Korean War and cessation of the Red Cross hotline on the** demilitarized zone (**DMZ**) with South Korea. **On a daily basis, North Korea spews invective at South Korea, the United States and the international community**, with no end in sight. **The leadership in Pyongyang exhorts its people to prepare for war, to endure additional hardship as North Korea sets a course for conflict. South Korea's new government has been clear in warning North Korea that any type of an attack against the South will result in an overwhelming military response**, with the South Korean military making necessary preparations. **The US has been equally clear**: any attack will result in a crushing response. The US decision to spend US$1 billion to deploy additional ballistic missile interceptors along the Pacific Coast is smart contingency planning as North Korea continues to develop its long-range ballistic missile capabilities, to include its long-range mobile missile, the KN-08. **The likelihood that even a minor miscalculation could escalate into military conflict with North Korea is real. Such a conflict could escalate quickly, with unimaginable devastation.** Our objective now has to be insuring that we don't stumble into such a conflict. **China's new leadership** team **can insure that this doesn't happen**, similar to what they did in April 2003, when China hosted trilateral talks between the US, North Korea and China. At that time, the situation on the Korean Peninsula was tense and deteriorating quickly. North Korea had withdrawn from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), threatened to abandon the 1953 armistice, entered South Korean airspace with a jet fighter, intercepted a US reconnaissance aircraft and threatened to make Seoul a sea of flames. The April 2003 trilateral talks defused this tense situation, with all parties agreeing to the establishment of the six-party talks. **China's intervention is again necessary.** The new Xi Jinping leadership team in China can defuse this impending disaster by getting North Korea to sit down with the US and South Korea to determine if resumption of international talks is still viable. The new State Councilor responsible for foreign affairs, Yang Jiechi, and new Foreign Minister Wang Yi are experienced officials who have spent years trying to resolve the North Korea nuclear issue. Yang Jiechi, the former minister of foreign affairs and former ambassador to the US, knows the importance of achieving a peaceful resolution, while insuring that eventual denuclearization is accomplished. Failure to accomplish this goal will result in a nuclear arms race in the region, with attendant nuclear proliferation issues. Wang Yi previously was China's lead negotiator with the six-party talks with North Korea; he has worked these issues and appreciates the need for a peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue with North Korea. Wang Yi's recent posting as China's ambassador to Japan gave him first hand access to Japan's sense of vulnerability if North Korea retains its nuclear weapons and the likelihood that Japan would feel obliged to develop its own nuclear weapons. The upcoming appointment of Cui Tiankai as the new ambassador to the US is another positive development. Cui Tiankai also was engaged with the six-party talks and was a central figure in the drafting of the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement that committed North Korea to nuclear dismantlement in exchange for security assurances, economic assistance and the eventual normalization of relations. Thus China's three most-senior foreign policy officials all have rich experience with the North Korea nuclear issue and all appreciate the need to resolve this issue peacefully, insuring that denuclearization eventually is accomplished. Hopefully, China will take decisive action with North Korea and, working with this new leadership team, convince North Korea to return to negotiations and commit to nuclear dismantlement, in line with the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement. **Time is of the essence.**

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**Only US-China cooperation can solve the crisis—increasing mutual trust is key**

**Solana 13** (Javier, former EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, Secretary-General of NATO, and Foreign Minister of Spain, currently President of the ESADE Center for Global Economy and Geopolitics and Distinguished Fellow at the Brookings Institution, 4-23-13, "The Sino-American Test in North Korea" Project Syndicate) www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-us-and-china-in-north-korea-by-javier-solana

Repeated **threats from North Korea have turned the** Korean **Peninsula into one of the world’s most dangerous hotspots**. But the situation also offers an important opportunity: a gain in strategic trust between China and the United States, the two countries with the capacity to resolve the tensions once and for all. If they manage to cooperate constructively in order to shape a peace acceptable to all sides, this would make not only Korea, but also the region and the world, a safer place. **Ten years after** opting **out of the N**uclear Non-**P**roliferation **T**reaty, **North Korea clearly possesses nuclear weapons. The regime’s nuclear test in February – its third** since 2006 – **was likely a miniaturized device, which makes the situation even more worrying, given that successful miniaturization is critical for using nuclear weapons in ballistic missiles. February’s test provoked another round of** United Nations **sanctions**, drafted by the US and China, **triggering an escalation of threats and provocations from the North. The tension on the peninsula increased further with** the annual **joint military exercises** conducted by the US and South Korea – especially when American nuclear-capable B-52 and B-2 bombers were added to the drills. Nobody wants war on the Korean Peninsula. For the North, it would be suicide; for the South, with its vibrant economy and widening free-trade agreements, the opportunity cost would be particularly high. Likewise, regional stability is a prerequisite of China’s stellar economic growth, and military conflict would be a setback for US economic rebirth as well. Indeed, with US defense spending finally set to decline after a decade of debt-financed war in Iraq and Afghanistan, America has little fiscal room for an unforeseen military entanglement. The US “pivot” to Asia is built on economic opportunities there; a conflict with unpredictable fallout does not fit the scheme. **China is the key geostrategic player in resolving the conflict, because it provides North Korea with 90% of its energy, 80% of its consumer goods, and 40% of its food.** But it is unclear how much influence China’s government holds over Kim Jong-un’s regime. Sino-North Korean relations have borne a significant scar since 1991, when China recognized South Korea without insisting that the US formally recognize the North. The North Koreans believe that China sacrificed them for commercial interests, and bilateral relations have yet to recover. Nonetheless, **China continues to regard North Korea as an important strategic asset, because it serves as a buffer state** shielding China’s border from American troops on the peninsula – which has historically been used as an entry point by invading troops. **China’s ideal solution would therefore be to maintain the status quo while persuading the North to open up – a path of gradual change that avoids open conflict or the regime’s collapse. Either of these traumatic outcomes would spell disaster, for both the region and the world.** First, **the regime’s implosion would unleash a massive refugee flow, implying enormous social and economic costs**. Moreover, **Asia remains a continent defined by balance-of-power diplomacy, border conflicts, and historic mistrust, with no multilateral security structures to soften regional tensions. Given these conditions, even a small spark could ignite a wildfire.** In this environment, mistrust of China’s rise as a regional hegemon in much of East Asia only intensifies the need for active Chinese participation in promoting regional stability and peace – a peace framework with Asian roots, acceptable to all parties. Only through such efforts will China be able to increase its international legitimacy, thereby minimizing the risk of future conflict. **It is essential that China and the US work together to resolve the current crisis.** The US must reiterate clearly that indefinitely prolonging the status quo on the Korean Peninsula would imply a strategic loss for China, and that China must join the international community in its efforts to halt North Korea’s nuclear program. This **cooperation is the only way to force the North’s hand and put an end to the incessant cycle of crisis and mounting risk.** The current crisis offers a unique test case for joint handling of international affairs – or, in this case, regional affairs with global consequences – by the world’s two biggest powers. During US Secretary of State John Kerry’s trip to China this month, the two countries pronounced their shared goals: denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and durable peace in the region. This is a good starting point. Sino-US cooperation on this flashpoint could be a huge step forward in building much-needed bilateral strategic trust. But the two countries’ markedly different foreign-policy approaches will not facilitate matters. While the US tends to segment problems in order to find solutions to each part within a finite period of time, China relies on broad, long-term perspective and views issues as extended, relative processes. <<card continues>>

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**Korean conflict escalates to global nuclear war**

**Chol 11** Kim MyongChol is author of a number of books and papers in Korean, Japanese and English on North Korea, including Kim Jong-il's Strategy for Reunification. He has a PhD from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's Academy of Social Sciences "Dangerous games" Aug 20 www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/MH20Dg01.html

**The divided and heavily armed Korean Peninsula remains the most inflammable global flashpoint, with any conflict sparked there likely to become a full-blown thermonuclear war** involving the world's fourth-most powerful nuclear weapons state and its most powerful. **Any incident in Korea by design, accident, or miscalculation could erupt into a devastating DPRK-US war, with the Metropolitan US serving as a main war theater.** RodongSinmun warned on August 16: "The Korean Peninsula is faced with the worst crisis ever. An all-out war can be triggered by any accident." **Recent incidents illustrate the real danger of miscalculation leading to a total shooting war, given the volatile situation on the Land of Morning Calm. 1. The most recent case in point is the August 10 shelling of North Korea by the South. Frightened South Korea marines on Yeonpyeong** Island **mistook three noises** from a North Korean construction site across the narrow channel for artillery rounds, taking an hour to respond with three to five artillery rounds. **The episode serves as a potent reminder to the world that the slightest incident can lead to war.** A reportedly malfunctioning firefinder counter-artillery radar system seems to partly account for the panicky South Korean reaction. South Korean conservative newspaper the JoongAng Daily reported August 17: "A military source said that radar installed to detect hostile fire did not work last week when North Korea fired five shots toward the Northern Limit Line (NLL), the disputed maritime border, on Aug 10. "'We must confirm the location of the source of the firing through the ARTHUR (Artillery Hunting Radar) and HALO (hostile artillery location) systems, but ARTHUR failed to operate, resulting in a failure to determine the source of the fire,' said the source." BBC reported on November 25 last year the aggressive nature of troops on the South Korea-held five islands in North Korean waters. "Seen in this sense, they (five islands including Yeonpyeong Island) could provide staging bases for flanking amphibious attacks into North Korea if South Korea ever takes the offensive." 2. **An almost catastrophic incident took place at dawn on June 17 near Inchon**. South Korean marines stationed on Gyodong Island near Inchon Airport fired rifles at a civilian South Korean jetliner Airbus A320 with 119 people aboard as it was descending to land, after mistaking it for a North Korean military aircraft. The Asiana Airlines flight was carrying 119 people from the Chinese city of Chengdu. About 600 civilian aircraft fly near the island every day, including those flying across the NLL, but they face a perennial risk of being misidentified as a hostile warplane. It is nothing short of a miracle that the Airbus A320 was not hit and nobody harmed. 3. On March 26, 2010, the high-tech South Korean corvette Sokcho fired 130 rounds at flocks of birds, mistaking them for a hostile flying object. The innocent birds looked like a North Korean warplane just at a time when an alleged North Korean midget submarine had managed to escape with impunity after torpedoing the hapless Cheonan deep inside security-tight South Korean waters. The South Korean military's habit of firing at the wrong target increases the risk of an incident running out of control. CNN aired a story December 16, headlined: "General: South Korea Drill Could Cause Chain Reaction." F/A-18 pilot-turned Marine Corp General James Cartwright told the press in the Pentagon, "What we worry about, obviously, is if that it [the drill] is misunderstood or if it's taken advantage of as an opportunity. **"If North Korea were to react to that in a negative way and fire back at those firing positions on the islands, that would start potentially a chain reaction of firing and counter-firing. "What you don't want to have happen out of that is ... for us to lose control of the escalation. That's the concern."**Agence France-Presse on December 11 quoted former chief of US intelligence retired admiral Dennis Blair as saying that South Korea "will be taking military action against North Korea". New Korean war differs from other wars **Obama and the Americans seem to be incapable of realizing that North Korea is the wrong enemy, much less that a new Korean War would be fundamentally different from all other wars including the two world wars. Two things will distinguish a likely American Conflict or DPRK-US War from previous wars.**The first essential difference is that **the US mainland will become the main theater of war for the first tim**e since the US Civil War (1861-1865), giving the Americans an opportunity to know what it is like to have war fought on their own land, not on faraway soil. <<card continues>>

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<<card continues>> The US previously prospered by waging aggressive wars on other countries. Thus far, the Americans could afford to feel safe and comfortable while watching TV footage of war scenes from Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and Libya as if they were fires raging across the river. The utmost collateral damage has been that some American veterans were killed or returned home as amputees, with post traumatic stress disorder, only to be left unemployed and homeless. However, this will no longer be the case. At long last, it is Americans' turn to have see their homeland ravaged. An young North Korea in 1950-53 was unable to carry the war all the way across the Pacific Ocean to strike back, but the present-day North Korea stands out as a fortress nuclear weapons state that can withstand massive American ICBM (Intercontinental ballistic missile) attacks and launch direct retaliatory transpacific strikes on the Metropolitan USA. **The second essential difference is that the next war in Korea, that is, the American Conflict or the DPRK-USA War would be the first actual full-fledged nuclear, thermonuclear war that mankind has ever seen, in no way similar to the type of nuclear warfare described in science fiction novels or films.** North Korea is unique among the nuclear powers in two respects: One is that **the Far Eastern country, founded by legendary peerless hero Kim Il-sung, is the first country to engage and badly maul the world's only superpower in three years of modern warfare when it was most powerful, after vanquishing Nazi Germany** and Imperial Japan. **The other is that North Korea is fully ready to go the length of fighting [hu]mankind's first and last nuclear exchange with the US.** The DPRK led by two Kim Il-sungs - the ever-victorious iron-willed brilliant commander Kim Jong-il and his heir designate Kim Jong-eun - is different from Russia under Nikita Khrushchev which backed down in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Khrushchev and his company never fought the Americans in war. As a rule, most countries are afraid to engage the Americans. As the case is with them, North Korea is the last to favor war with the Americans. **However, it is no exaggeration to say that the two North Korean leaders are just one click away from ordering a retaliatory nuclear strike on the US military forces in Guam, Hawaii and metropolitan centers on the US mainland.** On behalf of Supreme Leader Kim Jong-il, Kim Jong-eun will fire highly destructive weapons of like Americans have never heard of or imagined to evaporate the US. The North Koreans are too proud of being descendents of the ancient civilizations of Koguryo 2,000 years ago and Dankun Korea 5,000 years ago, to leave the Land of morning Calm divided forever with the southern half under the control of the trigger-happy, predatory US. The North Koreans prefer to fight and die in honor rather than kowtow to the arrogant Americans. **At the expense of comforts of a better life, North Koreans have devoted more than half a century to preparing for nuclear war with the Americans. All available resources have been used to convert the whole country into a fortress,** including arming the entire population and indigenously turning out all types of nuclear thermonuclear weapons, and developing long-range delivery capabilities and digital warfare assets. **An apocalyptic Day After Tommorow-like scenario will unfold throughout the US**, with the skyscrapers of major cities consumed in a sea of thermonuclear conflagration**. The nuclear exchange will begin with retaliatory North Korean ICBMs detonating hydrogen bombs in outer space** far above the US mainland, leaving most of the country powerless. **New York, Washington, Chicago, San Francisco and major cities should be torched by ICBMs streaking from North Korea with scores of nuclear power stations exploding**, each spewing as much radioactive fallout as 150-180 H-bombs.

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**Scenario 2: Climate Change**

**US-China cooperation is critical to stop climate change—spills over globally**

**Steinbock 13** (Dan, Research Director, India China and America Institute, 7-11-13, "US-China Climate Change Battle Could Prolong Life" China US Focus) www.chinausfocus.com/energy-environment/us-china-climate-change-battle-could-prolong-life/

According to new evidence, there is a devastating trade-off between coal-fueled economic growth and human life expectancy. **Any progress in the U.S.-Chinese climate change talks could pave way for a truly global solution.** The concerns about climate change moved to a new stage only a few days ago. According to a just-published pioneering study, air pollution in northern China has caused the loss of 2.5 billion years of aggregate human life expectancy in the 1990s. Together, **the U**nited **S**tates **and China account for almost half** of **the world’s CO2 emissions. As a result, the two are also key players in efforts to address climate change**, while energy cooperation is one of the more promising areas of bilateral collaboration. Nevertheless, even elevated urgency will not easily change the different perspectives of the two great nations on climate change talks. Economic growth, human adversities In New York City, a lovely, relatively-pollution free summer day translates to a ‘good’ air quality index (AQI) of 40-50. In such conditions, PM2.5 air pollution poses little risk. In Shanghai, a similar summer day usually means an index of 80-120. However, a ‘moderate’ index value (AQI, 50-100) and ‘unhealthy’ levels that cause respiratory symptoms to sensitive groups (AQI, 101-150) are common, not to speak of higher values. In northern China, the toxic smog became a national concern in January, when air pollution in Beijing soared beyond the air quality index (AQI, 500) as particulate-matter levels rose above 700 micrograms per cubic meter. Of course, these facts have been “known” in the past. What the new, breakthrough study confirms is that a very high level of air pollution can significantly reduce the lives of people who are exposed to it. In the past, comparable studies on pollution effects in China have relied on long-term parallels in the United States and Europe. In contrast, the new study by U.S., Chinese and Israeli researchers (Michael Greenstone, Yuyu Chen, Avraham Ebenstein, and Hongbin Li) is based on longitudinal and quantitative data from the mainland. Due to pollution impact, the Chinese in the north have not only suffered from higher rates of lung cancer, heart attacks and strokes, but their life expectancy has been shortened by an average of 5.5 years. The research design stems from a policy implemented before 1980, when the Chinese government provided free coal for fuel boilers for all people living north of the Huai River; a rough dividing line between north and south in China. The free-coal policy allowed people in the north stay warm in winter, but at the cost of notably worse environmental conditions. From 1981 through 2000, air pollution, as measured by total suspended particulates, was about 55 percent higher north of the river than south of it. Further, there was also a sharp difference in mortality rates on either side of the border formed by the Huai River. This difference, in turn, was attributable to cardio-respiratory illness. In the past three decades, Chinese growth performance has been world-historical. Unfortunately, the same goes for the pollution levels. Comparing apples and oranges Typically, China’s high levels of pollution are seen as a result of misguided or absent Chinese policies. That is a convenient way to attribute the responsibility exclusively to China. And yet, even today more than half of Chinese exports can be attributed to foreign multinational companies operating in China. Foreign direct investment (FDI) in China has played a significant role in Chinese industrialization and growth, and thus in Chinese pollution as well. With the progress of industrialization and the rise of China during the past decade, there have been increasing comparisons of pollution experiences in the mainland and Western economies. In most cases, such comparisons have been flawed. As the MIT News put it in the commentary on their pioneering study: “In China, particulate-matter levels were more than 400 micrograms per cubic meter between 1981 and 2001… By comparison, total suspended particulates in the United States were about 45 micrograms per cubic meter in the 1990s.” In reality, post-industrial nations, such as the United States in the 1990s, and economies in which industrialization has just taken off, such as northern China in the same time period, represent very different levels of economic development. That difference can be illustrated by average prosperity level, as measured by the GDP per capita with purchasing parity power (PPP). After all, it is a rough measure of living standards. In 1981, Chinese average prosperity level was less than 6 percent of that in the U.S. Two decades later, this figure had more than doubled to 13.2 percent. In terms of absolute growth, it translated to a world-historical growth performance. But in terms of relative prosperity level, it remained less than a fraction of that in the U.S. In brief, pollution in industrializing northern China is not comparable with post-industrial America in the 1990s, but with U.S. manufacturing centers amidst U.S. industrialization in the late 19th century. Aggregate and per capita responsibilities While the pioneering study itself is heavy on tacit policy implications, its conclusions are thin. The authors believe that their results “may help explain why China’s explosive economic growth has led to relatively anemic growth in life expectancy” and be useful “in forming policy as developing countries search for the optimal balance between economic growth and environmental quality.” In reality, the results of this study illustrate only partially the impact of China’s economic growth on Chinese life expectancy. After all, China’s postwar industrialization in the 1950s already achieved impressive growth and significant progress in life expectancy. It is thus a mistake to focus on Chinese life expectancy in the light of the post-reform period growth only. More importantly, the policy implications involve both emerging and developing countries, and advanced economies. **As China continues to rely heavily on coal to power its fast-growing economy, it is the world’s largest CO2 emitter, in aggregate terms. In per capita terms, this role belongs to the U**nited **S**tates. Accordingly, the U.S.-Chinese disagreements over battling climate change focus on the relative responsibilities of developed and major developing nations.Along with other emerging and developing nations, China argues that since advanced economies continue to have far higher levels of emissions per capita, they alone should be subject to legally binding commitments to reduce emissions, while developing nations’ reductions should be voluntary. In contrast, the U.S. Congress and the Obama administration will not support legally binding commitments, such as the Kyoto protocol, without binding commitments from other major emitters, such as China. Washington sees China engaging in environmental blackmail. Beijing sees the U.S. in an effort to contain emerging nations’ rights to develop. Pragmatic compromises may loom in the horizon, as indicated by the recent joint statements during Secretary of State Kerry’s trip to China in April. Nevertheless**, successful U.S.-Chinese cooperation requires taking into account both the advanced nations’ concerns** about aggregate pollution and the emerging economies’ concerns about per capita pollution. A **pragmatic U.S.-Chinese cooperation would go a long way to pave way for truly global solutions.**

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**Scientific consensus proves warming is real and human-caused**

Richard **Somerville**, Distinguished Professor Emeritus at the Scripps Institution of Oceanography and Climate Scientist, PhD in Meteorology, 3/8/**11**, House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Energy and Power Hearing; "Climate Science and EPA's Greenhouse Gas Regulations”, Congressional Testimony, lexis, mnrs

**The Working Group** **One** (physical science) part of AR4 **was written by 152 scientists,** called "Lead Authors." 22 of the 152 are called "Coordinating Lead Authors." These 22 are the scientists who led the writing teams for each of the eleven chapters. I was a Coordinating Lead Author for AR4. In this testimony, however, I am speaking as an individual scientist, not representing IPCC or any other organization. **The** **WG1 portion of the 2007 IPCC report** (AR4) is about 1,000 pages long and **took three years to write.** During the writing, **more than 30,000 review comments, from both governments and individuals, were received on three separate drafts of the report. The authors' written responses to every review comment are in the public record**. **The open and transparent nature of the IPCC process, the multiple stages of peer review, and the credentials of the authors, all contribute to the stature of the report**. **The** **relentless upward trend in** the amount ("**concentration**") **of** carbon dioxide or **CO2 in the atmosphere continues.** In fact, **the concentration** now **is increasing more rapidly than before.** Charles David Keeling, who in 1958 began these key observations of atmospheric CO2 concentrations, died in 2005. However, other scientists are now continuing the meticulous measurements that he undertook, initially made with an instrument that he invented. **There is no doubt** whatever **that the increasing CO2 concentrations are caused by human activities, primarily by the burning of fossil fuels** (coal, oil and natural gas), but also importantly by land use changes, especially agriculture and deforestation. 3. The international scientific congress in Copenhagen in March 2009 There were two noteworthy climate meetings in Copenhagen in 2009. The more famous one, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) meeting, was held in Copenhagen in December 2009. This was the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP15). The UNFCCC is the document to which the countries that had ratified it were parties. This document has as its goal avoiding dangerous human-caused interference to the climate system. The United States and virtually every other country of the world is a party to the UNFCCC. The primary scientific input to the COP15 negotiations was, of course, AR4, the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), published in 2007. This report, and many other recent IPCC documents, are available at www.ipcc.ch and are also published by Cambridge University Press. However, **new scientific developments occur continually**. Since the publication of the AR4 IPCC report, new knowledge has emerged that furthers our understanding of climate change, including the impacts of human influence on the climate. To bring this new knowledge together, about nine months before COP15, another international congress, called Climate Change: Global Risks, Challenges and Decisions, was held, also in Copenhagen, from 10-12 March 2009. One must keep in mind that the AR4 IPCC report was published in 2007, and the most recent papers that it assesses were published in 2006. The Copenhagen congress in March 2009 covered more recent research results, but the conclusions of this meeting did not go through any procedure resembling the long IPCC process of multiple drafts and extensive review. Nor did the March 2009 Copenhagen meeting report have the full participation of many expert authors, as did the IPCC. This fact illustrates the inevitable trade-off between the slow and painstaking IPCC process and faster but less thorough summaries and assessments of recent science. We now consider some of the key results presented at the March 2009 Copenhagen meeting. **Temperature is the single most important climate variable.** Let us first consider recent temperature trends. IPCC in 2007 concluded, "**Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident from observations of increases in global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice, and rising global average sea level**." **The** 2007 **IPCC** Fourth Assessment **Report** (AR4) **described "an unambiguous picture of the ongoing warming of the climate system." This trend is continuing.** Small year-to-year differences in global average temperatures are unimportant in evaluating long-term trends. During a warming trend, **a given year is not always warmer than** all the **previous years, because the** ongoing **warming is sometimes temporarily masked by internal climate variability, a normal and natural phenomenon**. <<card continues>>

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<<card continues>> For example, 2008 was slightly cooler globally than 2007, in part because a La Nina occurred in 2008 (NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies, 2009). Such natural events can lead to slight temporary cooling. Solar output was also at its lowest level of the satellite era, another temporary cooling influence. Quantitatively, the global average near-surface atmospheric temperature in 2008 was only about 0.1 deg C less than in the years immediately preceding it. Such a small difference over such a short time is not statistically significant in evaluating trends. It is noteworthy that 2008, while at the time it may have been the coolest year since 2000, was one of the ten warmest years since instrumental records began in mid-19th century, and the most recent ten-year period is still warmer than the previous ten-year period. The long-term trend is clearly still a warming trend (NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies, 2009). Its magnitude is about 0.2 degrees Celsius per decade, consistent with IPCC AR4 projections. This is equivalent to about one third of a degree Fahrenheit per decade. Our knowledge of the causes of this trend has also improved. IPCC said in 2007, "Most of the observed increase in globally averaged temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations." Science never provides absolute certainty. Here, 'very likely' is calibrated language used by IPCC to express the degree of scientific uncertainty or the possible range of given scientific findings. In this terminology, used consistently in AR4, "very likely" means at least 90% probable. **Thanks to recent research**, we have learned that **by far the greatest part of the observed century-scale warming is due to human rather than natural factors** (Lean and Rind, 2008). These **scientists analyzed the role of natural factors** (e. g., solar variability, volcanoes) **versus human influences** (e. g., added man-made greenhouse gases and aerosols) on temperatures since 1889. They found, for example, that **the sun contributed only about 10% of surface warming in the last century and a negligible amount in the last quarter century**, thus contributing far less than had been estimated in earlier assessments. Recent research has also clarified our understanding of a warming trend in the atmosphere above the lowest layers near the Earth's surface. By reducing errors in temperature measurements, a warming in the tropical upper troposphere, 10 to 15 kilometers (roughly 6 to 10 miles) above the surface, is now apparent in observations, thus reconciling different measurement data and model simulations (Thorne, 2008). A new method based on **wind observations** (Allen and Sherwood, 2008) **show**s **a similar warming trend** in the upper troposphere, consistent with model results.

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**Warming kills the biosphere—causes extinction of all life**

**Costello 11** (Anthony, Institute for Global Health, University College London, Mark Maslin, Department of Geography, University College London, Hugh Montgomery, Institute for Human Health and Performance, University College London, Anne M. Johnson, Institute for Global Health, University College London, Paul Ekins, Energy Institute, University College London [“Global health and climate change: moving from denial and catastrophic fatalism to positive action” May 2011 vol. 369 no. 1942 1866-1882 Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society)

Advocacy about the health consequences will ensure that climate change is a high priority. The United Nations Convention on Climate Change was set up in 1992 to ensure that nations worked together to minimize the adverse effects, but McMichael and Neira noted that, in preparation for the Copenhagen conference in December 2009, only four of 47 nations mentioned human health as a consideration [1]. With business as usual, **global warming** caused by rising greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions **will threaten mass populations through increased transmission of** some **infections, heat stress, food and water insecurity, increased deaths from more frequent and extreme climate events, threats to shelter and security, and through population migration** [2]. On the one hand it is necessary in the media to counter climate change sceptics and denialists, but on the other it is also important not to allow climate catastrophists, who tell us it is all too late, to deflect us from pragmatic and positive action. Catastrophic scenarios are possible in the longer term, and effective action will be formidably difficult, but evidence suggests that we do have the tools, the time and the resources to bring about the changes needed for climate stability. 2. Climate change evidence and denial Given the current body of evidence, it is surprising that global warming and its causal relationship with atmospheric GHG pollution is disputed any more than the relationship between acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection, or lung cancer and cigarette smoking. The basic principles that determine the Earth’s temperature are, of course, relatively simple. Some of the short-wave solar radiation that strikes the Earth is reflected back into space and some is absorbed by the land and emitted as long-wave radiation (heat). Some of the long-wave radiation is trapped in the atmosphere by ‘greenhouse gases’, which include water vapour, carbon dioxide and methane. Without GHGs the Earth would be on average 33◦C colder. Over the last 150 years, since the Industrial Revolution, humans have been adding more carbon dioxide and methane into the atmosphere. The result is that the Earth’s atmosphere, ocean and land are indeed warming—due to increased atmospheric ‘greenhouse gas’ concentrations [3]. Gleick et al. [4], from the US National Academy of Sciences, wrote a letter to Science stating ‘There is compelling, comprehensive, and consistent objective evidence that humans are changing the climate in ways that threaten our societies and the ecosystems on which we depend’. The most recent report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) [5], amounting to nearly 3000 pages of detailed review and analysis of published research, also declares that the scientific uncertainties of global warming are essentially resolved. This report states that there is clear evidence for a 0.75◦C rise in global temperatures and 22 cm rise in sea level during the twentieth century. The IPCC synthesis also predicts that global temperatures could rise further by between 1.1◦C and 6.4◦C by 2100, and **sea level could rise by between 28 and 79 cm**, or more if the melting of Greenland and Antarctica accelerates. In addition, weather patterns will become less predictable and the occurrence of extreme climate events, such as storms, floods, heat waves and droughts, will increase. **There is also strong evidence for ocean acidification** driven by more carbon dioxide dissolving in the oceans [6]. Given the current failure of international negotiations to address carbon emission reductions, and that atmospheric warming lags behind rises in CO2 concentration, there is concern that global surface temperature will rise above the supposedly ‘safe limit’ of 2◦C within this century. Each doubling of atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration alone is expected to produce 1.9–4.5◦C of warming at equilibrium [7]. Of course, climate modelling is an extremely complex process, and uncertainty with projections relating to future emissions trajectories means that the time scale and magnitude of future climate change cannot be predicted with certainty [8]. These uncertainties are magnified when future climate predictions are used to estimate potential impacts. For example, the environmental impacts of **climate change** are also uncertain, but could underestimate such impacts because they **detrimentally interact with habitat loss, pollution and loss of biodiversity** due to other causes. There is also the additional problem that switching from biome to biome may not be directly reversible. For example, rainforest recycles a huge amount of water so it can survive a significant amount of aridification before it burns and is replaced by savannah. But the region then has to get much wetter before rainforest can return, as there is greatly reduced water cycling in savannah [9]. In the policy arena, further uncertainty surrounds the desire for international agreements on emission cuts, and the possible routes to such agreement and implementation. The feasible speed of technological innovation in carbon capture and provision of renewable/low-carbon energy resources is also uncertain. Denying the causes or the current weight of evidence for anthropogenic climate change is irrational, just as the existence of ‘uncertainties’ should not be used to deny the need for proportionate action, when such uncertainties could underestimate the risks and impact of climate change. There is no reason for inaction and there are many ways we can use our current knowledge of climate change to improve health provision for current and future generations. 3. Catastrophism At the other end of the scale are doom-mongers who predict catastrophic population collapse and the end of civilization. In the early nineteenth century, the French palaeontologist Georges Cuvier first addressed catastrophism and explained patterns of extinction observed in the fossil record through catastrophic natural events [10]. We know now of five major extinctions: the Ordovician–Silurian extinction (439 million years ago), the Late Devonian extinction (about 364 million years ago), the Permian–Triassic extinction (about 251 million years ago), the End Triassic extinction (roughly 199 million to 214 million years ago) and the Cretaceous– Tertiary extinction (about 65 million years ago). These mass extinctions were caused by a combination of plate tectonics, supervolcanism and asteroid impacts. The understanding of the mass extinctions led Gould & Eldredge [11] to update Darwin’s theory of evolution with their own theory of punctuated equilibrium. **Many scientists have suggested that the current human-induced extinction rates could be as fast as those during these mass extinctions** [12,13]. For example, one study predicted that 58 per cent of species may be committed to extinction by 2050 due to climate change alone [14], though this paper has been criticized [15,16]. Some people have even suggested that **human extinction may not be a remote risk** [17–19]. **Sherwood & Huber** [7] **point to continued heating effects that could make the world largely uninhabitable by humans and mammals** within 300 years. Peak heat stress, quantified by the wet-bulb temperature (used because it reflects both the ambient temperature and relative humidity of the site), is surprisingly similar across diverse climates and never exceeds 31◦C. They suggest that **if it rose to 35◦C,** which never happens now but would at a warming of 7◦C, **hyperthermia in humans and other mammals would occur as dissipation of metabolic heat becomes impossible**, therefore **making many environments uninhabitable.**

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**Scenario 3: Economy**

**Strong US-China relations are key to global economy**

**Spence 13** (Michael, Nobel laureate in economics, is a professor of economics at New York University’s Stern School of Business and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, 5-31-13, “Global progress requires that China and the U.S. cooperate” The Daily Star) http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Opinion/Commentary/2013/May-31/218938-global-progress-requires-that-china-and-the-us-cooperate.ashx#axzz2cqetDMyS

**The U.S. economy**, meanwhile, **retains many elements of dynamism and flexibility. But,** while GDP growth seems to be returning slowly to potential**, the slow pace of recovery** in employment and the residual secular shifts in income distribution **remain causes of concern**. In particular, the shift of income from those who save less to those who save more implies uncertainty about the restoration of aggregate demand. **Political polarization has become another source of uncertainty**. Many centrists agree that an optimal fiscal policy would feature short-term stimulus, a multiyear medium-term deficit reduction plan, and measures to reduce long-term liabilities, especially if retrenchment protected growth-oriented public-sector investments. But that is difficult to achieve in a context of deleveraging and fixation on debt. **If current trends continue, with the U.S. economy recovering slowly but steadily, the pattern of convergence with China will continue**. East Asia as a whole will surpass the U.S. in terms of aggregate GDP by 2015, with China contributing the highest proportion. China’s GDP is projected to catch up to that of the U.S. and Europe in 10-15 years, at which point (if not sooner) both Chinese and U.S. real GDP will exceed $25 trillion (in 2012 prices), more than three times China’s current GDP. Each will account for approximately 15 percent of global output. And yet **this shift will be accompanied by very substantial global economic challenges and uncertainties, underscoring the importance of Sino-U.S. cooperation. A constructive, cooperative relationship can make a significant contribution to both countries’ efforts to adapt their policies and institutions to achieve sustainable, inclusive growth patterns.** Beyond the bilateral benefits, **the rest of the global economy is dependent on Chinese and U.S. leadership – both in terms of growth and in matters concerning global economic governance and coordination. Trade and economic openness, financial stability and regulation, energy security, climate change, and many other issues confront the world collectively. It is very difficult to imagine successful global rebalancing and progress without China and the U.S. taking a leading role in the process.**

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**Economic decline causes nuclear war**

**Harris and Burrows ‘9**

(Mathew, PhD European History at Cambridge, counselor in the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer, member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” <http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf>)

Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, **history may be more instructive than ever**. While we continue to believe that **the Great Depression** is not likely to be repeated, the **lessons** to be drawn from that period **include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies** (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) **and** on the **sustainability of multilateral institutions** (think League of Nations in the same period). **There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century.** For that reason, the ways in which **the potential for greater conflict could grow** would seem to be even more apt **in a constantly volatile economic environment** as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. **Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced.** For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. **Terrorist groups** in 2025 **will** likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups\_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks\_and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that **become self-radicalized**, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity **conflict** and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella **could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict** if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. **The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals** combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also **will produce inherent difficulties** in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, **short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty** of Iranian intentions **may place more focus on preemption** rather than defense, potentially **leading to escalating crises.** 36 Types of **conflict** that the world continues to experience, such as **over resources, could reemerge**, particularly if **protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions** of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this **could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources,** for example, to be **essential for** maintaining domestic stability and the **survival of their regime**. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. **If** the **fiscal stimulus focus for** these **countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional** naval **capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves**, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. **With water** also **becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.**

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**Studies prove**

**Royal,** Department of Defense Cooperative threat reduction director, 20**10** [Jedediah, Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises, in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, p.213-4]

Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However**, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources**. **Crises could** potentially **be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states**.4 Third, others have considered **the link between economic decline and external armed conflict** at a national level. Bloomberg and Hess (2002) **find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn.** They write, **The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing**. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other (Bloomberg & Hess, 2002, p.89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. ‘**Diversionary theory’ suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts** to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995), and Bloomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics arc greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that **periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force**. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas **political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict** at systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

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**Contention 2 is Miscalc:**

**Tensions are running high in the Taiwan Strait—new provocations by Taiwan are pushing the region into conflict**

**Chan 13** (John, staff writer, 4-18-13, Taiwan holds military exercises amid rising US-China tensions" World Socialist Web Site) https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/04/18/taiw-a18.html

**Taiwan is staging live-fire military exercises** this week, based on a scenario of a Chinese attack on Taiwan’s Penghu Islands. **This comes amid escalating tensions in East Asia stoked by the US “pivot** to Asia” strategy aimed at containing China, including recent US war threats over North Korea’s nuclear program and disputes over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. **Taiwan’s five-day Han Kuang exercises are testing 145 different types of equipment**—such as navy frigates, army tanks, artillery, and anti-ship and anti-air missiles—**on the islands, which lie in the Taiwan Strait between mainland China and the island of Taiwan.** For its part, **China has stationed hundreds of thousands of troops in parts of its territory along the Taiwan Strait, together with hundreds of warplanes and 1,000 tactical ballistic missiles.** This has led military commentators to suggest that China could likely win a localised, conventional war fought in the Taiwan Strait against Taiwanese and US forces. Yesterday, President Ma Ying-jeou of Taiwan’s ruling Kuomintang (KMT) inspected the drills, ostensibly held to dampen criticisms by media and lawmakers that the Taiwanese military was not doing enough to protect Taiwan from China. Ma said: “In the past few years, the Chinese communists [i.e., the mainland Chinese government] have conducted a massive build-up, in both quality and quantity, following fast economic development. In the face of the threat, we have to make preparations if we are to sustain peace in the Taiwan Strait.” On Tuesday, China released a defence White Paper, which criticised “Taiwanese independence separatist forces” and said a formal declaration of independence by Taiwan would constitute the “biggest threat to the peaceful development of cross-straits relations.” After being overthrown by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the 1949 revolution, the US-backed KMT regime of Chiang Kai-shek fled to Taiwan. Taiwan’s government still claims to be the government of all China. The mainland Chinese government in Beijing asserts that Taiwan is part of China, and has previously threatened to go to war if Taiwan declares independence. **In 2005, Beijing adopted an “anti-secession law,” requiring military action if Taiwan seceded. These tensions underscore the significance of the recent signing of a fishery agreement—after 17 years and 16 rounds of fruitless talks—between Taiwan and Japan over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands**. Japan made concessions, allowing Taiwanese vessels to fish within 19 kilometres of the islands. Known as Senkaku in Japanese and Diaoyu in Chinese, Japan annexed the islands, as well as Taiwan, after the First Sino-Japanese War of 1895. Last year, the rocky outcrops were the focus of an explosive military stand-off between China and Japan, which administers the islands, after Japan bought them from their private owners. Both Japan and China mounted chauvinist campaigns promoting their claims to the islands, while deploying naval forces to the region. **Immediately after the current deal with Japan emerged, Taiwanese Coast Guard Administration Director Wang Jin - wang said that any non-Taiwanese fishing boats—i.e., including mainland Chinese boats—in the islands’ territorial waters would be expelled, “according to the laws.” The agreement was bound to antagonise China**. Firstly, **Tokyo in effect violated the “one China” policy by treating Taipei as a sovereign government,** able to sign a deal with Japan. China regards Taiwan as a renegade province. Secondly, Taiwan, in reaching the fishing agreement, tacitly acknowedged Japan’s control over islands that China claims. **China immediately criticised the deal.** “We are extremely concerned about Japan and Taiwan discussing and signing a fishing agreement,” Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Hong Lei declared. **China sent two warships to patrol near the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands yesterday**, the anniversary of the Treaty of Shimonoseki that ended the 1895 Sino-Japanese War, **to show its opposition to Japanese control of the islands. The latest military exercises in Taiwan and the sudden shift in Taiwanese policy over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands indicate that powerful forces are pushing the Taiwanese ruling elites toward a closer alignment with American imperialism and its regional allies**, such as Japan—**just as the US escalates tensions with China.**

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**Status quo ambiguity will inevitably lead to war—clarifying against a security commitment to Taiwan is key to prevent miscalc**

**Carpenter 09** (Ted Galen, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, 2009, “East Asian Security Commitments” Cato Handbook for Policymakers)

**Washington's security commitment to Taiwan** is more vague and informal than the mutual defense treaty with South Korea. It **is contained in** provisions of **the Taiwan Relations Act**, which Congress passed in 1979 in response to the Carter administration's decision to end diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (which still claimed to be the legitimate government of the mainland as well as Taiwan) and recognize the People's Republic of China. **The TRA commits the U**nited **S**tates **to provide defensive arms to Taiwan and to regard any attempt by Beijing to use military coercion against Taiwan as a "grave breach of the peace." That commitment falls short of a pledge to intervene with U.S. forces, but it implies as much. Washington has implemented its policy regarding Taiwan with** an approach that experts have described as "dual deterrence" or "**strategic ambiguity.**" The logic of strategic ambiguity is that the Taiwanese will remain uncertain about the extent of U.S. protection—especially if Taipei engages in provocative conduct. Conversely, Beijing will believe that using military force against the island is too risky, because the United States would probably intervene. Supposedly, this mutual uncertainly should lead to caution and restraint on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. **The** chief **problem with that policy is that it assumes both governments will interpret Washington's posture in exactly the way U.S. officials desire. Unfortunately, events suggest that Taipei and Beijing may be reading American policy in precisely the opposite way from what U.S. leaders intend. The Taiwanese seem increasingly confident that the U**nited **S**tates **would never abandon a fellow democracy. China**, at the same time, **seems ever more skeptical that the U**nited **S**tates **would** disrupt the entire global economy and **risk war with a nuclear-armed China** **just to back a small, upstart secessionist island. Those developments are a warning bell in the night about the danger of miscalculation.** From the standpoint of basic prudence, **the defense commitment to Taiwan is unwise. As China's economic leverage and military capabilities grow, it becomes increasingly problematic and dangerous for the U**nited **S**tates **to act as Taiwan's protector**. As noted in Chapter 53, **Beijing is not likely to tolerate Taiwan's de facto independence indefinitely**, even if future governments in Taipei avoid adopting the kinds of assertive, pro-independence policies that the government of President Chen Shui-bian pursued between 2000 and 2008. **The best strategy for the U**nited **S**tates **would be to limit its risk exposure** by confining its role to selling arms to Taipei. The implied obligation contained in the Taiwan Relations Act to intervene with U.S. forces in the event of a crisis should be rescinded.

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**China will go to war over Taiwan—nationalism and internal pressures**

**Fu 06** (Zhengyuan, former Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford and a former Senior Research Professor of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Fall 2006, "The Taiwan Issue and Sino-U.S. Relations" Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems, Lexis)

Since the mid-1990s, the controversy over the **Taiwan** issue **has become the most significant factor boosting Chinese nationalism. This issue touches a very sensitive chord in the psyche of the Chinese people.** Many **visitors to China note** the **willingness of people** in all walks of life **to go to war over Taiwan's independence** since 1995. n41 **There is a consensus** among most people on both sides of the Strait **that Taiwan is an integral part of China**, historically, culturally, and geographically. They are opposed to Taiwan's independence and want to maintain the status quo. n42 The Chinese people regard the forced colonization of Taiwan by Japan (1895-1945) as a national humiliation. n43 The wounds inflicted by Japan's invasion remain with the Chinese people to this day. The Chinese are hypersensitive to any indication of Japanese rearmament or imperialistic intention towards China. This explains China's dismay at Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi's five annual visits to Yasukuni Shrine, where 1,068 convicted war criminals, including executed wartime Prime Minister Hideki Tojo and thirteen other Class A war criminals, are honored. n44 The Chinese people consider Koizumi's visits, which are also opposed by many Japanese people, an open expression of revived [\*260] ambition and renewed planning of aggression against China. n45 This reaction would be similar to the reaction of European and Jewish people if German Chancellor Schroeder insisted on paying annual homage to a shrine honoring Hitler, Goering, Goebbels, and other convicted Nazi war criminals. To this day, **the separation of Taiwan from the Mainland means the national humiliation perpetrated by Japanese militarists has not been vindicated. For most Chinese, only reunification will restore China's national honor. Any act of secession by Taiwan would be considered by the Chinese people as an infraction on China's territorial integrity and national sovereignty.** n46 **Under such circumstances, any U.S.** or Japanese **encouragement for Taiwan's independence will be perceived as a violation of China's territorial integrity and national sovereignty. If Taiwan were to proclaim itself independent, and had the support of the U**nited **S**tates or Japan, **the Chinese people would feel that their country was** once again **subjected to the same kind of invasions as those launched by Western powers** and Japan **during the Nineteenth Century. In the Twenty-First Century, the Chinese people will not acquiesce to foreign domination of their country.** Irrespective of ideological leanings**, the absolute majority of the Chinese people**, even those who are against the present P.R.C. regime, **are opposed to Taiwan's independence.** n47 Furthermore, **if the CCP leaders do not take decisive action in the event of Taiwan's declaration of independence, they will be faced with not only an angry populace and legitimacy crisis, but the prospect of encouraging similar centrifugal movements in Tibet and Xinjiang.** Moreover, **an independent Taiwan in alliance with a hostile power would pose a serious threat to China's national security. For China, Taiwan's independence means war.** n48

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**Conflict over Taiwan escalates, goes nuclear**

William **Lowther**, "Taiwan Could Spark Nuclear War: Report," TAIPEI TIMES, 3--16--**13**, p. 3.

**Taiwan is the most likely potential crisis that could trigger a nuclear war between China and the US**, a new academic report concludes. “**Taiwan remains the single most plausible and dangerous source of tension and conflict** between the US and China,” says the 42-page report by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Prepared by the CSIS’ Project on Nuclear Issues and resulting from a year-long study, the report emphasizes that **Beijing continues to be set on a policy to prevent Taiwan’s independence, while at the same time the US maintains the capability to come to Taiwan’s defense**. “**Although tensions** across the Taiwan Strait **have subsided** since both Taipei and Beijing embraced a policy of engagement in 2008, **the situation remains combustible, complicated by rapidly diverging cross-strait military capabilities and persistent political disagreements**,” the report says. In a footnote, **it quotes** senior fellow at the US Council on Foreign Relations Richard **Betts describing Taiwan as “the main potential flashpoint** for the US **in East Asia**.” The report also quotes Betts as saying that **neither Beijing nor Washington can fully control developments that might ignite a Taiwan crisis**. “**This is a classic recipe for surprise, miscalculation and uncontrolled escalation**,” Betts wrote in a separate study of his own. The CSIS study says: “For the foreseeable future **Taiwan is the contingency in which nuclear weapons would most likely become a major factor, because the fate of the island is intertwined** both **with the legitimacy of** the **C**hinese **C**ommunist **P**arty and the reliability of US defense commitments in the Asia-Pacific region.” Titled Nuclear Weapons and US-China Relations, the study says disputes in the East and South China seas appear unlikely to lead to major conflict between China and the US, but they do “provide kindling” for potential conflict between the two nations because the disputes implicate a number of important regional interests, including the interests of treaty allies of the US. **The danger posed by flashpoints such as Taiwan**, the Korean Peninsula and maritime demarcation disputes **is magnified by the potential for mistakes,** the study says. “**Although Beijing and Washington have agreed to a range of crisis management mechanisms**, such as the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement and the establishment of a direct hotline between the Pentagon and the Ministry of Defense, **the bases for miscommunication and misunderstanding remain and draw on deep historical reservoirs of suspicion**,” the report says. For example, it says, it is unclear whether either side understands what kinds of actions would result in a military or even nuclear response by the other party. To make things worse, “**neither side seems to believe the other’s** declared policies and **intentions, suggesting that escalation management, already a very uncertain endeavor, could be especially difficult in any conflict**,” it says. Although conflict “mercifully” seems unlikely at this point, the report concludes that “it cannot be ruled out and may become increasingly likely if we are unwise or unlucky.” The report says: “**With both sides possessing and looking set to retain formidable nuclear weapons arsenals, such a conflict would be tremendously dangerous and** quite possibly **devastating.”**

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**Turns all impacts—fallout over Taiwan will draw in other actors**

**Hunkovic 09** (Lee J, American Military University, “The Chinese-Taiwanese Conflict: Possible Futures of a Confrontation between China, Taiwan and the United States of America”, [http://www.lamp-method.org/eCommons/ Hunkovic.pdf](http://www.lamp-method.org/eCommons/Hunkovic.pdf))

**A war between China, Taiwan and the United States has the potential to escalate into a nuclear conflict and a third world war**, therefore, **many countries** other than the primary actors **could be affected by such a conflict, including Japan, both Koreas, Russia, Australia, India and Great** **Britain, if they were drawn into the war, as well as all other countries in the world that participate in the global economy, in which the U**nited **S**tates **and China are the** two **most dominant** members. If China were able to successfully annex Taiwan, the possibility exists that they could then plan to attack Japan and begin a policy of aggressive expansionism in East and Southeast Asia, as well as the Pacific and even into India, which could in turn create an international standoff and deployment of military forces to contain the threat. In any case, **if China and the U**nited **S**tates **engage in a full-scale conflict, there are few countries in the world that will not be** economically and/or militarily **affected** by it. However, China, Taiwan and United States are the primary actors in this scenario, whose actions will determine its eventual outcome, therefore, other countries will not be considered in this study.

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**Sending a firm signal to Taiwan is key—prevents provocations**

**Hadar 96** (Leon, BT's Washington correspondent, 2-15-96, "US ambiguity is problematic, not strategic" Business Times, Lexis)

That is the way Nye sees the essence of his **"creative ambiguity"**. It **sounds like a sophisticated armchair strategic concep**t, the kind scholars discuss in seminars at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. **It is possible Nye and** some **doctoral students were able to design a computer program to help conduct one of those "war games", in which US "strategic ambiguity" was effective in defusing tensions** between (the students representing) China and Taipei. **Unfortunately, in the "real" world, "actors" do not react like computer programs, in the rational and mechanical way that the concept of "strategic ambiguity" assumes. From Sarajevo 1914 to Kuwait 1990, miscalculations do happen. And the costs can be quite heavy. Washington's "China bashers" argue that by not making clear to Beijing that the US will use its military force to defend Taiwan** against a Chinese attack, President Bill Clinton's current **diplomatic ambiguity will have the same effect that** former President Harry **Truman's failure to articulate military support for South Korea had in encouraging North Korea to attack the South**, leading to the bloody war in the peninsula. Actually, **this analogy is misleading. South Korea did not try to change the status quo in the peninsula in 1950. The North clearly was the aggressor**, and an earlier and clear signal from Washington could have (perhaps) made a difference. **The situation in the straits is quite different. Taiwan's leaders**, through an incremental diplomatic strategy, which is supported strongly in Congress, **are trying to erode the One-China policy. They are using economic, diplomatic and military power to force Beijing to accept a change in the status quo. China perceives that as a threat to its national interest and promises to retaliate.** Hence **the problem with** Clinton's "**strategic ambiguity" lies not with** its alleged **lack of toughness towards Beijing, but with its failure to send a clear signal to Taipei.** By not criticising Taipei's dangerous diplomatic game and by playing occasionally into its hands (permitting President Lee Teng-hui to travel to Cornell), the Clintonites have allowed the anti-China and pro-Taiwan forces in Congress and the media to set the agenda and create overwhelming support for Taipei's position in Washington.

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**Deterrence can’t solve China-Taiwan war**

**Carpenter 01** (Ten Galen, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, 5-30-01, “Going Too Far Bush’s Pledge to Defend Taiwan” Cato Institute) http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/fpb66.pdf

**Proponents** of giving Taiwan a security guarantee blithely **assume that Beijing would back down if faced with a clear demonstration of American “resolve.”** The reasoning of Tom Lantos was typical: “An unambiguous statement will guarantee that hostility in the Taiwan Strait will not take place.” 1 4The Wall Street Journal also exuded confidence that a U.S. security commitment to Taiwan will never be challenged: “Thanks to Mr. Bush’s statements repudiating the policy of ‘strategic ambiguity,’ there is now less chance of a miscalculation by China’s leaders that they could attack Taiwan and then tough out the resulting international opprobrium.” 1 5 Realities of Deterrence **Such beliefs are based** almost entirely **on America’s Cold War experience. The conventional wisdom is that aggressors will always be deterred from molesting a U.S. ally** or client **to whom Washington provides an unambiguous security commitment. But the assumption that** the **deterrence of Soviet aggression** during the Cold War **can be replicated with** regard to **China over Taiwan is dubious.** A strategy of **deterrence is hardly infallible.** Indeed, **the historical record is littered with the wreckage of failures of deterrence.** Many **Europeans in the early** years of the **20th century assumed** that **the Continent’s elaborate system of alliances would make war unthinkable. The tragic events of 1914 demonstrated how wrong they were. A generation later, the explicit British and French security guarantees to Poland did not deter Germany from invading** that country. In addition to the balance of military forces, three factors are especially important in determining whether extended deterrence—attempting to deter an attack on an ally or client—is likely to succeed: the importance of the stakes to the protector, the importance of the stakes to the challenging power, and the extent of the challenging power’s inclination to gamble. All three factors worked to Washington’s advantage to an unusual degree in its confrontation with the Soviet Union. America’s major Cold War security guarantees—those for which the United States was prepared to put the safety of its own country at risk—were confined to Western Europe and Northeast Asia. Both regions were considered crucial to America’s own security and economic well-being, and U.S. policymakers were determined to prevent those power centers from coming under the control of the rival military superpower. It was therefore credible to leaders in the Kremlin that the United States would be willing to incur significant risks—even the possibility of a nuclear war—to thwart a Soviet conquest. Conversely, while those regions would have been a significant strategic and economic prize for the Soviet Union, neither area was essential to Moscow. Nor did Soviet leaders or the Soviet population have an emotional attachment to either region. There was, therefore, a definite limit to the risks the Kremlin was willing to run to gain dominion. Although Soviet leaders could never be sure that the United States would really go to war on behalf of its allies, challenging the commitment would have been an extraordinarily reckless gamble. Fortunately for the United States, the Soviet leadership tended to be relatively risk averse. Most of Moscow’s challenges occurred on the periphery, primarily in the Third World. Although Soviet leaders occasionally tested the U.S.-led alliance network (especially over West Berlin), they did not put their prestige on the line to such an extent that a tactical retreat became impossible. Indeed, as believers in Leninist doctrine, the Soviets were patient—pocketing geopolitical gains whenever they could be obtained at relatively low risk but backing off when the risk appeared excessive—supremely confident that their system would prevail in the long run. **There are crucial differences in all three deterrence factors when it comes to the prospect of a showdown over Taiwan. Taiwan may have some importance to the U**nited **S**tates, **since it is a significant trading partner and a sister democracy. Nevertheless, its relevance to American economic and security interests hardly equals the central importance U.S. policymakers thought that Western Europe and Northeast Asia had during the Cold War.** The problem is that **Chinese officials** probably **understand that point** as well. **Soviet leaders may have considered it credible that the U**nited **S**tates **would risk a major war to keep Western Europe and Northeast Asia out of Moscow’s orbit. But it is far less likely that the Chinese believe** that **Washington will incur the same risk merely to defend Taiwan**—a “country” the United States does not even officially recognize. **While Taiwan’s importance to the United States is much less, the island’s importance to China is much greater than was that of Western Europe or Northeast Asia to the Soviet Union. To Beijing, Taiwan is not merely a political and economic prize; the status of the island is caught up in issues of national pride and prestige.** Taiwan is a reminder of China’s long period of humiliation at the hands of outside powers. **When such potent emotions are engaged, even normally dispassionate political leaders do not always act prudently or even rationally. Nor is it as certain that the Chinese leaders will be as risk averse as the old Soviet hierarchy. The reaction of high-ranking PRC military officers when** Adm. **Blair warned them a few months ago that the United States would come to Taiwan’s aid in the event of an unprovoked attack was not reassuring.** The military officers reportedly reacted with disbelief verging on scorn. <<card continues>>

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<<card continues>> 16 **That attitude is reinforced by a pervasive impression within the PRC military hierarchy**—an impression founded on an interpretation of the rapid U.S. withdrawal from Somalia and the way the U.S. military waged the Gulf War and engaged in the Kosovo conflict—**that the American people are so averse to casualties that they would simply be unwilling to fight a serious war over Taiwan.** 1 7 It matters little whether Chinese skepticism about U.S. intentions is right or wrong. **If the Chinese believe the U.S. commitment is a bluff, they will be inclined to call that bluff. Applying the supposed lessons of the Cold War to deter China from settling the Taiwan issue on its own terms could, therefore, lead to either a humiliating U.S. retreat or a disastrous armed conflict.**

**Economic ties don’t prevent war—WWI proves**

**Dowd 13** (Alan, American Security Council Foundation Senior Fellow, 3-18-13, “Collision Course or Peaceful Pacific?” The Dowd Report) http://67.199.60.145/Articles.aspx?ArticleId=774

**Some argue that** the risk of **war**—even an accidental war—**is precluded by** the **economic linkages between China and its neighbors.** After all, China needs the Asia-Pacific region’s markets, and the region needs China’s cash. China owns $1.1 trillion in U.S. debt. **China’s** annual **trade with the U.S. is some $535 billion**, with Japan $333 billion, with South Korea $246 billion, with Australia $123 billion. **However, it pays to recall that European nations enjoyed deep and intricate commercial connections a century ago. Then came the summer of 1914**. Indeed, Kevin **Rudd**, the foreign minister of Australia, **describes the South China Seas as “a tinderbox on water” and points to ominous parallels to the Europe of 1913, where a combustible mix of** “primitive, almost atavistic **nationalism**s” **and “great power politics” opened the door to a war no one wanted. “The idea of armed conflict, which seems contrary to every element of rational self-interest for any nation-state enjoying** the benefits of such unprecedented regional **economic dynamism, has now become a terrifying**, almost **normal part of the regional conversation,”** he sighs.

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**Plan: The United States federal government should statutorily prohibit the President from introducing the United States armed forces into hostilities between the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan.**

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**Clarifying that the United States will not come to Taiwan’s defense solves US-China war**

**Carpenter and Logan 07** (Ted, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at Cato, and Justin, foreign policy analyst, 9-13-07, "Taiwan's Defense Budget How Taipei's Free Riding Risks War" Cato Institute) object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/PA600.pdf

Washington should couple its policy of continued arms sales to Taiwan with **a clear statement that the U**nited **S**tates **will not become involved in any armed struggle between Taiwan and the PRC.** It **would be appropriate** for U.S. officials to convey that message privately to Taipei at least a short time before making a public declaration. That would give the Taiwanese some time to realize the gravity of their predicament and adjust their own policies to reflect the impending shift in U.S. policy. **Even if Washington made clear that it does not intend to guarantee Taiwan's security, it is by no means certain that China would take military action against the island. A prudent Taiwanese defense posture, coupled with deft diplomacy, could reduce the likelihood even further. A statement of nonintervention from Washington would put responsibility for Taiwan's defense squarely on the shoulders of the Taiwanese.** The root cause of Taiwan's persistent underinvestment in its own defense is the pervasive belief that, despite rhetorical endorsement of strategic ambiguity, the United States would definitely come to Taiwan's assistance in the event of trouble. An explicit withdrawal of the security commitment would disabuse the Taiwanese of that notion. They would then have to make hard decisions both about how much to push the envelope regarding a separatist Taiwanese identity and about how much to spend on the military to discourage China from using force to impose reunification. If Taiwan's leaders and its people are not willing to make a con- certed effort on the defense front, they may have to strike the best deal they can in reunification negotiations. Those are all properly matters for the Taiwanese people and government, not Americans, to decide. **From America's standpoint, Taiwan should be considered a peripheral, not a vital, interest**.50 It would be better for the United States and for the cause of liberal democracy if Taiwan were to maintain its de facto independence from China But not better at any cost. At present, **the cost of American policy is a nontrivial chance of an eventual war with China over the island—a war that could cause massive destruction and casualties on all sides and could shake the global economy to its core, jeopardizing the prosperity and relative stability that the current age of globalization has created**. It is difficult to imagine how such a scenario would benefit the United States or even Taiwan. In short, **it would be unwise for the U**nited **S**tates **to risk war with an emerging great power like China to defend a small client state that is merely a peripheral interest.** That would be true even if that client state were making a serious effort to provide for its own defense. But Taiwan is not willing to make a serious defense effort. **It is time for America to extricate itself from such a potentially disastrous predicament.**

**Pro-China clarity resolves tension over Taiwan and boosts US-China relations**

Charles **Glaser**, professor of political science and international affairs @ George Washington University, March/April 20**11**, Will China's Rise lead to War?, p. web.clas.ufl.edu/users/zselden/coursereading2011/Glaser.pdf

Given such risks, **the U**nited **S**tates **should consider backing away from its commitment to Taiwan. This would remove the most obvious and contentious flash point between the U**nited **S**tates **and China and smooth the way for better relations** between them **in the decades to come.** Critics of such a move argue that it would result in not only direct costs for the United States and Taiwan but indirect costs as well: Beijing would not be satisfied by such appeasement; instead, it would find its appetite whetted and make even greater demands afterward--spurred by Washington's lost credibility as a defender of its allies. The critics are wrong, however, because **territorial concessions are not always bound to fail. Not all adversaries are Hitler, and when they are not, accommodation can be an effective policy tool. When an adversary has limited territorial goals, granting them can lead not to further demands but rather to satisfaction with the new status quo and a reduction of tension.**

**Congressional action is key—inconsistency between the Taiwan Relations Act and executive promises kill credibility with Beijing**

**Chan 10** (Steven, Professor of Political Science at the University of Colorado, Boulder, September 2010, “The Taiwan Relations Act Considered from Alternative Perspectives” Issues and Studies) http://iiro.nccu.edu.tw/attachments/journal/add/4/46-3-1.PDF

This **ambiguity**— deliberate and intentional— **has another consequence. It is a constant source of dissatisfaction, producing frequent demands for policy revision as Shelley Rigger has argued. She quotes Representative Grace Napolitano complaining that "it seems like that we [Americans] are talking out of both sides of our mouth"** 4 — **referring to this legislator's perception of inconsistencies in U.S. policies toward Taiwan and China. The same criticism**, however, **can be directed at Congress's** own **political posturing** which was intended to allow it to have things both ways, affording it the opportunity to take credit when policies succeed and to assign blame when they fail. Liberal and conservative legislators joined to support the TRA even though they were motivated by different reasons and agendas, accounting in part for the recurrent expressions of discontent about this legislation from different congressional quarters in subsequent years. **This legislative ambiguity is therefore an invitation to "continue political struggle."** Significantly, this invitation is also extended to Taiwan, providing it with a "wedge issue" with which to attempt to influence Washington. **The** same **ambiguity has** of course **been a constant source of irritation for Beijing which has alleged that the TRA is inconsistent with the** three **communiques that the** U.S. **executive branch has endorsed.** More generally, **domestic politics has had an important impact on U.S. relations with Taiwan and China.** The TRA and previous **U.S. policies have reflected considerations of domestic politics.** There is official pretense now that Taiwan is not a state— no less a pretense than that perpetuated for the thirty years during which Washington insisted that the government in Taipei represented China, refusing to accord diplomatic recognition to Beijing and accepting only indirect and eventually limited diplomatic contact with Beijing conducted between the Chinese and American ambassadors in Warsaw. Every U.S. president from John Kennedy to Jimmy Carter had professed a wish to establish diplomatic relations with China but had decided to delay this decision. The above comments should not be taken as denying that there was genuine, internal U.S. discord about how to approach relations with Taiwan and China, and that important parts of the U.S. foreign policy establishment felt at least cross-pressured— and indeed, continues to feel so. The TRA implies that anyone applying the so-called rational actor model to the analysis of U.S. policies toward Taiwan and China would be disappointed. That is, **the U.S. government** was/**is not a unitary actor.** Saying so inclines one to consider the TRA as an instance of two-level games. Indeed, as all the papers in this special issue acknowledge, Taiwan's leaders also face the challenge of reconciling competing domestic and international demands. Put simply, the metaphor of two-level games suggests that when a negotiator tries to strike a deal with a foreign party, she needs to be mindful of her domestic constituents whose support would be required to ratify any such deal. The greater the constraints she faces from potential blocking coalitions at home, the harder she will have to negotiate— and paradoxically, the more she may be empowered to drive a harder bargain with her foreign counterpart. She can try to get a better deal by suggesting that her domestic constituents would not ratify one featuring less attractive terms. This much is supposed to be understood by all those involved in international bargaining, with negotiators pleading routinely that their "hands are tied." Parenthetically, ratification is used here not to mean formal legislative approval but rather generalized political consent, cooperation, or even just acquiescence with a deal. **By** figuratively **saying that Congress wants** to have **a seat at the bargaining table, the TRA introduces more than just the** proverbial **double edged sword** to the situation, **converting it into a** more complicated **multi edged one. This legislation's explicit** even though unnamed **target is Beijing which is warned to refrain from coercing Taipei. Its implicit target is the U.S. executive branch which is enjoined not to engage in policies that have the intent or effect of assisting Beijing's coercive effort. It can be seen as a preemptive move to diffuse and deter pressure that may be applied by Beijing against Taipei**— and **even pressure brought by the U.S. executive branch to get Taipei to accommodate Beijing's demands**. If so, **it has the concomitant effect of improving Taipei's bargaining position, enabling it to demand a better deal than it could have otherwise expected from both Beijing and Washington.** In other words, the U.S. **Congress became Tai- wan's tacit partner in international negotiations**— with the word negotiation used here broadly to include non-verbal, indirect bargaining. That is, negotiations are not limited to face-to-face bargaining across a conference table. Not coincidentally and not necessarily contradicting the above observation, the TRA can improve the U.S. bargaining position when negotiating with Beijing. American negotiators representing the executive branch can now point to congressional sentiments as a way to resist Beijing's demands and entreaties. <<card continues>>

<<card continues>> When negotiators can legitimately claim that their constituents have kept them on a "short leash"— such as when labor union bargainers argue persuasively that their rank and file will reject particular concessions demanded by the management— they can turn these supposed constraints into a bargaining advantage. By convincing the other side that one has a narrow "win set"— that is, domestic circumstances limit one's range of politically feasible negotiation outcomes— one can put pressure on the other side to make concessions in order to achieve a settlement. From this perspective, instead of rebuking the White House, the TRA actually improves its bargaining hand. **Leaders in Beijing— and Taipei— are not likely to be so dense as to overlook such a possibility. From Beijing, the TRA could appear as a contrived act — a ploy** engineered **by Washington with the White House playing the "good cop" and Congress the "bad cop."** Far from interpreting the TRA as an indication of incoherence or discord in Washington, this legislation can be interpreted as strategic statecraft par excellence. The United States was trying to finesse a difficult situation to its own best advantage— having its cake and eating it too. The executive branch signs communiqués acknowledging that there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China, while the legislative branch tries to perpetuate Taiwan's de facto independence. **Beijing** has to discern whether "divided government"— or "two-level games"— is real or just a charade. It **has to wonder whether it may be put on a perpetual treadmill whereby deals struck with the executive branch may be unenforceable, subject to disavowal by the legislature and to recurrent demands for renegotiation and even efforts at unilateral revision.**

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### Growth Sustainable: 1NC

#### Sustainable—markets and technology

Chunying **Li and Chen 11** School of Economics, Dalian University of Technology Research in World Economy Yanying Chen--School of Economics, Dalian University of Technology Vol. 2, No. 2; October2011 “Entropy, Substitution and Sustainable Economic Growth” Accepted: May 6, 2011 doi:10.5430/rwe.v2n2p66

\*\***Studies cited:** Herman and Claudia, 2005, Tao, 2008, Loverjoy, 1996, Smulders and de Nooij, 2003, Pu Yongjian 2k, Yang 2004)

Sustainable development is the primary problem facing human society in the 21st century. As economic growth has long been a panacea to solve unemployment, population growth and equity issues for many countries, the controversy is centered on sustainability of economic growth (Jones, 1999; Cai, 2005, pp.34-37; Li, 2009, pp.32-35). The existing views about whether economic growth can be sustainable under resource constraints are attributed to two critical issues. Most economists define scarcity of resources in terms of opportunity cost, supporting that market price is an indicator of resource scarcity. When a resource becomes rare, a rise in price will induce the economic entity to use other relatively abundant resources, so economic growth can be sustainable. However, most ecologists understand resource scarcity from the physical stock’s view, thinking there is no possibility for resource substitution. Economic growth would stop or even be worse when the stock of critical resources was completely consumed by human economic activities (Daly, 1996; Yu, 2006, pp.12-17). From the economic point of view, the key difference between two critical issues mentioned above is the elasticity of substitution. The optimistic issue assumes the elasticity of substitution between factors should be large enough, at least equal to 1. For example, Stiglitz (1974, pp.123-137) built a model to prove feasibility of economic growth. One key assumption of his model was that elasticity of substitution between natural resources and capital was greater than 1. In contrast, the pessimistic issue assumes the elasticity of substitution is small, and there is at least a resource whose substitution elasticity for others is less than 1. Technical change is another aspect related to sustainable economic growth. The current view reflects optimism as to whether technical change can provide the solution to serious and even persistent environmental issues (Herman and Claudia, 2005, pp.133-147; Tao, 2008, pp.16-19). Most mainstream economists agree that technical change can remove resource limits on economic growth. Technical change could change the elasticity of substitution, improve resource efficiency and mitigate resource scarcity in a long time (Loverjoy, 1996, pp.266-278; Smulders and de Nooij, 2003, pp.59-79). Pu Yongjian (2000) believed that the material stock of natural resources was limited and would gradually decrease with the human economic growth. However, he also believed technological advances would improve the economic contribution of resources, so the economic stock of natural resources would grow continuously and economic growth was sustainable. The research of Yang (2004, pp.40-43) supported that technical change was the driving force of modern economic growth. Without technical change, economic growth would heavily depend on the consumption of energy and resources, which would eventually lead to energy depletion. The related literatures that focus on entropy, substitution and economic growth in the framework of new growth theory have not yet formed a complete theoretical system. This paper, Based on existing studies, uses entropy increasing law in Material-Energy-Information (MEI) system to analyze how elasticity of substitution and technical change will affect sustainable economic growth. Our research shows the elasticity of substitution between any two resources must decrease because of entropy increasing law in MEI system, and the efficiency improvement of resources from technical change is also limited. Therefore, substitution and technical change can not sustain economic growth forever. Our findings will not only provide a new perspective for the research of economic growth theory, but also help us better understand the dynamic process of economic growth.

#### innovation solves resource shortages

—new oil extraction, electric cars, nuclear fission/fusion, renewables, etc

Ben-Ami 11 — Daniel Ben-Ami, journalist and author, regular contributor to *spiked*, has been published in the *American*, the *Australian*, Economist.com, *Financial Times*, the *Guardian*, the *Independent*, *Novo* (Germany), *Ode* (American and Dutch editions), *Prospect*, *Shanghai Daily*, the *Sunday Telegraph*, the *Sunday Times*, and *Voltaire* (Sweden), 2011 (“Growth is good,” *Ode*, June, Available Online at http://www.odemagazine.com/doc/print/75/growth-is-good, Accessed 08-16-2011)

There are many reasons why the notion of scarce resources is mistaken. Take energy as an example. For almost a century, authorities have warned that oil is on the verge of running out. Yet the exhaustion of oil supplies is still a long way off. New sources of oil have been discovered, including under the seabed, and extraction techniques have been improved. In the future, it may also be possible to extract huge amounts of oil from tar sands or produce plentiful gasoline from coal. Perhaps one day, oil will be close to running out or it will be considered too dirty to use. That still leaves plenty of options. A

s technology improves, electric cars could become much more viable. It is also already possible to generate huge amounts of energy from nuclear fission, the process that powers the sun, while in the future, nuclear fusion could provide unlimited energy. Perhaps other technologies will turn out to be better, but the point is that apparently insurmountable resource shortages can be overcome. Human ingenuity is unlimited. It is not a question of needing, say, three planets to sustain humanity, but of making this planet more productive

#### Space solves scarcity

John Carl **Villanueva**, 3/30/**10**, “Space Colonization”, http://www.universetoday.com/61085/space-colonization/, umn-rks

Although Earth is abundant with natural resources, these natural resources are not unlimited. This is why practically all space programs include space colonization among their long-term goals. Space colonization refers to the setting up of a self-sufficient human habitat outside planet Earth. The nearest candidate is the Moon. This is followed by Mars and then perhaps somewhere in the neighborhood of Proxima Centauri, the nearest star from our Sun. Signs that the Earth is feeling the pressure of the ever mushrooming population are everywhere. Depleted rain forests, deteriorating ozone layer, uninhabitable rivers, and Global Warming are evidences of a stressed-out planet. Sure, there are solutions to these problems. But the fact remains that, pretty soon, the demands of our growing population would be too much for this planet to handle. The Apollo Program has shown us that it is possible to land and even walk on the Moon. Building structures there is not an impossible task. However, there is one main concern – the presence of water. For the Moon or any celestial body to be habitable, it has to have water. If possible, that water has to be in liquid form. With water, people can grow plants, which can then serve as sources of food. Energy is not a problem since Solar energy is readily available on the Lunar surface. Since there is no atmosphere on the Moon, energy from the Sun can reach solar panels unhindered. Solar panels are already being used to power satellites and even the Mars exploration rovers Spirit and Opportunity, so there’s no question to their reliability. Spirit and Opportunity are two mobile robots that are currently exploring the surface of the Red Planet. As with regards to the water problem, a possible solution may lie in the water ice deposits found in some polar craters on the Moon. Data gathered by the LCROSS lunar impact mission presented proofs of the presence of water ice there. If space colonization on the Moon is not possible, then there’s always Mars. Mars possesses many attributes that make it a very good candidate for colonization. Mars has a similar axial tilt to the Earth’s, giving it seasons similar to ours. It has a thin atmosphere that can partially shield inhabitants from solar and cosmic radiation. Best of all, like the Moon, Mars also has water ice deposits on its surface.

### Growth Good: Transition Bad 1NC

**dedev causes environmental destruction and the deaths of billions**

**Mead 12** (Walter Russell, James Clarke Chace Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities at Bard College,7/28/12, “The Energy Revolution 4: Hot Planet?” The American Interest) http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2012/07/28/the-energy-revolution-4-hot-planet/

**The shale boom hasn’t turned green success into green failure. It’s prevented green failure from turning into something much worse. Monbiot understands this better than McKibben; there was never any real doubt that we’d keep going to the liquor store.** If we hadn’t found ways to use all this oil and gas, we wouldn’t have embraced the economics of less. True, as oil and gas prices rose, there would be more room for wind and solar power, but the real winner of an oil and gas shortage is… coal. To use McKibben’s metaphor, **there is a much dirtier liquor store just down the road from the shale emporium, and it’s one we’ve been patronizing for centuries. The US and China have oodles of coal, and rather than walk to work from our cold and dark houses all winter, we’d use it.** Furthermore, when and if the oil runs out, the technology exists to get liquid fuel out of coal. It isn’t cheap and it isn’t clean, but it works. The newly bright oil and gas future means that we aren’t entering a new Age of Coal. For this, every green on the planet should give thanks. The second reason why greens should give thanks for shale is that environmentalism is a luxury good. People must survive and they will survive by any means necessary. But **they would much rather thrive than merely survive,** and if they can arrange matters better, they will. **A poor society near the edge of survival will dump the industrial waste in the river without a second thought. It will burn coal and choke in the resulting smog if it has nothing else to burn. Politics in an age of survival is ugly and practical.** It has to be. **The best leader is the one who can cut out all the fluff and the folderol and keep you alive through the winter.** During the Battle of Leningrad, people burned priceless antiques to stay alive for just one more night. **An age of** energy **shortages and high prices translates into an age of radical food and economic insecurity for billions of people. Those billions** of hungry, frightened, angry people **won’t fold their hands and meditate on the ineffable wonders of Gaia and her mystic web of life as they pass peacefully away. Nor will they vote George Monbiot** and Bill McKibben **into power. They will butcher every panda in the zoo before they see their children starve, they will torch every forest on earth before they freeze to death, and the cheaper and the meaner their lives are, the less energy or thought they will spare to the perishing world around them**

**.** But, thanks to shale and other unconventional energy sources, **that isn’t where we are headed. We are heading into a world in which energy is abundant and horizons are open even as humanity’s grasp of science and technology grows more secure. A world where more and more basic human needs are met is a world that has time to think about other goals and the money to spend on them. As China gets richer, the Chinese want cleaner air, cleaner water, purer food — and they are ready and able to pay for them. A Brazil whose economic future is secure can afford to treasure and conserve its rain forests. A Central America where the people are doing all right is more willing and able to preserve its biodiversity. And a world in which people know where their next meal is coming from is a world that can and will take thought for things like the sustainability of the fisheries** and the protection of the coral reefs. **A world that is more relaxed about the security of its energy sources is going to be able to do more about improving the quality of those sources and about managing the impact of its energy consumption on the global commons. A rich, energy secure world is going to spend more money developing solar power and wind power** and other sustainable sources than a poor, hardscrabble one. **When human beings think their basic problems are solved, they start looking for more elegant solutions. Once Americans had an industrial and modern economy, we started wanting to clean up the rivers and the air.** Once people aren’t worried about getting enough calories every day to survive, they start wanting healthier food more elegantly prepared. A world of abundant shale oil and gas is a world that will start imposing more environmental regulations on shale and gas producers. A prosperous world will set money aside for research and development for new technologie**s that conserve energy** or find it in cleaner surroundings. **A prosperous world facing climate change will be able to ameliorate the consequences** and take thought for the future in ways that a world overwhelmed by energy insecurity and gripped in a permanent economic crisis of scarcity simply can’t and won’t do.

#### Transition spurs right wing groups to power

Martin **Lewis**, Professor, School of the Environment, Duke University, GREEN DELUSIONS, 19**92**, p. 170-171.

While an explosive socioeconomic crisis in the near term is hardly likely the possibility certainly cannot be dismissed. Capitalism is an inherently unstable economic system, and periodic crises of some mag­intude are inevitable. An outbreak of jingoistic economic nationalism throughout the world, moreover, could quickly result in virtual economic collapse. Under such circumstances we could indeed enter an epoch of revolutionary social turmoil. Yet I believe that there are good reasons to believe that the victors in such a struggle would be radicals not of the left but rather of the right. The extreme left, for all its intellectual strength, notably lacks the kind of power necessary to emerge victorious from a real revolution. A few old street radicals may still retain their militant ethos, but today’s college professors

and their graduate students, the core marxist con­tingent, would be ineffective. The radical right, on the other hand, would present a very real threat. Populist right-wing paramilitary groups are well armed and well trained, while establishment-minded fascists probably have links with the American military, wherein lies the greatest concentration of destructive power this planet knows. Should a crisis strike so savagely as to splinter the American center and its political institutions, we could well experience a revolutionary movement simi­lar to that of Germany in the 1930.

### Growth Good: Disease—1NC

#### Economic decline kills disease research

**MSNBC 09**, Recession may worsen spread of exotic diseases, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29599786/, Krishy D

**A significant amount of the CDC funding for emerging diseases goes to salaries and state and local health departments**, explained Dr. Ali Kahn, deputy director of the National Center for Zoonotic, Vector-Borne and Enteric Diseases at the CDC, “There is no doubt **we could do a lot more** in the U.S. and worldwide **with additional funds**,” said Kahn. **The recession has weakened the government's ability to develop better treatments, vaccines or prevent an epidemic, experts said. “States do not have resources to keep people on board and these people are monitoring diseases, the epidemiologists doing shoe leather investigations**,” said Jeffrey Levi, executive director of Trust for America’s Health. “You cannot turn them on and off with a switch**. If you lose them you’ve lost them forever.”**

#### DISEASE SPREAD RISKS EXTINCTION

John D. **Steinbruner**, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution, “Biological Weapons: A Plague Upon All Houses,” FOREIGN POLICY n. 109, Winter 1997/19**98**, pp. 85-96, ASP.

It is a considerable comfort and undoubtedly a key to our survival that, so far, the main lines of defense against this threat have not depended on explicit policies or organized efforts. In the long course of evolution, the human body has developed physical barriers and a biochemical immune system whose sophistication and effectiveness exceed anything we could design or as yet even fully understand. But evolution is a sword that cuts both ways: New diseases emerge, while old diseases mutate and adapt. Throughout history, there have been epidemics during which human immunity has broken down on an epic scale. An infectious agent believed to have been the plague bacterium killed an estimated 20 million people over a four-year period in the fourteenth century, including nearly one-quarter of Western Europe's population at the time. Since its recognized appearance in 1981, some 20 variations of the HIV virus have infected an estimated 29.4 million worldwide, with 1.5 million people currently dying of AIDS each year. Malaria, tuberculosis, and cholera - once thought to be under control - are now making a comeback. As we enter the twenty-first century, changing conditions have enhanced the potential for widespread contagion. The rapid growth rate of the total world population, the unprecedented freedom of movement across international borders, and scientific advances that expand the capability for the deliberate manipulation of pathogens are all cause for worry that the problem might be greater in the future than it has ever been in the past. The threat of infectious pathogens is not just an issue of public health, but a fundamental security problem for the species as a whole.

**A2 “China-Taiwan Rels High”**

**Good relations between China and Taiwan are temporary**

**Carpenter 11** (Ted Galen, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, 4-20-11, "The Ticking Taiwan Time Bomb" National Interest) nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/the-ticking-taiwan-time-bomb-5201?page=1

Washington’s sense of relief is understandable and to some extent justified. However, the **temporary easing of tensions between Taipei and Beijing needs to be seen as just that: temporary. The underlying, fundamental dispute has not gone away,** nor is it likely to. Beijing still insists that Taiwan someday accept political reunification with the mainland. But the overwhelming majority of Taiwanese have no wish to see their self-governing island come under Beijing’s control. **Ma’s accommodating posture merely postpones the day of reckoning.** When the United States invaded Iraq, General David Petraeus famously posed the question: “Tell me how this ends.” A similar question ought to be asked about the Taiwan issue: “Tell me how this ends peacefully.” The various scenarios for a peaceful outcome do not inspire optimism. One theoretical possibility is that Beijing ultimately accepts Taiwan’s right to self-determination, even if Taiwanese voters choose independence. But the chances of that development are infinitesimally small. Both because of nationalist emotions and strategic calculations (Taiwan’s crucial geographic location within easy striking distance of the major sea lanes in the Western Pacific), no Chinese government is ever likely to accept the island’s legal separation from the mainland. Another scenario is that the status quo (de facto but conciliatory independence) goes on indefinitely. Washington would certainly prefer that outcome, and it is the course the majority of Taiwanese endorse. Public opinion polls over the past two decades consistently show about 50 to 60 percent in favor of the status quo, compared to about 30 percent who want to push for formal independence and a mere 10 to 15 percent who advocate reunion with the mainland. But **however much U.S. leaders and the Taiwanese people might want the status quo to go on forever, that position is not acceptable to Beijing. As China’s military and economic clout grows, the timetable regarding a willingness to tolerate this ambiguous situation is shrinking.** The status quo might continue for another decade, perhaps even two decades, but at some point the Chinese government is going to insist on substantive moves toward reunification. Which brings us to the third scenario for a peaceful resolution: Taiwan capitulates to Beijing’s demands and negotiates a deal based on a version of the Hong Kong model—extensive autonomy but with full acceptance of Beijing’s sovereignty. That is the most likely of the three scenarios, but it is still a long-shot. As noted, few Taiwanese favor reunification. The growing economic ties between Taiwan and the mainland might increase that total modestly, but probably not more than that. A transformation of the mainland’s political system to a democracy would likely boost the percentage still more, but there is little likelihood of such a transformation in the foreseeable future. Moreover, even if China did become democratic, there are still sizable economic and cultural differences that would make most Taiwanese reluctant to embrace reunification. Those troubling realizations should temper our sense of relief that **the Taiwan issue** is not a crisis at the moment. The issue **is merely slumbering. None of the scenarios for a peaceful outcome is likely** over the long term. And **given Washington’s implicit security guarantee to Taiwan, contained in the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, that prospect should cause more than a little unease. The Taiwan issue is a ticking time bomb that at some point is almost certain to lead to a confrontation with China,** unless the United States rescinds its risky commitment to defend the island.

**A2 “Circumv—Obama Ignores”**

**Statutory restrictions work – they raise the political cost of executive circumvention**

Morris S. **Ogul 96**, Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh, is the author of several articles on legislative oversight, and coauthor (with William J. Keefe) of The American Legislative Process (9th ed., 1997). Reviews in American History 24.3 (1996) 524-527, “The Politics of the War Powers” Louis Fisher. Presidential War Powers . Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995. xvi + 206 pp. Appendixes, bibliography, and index. $29.95., Project Muse, online, jj

In part, **these two positions can be reconciled. Recognition that presidents under specific political circumstances will in essence act unilaterally does not mean sustained tyranny is upon us**. **If congressional majorities and large segments of the public respond vigorously and negatively to specific presidential actions, political pressures will minimize the duration and impact of such actions**. Conversely if Congress and large segments of the public go along with the president, formal legal restrictions will have few decisive effects.¶ Over twenty years of experience with the War Powers Resolution (WPR) illuminates the problem. Presidents have usually claimed that they have consulted with Congress as stipulated in the WPR before committing troops to hostile zones. Few members of Congress would read the evidence that way. Presidents have notified Congress about what they were about to do while asserting that they have consulted Congress. What presidents have actually done does not conform with any normal meaning of consultation. Similarly, most presidential decisions to send troops into environments where combat is likely were reported, as required by the WPR , to the Congress. But presidents have studiously avoided reporting in the manner prescribed by the WPR, one that triggers its sixty-day cut-off provisions. [End Page 527]¶ This behavior by presidents surely leaves some critical decisions in a legal limbo. That, for good or evil, is where they actually are. What we can do is recognize that fact and act accordingly. Politics has and will govern the resolution of this issue. Whether this is desirable in principle can be debated. The realities of politics, however, have and are likely to prevail.¶ Legal restrictions sometimes cannot withstand political tides. Constitutional, limited government is not intended to work that way but it does in reality. There are few effective legal safeguards against intense and enduring political tides. Fortunately in U.S. history, such episodes have been few and relatively fleeting. **Legal restrictions** such as those specified in the War Powers Resolution have little direct, conclusive impact. They do, however, **help raise the political costs of unilateral executive actions**. **Therein lies their primary value**. Will presidents fully and freely involve Congress in decision making to send U.S. armed forces into potential or actual combat? Despite the force of Louis Fisher's account of the constitutional history of the war powers, the answer is probably not. **Will presidents carefully calculate the political costs of such initiatives? They usually will.** **Legislation designed to raise political costs may be a useful way to promote this possibility**, but Fisher places far too much weight on "solid statutory checks" (p. 205).

### OLC CP: 2AC

**Congress will override the executive—overturning the TRA is key**

**Goldstein and Schriver 01** (Steven, Professor of Government, Smith College, and Randall, ne of five founding partners of Armitage International LLC, a consulting firm that specializes in international business development, “An Uncertain Relationship: The United States, Taiwan and the Taiwan Relations Act” The China Quarterly) http://cm.olemiss.edu/courses/pol324/goldschr.pdf

**The TRA bears much of the responsibility for** these **stresses. This was an intensely political and ambiguous piece of legislation shaped** in form **by inter-branch conflict** and in substance by the balance between the two branches as well as that within Congress. The central finding is that the TRA has, over the past 21 years, taken on different colouratioas depending on the nature of these factors."1 To argue that it is the equivalent of a treaty or that it has assured the security of Taiwan since its passage is to ignore this dependent and variable quality. Similarly, to argue that United Statcs's actions since 1979 have represented a retreat from its original commitments is to miss entirely the ambiguity of those commitments. This final argument has an additional shortcoming. It seeks to assess the impact of the TRA by deductions drawn from actions or statements - in other words from what was done. There is, of course, another way of judging thai impact; from the perspective of what was not done. **Action by Congress, particularly in foreign affairs, is most frequently restrictive rather than directive. While it can rarely mandate a specific action by the executive. Congress can set permissive boundaries. How effective those boundaries will be**, of course, **varies by issue and**, most importantly, **by the legislative basis for Congressional action." It is here that the true significance of the TRA can be found**. The resurfacing of the Taiwan issue in Sino-Amcrican relations has been the result of the confluence of domestic and international factors. **The re-emergence of the cross-strait conundrum as the specific dilemma narrowing American options in resolving the Taiwan issue has been the direct result of Congressional action motivated by the complex mixture of partisan politics, institutional pride and ideological differences** described above. By 2000 the cumulative effect of these actions was to raise the level of support for Taiwan to the point that it represented the status quo in the American position that had to be maintained as better relations with the PRC were explored. Yet, as was the case earlier, it is change in this status quo that Beijing is demanding as a condition of better relations. Here is the significance of **the TRA** for American policy. Since 1996 it **has emerged as a powerful legislative instrument for the setting of foreign policy boundaries by Congress.** To some degree, **the act's effectiveness is the result of its very nature. Unlike the usual diet of Congressional action on foreign affairs, it is "the law of the land." Such a status has permitted members of Congress to declare it as the "legal standard"** against which to judge Taiwan policy; **has led at least one Congressional committee to suggest that a president might be held constitutionally accountable for not upholding it; and can provide the legitimacy for the efforts of sympathetic individuals in the defence bureaucracy to justify support for Congress's efforts.**

**Obama will ignore the OLC**

Jacob **Sullum**, senior editor, Reason, “War Counsel: Obama Shops for Libya Advice that Lets Him Ignore the Law,” TOWNHALL, 6—22—**11**, http://townhall.com/columnists/jacobsullum/2011/06/22/war\_counsel\_obama\_shops\_for\_libya\_advice\_that\_lets\_him\_ignore\_the\_law/page/full/

During the Bush administration, when the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel got into the habit of rationalizing whatever the president wanted to do, Indiana University law professor Dawn **Johnsen dreamed of an OLC that was willing to "say no to the president**." It turns out **we have such an OLC now. Unfortunately,** as Barack Obama's defense of his unauthorized war in Libya shows, **we do not have a president who is willing to take no for an answer**. While running for president, Obama criticized George W. Bush's lawless unilateralism in areas such as torture, warrantless surveillance and detention of terrorism suspects. "The law is not subject to the whims of stubborn rulers," he declared in 2007, condemning "unchecked presidential power" and promising that under his administration there would be "no more ignoring the law when it is inconvenient." Obama's nomination of Johnsen to head the OLC, although ultimately blocked by Senate Republicans, was consistent with this commitment; his overreaching responses to threats ranging from terrorism to failing auto companies were not. Last week, by rejecting the OLC's advice concerning his three-month-old intervention in Libya's civil war, Obama sent the clearest signal yet that he is no more inclined than his predecessor to obey the law. Under the War Powers Act, a president who introduces U.S. armed forces into "hostilities" without a declaration of war must begin withdrawing those forces within 60 days unless Congress authorizes their deployment. Hence the OLC, backed by Attorney General Eric Holder and Defense Department General Counsel Jeh Johnson, told Obama he needed congressional permission to continue participating in NATO operations against Libyan dictator Moammar Gadhafi's forces. While **the president can override** the **OLC**'s **advice,** that rarely happens. "Under normal circumstances," The New York Times noted, "the office's interpretation of the law is legally binding on the executive branch." In this case, rather than follow the usual procedure of having the OLC solicit opinions from different departments and determine which best comported with the law, **Obama considered the office's position along with others more congenial to the course of action he had already chosen**. **Obama preferred the advice of White House Counsel** Robert **Bauer and State Department legal adviser** Harold **Koh,** who argued that American involvement in Libya, which includes bombing air defenses and firing missiles from drone aircraft as well as providing intelligence and refueling services, does not amount to participating in "hostilities." A report that the Obama administration sent Congress says, "U.S. operations do not involve sustained fighting or active exchanges of fire with hostile forces, nor do they involve the presence of U.S. ground troops, U.S. casualties or a serious threat thereof, or any significant chance of escalation into a conflict characterized by those factors." All that is irrelevant, since the War Powers Act says nothing about those criteria. According to the administration's logic, Congress has no say over the president's use of the armed forces as long as it does not involve boots on the ground or a serious risk of U.S. casualties — a gaping exception to the legislative branch's war powers in an era of increasingly automated and long-distance military action. As Harvard law professor Jack Goldsmith, a former head of the OLC, told the Times, "The administration's theory implies that the president can wage war with drones and all manner of offshore missiles without having to bother with the War Powers Resolution's time limits."

**Links to politics**

**Miles 13** (Chris, editor and writer for major media outlets including the Associated Press, January 2013, "An Obama Gun Control Executive Order Could Sink the President's Favorability" Policy Mic) www.policymic.com/articles/23296/an-obama-gun-control-executive-order-could-sink-the-president-s-favorability

**An Obama** Gun Control **Executive Order** Could Sink the President's Favorability **Could** Obama **be wasting valuable political capital** by issuing an executive order on gun control? **If Obama acts unilaterally** on gun control, **the event will** likely **fire-up conservatives** and pro-gun advocates, **calling out the president for failing to use the legislative process. The** conservative **Drudge Report compared executive action to** dictators **Hitler and Stalin. The backlash could be immense and** could **cost Obama leverage in future political battles**, most notably the coming debt ceiling fight next month. Obama has often pulled the "popular mandate" card, saying that his re-election in November proves the American people are behind him ... almost unconditionally. But what do the American people really think about the gun debate. Well, for starters, just 4% of Americans identify guns as the nation's top problem, per Gallup. Based on that alone, Obama may think twice about pushing popcorn policies that will only splash onto headlines and divide Americans**. Any executive action could** even **hurt his favorability rating, and by extension his ability to negotiate in the future.**

**Executive orders are not enforced and will get rolled back**

Richard **Wolf**, citing Paul Light, professor of public service, “Obama Uses Executive Powers to Get Past Congress,” USA TODAY, 10—27—**11**, www.usatoday.com/news/washington/story/2011-10-26/obama-executive-orders/50942170/1, accessed 7-18-12.

On all three initiatives, **Obama used his executive authority rather than seeking legislation. That limited the scope of his actions, but it enabled him to blow by his Republican critics. "It's the executive branch flexing its muscles," presidential historian** and author Douglas **Brinkley says**. "President Obama's showing, 'I've still got a lot of cards up my sleeve.'" The cards aren't exactly aces, however. Unlike acts of Congress, **executive actions** cannot appropriate money. And they **can be wiped off the books by courts, Congress or the next president.** Thus it was that **on the day after Obama was inaugurated, he revoked one of George W. Bush's executive orders** limiting access to presidential records. **On the** very **next day, Obama signed an executive order calling for the Guantanamo Bay military detention facility in Cuba to be closed within a year. It remains open today**. Harry **Truman's federal seizure of steel mills was invalidated by the Supreme Court**. George H.W**. Bush's establishment of a limited fetal tissue bank was blocked by Congress.** Bill Clinton's five-year ban on senior staff lobbying former colleagues was lifted eight years later — by Clinton. "**Even presidents sometimes reverse themselves," says** Paul **Light,** a professor of public service at New York University. "Generally speaking, **it's more symbolic than substantive."**

**First Strike China CP: 2AC**

**China’s got survivable second strike --- ensures retaliation**

**Saunders 9** – Phillip C. Saunders; Senior Research Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University; July 2009 “ Managing Strategic Competition with China;” Strategic Forum; <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ifnss/0017050/f_0017050_14587.pdf>

Potential Dynamics The history of interactions between Chinese strategic nuclear modernization and U.S. efforts to develop ballistic missile defenses illustrates some potential dynam­ics of future U.S.-China competition in other strategic areas. **Beijing has sought to limit its vulnerability to nuclear black­mail by developing a viable second-strike capability against potential nuclear-armed adversaries, including the United States.** Technological limitations meant that the Chinese deterrent initially relied primar­ily on air-delivered weapons and then on vulnerable silo- and cave-based missiles. Chinese experts privately admitted that the credibility of China’s deterrent rested on a potential adversary’s uncertainty about whether a first strike could destroy all of China’s long-range nuclear missiles. **Rather than build large numbers of vulnerable first-generation missiles, China decided to develop a new generation of mobile land- and sea-based missiles that would be more survivable and better able to provide a cred­ible second-strike capability. As these new systems began nearing deployment early in this decade, U.S. withdrawal from the Antiballistic Missile Treaty and deployment of ballistic missile defenses challenged the premises behind mutually assured destruc­tion, prompting Chinese complaints that the United States sought “absolute security” for itself while keeping others vulnerable.** Some U.S. policymakers and strategists have been reluctant to accept mutual nuclear vulnerability with China, partly because it implies a reduction in U.S. freedom of action (and a potential increase in China’s ability to take actions that challenge U.S. interests).16 **But Beijing appears determined to estab­lish and maintain a credible second-strike nuclear capability through some combination of increased numbers, more survivable mis­siles, ballistic missile defense countermea­sures, and potentially targeting space-based elements of a U.S. missile defense system.** **The United States ultimately may have no choice but to accept a degree of vulnerability to Chinese nuclear weapons.** This issue has been a significant source of tension in Sino-U.S. relations for the past 10 years, and at times has had significant domestic political conse­quences. Despite concerns on both sides, these tensions have not prevented further develop­ment of the U.S.-China relationship and sig­nificant bilateral cooperation on issues such as counterterrorism and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

**A US first strike decimates the environment --- cause extinction**

**Takai ‘9**, Retired Colonel and Former Researcher in the military science faculty of the Staff College for Japan’s Ground Self Defense Force (“U.S.-China nuclear strikes would spell doomsday”, October 7, <http://www.upiasia.com/Security/2009/10/07/us-china_nuclear_strikes_would_spell_doomsday/7213/>)

What would happen if China launched its 20 Dongfeng-5 intercontinental ballistic missiles, each with a 5-megaton warhead, at 20 major U.S. cities? Prevailing opinion in Washington D.C. until not so long ago was that the raids would cause over 40 million casualties, annihilating much of the United States. In order to avoid such a doomsday scenario, consensus was that the United States would have to eliminate this potential threat at its source with **preemptive strikes on China**. But **cool heads at institutions such as the Federation of American Scientists and the National Resource Defense Council examined the facts and produced their own analyses** in 2006, which differed from the hard-line views of their contemporaries. The FAS and NRDC developed several scenarios involving nuclear strikes over ICBM sites deep in the Luoning Mountains in China’s western province of Henan, and analyzed their implications. **One of the scenarios involved direct strikes on 60 locations – including 20 main missile silos and decoy silos – hitting each with one W76-class, 100-kiloton** multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle carried on a submarine-launched ballistic missile. **In order to destroy the hardened silos, the strikes would aim for maximum impact by causing ground bursts** near the silos' entrances. Using air bursts similar to the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki would not be as effective, as the blasts and the heat would dissipate extensively. In this scenario, the 6 megatons of ground burst caused by the 60 attacks would create enormous mushroom clouds over 12 kilometers high, composed of radioactive dirt and debris. **Within 24 hours following the explosions, deadly fallout would spread from the mushroom clouds, driven by westerly winds toward** Nanjing and **Shanghai. They would contaminate the cities' residents, water, foodstuff and crops, causing irreversible damage**. The impact of a 6-megaton nuclear explosion would be 360 times more powerful than the Hiroshima bomb, killing not less than 4 million people. Such massive casualties among non-combatants would far exceed the military purpose of destroying the enemy's military power. This would cause political harm and damage the United States’ ability to achieve its war aims, as it would lose international support. On the other hand, China could retaliate against U.S. troops in East Asia, employing intermediate-range ballistic missiles including its DF-3, DF-4 and DF-21 missiles, based in Liaoning and Shandong provinces, which would still be intact. **If the United States wanted to destroy China's entire nuclear retaliatory capability, U.S. forces would have to employ almost all their nuclear weapons, causing catastrophic environmental hazards that could lead to the annihilation of mankind.** Accordingly, the FAS and NRDC conclusively advised U.S. leaders to get out of the vicious cycle of nuclear competition, which costs staggering sums, and to promote nuclear disarmament talks with China. Such advice is worth heeding by nuclear hard-liners.

### PC Low: F/L

#### Obama has no PC

The Economist 1/30 (Democracy In America, 1/30/14, “Clowns to the left, jokers to the right”, http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2014/01/barack-obama, zzx)

I find this argument unpersuasive. Ed Luce made the key point a year and a half ago: LBJ had liberal Republicans and conservative Democrats to work with, whose decision about whether to vote with or against the president on different bills could be influenced by a variety of political considerations. Those legislative cross-loyalties don't exist anymore. Neither do earmarks, the budget goodies targeted to individual districts that were once a widespread currency of congressional dealmaking (something we lamented here). The parties today are ideologically sorted, and there is almost nothing Mr Obama can do to convince or compel Republicans to vote with him. Republicans are able to halt the president's agenda in its tracks, and they have every reason to do so. There simply isn't any reason to believe that more aggressive legislative arm-twisting would have generated more success for Mr Obama; it seems entirely possible that if he had aggressively tried to dictate the terms of health-care reform legislation rather than allowing various senators to rewrite (and weaken) the bill, he might have lost even that signature achievement. Last year, Mr Obama decided to throw his entire weight behind gun-control legislation, taking on just the sort of ambitious and improbable crusade Mr Ignatius had advised him to attempt. The result was that he lost, squandered political capital, and mired his party in the mud.

#### sanctions now

Josh Rogin 2.05.14¶ GOP Will Force Reid to Save Obama’s Iran Policy—Over and Over Again <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/02/05/gop-will-force-reid-to-save-obama-s-iran-policy-over-and-over-again.html>

The Republican Senate caucus is planning to use every parliamentary trick in the book to push Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid to allow a floor vote on a new Iran sanctions bill that the Obama administration strenuously opposes.¶ The Obama White House has succeeded in keeping most Democrats in line against supporting quick passage of the “Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act,” which currently has 59 co-sponsors, including 13 Democrats. Reid has faithfully shelved the bill, pending the outcome of negotiations between Iran and the world’s major powers—the so-called “P5+1.”¶ But tomorrow, Republicans plan to respond by using an array of floor tactics—including bringing up the bill and forcing Reid to publicly oppose it—as a means of putting public pressure on Reid and Democrats who may be on the fence.¶ “Now we have come to a crossroads. Will the Senate allow Iran to keep its illicit nuclear infrastructure in place, rebuild its teetering economy and ultimately develop nuclear weapons at some point in the future?” 42 GOP senators wrote in a letter sent to Reid late Wednesday and obtained by The Daily Beast. “The answer to this question will be determined by whether you allow a vote on S. 1881, the bipartisan Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act, which is cosponsored by more than half of the Senate.”¶ The GOP letter calls on Reid to allow a vote on the bill during the current Senate work period—in other words, before the chamber’s next recess. Senate GOP aides said that until they get a vote, GOP senators are planning to use a number of procedural tools at their disposal to keep this issue front and center for Democrats. Since the legislation is already on the Senate’s legislative calendar, any senator can bring up the bill for a vote at any time and force Democrats to publicly object. ¶ Senators can also try attaching the bill as an amendment to future bills under consideration. Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell has been a harsh critic of Reid’s shelving of the bill, so he could demand a vote on it as a condition of moving any other legislation.

#### PC fails on sanctions

Foster 12 – 31 (Peter, “Obama has to get his act together,” <http://gulfnews.com/opinions/columnists/obama-has-to-get-his-act-together-1.1272540>)

And as for Obamacare, while far from a certain success, the websites and exchanges are now grinding into life and the “victims” of that particular fight — those who will pay more for their health insurance, not less — are relatively few in number. It also is not impossible — as Ronald Reagan had shown at the end of his second term — that Obama may yet be saved by his foreign policy, aided by John Kerry, a Secretary of State whose sheer energy and willingness to lead (unlike his boss) has been a welcome change in many capitals last year. Reagan showed what was possible. In early 1987, his ratings had plummeted so far (42 per cent), following the Iran-Contra scandal, that when he welcomed that year’s SuperBowl champions to the White House and the captain thanked the fans, Reagan was heard to observe: “Yes, I used to have fans.” But within a year, Reagan’s ratings were back over 50 per cent as he took credit for the sudden warming of ties with the Soviet Union and staged his historic summits with Mikhail Gorbachev. The real question is whether Obama — and a second-string team of advisers at the White House who keep putting up backs in Congress, including among Democrats — can re-emerge as a force for progress. Already a fight looms over Iran sanctions this month — thanks to a clumsy White House promise to veto a bill that was co-signed by 15 Democrat senators, with the promise of perhaps another 15 signatures to come. But instead of cutting a deal with Democrat senators facing re-election in the mid-terms — several with donors and electorates that want a tough line on Iran — Obama took the opportunity in his press conference to sneer at them. “I think the politics of trying to look tough on Iran are often good when you’re running for office or if you’re in office,” said the man who has run his last election. It is the kind of unnecessary clumsiness that has been the hallmark of this White House’s dealings with Congress. Obama is right. He has plenty going for him in 2014, but the underlying tailwinds will mean nothing without a change of attitude at the top. “A couple [of] days of sleep and sun” — the president’s own prescription for erasing the wounds of 2013 — will not be enough.

#### Congress won’t provide long-term sanctions relief BUT executive action solves

Hot Air 1-21 (“New executive overreach: Obama may relax U.S. sanctions on Iran — without action from Congress,” <http://hotair.com/archives/2014/01/21/new-executive-overreach-obama-may-relax-u-s-sanctions-on-iran-without-action-from-congress/>, CMR)

It used to be that O reserved his executive power grabs for matters on which Congress was deadlocked, or simply wasn’t moving fast enough for his liking. Not always, of course: Congress duly enacted the ObamaCare employer mandate that he suspended, but that likely would have produced deadlock if he had asked Congress to suspend it instead, which, I guess, in Obama’s mind is close enough. This time is different. If anything, there’s too much bipartisan support for Iran sanctions; the whole reason Harry Reid hasn’t let a vote come to the floor in the Senate is because he’s afraid pro-Israel Democrats will cross the aisle and join the GOP on a new slate of measures designed to turn the pressure up on Tehran. That could blow up O’s nuke negotiations with the mullahs. And even if new sanctions don’t pass, it may be impossible to get Congress to lift sanctions that are currently in effect as a reward for Iran if/when they meet some of the White House’s nuclear demands. That too is a function not of deadlock but of bipartisan agreement between Republicans and a slew of Democrats in Congress who are more hawkish towards Iran than Obama is. Solution: More unilateral action, of course. “The American people must get a say in any final nuclear agreement with Iran to ensure the mullahs never get the bomb,” [Sen. Mark] Kirk told the Washington Free Beacon. “The administration cannot just ignore U.S. law and lift sanctions unilaterally.”… Top White House aides have been “talking about ways to do that [lift sanctions] without Congress and we have no idea yet what that means,” said one senior congressional aide who works on sanctions. “They’re looking for a way to lift them by fiat, overrule U.S. law, drive over the sanctions, and declare that they are lifted.”… “It’s no secret that the president, with executive power, can determine sanctions implementation, particularly with waivers and the decision not to sanction certain entities,” said Jonathan Schanzer, a former terrorism finance analyst at the Treasury Department, which is responsible for enforcing sanctions… “In the case of Iran, such an approach could allow Washington to reach a nuclear accord without Congress having to vote on rescinding, even temporarily or conditionally, certain sanctions,” Clawson wrote. “No matter how stiff and far-reaching sanctions may be as embodied in U.S. law, they would have less bite if the administration stopped enforcing them.” It’s not that O’s going to somehow unilaterally repeal the sanctions in effect. A la the employer mandate, he’ll simply refuse to enforce existing law, using executive orders and waivers to make sure that funds that Congress wants choked off will somehow find their way to Iran if the mullahs play ball. The counterargument here, I guess, is that presidents always have some latitude in how they enforce sanctions. Right, but this isn’t a quibble about how best to carry out a mutually agree-upon policy; it’s a case of the executive and legislature being seemingly at loggerheads on the core question of whether U.S. policy should involve more pressure on an enemy or less — at a sensitive moment of international diplomacy to boot. Against that backdrop, systematically relaxing sanctions would amount to O substituting the policy he favors for the one favored by Congress. That’s actually bolder than his decision not to enforce the mandate, which Democrats were happy to see him do (even though they had passed the mandate in the first place) since it averted an extra ObamaCare-related political headache for them this year. By relaxing Iran sanctions, he’d potentially be defying his own party too.

**War power fights inevitable but Obama stays out**

**Brown 1-19** (Hayes, “How Two Senators Want To Change The Way The U.S. Wages War,” <http://thinkprogress.org/security/2014/01/19/3182921/senators-want-change-wages-war/>, CMR)

**In the aftermath of** last year’s aborted military campaign against **Syria, two senators want to rewrite the rules that have** — in theory at least — **governed the way the U**nited **S**tates **has used military force** for the last forty years. Following the chemical attack in Syria that killed hundreds, the United States for a time seemed on the verge of launching military action against Syria to punish its unleashing of such deadly weapons. That original determination to retaliate against **Syria** for crossing President Obama’s so-called “red-line” in turn **launched a debate over** whether **the president** had the **authority** to take such action without Congressional approval. That’s where the recently introduced War Powers Consultation Act comes in. **The new legislation** — which Sens. Tim Kaine (D-VA) and John McCain (R-AZ) introduced on Thursday — **would** replace the War Powers Act of 1973 in its entirely, enacting a new set of rules to, in the senators belief, better **keep the president accountable** when it comes to the use of force. Rather than only having to notify Congress after launching military action, Kaine and McCain want the force presidents to consult with legislators prior to sending U.S. soldiers, sailors, and pilots into harm’s way. Under current law, the president has to notify Congress whenever placing forces in areas where “imminent” hostilities are likely, and is given a sixty-day window to conduct the operation absent Congressional approval and another thirty-days allotted towards withdrawal. **The new proposal would reduce** that **autonomy**, **requiring the Executive** Branch **to “consult with Congress before ordering deployment into** a ‘significant armed **conflict**,’ or, combat operations lasting, or expected to last, more than seven days.” That provision would exclude humanitarian missions and covert operations, and the initial consultation could be deferred in time of emergency, but must take place within three days after. The legislation would also raise a new joint committee composed of the heads of the Armed Services, Foreign Relations, Intelligence, and Appropriations in both Houses of Congress “to ensure there is a timely exchange of views between the legislative and executive branches, not just notification by the executive.” Finally, the law, if passed and signed, would require a vote in Congress in support of or against any military operation within 30 days. “Under the Act, all Members of Congress would eventually be asked to vote on decisions of war in order to ensure a deliberate public discussion in the full view of the American public, increasing the knowledge of the population and the accountability of our elected officials,” a press release announcing the legislation reads. “I came to the Senate … with a number of passions and things I hoped to do, but I think I only came with one obsession, and this is that obsession,” Kaine said on the Senate floor when introducing the bill. “I do not think there is anything more important than — than the Senate and Congress can do than to be on the board on decisions about whether or not we initiate military action, because if we don’t, we are asking young men and women to fight and potentially give their lives, with us not having done the hard work of creating the political consensus to support them.” For now, **the White House has yet to take a public stance on** **how it views** McCain and Kaine’s **legislation**. “The Administration is reviewing the legislation and we will continue to work closely with Congress on matters associated with the use of U.S. military force,” National Security Council spokesperson Caitlin Hayden said in an email to ThinkProgress. Neither senator’s office responded to inquires as to whether the White House was consulted in drafting the bil.

No Israeli strike regardless of deal collapse

Keck 11/28/13

Zachary, associate editor of The Diplomat, “Five Reasons Israel Won't Attack Iran,” http://nationalinterest.org/print/commentary/five-reasons-israel-wont-attack-iran-9469

Although not a member of the P5+1 itself, Israel has always loomed large over the negotiations concerning Iran’s nuclear program. For example, in explaining French opposition to a possible nuclear deal earlier this month, French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius [3]stated [3]: “The security concerns of Israel and all the countries of the region have to be taken into account.” Part of Fabius’ concern derives from the long-held fear that Israel will launch a preventive strike against Iran to prevent it from obtaining nuclear weapons. For some, this possibility remains all too real despite the important interim agreement the P5+1 and Iran reached this weekend. For example, when asked on ABC’s This Week whether Israel would attack Iran while the interim deal is in place, [4]William Kristol responded [4]: “I don't think the prime minister will think he is constrained by the U.S. deciding to have a six-month deal. […] six months, one year, I mean, if they're going to break out, they're going to break out.” Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu has done little to dispel this notion. Besides blasting the deal as a “historic mistake,” Netanyahu said [5] Israel “is not obliged to the agreement” and warned “the regime in Iran is dedicated to destroying Israel and Israel has the right and obligation to defend itself with its own forces against every threat.” Many dismiss this talk as bluster, however. Over at Bloomberg View, for instance, Jeffrey Goldberg [6]argues that the [6] nuclear deal has “boxed-in Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu so comprehensively that it's unimaginable Israel will strike Iran in the foreseeable future.” Eurasia Group's Cliff Kupchan similarly argued: “The chance of Israeli strikes during the period of the interim agreement drops to virtually zero.” Although the interim deal does further reduce Israel’s propensity to attack, the truth is that the likelihood of an Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities has always been greatly exaggerated. There are at least five reasons why Israel isn’t likely to attack Iran. 1. You Snooze, You Lose First, if Israel was going to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities, it would have done so a long time ago. Since getting caught off-guard at the beginning of the Yom Kippur War in 1973, Israel has generally acted proactively to thwart security threats. On no issue has this been truer than with nuclear-weapon programs. For example, Israel bombed Saddam Hussein’s program when it consisted of just a single nuclear reactor. [7]Accordin

g to [7]ABC News [7], Israel struck Syria’s lone nuclear reactor just months after discovering it. The IAEA had been completely in the dark about the reactor, and took years to confirm the building was in fact housing one. Contrast this with Israel’s policy toward Iran’s nuclear program. The uranium-enrichment facility in Natanz and the heavy-water reactor at Arak first became public knowledge in 2002. For more than a decade now, Tel Aviv has watched as the program has expanded into two fully operational nuclear facilities, a budding nuclear-research reactor, and countless other well-protected and -dispersed sites. Furthermore, America’s [8]extreme reluctance to [8] initiate strikes on Iran was made clear to Israel at least as far back as 2008. It would be completely at odds with how Israel operates for it to standby until the last minute when faced with what it views as an existential threat. 2. Bombing Iran Makes an Iranian Bomb More Likely Much like a U.S. strike, only with much less tactical impact, an Israeli air strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities would only increase the likelihood that Iran would build the bomb. At home, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei could use the attack to justify rescinding his fatwa against possessing a nuclear-weapons program, while using the greater domestic support for the regime and the nuclear program to mobilize greater resources for the country’s nuclear efforts. Israel’s attack would also give the Iranian regime a legitimate (in much of the world’s eyes) reason to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and kick out international inspectors. If Tehran’s membership didn’t even prevent it from being attacked, how could it justify staying in the regime? Finally, support for international sanctions will crumble in the aftermath of an Israeli attack, giving Iran more resources with which to rebuild its nuclear facilities. 3. Helps Iran, Hurts Israel Relatedly, an Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear program would be a net gain for Iran and a huge loss for Tel Aviv. Iran could use the strike to regain its popularity with the Arab street and increase the pressure against Arab rulers. As noted above, it would also lead to international sanctions collapsing, and an outpouring of sympathy for Iran in many countries around the world. Meanwhile, a strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities would leave Israel in a far worse-off position. Were Iran to respond by attacking U.S. regional assets, this could greatly hurt Israel’s ties with the United States at both the elite and mass levels. Indeed, a war-weary American public is adamantly opposed to its own leaders dragging it into another conflict in the Middle East. Americans would be even more hostile to an ally taking actions that they fully understood would put the U.S. in danger. Furthermore, the quiet but growing cooperation Israel is enjoying with Sunni Arab nations against Iran would evaporate overnight. Even though many of the political elites in these countries would secretly support Israel’s action, their explosive domestic situations would force them to distance themselves from Tel Aviv for an extended period of time. Israel’s reputation would also take a further blow in Europe and Asia, neither of which would soon forgive Tel Aviv. 4. Israel’s Veto Players Although Netanyahu may be ready to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities, he operates within a democracy with a strong elite structure, particularly in the field of national security. It seems unlikely that he would have enough elite support for him to seriously consider such a daring and risky operation. For one thing, Israel has strong institutional checks on using military force. As then vice prime minister and current defense minister Moshe Yaalon [9]explained last year [9]: “In the State of Israel, any process of a military operation, and any military move, undergoes the approval of the security cabinet and in certain cases, the full cabinet… the decision is not made by two people, nor three, nor eight.” It’s far from clear Netanyahu, a fairly divisive figure in Israeli politics, could gain this support. In fact, Menachem Begin struggled to gain sufficient support for the 1981 attack on Iraq even though Baghdad presented a more clear and present danger to Israel than Iran does today. What is clearer is that Netanyahu lacks the support of much of Israel’s highly respected national security establishment. Many former top intelligence and military officials [10]have spoken [10] out publicly against Netanyahu’s hardline Iran policy, with at least one of them questioning whether Iran is actually seeking a nuclear weapon. Another former chief of staff of the Israeli Defense Forces told [11] The Independent that, “It is quite clear that much if not all of the IDF [Israeli Defence Forces] leadership do not support military action at this point…. In the past the advice of the head of the IDF and the head of Mossad had led to military action being stopped.”

### A2 “Prolif Impact”

**Proliferation is slow, doesn’t cascade, and doesn’t cause conflict – 60 years of empirics prove**

**DeGarmo 2011**

Denise, professor of international relations at Southern Illinois University, “Proliferation Leads to Peace”

Unfortunately, while **the fear of proliferation is pervasive, it is unfounded and lacks an understanding of the evidence. Nuclear proliferation has been slow**. From [1945 to 1970](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_states_with_nuclear_weapons), only six countries acquired nuclear weapons: United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France, China, and Israel. **Since the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty came into effect in 1970, only three countries have joined the nuclear club: India, Pakistan, and North Korea. In total, only .05% of the world’s states have nuclear weapons in their possession.** Supporters of non-proliferation seem to overlook the fact that there are states currently capable of making nuclear weapons and have chosen not to construct them, which illustrates the seriousness with which states consider their entrance into the nuclear club. Included on this list are such actors as: [Japan, Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Iran, South Korea, Taiwan, and South Africa](http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/svr_nuke.htm). The attraction of nuclear weapons is multifold. Nuclear weapons enhance the international status of states that possess them and help insecure states feel more secure. States also seek nuclear capabilities for offensive purposes. It is important to point out that **while nuclear weapons have spread very slowly, conventional weapons have proliferated exponentially across the globe. The wars of the 21**st **century are being fought in the peripheral regions of the globe that are undergoing conventional weapons proliferation**. What the pundits of non-proliferation forget to mention are the many lessons that are learned from the nuclear world. Nuclear weapons provide stability just as they did during the Cold War era. The fear of[Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD)](http://atomicarchive.com/History/coldwar/page15.shtml) loomed heavily on the minds of nuclear powers through out the Cold War and continues to be an important consideration for nuclear states today. States do not strike first unless they are assured of a military victory, and the probability of a military victory is diminished by fear that their actions would prompt a swift retaliation by other states. In other words, states with nuclear weapons are deterred by another state’s second-strike capabilities. During the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union could not destroy enough of the other’s massive arsenal of nuclear weapons to make a retaliatory strike bearable. Even the prospect of a small number of nuclear weapons being placed in Cuba by the Soviets had a great deterrent effect on the United States. Nothing can be done with nuclear weapons other than to use them for deterrent purposes. **If deterrence works reliably, as it has done over the past 60 plus years, then there is less to be feared from nuclear proliferation than there is from convention warfare**.

**China coop solves prolif**

**Lijun 2K** (Sheng, scholar at the Institute of South-east Asian Studies, Singapore, 7-16-2000, "Blessing in disguise for China?" The Straits Times, Lexis)

China is not the sole or even the most serious problem the US faces in the new century. The greater challenge will be a general and relative erosion of its power, which will result from the massive and rapidly-growing costs of maintaining leadership in a world of increasing uncertainty and volatility. **With the rapid advances in military technologies, the US will become more and more vulnerable with a diminishing "security surplus"**. Its huge security surplus comes from having weaker immediate neighbours and two vast oceans that require a strong navy and airforce to bridge. But **with the rapid advances in military technologies, more and more medium and small countries (even international terrorist groups) will possess more and more lethal but low-cost means that could be used to threaten US interests without sending naval and air fleets across the oceans. The weapons include computer hacking and miniaturised or portable nuclear/chemical/bio-chemical weapons**. Thus its surplus security will be reduced massively. Therefore, **the US needs to cultivate strategic co-operation with major powers, including China, to slow down the pace of the proliferation of weapons of massive destruction, in order to win more time to build US-led regional and global security co-operation mechanisms.** In this way the cost and the danger will be divided among these mechanisms. Therefore**, there is no strategic rationale for Washington to corner China. The Chinese potential to maintain regional and global stability and, if it should mess up, to destroy that stability, is immense.** If Washington is not hijacked by the US domestic politics and ideology, **China can work out a strategic accommodation with it on the Taiwan issue, at least preventing Taipei from becoming an "unguided missile".**

**Resolve DA: 2AC**

**Syria destroyed resolve**

Anthony **Cordesman 9/1**/13, holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C., “President Obama and Syria: The ‘Waiting for Godot’ Strategy,” http://csis.org/publication/president-obama-and-syria-waiting-godot-strategy

Instead, **the Administration** first **rushed into the kind of rhetoric you only use if you actually intend to act regardless of domestic and international support.** It tied its entire effort to Syrian use of chemical weapons and the precedent for using such weapons forever. **And only then did it suddenly spun around and talked about then need for delay, measured action, and Congressional approval.¶** While Beckett might not appreciate my efforts to define Godot as the Syrian Civil war, the Administration followed the script of Beckett’s play to the extent it never defined the reasons for what the actors were doing, why they were waiting, or what would happen after Godot came. Chemical weapons are a very real issue, but they are only a subset of the real issue: the overall level of suffering and growing regional instability coming out of the Syrian civil war.¶ **We now face the inevitable reaction. The President’s decisions have reinforced all of the doubts about American strength, and ou**

**r willingness to act, of both our friends and foes.** We now have ten days of confusion and uncertainty to deal with, and then **Congress will be evidently be asked to act only on a strike tailored to deter** the future use of **chemical weapons. It will still lack a meaningful plan for dealing with the Syrian civil war and its impact on the region.¶ Israel is threatening to return to hawk mode over Iran. Russia and China are in the “we told you so” mode.** Assad has already launched new conventional artillery barrages against Syrian civilian areas and now has time enough to disperse a significant number of key physical assets from fixed target sites. **France is left hanging – as is Britain** for very different reasons. **Our Arab allies and Turkey have no clear lead to follow. Our whole strategy in the Middle East remains unclear, as is our entire national security posture in an era of Sequestration and funding crises.**¶ **If the Congress does support the President, it will only be after we have openly faltered, and after having rushed forward before deciding on a course of delay. The President will have set a uniquely dangerous precedent by turning to Congress only after he appeared weak, rather than doing from the start**, and will have then committed himself to wait at least ten days for the congress to return for its holiday. **The message to the world is obvious.**

**Impact: Space Race**

**Tensions over Taiwan causes US-China space race**

**Wikistrat 12** (Defense-focused multiplayer online consultancy, 1/15/12, “10 strategic issues with Obama's East Asia "pivot"” CNN World) http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/01/15/top-ten-military-strategic-issues-from-obamas-pivot-to-east-asia/

**China will spend** even **more on** anti-ship ballistic missiles and – quite possibly – **an accelerating arms race in space to deter American aircraft carriers from loitering around Taiwan. None of this deals with China’s actual security challenge of becoming increasingly reliant on raw materials and energy emanating from distant, historically unstable regions like the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America.** That means China will be forced to accept the U.S. global commons “policing role,” thus allowing Beijing to continue free-riding on U.S. military stabilization efforts outside of East Asia – something we’ve long complained about. **That makes the Obama Doctrine approach seem even more tenuous as a long-term strategy.**

**Nuclear WWIII**

**Robb 99** Senator Charles S. Robb, Senate committees on armed services, foreign relations and intelligence, Washington Quarterly, 1999 Winter

**In a second, more likely scenario, the United States deploys the same capabilities, but** other nations do not simply acquiesce. Understanding the tremendous advantages of military space operations, **China deploys nuclear weapons into space that can either be detonated near U.S. satellites or delivered to the earth in just minutes. Russia fields ground-based lasers for disabling and destroying our satellites, then deploys satellites with kinetic-kill munitions for eradicating ground targets. It also reneges on the START** treaties, knowing that, rather than trying to replicate America's costly defensive systems, its incremental defense dollar is better spent on offensive warheads for overwhelming American defenses. Other **rogue nations**, realizing that their limited missile attack capabilities are now useless against our new defense screen, **focus on commercially available cruise missiles, which they load with chemical and biological warheads** and plan to deploy from commercial ships and aircraft. Still **others bring to fruition the long-expected threat of a nuclear weapon in a suitcase.** If history has taught us anything, it is that a future more like the second scenario will prevail. It defies reason to assume that nations would sit idle while the United States invests billions of dollars in weaponizing space, leaving them at an unprecedented disadvantage. This second scenario suggests three equally troubling consequences. The first is that Americans would, in a relative sense, lose the most from a space-based arms race. The United States is currently the preeminent world military power, and much of that power resides in our ability to use space for military applications. A large percentage of our military communications now passes through space. Our troops rely on weather satellites, our targeteers on satellite photos, and virtually all of our new generations of weapons on the Global Positioning System satellites for pin-point accuracy. By encouraging potential adversaries to deploy weapons into space that could quickly destroy many of these systems, a space-based arms race would render many of these more vulnerable to attack than they are today. Even if our potential adversaries were unable to build a competing force, they could still position deadly satellites disguised as commercial assets near or in the path of our most vital military satellites. And even if we could sustain our space advantage, the costs would be extraordinary. Why pursue this option when there is no compelling reason to do so at this time? Why make a battlefield out of an arena upon which we depend so heavily? The second consequence would be that **a space-based arms race would be essentially irreversible** -- we would face the difficulty, if not impossibility, of assessing what is being put into space. Under the START regime, signatories currently cooperate in inspecting and monitoring each other's intercontinental ballistic missiles, bombers, and submarines, all of which operate within a narrow band above and below sea level. Most space payloads, however, are built and launched with great secrecy and can operate at any distance from the earth, even on celestial bodies such as the moon. Most satellites would operate up to geostationary orbit, or about 22,000 miles from the earth's surface, yielding a total operational volume millions of times greater than that now occupied by missiles, bombers, and submarines. Attempting to monitor weapons in this vast volume of space would be daunting. We would no longer be counting with reasonable confidence the number of concrete silos at missile wings or submarine missile tubes at piers or bombers on airfields. In many cases we would have no idea what is out there. Military planners, conservative by nature, would assume the worst and try to meet enemy deployments in space with an equal or greater capability. Of course, for about $ 400 million per launch, we could use the space shuttle to make closer inspections, assuming that other nations would be willing to tolerate our presence near their critical space assets. Due to orbital constraints, however, the shuttle could reach only a fraction of the total number of satellites in orbit. Another option would be to expand and improve our space monitoring assets -- but only at a cost of tens of billions of dollars. Once this genie is out of the bottle, there is no way to put it back in. We could never afford to bring all these systems back to earth, and destroying them would be equally unfeasible, because the billions of pieces of space debris would jeopardize commercial satellites and manned missions. The third consequence of U.S. space weaponization would be the heightened probability of strategic conflict. Anyone familiar with the destabilizing impact of MIRVs will understand that **weapons in space will bring a new meaning to the expression "hair trigger." Lasers can engage targets in seconds. Munitions fired from satellites in low-earth orbit can reach the earth's surface in minutes**. As in the MIRV scenario, **the side to strike first would be able to destroy much of its opponent's space weaponry before the opponent had a chance to respond**. The **temptation to strike first during a crisis would be overwhelming;** much of the decisionmaking would have to be automated. **Imagine that during a crisis one of our key military satellites stops functioning and we cannot determine why. We -- or a computer controlling our weapons for us -- must then decide whether or not to treat this as an act of war and respond accordingly. The fog of war would reach an entirely new density,** with our situational awareness of the course of battle in space limited and our decision cycles too slow to properly command engagements. **Events would occur so quickly that we could not even be sure which nation had initiated a strike.** We would be repeating history, but this time with far graver consequences. In the absence of explicit evidence that another nation with the economic and technical means is developing weapons for space, we should forgo our advanced prototyping and testing of space weapons. We should seek to expand the 1967 Treaty on the Exploration and Use of Outer Space to prohibit not just weapons of mass destruction in space, but all space-based weapons capable of destroying space, ground, air, or sea targets. We should also explore a verification regime that would allow inspection of space-bound payloads. During the Reagan years advocates of the Strategic Defense Initiative ran an effective television spot featuring children being saved from nuclear attack by a shield represented by a rainbow. **If we weaponize space, we will face** a very different image -- **the image of hundreds of weapons-laden satellites orbiting directly over our homes** and our families **24 hours a day, ready to fire within seconds. If fired, they would destroy thousands of ground, air and space targets within minutes**, before there is even a chance of knowing what has happened, or why. This would be a dark future, a future we should avoid at all costs.

# \*\*1AR\*\*

**Losers Lose Wrong**

**won’t escalate**

Matthew **Kroenig 12** Matthew Kroenig is a Stanton nuclear security fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and an assistant professor of government at Georgetown University. From July 2010 to July 2011, he was a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow in the Department of Defense, where he worked on Middle East defense policy and strategy. Previously, in 2005, he worked as a strategist in the Office of the Secretary of Defense “Why Attacking Iran Is A Good Idea” March 21, 2012 http://postwarwatch.com/2012/03/21/matthew-kroenig-attacking-iran/

**The United States would try to build** international support for an attack, to build **a coalition, or even call for a vote in the UN Security Council.** China and Russia would almost certainly veto such a measure, so it is very unlikely there could be a Security Council Resolution. But **the US could build an international coalition with the British, the French, and other allies to support an attack**. The question is, what would **China and Russia** do, would they support Iran? They **are not formal allies of Iran. They have been less than amicable with Iran; Russia and China would almost certainly protest a US strike, yet it is unlikely that they could or would retaliate in a meaningful way** against the United States **economically or militarily**: I think **they would lodge a diplomatic protest, but that is all.**

**Security establishment guarantees no strike.**

**Larison 12/2/13**

Daniel, a senior editor at TAC, where he also keeps a solo blog. He has been published in the New York Times Book Review, Dallas Morning News, Orthodox Life, Front Porch Republic, The American Scene, and Culture11, and is a columnist for The Week. He holds a PhD in history from the University of Chicago, http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/why-israel-wont-attack-iran/

That may help to explain why Netanyahu has so little support within the Israeli national security establishment for attacking Iran. Keck continues: Many former top intelligence and military officials have spoken out publicly against Netanyahu’s hardline Iran policy, with at least one of them questioning whether Iran is actually seeking a nuclear weapon. This may be the **most important reason** why **an Israeli attack is so** very **unlikely**: too many of the people tasked with the responsibility for carrying it out **don’t believe that it is worth doing**. Unless that changes dramatically in the next year or so, it seems very unlikely that **Israel would assume all the risks of starting a war with Iran.**

**It’s all hype—Israel won’t strike**

**Dreyfuss ‘12**

Robert, The Diplomat, “Why Israel Won't Attack Iran,” http://thediplomat.com/2012/08/why-israel-wont-attack-iran/?allpages=yes

How so? For starters, by attacking Iran – even in the midst of a U.S. election campaign – Israel would run the risk of angering and alienating Washington, **its main patron**, in a manner likely to forever change the U.S.-Israeli relationship for the worse. Second, with nearly the **entire Israeli national security establishment strongly opposed to striking Iran**, Netanyahu and Barak would isolate themselves politically, **collapse their own government**, and perhaps propel a much more dovish coalition into power. Third, striking Iran would trigger devastating counterattacks from Tehran and its allies, including the well-armed Hezbollah movement in Lebanon, leading to hundreds if not thousands of Israel civilian casualties. Fourth, already isolated internationally, Israel would turn itself into a **global pariah,** a kind of rogue state blamed for the subsequent spike in oil prices, economic carnage, and military conflict in and around the Persian Gulf that could roil the region for a decade or more. Perhaps most important, **nearly all military analysts**, in Washington and in Israel itself, believe that even an all-out Israeli attack on Iran would not eliminate its ability to produce a nuclear weapon, Indeed, as Martin Dempsey, the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated last week, “I think that it’s a fair characterization to say that they could delay but not destroy Iran’s nuclear capabilities.” Worse, as Israel knows, an attack would solidify the power of hawks in Iran’s government. Not to mention that **Iran has no bomb**, it isn’t likely to get one for a few years (even if that’s Iran’s intention), and it has **no means** of delivering a weapon – meaning that the dire threat that Israel says might require a unilateral strike doesn’t exist. Still, that hasn’t dissuaded Netanyahu and Barak from scaremongering about Iran, nor did it prevent a former Mossad chief, Efraim Halevy, from declaring that Iran should “be very fearful of the next 12 weeks,” i.e., between now and the November Presidential election in the United States. So, why have Israel’s leaders escalated their **rhetoric** in recent weeks to a fever pitch? Because they, and their allies – including the American Israel Public Affairs Committee and its spinoff, the Washington Institution for Near East Policy (WINEP), and other, likeminded groups and think tanks – **believe** that even **an outlandish set of threats against Iran can accomplish important objectives for Netanyahu**.

**UQ Overwhelms- 1AR**

**Bill dead – no AIPAC push and GOP will defer to Obama**

Mark **Landler 2/5** “Pro-Israel group holds less sway in Washington”, The Sydney Morning Herald,

<http://www.smh.com.au/world/proisrael-group-holds-less-sway-in-washington-20140205-hvb7k.html>

Washington: **The last time the nation's most potent pro-Israel lobbying group lost a major showdown with the White House was when** President Ronald **Reagan agreed to sell AWACS** surveillance planes **to Saudi Arabia** over the group's bitter objections.¶ **Since then**, the group, **the A**merican **I**srael **P**ublic **A**ffairs **C**ommittee**, has run up an impressive record of legislative victories i**n its quest to rally US support for Israel, **using a robust** network of grass-roots supporters and a rich **donor base to push a raft of bills through Congress**. Typically, they pass by unanimous votes.¶ **But now AIPAC**, as the group is known, once again **finds itself in a** very public **standoff with the White House**. **Its top priority,** **a** Senate **bill to impose new sanctions on Iran**, **has stalled after stiff resistance from** President Barack **Obama, and in what amounts to a tacit retreat, AIPAC has stopped pressuring** Senate **Democrats to vote for the bill**.¶ **Officials at the group** insist it never called for an immediate vote and **say the legislation may** yet **pass if** Mr **Obama's effort to negotiate a nuclear agreement with Iran fails** or if Iran reneges on its interim deal with the West. **But for the moment**, Mr **Obama has successfully made the case that passing new sanctions** against Tehran now **could scuttle the nuclear talks** and put the US on the road to another war.¶ Advertisement ¶ **In doing so, the president has raised questions about the effectiveness of AIPAC's tactics** and even its role as the unchallenged voice of the pro-Israel lobby in Washington. Jewish leaders say that pro-Israel groups disagreed on how aggressively to push the legislation, even if all the groups favour additional sanctions.¶ "Some of us see the object as being to target Iran," said Abraham H. Foxman, the national director of the Anti-Defamation League. "We're not out there to target the president; we're out there to target Iran."¶ **With neither side spoiling for a fight** or **ready to back down,** Mr Foxman said, **the sanctions campaign is stalled. Lawmakers confirm that the political climate on Capitol Hill has changed since the bill's sponsors** and AIPAC **made their push** before Christmas.¶ Senator Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, a staunch supporter of Israel, is one of 16 Democrats who signed on to the bill, along with 43 of the Senate's 45 Republicans, bringing it to within a few votes of a veto-proof majority. Now Senator Blumenthal says the Senate should hold off on a vote to give Obama breathing room for diplomacy.¶ "**There's been an unquestionable, undeniable shift in the perception of national security**," Senator Blumenthal said. "I'm sensitive to the feelings, the resistance, the aversion of the general public to any kind of American military engagement."¶ On Monday, 70 House Democrats sent Mr Obama a letter backing his diplomatic efforts and opposing new sanctions. And former Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton added her voice to those urging no legislation. **The bill's chief sponsors insist they are not retreating**. "The American people - Democrats and Republicans alike - overwhelmingly want Iran held accountable during any negotiations," said Senator Mark S. Kirk, a Republican from Illinois, who is a lead co-sponsor, along with Senator Robert Menendez, a Democrat of New Jersey.¶ But AIPAC's headaches go beyond Iran. In September, it threw an army of lobbyists behind an effort to win a congressional mandate for Mr Obama's threatened military strike on Syria. Facing certain failure in Congress, the president pulled the plug on the effort.¶ Earlier last year, it came under fire from the right for not publicly opposing Mr Obama's nomination of Chuck Hagel as secretary of defence, because of what critics said was his anti-Israel record.¶ None of this will prevent AIPAC from drawing 14,000 supporters and a who's who of speakers from the White House and Congress when it holds its annual meeting here next month. But this year's meeting could be more complicated than the one in 2012, when Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel and a stream of congressional backers turned out to demand that Mr Obama threaten Iran with a military strike if it produced a nuclear weapon. The president, appearing as the keynote speaker, promised that he would keep all options on the table, including military action, to curb Iran's ambitions.¶ AIPAC officials said that their fundraising is at record levels and that the March meeting will be the largest in its history. The group has helped secure $US3.1 billion in US aid for Israel and largely framed the public debate over Iran's nuclear program.¶ "Under any other circumstances, **having 59 senators from both parties supporting a bill** that has this type of opposition **is extraordinary**," said a spokesman for AIPAC, Marshall Wittmann. "For someone **to describe this as a setback is completely preposterous**."¶ Mr Wittmann disputed suggestions that the group had been weakened by its support for the abortive military action against Syria or its decision not to lobby against Hagel. Mr Obama's threat of force, he said, helped get chemical weapons out of Syria. As for Senator Hagel, Mr Wittmann said, "our focus is on the policy."¶ Still, in its zeal to pass the bill, AIPAC may have overreached. Last month, a regional director for the group came to the defence of Representative Debbie Wasserman Schultz of Florida, the chairwoman of the Democratic National Committee, after AIPAC sent a letter urging its members to demand that she clarify her support for sanctions.¶ In the follow-up letter, emailed to AIPAC members in Florida, a national board member, Ike Fisher, declared, "congresswoman Wasserman Schultz has a strong record of support for the US-Israel relationship." Ms Wasserman Schultz declined to comment.¶ In another small but telling contretemps, a group of prominent liberal Jews sent a letter last week to Mayor Bill de Blasio of New York, rebuking him for speaking last month at a closed-door gathering of AIPAC, which they said "speaks for Israel's hard-line government and its right-wing supporters."¶ Founded in 1951, a few years after the state of Israel, AIPAC says its mission is to "strengthen, protect and promote the US-Israel relationship," regardless of the governments in either country.¶ "The source of AIPAC's power is its ability to generate bipartisan votes," said Steven J. Rosen, a former senior official at the group, who was forced out in 2005 after being caught up in an espionage case.¶ The trouble is, AIPAC's fervent push on Iran sanctions has increasingly allied it with Mr Netanyahu and against Mr Obama. J Street, a more dovish pro-Israel group, has lobbied vigorously against the bill, underscoring divergent views within the pro-Israel lobby.¶ "You're seeing, in the American Jewish community, an engagement in the debate in a more complex way," said Representative Peter Welch, a Vermont Democrat. "Some say they want sanctions, but some say they support the White House."¶ Even AIPAC's efforts to support the president have been troubled. It had deep reservations about Mr Hagel, which officials shared privately with lawmakers. But it did not publicly oppose his nomination, in part because White House officials said the president would not forget it.¶ "A lot of **this has been about Obama**," said Steve Rabinowitz, who worked in the Clinton administration and advises Jewish groups. "The good news is that **his foreign-policy cred has strengthened, and there is increasing deference to the president on foreign policy**."¶ Senator Christopher S. Murphy, a freshman Democrat from Connecticut, embodies this trend. After voting for sanctions in the House, he opposed the Senate bill because, he said in an interview, the whole point of sanctions was to force Iran to the bargaining table.

**Iran Aff IL: PC Fails—1AR**

**Obama is irrelevant—interim agreement success is key to sanctions**

Patricia **Zengerle**, **1/13**/14, Iran deal progress dampens push for new U.S. sanctions bill, www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/14/us-iran-nuclear-congress-idUSBREA0D02T20140114?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews&utm\_source=dlvr.it&utm\_medium=twitter&dlvrit=992637

President Barack **Obama is more likely to win his battle with the U.S. Congress to keep new sanctions on Iran at bay now that world powers and Tehran have made a new advance in talks** to curb the Islamic Republic's nuclear program. Despite strong support for a bill in the Senate to slap new sanctions on the Islamic Republic, analysts, lawmakers and congressional aides said on Monday that **the agreement to begin implementing a nuclear deal on January 20 makes it harder for sanctions supporters to attract more backers.** Senator Richard Blumenthal, a Connecticut Democrat, was one of several of the 59 co-sponsors who said there is no clamor for a vote any time soon. "I want to talk to some of my colleagues. I'm encouraged and heartened by the apparent progress and certainly the last thing I want to do is impede that progress. But at the same time, sanctions are what has brought the Iranians to the table," he told reporters. Sixteen of Obama's fellow Democrats are among the co-sponsors of the measure requiring further cuts in Iran's oil exports if Tehran backs away from the interim agreement, despite Iran warning that it would back away from the negotiating table if any new sanctions measure passed. The current list of supporters is close to the 60 needed to pass most legislation in the 100-member Senate. But 67 votes would be required to overcome a veto, which Obama has threatened as he tries to reach a wider agreement with Iran to prevent it from developing an atomic bomb. "The prospects for a diplomatic solution could implode if Iran leaves the table or if Iran responds with their own provocative actions," said Colin Kahl, who served as a Middle East expert at the Pentagon until 2011 and now teaches security studies at Georgetown University. "Even if neither happens, Iran's moderate negotiators would likely harden their negotiating positions in the next phase to guard their right flank at home against inevitable charges of American 'bad faith,' making a final compromise harder to achieve," he said. The bill in the Senate would cut Iran's oil exports to almost zero two years after enactment, place penalties on other industries and reduce Obama's power to issue a waiver on Iran sanctions, if Iran were to break the interim deal. Supporters say it is necessary to pass a bill now rather than wait to see if Iran complies with the agreement in order to pressure Tehran to negotiate in good faith and not to keep developing nuclear weapons while talks continue. "If the Iranians have their way, they'll drag it out forever," Arizona Senator John McCain, a Republican co-sponsor of the measure, told reporters. Iranian officials say their nuclear program is peaceful. Democratic Senator Robert Menendez of New Jersey and Republican Mark Kirk of Illinois, the measure's lead sponsors, are trying to attract more supporters, hoping to pressure Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid to allow a vote on the legislation. Pro-Israel lobbying groups, convinced that Iran cannot be trusted, are also pushing lawmakers to sign on in the hope of increasing the pressure on Reid, a Nevada Democrat, to let the bill move ahead. But there is no guarantee that all the senators who co-sponsored the sanctions move would actually vote for any final bill, and even less that Democrats would override a veto by a president from their own party. Backers of the sanctions bill said they could force Reid's hand by putting a hold on nominations by the administration - such as dozens pending for State Department positions. But Senate leadership aides - including Republicans - acknowledge that the chamber's rules give Reid enough leeway to block any action. DEMOCRATS IN LINE **Stopping** - or delaying - **new sanctions is** also **made easier because there is a strong core of lawmakers - including senior Democrats - who strongly oppose them**. Ten powerful committee chairs signed a letter in December opposing the new sanctions, and none of those 10 has changed position. An aide to Menendez, who is chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said there had been no indication by Monday on when the sanctions bill might come to the floor. Analysts said there had been real concern about a delay in implementing the interim agreement reached in Geneva between Iran and the so-called P5+1 powers in November. But **Sunday's announcement of the start date eases** those **fears**. **"It shows that they are moving ahead, and what that means is that Iran's not delaying**, which was a fear," said Michael Adler, an expert on Iran at the Wilson Center think tank in Washington.

**Reid is also key, not Obama**

Jon **Terbush**, The Week, **1/16**/14, Should Congress stop meddling with the Iranian nuclear talks, theweek.com/article/index/255168/should-congress-stop-meddling-with-the-iranian-nuclear-talks

It's unclear if Democrats would really follow through with such a huge slap to Obama's authority, or if their noise is just pre-election posturing. Plus, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) has indicated he may not bring the sanctions up for a vote.

Furthermore, **House Republicans may have inadvertently killed the Senate's efforts by saying they could bring the bill up in their chamber; co-opting the plan would give it a partisan whiff that could** turn off some on-the-fence Democrats**.**

**Reid may be the White House's best friend on the issue.** The push for more sanctions hasn't gone away in the face of a veto threat, and **he may be the only one who can keep it from bringing it to that point.**

**He ensures uniqueness overwhelms**

Stacy **Kaper**, **1/16**/14, Iran Hawks Flounder Against Reid-Obama Coalition, www.nationaljournal.com/daily/iran-hawks-flounder-against-reid-obama-coalition-20140116

**Senate Iran hawks have lots of votes** to back their sanctions legislation. What they lack is a plan to get the bill to the floor**.** Fifty-nine senators—including 16 Democrats—have signed onto sanctions legislation from Democratic Sen. Robert Menendez and Republican Sen. Mark Kirk. The measure would punish Iran with sanctions if it reneges on an interim nuclear agreement or if that agreement does not ultimately abolish any nuclear-weapons capabilities for Iran. That count has climbed rapidly since the bipartisan pair introduced their legislation in late December. But now **it's unclear whether that support will be enough to clear the bill's next major hurdle:** Senate Majority Leader Harry **Reid.** **Reid is siding with the White House**, which has put intense pressure on lawmakers not to act on sanctions, arguing it could result in both a nuclear-armed and hostile Iranian state. And without Reid's backing, supporters of the Menendez-Kirk bill are unsure how to move the measure to the floor. "I assume that if the Democrat senators put enough pressure on Senator Reid he might bring it to the floor," said Missouri Republican Sen. Roy Blunt. "But, you know, we are at a moment in the Senate where **nothing happens that Senator Reid doesn't want to happen**; and this is something at this moment that Senator Reid doesn't want to happen." And for now, sanctions supporters are still mulling their strategy.

**Losers Lose Defense: 1AR**

**Losers win – plan resurrects the agenda**

**Thompson 13** Loren, “The Syria Vote: Why Obama Wins If He Loses”, 9/9, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2013/09/09/the-syria-vote-why-obama-wins-if-he-loses/>,

Sometime this week, Congress will begin voting on a resolution that would support President Obama’s proposal to launch limited strikes against the military forces of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad as retribution for their use of chemical weapons. Although Washington is divided on the advisability of carrying out the strikes, there is virtual unanimity among observers that if the president does not prevail on Capitol Hill it will be a major blow to his power and influence — both at home and abroad.¶ The **pundits are wrong**. If Obama carries the day in both chambers, he will lose over the long run because of the likely political fallout from any new military action in the Middle East. On the other hand, **if he loses** the vote **he will win** over the long run **by escaping the distractions and drawbacks of** an **action** that **he** himself **is reluctant to** **take**. Since he is in fact highly likely to lose the congressional vote and almost certain not to act unilaterally once he does, let’s look at all the benefits that will accrue to him when legislators reject his risky plan.¶ 1. Undesirable consequences of military action will be avoided. These consequences could include retaliation by Syria or its Iranian ally forcing the U.S. to broaden its military involvement; a tipping of the military balance in the civil war to favor jihadists; Russian intervention on the side of Assad’s government; destabilization of the Syrian state; or a pressing need to inject U.S. ground forces in order to secure chemical weapons. If Congress rebuffs the proposal for punitive strikes, most of these things are less likely to happen.¶ 2. **Obama upholds his principles without having to pay the cost**. The White House is waging the biggest lobbying campaign of Obama’s second term in an effort to convince Congress it should back limited military action in Syria. The main reason it is doing so is the president’s deeply held belief that the international norm against use of “weapons of mass destruction” (nerve gas in this case) must be upheld. Although the lobbying campaign probably will fail, everyone will recognize Obama stuck with his principles even when it was politically unpopular — a circumstance which arguably bolsters his credibility rather than diminishes it.¶ 3. **If things go wrong** in Syria, **it won’t be Obama’s fault**. Some Middle East analysts are saying that Assad was emboldened to use chemical weapons because of U.S. reluctance to get involved in what is now a long-running civil war. It’s true that Obama has tried to avoid new entanglements in the Middle East throughout his presidency and has not moved decisively to arm moderate rebels fighting government forces. However, by rejecting the president’s belated bid to punish Assad’s brutality, **Congress will absolve the administration of responsibility for any adverse developments** that follow.¶ 4. **The president avoids blame for subverting global institutions**. By **proposing to act unilaterally** — or at least, with active support from few other nations besides France — **the White House** **has left itself open to charges that it doesn’t** really **support the rule of law** in international relations. If it did, it would be working with the United Nations and other collective-security organizations to punish Assad’s government. But if America fails to act militarily, then it can’t be accused of creating a precedent for ignoring global institutions and world opinion. ¶ 5. **Negative fallout for the economy will be minimized**. Last week’s jobs report was just the latest indication that **the current** economic **recovery is** one of the **weak**est on record. One thing **the nation’s sputtering economy doesn’t need** right now is **a spike in oil prices resulting from renewed** U.S. **military action** in the Middle East — perhaps followed by far worse market reactions when Syria and its friends decide how they want to respond to the U.S. strikes (think cyber). By avoiding overt intervention in Syria’s civil war, **the U.S. will reduce the likelihood of overseas developments derailing** the gradual return of **prosperity**.¶ 6. Congress confirms the shift to an Asia-Pacific strategy. Although the White House has always said that the Asia-Pacific strategy it unveiled in early 2012 did not mean America was abandoning the Middle East, everyone knew it meant less U.S. presence there. The proposed strikes in Syria are out of step with the trend in U.S. foreign policy, which recognizes the rising importance of East Asia and the declining importance of the Middle East (especially given the U.S. renaissance in fossil-fuel production). By voting down military intervention in Syria, Congress will in effect be reinforcing a strategic shift that the president himself initiated.¶ 7. **Obama gets to focus on his domestic agenda**. Barack Obama was elected president to extricate America from unpopular wars in Southwest Asia and fix a broken economy. The main thrust of his presidency has always been domestic policy, and **his agenda is better served by avoiding** the **distractions of overseas military involvement**. With analysts already forecasting that wrangling over Syria will undercut the prospects for immigration reform this year, **it would** actually **be helpful to the president’s priorities if Congress decisively rejected military action**. **Anyone who remembers the challenges** Jimmy **Carter**, Ronald **Reagan and** both **Bushes faced** in the Middle East **understands how involvement** there **can wreck domestic agendas**.¶ 8. If there’s no war, voters are more likely to punish Republicans at the polls. President Obama’s standing in public opinion polls is not high, and the Syria imbroglio threatens to drag his approval rating far below the 50% threshold needed for Democrats to make a good showing in next year’s midterm elections. If Obama is forced to drop the idea of military action because of lopsided congressional votes against the pending resolution, that defeat will be long forgotten by November of next year. The election will then be mainly about domestic issues, where Obama tends to be more popular than his GOP opponents. In fact, staying out of Syria could prove crucial to Democrats holding the Senate — and maybe even taking the House.¶ So **the notion** that President **Obama will be a big loser if Congress refuses to go along with his military plan** to punish Syria **is** at least half **wrong**. He may look weakened in the near term, but over the longer term staying the course of disengaging from a region America has shown itself powerless to fix will serve his political purposes far better. Despite Obama’s non-stop efforts to convince global leaders, members of Congress and the public that punishing Bashar al-Assad’s government is the right thing to do, **being deprived of that option could be a real boon to the president’s second term**.