### 1

#### Restrictions on authority prohibit- the aff is a condition

William Conner 78, former federal judge for the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York United States District Court, S. D. New York, CORPORACION VENEZOLANA de FOMENTO v. VINTERO SALES, http://www.leagle.com/decision/19781560452FSupp1108\_11379

Plaintiff next contends that Merban was charged with notice of the restrictions on the authority of plaintiff's officers to execute the guarantees. Properly interpreted, the "conditions" that had been imposed by plaintiff's Board of Directors and by the Venezuelan Cabinet were not "restrictions" or "limitations" upon the authority of plaintiff's agents but rather conditions precedent to the granting of authority. Essentially, then, plaintiff's argument is that Merban should have known that plaintiff's officers were not authorized to act except upon the fulfillment of the specified conditions.

#### Vote neg limits - anything can indirectly affect war powers--also makes the topic bidirectional because conditions can enhance executive power

### 2

#### A. Interp – “Substantially” means the plan must be across the board

Anderson et al, 2005[Brian Anderson, Becky Collins, Barbara Van Haren & Nissan Bar-Lev, WCASS Research / Special Projects Committee\* Report on: A Conceptual Framework for Developing a 504 School District Policy, http://www.specialed.us/issues-504policy/504.htm]

A substantial limitation is a significant restriction as to the condition, manner, or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity.¶ The 504 regulation does not define substantial limitation, and the regulation gives discretion to schools to decide what substantial limitation is. The key here is to be consistent internally and to be consistent with pertinent court decisions.¶ The issue “Does it substantially limit the major life activity?” was clarified by the US Supreme Court decision on January 8th, 2002 , “Toyota v. Williams”. In this labor related case, the Supreme Court noted that to meet the “substantially limit” definition, the disability must occur across the board in multiple environments, not only in one environment or one setting. The implications for school related 504 eligibility decisions are clear: The disability in question must be manifested in all facets of the student’s life, not only in school.

#### B. Violation – the plan doesn’t increase restrictions across the board – it only applies to US citizens.

#### C. Vote neg –

#### Limits – our interp is key to reasonable limit on the topic

Justice O’Connor ‘02 [Sandra Day, No. 00—1089 TOYOTA MOTOR MANUFACTURING, KENTUCKY,

INC., PETITIONER v. ELLA WILLIAMS, Jan 8, http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/00-1089.ZO.html]

Our consideration of this issue is guided first and foremost by the words of the disability definition itself. “[S]ubstantially” in the phrase “substantially limits” suggests “considerable” or “to a large degree.” See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2280 (1976) (defining “substantially” as “in a substantial manner” and “substantial” as “considerable in amount, value, or worth” and “being that specified to a large degree or in the main”); see also 17 Oxford English Dictionary 66—67 (2d ed. 1989) (“substantial”: “[r]elating to or proceeding from the essence of a thing; essential”; “[o]f ample or considerable amount, quantity, or dimensions”). The word “substantial” thus clearly precludes impairments that interfere in only a minor way with the performance of manual tasks from qualifying as disabilities. Cf. Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S., at 565 (explaining that a “mere difference” does not amount to a “significant restric[tion]” and therefore does not satisfy the EEOC’s interpretation of “substantially limits”). “Major” in the phrase “major life activities” means important. See Webster’s, supra, at 1363 (defining “major” as “greater in dignity, rank, importance, or interest”). “Major life activities” thus refers to those activities that are of central importance to daily life. In order for performing manual tasks to fit into this category–a category that includes such basic abilities as walking, seeing, and hearing–the manual tasks in question must be central to daily life. If each of the tasks included in the major life activity of performing manual tasks does not independently qualify as a major life activity, then together they must do so. That these terms need to be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled is confirmed by the first section of the ADA, which lays out the legislative findings and purposes that motivate the Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101. When it enacted the ADA in 1990, Congress found that “some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities.” §12101(a)(1). If Congress intended everyone with a physical impairment that precluded the performance of some isolated, unimportant, or particularly difficult manual task to qualify as disabled, the number of disabled Americans would surely have been much higher. Cf. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S., at 487 (finding that because more than 100 million people need corrective lenses to see properly, “[h]ad Congress intended to include all persons with corrected physical limitations among those covered by the Act, it undoubtedly would have cited a much higher number [than 43 million disabled persons in the findings”).

#### Ground – carving out small parts of each part of the topic justifies allows the aff to significantly swing ground in their favor – the neg will never be prepared to answer ne specific advs or link.

### 3

#### text:

#### The United States Federal Government should restrict the President's war making authority by limiting targeted killing without charge within zones of active hostilities to declared territories and by statutory codification of executive branch review policy for those practices; and in addition, by limiting targeted killing without charge outside zones of active hostilities to reviewable operations guided by an individualized threat requirement, a feasibility test for criminal prosecution, procedural safeguards, and by statutory codification of executive branch review policy for those practices. The United States federal government should release the detainee al-Libi.

### 4

#### Security discourse is constructed and shapes policy- root cause of war, causes dehumanization and extermination

**Talbot 8** ( 'Us' and 'Them': Terrorism, Conflict and (O)ther Discursive Formations by Steven Talbot Defence Science and Technology Organisation Sociological Research Online, Volume 13, Issue 1Published: 21/3/2008

As a point of departure, this paper aims to explore the significance of identity[1](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#fn1)formation and negotiation as it pertains to various representations of terrorism. Particularly, this paper examines the ways in which adversarial identities are socially constructed according to notions of difference which simultaneously encourages a comparison to, and rejection of, [O]thers. Drawing upon the notion of the Other, this paper examines some of the ways in which identity is constructed through a variety of social and historical processes, and articulated within a range of discourses evoking different and often mutually exclusive combinations of sameness and difference. Using a social constructionist lens, I argue that representations of terrorism are constructed from within specific discourses which accentuate difference. My analysis therefore positions identity formation within a dynamic and relational context where discursive representation, ways of knowing, power and language intertwine. 1.4 Consequently, the following discussion explores identity formation and terrorism through an interpretive, constitutive and discursive lens. I start my discussion with an overview of the socially constructed or constituted nature of identity. This is followed by an exploration of the roles various discursive frameworks play in shaping representations of identity. I then examine some of the implications for viewing terrorism and identities within dichotomous frameworks, particularly within notions of Self and Other, and consequently, the discursive practice of ‘Othering.’ Finally, I interrogate the relational and discursive context of identity further by exploring the relationship between the above theoretical concerns as they pertain to polarised collective identities and intractable conflicts. Socially constituted identities 2.1 Identity construction pertains to the creation, maintenance and articulation of social identities by individuals or groups. Rummens ([2001](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#rummens2001)), draws a distinction between personal and social identities. Personal identity usually refers to the result of an identification of self, by self, or in other words the self-identification on the part of the individual. Social identity in contrast refers to the outcome of an identification of self by others, or the identity that is assigned an individual by another (p.3). Both of these concepts differ from self-identity, the individual self which is reflexively understood and worked upon by the individual through self-monitoring and self reflection ([Beck, 1992](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#beck1992); [Giddens, 1991](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#giddens1991)). 2.2 Sociological research into identity tends to focus on issues concerning the ascribed nature of identity, and the social construction and negotiation of group differences, whereas psychological approaches are more inclined to look at identity development and formation within the individual (i.e. identity searching, self concept and identity crisis). However it is important to remember that identities are not just ascribed or ‘achieved’ through socialisation processes, but are also socially constructed and negotiated between social actors. Through a sociological lens, identities by definition are socially constituted phenomena. In this sense, an individual’s or group’s identity is created, negotiated, and actively recreated through interaction with others. Identity can therefore be viewed as being a verb – it is something that one does, or is accomplished through social interaction ([West and Zimmerman, 1987](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#westzimmerman1987)). 2.3 Identity underscores how humans organise and therefore understand their social world. The notion of collective identity has been examined in classic sociological constructs like Marx’s ([1977](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#marx1977)) ‘class consciousness,’ Durkheim’s ([1960](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#durkheim1960)) ‘collective conscience’ and Weber’s ([1922](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#weber1922)) Verstehen (meaningful understanding). The commonality between these works is found in their emphasis on shared attributes, similarities, or the ‘We-ness’ of groups ([Cerulo, 1997](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html" \l "cerulo1997), p.386). Thus, the construction of group identities often involves a normative component, or in other words, individuals need to be able to recognise themselves in certain qualities, characteristic or behaviours associated with their group ([Schulte-Tenckhoff, 2001](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#schulte-tenckhoff2001), p.6). This recognition of ‘we-ness’ is important given the origins of the term identity. Identity finds its linguistic roots in the Latin noun identitas, with titas being a derivation of the Latin adjective idem meaning the same. Thus, the term is comparative in nature in relation to sharing a degree of sameness with others ([Rummens, 2001](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html" \l "rummens2001), p.3). Identity is therefore a relational construct, or as Connolly astutely asserts, ‘[t]here is no identity without difference’ ([1995](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#connolly1995), p.xx). 2.4 More significantly, identity constructions often emerge in response to the types of political systems governing that society. Political systems are extensions of societal identity. For example, liberal democracy is a political structure that forms and reflects a part of a societal identity construction in that it proscribes certain ideals and practices which inform members of liberal democratic societies how to live together and treat others. In turn, the pursuit of political goals is also linked to the pursuit of identity (superpower identities inform superpower interests). Consequently, a political system can also be viewed as a source of threat to societal identity ([Hughes, 2004](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#hughes2004), p.26). As Hughes observes, for those societies who draw their identity from non-liberal democratic (Western) traditions, the liberal democratic structure, and the values contained within this structure, may be perceived as a threat to group identity. The rhetoric of Osama Bin Laden is an example of this, with its emphasis on acts of violence against the Western, liberal democratic influences and their perceived threat to Islamic identity. 2.5 Political structures and associated organising principles exert influence on political agendas, policy and collective self-definition. Moreover, political elites create, manipulate and dismantle identities of nations and thus shape the subsequent construction of allies and enemies ([Corse, 1996](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#corse1996); [Gillis, 1994](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#gillis1994); [Zerubavel, 1995](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#zerubavel1995) cited in [Cerulo, 1997](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#cerulo1997) p.390). Identity shifts can therefore also occur based on changing socio-political factors, for example, as a result of changing policy, increased ethnic politics, and political activism. Constructivists would contend that identities, norms, and culture play an integral role for understanding world politics (and related policy) and international relations, particularly with its emphasis on those processes through which behaviour and identity construction is conceptualised and legitimated by various political agencies. The roles knowledge construction and discourse plays in facilitating this process will be explored in the following discussion. Discourse and identity 3.1 Cultural constructions of identity are shaped by ‘a series of specific dialogues, impositions, and inventions’ ([Clifford, 2004](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#clifford2004), p.14). Such a position invariably requires a closer examination of the relationship between identity construction, language, power, knowledge creation and associated discursive practices. 3.2 For Hall, a discourse: ‘defines and produces the objects of our knowledge. It governs the way that a topic can be meaningfully talked about and reasoned about. It also influences how ideas are put into practice and used to regulate the conduct of others’ ([1997](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#hall1997), p.44). 3.3 The same discourse (which characterises a way of thinking or the given state of knowledge at one time) can appear throughout a range of texts, across numerous sites. When these discursive events refer to the same object, say terrorism for example, and share a similar style and support a strategy, they are said to belong to the same discursive formation ([Hall, 1997](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#hall1997), p.44). It is through these discursive formations that things/practices acquire their meaning. However, discursive representation is not a benign practice, for it is often those in positions of power and authority who are able to construct ‘reality’ and thus knowledge **itself**. As Klein ([1994](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#klein1994)) explains: ‘[a] discourse, then, is not a way of learning ‘about’ something out there in the ‘real world’; it is rather a way of producing that something as real, as identifiable, classifiable, knowable, and therefore, meaningful. Discourse creates the conditions of knowing’ (cited in [George, 1994](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#george1994), p.30). 3.4 Foucault contends that knowledge is a form of power, and that power is present or exercised within decisions regarding what circumstances knowledge is applied or not. Moreover, Foucault argues that knowledge (when linked to power) assumes the authority of ‘the truth’ and has the power to make itself true through a variety of regulatory and disciplining practices ([Hall, 1997](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#hall1997), p.49). Knowledge (ways of knowing about others through discursive representations) therefore is constructed by humans through their interactions with the world around them and is a reflection of existing social, historical and political factors, and as such, is never neutral. 3.5 In his analysis of the socially constructed nature of knowledge, Foucault explores the production of knowledge through discourse, and particularly how knowledge about the social, the individual, and associated shared meanings are produced in specific periods. In Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason (1988) and The History of Sexuality Volume One ([1981](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#foucault1981)), Foucault provides examples of the shifting historical significance of sexuality and mental illness and the emergence of deviant identities. In this respect, mental illness and sexuality did not exist as independent objects, which remained the same and meant the same thing throughout all periods. Rather, it was through distinct discursive formations that the objects ‘madness’ or ‘heterosexuality’ emerged and appeared as meaningful constructs. Sexual relations and desires have always been present, but the constructs ‘heterosexual’ and ‘homosexual’ were produced through moral, legal, and medical discourses and practices. Through these discourses and practices, behaviours and acts were aligned with the construction of ‘types of’ people or identities - identities which were subject to medical treatment and legal constraints designed to regulate behaviour. In this respect, social and self identities are a consequence of power reflected in historically and institutionally specific systems/sites of discourse. 3.6 As social constructs, it is important therefore to view knowledge and discourse production through the socio-historical conditions in which they are produced. In this respect, discourses concerning terrorism, security dilemmas and threat, and world order, are produced within specific historical, geographical and socio-political contexts as well as within social relations of power. Furthermore, the controlling and legitimising aspects of discourse are such that proponents of violence are not likely to construct a narrative that is contrary to their values. For instance, Al Qaeda is unlikely to construct a narrative that posits them in a contrary manner to their own moral values by engaging in ‘terrorist’ activities. Rather, they would position themselves as acting morally, and as victims of oppression or humiliation ([Cobb, 2004](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#cobb2004)). Similarly, the US and her coalition allies are also likely to construct a narrative which posits their involvement in a ‘fight against terror’ within a discursive framework of liberty and democracy, rather than expansionist or imperialist terms. 3.7 This paper now turns its attention to some of the ways in which identities are constituted through discursive practices which accentuate difference or sameness through the use of binaries. Dichotomous logic and identity construction Self/Other binaries 4.1 Notions of self and other and their implications for identity formation have been explored through psychoanalytical and postcolonial inquiry. In his book The Analysis of the Self: A Systematic Analysis of the Treatment of the Narcissistic Personality Disorders ([1971](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#kohut1971)), the founder of the psychology of the self Heinz Kohut extends Freud’s theory of narcissism (which has a dual orientation) in his examination of narcissistic rage and accompanying desires for revenge, and introduces the idea of ‘self-object relationships and transferences’ associated with mirroring and idealisation. Lacan ([2002](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#lacan2002)) also draws upon the notion of mirroring in regard to the identity formation of infants. Lacan’s ‘mirror stage’ occurs when the infant recognises its reflection and begins to view itself as being separate from its mother, or observes its mirrored image as viewed by the mother. The mirror stage represents the initial recognition of self as a unified subject, apart from external world and the ‘Other.’ This ‘Other’ (the first ‘big Other’ in an infant’s life being the mother) is fundamental to the constitution of self, as well as sexual identity. 4.2 In his foundational work Orientalism ([1978](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#said1978)), Edward Said examines the historical construction of the East (Them/Other) and West (Us/Self) as essentially different entities through discursive practices. Drawing upon Foucault’s notion of discourse, Said contends that Orientalism is a discourse: by which European culture was able to manage – and even produce – the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period (p. 3). 4.3 Such a discourse draws upon assumptions that are imperialist by design, privilege European sensibilities and representations of the Other, and reinforce ideas concerning the fixed nature of states of being and difference ([McDowell, 2003](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#mcdowell2003)). Said argues that Orientalist ideas can be found in current representations of ‘Arab’ cultures as backward, lacking democracy, threatening and anti-Western ([2003](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#said2003)). Similarly, Occidentalism[2](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#fn2) can be found in stereotypical representations of an “imperialist, corrupting, decadent and alienating West” (Nadje Al-Ali cited in [Freund, 2001](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#freund2001)). As I suggest later, these representations have become a feature of the current Western perceptions of terrorism. 4.4 As a practice, Othering is not solely a province of East versus West relations, but also exists as a strategy within other non-Westerns nations. For example, Shah ([2004](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#shah2004)), Kennedy-Pipe and Welch ([2005](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#kennedy-pipewelch2005)) and Baev ([2007](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#baev2007)) note how the ‘war on international terrorism’ discourse has been used by Russia to legitimate it actions against former Soviet republics like Chechnya. 4.5 Within a sociological context, identity discourse is often characterised by issues concerning essentialising and marginalising social groups, as well as totalising and categorising individuals and groups ([Gaudelli, 2001](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html" \l "gaudelli2001), p.60). Categorisation results as a response to diversity, wherein categorisation assists with making the diversity (of people) more understandable. As a consequence of this, people become viewed as being more typical of certain categories (eg. a Muslim from Iraq is stereotypically viewed as being ‘Muslim’ in comparison to an Australian Muslim in Cronulla within some discursive frameworks). Following the construction and application of these categories, is a tendency to essentialise (belief in essence) as is evident in notions of ‘the laconic Aussie,’ ‘the whingeing Pom,’ and the ‘fanatical terrorist.’ In this sense, the act of ‘naming’ is akin to ‘knowing.’ 4.6 Dividing practices evident in the categorisation and essentialising processes which inform the production of binaries reflect power struggles, as they primarily entail an external authority imposing a ‘condition of life upon people’ ([Gaudelli, 2001](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html" \l "gaudelli2001), p.74) that are supposed to have certain essences. These power relations become evident in the abilities of claim-makers or particular agents to make certain discourses, categories and labels acceptable and make them ‘stick’ as it were. In turn, essentialism results in reifying culture by viewing cultural systems as being discrete and homogeneous units (nationally, ethnically and ideologically), which are ‘naturally given’ and fixed in locality ([Jones, 1999](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#jones1999)). Here it is important to remember, that it is not culture that is ‘found’ or ‘discovered’ out in the field, but individuals who act and interact and express their views of culture ([Schulte-Tenckhoff, 2001](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#schulte-tenckhoff2001), p.5). This paper contends that it is the relations between groups and related boundary making practices (insider/outsider, Self/Other) rather than ‘traits’ which are important indicators and producers of identity. As discussed above, binaries such as those of Self/Other have a tendency to convey world views in concrete, simplified and often imperialist ways ([Berry, 2006](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#berry2006)). The process of ‘Othering’ is commensurate with identification (as culture, community, or nation) which further entails an act of differentiation, authentication, and at times, exclusion – creating boundaries between members of the ‘in’ group and outsiders. In this sense the: ‘Self/Other relation induces comparisons used by social actors to describe themselves or to describe others, depending on their location. In locking a given group into a substantially transformed identity, one constructs and immobilises this relation so that it operates in favour of those to whose advantage it is’ ([Schulte-Tenckhoff, 2001](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#schulte-tenckhoff2001), p.11). 4.7 Self/Other relations are therefore ‘matters of power and rhetoric rather than of essence’ ([Clifford, 2004](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#clifford2004), p.14). Within this context, boundary-making practices are a way of ‘locking’ ‘imagined communities’ into strategically informed ontological states of being. Moreover, these boundaries are inter-subjectively determined, that is, they are constructed through an emphasis on only a subset of many identity labels that apply (eg. religion). President George Bush has described his war on terror as a ‘crusade’ and a ‘divine plan’ guided by God. These sentiments are similar to Islamic calls for Jihad, with religious terrorists viewing themselves as God’s people and their enemies as God’s enemies, ‘infidels’, or sinners. As a consequence, for both sides, the conflict takes on the form of a ‘spiritual battle.’ Thus religious doctrine acts as fuel for Islamic-based terrorism as it does for the US led ‘war on terror’. Inside this discursive framework, both would contend that each party’s religion is the only meaningful one ([Berry, 2006](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#berry2006) p.4). Indeed, the construction of identity plays a key role in relation to the prospect for religious and political violence. Hence, identity claims invariably informs interests. The call by fundamentalist Islamists for a Jihad on Western nations for example is a realisation of both interests and identities simultaneously. In this sense, identities and interests are mutually reinforcing concepts and incapable of being pursued separately ([Hughes, 2004](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#hughes2004), p.7). 4.8 Identity negotiation highlights the political nature of social identifications of Self and Others within and between groups. Contestation arises out of those ascribed social or collective identities that do not align with an individual’s or group’s self-definition, highlighting global and national tensions, as well as power dynamics which frequently underplay such identification processes. Hence Self/Other struggles are ultimately struggles of legitimacy and meaning, frequently enacting and fuelling conflict. Indeed, it is in the creation of Self and an all-threatening Other that the state, or prominent figures within terrorist networks like Al Qaeda, use their power and available resources for legitimated violence ([Grondin, 2004](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html" \l "grondin2004)). Enemies and Others 4.9 Identity boundaries are functional in that they allow us to distinguish humans from animals, culture from nature, as well as differences between classes and nations. Using identity to distinguish in this way is the foundation for insecurity and conflict. Such boundaries allow the demarcation of ‘Us’ versus ‘Them’ and ‘domestic’ versus ‘foreign.’ Without the creation of these distinctions, the ‘enemy’ could not be identified ([Campbell, 1998](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#campbell1998) cited in [Hughes 2004](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#hughes2004)). 4.10 Sociology of the enemy examines the social process of constructing enemies, and within the context of identity politics and negotiation, creating Others for advantageous reasons. Politicians, other charismatic leaders, social elites, and the military alike, are in prime positions to construct particular representations of the enemy. In turn, these representations are also influenced by a host of other actors (academics and intellectuals, advisors), and array of sources and representations at their disposal. The proliferation of these representations through the internet, media reports, government documents, books, articles, and film has led to an expansion of an enemy discourse (as part of a deliberate and incidental public diplomacy[3](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#fn3)), assisting the articulation of a dualistic collective moral righteousness which attempts to legitimate the destruction of the Other ([Aho, 1994](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html" \l "aho1994); cited in [Cerulo 1997](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#cerulo1997); [Berry, 2006](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#berry2006); [Hansen, 2004](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#hansen2004)). 4.11 Orientalist and occidentalist inspired representations of ‘enemies’ can be seen at work within the current terrorism discourse. The Australian and US national security ideology for example frames the terrorism discourse within a system of representations that defines Australian and US national identities through their reference to the Un-Australian, Un-American, Un-Western Other, usually confined to a Muslim/Islamic centre located in the Middle East, but also extending by association to Muslim/Islamist global diasporas. Similarly, representations of the Un-Eastern, Un-Muslim or Non-Islamic Other are employed by some Islamic fundamentalist groups to assert their identity and cause. Both parties construct an enemy that reflect and fuel ideological strains within the American/Australian body politic and Islamist terrorist networks ([Grondin, 2004](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html" \l "grondin2004), pp.15-16). The use of dichotomous logic in these representations fails to account for degrees of ‘Otherness’ and ‘Usness,’ or diversity, within both populations. In this sense, the homogenising effects of such a discourse fails to acknowledge an ‘other – Other,’ namely, a more moderate Muslim population located within an Islamic centre and its periphery. Similarly, distinctions can be drawn between an Australian ‘Us’ and her United States counterpart. In either case, the discursive construction of a homogenous West and ‘Rest’ has the effect of silencing dissenting voices residing within both camps. 4.12 Using simple dichotomies like ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ or ‘friend’ or ‘foe’ ignore the multidimensionality of identity and fail to recognise the interconnectedness and complexity of modern life. The use of such terms also highlights the emotional underpinnings for issues of security. With their use of an enemy discourse which incorporates notions of religiosity, good versus evil, and right and wrong, both the Taliban and US led ‘coalition of the willing’ appeal to beliefs over empiricism (what is knowable, measurable and debatable) – belief systems grounded in notions of faith where it is important to believe things to be true, rather than actually being true ([Berry, 2006](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#berry2006), p.5). Similarly, claim making of this nature appeals to emotions (like hatred, revenge and fear) in contrast to logic in the sense that they encourage communities to feel in particular ways which are less likely to be challenged than appeals to think in particular ways ([Loseke, 2003](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html" \l "loseke2003), p.76). Hence, Berry ([2006](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#berry2006)) contends, that because definitions of enemies are often not empirically based, they can fluctuate according to the needs of the definers. 4.13 With the creation of ‘identifiable’ enemies, defining ‘Us’ automatically entails defining ‘Them,’ with ‘Them’ being the social foe or ‘evil’ ([Huntington, 1996](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#huntington1996)). As Burman and MacLure ([2005](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#burmanmaclure2005)) remind us, ‘there is always a hierarchy in these oppositions’ for there is an essence of a higher principle or ideal articulated in one, and something lesser, or subordinate in the other (p.284). Thus, within this hierarchical value system of prioritised logic, good is seen as coming before evil, positive before negative, Us before Them, and real over the written. Moreover, to label a population as evil is to render the other ‘sub-human.’ We are told of the ‘Evil doers,’ Axis of evil,’ Osama Bin Laden the evil, America the evil, capitalism the evil, and terrorism the evil, and evil acts ([Davetian, 2001](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html" \l "davetian2001)). The ensuing pursuit and eradication of this evil within the context of calls for jihad and a corresponding ‘war on terror’ also implies a ‘promotion of war more willingly than accommodation’ ([Armitage, 2003](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html" \l "armitage2003), p.202). However, as is the case with dichotomous logic, good and evil are two sides of the same coin, or mutually sustaining concepts. Thus, to speak of eradicating evil in this context is a nonsensical pursuit. As Baudrillard explains: ‘We believe naively that the progress of the Good, its advance in all fields (the sciences, technology, democracy, human rights), corresponds to a defeat of Evil. No one seems to have understood that Good and Evil advance together, as part of the same movement…Good does not conquer Evil, nor indeed does the reverse happen: they are once both irreducible to each other and inextricably interrelated’ ([2002](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#baudrilard2002), p.13). Dichotomous logic can be applied to an examination of security and associated threat discourses. Threats and (in)security 4.14 Stern defines terrorism as ‘an act or threat of violence against non-combatants with the objective of exacting revenge, intimidation, or otherwise influencing an audience’ ([2003](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#stern2003), p.xx). One of the aims of this act of violence is to instil fear in the target audience. However, to better understand this notion of terrorism and threat, one also needs to understand the discursive power of claim makers, and those in positions of authority (whether they be political parties, clerics and other elites or the military for that matter) in shaping or co-constituting them so. As Campbell ([1998](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#campbell1998)) alludes: ‘[d]anger is not an objective condition. It is not a thing which exists independently of those to whom it may become a threat…nothing is a risk in itself;…it all depends on how one analyses the danger, considers the event’ (pp.1-2). 4.15 To this end, the securitization school of thought developed by the Copenhagen School examines the socially constructed dimension of security threats by looking at the ways in which processes like social interaction form as well as alter interests, and in the process, construct or constitute security. By using an inter-subjective lens to look at security, proponents of this school explore the extent to which power relationships and language as expressed through discourse shape understandings of threatsand subsequent security responses. They argue that by labelling something a security issue or threat, actors invoke the right to use whatever means to stop that threat. Here language is akin to a ‘speech act,’ or in other words, relates to the act of speaking in a way that gets someone else to act ([Hughes, 2004](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#hughes2004), p.14). 4.16 Labelling something as a security issue, or some group or community as a threat can therefore be seen as a powerful political tool in terms of the behaviour of governments and other interest groups. Indeed, to label a problem a ‘security’ issue or a ‘threat’ gives this problem a special status, and one which can legitimate extraordinary measures to tackle it. Within the current climate of terrorism, threats to security are often characterised as emanating from Others who view their global neighbours rapaciously and are ready to pounce at first sign of weakness. 4.17 The following discussion examines the relational and socially constructed nature of identity and its relevance to various discursive representations of terrorism through its analysis of polarised collective identities and intractable conflict. Polarised collective identities and conflict 5.1 Protracted conflicts have dominated the international arena and have resulted in much of the violence and terrorism witnessed today. These types of conflict usually centre on deep-rooted issues such as struggles over material, human needs, or an historical grievance. The relationships which feature in these forms of conflict comprise of self-perpetuating spiral of violent interactions in which each party develops a vested interest in the continuation of the conflict. They also characteristically entail ‘polarised perceptions of hostility and enmity’ ([Bercovitch, 2003](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html" \l "bercovitch2003)). 5.2 In the case of polarised collective identities and protracted conflict, conflict invariably centres on identity struggles, categorisation, and perceived difference (and related issues concerning values and beliefs). Social and collective identity construction is by nature a source of indirect and direct threat. As Hughes explains: ‘[i]ndirectly, identity construction contains the possibility for identity threat since the adoption and practice of one identity necessarily precludes the fulfilment of another by the same audience’ ([2004](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#hughes2004), p.24). 5.3 Direct threats are expressed in terms of an identity’s stance toward the existence and identification of ‘others.’ These stances can occur along a continuum ranging from accepting to eliminating ([Hughes, 2004](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#hughes2004), p.24). It is important to note, however that identity contains the potential for, rather than the inevitability of conflict. Nevertheless, an examination of the literature and theories concerning identity, Self-Other differentiation, highlights the extent to which individuals not only display a tendency for assigning people with whom they interact into a class of Self/Other, but also show how individuals treat more favourably other individuals whom they consider Self, than those who they regard as Other. ‘Inclusive fitness’ and social identity theories for example have shown how sharing ‘genetic material,’ or having similar observable characteristics such as looks, religion, ethnicity (markers of ‘in-group’ and ‘out-group’ status) informs behaviour between groups/others ([Ben-ner, McCall, Stephane, and Wang, 2006](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#ben-ner2006)). 5.4 The concept collective identity refers to a ‘shared place’ in the social world, or the ‘we’ aspect of identity that develops through a process of self-categorization, identification and social interaction. Moreover, whilst these identities can be chosen freely by individuals, they can also be imposed by others who have the resources and authority to do so (as is the case with labelling Others evil, a threat, or enemies through the discursive practices highlighted above). Collective identities serve many symbolic, practical and normative functions such as fulfilling needs for belonging, distinctiveness, respect, unity and status. They also provide a justification for claims and a focus for the maintenance of a distinctive culture or way of life ([Coleman, 2004](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#coleman2004)). Such a position presumes or utilises a sense of ‘we-ness,’ or group homogeneity, which discounts levels of heterogeneity that may exist. 5.5 As stated above, protracted conflicts are rooted in the perceived threat to basic human needs and values, as well as concerns over group dignity, recognition, security and distributive justice. When these aspects of collective identities are denied or threatened in some way, intractable conflict occurs. As the conflict intensifies, antagonistic groups become increasingly polarised through an in-group discourse and out-group hostilities focussed on the negation, defamation and vilification of the out-group ([Druckman, 2001](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html" \l "druckman2001); [Fordham and Ogbu, 1984](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#fordhamogbu1984); [Hicks, 1999](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#hicks1999); [Kelman, 1999](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#kelman1999) cited in [Coleman, 2004](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#coleman2004)). 5.6 In his review of the literature, Coleman ([2004](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#coleman2004)) highlights a series of conditions, processes and structural issues that are conducive to the development and maintenance of polarised collective identities and related conflict. Eight of these conditions include: 1. ‘Situations where there is a pervasive belief in enduring hostilities where the disputants feel locked – into the intensity and oppression of the conflict relationship’ ([Coleman, 2004](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#coleman2004), p.11; [Fordham and Ogbu, 1984](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#fordhamogbu1984)). 5.7 During his speech to the National Guard in February 2006, President George [Bush](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#bush2006) talks of the ongoing nature and progress of the War on Terror: …On September the 11th, 2001, our nation saw that vast oceans and great distances could no longer keep us safe. I made a decision that day -- that America will not wait to be attacked again. (Applause.) And since that day, we've taken decisive action to protect our citizens against new dangers. We're hunting down the terrorists using every element of our national power -- military, intelligence, law enforcement, diplomatic, and financial. We're clarifying the choice facing every nation: In this struggle between freedom and terror, every nation has responsibilities -- and no one can remain neutral… 5.8 Implied within this discourse is the notion that if you are not with us, then you are against us, and thus a potential enemy. The discussion also makes it clear that there is no room for negotiation with, or accommodation to, the enemy. The view that terrorists are also locked into a zero-sum battle has also been reported. R. James Woolsey has been quoted in the National Commission of terrorism as saying, “today’s terrorists don’t want a seat at the table, they want to destroy the table and everyone sitting at it” ([Morgan, 2004](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#morgan2004), pp.30-31). 2. The involvement of ‘salient aspects of identity’ (cultural differences) ‘where the in-group and out-group can be easily differentiated’ ([Coleman, 2004](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#coleman2004), p.12; [Gurr, 2000](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#gurr2000)). 5.9 The representation of the Muslim/Islamic Other with its emphasis on radically different values systems, becomes evident in references to religious motivations for terrorist attacks – religious ideals which are positioned in opposition to more ‘moderate’ Christian values. As argued above, both often use religious justifications as part of their claims making and their respective calls for a ‘Jihad’ on the US and her Allies, and the US led ‘War on Terror.’ Similarly, Esmer ([2002](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#esmer2002)) and Norris and Inglehart ([2002](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#norrisinglehart2002)) note how hallmarks of Western democracies which are built upon principles of rights (the ‘Land of the Free’), gender equality, sexual liberation pose a threat to traditional values extant in some Islamic cultures. Representations of this kind accentuate perceived cultural differences. In this sense, culture can be viewed as having three components: an empirical aspect (culture understood as communities with their own sets of identifiable, observable, and transferable cultural traits); an analytical aspect (culture used as a conceptual tool) and more significantly a strategic aspect (instrumentalisation of culture/religion to advance identity claims) (LCC, 2001, p.4). 3. ‘Where there exists the perception of negative treatment or threat to an identity group of high centrality and importance’ ([Coleman, 2004](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#coleman2004), p.12; [Fordham and Ogbu, 1984](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#fordhamogbu1984)). 5.10 There will be in most issues concerning security, a structure of two basic discourses, which articulate radically differing representations of identity (whether they be the humiliated other, the freedom fighting champion, or fanatical terrorist). Many ethnic and religious conflicts that cover the globe are fuelled by stories of humiliation, which in turn, are the basis for stories of revenge. Authors like Hassan ([2004](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#hassan2004)), Bendle ([2002](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#bendle2002)), Cobb, ([2004](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#cobb,2004)) and Davetian ([2001](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#davetian2001)) have noted how (suicide) terrorist attacks offer self empowerment in the face of powerlessness, redemption in the face of damnation and honour in the face of humiliation. 5.11 Group boundaries are also often delineated according to symbolic, spatial, religious and social referents, ensuring collective identification within, while simultaneously ensuring the exclusion of outsiders. In this respect, the symbolic attacks on the Pentagon, Twin Towers, and the planned attack on the Whitehouse, represent an attack on the pillars of Western democracy and capitalism, and as such, threats to ‘ways of life’ and identity. 4. ‘High mortality salience where death-related anxieties motivate people to become more deeply committed to their cultural groups as a means of buffering such anxiety’ ([Coleman, 2004](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#coleman2004), p.12; [McCauley, 2001](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#mccauley2001)). 5.12 Humphrey argues that the impact of September 11th as reported by real time coverage on international television networks, “was seductive in conjuring up the sense that we are living in an era of ubiquitous and even world-ending violence” ([2004](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#humphrey2004): 3). The fear of apocalyptic violence posed by WMD was a major justification for pursuing a pre-emptive war against Afghanistan and Iraq. In turn, a ‘death-related anxiety’ was felt by Western nations with the prospect of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) falling into the hands of Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda terrorist networks. These fears were not alleviated when George W. Bush for example asserted the ‘terrorist groups’ would use WMD ‘without a hint of conscience’ ([Bullimer 2002](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html" \l "bullimer2002)). By linking these two issues (terrorism and WMD) political discourses of this kind reified terrorism and WMD, setting into action a series of actions designed to control their proliferation. 5.13 Structural issues which act to reinforce and maintain polarised collective identities include: 5. ‘A negation of the Other’ ([Coleman, 2004](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#coleman2004), p.17). 5.14 This, according to Coleman is the ‘fundamental aspect of the in-group’s identity’ (17). Identity creation through negation entails making a statement of in-group’ identity with reference to what it is not, or does not consist of, for example ‘I am a Christian, not a Muslim.’ Strategies employed in the negation of the Other also include: marginalisation of ethnic and religious groups through naming; racialisation; criminalisation; and stigmatisation. Response strategies of the ‘out-group’ include: collective resistance to ascribed identities; group empowerment; demands for collective group rights (territorial claims) in an attempt to secure greater autonomy, legitimisation and social control ([Rummens, 2001](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html" \l "rummens2001), p.18). 6. ‘The outgroup images become negative, homogeneous, abstract and stereotypical’…particularly in regards to the productions of ‘enemy images’ which ‘contain an emotional dimension of strong dislike…these images tend to become self-fulfilling and self-reinforcing, serving important interests and needs’ ([Coleman, 2004](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#coleman2004), pp.17-18; [Stein, 1999](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#stein1999); [Toscano, 1998](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#toscano1998)). 5.15 Implicit within ‘Us/Them,’ ‘East/West,’ ‘Good/Bad’ and ‘Self/Other’ binaries is the notion that opposing identities are relatively homogenous. The use of these non-specific yet all-inclusive tags also serves to dehumanise and depersonalise a highly abstracted Other. In turn, depersonalisation allows social stereotyping, group cohesiveness and collective action to occur. The construction of absolutist discourses of this kind are an important vehicle for understanding conflict: ‘[a]lthough generally described as integrated and homogensous, communities as loci of production, transmission, and evolution of group membership foster conflict through the negotiation and manipulation of social representations’ (LCC, 2001, p.6). 5.16 Here, the demarcation of the common enemy/Other assists with the mobilisation of one group against another ([Aho, 1994](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html" \l "aho1994)). Identity demarcation of this kind further allows the mobilisation of audiences to carry out conflict. President Bush for example has made many references to ‘evil doers’. He has been quoted as saying ‘we're on the hunt...got the evildoers on the run...we're bringing them to justice’ and ‘they kill without mercy because they hate our freedoms...’ ([Sample, 2006](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#sample2006), [The White House, 2001](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#the%20white%20house2001)). The emotive language used in ‘speech acts’ of this kind are designed to elicit ‘in-group’ distinctiveness and cohesion through the negation and disparagement of the ‘out-group’ (terrorist organisations). The use of terms ‘evil doers,’ ‘them,’ and ‘they’ are interesting however in the sense that they refer to an enemy that extends beyond the confines of terrorist organisations like Al Qaeda. 7. ‘A clear and simplified depiction of good (us) and evil (them) that serves many functions’ ([Brown and Gaertner, 2001](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#browngaertner2001); [Coleman, 2004](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#coleman2004), p.18). 5.17 By framing their conflict within a discourse which accentuates a struggle between good and evil, both religious terrorist groups and their Western-led protagonists, view non-members of either camp to be ‘infidels’ or ‘apostates’ ([Cronin, 2003](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#cronin2003)) and ‘immoral’ or ‘fanatical’ respectively. The maintenance of such a discourse can be seen as serving a dual purpose; namely, to dehumanise the respective victims on both sides of the conflict, and sustain in-group and out-group identities. 8. ‘In extreme cases, pain and suffering for one’s group and one’s cause come to be considered meritorious’ ([Coleman, 2004](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#coleman2004), p.19; [Zartman, 2001](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#zartman2001)). 5.18 Martyrdom is a well documented motivation for engaging in terrorist activity. From 1996-1999, Nasra Hassan, a United Nations relief worker in Gaza interviewed 250 aspiring suicide bombers. In one interview, the late spiritual leader of Hamas, Sheikh Yasin, told her that martyrdom was a way of redemption, "[l]ove of martyrdom is something deep inside the heart. But these rewards are not in themselves the goal of the martyr. The only aim is to win Allah's satisfaction. That can be done in the simplest and speediest manner by dying in the cause of Allah. And it is Allah who selects martyrs" ([Hassan, 2004](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#hassan2004), p.1). Conclusion 6.1 This paper has explored some of the issues concerned with identity formation, construction and negotiation. In doing so, this paper has focussed on the socially constructed aspects of identity, and in particular, the extent to which social identities are subjectively constructed according to perceived differences in comparison to others. Hansen contends, identity is “always a relational concept, and it is constructed within discourses, not given by the thing itself” ([2004](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#hansen2004), p.4). 6.2 Meaning is therefore also relational, for the identification of/with difference between imagined communities like the East and West denotes, or holds meaning. Consequently, identity construction involves a degree of ‘Othering’, and within this context, social identities can be constructed and understood as being more or less threatening and different. Issues of Otherness are central to understanding terrorist activity, and are a feature of security discourses girding the current ‘war on terror.’ To this end, this paper has examined the relationship between power and the formation, emergence, and mobilisation of culturally-based collective identities and their expression through representation, narratives, discourse and language. 6.3 Using a social constructionist and a somewhat postcolonialist inspired analysis, this paper questions the utility of dichotomies like Self/Other, insider/outsider, Us/Them, Good/Evil used within terrorist discourses. The ensuing discursive formation shapes the ways in which terrorism can be meaningfully talked about, understood, and tackled. In the process of defining and establishing difference, the discourse of the Other is also highlighted, since such definitions invariably allude to an object in terms of what it is not. Such a practice entails the social construction of some other person, group, culture or nation as being different and deficient from one’s own. Hence as Simon Dalby ([1997](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#dalby1997)) observes, “specifying difference is a linguistic, epistemological and, most importantly, a political act; it constructs a space for the other distanced and inferior from the vantage point of the person specifying the difference” (cited in [Grondin, 2004](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html#grondin2004), p.5-6). For Said, accentuating difference in this way is central to dichotomous representations of the Self and Other, and through the lens of Orientalism, the creation of a self serving discourse which privileges the world-view of the West. 6.4 When examining issues concerning what is terrorism, who practices it and why, as well as appropriate responses to this activity, this paper contends that such issues are often clouded by a rhetoric (discourse) that has deflected attention away from political and moral concerns underlying political violence. This paper has also argued that utilising dichotomous logic in the construction of an enemy is a counterproductive strategy for grappling with terrorism. The use of binaries like Good/Evil and Us/Them assist with the construction of a dehumanised Other who cannot be reasoned with, thus repudiating calls for negotiation, and in the process, reducing incentives to understand difference. Demonising the enemy in such a manner, amplifies fear and alarm, and perpetuates cycles of revenge and retaliation which necessitate more violent responses to perceived injustices. In this sense, the production and maintenance of a West and Rest dichotomy, a dichotomy which characterises current terrorist and security discourses, has also lead to the creation of mutually sustaining antagonisms ensuring further conflict. 6.5 Consequently, it is important to rethink the binary oppositions employed within the social constructions of other socio-cultural groups, enemies or threats, and national identities. When employed within a national security context, these dichotomies not only serve to reify imagined differences between communities, but also may inflame hostilities through the continuation of oppositional identities and relations which are viewed as being fixed, and thus resistant to change. A way around this binary impasse is the construction of counter-discourses which contain dual positions for both parties as victims and as agents of conflict. As long as both sides represent themselves as being victims, rather than perpetrators of violence, more violence will ensue. Moreover, another way to challenge the legitimacy of dichotomous logic is to create a counter-discourse highlighting the diversity extant within ‘so-called’ homogenous populations.

#### Role of the ballot is to either accept or reject the affs securitization—prior to action

**Saltera 8** (Securitization and desecuritization: a dramaturgical analysis of the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority Mark B Saltera School of Politics, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K1N 6N5. E-mail: msalter@uottawa.ca, , 2008

This model of settings for securitizing moves fits cleanly with Paris School interventions on the trope of risk (Aradau and van Munster 2007; Aradau et al. 2008). However, it is precisely because security plays differently to each audience, is used differently by different speakers, and changes in its meaning that we need to expand our analysis of how securitizing moves are accepted or rejected. Bigo (2006: 7) uses the notion of 'field' to demonstrate how 'these professions do not share the same logics of experience or practice and do not converge neatly into a single function under the rubric of security. Rather, they are both heterogeneous and in competition with each other'. This article offers a way into that field analysis of securitization, that is not reduced to linguistic analysis, through a dramaturgical analysis of setting: within each securitizing move, we must consider who may speak, what may be spoken, and what is heard. Top of page Securitization Securitization theory has been an incredibly fruitful approach for the study of security. Having disaggregated 'state security' into several sectors (military, political, societal, economic, and ecological), Buzan argues that 'the question of when a threat becomes a national security issue depends not just on what type of threat it is, and how much the recipient state perceives it, but also on the intensity with which the threat operates' (1991: 133–4). This was expanded by Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde in the formal model of securitization: 'the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat to have substantial political effects...to break free of procedures or rules he or she would otherwise be bound by...' (1998: 25). The attempt at securitization is called a 'securitizing move', which must be 'accepted' or rejected by the target audience. The authors argue that the conditions for success are (1) the internal grammatical form of the act, (2) 'the social conditions regarding the position of authority for the securitizing actor — that is, the relationship between the speaker and the audience and thereby the likelihood of the audience accepting the claims made in a securitizing attempt, and (3) features of the alleged threats that either facilitate or impede securitization' (1998: 33). There is room within the original cast of the theory to expand the notion of facilitating conditions or impediments for securitizing moves — but little direction as to what those might be. In this reading, the second factor — these social conditions — is under-determined and must be explored further. In the debate between the CS, so named in a response by McSweeney (1996, 1998), subsequent replies (Buzan and Waever, 1997), and a provocative intervention by Williams (2003), a number of critiques of the model of securitization were raised. The CS was faulted by McSweeney for appearing to give an ontological pre-existence to the 'speaker' and 'audience' that is at odds with a more processual or constructivist perspective of identity (1996: 83). Williams argued that different kinds of speech might constitute an act, and made an important theoretical connection to Schmittian politics of sovereign exceptionality. Williams wrote that the CS process of securitization — notably that securitization implies depoliticization — can be found in other theories of sovereign authority, and that securitizing moves are an attempt by the sovereign to decide the exception and thus remove the sector from democratic debate (2003). Buzan, presented a spectrum of how issues might be weighted: 'nonpoliticized... through politicized... or securitized' (1998: 23). Within this account, the CS appears to represent securitization as a threshold — particularly within a democratic society. Either a threat is represented and then accepted as a security issue, or it remains contested within the realm of normal, deliberative politics. Successful securitization is at root a political process, but the actual politics of the acceptance are left radically under-determined by this model. The authors argue that 'the issue is securitized only if and when the audience accepts it as such... (it must) gain enough resonance for a platform to be made from which it is possible to legitimize emergency measures...' (1998: 25). It is precisely the dynamics of this acceptance, this resonance, this politics of consent that must be unpacked further. The Copenhagen School, certainly open their model to consideration of the 'external, contextual, and social roles and authorized speakers' of the speech act 'and, not least, under what conditions (i.e. is the securitization successful)' (1998: 32). But, within their model, there is no frame for how securitizations are successful or fail. A subsidiary point that is worth noting: these external and internal conditions for securitization appear to work in reverse for the process of desecuritization (Wæver 1995). The speaker proposes that there is not a threat, or at least not a threat that is existential, and that the problem can be comprehended or managed within the rubric of normal politics. There are a number of assumptions within articles about securitization theory about the differential ease or difficulty of securitization and desecuritization. These unexplored assumptions arise because there is no theory for the actual process of the success or failure for a securitizing or desecuritizing move. The statist model of securitization does not match the complexity of contemporary social dynamics of security. First, other non-state actors must be included in the model, as demonstrated by Bigo (2006) and others. Security is not contained solely within the traditional boundaries of the state and the authority to make securitizing moves not limited to state actors. Second, two temporal dimensions must be added to considerations of securitization and desecuritization: the duration of the securitization and the entropy of the public imagination. Some issues, such as the war on drugs, rose and faded in the public imagination, largely independent from the 'actual' or empirical degree of threat (Campbell 1993; Aradau 2001). Third, securitization is not an instantaneous or irrevocable act. Rather securitization reflects the complex constitution of social and political communities and may be successful and unsuccessful to different degrees in different settings within the same issue area and across issues. Floyd demonstrates convincingly that desecuritization is entirely 'issue-dependent rather than static' (2007: 349). Nor is securitization an act that removes an issue from deliberative politics forever. Rather, studies of securitization need to account for the movement of issues into and out of the security sector over time. An issue that has faded from the public view may rest within the security frame or enjoy a kind of 'entropy' where the public, elite, technocratic, or scientific communities assume that exceptional security measures have lapsed in the face of a threat that no longer seems pressing or relevant. Hysteria over the presence of communists and homosexuals within government departments no longer seems a national security threat, in the way that McCarthy and others described. For example, a securitization act may be successful with a scientific or technocratic community, and yet fail in the elite and popular realm, such as the debate over global warming during the 1980s and 1990s. A process of desecuritization may occur within popular politics, while elites and professionals remain unconvinced, such as transportation safety. Doty examines how the Minutemen along the US–Mexico border consider themselves to be acting in a 'decisionist' mode, even though they are not sovereign actors (2007: 129–31). A particular group has successfully securitized illegal migration at the border for a segment of the population, while simultaneously human rights groups — by placing water in the desert and advocating for amnesty — act as if the issue is politicized. John McCain (Arizona Senator and Republican Presidential nominee) proposed legislation (with Democratic Senator Edward Kennedy, for whom 'all politics are local') that would provide a 'path to citizenship' and border security — only to withdraw it in the face of public criticism. In this case, the issue was the subject of intense 'normal' political debate, and the securitizing move was incomplete and heterogeneous across the political landscape. The model provided by the CS gives us no way to measure the success or failure of a securitizing move. In this article, I gauge the success or failure of a securitizing move by ranking the degree to which policies, legislation, and opinion accords with the prescriptions of the speech act: 1. To what degree is the issue-area discussed as part of a wider political debate? 2. Is the description of the threat as existential accepted or rejected? 3. Is the solution accepted or rejected? 4. Are new or emergency powers accorded to the securitizing agent? Unfortunately we are unable to provide accessible alternative text for this. If you require assistance to access this image, please contact help@nature.com or the author This scale of success–failure is particularly useful in assessing the persistence of a security issue within different audiences. A more nuanced notion of success and failure also gives us a purchase on whether an issue remains securitized over time so that we may develop a theory of the public imagination in the future. Two recent contributions to securitization theory stand out for my analysis.1 Balzacq and Stritzel share my excitement about the potential of the CS, and my worry about the under-developed social aspect of securitization. Stritzel leads the theoretical debate, and provides a strong grounding for this present article. He argues 'too much weight is put on the semantic side of the speech act articulation at the expense of its social and linguistic relatedness and sequentiality' (2007: 358). He critiques the under-theorization of the speaker–audience relations, stating that 'in empirical studies one cannot always figure out clearly which audience is when and why most relevant, what implications it has if there are several audiences, and when exactly an audience is "persuaded"' (2007: 363). Stritzel proposes an embedded analysis of securitization: '(1) the performative force of the articulated threat texts, (2) their embeddedness in existing discourses, and (3) the positional power of actors who influence the process of defining meaning' (2007: 370). By this, he argues, the discourse of securitization must be understood as situated within a relationship between speaker–audience and within a context that predates the actual securitizing act. What makes a securitizing move successful is, for Stritzel, the extent to which the actor has the power to make the threat and the discursive weight of that threat (has it been well established, or is this a new threat?). Stritzel's general model of embedded securitization is productive, but does not explain the success or failure of securitizing moves with any greater clarity than the CS. It is a useful framework that can guide empirical work, but it does not allow us to generate any hypotheses about the politics of securitization and, in particular, about securitizing moves that fail to garner acceptance or resonance. Adding the range of success/failure, as detailed above, helps Stritzel's embedded analysis disaggregate 'persuasion' into multiple steps of audience acceptance. Balzacq also offers a model of the social aspect of securitization that includes 'the context, the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience, and the power that both the speaker and the listener bring to the interaction' (2005: 172). In posing the question of strategic or pragmatic practice, Balzacq argues that 'the positive outcome of securitization, whether it be strong or weak, lies with the securitizing actor's choice of determining appropriate times within which the recognition, including the integration of "imprinting" object — a threat — by the masses is facilitated' (2005: 182). His examples demonstrate that these choices are constrained by history, memory, and discursive tropes. What a dramaturgical analysis adds is the notion that — just as there are different national and psycho-cultural contexts — so too are there different sociological, political, bureaucratic, and organizational contexts within a populace. A popular audience will 'accept' securitization of threats differently to an elite or scientific audience. Global warming as an environmental securitization, for example, has had creeping success — but on radically different grounds with scientists, bureaucrats, elite politicians, and the populace (both within states and between states). It is unclear to me if 'securitizing agents always strive to convince as broad an audience as possible' (2005: 185), particularly within the context of security professionals (Balzacq 2008). In the case study below, the securitization of Canadian civil aviation security was pitched to narrow, specific audiences — and there was little effort to securitize the issues for the general public. At a base level, popular politics (at least in democratic societies) operates differently than scientific politics; technocratic politics from elite politics. In short, in addition to the 'régime of truth, [a society's] "general politics" of truth' (Foucault 1980: 131), there are also specific politics of truth. Foucault hints at these specific regimes of truth in discussing the relationship between the specific intellectual and 'direct and localised relation[s] to scientific knowledge and institutions' (1980: 128). I return to these notions of direct and localized relations in the case study. This is why a dramaturgical approach to the actual evolution of particular securitizing moves is so productive; the language and political games at stake in each setting are radically different. Balzacq has gone on to argue that 'securitization sometimes occurs and produces social and political consequences without the explicit assent of an audience' (2008: 76). He uses the new governance literature to propose a new investigation into policy tools that are 'instruments of securitization' (2008: 79). Both Balzacq's work and this article are attempting to remedy the same flaw in the CS's methodology: an overreliance on speech acts to the neglect of the social. A dramaturgical analysis of setting, however, provides the audience that Balzacq displaces. It is crucial to our analysis that the audience is determinative of the form of securitizing move. Even if those audiences are internal or organizational, as Goffman explains: 'no audience, no performance' (1974: 125). He argues, "if one individual attempts to direct the activity of others by means of example, enlightenment, persuasion, exchange, manipulation, authority, threat, punishment, or coercion, it will be necessary, regardless his power position, to convey effectively what he wants done, what he is prepared to do to get it done and what he will do if it is not done. Power of any kind must be clothed in effective means of displaying it, and will have different effects depending upon how it is dramatized. (1959: 241, emphasis added)" Viewing securitizing moves as a kind of performance, we can see the importance of 'front' and 'backstage': that the same securitizing speech acts may be framed differently within the professional team and in front of an audience. Among themselves, (security) agents may speak in one way, but use other ways to conform to the expectations of a popular audience — and there are some that are always totally excluded from the securitizing process (1959: 145). The audience is not always the public. There is a network of bureaucrats, consultants, parliamentarians, or officials that must be convinced that securitization is appropriate, efficient, useful, or effective. Balzacq identifies a series of backstage securitizing moves that have public effects, though are never securitized publicly. Rather than disappear the audience, a more flexible notion of the setting of securitization allows for micro-sociologies of the particular securitizing moves. Top of page Dramaturgical Analysis Dramaturgical analysis uses the vocabulary of the theatre to understand social settings, roles, and performances of identity. Sociologist Goffman also introduced the notion of the 'framing' of identities and issues, to which much critical scholarship is indebted (1974).2 Much post-structuralist work relies on notions of performance, and critical work in international relations often assumes that key political divisions such as inside/outside, order/anarchy, self/other must be continually performed and reinforced to have effect. In this research programme, I am interested less in the national application of Butler's notion of the performativity of gendered and other identities (1990), Campbell's (1993) notion of foreign policy as an articulation of danger that acts as an identity function, Sylvester's analysis of 'dramaturgies of violence' (2003a) or 'development' (2003b), important and provocative though they may be. Instead, this dramaturgical theory argues that the setting of a securitizing move is determined by the actors and their roles, the rules of the discourse permissible within that space, and the expectations of the audience. When we push this theatrical metaphor, we can classify the different types of securitizing moves that all share similar conventions, narratives, characters, and tropes. The use of specialized language, procedural forms, and common conventions all suggest a common setting.3 For example, terms, precedents, or issues whose specialized meanings both speaker and audience share.4 Buzan et al. themselves use dramatic language: 'the staging of existential issues in politics to lift them above politics...an issue is dramatized and presented as an issue of supreme priority...' (1998: 26). Huysmans alludes to the 'security drama' and leads to this focus on 'the processes of security' (1995: 66). Rather than classify securitizing moves as comedies, tragedies, and histories, we can classify them according to the setting: popular, elite, technocratic, and scientific settings. Each of these settings structures the speaker–audience relationship of knowledge and authority, the weight of social context, and the success of the securitizing move. The setting of a securitizing act includes the stage on which it is made, the genre in which it is made, the audience to which it is pitched, and the reception of the audience. What is particularly useful about Goffman's dramaturgical analysis is precisely the mutual constitution of self and audience. The characters in the drama must use information to convince the audience of a particular story: 'the over-communication of some facts and the under-communication of others... a basic problem for many performances, then, is that of information control' (1959: 141). The setting of a performance, then, communicates the ground-rules for who may speak, what may be said, and what is heard. For example, when Shakespeare was originally staged, groundlings, who paid little admission and sat in the stalls below the stage, might speak to and throw food at the actors — something probably frowned upon at Stratford-upon-Avon today. British pantomime has a particularly interactive audience–actor relationship (oh no it doesn't, oh yes it does), as does the Rocky Horror Picture Show, both of which rely on the audience knowing the call-and-answer structure of the drama. This is to say that in addition to an awareness of the language, tropes, metaphor, plots, and devices that are embedded in the process of securitization, dramaturgical analysis also directs our attention to the constitution of the actor–audience in a particular discursive relationship. Also, Goffman argues that the presentation of the self changes from different social settings, and that an understanding of the setting can illuminate the exigencies of different performances. For him, the character and audience join together in a 'working consensus' to create 'the belief that ([he performer] is related to [the audience] in a more ideal way than is always the case' (1959: 48). Any social scene, such as the setting of securitizing moves, involves the presentation of a self, the setting for that narrative, and audience reception. Speech-act models of securitizing miss the crucial aspect of the 'setting' of the narrative. In particular, the setting of a political speech act includes the stage upon which the securitization is attempted (national, organizational, bureaucratic, or scientific) and also the past narrative history of failed and successful securitizations by lauded or derided characters (Merelman 1969: 225).5 Securitizing moves in popular, elite, technocratic, and scientific settings are markedly different — they operate according to different constitutions of actor and audience. A securitizing move is not the same in all contexts, because it is not simply made up of the internal grammatical elements. Krebs and Jackson analyse the importance of public rhetoric, while bracketing the questions of motivation (2007: 41). Whether the intention of the speaker is entirely calculative or emotive, the rules of the setting remain the same (Goffman 1959: 66). A securitizing move made for political gain or from fear adheres to the same logic, but the effect of the message may be different. This focus on the reflexive relationship between speaker and audience is particularly important for theories of securitization. Securitizing moves follow an internal grammar that is determined not simply by internal rules (i.e. the invocation of an emergency or exception to normal politics), but also to a common, social grammar (i.e. the universe of tropes, images, metaphors, histories that can be invoked). Securitizing moves occur within the universe of the audience imagination. It is not simply a power relationship — but a knowledge-authority game. A popular securitizing move may be prompted by an informal authority such as a civil society group (like the Minutemen along the US–Mexico border); but, civil society groups may be ineffective in scientific settings (Minutemen and similar groups do not participate in academic or professional arguments about border security). A scientist will use different authority to convince her colleagues than her bureaucratic counterparts. For example, the case for the presence of weapons of mass destruction in the lead-up to the most recent American invasion of Iraq illustrates how ambiguity was leeched from the technocratic discourse as it was marshalled in the popular sphere. Uncertainty was purged as the reports were summarized, as technocrats aimed to convince the political elite, and in turn as the elite aimed to convince the general populace. In short, the 'acceptance' of the audience and the 'resonance' of an existential threat is different within different spheres. I argue that we can distinguish these distinct settings by the grand narratives by which truth is authorized, the characters who are empowered to speak, and the relationships between characters and audience. Within the security sphere, different narratives are deployed for security threats in different sectors; different characters may attempt a securitizing speech act; and the relationship between the audience and the performer structure how those speech acts are made and received. This model of different settings for securitization stems from research into the widening of public security in post-9/11 politics. There is a consensus among critical scholars that the amount of social life that is governed by 'security' claims has increased since 9/11 — but not all securitizing moves have been successful. In studying the evolution of civil aviation security, it was clear that the rules of the speech act were different in different settings: who could speak, who could hear, and what could be said all varied radically — even on the same issue within the same sector. Using the case of the CATSA below, I argue that there are four key settings for these securitizing moves. This is not to say that, in other contexts, more settings are not possible, but rather that the four settings are the fewest number of categories that allow for significant differentiation within this case. The changing nature of perceptions of the aviation sector over the past 40 years demonstrates the importance of time and entropy within securitization studies. The gradual and increasing securitization of international aviation has been a long process, one in which terrorist groups rather than government elites have been the organizational and discursive entrepreneurs. The travelling public has a short memory, politicians aim at the next election cycle, and bureaucrats are risk averse. Securitization has occurred at once or necessarily as a result of one speech act that is accepted or rejected but often through the imposition of new regulations or international standards. The setting of securitization is clearly crucial. The success of a securitization act is dependent not exclusively on the formal syntax or on the informal social context, but also on the particular history, dominant narrative, constitutive characters, and the structure of the setting itself. A popular appeal to national security is often effective in popular and elite politics, but may be less convincing in a scientific realm. The restrictions of mandate and bureaucratic thinking will predominate in technocratic politics in (at least potentially) different ways to the decision making of elites bent on maintaining power or gaining reelection. The setting also determines the characters that may attempt a securitizing speech act. Imams and ministers have an authority to name cultural and moral threats to society within the setting of popular politics, but there is a different stage presence about scientific truths. For example, American librarians had a surprise entry onto the popular scene due to their perceived scientific interest in privacy and free speech, which trumped elite policy demands in the realm of popular politics during the debate surrounding the total information awareness proposal (Abdolian and Takooshian 2003; Monahan 2006). The disproportionate effect of librarians in this public debate cannot be explained simply by power differentials as in Stritzel or Balzacq. Different actors possess different authorizations to speak in different political settings. In the following case, the same securitizing move (to expand aviation security and airport passenger security) was made by different actors, to different audiences, with different claims to authority, in different languages, with different effects. This was evident over time as the securitizing move was accepted or rejected by the target audience. Top of page Securitization and CATSA CATSA provides an excellent case for dramaturgical analysis.6 There is a clear and accepted securitizing move in response to the attacks of 9/11: the creation of CATSA. Because the 9/11 attacks were directly connected to failures in airport security, specifically passenger screening, the securitization of civil aviation was relatively straightforward: the external threat of terrorists using planes as weapons of mass destruction had a deep resonance across the populace, political elite, technocrat, and scientific audiences.7 In particular, the real-time broadcast of the second plane hitting the World Trade center, and the repetition of those images, gave aviation security a dominant position in the public imagination of homeland security. Previous to 9/11, in Canada (and the United States) aviation passenger screening was done by airlines according to national standards set by the transportation authority. Airport security was not a realm of emergency or crisis, and could be handled by non-state entities (like airlines or airport authorities). It was depoliticized, expressed in terms of cost and regulations and technical standards. To nationalize airport security — make it part of the governmental structure, through CATSA — represented an expansion of governmental powers that was due to a perceived emergency and existential threat.8 The securitizing move was successful, even easy. However, this does not tell us enough about the process of securitization. During 2004–2007, there were several other securitizing and desecuritizing moves. There are clear popular, elite, technocratic, and scientific communities that engaged in these (de)securitization processes. Popular sentiment can be evaluated through public media, particularly in 2006. Furthermore, in 2004, CATSA engaged the scientific community in an examination of its security strategy, the proceedings of which were then published in 2006. Elite, technocratic, and scientific settings are evidenced through a 5-year governmental review of the CATSA Act in 2005–2007 and an Auditor-General Special Examination of CATSA in 2006. In these reviews, experts, bureaucrats, and policy-makers evaluated the security function of CATSA. In particular, the CATSA Act Review, conducted by Transport Canada with a wide range of public consultations, provides a thick slice of public, scientific, technocratic, and elite opinion after 5 years of operation. During these two critical reviews, the CATSA executive attempted to convince the elite of the need for an expansion of their mandate. In other words, a further securitization of airport security was called for. This was rejected by the technocrats, experts, and the elite. The CATSA case thus provides us with a clear sector that is successfully securitized, popular and expert challenges to that securitization, and a rejection of an expansive securitizing move. There is thus a prima facie case for a successful securitization move in the area of aviation security in Canada. Before 9/11, passenger screening was done by airports and airlines according to standards set by Transport Canada. Despite Vancouver-based attacks on Air India in 1985, there had been a general trend towards the depoliticization of airport security. It was a subject accessible to public debate, but not politically salient (referenced in political campaigns or in parliamentary debates). Transport Canada was the owner/operator of the majority of airports, and consequently was responsible for passenger screening. Airport policing, which had been the responsibility of the federal police force (RCMP), was conducted by regional forces. Following the 9/11 attacks, Finance Minister Paul Martin submitted a budget that included the creation of the CATSA. The CATSA Act received royal assent on 27 March, 2002, as a new crown corporation responsible for 'effective, efficient and consistent screening of persons accessing aircraft or restricted areas through screening points, the screening of the property in their possession or control, and the screening of the belongings or baggage they give to the air carrier for transport' (CATSA Act Review 2006: 13).9 On 31 December 2002, CATSA undertook responsibility for all passenger screening. The creation of CATSA and its initial responsibilities was supported by the Minister of Transport and Finance Minister Paul Martin, who shortly thereafter became the Prime Minister and issued Canada's first National Security Strategy. There was a clear case for securitization: the threat of terrorism particularly to civil aviation was acute, the previous system of privatized or deregulated screening might lead to inconsistencies among Canadian airports which fundamentally threatened the integrity of the system, and, finally, running counter to the trend towards deregulation in civil aviation, the government had a security role. This opinion was exemplified in the National Security Strategy (Canada. Office of the Auditor General 2006: 36). In the following sections, this article parses the four settings of securitizing moves in the civil aviation security sector during 2004–2007. The traditional CS explanation would go this way: the Canadian state made a securitizing move to define the terror threat to civil aviation as an existential threat that required extraordinary action; this move was accepted by the public, and CATSA was formed in 2001–2002 with new powers and authorities (in evidence through the changes to the Aeronautics Act). The Canadian state has not attempted any significant securitizing moves since the formation of CATSA. However, a close reading of the evolution of CATSA, and, in particular, the reviews in 2005–2006, demonstrates a much more complex picture of securitizing moves and counter-moves. Within the elite setting, political and bureaucratic actors actively debated the roles and responsibilities of CATSA and attempted to increase or decrease the powers and authorities of the organization. Within the popular scene, CATSA became the subject of a number of journalistic and public government reports by a Senate committee that questioned the nature of the threat to aviation security and the appropriate policy responses. Within the scientific setting, academics and experts attempted to desecuritize the work of CATSA through a critical appraisal of the risk management approach. Within a technocratic setting, the ability of CATSA to provide and measure security was radically questioned by the Auditor-General, leading to a desecuritizing move. Running throughout all of these settings, there is a common thread: the CATSA executive wanted to increase its mandate, including more counter-terror operations in its operational purview. This particular securitizing move followed the same pattern: existential threat and new powers needed. However, this same securitizing move was made in different ways in different settings. Elite The CATSA Act Review provides a productive snapshot of the securitizing moves in play between 2005 and 2006. The Minister of Transport, later Transport, Infrastructure and Communities, appointed an expert advisory panel in November 2005 to report on CATSA after 5 years of operation, which was tabled in Parliament on 12 December 2006.10 The Advisory Panel had a wide remit to 'examine the provisions and operations of the CATSA Act to ensure that the legislation provides a sound and adequate statutory basis for CATSA's aviation security mandate, provide advice on future aviation security requirements and other developments that may impact on CATSA's future operations...on other important issues that come to [the Panel's] attention' (CATSA Act Review 2006: 15). In the preparation of their report, the panel conducted a number of public consultations and received submissions from over 40 agencies, institutions, airports, organizations, and individuals. CATSA itself also prepared a number of position papers. This is a complex situation for the study of securitization: the three experts on the advisory panel are the primary authors of the report; they are guided and supported by a bureaucracy from Transport Canada; the final audience is the Minister of Transport. Because the audience of this legislative review was the Minister of Transport, Communities and Infrastructure (and other political decision-makers), I analyze this process as part of the elite process. The Auditor-General's Special Examination, though it occurred in a similar timeframe and with consequences for CATSA's Board, was conducted with reference to the Office of the Auditor-General which has a defined mandate. Thus, I examine the Special Examination below as part of the technocratic audience. It was clear that the mandate of CATSA was in contention. There was a potential within the social space for a securitizing move. The Panel notes: 'it is apparent to the Panel and to many stakeholders that clarification is needed concerning the operation mandate of CATSA and Transport Canada... CATSA thinks it should determine the "hows" [of security functions], while Transport Canada insists they are to be determined within the [Security Screening Order]' (CATSA Act Review 2006: 146). CATSA argued in their submissions that Transport Canada's Security Screening Order was extremely detailed in its prescription, and made security screening inflexible. CATSA made a clear securitizing move: a threat, which was existential, that required extraordinary action — in this case the expansion of its mandate and the transformation of an aviation screening corporation into a counter-terrorism agency (CATSA 2006a: 4). In particular, it was argued before the Advisory Panel that the CATSA Act, Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, and the security screening order, gave CATSA an extremely clear, but restricted mandate in its passenger screening. CATSA screeners were responsible for and authorized to detect and to interdict prohibited items only, or to validate the identity of some non-passengers entering into secure air-side operations. In other words, CATSA could not use any profiling, risk-management, or policing methods in their security screening. CATSA argued that its ability to use these tools — such as behavioural profiling or risk management — would make the civil aviation security system much more secure. CATSA sought increased access to intelligence, a greater flexibility in screening-point staffing, and screening procedures. These moves were rejected by the expert panel and the Minister in the CATSA Act Review.11 In 'Our vision for aviation security', submitted to the Review, CATSA makes its case for an expanded mandate. CATSA can provide 'a national approach and consistency', 'public security', 'accountability', 'access to intelligence', and 'international networks' (CATSA 2006b: 5–6). The desire for national consistency among Canadian airports was one of the chief reasons for the creation of CATSA. The form of the organization balances accountability across a Board of Directors, the Minister for Transport, Infrastructure and Communities, and the Treasury Board (which approve, among other aspects, CATSA's budget and corporate plans). However, these other three priorities (public security, access to intelligence, and international networks) represent an expansion of its mandate. Airports, in their submissions to the CATSA Act Review, argue that screening can be handled efficiently and effectively by their own private security staff — essentially a desecuritizing move (Aéroports de Montréal 2006; Canadian Airports Council 2006). They argue that security screening is not an existential threat and does not require additional powers or authorities. Aéroports de Montreal concludes: 'ADM strongly opposes any expansion of CATSA's mandate to encompass, for example, access control or policing functions, since this could be a further infringement of airports' control over their operations. Furthermore, the Minister should not be able to grant CATSA new responsibilities without consulting the airports' (2006: 3). The Canadian Airports Council writes: 'With the exception possibly of cargo security, airports are not in favour of an expanded mandate for CATSA, and airports should be consulted thoroughly before any expansion to CATSA's mandate takes place. Some airports have expressed an interest in taking over or sharing some of CATSA's functions at airports' (2006: 1). Against the argument that airports might be able to provide security screening, CATSA argues 'public security is the #1 priority — CATSA's legislated mandate is air transport security — period. We are not in the business of operating parking, leasing space to businesses, airport cleaning and maintenance, or other areas of interest to airport authorities. Public security is compromised when screening operations are "cross-collateralized" with other airport operations' (5). Within this complex discursive environment, securitization/desecuritization is not simply a binary (on/off) condition but more processual. An examination of the submissions to the Advisory Panel illustrates who 'counts' as a stakeholder for the process, who counts as expert, whose voice is heard. While CATSA, the Advisory Panel, and the Review Secretariat clearly had primary speaking roles (with stakeholders in supporting roles) in this particular securitization drama, the important audience was the Minister. This is a failed securitizing move: CATSA attempted to expand their mandate, to widen their security footprint, to convince the political elite that, due to the terror threat, more powers should accrue to the security service. CATSA publications emphasize the threat of terror, memorialize past attacks, and have instituted a training programme on terror for senior staff (David 2006). The attempt by CATSA to expand their mandate and securitize other areas of airport security was rejected by both the expert panel and the political elite. Both elite and experts were convinced of the threat, but none were convinced that special or expanded powers were needed. The Minister argued specifically that 'Responsibility for aviation security will continue to rest with the Minister of Transport, Infrastructure and Communities... CATSA's activities will be focused on its core aviation security-screening role: the effective and efficient screening of persons who access aircraft or restricted areas through screening points, the property in their possession or control, and the belongings or baggage that they give to an air carrier for transport' (Cannon 2007). Experts and elites argued that the public–private system, structured by rules from Transport Canada, could secure the system. In other words, the existential threat was accepted by the audiences, but not an expansion of powers. Consequently, the securitizing move was not accepted by the key audiences, the Advisory Panel and the Minister. Popular Within popular politics, the securitization of airport screening was easy to accomplish, particularly in countries that had 'focusing events' such as 9/11 (Birkland 1997, 2004). As Lyon observes, 'apart from short-term responses to some notorious hijackings over the past 30 years, airport security was never a topic that engaged the public imagination in Canada (or elsewhere for that matter)' (2006: 398). In 1985, the attack on Air India flight originated in Canada. Investigations determined that it was a result of weak baggage screening and the lack of reconciliation between passengers and luggage. However, passenger screening was not seen as such an important issue — the majority of hijacking or terror attacks occurred in the United States, particularly with reference to Cuba, or in Europe and the Middle East.12 In January 2003, the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence tabled a report in Parliament titled The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports that called for a reinstatement of the RCMP presence and a wide-ranging overhaul of the system. Despite frequent interviews in the popular press by its author, this report did not resonate with the public, the policy, or the political audiences: it represents another failed securitizing move.13 However, the success of the securitization of aviation security can be seen in the popular reaction to two cases of investigative journalism. First, a journalist from the French-language paper Journal de Montréal infiltrated the secure, air-side areas at Trudeau airport in Montreal on a number of occasions through different access points. The journalist entered a catering company's facilities (Cara Foods) and gained access to restricted areas through a disused hanger. The reporter 'found a place to slip under the airport's perimeter fence, but there's no need to get your knees dirty: he also just walked in, repeatedly, as if he belonged. In prohibited zones he gained easy access to the outside of aircraft, to carts full of meals about to be loaded onto planes, and to a truck used to provide water to aircraft' (Gazette 2006). Though none of the checkpoints he passed were staffed by CATSA employees, or indeed the actual regulatory responsibility of CATSA, it was CATSA that was held publicly responsible. While CATSA has responsibility for key elements of aviation security, such as passenger and non-passenger screening at identified checkpoints, it is not responsible for overall perimeter security or security of air-side services. An editorial opined: 'Transport Minister Lawrence Cannon and CATSA chief Maurice Baril have got some explaining to do. Security can't be perfect, but it should surely be better than this'. Minister Cannon summoned Maurice Baril (who was CATSA's Chairman of the Board of Directors, who subsequently resigned) and CATSA President and CEO Jacques Duchesneau to Ottawa 'for further discussions' (Cannon 2006). In Canada, the responsibility for airport security, and the maintenance of air-side security, is shared among a number of different players in the airport and coordinated by Transport Canada through the Aviation Security Regulations. Thus, CATSA is responsible only for its six stated tasks, mandated in the CATSA Act. However, the popular response was that CATSA should be responsible for all of airport security — that all aspects of airport security were the responsibility of the government, because of the existential threat, because of the need for emergency powers. The (inappropriate) critique of CATSA — for, in essence, having a restricted mandate — is a clear demonstration that the public expected that CATSA would be responsible for all airport security (perhaps because of its much larger American counterpart the Transportation Security Administration or a 'misleading' corporate identity). For securitization theory, this implies that the audience, in this case the popular audience, may not simply accept securitization but also initiate an expansion of government powers. The second popular case that demonstrates how the wider public may not simply support, but widen securitization, is the 'revelation' by a Canadian television news programme that CATSA itself had security problems. CBC's investigative journalism programme, The Fifth Estate, broadcast 'Fasten Your Seatbelt' on 5 November 2005 (CBC 2005). A whistle-blower argued that 'customer service' was prioritized over security in passenger screening, and then a security expert, Steve Elson, demonstrated how to circumvent screening points (CBC 2006). The 'security expert' was described as being a former TSA inspector who currently consults on security matters (validating his expertise in both government and liberal economic terms). Once again, a complex web of regulations and responsibilities was simplified (and misconstrued). The whistle-blower was a CATSA employee, and the programme highlighted the role of CATSA in passenger screening and the random nature of non-passenger screening. Within the programme, there was little discussion of the role of the actual regulator and ministry responsible for aviation security: Transport Canada. However, in an unaired portion of the interview with Senator Colin Kenny, one of the authors of The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports said, 'The problem is with Transport Canada. They set the regulations, CATSA simply follows them' (CBC n.d.). CATSA has specifically mentioned their attention to public pressure (Auditor-General 2006), and continuously measures passenger satisfaction rates. Within the popular realm, journalists and government representatives had the roles as experts to 'speak authoritatively'. In these cases, CATSA representatives — who were experts on the legislated mandate of CATSA — were unable to convince the populace through press releases, interviews, etc. that CATSA was not responsible for the security breeches. The socio-political context of Canada also determined 'what might be said'. In particular, the extremely complex interplay of authorities and responsibilities at the airport was radically simplified: CATSA was represented as being solely responsible for aviation security. Any failures of airport security, by themselves or their subcontractors, were laid at the feet of CATSA — as demonstrated by the Minister of Transport calling the President of CATSA back to Ottawa immediately after the Montreal incidents. The success of the securitization of aviation security within this realm is clear in the public criticism of CATSA for not using enough emergency measures to contain this existential threat. The travelling public, which is frequently surveyed by CATSA about its customer service, plays a large role in CATSA's internal discussions, but a smaller role in its discussions with external agencies. These conclusions demonstrate why more nuance is needed in current models of securitization. More is going on than a simple politics of blame or bureaucratic infighting, although plainly some of those dynamics are in play. Rather, CATSA was being responsibilized for all of aviation security in Canada, despite its limited mandate. The popular pressure, I argue, is a representation of the 'facilitating conditions' in the popular imagination: the public was open to securitizing moves by the government. There is also the restriction of 'what might be said': in short, an over-simplification of complex regulatory systems and a misrepresentation of the level of attainable security. No system is completely secure — a fact that is often and easily acknowledged among experts in aviation security. But, this was not portrayed in the popular scene. Investigative journalists, in this case, had the position to speak authoritatively in a way that a Senator and other security experts did not. The public could only express their satisfaction with CATSA's screening as a customer service to CATSA, or in the popular media as a policing and counter-terrorism agency. The failure of the expansion of the security mandate of CATSA in the elite realm and the simultaneous popular critique of CATSA's mandate indicate that the setting matters. Scientific In addition to a set of technical debates, CATSA is also engaged with the scientific community on how to effectively and efficiently screen passengers. I want to focus on the primary adoption of the risk management model, since this has been examined in the Auditor-General's Special Examination and CATSA Act Review process. CATSA was responsible for the purchase and implementation of a wide-scale technological upgrade to explosive detection systems, to meet Canadian and international standards. It has also won awards for its technological innovation for the RAIC programme that uses biometric identification.14 There is also a robust debate in expert circles regarding the use of private firms for security screening, whether airport security can be left to the private sector or should be provided by the government (Frederickson and Laporte 2002; Hainmüller and Lemnitzer 2003; Seidenstat 2004).15 CATSA is mandated to secure key elements of the civil aviation infrastructure through passenger screening. CATSA, however, provides screening according to the 'Security Screening Order', under the Aeronautics Act and the Canadian Aviation Security Regulations. As a crown corporation, CATSA is also bound by government policy to implement a 'risk management strategy', the key elements of which are the evaluation of potential impact and frequency of exposures to different risks. It then formulates a strategy that accepts, avoids, transfers, or mitigates that risk. Within this framework, 'It is government policy to identify, and reduce or eliminate risks to its property, interests and employees, to minimize and contain the costs and consequences in the event of harmful or damaging incidents arising from those risks, and to provide for adequate and timely compensation, restoration and recovery' (Canada. Treasury Board of Canada 2001). CATSA actively engaged the academic and expert communities in formulating its risk management strategy (Brodeur 2006),16 and its proposed Security Management Systems approach (Salter 2007). The CATSA executive asked for training in risk management and, in 2005, the International Centre for Comparative Criminology organized two seminars (in Paris and in Montréal) on risk management. The academic experts at these workshops represented the fields of surveillance studies, criminology, sociology, public health, environmental studies, and risk management itself. The core issues for the experts were the following: 'uncertainty theoretically supersedes risk and rule-based and risk-based models are not mutually exclusive in the promotion of security. Not only can they be reconciled in practice, but they must' (Brodeur 2006: 324). This poses two problems for CATSA, which later became evident in the CATSA Act Review and the Auditor-General's Special Examination: uncertainty within the public security fields makes measurement impossible; following security regulations alone would be insufficient to demonstrate risk management. Among the social scientists represented at the Montréal seminar, there was a consensus that the tactic of risk management, used often in environmental planning and other scientific realms, cannot be easily transferred to the social realm (Zedner 2006: 424). Ericson, an internationally renowned criminologist who pioneered the critical study of risk management, argued, 'risk management systems can restrict freedom, invade privacy, discriminate, and exclude populations. Such self-defeating costs and the uncertainties they entail can be minimized only by infusing risk management systems with value questions about human rights, well-being, prosperity, and solidarity' (2006: 346). These experts questioned not only the empirical reliability of risk management (Manning 2006: 457), but also the ideological function of screening by risk (O'Malley 2006: 420). These experts agreed that the move to a risk-based model of airport screening would require more specific intelligence and the widening of CATSA's mandate. But, they also stressed that because of the radical incalculability of the threat of terror, risk-based security screening had to be combined with rules-based screening. Since risk management could not prevent terror, and may cause potential problems, the problem of airport security had to be made explicitly political. Within these seminars, the setting was academic: experts were selected because of their scholarly credentials and the discourse was in an academic mode.17 At root, the experts attempted a desecuritizing move: since uncertainty trumps risk, the lack of metrics makes measurement (and thus management of risk) impossible. Thus, the security screening process must be political. Since a risk-based approach cannot guarantee security, and the risk- and rule-based systems were in some conflict, CATSA (and by implication Transport Canada, the regulator) must deal with these uncertainties and risks, sensitive to the politics of the situation. Screening procedures could not be an emergency, existential threat that required extraordinary powers or policies. Because security was unobtainable, the process had to remain steadfastly political. Though there was a consensus among the scientific field, this desecuritizing move failed — none of the other audiences were convinced, as demonstrated below in the review of the technocratic setting. Technocratic While the CATSA Act Review had the political elite as its audience, the Auditor-General's Special Examination had only the Office of the Auditor-General as its audience. It was also presented to the CATSA Board of Directors, with clear implications for the Minister — but the authors of the report were a team of auditors not politicians. A Special Examination of CATSA was undertaken by the Auditor-General of Canada during November 2005–June 2006 (a similar time period to the CATSA Act Review process). The Auditor-General appraised the extent to which CATSA was fulfilling and measuring its mandate, as well as other financial and management standards.18 It is beyond the mandate of the Auditor-General's Special Examination to analyse the mandate of the organization (Canada. Office of the Auditor General 2006: 9). CATSA tried to use the Special Examination as another venue to expand its mandate, which, as I argue above, is a securitizing move — accruing more governmental power to manage an existential threat. Just as CATSA attempted this with respect to the elite audience of the CATSA Act Review, they also attempted this in the technocratic setting. As the report concludes: 'CATSA does not wish to be constrained by its limited mandate. CATSA would like to have more control over the way screening operations are conducted, the allocation of screening staff, and the selection of screening equipment; and it would like direct access to intelligence information' (3). The case for the expansion of CATSA's mandate is made in terms of security, emergency, and extraordinary powers: it satisfies the internal criteria for a securitizing move. Here is the key moment: 'CATSA's view is that counterterrorism is a key aspect of its work. This is evident in CATSA documents. Transport Canada has stated that CATSA's current mandated responsibilities do not specifically include counter-terrorism' (14). The CATSA Act Review Advisory Panel also notes this troubled relationship: 'there appears to be a high level of frustration and mistrust between Transport Canada and CATSA at the national level' (CATSA Act Review 2006: 137). The Auditor-General's report is relatively neutral in this bureaucratic in-fighting but that neutrality stands as a rejection of the securitizing move. In short, the securitizing move fails because it does not accept 'security' as a legitimate justification for reevaluating the mandate of CATSA: 'This Special Examination did not question CATSA's mandate; rather it assessed CATSA's systems and practices within its mandate and the regulations that govern the aviation security system' (9). Despite the best efforts of CATSA to make the mandate part of the audit, in order to use the report as a tool in their securitizing move, the Auditor-General did not accept the move. Within the Auditor-General's review, who may speak and what may be said is radically different. CATSA officials prepared reports for the Auditor-General's team who also consulted with an expert team.19 The terms of reference for the report, however, were specific to the crown corporation model and its relevant legislation regarding financial administration. Essentially, security was not the object of study: however, risk management was under scrutiny. Thus, while similar messages were made by CATSA and Transport Canada, they were expressed in different, more managerial language. The audience for this report was primarily the Board of Directors, and indirectly the responsible Minister, Treasury Board Secretariat, and the Parliament of Canada to which the Auditor-General reports. However, the review results were also marshalled in the CATSA Act Review process, in order to bolster the case for a refusal of the securitizing move to increase CATSA's mandate. Thus, the same securitizing/desecuritizing moves are played out, but in a totally different register within different sectors. Settings for Canadian Aviation Security This dramaturgical analysis of CATSA during the crucial 2005–2006 period has demonstrated the need for an analytical disaggregation of the actor–audience model in securitization theory. Within different settings (popular, elite, scientific, and technocratic), different actors were empowered to speak, and different audiences constituted — the rules of those discursive relationships were also impacted by setting. Stakeholders from the CATSA Act Review had no voice in the experts' academic workshop; reports on the measurement of security for the Advisory Panel were not used in the Auditor-General's Special Examination. These different settings also defined the content of securitizing moves: though there was a common desire to expand CATSA's security mandate, it was done with different arguments in the expert workshop, the Special Examination, and the CATSA Act Review. Finally, the CATSA case demonstrates the need to parse the success/failure of securitizing moves in a more nuanced way. CATSA's securitizing move was premised on the acceptance of an existential threat (which is commonly believed), the description of a crisis or emergency (accepted by some and rejected by others), and the accrual of new executive power (which was completely rejected). Top of page Conclusion The CS model of securitization is provocative and productive of many political and research agendas. Making the model more sensitive to who may speak, who can hear, and what can be said within particular settings allows us to evaluate the politics of successful moves to securitize or desecuritize an issue. This kind of analysis necessarily involves an examination of a particular setting over time, a factor often downplayed in CS analysis. Sector studies in public safety, security studies, migration, trafficking, minority rights, and disease can all benefit from a clearer consideration of audience–speaker co-constitution of authority and knowledge, the weight of social context, and the degree of success of particular moves. Desecuritization is seen a priori as more politically preferable than securitization (Wæver 1999: 335). Deliberative politics are by definition more democratic than exceptional politics. This has led to the important debate led by Aradau (2001, 2004, 2006), Alker (2006), Taureck (2006), Behnke (2006), Huysmans (2006), and Floyd (2007) on the ethical relationship of emancipation and politicization to securitization. This follows from a productive discussion on the role of security experts (Eriksson 1999; Goldmann 1999; Wæver 1999; Williams 1999). While this article does not engage this debate extensively, we would argue that, tactically, analysts and experts must understand the political dynamics of successful securitization and desecuritization processes if they wish to intervene. In this, I once again take the lead from Foucault who says that his own analysis has sprung from his personal experiences and a kind of a malaise with objective, abstract, Archimedian theory. In building from his insider knowledge of and outsider status within institutions (such as the clinic, human sexuality, or the penal system), Foucault conducts a 'history of the present' — to ask not 'what does the prison mean' but 'how does the prison mean?' With particular experience in different realms of security studies, it seems that securitization theory might contribute to this kind of history of the present. This is to say that the process of successful securitization and desecuritization operates differently within different settings. If, as security experts, it is part of our role to intervene in the securitization/desecuritization process, then we must gain a tactical knowledge of the conditions for success and failure. There is an assumption in this debate about securitization/desecuritization that experts are significant or important voices. It is true that 'in writing or speaking security, the analyst him/herself executes a speech act, this speech act is successful if the problem raised becomes recognized as a security problem in the academy and/or in the wider policy making discourse' (Floyd 2007: 336).

### 5

#### CIR passes now—new Obama strategy

Brian Bennett and Christi Parsons, “Obama Softens Tone on Immigration Reform,” LOS ANGELES TIMES, 10—24—13, [www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-immigration-obama-20131025,0,6755968.story#axzz2ikONvPvJ](http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-immigration-obama-20131025,0,6755968.story#axzz2ikONvPvJ)

After months of insisting the House should take up the comprehensive immigration bill that passed the Senate in June, President Obama changed tactics Thursday and said he might consider GOP proposals to overhaul separate partsof the immigration system. The White House is hoping that public anger at the 16-day government shutdown has so badly damaged the GOP that House Republican leaders will consider immigration reform as a way to improve their popularity with moderate voters. Obama's aides also are intent on showing the president is willing to compromise, partly to counter GOP charges that he was inflexible during the bitter shutdown standoff. In remarks at the White House, Obama hinted that he was no longer tied to the Senate bill, the elaborate product of months of intense bipartisan negotiations, to achieve what he has called a major priority for his second term. Obama instead signaled that he might consider a package of smaller bills, if necessary, as long as they provide a path to citizenship for the estimated 11 million people in the country without legal status. "If House Republicans have new and different additional ideas on how we should move forward, then we want to hear them. I'll be listening," Obama told several dozen pro-reform activists from labor, business and religious groups. White House spokesman Jay Carney echoed the shift, telling reporters there are "a variety of ways that you can reach the ultimate goal" of a bill that Obama could sign into law. "The House's approach will be up to the House," Carney said. "There is a comprehensive bill the House Democrats have put together that is similar to the Senate bill and reflects the president's principles. But the means by which we arrive at our destination is in some ways of course up to the lawmakers who control the houses of Congress." The White House effort to resuscitate a bill that seemed all but dead in the House before the shutdown still faces steep and perhaps insurmountable odds. But the jockeying Thursday raised at least some hope that compromise remains possible. "I hope President Obama meant what he said today about listening to new and different ideas presented by House Republicans," House Judiciary Committee Chairman Robert W. Goodlatte (R-Va.) said in a statement. "The president should work with Congress, including House Republicans, to achieve immigration reform, and not against us." In recent weeks, GOP leaders have worked behind the scenes to craft legislative proposals that might pass muster with rank-and-file Republicans and — if joined with a legalization program — could appeal to the White House. Majority Leader Eric Cantor and other House Republicans have met in small groups to write bills that would change parts of the immigration system. GOP proposals include adding high-tech visas, revamping farm and low-skilled immigrant labor programs, and ramping up border security. "I expect us to move forward this year in trying to address reform and what is broken about our system," Cantor said on the House floor Wednesday.

#### Detention guts Obama cred

Michael Kelly, “Why Losing Indefinite Detention Powers Would Be a Disaster for Obama,” BUSINESS INSIDER, 10—24—12,

<http://www.businessinsider.com/why-losing-indefinite-detention-powers-would-be-a-disaster-for-obama-2012-10>

There's a big story by Greg Miller in the Washington Post on how the Obama administration has expanded its powers in the War on Terror. Miller notes that the legal foundation for U.S. counterterrorism strategy is partially based on "the Congressional authorization to use military force" (AUMF) that was passed after 9/11. Specifically it seems to be based on an interpretation of the AUMF that was "reaffirmed" by the indefinite detention clause of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). This explains why Obama is fighting so hard to keep the indefinite detention clause in effect. In court the government argued that the indefinite detention clause is simply a "reaffirmation" of the Authorization Use Of Military Force (AUMF), which gives the president authority "to use all necessary and appropriate force against those ... [who] aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001 or harbored such organizations or persons." In the NDAA lawsuit, the government argued that the NDAA §1021 is simply an "affirmation" or "reaffirmation" of the AUMF. But the NDAA adds language to the AUMF when it says "The President also has the authority to detain persons who were part of or substantially supported, Taliban or al-Qaida forces or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners, including any person who has committed a belligerent act, or has directly supported hostilities, in the aid of such enemy forces." That extra part is what Judge Katherine Forrest ruled unconstitutionally vague. And since Judge Forrest was careful to protect the AUMF in her permanent injunction, the government should be OK with that decision if the AUMF and NDAA indefinite detention powers are precisely the same. Tangerine Bolen, an activist and plaintiff on the NDAA lawsuit, told us that the government's reaction raised "significant red flags" that the indefinite detention clause is "a retroactive legislative fix ...[that] allows them to continue to arbitrarily apply indefinite detention to whomever they wish, whenever they wish, for whatever reasons they wish without being held accountable." Thus a victory for the plaintiffs in the NDAA lawsuit would strike down unjustified indefinite detention powers that the government has been claiming for years. "Our lawsuit is the lock on Pandora's box," Bolen said. "And Pandora's box is the overly broad application of the AUMF… [Blocking NDAA §1021] is to suddenly and sharply delimit powers upon which President Obama has come to rely wrongfully. He never should've had these powers. Bush never should've had these powers." The Post notes that critics of Obama's secret drone war argue that its legal justifications have become much weaker as "the drone campaign has expanded far beyond the core group of al-Qaeda operatives ... [and] officials see an array of emerging threats beyond Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia — the three countries where almost all U.S. drone strikes have occurred." Bolen argues that the "irreparable harm" is that the permanent injunction would possibly be "exposing illegal activities for the last decade. It could have such a set of ripple consequences: we could see people in the Bush administration, Obama administration and security agencies be investigated for how they have applied the AUMF. Obama could finally be forced to release all the prisoners at Guantanamo Bay who have been cleared for years. It's an incredible headache for him."

#### Capital key

Laura Matthews, “Immigration Reform Bill: ‘I’m Going to Push to Call a Vote,’ Says Obama,” INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TIMES, 10—16—13,

[www.ibtimes.com/2013-immigration-reform-bill-im-going-push-call-vote-says-obama-1429220](http://www.ibtimes.com/2013-immigration-reform-bill-im-going-push-call-vote-says-obama-1429220)

When Congress finally passes a bipartisan bill that kicks the fiscal battles over to early next year, the spotlight could return to comprehensive immigration reform before 2013 ends. At least that’s the hope of President Barack Obama and his fellow Chicagoan Rep. Luis Gutierrez, D-Ill., chairman of the Immigration Task Force of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus and one of the most vocal advocates for immigration reform in the House of Representatives. “When we emerge from this crazy partisan eruption from the Republicans, there will be a huge incentive for sensible Republicans who want to repair some of the damage they have done to themselves,” Gutierrez said in a statement. “Immigration reform remains the one issue popular with both Democratic and Republican voters on which the two parties can work together to deliver real, substantive solutions in the Congress this year.” Reforming the status quo has consistently been favored by a majority of Americans. Earlier this year, at least two-thirds of Americans supported several major steps to make the system work better, according to a Gallup poll. Those steps include implementing an E-verify system for employers to check electronically the immigration status of would-be employees (85 percent), a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants, (72 percent), an entry-exit check system to make sure people who enter the country then leave it (71 percent), more high-skilled visas (71 percent) and increased border security (68 percent). The Senate passed its version of a 2013 immigration reform bill in June that includes, but is not limited to, a pathway to citizenship for immigrants without documentation and doubling security on the southern border. But that measure has stalled in the House, where Republicans are adamant they will take a piecemeal approach. The momentum that lawmakers showed for reform has been sapped by the stalemate that that has shut down the government for 16 days and brought the U.S. to the brink of default. The Senate has agreed on Wednesday to a bipartisan solution to break the gridlock. When the shutdown and default threat is resolved (for a time), that’s when Obama will renew his push to get Congress to move on immigration reform. On Tuesday the president said reform will become his top priority. “Once that’s done, you know, the day after, I’m going to be pushing to say, call a vote on immigration reform,” Obama told Univision affiliate KMEX-TV in Los Angeles. “And if I have to join with other advocates and continue to speak out on that, and keep pushing, I’m going to do so because I think it’s really important for the country. And now is the time to do it.” The president pointed the finger at House Speaker John Boehner, R-Ohio, for not allowing the bill to be brought to the floor for a vote. Boehner had promised that the Senate’s bill would not be voted on unless a majority of the majority in the House supports it -- the same principle he was holding out for on the government shutdown before he gave in. “We had a very strong Democratic and Republican vote in the Senate,” Obama said. “The only thing right now that’s holding it back is, again, Speaker Boehner not willing to call the bill on the floor of the House of Representatives. So we’re going to have to get through this crisis that was unnecessary, that was created because of the obsession of a small faction of the Republican Party on the Affordable Care Act.” Republicans are opposing the Democratic view of immigration reform because of its inclusion of a 13-year path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants. They said this amounted to “amnesty.” Some Republicans prefer to give them legal resident status instead. Immigration advocates have also been urging Obama to use his executive authority to halt the more than 1,000 deportations taking place daily. Like the activists, Gutierrez said the government shutdown didn’t do anything to slow the number of daily deportations. Some Republicans who welcomed Sen. Ted Cruz’s filibuster over Obamacare because it shifted the focus from immigration. “If Ted [didn’t] spin the filibuster, if we don’t make this the focus, we had already heard what was coming,” Rep. Louie Gohmert, R-Texas, told Fox News on Tuesday. “As soon as we got beyond this summer, we were going to have an amnesty bill come to the floor. That’s what we would have been talking about. And that’s where the pivot would have been if we had not focused America on Obamacare.” Still, pro-immigration advocates are hopeful they can attain their goal soon. “With more prodding from the president and the American people,” Gutierrez said, “we can get immigration reform legislation passed in the House and signed into law.”

#### Saves economy

---Innovation ---Investment capital ---Aging workforce

Huffington Post, 2-7-2013, Why Our Economy Demands Immigration Reform, p. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jonathanmiller/immigration-reform-economy\_b\_2639092.html

When it comes to restoring strong, long-term growth in our nation's economy, there are few solutions more practical, bi-partisan, and urgent than immigration reform. Our current immigration system is rigid, outdated, and simply unable to keep up with demands of the new global marketplace. For our nation to thrive and transcend international competition in the 21st century economy, it is incumbent for us to build an immigration system that welcomes people who share our values, as well as the entrepreneurial spirit that has made our country great. No one can doubt that we are a nation whose foundation was built by immigrants. But did you know that more than 40 percent of today's Fortune 500 companies were founded by an immigrant, or a child of an immigrant? Or that more than 75 percent of all the patents received by the top ten U.S. universities in 2011 had an immigrant inventor? While we celebrate our nation's first immigrants every Thanksgiving -- and while many of us cherish the stories shared by our own family members who made the pilgrimage to our shores -- we too often forget that today, and every day, recent immigrants continue to play a vital role in the American economy. Unfortunately, far too often, our immigration policies drive too many foreign-born entrepreneurs and job creators away, even after we have trained them and given them degrees from American universities. This is not simply a matter of compassion or human interest. This is about the very survival of our economy, way of life, and continued global leadership. We must make it easier for foreign-born, U.S.-educated students to get visas. We must create a startup visa program for entrepreneurs and innovators who want to come to our country to start businesses and hire American workers, especially when they already have U.S. investors to back their ideas. We must be doing everything we can to keep that capital in the U.S., rather than handing the next great idea over to our competitors. Furthermore, with the enormous baby boomer generation set to retire, our current aging workforce simply cannot keep up with the demands. We need many more young workers, both in the high- and low-skilled areas of our economy. The U.S. government estimates that there are more than 3.5 million unfilled jobs in this country, even with high unemployment. Shortages are particularly high in industries with seasonal demands, like agriculture, landscaping, and hospitality. Many hotels and resorts across the country remain at half capacity, even during the busiest tourist seasons, simply because they cannot find enough workers to meet demands. We leave hundreds of millions of dollars in crops out in the fields because we can't hire enough workers to harvest them in time. Unfortunately, our system is not structured in a way that accounts for the ebb and flow of our labor needs. We need a more flexible visa allotment system, and we need to expand the number of employment-based visas that are issued each year. Right now, only 7 percent of all green cards are distributed for employment based reasons, which is clearly far too low.

**Economic collapse causes global nuclear war**

**Merlini,** Senior Fellow – Brookings, **11** [CesareMerlini, nonresident senior fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe and chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Italian Institute for International Affairs (IAI) in Rome. He served as IAI president from 1979 to 2001. Until 2009, he also occupied the position of executive vice chairman of the Council for the United States and Italy, which he co-founded in 1983. His areas of expertise include transatlantic relations, European integration and nuclear non-proliferation, with particular focus on nuclear science and technology.A Post-Secular World? DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2011.571015 Article Requests: Order Reprints : Request Permissions Published in: journal Survival, Volume 53, Issue 2 April 2011 , pages 117 - 130 Publication Frequency: 6 issues per year Download PDF Download PDF (~357 KB) View Related Articles To cite this Article: Merlini, Cesare 'A Post-Secular World?', Survival, 53:2, 117 – 130]

Two neatly opposed scenarios for the future of the world order illustrate the range of possibilities, albeit at the risk of oversimplification. The first scenario entails the premature crumbling of the post-Westphalian system. One or more of the acute tensions apparent today evolves into an open and traditional **conflict** between states, perhaps even**involving** the use of**nuclear weapons**.The crisis **might be triggered by a collapse of the global** economic and **financial system, the vulnerability of which we have just experienced, and the prospect of a second Great Depression, with consequences for peace** and democracy**similar to** those of **the first**. Whatever the trigger, the unlimited exercise of national sovereignty, exclusive self-interest and rejection of outside interference would likely be amplified, emptying, perhaps entirely, the half-full glass of multilateralism, including the UN and the European Union. Many of the more likely conflicts, such as between Israel and Iran or India and Pakistan, have potential religious dimensions. Short of war, tensions such as those related to immigration might become unbearable. Familiar issues of creed and identity could be exacerbated. One way or another, the secular rational approach would be sidestepped by a return to theocratic absolutes, competing or converging with secular absolutes such as unbridled nationalism

### Allies

#### NATO collapse spurs CSDP shift- US would support the transition

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The second option for CSDP is to continue to attempt to carve out a workable relationship with NATO as a separate and autonomous entity. That option presents a number of challenges. Why would another twenty years produce markedly better results for CSDP than the last twenty? As long as the two organizations remain, or are kept distinct, there will be a huge tendency to revert to an uneven and inequitable division of labor—with NATO doing the heavy-lifting and CSDP serving as a mere back-up organization for minor missions. But that again will prove unsatisfactory both to the United States and to the European Union. As long as the two organizations remain separate in their membership and objectives, sparring and generally dysfunctional behavior will afflict both. There have, in recent years, been strong arguments in favor of the EU developing its own OHQ, separate from NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), because that was the logic of autonomy.29 It is easy to grasp the problem in leaving the EU dependent, through lack of an OHQ, on U.S. goodwill in the event of a mission the United States might not support, although it is hard to see what that mission might be. But in a period of general and massive economic retrenchment, is this type of duplication viable? The EU should aim to become more and more capable of doing high-level operational planning through SHAPE.¶ The third CSDP-NATO option is for CSDP to merge with NATO and take over NATO functions. This also presents a number of major challenges and is predicated on two key assumptions. The first is that the United States is serious about encouraging the Europeans progressively to become consequential players, essentially responsible for taking on the leadership of stability and security in the greater EU area. In the triple context outlined above, the odds seem in favor of this being the case. Why would the United States continue to want the burden and expense of carrying the security of the Europeans (who are more numerous and wealthier than they) in an era of austerity and retrenchment and when the world of 1947–49 has moved on several times? The U.S. “decline” has been seriously exaggerated, but even Washington now has to make real choices and focus its attention on strategic priorities.¶ In the short- and medium-terms, it is reasonable to expect that, despite Gates’ warnings and the uncertain fate of the U.S. defense budget, the United States will be prepared to continue to underpin NATO for a transitional period. Washington remains committed to the transatlantic relationship, which constitutes a vital interest for U.S. foreign and security policy. But there are two caveats. First, it will do so increasingly reluctantly, especially if the Europeans persist in shirking their historical and strategic responsibilities. Second, the United States will not do so forever. There is a real time limit on the 1949 arrangements—the “O” in NATO.30 However, if the Europeans are seen to be taking control of their own destiny and neighborhood, then there are reasons to believe that the United States will be willing to share and eventually even to transfer responsibilities to the Europeans, who will progressively become the major stakeholder(s) in the “Alliance.” This is a major assumption.¶ The second assumption is perhaps even more difficult to make. It is that the EU (collectively) will agree to shoulder the responsibilities of regional security and stabilization and to provide the resources that shift will require. If the EU intends to become a global player, it has no alternative than to become a global military (and civilian-military) power. The generation of a credible CSDP, however, can only happen if the EU, in the wake of developments at the economic and financial level (the Eurozone), agrees to move forward in significant pooling of sovereignty. If it does not, then it is probable that the EU will never succeed in forging a common security and defense policy.¶ The biggest challenge remains that of capacity generation. The dynamics of pooling and sharing should be concentrated in the EU.31 It makes no sense to have two separate processes, one operating within NATO and another within the EU. There is very little chance that mere coordination of national means would suffice to meet European requirements.32 Shared sovereignty is only meaningful if accompanied by policy convergence and shared security and strategic objectives—in other words, a process of political integration. Pooling and sharing have political, economic, industrial, and operational implications. The EU is a global political project, whereas NATO deals “merely” with security. The EU is also the framework within which Europe generates common interests. Logically, therefore, it is the place where these interests can best be harmonized at the level of the defense industrial base. This European procurement process should be conducted in tight liaison with NATO, but the EU framework will remain indispensable. The role of the EDA should be central and the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) should morph into an agency which ensures liaison with the U.S. defense industrial base. There are two key reasons why, to date, EU capacity-generation has not had the desired effect. First, as long as the United States gives the impression that it will “cover” Europe, the motivation for Europeans to stump up for defense is removed. Second, Europeans have not yet gone anywhere near as far as they will eventually have to go in the direction of pooling/sharing, rationalization, and specialization.

#### NATO free riding chain-gangs the US into war with russia

Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute , 4/22/13 “NATOs Lack of Any Serious Purpose Means It Should Retire” <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/natos-lack-any-serious-purpose-means-it-should-retire>

NATO’s foreign ministers are meeting this week and have a “busy agenda,” proclaims the alliance. Yet NATO no longer has any serious purpose. European countries want to be military powers, but increasingly are failing to maintain capable forces. America always has been the dominant power in NATO. The U.S. may soon be the only effective power in the alliance. NATO should retire. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was created more than six decades ago. Having fought to free Western Europe from Nazi domination, Washington was determined to keep Western Europe free from Soviet domination. Yet a Soviet invasion quickly became unlikely, if for no other reason than the potential of escalation to nuclear war. After the collapse of the U.S.S.R. the transatlantic alliance became irrelevant. Its purpose, famously explained Lord Hastings Ismay, was “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.” All of these objectives had been met. Today the Soviet Union is gone. Russia may be hostile, but it lacks both the will and ability to threaten Europe. At most Moscow can beat up on weak neighbors like Georgia. Germany remains down militarily, skeptical of international involvement. Ironically, most of Europe wants Berlin to do more. Economically the federal republic is way up — underwriting the entire European Union. The U.S. is in. America and Europe share history, tradition, and values. Economic ties may grow through a transatlantic free trade agreement. Military links are secondary. However, despite the changed international environment institutional survival became NATO’s paramount objective. Proposals were advanced to shift from deterring the Soviets to combating illegal drug use, underwriting student exchanges, and promoting environmental protection. Eventually the alliance decided to operate “out of area.” As common security threats disappeared, members increasingly used the alliance to drag other members into narrow conflicts favored by only a few members. Germany helped trigger the Balkan wars with its speedy recognition of the seceding Yugoslavian territories without any protection for Serbian minorities. While the initial attack on Afghanistan to displace al-Qaeda and oust the Taliban properly responded to 9/11, the years of combat that followed (and which continue) did not. Britain and France pressed for war in Libya even though they were incapable of prosecuting it alone. Mali belongs to Paris, though as yet the rest of the alliance has stayed out of combat there. These unnecessary wars have kept the alliance busy, but they also have accelerated its decline. They demonstrate that NATO is irrelevant to its members’ security. Many Europeans no longer even see any obvious need for national militaries. Observed Christian Moelling with the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik: “At a time of significant financial hardship, some … might even begin to question the merit of having armed forces at all.” Europe faces the prospect of having armed forces consisting of little more than gaudily garbed ceremonial soldiers, strutting in front of palace+es and parliaments. Oddly, at this moment the old imperial temptation appears to be reasserting itself in some European capitals. Philip Stephens wrote in the Financial Times that “Europeans have caught the interventionist bug just as the U.S. has shaken it off. The French and the British led the war to depose Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi. They are in the vanguard of calls for intervention in Syria.” Paris also acted in Mali. The Europeans seem increasingly determined to reshape conflicts and rebuild nations throughout the Middle East and Africa without possessing the military force to do so.¶ With this backdrop a senior NATO official visited Washington last week. He spoke at a private gathering, quipping that he couldn’t be quoted but he could be fired. The discussion suggested an alliance in terminal decline.¶ He argued that NATO is being transformed by several important events. One is Afghanistan, which has dominated NATO thinking for more than a decade yet has “reduced the aptitude for crisis management,” that is, fighting wars “beyond direct defense.” Another is the diminution of terrorism as a strategic concern. It still exists, witness Boston. But rather than posing “an overarching threat,” it is something that “we will have to live with.”¶ The financial-economic crisis continues, sapping military budgets on both sides of the Atlantic. As a result “there is no chance for budget increases, not even for keeping spending levels as they are.” The energy revolution is reducing the “political relevance of the Persian Gulf and Russia.” The so-called pivot to Asia will further diminish American force levels in Europe.¶ All of these have had an effect. But the elephant in the room is the disappearance of any transatlantic security need. Military alliances are intended to deal with common threats. One existed during the Cold War. But no longer.¶ So what should NATO do as the troops come home from Afghanistan? One of the event’s participants urged Syria as the next mission for the alliance. If not, then what is the use of NATO, he asked? However, the conflict poses no direct threat to any alliance member — a few artillery shells landing on Turkish territory don’t count. Getting involved in a brutal civil war in which one side possesses a sizable army armed with chemical weapons and the other side includes many anti-Western radicals would be madness.¶ Another discussant suggested getting back to the core duty of collective security, including cyber security and missile defense. However, such activities, though useful, do not require a formal military alliance among the western powers. Cyber cooperation should extend well beyond Europe, while anti-missile activity could mix bilateral and regional links.¶ Would not expanding the alliance reinforce the more traditional security mission? One questioner contended that NATO membership would secure the borders of Montenegro from Serbia, from which Montenegro seceded. Another participant proposed adding Georgia, which desires protection from Russia.¶ However, the transatlantic alliance is not a charity. NATO’s purpose is to guard the security of existing members, not to risk their security protecting other countries. Serbia poses no danger to the U.S. and its allies, which dismembered what was left of Yugoslavia not that many years ago. There’s no reason for America to threaten war on behalf of Montenegro, one of the resulting pieces.¶ Adding Tbilisi to NATO would be even more foolish. Georgia was part of the Russian Empire before the Soviet Union. Georgia is entitled to independence, but not to U.S. protection. Washington has nothing at stake which warrants confronting nuclear-armed Moscow over interests the latter views as vital in its own backyard. Doing so would degrade, not enhance, American security.

#### Extended deterrence breakdowns inevitable and highly probable- cold war analogy is wrong

Ted Galen Carpenter, Vice President, Defense and Foreign Policy Studies, Cato Institute, "The Limits of Deterrence," NATIONAL INTEREST (ONLINE), 9-3-08, www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=9622, accessed 4-16-10.

Despite the cold-war experience, extended deterrence (protecting allies or client states) is hardly infallible. Indeed, history is littered with the wreckage of deterrence failures. Most Europeans in the early years of the 20th century assumed that the Continent's elaborate system of alliances would make war unthinkable. The tragic events of 1914 demonstrated how wrong they were. A generation later, the explicit British and French security guarantees to Poland did not deter Germany from invading that country. The United States is certainly more powerful militarily than Russia, but the balance of military power is not the only consideration. Another crucial factor is the importance of the issues at stake to the protector compared to their importance to the challenging power — what might be termed the balance of fervor. That factor worked in America's favor in its confrontation with the Soviet Union. It does not do so today with respect to Russia.

#### \*\*Free riding guts nato effecitivness

NYT 11 “Talking Truth to NATO”¶ Published: June 10, 2011 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/11/opinion/11sat1.html?\_r=0

America’s key strategic alliance throughout the cold war is in far deeper trouble than most members admit. The Atlantic allies face a host of new and old dangers. Without more and wiser European military spending — on equipment, training, surveillance and reconnaissance — NATO faces, as Mr. Gates rightly warned, “a dim if not dismal future” and even “irrelevance.”¶ The secretary is retiring at the end of this month, which is likely one of the reasons he jettisoned the diplomatic niceties. But not the only one. As he made clear, this country can no longer afford to do a disproportionate share of NATO’s fighting and pay a disproportionate share of its bills while Europe slashes its defense budgets and free-rides on the collective security benefits.¶ NATO’s shockingly wobbly performance over Libya, after the Pentagon handed off leadership, should leave no doubt about the Europeans’ weaknesses. And while America’s NATO partners now have 40,000 troops in Afghanistan (compared with about 99,000 from the United States), many have been hemmed in by restrictive rules of engagement and shortages of critical equipment. Too many are scheduled for imminent departure.¶ The free-rider problem is an old one but has gotten even worse over the last two decades. During most of the cold war, the United States accounted for 50 percent of total NATO military spending; today it accounts for 75 percent. Mr. Gates was right when he warned of America’s dwindling patience with allies “unwilling to devote the necessary resources or make the necessary changes to be serious and capable partners in their own defense.”¶ Decades of underinvestment, poor spending choices and complacent denial about new challenges have created what Mr. Gates called a “two-tiered alliance.” He is right that too many of its members limit themselves to “humanitarian, development, peacekeeping and talking tasks,” and too few are available for the combat missions the alliance as a whole has agreed to assume.¶ Libya, a mission much more directly linked to the security of Europe than of the United States, strikingly illustrates the consequences.¶ Fewer than half of NATO’s 28 members are taking part in the military mission. Fewer than a third are participating in the all-important airstrikes. British and French aircraft carry the main burden. Canada, Belgium, Norway and Denmark, despite limited resources, have made outsized contributions. Turkey, with the alliance’s second-largest military, has remained largely on the sidelines. Germany, NATO’s biggest historic beneficiary, has done nothing at all.¶ Even fully participating members have failed to train enough targeting specialists to keep all of their planes flying sorties or to buy enough munitions to sustain a bombing campaign much beyond the present 11 weeks.¶ That should frighten every defense ministry in Europe. What if they had to fight a more formidable enemy than Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi’s fractured dictatorship?¶ Combat is not always the best or only solution. NATO needs those European development and peacekeeping capabilities. All alliance members must also have at least the basic military capacities to meet common threats. Without that, the alliance will grow increasingly hollow — a fact that enemies will not miss.¶ Mr. Gates was right to speak out. We hope his likely successor, Leon Panetta, will keep pushing hard. A two-tiered military alliance is really no alliance at all.

#### No offense- Russia won’t threaten Europe- AND Georgia expansion kills cooperation over every global issue

Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow, Cato Institute, "Alliances as Transmission Belts of War," Campaign for Liberty, 10-21-09, www.campaignforliberty.com/article.php?view=284, accessed 4-16-10.

Unfortunately, real peace is not yet at hand. The Mission warns: "Even though both sides stress their commitment to a peaceful future, the risk of a new confrontation remains serious." Georgia and Russia routinely charge each other with provocations. South Ossetia and Tbilisi have been accusing each other of border violations. Saakashvili recently switched defense ministers in order to speed the rebuilding of Georgia’s armed forces. Abkhazia shifted control of its railroad to Moscow, sparking Georgian charges of "robbery." In August Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin visited Abkhazia. If Tbilisi was willing to start a war merely hoping for aid from countries with which it had no formal treaty obligation, imagine how Tbilisi likely would act if it enjoyed an official American promise to go to war. There would be no greater invitation to irresponsibility. Still, NATO expansion advocates assume that Russia would back down in any confrontation if Georgia belonged to the Atlantic alliance. Even if that was true, Washington would antagonize Moscow for no obvious benefit. NATO made sense when the Soviet Union threatened war-torn Western Europe. But that world disappeared long ago. Today the European Union states have more than ten times the GDP of Russia and Moscow’s old Warsaw Pact allies have changed sides. Russia has neither the will nor the ability to conquer its neighbors. Even so, confronting Moscow would risk much potential loss. Washington wants Russian cooperation on supplying U.S. forces in Afghanistan, persuading Iran to eschew nuclear weapons, convincing North Korea to give up nuclear weapons, reducing American and Russian nuclear weapons, and supplying energy to the world market. Moscow is not likely to offer its assistance gratis. Moreover, deterrence is never certain. Deterrence requires that an opponent view a threat as credible, and believe the consequences of backing down are less damaging than of moving forward. The issue is not what American policymakers view as reasonable, but what leaders in the opposing nation (or nations) believe.

#### Russia relations solve everything

**CFR** Task Force 200**6** [Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force for Russia, Chaired by John Edwards and Jack Kemp, “RUSSIA’S WRONG DIRECTION: WHAT THE UNITED STATES CAN AND SHOULD DO,” http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Russia\_TaskForce.pdf]

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, American presidents and policymakers have believed that the interests of the United States are served by engagement with Russ**ia**. This Task Force, too, began its review of U.S. policy—and concludes it—convinced of the extraordinary importance of getting U.S. relations with Russia right. U.S.-Russian cooperation can help the United States to handle some of the most difficult challenges it faces: terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, tight energy markets, climate change, the drug trade, infectious diseases, and human trafficking. These problems are more manageable when the United States has Russia on its side rather than aligned against it. Good relations between Moscow and Washington also bolster one of the most promising international realities of our time—the near absence of security rivalries among the major powers. That the world’s leading states deal with each other in a spirit of accommodation is a great asset for American policy, and the United States will be in a better position to protect that arrangement if relations with Russia are on a positive track.

#### \*\*Russia war outweighs

Nick Bostrum, Professor of Philosophy, Yale University, “Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards,” 2002, www.transhumanist.com/volume9/risks.html.

A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[4] Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century.

#### Cyber coop not dependent on NATO

Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute , 4/22/13 “NATOs Lack of Any Serious Purpose Means It Should Retire” <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/natos-lack-any-serious-purpose-means-it-should-retire>

.¶ Another discussant suggested getting back to the core duty of collective security, including cyber security and missile defense. However, such activities, though useful, do not require a formal military alliance among the western powers. Cyber cooperation should extend well beyond Europe, while anti-missile activity could mix bilateral and regional links.

#### Piracy is dead—statistics, international naval patrolling, private ship security, best management practices manual, Somalia stability

Venugopalan, 13 (Urmila Venugopalan – South Asia manager at Oceans Beyond Piracy, April 10, “Is Somali piracy over?”, CNN, http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2013/04/10/is-somali-piracy-over/)

Difficult economic conditions have pushed many a business leader into early retirement. But Mohamed Abdi Hassan – the Somali pirate kingpin nicknamed “Afweyne” or “Big Mouth” – surely never expected to be among them. The notorious crime boss made a splash at the beginning of this year when he announced his decision to “quit” piracy after eight lucrative years in the business. Coinciding with news reports that pirate attacks in the Indian Ocean have plunged to a five-year low, Hassan’s “retirement” raises an unexpected question: is Somali piracy over?

Certainly, the statistics paint an optimistic picture of fewer attacks and fewer successful hijackings. The International Maritime Bureau’s 2012 annual report noted that the number of recorded pirate attacks fell dramatically, from 237 in 2011 to just 75 last year. Attempted attacks also dropped sharply, from 189 in 2011 to 59 in 2012, although this figure is likely complicated by increased in the underreporting of such incidents. Pirates were also less successful at hijacking commercial vessels, capturing only 14 last year, down 50 percent from 2011. These statistics have encouraged some to claim that the Somali piracy bubble has burst.

But is it too soon to write off this business?

Certainly, the international community’s circumspect reaction to these figures is telling. U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki Moon warned in November that despite the sharp decline in attacks, progress was fragile and “easily reversed if we do not address the causes of piracy.” Other leaders have echoed this sentiment, suggesting that the falling numbers are not necessarily evidence of a firm positive trend.

So what is really driving Somali piracy to its lowest level in five years? For a start, there are the ongoing international naval patrols in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean. In particular, enhanced cooperation among international navies has been a key factor behind the steep drop in piracy. For example, regular naval patrols led by the “big three” missions – NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield, the EU’s Operation Atlanta, and Combined Task Force 151 – have been supplemented since last year by an increase in unilateral deployments by China, India, Japan, Russia, and South Korea. Indeed, on any given day during 2012, there were between 21 and 30 vessels taking part in east African counter-piracy efforts.

More from CNN: Help Somalia fight roots of piracy

But patrolling an area of about four million square kilometers – roughly equivalent to one and a half times the size of mainland Europe – is expensive. In fact, Oceans Beyond Piracy calculated in its 2012 Economic Cost of Piracy report that the total military cost for the big three naval operations was around $1 billion. With the global economy still sluggish, and with governments cutting budgets, it is difficult to imagine there will be the political will to sustain a long term counter-piracy presence in the Indian Ocean. Moreover, the declining number of pirate attacks could well be interpreted as proof that the missions have fulfilled their objectives. All this means that there is a risk that pirate activity could well pick up after the EU and NATO’s counter-piracy mandates expire in 2014.

Still, deploying impressive military hardware isn’t the only way to keep shipping safe. Commercial vessels have also been increasingly employing privately contracted armed guards. So far, this appears to have been effective – not a single ship with private armed security on board has been hijacked by pirates to date. For many in the shipping industry, this regularly touted fact – coupled with the diminishing number of assaults – validates the growing use of armed guards. However, their use is not without its own set of challenges. Around half of all ships transiting the “high risk area” – which stretches from the Persian Gulf to the Seychelles in the south and up to the western coast of India – employ on average four-man teams of private armed guards. As a result, shipping companies are now spending between $1.15 billion and $1.53 billion dollars per year on these armed security teams, according to the 2012 Economic Cost of Piracy study. And while private security firms can justifiably claim to have made the seas safer for their clients, they continue to operate in a largely unregulated space, under uncertain rules of engagement.

A final factor in driving down incidences of piracy has been the implementation of the shipping industry’s current best management practices manual. In particular, it recommends that ships should transit at “full sea speed” (or at least 18 knots) throughout the high risk area – a tactic that has been successful in thwarting hijack attempts in recent years. So far, no vessel traveling at this speed or faster has been successfully hijacked. But this too comes at a price. When ships “speed up” while transiting the high risk area, they burn fuel more quickly. As a result, “shipping companies spent an extra $1.53 billion on fuel costs associated with steaming at faster than optimal speeds in order to prevent pirate attacks,” according to Oceans Beyond Piracy’s latest report.

Undoubtedly these high-cost band aids have been effective in reducing the number of pirate attacks and hijackings at sea. But the reality is that a comprehensive and lasting solution to piracy will have to take place on land, in Somalia.

Is this likely?

There was some reason for hope last year. The military gains made by AMISOM (African Union Mission in Somalia) forces against al-Shabaab militants were matched by significant political progress, including the approval of a new constitution, the swearing-in of a parliament, and the election of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. But a series of suicide bombings in Mogadishu, coupled with the warning last week by the British government that it believes terrorist attacks are being planned in Somalia’s capital, are reminders of just how much remains to be done.

#### Cyber war infeasible

**Clark**, MA candidate – Intelligence Studies @ American Military University, senior analyst – Chenega Federal Systems, 4/28/’**12** (Paul, “The Risk of Disruption or Destruction of Critical U.S. Infrastructure by an Offensive Cyber Attack,” American Military University)

The Department of Homeland Security worries that our critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) may be exposed, both directly and indirectly, to multiple threats because of CIKR reliance on the global cyber infrastructure, an infrastructure that is under routine cyberattack by a “spectrum of malicious actors” (National Infrastructure Protection Plan 2009). CIKR in the extremely large and complex U.S. economy spans multiple sectors including agricultural, finance and banking, dams and water resources, public health and emergency services, military and defense, transportation and shipping, and energy (National Infrastructure Protection Plan 2009). The disruption and destruction of public and private infrastructure is part of warfare, without this infrastructure conflict cannot be sustained (Geers 2011). Cyber-attacks are desirable because they are considered to be a relatively “low cost and long range” weapon (Lewis 2010), but prior to the creation of Stuxnet, the first cyber-weapon, the ability to disrupt and destroy critical infrastructure through cyber-attack was theoretical. The movement of an offensive cyber-weapon from conceptual to actual has forced the United States to question whether offensive cyber-attacks are a significant threat that are able to disrupt or destroy CIKR to the level that national security is seriously degraded. It is important to understand the risk posed to national security by cyber-attacks to ensure that government responses are appropriate to the threat and balance security with privacy and civil liberty concerns. The risk posed to CIKR from cyber-attack can be evaluated by measuring the threat from cyber-attack against the vulnerability of a CIKR target and the consequences of CIKR disruption. As the only known cyber-weapon, Stuxnet has been thoroughly analyzed and used as a model for predicting future cyber-weapons. The U.S. electrical grid, a key component in the CIKR energy sector, is a target that has been analyzed for vulnerabilities and the consequences of disruption predicted – the electrical grid has been used in multiple attack scenarios including a classified scenario provided to the U.S. Congress in 2012 (Rohde 2012). Stuxnet will serve as the weapon and the U.S. electrical grid will serve as the target in this risk analysis that concludes that there is a low risk of disruption or destruction of critical infrastructure from a an offensive cyber-weapon because of the complexity of the attack path, the limited capability of non-state adversaries to develop cyber-weapons, and the existence of multiple methods of mitigating the cyber-attacks. To evaluate the threat posed by a Stuxnet-like cyber-weapon, the complexity of the weapon, the available attack vectors for the weapon, and the resilience of the weapon must be understood. The complexity – how difficult and expensive it was to create the weapon – identifies the relative cost and availability of the weapon; inexpensive and simple to build will be more prevalent than expensive and difficult to build. Attack vectors are the available methods of attack; the larger the number, the more severe the threat. For example, attack vectors for a cyberweapon may be email attachments, peer-to-peer applications, websites, and infected USB devices or compact discs. Finally, the resilience of the weapon determines its availability and affects its usefulness. A useful weapon is one that is resistant to disruption (resilient) and is therefore available and reliable. These concepts are seen in the AK-47 assault rifle – a simple, inexpensive, reliable and effective weapon – and carry over to information technology structures (Weitz 2012). The evaluation of Stuxnet identified malware that is “unusually complex and large” and required code written in multiple languages (Chen 2010) in order to complete a variety of specific functions contained in a “vast array” of components – it is one of the most complex threats ever analyzed by Symantec (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011). To be successful, Stuxnet required a high level of technical knowledge across multiple disciplines, a laboratory with the target equipment configured for testing, and a foreign intelligence capability to collect information on the target network and attack vectors (Kerr, Rollins and Theohary 2010). The malware also needed careful monitoring and maintenance because it could be easily disrupted; as a result Stuxnet was developed with a high degree of configurability and was upgraded multiple times in less than one year (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011). Once introduced into the network, the cyber-weapon then had to utilize four known vulnerabilities and four unknown vulnerabilities, known as zero-day exploits, in order to install itself and propagate across the target network (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011). Zero-day exploits are incredibly difficult to find and fewer than twelve out of the 12,000,000 pieces of malware discovered each year utilize zero-day exploits and this rarity makes them valuable, zero-days can fetch $50,000 to $500,000 each on the black market (Zetter 2011). The use of four rare exploits in a single piece of malware is “unprecedented” (Chen 2010). Along with the use of four unpublished exploits, Stuxnet also used the “first ever” programmable logic controller rootkit, a Windows rootkit, antivirus evasion techniques, intricate process injection routines, and other complex interfaces (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011) all wrapped up in “layers of encryption like Russian nesting dolls” (Zetter 2011) – including custom encryption algorithms (Karnouskos 2011). As the malware spread across the now-infected network it had to utilize additional vulnerabilities in proprietary Siemens industrial control software (ICS) and hardware used to control the equipment it was designed to sabotage. Some of these ICS vulnerabilities were published but some were unknown and required such a high degree of inside knowledge that there was speculation that a Siemens employee had been involved in the malware design (Kerr, Rollins and Theohary 2010). The unprecedented technical complexity of the Stuxnet cyber-weapon, along with the extensive technical and financial resources and foreign intelligence capabilities required for its development and deployment, indicates that the malware was likely developed by a nation-state (Kerr, Rollins and Theohary 2010). Stuxnet had very limited attack vectors. When a computer system is connected to the public Internet a host of attack vectors are available to the cyber-attacker (Institute for Security Technology Studies 2002). Web browser and browser plug-in vulnerabilities, cross-site scripting attacks, compromised email attachments, peer-to-peer applications, operating system and other application vulnerabilities are all vectors for the introduction of malware into an Internetconnected computer system. Networks that are not connected to the public internet are “air gapped,” a technical colloquialism to identify a physical separation between networks. Physical separation from the public Internet is a common safeguard for sensitive networks including classified U.S. government networks. If the target network is air gapped, infection can only occur through physical means – an infected disk or USB device that must be physically introduced into a possibly access controlled environment and connected to the air gapped network. The first step of the Stuxnet cyber-attack was to initially infect the target networks, a difficult task given the probable disconnected and well secured nature of the Iranian nuclear facilities. Stuxnet was introduced via a USB device to the target network, a method that suggests that the attackers were familiar with the configuration of the network and knew it was not connected to the public Internet (Chen 2010). This assessment is supported by two rare features in Stuxnet – having all necessary functionality for industrial sabotage fully embedded in the malware executable along with the ability to self-propagate and upgrade through a peer-to-peer method (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011). Developing an understanding of the target network configuration was a significant and daunting task based on Symantec’s assessment that Stuxnet repeatedly targeted a total of five different organizations over nearly one year (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011) with physical introduction via USB drive being the only available attack vector. The final factor in assessing the threat of a cyber-weapon is the resilience of the weapon. There are two primary factors that make Stuxnet non-resilient: the complexity of the weapon and the complexity of the target. Stuxnet was highly customized for sabotaging specific industrial systems (Karnouskos 2011) and needed a large number of very complex components and routines in order to increase its chance of success (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011). The malware required eight vulnerabilities in the Windows operating system to succeed and therefore would have failed if those vulnerabilities had been properly patched; four of the eight vulnerabilities were known to Microsoft and subject to elimination (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011). Stuxnet also required that two drivers be installed and required two stolen security certificates for installation (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011); driver installation would have failed if the stolen certificates had been revoked and marked as invalid. Finally, the configuration of systems is ever-changing as components are upgraded or replaced. There is no guarantee that the network that was mapped for vulnerabilities had not changed in the months, or years, it took to craft Stuxnet and successfully infect the target network. Had specific components of the target hardware changed – the targeted Siemens software or programmable logic controller – the attack would have failed. Threats are less of a threat when identified; this is why zero-day exploits are so valuable. Stuxnet went to great lengths to hide its existence from the target and utilized multiple rootkits, data manipulation routines, and virus avoidance techniques to stay undetected. The malware’s actions occurred only in memory to avoid leaving traces on disk, it masked its activities by running under legal programs, employed layers of encryption and code obfuscation, and uninstalled itself after a set period of time, all efforts to avoid detection because its authors knew that detection meant failure. As a result of the complexity of the malware, the changeable nature of the target network, and the chance of discovery, Stuxnet is not a resilient system. It is a fragile weapon that required an investment of time and money to constantly monitor, reconfigure, test and deploy over the course of a year. There is concern, with Stuxnet developed and available publicly, that the world is on the brink of a storm of highly sophisticated Stuxnet-derived cyber-weapons which can be used by hackers, organized criminals and terrorists (Chen 2010). As former counterterrorism advisor Richard Clarke describes it, there is concern that the technical brilliance of the United States “has created millions of potential monsters all over the world” (Rosenbaum 2012). Hyperbole aside, technical knowledge spreads. The techniques behind cyber-attacks are “constantly evolving and making use of lessons learned over time” (Institute for Security Technology Studies 2002) and the publication of the Stuxnet code may make it easier to copy the weapon (Kerr, Rollins and Theohary 2010). However, this is something of a zero-sum game because knowledge works both ways and cyber-security techniques are also evolving, and “understanding attack techniques more clearly is the first step toward increasing security” (Institute for Security Technology Studies 2002). Vulnerabilities are discovered and patched, intrusion detection and malware signatures are expanded and updated, and monitoring and analysis processes and methodologies are expanded and honed. Once the element of surprise is lost, weapons and tactics are less useful, this is the core of the argument that “uniquely surprising” stratagems like Stuxnet are single-use, like Pearl Harbor and the Trojan Horse, the “very success [of these attacks] precludes their repetition” (Mueller 2012). This paradigm has already been seen in the “son of Stuxnet” malware – named Duqu by its discoverers – that is based on the same modular code platform that created Stuxnet (Ragan 2011). With the techniques used by Stuxnet now known, other variants such as Duqu are being discovered and countered by security researchers (Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security 2011). It is obvious that the effort required to create, deploy, and maintain Stuxnet and its variants is massive and it is not clear that the rewards are worth the risk and effort. Given the location of initial infection and the number of infected systems in Iran (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011) it is believed that Iranian nuclear facilities were the target of the Stuxnet weapon. A significant amount of money and effort was invested in creating Stuxnet but yet the expected result – assuming that this was an attack that expected to damage production – was minimal at best. Iran claimed that Stuxnet caused only minor damage, probably at the Natanz enrichment facility, the Russian contractor Atomstroyeksport reported that no damage had occurred at the Bushehr facility, and an unidentified “senior diplomat” suggested that Iran was forced to shut down its centrifuge facility “for a few days” (Kerr, Rollins and Theohary 2010). Even the most optimistic estimates believe that Iran’s nuclear enrichment program was only delayed by months, or perhaps years (Rosenbaum 2012). The actual damage done by Stuxnet is not clear (Kerr, Rollins and Theohary 2010) and the primary damage appears to be to a higher number than average replacement of centrifuges at the Iran enrichment facility (Zetter 2011). Different targets may produce different results. The Iranian nuclear facility was a difficult target with limited attack vectors because of its isolation from the public Internet and restricted access to its facilities. What is the probability of a successful attack against the U.S. electrical grid and what are the potential consequences should this critical infrastructure be disrupted or destroyed? An attack against the electrical grid is a reasonable threat scenario since power systems are “a high priority target for military and insurgents” and there has been a trend towards utilizing commercial software and integrating utilities into the public Internet that has “increased vulnerability across the board” (Lewis 2010). Yet the increased vulnerabilities are mitigated by an increased detection and deterrent capability that has been “honed over many years of practical application” now that power systems are using standard, rather than proprietary and specialized, applications and components (Leita and Dacier 2012). The security of the electrical grid is also enhanced by increased awareness after a smart-grid hacking demonstration in 2009 and the identification of the Stuxnet malware in 2010; as a result the public and private sector are working together in an “unprecedented effort” to establish robust security guidelines and cyber security measures (Gohn and Wheelock 2010).

#### No impact to trade –

#### ONE, it’s resilient

**Rodrik ‘9** Dani Rodrik, Rafiq Hariri Professor of International Political Economy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. “The Myth of Rising Protectionism”. 2009. http://relooney.fatcow.com/0\_New\_5973.pdf

The reality is that the international trade regime has passed its greatest test since the Great Depression with flying colors. Trade economists who complain about minor instances of protectionism sound like a child whining about a damaged toy in the wake of an earthquake that killed thousands. Three things explain this remarkable resilience : ideas, politics , and institutions . Economists have been extraordinarily successful in conveying their message to policymakers – even if ordinary people still regard imports with considerable suspicion. Nothing reflects this better than how “protection” and “protectionists” have become terms of derision. After all, governments are generally expected to provide protection to its citizens. But if you say that you favor protection from imports , you are painted into a corner with Reed Smoot and Willis C. Hawley, authors of the infamous 1930 US tariff bill. But economists’ ideas would not have gone very far without significant changes in the underlying configuration of political interests in favor of open trade. For every worker and firm affected adversely by import competition, there is one or more worker and firm expecting to reap the benefits of access to markets abroad. The latter have become increasingly vocal and powerful, often represented by large multinational corporations. In his latest book, Paul Blustein recounts how a former Indian trade minister once asked his American counterpart to bring him a picture of an American farmer: “I have never actually seen one,” the minister quipped. “I have only seen US conglomerates masquerading as farmers.” But the relative docility of rank-and-file workers on trade issues must ultimately be attributed to something else altogether: the safety nets erected by the welfare state. Modern industrial societies now have a wide array of social protections – unemployment compensation, adjustment assistance, and other labor-market tools, as well as health insurance and family support – that mitigate demand for cruder forms of protection. The welfare state is the flip side of the open economy. If the world has not fallen off the protectionist precipice during the crisis, as it did during the 1930’s, much of the credit must go the social programs that conservatives and market fundamentalists would like to see scrapped. The battle against trade protection has been won – so far. But, before we relax, let’s remember that we still have not addressed the central challenge the world economy will face as the crisis eases: the inevitable clash between China’s need to produce an ever-growing quantity of manufactured goods and America’s need to maintain a smaller current-account deficit. Unfortunately, there is little to suggest that policymakers are yet ready to confront this genuine threat.

#### TWO, trade doesn’t stop war

**Parlow and Chakrabati 9** Does trade promote peace? A new window in Economics Anton Parlow and Prof. Avik Chakrabati University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee Department of Economics November 24, 2009 https://pantherfile.uwm.edu/aparlow/www/papers/conflict\_2.pdf

The regression results for the unrestricted bivariate VAR-model including one lag are presented in table 5. The main result is that conflict does not explain trade and trade does not explain current level of conflicts. Meaning there is no relationship between past values trade and conflict on current values of the two variables using the sample chosen here. Both variables are only explained by their own past realizations. Furthermore the conflict equation is hardly valid as a model (very low R2 and F-value). The coefficients of the past realizations of conflict on trade and trade on conflict are unusual in magnitude and not significant at all. There is no comparable approach so far in the literature which means we need further research to con\_rm these results. Furthermore a longer time pe- riod is needed and maybe more variables for the VAR-model e.g. GDP as a measurement for economic size. A problem with adding more variables to a VAR-system is that it gets less tractable and needs some structure to make useful interpretations of the parameter estimates.

### Overreach

**US action irrelevant to international norms on drones – other tech proves**

**Etzioni 13** – professor of IR @ George Washington (Amitai, “The Great Drone Debate”, March/April, <http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20130430_art004.pdf>, CMR)

Other **critics contend** that **by the U**nited **S**tates ¶ **using drones, it leads other countries into making and** ¶ **using them.** For example, Medea Benjamin, the cofounder of the anti-war activist group CODEPINK ¶ and author of a book about drones argues that, “The ¶ proliferation of drones should evoke reﬂection on the ¶ precedent that the United States is setting by killing ¶ anyone it wants, anywhere it wants, on the basis of ¶ secret information. Other nations and non-state entities are watching—and are bound to start acting in ¶ a similar fashion.”60 Indeed scores of countries are ¶ now manufacturing or purchasing drones. There can ¶ be little doubt that the fact that drones have served ¶ the United States well has helped to popularize them. ¶ However, **it does not follow that U**nited **S**tates ¶ **should not have employed drones in the hope that** ¶ **such a show of restraint would deter others**. First ¶ of all, this would have meant that either the United ¶ States would have had to allow terrorists in hardto-reach places, say North Waziristan, to either ¶ roam and rest freely—or it would have had to use ¶ bombs that would have caused much greater collateral damage. ¶ Further, **the record shows** that **even when the** ¶ **U**nited **S**tates **did not develop a particular weapon,** ¶ **others did.** Thus, **China has taken the lead in** the ¶ development of **anti-ship missiles and** seemingly ¶ **cyber weapons** as well. One must keep in mind ¶ that **the international environment is** a **hostile** ¶ one. **Countries**—and especially non-state actors—¶ most of the time **do not play by** some set of **selfconstraining rules**. Rather, **they** tend **to employ** ¶ **whatever weapons they can obtain that will further** ¶ **their interests.** The United States correctly does ¶ not assume that it can rely on some non-existent ¶ implicit gentleman’s agreements that call for the ¶ avoidance of new military technology by nation X ¶ or terrorist group Y—if the United States refrains ¶ from employing that technology¶ I am not arguing that there are no natural norms ¶ that restrain behavior. There are certainly some ¶ that exist, particularly in situations where all parties beneﬁt from the norms (e.g., the granting of ¶ diplomatic immunity) or where particularly horrifying weapons are involved (e.g., weapons of ¶ mass destruction). However **drones are but one** ¶ **step**—following bombers and missiles—**in the** ¶ **development of distant battleﬁeld tech**nologies. ¶ (Robotic soldiers—or future ﬁghting machines—¶ are next in line). **In such circumstances, the role** ¶ **of norms is much more limited**.

**No drones arms race – multiple checks**

- narrow application – diplomatic and political costs – state defenses

**Singh 12** – researcher at the Center for a New American Security (Joseph, “Betting Against a Drone Arms Race”, 8/13, <http://nation.time.com/2012/08/13/betting-against-a-drone-arms-race/#ixzz2TxEkUI37>, CMR)

Bold predictions of a coming drones arms race are all the rage since the uptake in their deployment under the Obama Administration. Noel Sharkey, for example, argues in an August 3 op-ed for the Guardian that rapidly developing drone technology — coupled with minimal military risk — portends an era in which states will become increasingly aggressive in their use of drones.¶ As drones develop the ability to fly completely autonomously, Sharkey predicts a proliferation of their use that will set dangerous precedents, seemingly inviting hostile nations to use drones against one another. Yet, **the narrow applications of** current **drone tech**nology **coupled with** what we know about **state behavior** in the international system **lend no credence to** these **ominous warnings**.¶ Indeed, critics seem overly-focused on the domestic implications of drone use.¶ In a June piece for the Financial Times, Michael Ignatieff writes that “virtual technologies make it easier for democracies to wage war because they eliminate the risk of blood sacrifice that once forced democratic peoples to be prudent.”¶ Significant public support for the Obama Administration’s increasing deployment of drones would also seem to legitimate this claim. Yet, **there remain** equally **serious** **diplomatic and political** **costs** that emanate from **beyond a fickle electorate, which** will **prevent** the likes of the **increased drone aggression** predicted by both Ignatieff and Sharkey.¶ Most recently, **the** serious **diplomatic scuffle instigated by Syria**’s **downing a Turkish reconnaissance plane** in June **illustrated** **the** very serious **risks** of operating any aircraft in foreign territory.¶ **States** **launching drones must still weigh** the **diplomatic and political costs** of their actions, **which make the calculation surrounding their use no fundamentally different** to any other aerial engagement.¶ **This** recent bout also **illustrated a salient point** regarding drone technology: **most states maintain** at least minimal air **defenses that can quickly detect and take down drones**, as the U.S. discovered when it employed drones at the onset of the Iraq invasion, while Saddam Hussein’s surface-to-air missiles were still active.¶ What the U.S. also learned, however, was that **drones constitute an effective military tool in an extremely narrow strategic context.** They are well-suited either in direct support of a broader military campaign, or to conduct targeted killing operations against a technologically unsophisticated enemy.¶ In a nutshell, then, the very contexts in which we have seen drones deployed. Northern Pakistan, along with a few other regions in the world, remain conducive to drone usage given a lack of air defenses, poor media coverage, and difficulties in accessing the region.

**Realist theory disproves the advantage**

JM **Greico**- professor of political science at Duke University, **1993** “Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate”¶ edited by David Allen Baldwin, chapter entitled “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism” p. 116-118

**Realism** has **dominated international relations theory** at least since World War II.' For realists, international **anarchy fosters competition** and conflict among states **and inhibits** their **willingness to cooperate** **even when** **they share common interests**. Realist theory also argues that **international institutions are unable to mitigate anarchy's constraining effects on interstate cooperation**. Realism, then, presents **a pessimistic analysis of the prospects for international cooperation and** of **the** **capabilities of** international **institutions**.2¶ The major challenger to realism has been what I shall call liberal institutionalism. Prior to the current decade, it appeared in three successive presentations—functionalist integration theory in the 1940s and early 1950s, neofunctionalist regional integration theory in the 1950s and 1960s, and interdependence theory in the 1970s.3 All three versions rejected realism's propositions about states and its gloomy understanding of world politics. Most significantly, they argued that international institutions can help states cooperate. Thus, compared to realism, these earlier versions of liberal institutionalism offered a more hopeful prognosis for international cooperation and a more optimistic assessment of the capacity of institutions to help states achieve it.¶ **International tensions and conflicts during the 1970s undermined liberal institutionalism and reconfirmed realism in large measure**. Yet that difficult decade did not witness a collapse of the international system, and in the light of continuing modest levels of interstate cooperation, a new liberal institutionalist challenge to realism came forward during the early 1980s (Stein 1983:115-40; Axelrod 1984; Keohane 1984; Lipson 1984; Axelrod and Keohane 1985). What is distinctive about this newest liberal institutionalism is its claim that it accepts a number of core realist propositions, including, apparently, the realist argument that anarchy impedes the achievement of international cooperation. However, the core liberal arguments—that realism overemphasizes conflict and underestimates the capacities of international institutions to promote cooperation—remain firmly intact. The new liberal institutionalists basically argue that even if the realists are correct in believing that anarchy constrains the willingness of states to cooperate, states nevertheless can work together and can do so especially with the assistance of international institutions.¶ This point is crucial for students of international relations. If neo-liberal institutionalists are correct, then they have dealt realism a major blow while providing ine intellectual justification for treating their own approach, and the tradition from which it emerges, as the most effective for understanding world politics.¶ This essay's principal argument is that, in fact, neoliberal **institutionalism misconstrues the realist analysis of international anarchy and** therefore **it misunderstands the realist analysis of the impact of anarchy on the preferences and actions of states. Indeed, the new liberal institutionalism fails to address a major constraint on the willingness of states to cooperate which is generated by international anarchy and which is identified by realism.** As a result, the new theory's **optimism about international cooperation is likely to be proven wrong.¶** Neoliberalism's claims about cooperation are based on its belief that states are atomistic actors. It argues that states seek to maximize their individual absolute gains and are indifferent to the gains achieved by others. Cheating, the new theory suggests, is the greatest impediment to cooperation among rationally egoistic states, but international institutions, the new theory also suggests, can help states overcome this barrier to joint action. Realists understand that states seek absolute gains and worry about compliance. However, realists¶ find that **states are positional, not atomistic**, in character, and **therefore** realists argue that, in addition to concerns about cheating, **states in cooperative arrangements** also **worry that their partners might gain more from cooperation that they do**. For realists, **a state will focus both on its absolute and relative gains from cooperation**, and a state that is satisfied with a partner's compliance in a joint arrangement might nevertheless exit from it because the partner is achieving relatively greater gains. Realism, then, finds that **there are** at least **two major barriers to international cooperation**: **state concerns about cheating and state concerns about relative achievements of gains.** Neoliberal **institutionalism pays attention exclusively to the former** **and is unable to identify, analyze, or account for the latter.¶** Realism's identification of the relative gains problem for cooperation is based on its insight that **states in anarchy fear for their survival as independent actors**. According to realists, states worry that **today's friend may be tomorrow's enemy** in war, and fear that achievements of joint gains that advantage a friend in the present might produce a more dangerous potential foe in the future. As a result, **states must give serious attention to the gains of partners.** Neoliber-als fail to consider the threat of war arising from international anarchy, and this allows them to ignore the matter of relative gains and to assume that states only desire absolute gains. Yet in doing so, they fail to identify a major source of state inhibitions about international cooperation.¶ In sum, I suggest that **realism**, its emphasis on conflict and competition notwithstanding, **offers a more complete understanding of the problem of international cooperation than does its latest liberal challenger**. If that is true, then **realism is still the most powerful theory of international politics**

**Empirically denied**

**no Mideast escalation**

**Fettweis 07** Asst Prof Poli Sci – Tulane, Asst Prof National Security Affairs – US Naval War College, (Christopher, “On the Consequences of Failure in Iraq,” Survival, Vol. 49, Iss. 4, December, p. 83 – 98)

**Without the US presence, a** second **argument goes, nothing would prevent Sunni–Shia violence from sweeping into every country** where the religious divide exists. A Sunni bloc with centres in Riyadh and Cairo might face a Shia bloc headquartered in Tehran, both of which would face enormous pressure from their own people to fight proxy wars across the region. In addition to intra-Muslim civil war, cross-border warfare could not be ruled out. Jordan might be the first to send troops into Iraq to secure its own border; once the dam breaks, Iran, Turkey, Syria and Saudi Arabia might follow suit. **The Middle East has no shortage of rivalries, any of which might descend into direct conflict after a** destabilising **US withdrawal**. **In the worst case, Iran might emerge as the regional hegemon, able to bully** and blackmail **its neighbours** with its new nuclear arsenal. **Saudi Arabia and Egypt would soon demand suitable deterrents** of their own, and a nuclear arms race would envelop the region. Once again, **however, none of these outcomes is particularly likely**. Wider war **No matter what** the outcome in Iraq, **the region is not likely to devolve into chaos**. Although it might seem counter-intuitive, by most traditional measures the Middle East is very stable. Continuous, uninterrupted governance is the norm, not the exception; most Middle East regimes have been in power for decades. Its monarchies, from Morocco to Jordan to every Gulf state, have generally been in power since these countries gained independence. In Egypt Hosni Mubarak has ruled for almost three decades, and Muammar Gadhafi in Libya for almost four. The region's autocrats have been more likely to die quiet, natural deaths than meet the hangman or post-coup firing squads. Saddam's rather unpredictable regime, which attacked its neighbours twice, was one of the few exceptions to this pattern of stability, and he met an end unusual for the modern Middle East. Its regimes have survived potentially destabilising shocks before, and they would be likely to do so again. **The region** actually **experiences very little cross-border warfare**, and even less since the end of the Cold War. Saddam again provided an exception, as did the Israelis, with their adventures in Lebanon. Israel fought four wars with neighbouring states in the first 25 years of its existence, but none in the 34 years since. **Vicious civil wars that once engulfed Lebanon and Algeria have gone quiet, and its ethnic conflicts do not make the region particularly unique.** **The biggest risk of an American withdrawal is intensified civil war in Iraq rather than regional conflagration**. **Iraq's neighbours will likely not prove eager to fight each other** to determine who gets to be the next country to spend itself into penury propping up an unpopular puppet regime next door. **As much as the Saudis and Iranians may threaten to intervene** on behalf of their co- religionists, **they have shown no eagerness to replace** the counter-insurgency role that **American troops** play today. If the United States, with its remarkable military and unlimited resources, could not bring about its desired solutions in Iraq, why would any other country think it could do so?[17](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00396330701733852#EN0017) 17. See Steven Simon, ‘America and Iraq: The Case for Disengagement’, Survival , vol. 49, no. 1, Spring 2007, esp. pp. 66–8. [View all notes](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00396330701733852#inline_frontnotes) **Common interest, not the presence of the US military, provides the ultimate foundation for stability**. **All ruling regimes in the Middle East share a common** (and understandable) **fear of instability**. It is the interest of every actor – the Iraqis, their neighbours and the rest of the world – to see a stable, functioning government emerge in Iraq. **If the United States were to withdraw, increased regional cooperation to address that common interest is far more likely than outright warfare**.

Zero risk of indopak war

**Kumar, 13** (Sanjay – correspondent for The Diplomat, “Pakistan’s Elections: A Harbinger of Peace on the Subcontinent?”, The Diplomat, <http://thediplomat.com/the-pulse/2013/05/16/pakistans-elections-a-harbinger-of-peace-on-the-subcontinent/>)

Now that we know Nawaz Sharif will succeed Raja Pervez Ashraf as the next prime minster of Pakistan, it’s worth noting that **Pakistan has never seen a democratic transition as smooth** as the one set to take place between the outgoing Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and the newly elected Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz, or PML(N).

In its 66-year history as an independent nation, Pakistan has witnessed three military coups and extended rule by army generals. Even today, the nation is plagued by political turmoil. But **this year seems to be a new chapter** in its turbulent history.

The verdict from the 2013 elections gives the PML(N) 123 seats out of 254 declared results as of Tuesday evening, giving Sharif’s party an unassailable lead over its main rivals, PPP and Imran Khan's Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, which had secured 31 and 26 seats, respectively. The electoral results for the final 18 of Pakistan’s 272 National Assembly seats remain unannounced.

The **voter turnout this year was impressive**, with 60 percent of all registered voters turning up to the polls, up from a 45 percent turnout in the last national elections in 2008. This impressive turnout came **despite** the **threat of violence**. More than 150 people lost their lives and scores were injured in attacks by insurgents across the country during the election campaigning period and on election day. **This brave statement** by the people of Pakistan **sends a** new **message** to the outside world **and gives hope for peace** on the Subcontinent.

In particular, **India has** a **stake in the democratic success of its neighbor**, with whom relations have been turbulent. **There is** **widespread hope** in India that **Sharif**, who formed a new Indo-Pakistani relationship in the 1990s, **will revive the peace process and improve** Islamabad’s **ties** with New Delhi.

Indian Prime minister Manmohan **Singh was one of the first** world leaders **to congratulate Sharif** after his emphatic victory. In a letter, **Singh talked about charting a new course for the relationship** between the two countries **and invited his** Pakistan **counterpart to visit** India.

**Sharif reciprocated** and emphasized the need for improved relations with India. **He** further **stressed the importance of resolving issues, including Kashmir**, through peaceful means. **He** even informally **invited the Indian premier to his inauguration** ceremony in Islamabad.

According to veteran Pakistani author and political analyst Ahmed Rashid, **circumstances may be more favorable** this time for Sharif **to improve ties** with New Delhi. He writes, “During his two premierships in the 1990s, Sharif made genuine **efforts at peace** with India but **was thwarted by an aggressive** and uncompromising **army**.” But, he continues, “**The army**—faced with a severe weakening of the state—now **seems more amenable to improving relations** with New Delhi.”

The Hindu opines that where **Sharif “gives** most **hope is in his** **strong and unambiguous** **articulation of better** India-Pakistan **relations**, though this will depend on his stated determination to correct the civil-military imbalance, and reclaim the national agenda from the security establishment. Whether he can succeed is another question, but India will be hoping he will.”

As Pakistan passes through a rough economic patch, **deeper engagement** with its immediate neighbor **will** not only **give the** volatile **country increased political stability** **but** will **also boost growth**. **India can** play a major role in **reviv**ing **Pakistan's** bankrupt **economy** as a potential investor.

According to an article published by the New Delhi-based think tank Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), **trade** between the two South Asian countries **could receive renewed impetus under the** new **regime**, barring complications from opposition by the religious right. However, the IDSA article also notes that “one should not expect a lot of change in policies related to terrorism targeted at India or its aversion to India’s presence in Afghanistan.”

Despite skepticism, **there is** a general mood of **optimism in India** about the regime change in Pakistan. Just a couple of weeks ago Indian media was full of anti-Pakistan stories in the wake of the attack on Indian prisoner Sarabjit Singh in a Pakistani jail. While most Indian reports were full of jingoism in their coverage of the death of Singh, **the election** has **changed the tone of** the **discourse.**

The **optimism stems from Sharif’s earlier initiatives** in the 1990s **to deepen ties with India**. In 1999, **he started a bus service** that runs **between Lahore and New Delhi**. Then Indian PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited Pakistan in the inaugural bus ride. This bonhomie, however, was short-lived. Later that year hostilities erupted between the two nations at the Kargil sector, when the Pakistani army crossed the Line of Control under the leadership of former military ruler Pervez Musharraf.

The new leadership in Pakistan has a very tough job at hand: alleviate the deep-seated historical fear and mistrust between the two countries.

Likewise, India will have to show maturity in understanding the changing mood and aspirations of the people of Pakistan.

New Delhi needs to recognize that **never before has there been such** an **overwhelming consensus** **for Pakistan to normalize relations** with India. If the leaderships of both countries work hard to tap this desire, **they may be able to usher in** a new era of **peace and progress** on the Subcontinent.

#### No internal link—their Goldsmith card just says Special Ops will hesitate before doing controversial actions like targeted killing—no reason why that’s necessary to solve their impact

#### Budget cuts will wreck special ops—much bigger alt cause

Slattery 12 (Brian, 1-31-12, "U.S. Special Forces Will Be Weakened by Defense Budget Cuts") Heritage) blog.heritage.org/2012/01/31/u-s-special-forces-will-be-weakened-by-defense-budget-cuts/

However, the relationship between conventional and nonconventional forces is not so simple. The President makes the assumption that lowering the number of active-duty troops will leave more resources for elite forces. An article in the Washington Examiner exposes a number of weaknesses in this assumption. “Special operations forces are a scalpel, not a Swiss Army knife,” said Heritage’s James Carafano. “They are not a substitute for all the instruments of military power needed to protect the nation’s interests.” Another military official stated: “I have a spare tire in my car, doesn’t mean I’m going to get a flat every day, but I know one day I will.” Many proponents of this “leaner” force argue it is unlikely that the U.S. will engage in a large-scale conventional conflict such as Iraq or Afghanistan in the future. Unfortunately, that was the argument made before Korea, Vietnam, and even the two conflicts from which troops are currently withdrawing. The U.S. has consistently failed to predict where or when its next large-scale operation would be. It is irresponsible to hollow out America’s conventional forces based on an assumption that has been incorrect several times in the past. Special Forces capabilities will not be left unaffected by reductions to conventional forces. “One consequence of a smaller military will be fewer troops from which to select the men who eventually become Army Delta Force soldiers and Navy SEALs,” the article states. Moreover, as the overall defense budget erodes, so does the support infrastructure for special ops to perform their missions. This was regrettably evident during the failed attempt to rescue 50 American hostages from Iran in 1980. The Obama Administration cannot forget what caused this tragic failure: systematic budget reductions in the aftermath of Vietnam. The special forces unit in Iran was operating helicopters they knew were old and ill-equipped, yet they were the best the military could provide. It may be unfair to assert that the mission would have been a success if newer equipment were available. Nevertheless, it is irresponsible to put America’s forces in harm’s way without the support and funding they require.

**Special ops are overstretched**

**Benson 12** (Pam, reporter, 7-27-12, "Special Operations forces risk being overused, misused, former chief says" CNN) security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/07/27/special-operations-forces-risk-being-overused-misused-former-chief-says/

The **use of military Special Operations Forces has been a proven success** in Iraq, Afghanistan and - with last year's raid on Osama bin Laden's compound - in Pakistan, **but that success has some people concerned. Will the forces become the tool of choice for a president? The former head of the** U.S. **Special Operations** Command **told the Aspen Security Forum** Thursday **he fears there could be a misuse of the highly trained specialists.** "It's a real danger," retired Adm. Eric Olson said. "**They come to be thought of as a utility infielder,** sometimes a utility infielder with guns, **and they may be asked to solve problems that are not necessarily special operations problems."** **Olson cited cases of Special Operations Forces being asked to provide security for individuals overseas. The high demand has strained the elite forces.** Last year, **Olson warned the units were "beginning to show some fraying around the edges."**

**naval power resilient**

Greg **Grant**, military.com associate editor, 2-20-**2009**, “CSBA’s $20 billion a Year Shipbuilding Plan,” DoD Buzz, <http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/02/20/csbas-20-billion-a-year-shipbuilding-plan/>

To begin with, Work says, **the U.S. Navy is in far better condition than many believe**. **Alarmists** who say U.S. naval power is in serious decline **perform a rather dishonest counting** of the current number of ships and compare that to the 1980s “600 ship Navy” standard. A more honest net assessment compares the size and combat power of the Navy to potential contemporary competitors, which paints a very different picture. Counting those ships that can “perform naval fire and maneuver,” including submarines and aviation platforms, the Navy has 203 warships. The Russian and Chinese navies combined operate 215 warships, so **the U.S. has close to the “two navy standard**” the Royal Navy aimed to maintain in its heyday. Measuring fleet tonnage displacement, the best proxy for measuring a fleet’s overall combat capability, the U.S. Navy enjoys a “13-Navy standard” over the world’s next biggest navies. Because the U.S. Navy early on shifted to vertical launch magazines, it carries far more missiles, 7,804 in 75 warships, than any other navy, adding up to a “twenty-navy firepower standard.” **The Navy enjoys a very high operational tempo that is unmatched by any other nation**. The fleet is transforming to a “collaborative battle network” force that will integrate aerial and sea drones, satellites, seabed sensors into an unmatched command and control system. The Navy can also count on the naval power of its closest ally: the U.S. Coast Guard, with 160 cutters and 800 small craft, a force ideally suited for engaging partner navies. Then there are the 10 carrier air wings, naval special warfare units, P-8A Poseidon Multi-Mission aircraft, aerial drones and 569 MH-60 helicopters. The MH-60s are the “small craft” of the U.S. Navy, faster than any ship, able to patrol vast areas and armed with torpedoes or Hellfire missiles. **The Navy doesn’t need to worry about losing global maritime supremacy anytime soon**, so Work says, the focus should be less about ship numbers and more on how the Navy fits into the national strategy and how to maintain naval dominance going forward in the face of technological advances in precision weapons and targeting. The biggest challenge the fleet will face in the future isn’t that some nation (China) might build a blue water fleet to challenge the Navy on the open ocean, as that would play to our naval and air strengths. Rather, its what Work calls “land based maritime reconnaissance-strike complexes,” land based anti-ship missiles of ever greater range, accuracy, maneuverability and number. The idea of parking carriers offshore and launching sustained air strikes is no longer valid, or at least won’t be very soon. The key parameter in future wars, conducted both from the air and sea, will be range, Work says. The Navy must fight outside the range of an enemy’s anti-air and anti ships missiles, or at least outside the missile salvo fire range. Another evolving challenge is ever more sophisticated undersea combat systems, drones, sonar systems and advanced submarines.

**budget cuts thump**

**CSBA**, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 3/12/’**12**

(<http://www.csbaonline.org/2012/03/12/analysis-dod-budget-will-severely-constrain-army-marine-vehicle-modernization/>)

**The Army and Marine Corps will be in the market for** a **new** generation of ground **vehicles** soon. **But acquisition officials there should think hard before they buy**, according to Dr. Andrew Krepinevich, the president of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (listen to interview) The **modernization** of Army and Marine Corps ground vehicles **is the subject of a recent** CSBA **report**, “The Road Ahead: Future Challenges and Their Implications for Ground Vehicle Modernization.” **Krepinevich and** his co-author, Eric **Lindsey**, **wrote** that the while both services are in the early stages of **vehicle modernization**, those **efforts “will be severely constrained by** the **budget cuts** **looming over the Department** of Defense.”

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## 2NC

### NATO 2NC

#### Nato causes deterrence breakdowns in eastern Europe- draws in the US causes nuke war

Ted Galen Carpenter, Vice President, Defense and Foreign Policy Studies, Cato Institute, "The Limits of Deterrence," NATIONAL INTEREST (ONLINE), 9-3-08, www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=9622, accessed 4-16-10.

The situation today is radically different. It is far less credible to any Russian leader that the United States would risk war with a nuclear-armed Russia merely over a territorial spat involving Georgia — or even tiny countries such as the Baltic republics that are already members of NATO. The importance of those states to Washington is simply not comparable to Western Europe's importance to America during the Cold War. Conversely, Russia's quarrels with several countries on its borders involve an array of potent ethnic, economic, and strategic considerations. To be blunt, the NATO commitment to small, vulnerable countries in Russia's immediate neighborhood looks like a bluff — and not a very credible one at that. U.S. policymakers have to hope that Putin or some future Russian leader doesn't decide to call that bluff. If Moscow ever challenges Washington's commitment, the United States will be left with a choice between a bad outcome and a worse one. The bad outcome is that U.S. leaders face the reality that it would be reckless to risk a major war to protect a client that is of little strategic or economic relevance to America — even though a retreat would raise serious questions about the credibility of other U.S. commitments. The worse outcome would be to actually try to fulfill the security pledge and risk a war with nuclear implications.

#### Baltic wars go nuclear and draw in the US

Jorge Benitez, director of [NATOSource](http://www.acus.org/natosource) and a senior fellow in the [Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security](http://www.acus.org/program/brent-scowcroft-center-on-international-security), “[Impact of Russia-Georgia War on NATO Defense Planning and Article 5](http://www.acus.org/natosource/impact-russia-georgia-war-nato-defense-planning-and-article-5)”, 7/17/13 <http://www.acus.org/natosource/impact-russia-georgia-war-nato-defense-planning-and-article-5>

Among other things, the Russian army since 2010 has stepped up its military exercises simulating attacks against the Baltic states and Poland. The Zapad 2013 exercises that are due to be held later this year will apparently be similar to Zapad 2009 and Zapad 2011, including preventive nuclear strikes against Poland. NATO can offset such posturing by responding with its own Steadfast Jazz exercises of rapid-response forces, but Russia’s shift toward belligerence and military competition is bound to take its toll. All of this raises the question of what would happen in the unlikely event that Russia did attack the Baltic states. Presumably, the United States and other NATO member states would feel compelled to uphold Article V by embarking on military action to defend the Baltic states, as envisaged in the Eagle Guardian plan. In so doing they would in effect be going to war against Russia. At worst, such a step would risk escalation to a nuclear exchange; at best, it would require the NATO countries to fight in a region in which they would be at a severe geographic disadvantage. On the other hand, if the United States and its allies decided not to fulfill Article V in the Baltic region and to refrain from intervening against Russian forces, this would gravely damage the credibility of all of NATO’s defense commitments. Why would any country want to belong to an alliance that refused to protect its members against external aggression? The drafting of the expanded Eagle Guardian plan was a valuable and necessary process for NATO, but the public disclosure of it entailed significant costs. The dilemma that would face the alliance if the “unthinkable” were to happen in the Baltic region might be easier to manage now that contingency plans are in place to offer a range of options, which can be tested in command-staff and live exercises. In the end, however, the choices NATO governments will have to make will be onerous no matter how good the plans are.

#### Turkish adventurism triggers nuke war

**BLANK** (MacArthur Professor of Research at the Strategic Studies Institute) **2K**

[Stephen, “American Grand Strategy and the Transcaspian Region” World Affairs, Fall, p. asp// wyo-tjc]

Russia's warnings about U.S. efforts to obtain military-political-economic leverage in the Transcaspian and the Russian elite's extreme sensitivity regarding the region show that Moscow will resolutely contest expanded U.S. presence. The war in Chechnya shows that Russia is willing to do so forcefully, if necessary. Russia's new draft military doctrine suggests that Moscow will threaten even World War III if there is Turkish intervention, yet the new Russo-Armenian and Azeri-Turkish treaties suggest just such a possibility.(n75) Conceivably, the two larger states could then be dragged in to rescue their allies from defeat. The Russo-Armenian treaty is virtually a bilateral military alliance against Baku. It reaffirms Russia's lasting military presence in Armenia, commits Armenia not to join NATO, and could justify further fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh or further military pressure against Azerbaijan that will impede energy exploration and marketing.(n76) It also reconfirms Russia's determination to resist U.S. presence and to remain the regional hegemon. Thus many structural conditions for conventional war or protracted ethnic conflict where third parties intervene now exist in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia. The outbreak of violence by disaffected Islamic elements, the drug trade, the Chechen wars, and the unresolved ethnopolitical conflicts that dot the region, not to mention the undemocratic and unbalanced distribution of income across corrupt governments, provide plenty of tinder for future fires. Many Third World conflicts generated by local structural factors also have great potential for unintended escalation. Big powers often feel obliged to rescue their proxies and proteges. One or another big power may fail to grasp the stakes for the other side since interests here are not as clear as in Europe. Hence commitments involving the use of nuclear weapons or perhaps even conventional war to prevent defeat of a client are not well established or clear as in Europe. For instance, in 1993 Turkish noises about intervening on behalf of Azerbaijan induced Russian leaders to threaten a nuclear war in that case. Precisely because Turkey is a NATO ally but probably could not prevail in a long war against Russia, or if it could, would conceivably trigger a potential nuclear blow (not a small possibility given the erratic nature of Russia's declared nuclear strategies), the danger of major war is higher here than almost everywhere else in the CIS or the "arc of crisis" from the Balkans to China. As Richard Betts has observed, The greatest danger lies in areas where (1) the potential for serious instability is high; (2) both superpowers perceive vital interests; (3) neither recognizes that the other's perceived interest or commitment is as great as its own; (4) both have the capability to inject conventional forces; and (5) neither has willing proxies capable of settling the situation.(n77) Betts's analysis implies that for each side the interest or area in question is a vital one. This does not imply that conflict between the superpowers or their proxies is preordained. Rather this analysis drives home the region's dangerous structural conditions. Great power rivalry does not necessarily impart stability to an already troubled region, quite the contrary. Russo-Chinese efforts at Bishkek in 1999 to tie Central Asia to their kite and Russia's new military doctrine demonstrate that such rivalry also stimulates efforts to create spheres of influence even while providing smaller states means to resist them.(n78) Nevertheless, the disproportion between Russia and the smaller Transcaspian states means that no natural equilibrium is possible there. Russia will neither restrain itself nor be restrained by any local institution or power in its pursuit of unilateral advantage and the reintegration of the CIS.(n79) The only restraints it now accepts are objective ones, such as the limits of its faltering economic and military power, that preclude the easy attainment of its goals of regional hegemony and compel it to pursue its aims by more pacific and less-coercive means. And even the perceptions of waning power are difficult to accept and translate into Russian policy. Often Russia refuses to accept the limits on its capability to achieve its vital interests. And where it has moved from using military coercion to economic efforts to retain its preeminence, it has done so as much for lack of a viable military as from the insight that it stands to gain more from a more purely economic approach.(n80) Although this local disproportion in Russia's favor hardly means that Russia can succeed at will across Central Asia, it does mean that if any regional balance, on energy or other major security issue, is to be achieved, someone else must lend power to the smaller littoral states to anchor that balance. The analysts who argue against any major American involvement fail to realize the tragic situation of the region. If the Transcaspian states are to be free and independent and have any hope of independent future development someone from the outside will have to help them because Russia still refuses to accept their sovereignty and independence. As the Finnish diplomat Max Jakobson observed, everyone he meets in Russia confidently expects the CIS to rejoin Russia, and prominent Russian statesmen such as Yevgeny Primakov and Andrei Kokoshin have no compunction about publishing statements concerning the illegitimacy of the current status quo and the expected "augmentation" of Russia's borders.(n81) These statements are hardly an aberration. Russia's national security concept, published in January 2000, states, The interests of ensuring Russia's national security predetermine the need, under appropriate circumstances, for Russia to have a military presence in certain strategically important regions of the world. The stationing of limited military contingents [the same term used to describe forces in Afghanistan] (military bases, naval units) there on a treaty basis must ensure Russia's readiness to fulfill its obligations and to assist in forming a stable military-strategic balance of forces in regions, and must enable the Russian Federation to react to a crisis situation in its initial stage and achieve its foreign policy goals.(n82) Therefore, the local states sought Washington's help as much as Washington turned its attention to them. This fact gets lost in analyses such as that of Anatol Lieven that airily dismiss Russia's continuing mischief making and threat mongering throughout the region.(n83) But the outside balancer must be ready to play a protracted and potentially even a military role in the region and risk the kind of conflicts described above. That power, to retain influence over the long term, cannot remain a detached and unmoved mover. There is little evidence that the United States can or will play this role, suggesting that ultimately its bluff can be called. For an outside regional balancer to prevail, it must abet the local producers' current efforts to diversify foreign investment in local energy deposits, encourage the growth of these states' economic and military power, promote regional economic-military cooperation, and stabilize them from within and without. Washington can achieve only part of this agenda. But even partial failure here will trigger a reversion to the phenomena we seek to avoid.

#### Comparative ev—nato more likely to cause war than stop it

Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, 8/13/12 “How NATO Expansion Makes America Less Safe” <http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2012/08/13/how-nato-expansion-makes-america-less-safe/2/>

Still, alliance advocates claim that NATO could at least protect countries at Europe’s periphery. For instance, had Georgia been a member, they argue, Moscow would not have attacked. Lithuanian Foreign Minister Petras Vaitiekunas contended that including Tbilisi would “clearly show to Russia how unhelpful it is to even try flexing its muscles.” Yet history is full of examples of alliances which failed to deter powers from acting when they believed their vital interests to be at stake. In World War I most of the continent plunged into bloody conflict despite competing military leagues. In World War II Germany ignored British and French commitments to Poland. Today Moscow might not believe that Americans and Europeans with little at stake would be so foolish as to confront a nuclear armed power over interests it viewed as vital. Moreover, the Russians are not likely to be any more inclined toward “appeasement” than would the U.S. in a comparable situation. Indeed, given the West’s consistent policy of ignoring Russian interests, Moscow likely would insist even more strongly that concessions not be made and humiliations not be countenanced.

### EU Shift O/V 2NC (1:20

#### EU defense solves better—boosts US-EU relations, avoids defense cuts which thump NATO

Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute , 4/22/13 “NATOs Lack of Any Serious Purpose Means It Should Retire” <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/natos-lack-any-serious-purpose-means-it-should-retire>

The most plausible continuing NATO role is to train the militaries of friendly nations to empower them to handle military contingencies in their own neighborhoods. But that doesn’t require a formal military alliance constantly looking for new wars to fight. The biggest challenge facing the alliance is shrinking national force structures. The NATO visitor acknowledged that “all Europeans are cutting their militaries, including the big spenders.” Defense Secretaries Robert Gates and Leon Panetta both lamented Europe’s waning efforts. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen recently admitted: “if European defense spending cuts continue, Europe’s ability to be a stabilizing force even in its neighborhood will rapidly disappear.” There’s no reason to believe the reductions won’t continue. Last year the Brookings Institution published a report reviewing widespread cutbacks across the continent. Explained Clara Marina O’Donnell: “current military spending trends are reducing the ability of most NATO allies to contribute to international security.” Troop numbers are coming down sharply. Moreover, recently reported Stars and Stripes, “Cuts by countries as large as Germany and as small as Latvia have resulted in program cancellations, changed equipment orders and, in the case of Britain, a plan to mothball a new aircraft carrier.” Earlier this year Rasmussen declared that “There is a lower limit on how little we can spend on defense.” Where is it? In 2006 the NATO members promised to spend two percent of GDP on the military. Today the Europeans collectively spend 1.5 percent of GDP on defense, compared to America’s five percent. Americans spend $2333 per person on the military, compared to just $503 by Europeans. Despite the much-maligned budget sequester, Washington continues to account for roughly 40 percent of the entire globe’s military outlays. The visiting official recognized the problem. If we take Secretary Gates’ formulation “that NATO is dead if members don’t spend two percent of GDP, then NATO is dead as they will not spend two percent of GDP.” Thus, he complained that “focusing burden-sharing on finances doesn’t get us anywhere.” Instead, he suggested giving “burden-sharing a different spin.” He argued that despite Europe’s diminishing commitment to the alliance, America still benefited. “The European allies may be useless for many things, but they still provide legitimacy and the continent acts as a worldwide operational hub.” However, that legitimacy is of little account if Washington believes a vital issue to be at stake. The American people don’t care; they will support their government even in the face of widespread international opposition, evident in Vietnam and Iraq, for instance. What turned the U.S. public against these wars were the reality of casualties and the perception of failure. Where legitimacy seems to be important, either the United Nations or a coalition of the willing would prove sufficient. Nor is a formal alliance necessary for base access and logistical backing. Washington could forge replacement arrangements with individual European states as well as any continental European military alliance. Given the deep differences of opinion which emerged over such issues as Iraq, Libya, and Syria, less formal cooperative mechanisms would reduce political tensions. A country could offer operational support without providing combat units or even endorsing a particular conflict. Funding for a nation’s military would not be undercut by participation in an unpopular international conflict.¶ Despite its problems at home, NATO bizarrely is seeking to expand abroad. Rasmussen recently traveled to Japan and South Korea to promote NATO cooperation in Asia. How can a European alliance increasingly incapable of defending Europe play a role in Asia? There are opportunities for non-military cooperation: sharing expertise on civil emergencies, advancing cyber-security, and promoting non-proliferation. However, these relationships could as easily involve the European Union as NATO. Noted Richard Weitz of the Hudson Institute, “while NATO has adopted a global perspective, its main activities beyond Europe and Afghanistan thus far have consisted primarily of dialogue.”¶ Alliances should be based on international circumstance. Rasmussen recently argued that “The need for a strong military alliance between Europe and North America has never been stronger.” That is nonsense. Neither continent faces an existential military threat. Neither faces a significant global competitor. Neither has a compelling interest to meddle in regional conflicts. While there is much about which the U.S. and Europe should cooperate, there is no need for an American-dominated transatlantic military alliance. Thus, what is needed is U.S. burden-shedding rather than allied burden-sharing. Europeans could provide forces sufficient to defend themselves, patrol the Mediterranean, aid the Central Asia states, and protect their interests in North Africa and the Middle East. If they chose not to do so, no worries for America. But they shouldn’t expect Washington to step in. And U.S. officials then could stop their unproductive whining about Europe’s defense choices. America’s Cold War security policy shielded war-torn allies until they could recover and gain the economic means and political stability to defend themselves. That policy was a great success. Now Washington should celebrate by turning NATO over the Europeans.

#### It’s make or break for the CSDP--solves tons of regional conflicts- including the arctic

By Jolyon Howorth 12 Jean Monnet professor of European politics and emeritus professor of European studies at the University of Bath (UK) ¶ “European defense policy needs recalibration”¶ Posted By Stephen M. Walt Friday, June 29, 2012 <http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/06/29/european_defense_post_libya_towards_the_rubicon>

The European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSDP) is currently approaching its Rubicon. For twenty years, Europeans dallied with cooperation in security and defense policy. But when the Libyan crisis broke in 2011, their willingness and their ability to handle a regional operation of medium intensity evaporated. It is difficult to overstate the extent to which Libya was precisely the type of mission for which the EU, via CSDP, had been preparing. Yet, in the most serious crisis on Europe's borders since the birth of CSDP, the EU went AWOL. Are the EU member states serious about being in the security and defense business at all?¶ Free-riding is a deeply engrained European habit. For forty years, West Europeans depended on the United States for their very survival. Debates over burden-sharing were constant. In 1990, the U.S. covered 60 percent of NATO's overall expenditure. By 2011, that figure was 75 percent. There is little wonder that, in his valedictory speech in June 2011, Robert Gates warned that the pattern's continuation could force the new generation of U.S. politicians to question U.S. investment in NATO.¶ Some say that Europe faces no real threats in 2012. Why, therefore, should it devote large sums to defense? Europe may be internally at peace with itself, but can it count on continuing to live so? A glance at the map is sufficient to answer in the negative. From the Arctic Circle to the Baltic Sea and down to the Black Sea, from the Bosphorus to the Straits of Gibraltar, destabilization hovers around the EU's entire periphery. To imagine that the Union can rely on its own internal Kantian pact to avoid engagement with a turbulent world is not simply naïve. It is irresponsible.

#### Arctic goes nuclear because of NATO

Wallace 10**,** Professor Emeritus at the University of British Columbia

(Ridding the Arctic of Nuclear Weapons A Task Long Overdue”, <http://www.arcticsecurity.org/docs/arctic-nuclear-report-web.pdf>)

The fact is, the Arctic is becoming a zone of increased military competition. Russian President Medvedev has announced the creation of a special military force to defend Arctic claims. Last year Russian General Vladimir Shamanov declared that Russian troops would step up training for Arctic combat, and that Russia’s submarine fleet would increase its “operational radius.” Recently, two Russian attack submarines were spotted off the U.S. east coast for the first time in 15 years. In January 2009, on the eve of Obama’s inauguration, President Bush issued a National Security Presidential Directive on Arctic Regional Policy. It affirmed as a priority the preservation of U.S. military vessel and aircraft mobility and transit throughout the Arctic, including the Northwest Passage, and foresaw greater capabilities to protect U.S. borders in the Arctic. The Bush administration’s disastrous eight years in office, particularly its decision to withdraw from the ABM treaty and deploy missile defence interceptors and a radar station in Eastern Europe, have greatly contributed to the instability we are seeing today, even though the Obama administration has scaled back the planned deployments. The Arctic has figured in this renewed interest in Cold War weapons systems, particularly the upgrading of the Thule Ballistic Missile Early Warning System radar in Northern Greenland for ballistic missile defence. The Canadian government, as well, has put forward new military capabilities to protect Canadian sovereignty claims in the Arctic, including proposed ice-capable ships, a northern military training base and a deep-water port. Earlier this year Denmark released an all-party defence position paper that suggests the country should create a dedicated Arctic military contingent that draws on army, navy and air force assets with shipbased helicopters able to drop troops anywhere. Danish fighter planes would be tasked to patrol Greenlandic airspace. Last year Norway chose to buy 48 Lockheed Martin F-35 fighter jets, partly because of their suitability for Arctic patrols. In March, that country held a major Arctic military practice involving 7,000 soldiers from 13 countries in which a fictional country called Northland seized offshore oil rigs. The manoeuvres prompted a protest from Russia – which objected again in June after Sweden held its largest northern military exercise since the end of the Second World War. About 12,000 troops, 50 aircraft and several warships were involved. Jayantha Dhanapala, President of Pugwash and former UN under-secretary for disarmament affairs, summarized the situation bluntly: “From those in the international peace and security sector, deep concerns are being expressed over the fact that two nuclear weapon states – the United States and the Russian Federation, which together own 95 per cent of the nuclear weapons in the world – converge on the Arctic and have competing claims. These claims, together **with** those of other allied NATO countries – Canada, Denmark, Iceland, and Norway – could, if unresolved, lead to conflict escalating into the threat or use of nuclear weapons.” Many will no doubt argue that this is excessively alarmist, but no circumstance in which nuclear powers find themselves in military confrontation can be taken lightly. The current geo-political threat level is nebulous and low – for now, according to Rob Huebert of the University of Calgary, **“[**the] issue is the **u**ncertainty as Arctic states and non-Arctic states begin to recognize the geo-political/economic significance of the Arctic because of climate change.”

### European War 1NC

#### No european war

#### Joseph Nye 04, Kennedy School of Government Dean and Professor of International Relations at Harvard, 2004, Soft Power, p. 19-20

A second important change was the way that modern communications technology fomented the rise and spread of nationalism, which made it more difficult for empires to rule over socially awakened populations. In the nineteenth century Britain ruled a quarter of the globe with a tiny fraction of the world’s population. As nationalism grew, colonial rule became too expensive and the British empire collapsed. Formal empires with direct rule over subject populations such as Europe exercised during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are simply too costly in the twenty-first century. In addition to nuclear and communications technology, social changes inside the large democracies also raised the costs of using military power. Postindustrial democracies are focused on welfare rather than glory, and they dislike high casualties. This does not mean that they will not use force, even when casualties are expected-witness Britain, France, and the United States in the 1991 Gulf War, and Britain and the United States in the 2003 Iraq War. But the absence of a prevailing warrior ethic in modern democracies means that the use of force requires an elaborate moral justification to ensure popular support, unless actual survival is at stake. For advanced democracies, war remains possible, but it is much less acceptable than it was a century, or even a half century, ago. 28 The most powerful states have lost much of the lust to conquer. 29 Robert Kagan has correctly pointed out that these social changes have gone further in Europe than the United States, although his clever phrase that Americans are from Mars and Europeans from Venus oversimplifies the differences. 30 After all, Europeans joined in pressing for the use of force in Kosovo in 1999, and the Iraq War demonstrated that there were Europeans from Mars and Americans who preferred Venus. Nonetheless, the success of the European countries in creating an island of peace on the continent that had been ravaged by three Franco-German wars in less than a century may predispose them toward more peaceful solutions to conflict.

### Georgia O/V 2NC (:45

#### Georgia expansion inevitable without nato collapse

Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, 4/26/13 “Georgia’s Dangerous Slide toward NATO” <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/georgias-dangerous-slide-toward-nato>

Georgia suffered through a tumultuous birth when it split from the Soviet Union two decades ago. Saakashvili ousted Eduard Shevardnadze, the former Soviet foreign minister, in the 2003 “Rose Revolution.” The Western-educated Saakashvili looked to the United States and Europe for support. But he found himself alone when he started and lost a war with Russia in 2008. Even before that conflict, Tbilisi courted the United States and NATO. Shortly after achieving independence, Georgia contributed troops to the NATO mission in Kosovo, joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (later renamed the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council), and joined the Partnership for Peace program. But that was just the start. Observed NATO: “Relations between NATO and Georgia have deepened significantly over the years since dialogue and cooperation was first launched in the early 1990s.” The Saakashvili government inaugurated an Individual Partnership Action Plan with NATO and joined the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. In 2006 Tbilisi gained an Intensified Dialogue on membership and at the April 2008 NATO Summit alliance leaders agreed that Georgia would eventually become a member. Moreover, Saakashvili emphasized his personal ties to America, hired an adviser to Sen. John McCain as a lobbyist, and sent troops to fight in Iraq. President George W. Bush showered Tbilisi with praise and money and staged a state visit to Georgia. The Bush administration also strongly backed Tbilisi for membership in what nominally remained the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. However, leading European members of the alliance were less disposed to confront nuclear-armed Russia over a border dispute considered vital by the latter but irrelevant to Europe. The 2008 conflict vindicated their stance. Nevertheless, the Bush administration continued to press for Georgia’s admission. So has the Obama administration, though without obvious enthusiasm. Last year Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared that the 2012 NATO summit in Chicago should be the last such meeting that did not focus on enlargement. Georgia is considered to be in the first tier of aspirants, along with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro. Although NATO insiders say opposition to Tbilisi’s membership has ebbed, several members remain negative, including Germany. A NATO research paper by Karl-Heinz Kamp of the NATO Defense College admitted that “The crunch point of the enlargement question” is Georgia. Nevertheless, NATO and Georgia continue to act as if “yes” is the inevitable answer. Alliance officials are regular visitors to Tbilisi. Last April Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen declared: “Georgia is a special partner for NATO.” Two months later NATO Deputy Secretary General Alexander Vershbow said in Tbilisi: “At our NATO Summit in Bucharest in 2008, the Allies decided that Georgia will become a member of NATO. The Chicago Summit made clear that Allies stand by that decision and recognized the progress Georgia has made in meeting NATO’s standards.” Last September Rasmussen commended Georgia’s “very significant” contribution to the Afghan mission and offered NATO’s “unwavering support for Georgia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty within its internationally recognized borders.” He concluded, “you have a friend in NATO—and a future home in NATO.” Prime Minister Ivanishvili visited NATO headquarters in November and in December NATO foreign ministers met with the NATO-Georgia Commission amid much praise for Georgia’s participation in ISAF. Last year the alliance also held its annual “NATO Week in Georgia.” Explained NATO Special Representative James Appathurai, “it’s very important that the people of Georgia understand not just what the goal of NATO membership is, but also what NATO is and what it does.” Georgian officials certainly understand. NATO membership carries an American security guarantee. To win that commitment Tbilisi is working hard. Michael Cecire of the Foreign Policy Research Institute recently wrote of “Tbilisi’s desire to shed its reputation as a Euro-Atlantic security liability, dating back to Georgia’s five-day war with Russia in 2008.” The new government reaffirmed Tbilisi’s desire to join NATO, doubled Georgian forces in Afghanistan, and continued military training exercises with the U.S. More recently Georgia announced its intention to provide troops for the European Union’s training mission in Mali (growing out of France’s invasion). Earlier this year Tbilisi promoted military cooperation with Hungary and Lithuania. Most important, Tbilisi announced plans to turn its military into a niche counterterrorism force under the NATO doctrine of “Smart Defense,” which envisions a division of labor among members. That is, Georgia will effectively disarm against Russia in the expectation that the West will offer substitute protection.

### Russia Rels Link 2NC (:10

#### NATO kills US/Russia relations and causes Russian expansionism

**Carpenter 9** – Vice president for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institutes (3/30/09, Ted Galen, “NATO at 60 A Hollow Alliance” Policy Analysis no. 635)

A second major problem afflicting NATO is that various policies pursued since the end of the Cold War—especially the alliance’s actions in the Balkans and the expansion of NATO to include new members on Russia’s western frontier—have poisoned relations with Moscow and re-ignited security tensions in Europe. Trampling on Russia’s Interests in the Balkans In 1995, NATO forces intervened in Bosnia’s civil war to undermine the Serbs, Russia’s long-standing co-religionists and political allies. Then, in 1999, the United States and its allies waged an air war against Serbia, ultimately wrenching away its province of Kosovo. They bypassed the UN Security Council to do so, thereby evading a Russian veto. Although Russian political leaders fumed at such treatment, they could do little except issue impotent complaints. The country was too weak to do much else, as both its economy and military were in disarray.12 Western policy regarding Russia’s sensibilities and tangible interests in the Balkans has not become more adept with the passage of years. Once again dismissing Moscow’s objections, the United States and its leading European allies bypassed the UN Security Council to grant Kosovo independence in February 2008. Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov warned that such a step set a dangerous international precedent that would encourage secessionist movements around the world. America and NATO, he said, had “opened a Pandora’s box.” Ominously, he noted specifically that the Kosovo precedent would seem to apply to Georgia’s secessionist regions, South Ossetia and Abkhazia.13 Six months later, when the Georgian government tried to regain control of South Ossetia, Russian forces exploited that foolish move and launched a devastating counteroffensive against its southern neighbor. When those military operations ceased, the Kremlin promptly recognized the independence of both South Ossetia and Abkhazia. At least in part, Russia’s actions in Georgia appeared to be payback for the West’s actions regarding Kosovo.14

### Trade—Ext 2--No War 2NC

#### Their logic is backwards—peace causes trade, not the other way around

**Mueller 9**—pol sci prof and IR, Ohio State.Widely-recognized expert on terrorism threats in foreign policy. AB from U Chicago, MA in pol sci from UCLA and PhD in pol sci from UCLA(John, Faulty Correlation, Foolish Consistency, Fatal Consequence: Democracy, Peace, and Theory in the Middle East, 15 June 2007, http://psweb.sbs.ohio-state.edu/faculty/jmueller/KENT2.PDF)

This already seems to hold for the relationship between peace and trade. Although expanding trade and interactions may enhance or reinforce the process, attitude toward war is likely to be the key explanatory variable in the relationship. Thus, it has frequently been observed that militarized disputes between countries reduce tradebetween them (Pollins 1989a; Pollins 1989b; Li and Sacko 2002). By contrast, if a couple of countriesthat have previously enjoyed a conflictual relationship lapse into a comfortable peace and become extremely unlikely to get into war, businesses in both places may well become inclined to explore the possibilities for mutually beneficial exchang

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e. Similarly, although international institutions and norms often stress peace, they, like expanded trade flows, are not so much the cause of peace as its result. Many of the institutions that have been fabricated in Europe--particularly ones like the coal and steel community that were so carefully forged between France and Germany in the years following World War II--have been specifically designed to reduce the danger of war between erstwhile enemies. However, since it appears that no German or Frenchman in any walk of life at any time since 1945 has ever advocated a war between the two countries, it is difficult to see why theinstitutions should get the creditfor the peacethat has flourished between those two countries for the last half century and more.17 They are among the consequences of the peace that has enveloped Western Europe since 1945, not its cause. As Richard Betts puts it for institutions of collective security, "peace is the premise of the system, not the product.18

### Modeling: Ext1A—US Not Key 2NC

#### All their “precedent” evidence relies on the assertion that there’s a causal link between U.S. drone doctrine and other’ countries choices---that’s not true---no tangible evidence

Kenneth Anderson 11, Professor of International Law at American University, 10/9/11, “What Kind of Drones Arms Race Is Coming?,” <http://www.volokh.com/2011/10/09/what-kind-of-drones-arms-race-is-coming/#more-51516>

New York Times national security correspondent Scott Shane has an opinion piece in today’s Sunday Times predicting an “arms race” in military drones. The methodology essentially looks at the US as the leader, followed by Israel – countries that have built, deployed and used drones in both surveillance and as weapons platforms. It then looks at the list of other countries that are following fast in US footsteps to both build and deploy, as well as purchase or sell the technology – noting, correctly, that the list is a long one, starting with China. The predicament is put this way:

Eventually, the United States will face a military adversary or terrorist group armed with drones, military analysts say. But what the short-run hazard experts foresee is not an attack on the United States, which faces no enemies with significant combat drone capabilities, but the political and legal challenges posed when another country follows the American example. The Bush administration, and even more aggressively the Obama administration, embraced an extraordinary principle: that the United States can send this robotic weapon over borders to kill perceived enemies, even American citizens, who are viewed as a threat.

“Is this the world we want to live in?” asks Micah Zenko, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. “Because we’re creating it.”

By asserting that “we’re” creating it, this is a claim that there is an arms race among states over military drones, and that it is a consequence of the US creating the technology and deploying it – and then, beyond the technology, changing the normative legal and moral rules in the international community about using it across borders. In effect, the combination of those two, technological and normative, forces other countries in strategic competition with the US to follow suit. (The other unstated premise underlying the whole opinion piece is a studiously neutral moral relativism signaled by that otherwise unexamined phrase “perceived enemies.” Does it matter if they are not merely our “perceived” but are our actual enemies? Irrespective of what one might be entitled to do to them, is it so very difficult to conclude, even in the New York Times, that Anwar al-Awlaki was, in objective terms, our enemy?)

It sounds like it must be true. But is it? There are a number of reasons to doubt that moves by other countries are an arms race in the sense that the US “created” it or could have stopped it, or that something different would have happened had the US not pursued the technology or not used it in the ways it has against non-state terrorist actors. Here are a couple of quick reasons why I don’t find this thesis very persuasive, and what I think the real “arms race” surrounding drones will be.

Unmanned aerial vehicles have clearly got a big push from the US military in the way of research, development, and deployment. But the reality today is that the technology will transform civil aviation, in many of the same ways and for the same reasons that another robotic technology, driverless cars (which Google is busily plying up and down the streets of San Francisco, but which started as a DARPA project). UAVs will eventually move into many roles in ordinary aviation, because it is cheaper, relatively safer, more reliable – and it will eventually include cargo planes, crop dusting, border patrol, forest fire patrols, and many other tasks. There is a reason for this – the avionics involved are simply not so complicated as to be beyond the abilities of many, many states. Military applications will carry drones many different directions, from next-generation unmanned fighter aircraft able to operate against other craft at much higher G stresses to tiny surveillance drones. But the flying-around technology for aircraft that are generally sizes flown today is not that difficult, and any substantial state that feels like developing them will be able to do so.

But the point is that this was happening anyway, and the technology was already available. The US might have been first, but it hasn’t sparked an arms race in any sense that absent the US push, no one would have done this. That’s just a fantasy reading of where the technology in general aviation was already going; Zenko’s ‘original sin’ attribution of this to the US opening Pandora’s box is not a credible understanding of the development and applications of the technology. Had the US not moved on this, the result would have been a US playing catch-up to someone else. For that matter, the off-the-shelf technology for small, hobbyist UAVs is simple enough and available enough that terrorists will eventually try to do their own amateur version, putting some kind of bomb on it.

Moving on from the avionics, weaponizing the craft is also not difficult. The US stuck an anti-tank missile on a Predator; this is also not rocket science. Many states can build drones, many states can operate them, and crudely weaponizing them is also not rocket science. The US didn’t spark an arms race; this would occur to any state with a drone. To the extent that there is real development here, it lies in the development of specialized weapons that enable vastly more discriminating targeting. The details are sketchy, but there are indications from DangerRoom and other observers (including some comments from military officials off the record) that US military budgets include amounts for much smaller missiles designed not as anti-tank weapons, but to penetrate and kill persons inside a car without blowing it to bits, for example. This is genuinely harder to do – but still not all that difficult for a major state, whether leading NATO states, China, Russia, or India. The question is whether it would be a bad thing to have states competing to come up with weapons technologies that are … more discriminating.

### Modeling: Ext2—No Arms Race 2NC

#### No arms race – our Singh evidence says states won’t pursue drones due to their narrow applications, enormous diplomatic and political costs, and credible state defenses

#### AND, the costs outweigh the benefits – reject aff alarmism

**Singh 12** – researcher at the Center for a New American Security (Joseph, “Betting Against a Drone Arms Race”, 8/13, <http://nation.time.com/2012/08/13/betting-against-a-drone-arms-race/#ixzz2TxEkUI37>, CMR)

In short, the doomsday drone scenario Ignatieff and Sharkey predict results from an excessive focus on rapidly-evolving military technology.¶ Instead, we must return to what we know about state behavior in an anarchistic international order. Nations will confront the same principles of deterrence, for example, when deciding to launch a targeted killing operation regardless of whether they conduct it through a drone or a covert amphibious assault team.¶ Drones may make waging war more domestically palatable, but they don’t change the very serious risks of retaliation for an attacking state. Any state otherwise deterred from using force abroad will not significantly increase its power projection on account of acquiring drones.¶ What’s more, the very states whose use of drones could threaten U.S. security – countries like China – are not democratic, which means that the possible political ramifications of the low risk of casualties resulting from drone use are irrelevant. For all their military benefits, putting drones into play requires an ability to meet the political and security risks associated with their use.¶ Despite these realities, there remain a host of defensible arguments one could employ to discredit the Obama drone strategy. The legal justification for targeted killings in areas not internationally recognized as war zones is uncertain at best.¶ Further, the short-term gains yielded by targe

ted killing operations in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen, while debilitating to Al Qaeda leadership in the short-term, may serve to destroy already tenacious bilateral relations in the region and radicalize local populations.¶ Yet, the past decade’s experience with drones bears no evidence of impending instability in the global strategic landscape. Conflict may not be any less likely in the era of drones, but the nature of 21st Century warfare remains fundamentally unaltered despite their arrival in large numbers.

### Central Asia 1NC

#### No great power draw in

#### Richard Weitz 06, senior fellow and associate director of the Center for Future Security Strategies at the Hudson Institute, Summer, 2006 [Washington Quarterly, “Averting a New Great Game in Central Asia”]

Fortunately, the fact that Central Asia does not represent the most important geographic region for any external great power also works against the revival of a traditional, geopolitical great-game conflict. Russia, China, and the United States have strong reasons to cooperate in the region. Although each country has extensive goals in Central Asia, the resources they have available to pursue them are limited, given other priorities. As long as their general relations remain non-confrontational, Moscow, Beijing, and Washington are unlikely to pursue policies in a lower priority region such as Central Asia that could disrupt their overall ties. Most often, they will find it more efficient and effective to collaborate to diminish redundancies, exploit synergies, and pool funding and other scarce assets in the pursuit of common objectives. Unfounded fears or overtly competitive policies could undermine these opportunities for cooperation and should be avoided.

### **navy**

#### Naval power’s strong --- their evidence uses incorrect measures of influence

**Crisher 12** – Brian, PhD Candidate in the Department of Political Science at Florida State University, and Mark Souva, Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at Florida State University, “How Strong Is the U.S. Navy Really?”, 10-23, http://themonkeycage.org/blog/2012/10/23/how-strong-is-the-u-s-navy-really/

In the last debate, Governor Romney made the claim that the US Navy is the smallest it’s been since 1916 implying that the US Navy is regressing in terms of overall strength. How accurate is this claim? We recently compiled a new data s

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et on naval capabilities and created a measure of state naval strength for all countries from 1865 to 2011. As such, we are in a position to address the claims of the Romney campaign. Broadly stated, our measure of state naval power is based on a state’s total number of warships (non-fighting ships are excluded) and each ship’s available firepower. To make comparisons over time, our annual measure is based on available firepower within the international system in that year. (For more information, see our paper here.) In 1916, the US controlled roughly 11% of the world’s naval power. This is an impressive number that ranks the US third in naval strength behind the UK (34%) and Germany (19%), and just ahead of France (10%). What about the US navy in 2011? In 2011, the US controlled roughly 50% of the world’s naval power putting it in a comfortable lead in naval power ahead of Russia (11%). The US Navy has decreased in absolute size as Governor Romney argues (although this decline has been ongoing since the end of Cold War). U.S. warships are more powerful now than in the past, as President Obama implied. However, neither the number of warships nor the power of our ships is what is most important for understanding military and political influence. It is relative military power that matters most. In this respect, the U.S. navy is far stronger now than in 1916.

### **Ptx**

### China-U.S. Relations 1NC

#### Relations are resilient, but the cooperation that their impacts assume is impossible

Harry **Harding 11**, founding dean of the School of Leadership and Public Policy at the University of Virginia, “Are China and the U.S. on a collision course?”, June 14, http://thinkingaboutasia.blogspot.com/2011/06/are-china-and-us-on-collision-course.html

In my judgment, it is highly unlikely for the relationship between the US and China to be primarily cooperative, at least in the short to medium term. The differences in values, political systems, interests, levels of development, and perceptions of the existing international order are simply too great for the two countries to find common ground on all issues, or even to find a mutually agreeable allocation of costs and benefits when they try to pursue common interests. Only a common interest that was massively compelling – say a widespread pandemic, another financial crisis, a global outbreak of terrorist activity targeted at both countries, or increasingly severe consequences of climate change – might produce a predominantly cooperative relationship. Fortunately, an essentially confrontational relationship is also unlikely, especially if one is primarily concerned with the risks of military conflict. The high degree of economic interdependence between the two countries has already created a relatively resilient relationship. The cost of military conflict, especially given the fact that both China and the US are nuclear powers, will be a significant deterrent against military conflict. Equally important, the probability of the most worrying of the trigger events identified above– a unilateral declaration of independence by Taiwan – is presently quite low, as is the risk that China would try to compel unification through the use of force.

## 1NR

### CIR Good: Economy--Impact 2NC

#### DA outweighs ---

#### A. Magnitude --- economic collapse causes extinction through global nuclear war --- 1NC Kerpen. Magnitude first because you can only die once.

#### B. Timeframe ---- bleeding talent now.

**The Hill**, **2-5**-2013, House Republicans place priority on immigration fix for high-skilled workers, p. http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/281229-house-republicans-place-priority-on-immigration-fix-for-high-skilled-workers

But Vivek Wadhwa, vice president of innovation and research at Singularity University, said Congress needs to fix the broken high-skilled immigration system "as soon as possible." He argued that the tech industry in the U.S. and other countries is undergoing a boom period and "we can't lose time" on addressing the immigration problem for high-skilled workers because it will ultimately effect the U.S. economy. "America is bleeding talent right now," he said.

decreases US legitimacy

### CIR Will Pass: 2NC Wall

**Immigration will pass now—Obama’s new push will build House Republican support for incremental legislation that will be bundled with citizenship – FRAMING ISSUE – PC is the only relevant question because he can persuade remaining holdouts and sustain existing votes – that’s Bennett and Matthews**

#### The stars have aligned---Obama’s push secures quick passage in both houses

- a2 shutdown thumper

- a2 citizenship

- vote soon

Clift 10-25-13 (Eleanor, “Obama, Congress Get Back to the Immigration Fight”, <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/10/25/obama-congress-get-back-to-the-immigration-fight.html>, )

After months of relative quiet on the subject of immigration reform, President **Obama reclaimed center stage** in an event in the East Room of the White House Thursday, **urging the Republican**-controlled **House to take up bipartisan legislation** passed in June by a big margin (68-32) in the Senate. “It doesn’t get easier to put off,” he said, a pointed reminder to Republicans that the politics are stacked against them if they punt on an issue of central importance to the fastest growing bloc of voters in the country. Neutralizing the Democrats’ advantage among Hispanics is crucial to the GOP’s presidential prospects, and could improve Congress’ image in the wake of the government shutdown. “Rather than create problems, let’s prove to the American people that Washington can actually solve some problems,” Obama implored. Among those assembled in the East Room for the president’s remarks was Frank Sharry, founder and director of America’s Voice and a longtime activist for immigration reform. Asked what he was thinking as he listened to Obama’s 12-minute speech, he termed it “a modest push,” noting that Obama has been “remarkably restrained” on the issue when you consider that overhauling the nation’s broken immigration system is his top second-term priority. Obama sidelined himself in deference to Republicans who needed room to build support without being aligned with a president so many in the GOP caucus reflexively dislike. But now with the shutdown behind them and Republicans on the defensive, Obama saw an opening to get back in the game. His message, says Sharry: “‘Hey, I’m flexible,’ which after the shutdown politics was important, and he implied ‘if you don’t do it, I’m coming after you.’” For Obama and the Democrats, **immigration reform is a win-win issue**. They want an overhaul for the country and their constituents. If they don’t get it, they will hammer Republicans in demographically changing districts in California, Nevada, and Florida, where they could likely pick up seats—not enough to win control of the House, but, paired with what Sharry calls “the shutdown narrative,” Democratic operatives are salivating at the prospect of waging that campaign. **Some Republicans understand the stakes**, **and** former vice-presidential candidate and budget maven Paul **Ryan is at the center of a newly energized backroom effort to craft legislation that would deal with the thorniest aspect of immigration reform** for Republicans: the disposition of 11 million people in the country illegally. Rep. Raul Labrador (R-ID), an early advocate of reform who abandoned the effort some months ago, argues that Obama’s tough bargaining during the shutdown means Republicans can’t trust him on immigration. “When have they ever trusted him?” asks Sharry. “Nobody is asking them to do this for Obama. They should do this for the country and for themselves.... We’re not talking about tax increases or gun violence. This is something the pillars of the Republican coalition are strongly in favor of.” Among those pillars is Chamber of Commerce President Tom **Donahue**, who on Monday **noted** the **generally good feelings about immigration reform** among disparate groups, among them business and labor. **He expressed optimism** that **the House could pass something, go to conference and resolve differences with the Senate, get a bill and have the president sign it** “and guess what, government works! Everybody is looking for something positive to take home.” The Wall Street Journal reported Thursday that **GOP donors are withholding contributions to lawmakers blocking reform**, and that Republicans for Immigration Reform, headed by former Bush Cabinet official, Carlos Gutierrez, is running an Internet ad urging action. Next week, evangelical Christians affiliated with the Evangelical Immigration Table will be in Washington to press Congress to act with charity toward people in the country without documentation, treating them as they would Jesus. The law-enforcement community has also stepped forward repeatedly to embrace an overhaul. House Speaker John Boehner says he wants legislation, but not the “massive” bill that the Senate passed and that Obama supports. **The House seems inclined to act**—if it acts at all—on a series of smaller bills starting with “Kids Out,” a form of the Dream Act that grants a path to citizenship for young people brought to the U.S. as children; then agriculture-worker and high-tech visas, accompanied by tougher border security. The sticking point is the 11 million people in the country illegally, and finding a compromise between Democrats’ insistence that reform include a path to citizenship, and Republicans’ belief that offering any kind of relief constitutes amnesty and would reward people for breaking the law. The details matter hugely, but **what a handful of Republicans, led by Ryan, appear to be crafting is legalization** for most of the 11 million but without any mention of citizenship. It wouldn’t create a new or direct or special path for people who came to the U.S. illegally or overstayed their visa. **It would allow them to earn legal status** through some yet-to-be-determined steps, and once they get it, they go to the end of a very long line that could have people waiting for decades. The Senate bill contains a 13-year wait. However daunting that sounds, **the potential for meaningful reform is** tantalizingly close **with Republicans actively engaged in preparing their proposal, pressure building** from the business community and religious leaders, **and a short window before the end of the year** to redeem the reputation of Congress and the Republican Party after a bruising takedown. The pieces are all there for long-sought immigration reform. **We could be** a few weeks away **from an historic House vote**, or headed for a midterm election where Republicans once again are on the wrong side of history and demography.

#### They’re wrong—Both Republicans and Obama are pushing

Fox News, “Republican Lobbying Groups Ste up push on House to pass Immigration reform,” 10-28-13, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/10/27/republican-lobbying-groups-step-up-push-on-house-to-pass-immigration-reform/

Republicans who back immigration reform are ramping up their push to get the House to bring legislation to the floor, as the issue threatens to potentially create a public divide within the GOP.¶ [The Wall Street Journal](http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2013/10/24/republicans-for-immigration-reform-boost-effort-in-house/) reports the group Republicans for Immigration Reform is building up its lobbying efforts in Washington, releasing a [web ad](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v60aesNL43A) last week urging the House to act that has been viewed over 600,000 times, according to the group.¶ This week, the [New York Times](http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/26/us/politics/conservative-coalition-presses-house-republicans-to-act-on-immigration.html?pagewanted=1&_r=2) reports a coalition of about 600 mostly Republican leaders in business and agriculture will begin an effort to lobby 80 GOP representatives on the issue. Some GOP donors are also reportedly privately withholding their contributions from members of Congress who oppose action of immigration reform.¶ The issue has the potential to divide GOP lawmakers again after public in-party fighting over the recent budget negotiations.¶ The New York Times reports that while some House members and House Speaker John Boehner are pushing for the lower chamber of Congress to pass its own immigration legislation before the end of the year; some conservative lawmakers have said they will not act on the issue regardless of pressure.¶ “I care about the sovereignty of the United States of America and what it stands for, and not an open-door policy,” Rep. Ted Yoho, R-Fla., who is opposing all of the bills the House is currently considering, told the New York Times.¶ However, both President Obama and Boehner expressed optimism last week that the House could pass immigration legislation.¶ Obama on Thursday told an audience of business, community and labor leaders that the time to pass the Senate-passed reform bill is now, and urged the House to do so soon.¶ “Everybody knows our current immigration system is broken; across the political spectrum people understand that,” he said. “We’ve known that for years it’s not smart to invite some of the brightest minds in the world to study here and not start businesses here and we send them back to their home countries to create jobs, invent new products someplace else.”

#### Momentum – GOP support coalescing

Jacoby 10-22-13 (Tamar, “Immigration reform would help GOP”, <http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/21/opinion/jacoby-immigration-after-shutdown/?hpt=ju_c2>, )

What are **the chances** that **the House will** now **move ahead on immigration**? The answer will **have** less **to do with** immigration than with **how the budget battle has changed the larger political dynamic in Washington.**¶House Republicans' views on immigration are untested, and **many** advocates for reform **believe they are implacably hostile.** But **the truth is Republican opinion has been** evolving **since the 2012 election**. More and more House Republicans, **perhaps** the majority, **know** that **reform is overdue and that the GOP must be part of the solution** -- to remain competitive with Latino voters and because it's the right thing to do.¶ **Individual lawmakers and essential staff continued to work on the issue even through the dark days of the shutdown.** And **members are** coalescing **around** answers to the hardest of the hard questions: what to do about immigrants living in the United States illegally? House Majority Leader Eric **Cantor is working on a bill that would create a path to citizenship** for "Dreamers" brought to the U.S. illegally as children.¶ And **one recent informal count found 84 House Republicans** -- more than one third of the total -- **in favor of legal status** for the Dreamers' parents.¶ Bottom line: If it weren't for the rancor of the budget brawl, the House might be in a good place on immigration, with Republicans ready to move forward and pass a package of measures they could send to a conference with the Senate bill.¶

### CIR Will Pass: A2 “House GOP Blocks”

#### CIR can pass the House—multiple House Republicans are working on a comprehensive bill and Boehner will break the Hastert rule

Silver 10-23-13 (Mary, Epoch Times, "Prospects for Immigration Reform Improving" Epoch Times) www.theepochtimes.com/n3/326406-prospects-for-immigration-reform-improving/

The tide may be about to change in the immigration reform debate. The Senate has developed a broad immigration reform proposal, but the standstill in the House has made reform seem out of reach until recent developments. Bipartisan support for a bill that would provide a pathway to citizenship for the estimated 11 million people in America without documents may be within reach. Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart (R-Fla.) is working on a House bill to reform American immigration laws. He said in a statement that it “must be a solution that will secure the border, strengthen our economy, respect the rule of law, modernize our visa system, and address the issue of the millions of undocumented immigrants in a way that is both reasonable and humane.” Rep. Darrell Issa (R-Calif.) is also working on a proposal to give temporary legal status to undocumented immigrants. Immigration reform advocates plan to keep pressing legislators for change. Current law demands that undocumented people to leave the country and re-enter legally before they can begin the process that could ultimately lead to citizenship. Even the DREAM Act, also known as Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), is only a stopgap, deferring deportation for people under 30. A plan for President Obama to expand DACA to all ages is an unlikely, temporary solution. The constitutionality of such a sweeping executive order is questionable and the president has declined to consider it an option. Wide Public Support Frank Sharry, executive director of immigration advocacy group America’s Voice, encourages Diaz-Balart and Issa’s efforts to introduce legislation to the House. “The public overwhelmingly supports reform with a path to citizenship and the Senate has already approved, on a bipartisan basis, a reform package that includes a path to citizenship. It’s time for the House to step up,” he said in a statement. Angela Kelley, vice president for Immigration Policy at the Center for American Progress, thinks there is hope if the Senate bill can stay alive through the end of this year. The country is just emerging from “a highly dysfunctional and frankly, bizarre time in Washington,” she said. The Hastert Rule House Speaker John Boehner was able to avoid a national default when he broke the Hastert rule, meaning he allowed the vote to reopen the government and raise the debt ceiling to pass without the support of a majority of Republicans. This suggests that he may also break the Hastert rule again, if necessary, to pass immigration reform, according to Kelly. The Hastert rule is named for former Republican Speaker Dennis Hastert. Staying Alive If the House could bring an immigration reform bill into a conference committee, the bill could stay alive into 2014. This is the first year of this Congress, so legislation that has advanced into a committee could still be passed in 2014, according to Kelley. She said 27 Republicans have come out in support of a path to citizenship, and therefore could sponsor a bill that provides one.

### CIR IL: PC Key—2NC

**And- err neg- your won’t pass args are just pc key warrants- Obama can overcome opposition**

Neil **Munro** White House Correspondent **10-21**-2013 <http://dailycaller.com/2013/10/21/u-s-chamber-of-commerce-pleads-for-obamas-help-to-pass-immigration-boost/2/>

The president needs to get personally involved inthe high-stakes immigrationbattle to overcome growing GOP distrust, Tom Donohue, head of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, said Monday.¶ “I have serious concerns about trust all around in town right now, which suggests the way to get out is leadership,” Donohue told reporters at a breakfast meeting hosted by the Christian Science Monitor.¶ “We need leadership in the business community, we need leadership in the House, we need leadership in the Senate, and we need leadership in the White House,” he said.¶ However, he indirectly acknowledged the difficulty of getting the unpopular bill through Congress this year, amid bitter partisan fights over higher-priority budgets bills.¶ “We’ve got a whole year plus [left to go] of this Congress,” he said.¶ The backers of the immigration bill had initially hoped to get it done by August 2013.¶ Donohue’s call for Obama to get more involved comes as more GOP legislators say the immigration deal should be sidelinedbecause Obama can’t be trusted to negotiate in good faith, or even to implement provisions that he doesn’t like.

#### Capital key—splits the opposition

Richard Andrew, “Will the GOP Accept Obama’s Peace Offering?” Ring of Fire, 10—25—13,

www.ringoffireradio.com/2013/10/will-gop-accept-obamas-peace-offering/

President Obama is pushingfor **i**mmigrationreform now while the GOP has been knocked on their heels from the government shutdown. Obama is trying to give them a way out by moving a bill that a majority in both congressional chambers can agree to**.** The operative word here is compromise. Frank Sharry, executive director of America’s Voice, an immigration advocacy group, told NPR “If they want to take advantage of the get-out-of-jail card Democrats have offered them, this would be the perfect opportunity to do it.” There have been huge rallies around immigration since way before the last presidential election. Groups like America’s Voice are going to step up their rallies regardless of what Congress does. Sharry continues with a determined outcry, “We’re going to throw down until they either say ‘yes’ or they make it clear they’re not going to get to yes and then we’ll pivot to try to un-elect them.” That sounds like a determined group. These advocacy groups believe that, after the shutdown debacle , the GOP is ready to show the country that they can govern. NPR reported that after successfully staring down congressional Republicans in the shutdown-debt ceiling fight, President Obama has pivoted to immigration in a move with almost no downside. I have found the enemy and it is us. If President Obama is trying to push for immigration reform, the Tea Partiers will find a way to turn it against him. Sen. Rubio (R-FL), has already begun to turn the blame towards Obama. Rubio said that “The president has undermined this effort, absolutely, because of the way he has behaved over the last three weeks.” Like Rubio, Rep. Raul Labrador (R-ID), also has immigrant parents. The American Prospect reported him as saying, “After the way the president acted over the last two or three weeks where he would refuse to talk to the Speaker of the House … they’re not going to get immigration reform. That’s done.” The President will have to showsomestrong leadership skills that can drive a wedge between the Tea Party caucus in both Houses and the moremoderate Republicans. What would happen if we have a debate about immigration? That would bring the GOP out of the darkness and into the public light and hold the Tea Party’s feet to the fire. That should be the first thing Congress should do to bring about change on the subject of immigration. The president has already alluded to the second point of attack. In a comment he made on Univision last week, he said, “We had a very strong Democratic and Republican vote in the Senate. The only thing right now that’s holding it back is, again, Speaker Boehner not willing to call the bill on the floor of the House of Representatives.”

### a2 next summer

#### CIR is likely to pass—momentum

Leopold 10-24-13 (David, Immigration attorney, past president & past general counsel, American Immigration Lawyers Association, "Immigration Reform Is Alive and Kicking on Capitol Hill" www.huffingtonpost.com/david-leopold/immigration-reform-is-alive\_b\_4136478.html

As it turns out, reports of the death of immigration reform were greatly exaggerated. Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart (R-Fla.), Rep. Darrell Issa (R-Calif.) and other House Republicans and Democrats are reportedly working on various immigration plans, some of which, including a bill to be released next week by Issa, deal with the toughest issue of all -- what to do about the nation's 11.7 million undocumented immigrants. And Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) says that immigration reform could get to the floor of the House before the end of the year. Is common sense breaking out on Capitol Hill? That might be too much to ask for. But at least the GOP leadership seems to be taking a hard look at political reality. Here are four big reasons why an immigration overhaul is likely to happen by the end of the year: 1. Immigration reform is a political win-win for Democrats and Republicans. I can't say that either the Democrats or Republicans came out of last week's shutdown and debt limit brinksmanship looking good to the American people, but the whole debacle hurt the Republicans much more. A recent NBCNews/Wall Street Journal poll found that the public blames the GOP more than President Obama by 53 percent to 31 percent, a 21 point margin. And approval ratings for the Republican party are at an all-time low -- never before in the history of polling have the numbers shown such blatant disappointment. Immigration reform gives the Republicans a unique opportunity to do something big, to reach across the aisle and work with House Democrats to pass real immigration reform either in a comprehensive package or as a series of bills that ultimately have a chance to fix what's wrong with our immigration system. It would be a colossal mistake for the House GOP not to seize the chance to lead on immigration reform. The American people want it, the country needs it, and it's a pathway to political redemption for the badly bruised Republican party. 2. The immigration reform coalition is unified and ready to make the final push. A broad coalition of business, labor, faith-based and ethnic groups are full of energy and ready to finish the job the Senate started in the spring. In the midst of the combined "shutdown and debt ceiling" crisis, thousands of Americans descended on Washington to join the "March for Dignity and Respect." Eight members of Congress, including civil rights icon John Lewis (D-Ga.), joined together in an historic act of civil disobedience and were arrested near the steps of the Capitol in a show of solidarity with the immigration reform movement. As Rep. Charles Rangel (D-N.Y.) wrote recently in his The Huffington Post column "Why I Went To Jail": Some may call it a publicity stunt. Some may call it a political theater. For whatever reason some may think I stood out there with thousands of clergy and advocates calling for immigration reform, the fact is that it got attention. And immigration reform is a critical issue that desperately needs it. If eight Members of Congress getting thrown in jail is what it takes to get people talking about it, then I'll gladly sit in the slammer. We cannot let ourselves forget that our nation has been built by immigrants, and the story of America began with people from another nation traveling to our shores. Congress needs to fix the twisted morass of rules and regulations that pass for America's immigration policy. No longer can we sit idle as our mess of a "system" ruthlessly breaks up American families, stifles economic growth, and compromises our nation's democratic principles. Now is the time. 3. The DREAMERs have become doers. A funny thing happened since the DREAM Act was first introduced in 2001. The DREAMERs grew up. And they grew up as Americans, watching football, going to homecoming dances, eating hotdogs on the 4th of July and dreaming about giving back to the country they've struggled against all odds to enrich. They are no longer the helpless children who were brought to the U.S. by their parents. Today they are, in effect, undocumented Americans. Through masterful use of 21st century tools like Facebook and Twitter, coupled with old-fashioned organizing and courage, the DREAMERs have become a key voice in the strug le for immigration reform. They, more than any other group, deserve the lion's share of credit for pushing the administration to grant g an administrative deportation reprieve to qualified undocumented youth last year. For DREAMERs there is no giving up on their journey toward U.S. citizenship. They will no longer take no for an answer. 4. Now is the time. The passion is there, the energy is there, and, most of all, the American people are there. It's time for both parties to sit down together and create an immigration process that will protect our borders, keep our families safe and together, give our businesses the tools they need to compete in the global economy, and provide a road map to lawful immigration status for the 11 million aspiring citizens currently living in the shadows. Now, not later. Now.

### ID Lx: 2NC

#### Plan costs political capital – Congress, especially congressional democrats, will oppose any plans to restrict detention, they fear looking weak on National Security issues, and the public overwhelmingly supports detention – that’s Catallini

#### Restricting detention costs capital – bipartisan opposition

CCR 11 Center for Constitutional Rights [Detained Man Describes Peaceful Protests Against Indefinite Detention at Guantánamo, http://yubanet.com/usa/Detained-Man-Describes-Peaceful-Protests-Against-Indefinite-Detention-at-Guant-namo.php#.Ujn\_vMbYuYQ]

Upon the anniversary of President Obama's broken promise to close Guantánamo, the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) reported that a man detained at the prison, who prefers to remain anonymous, told his attorney during an unclassified call of a spontaneous peaceful protest that has swept through Camp 6, where most of the remaining detainees are currently being held. He described signs the men have posted demanding justice and humane treatment. The protest began because the government has been transferring—sometimes by force—detainees from the communal facility that had previously held most of the men, Camp 4, to the solitary-celled, Supermax-style facility of Camp 6. The detained man said the protest was inspired by news of the recent revolution in Tunisia. The detainees object to the move because of worse conditions in Camp 6, and because of their accurate perception that the move is a signal that the Obama administration has no plans to send them home anytime soon. See below for more information on the protest, language from the protest signs and excerpts from the unclassified attorney call with the detained man who reported the protest. CCR also released the following statement: In the last presidential election, both candidates campaigned on a promise to close Guantánamo—an international symbol of injustice that both men acknowledged was damaging U.S. foreign policy and national security interests. Today, on the eve of the first anniversary of President Obama's failed deadline to close Guantánamo, it is clear that all three branches of government have effectively abandoned that goal. The President continues to make hollow assertions that closing Guantánamo is the right thing to do and will make the U.S. safer. Yet, he has shown no willingness to use political capital to pursue that goal against strident opposition from demagogues in Congress and the media. In the absence of presidential leadership, both parties in Congress continue to block transfers out of Guantánamo, even for men who have successfully challenged the legality of their detention or who have been cleared for release by the administration's own thorough review process. With the Supreme Court now largely removed from the picture, thanks to the likely recusal of Justice Elena Kagan from cases involving detainee affairs because of her previous role as Solicitor General, the Court of Appeals for D.C.—the most deferential in the country to executive claims of authority—has raised the burden on detained men seeking relief through the courts to levels even higher than the government has requested.

#### Closing Gitmo spurs a substantial political backlash--congress fights it

Eric Posner, "President Obama Can Shut Guantanamo Whenever He Wants," SLATE, 5--2--13, www.slate.com/articles/news\_and\_politics/view\_from\_chicago/2013/05/president\_obama\_can\_shut\_guantanamo\_whenever\_he\_wants\_to.html, accessed 7-21-13

The real issue here, of course, is that Congress has given the president a convenient excuse for not doing something he doesn’t really want to do anyway. The public wants to keep Guantanamo open. Shutting it would generate a serious backlash that enraged members of Congress would whip up. It also matters that President Obama does not object to indefinite detention, but to the island prison itself. That is why he wants to move detainees to a supermax in the United States, not release them. But doing so would make clear that his campaign promise to shut down Guantanamo Bay was an empty one. The place of indefinite detention would change; the system supporting it would not. He does better with headlines like “Congress, rules keep Obama from closing Guantanamo Bay” than with “Obama moves detainees to U.S. soil where they will remain forever.” The president will not shut Guantanamo, and the reason is politics, not law. If you don’t like this choice, blame him.

### CIR Thumper Ans: Topshelf

#### All of our uniqueness evidence answers this—he’s only spending political capital on CIR

#### Their conception of link uniqueness is wrong --- the plan introduces an entirely new initiative on Obama’s agenda. He has a carefully calibrated agenda now and has accounted for issues like \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_, but not the plan.

#### And, default to issue specific uniqueness --- recent evidence proves CIR is likely now and there is only a chance the plan disrupts the agenda.

#### No thumpers---Obama focusing attention on immigration

Shear 10-24-13 (Michael D, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/25/us/politics/obama-urges-house-republicans-to-act-on-immigration.html?_r=0>, )

President **Obama** on Thursday **renewed his call for an immigration overhaul**, telling an audience of activists at the White House that the fate of a bipartisan Senate bill now rests with Republicans in the House. “Anyone still standing in the way of this bipartisan reform should at least explain why,” Mr. Obama said to repeated applause in the East Room. “**If House Republicans have new and different** additional **ideas** **for how we should move forward**, then **we should** hear them. I will **be listening**.” The Senate passed legislation in June by a vote of 68-32, giving a lift to Mr. Obama’s plans to improve border security, require employers to verify the immigration status of their workers, and provide a path to citizenship for 11 million undocumented immigrants. White House strategists hoped that the vote would prompt action in the House, where Republicans had resisted similar calls for an overhaul of the system. But the effort stalled this summer, with many House Republicans expressing dissatisfaction with the increases in border security and saying they do not support any plan that would allow people in the country illegally to eventually become citizens. Mr. Obama’s remarks on Thursday were aimed at rebooting the discussion after months in which attention shifted to concerns about Iran and Syria and contentious disputes at home with the House Republicans that led to a government shutdown.

#### No thumpers

CNN, 10/24 (“Obama puts immigration back in spotlight,” Oct 24th, 2013, <http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/24/politics/immigration-reform/>)//HAL

Washington (CNN) -- It's time to fix the United States' "broken immigration system," President Barack Obama said Thursday, citing bipartisan support to revamp immigration laws. His speech didn't reveal anything that hasn't been said before, but the announcement put the immigration issue back in the spotlight. "We've kicked this particular can down the road for too long," Obama said. Immigration reform was placed on the back burner after the Democratic-controlled Senate passed a bill in June that went nowhere in the House of Representatives. Controlled by Republicans, the House has said it would prefer to undertake a number of smaller bills instead of the one large package passed by the Senate. Obama on Thursday called it a good bill that was supported by several Republicans. [UK's message to immigrants: Stay out](http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/24/opinion/navarrette-anti-immigration-uk/index.html) "It's good for our economy, it's good for our security, it's good for our people and we should do it this year," he said. But don't expect a bill to sail through Congress that easily, a senior House GOP leadership aide told CNN. "Expectations are low" that any immigration bill could pass this year, the aide said. "There is a sincere desire to work on this issue, but there's also very little good will after the President spent the last two months refusing to work with us." Republican lawmakers have said that they prefer reform on a piecemeal basis and that border security measures must be put in place before the status of undocumented immigrants can be discussed. Obama lauded the Senate's immigration bill, but House Majority Leader Eric Cantor has already said that the House won't do anything with it because the GOP opposes it. "I expect us to move forward this year in trying to address reform and what is broken about our system," he said. A CBS News poll released Wednesday found public support for immigration reform. There is widespread support for providing a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants if they meet certain requirements, including undergoing a waiting period, paying fines and back taxes, passing criminal background checks and learning English, the poll found. The same poll, however, found that more people think that securing the country's borders should be a priority over resolving the status of undocumented immigrants. "It doesn't make sense to have 11 million people who are in this country illegally without any ... way to come out of the shadows, get right with the law, meet their responsibility and permit their families, then, to move ahead," Obama said. House Democrats introduced their own version of an immigration bill at the beginning of the month, one without the huge expansion of the Border Patrol included in the Senate bill. One of the most contentious parts of the Senate version was a one-year path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants. Many Republicans have rejected any route to legal status as amnesty for lawbreakers. House Oversight Committee Chairman Darrell Issa also is working on a proposal to offer temporary status as early as next week for some undocumented immigrants, a spokesman for the California Republican said. The bill would provide temporary legal status, likely for six years, for those who meet economic tests. An aide says this approach could help "break the logjam" on the issue of undocumented immigrants currently in the United States.

### CIR Thumper Ans: A2 “Farm Bill”

#### No

Galston 10-23-13 (William A, “William Galston: An Immigration Challenge for Boehner”, <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303448104579149470077037700>, )

In his post-shutdown remarks, President Obama identified three areas in which bipartisan progress is possible—agriculture, the budget and immigration. **The farm bill is** usually routine **and** should pass easily once agreement is reached on nutrition programs. Unless the ever-elusive grand bargain is on the table, and few believe it is, fiscal talks will yield modest results at best. But immigration is different. Comprehensive immigration reform would be to Mr. Obama's second term what the Affordable Care Act was to his first: a signature legislative achievement.

### CIR Good: Economy--Internals 2NC

#### Immigration reform is key to the economy --- 1NC Huffington Post. Three internal links (1) innovation, (2) capital investment, and (3) aging workforce.

#### We control the magnitude of the link --- reform is key to the “survival of the economy.” This isn’t a drop in the bucket.

#### Immigration reform key to averting economic suicide.

**Albany Herald**, **2-7**-2013, Immigration reform is key to averting economic suicide, p. http://www.albanyherald.com/news/2013/feb/07/immigration-reform-key-averting-economic-suicide/

Immigration reform is key to averting economic suicide

#But legal immigrants are more important to the country’s economic future and deserve equal attention. The current strictures that inhibit investors, inventors and entrepreneurs from settling in the United States might be the single most wrongheaded and self-defeating policy followed by the entire federal government. And that’s saying something. #Every serious study shows that immigrants are job makers, not job takers. The nativists who resisted newcomers throughout our history have always been wrong, and they’re wrong today. Immigrants are far more likely than homegrown workers to start businesses and secure patents. The Kauffman Foundation concludes that 52 percent of Silicon Valley startups were “immigrant-founded,” and that list includes Google and Yahoo, Intel and Instagram. #Instead of welcoming these economic dynamos, we’re driving them away. “Right now,” the president said recently in Nevada, “there are brilliant students from all over the world sitting in classrooms at our top universities. They’re earning degrees in the fields of the future, like engineering and computer science. But once they finish school, once they earn that diploma, there’s a good chance they’ll have to leave our country. Think about that.” #We have, and it’s sickening. Countries like Australia, Germany and Canada are taking advantage of our idiocy by enticing these brilliant students with offers of rapid residency and citizenship. Other grads are simply going home, to China, India and the Philippines, where a rising middle class is making life a lot more comfortable than it was a generation ago. #“When America turns away a potential investor, entrepreneur or job creator, that person does not simply cease to exist,” warns the R Street Institute, a pro-business think tank. “She returns to her own country and starts a business that competes directly with American companies. And she hires citizens of her own country instead of Americans.” #It gets worse. American companies are being forced to follow that departing talent and shift operations to other countries. Microsoft points out that while it now spends 83 percent of its research budget in the U.S., “companies across our industry cannot continue to focus R&D jobs in this country if we cannot fill them here.” Unless the law changes, “there is a growing possibility that unfilled jobs will migrate over time” to countries that are far friendlier to immigrant workers. #Fortunately, smart lawmakers in both parties are confronting the issue. Currently only 65,000 work permits, called H-1B visas, are available annually for foreign-born grads, and they are snapped up quickly in most years. A bipartisan measure, the Immigration Innovation Act, or “I-Squared,” would raise that cap considerably, to 300,000 in years of rapid economic growth. Moreover, visa holders would find it easier to change jobs and their spouses would be allowed to work, a critical factor in retaining young, two-professional families. #Obtaining a green card and permanent residency presents an even tougher obstacle course than getting a work visa. That’s especially true for immigrants from populous countries such as China and India, because employment-related permits are subject to strict national quotas. I-Squared would end those quotas, expand the total number of green cards and create new exceptions for “outstanding professors and researchers.” The bill shrewdly recognizes the political pressures to produce more homegrown science and engineering whizzes, so it would impose a fee on applicants for H-1B visas and use the revenue to support local educational efforts in those fields. #The I-Squared legislation makes total sense. So does another initiative, also bipartisan, that would create a new visa category for immigrants willing to invest in startup companies. But, then, these ideas have made sense for years and nothing has happened. #The craziness has to end now. As a separate bill or as part of a larger immigration package, Congress must act, and soon. Even Mitt Romney and President Obama agreed on this issue during the campaign. We desperately need those “brilliant students” the president talks about to stay and work, to think and create, here in America. Driving them away amounts to economic suicide.

### Special Ops 2NC

#### There’s really no internal link—Special Ops might hesitate on things like detention or drones but there’s no reason why that’s key to solve middle east war or indo-pak war – their internal links are predicated on different special ops actions

#### Budget cuts independently wreck special ops – budget cuts mean there will be fewer high skilled troops that can be qualified to work in special ops – that’s slattery

#### Finishing the slattery card

article states. Moreover, as the overall defense budget erodes, so does the support infrastructure for special ops to perform their missions. This was regrettably evident during the failed attempt to rescue 50 American hostages from Iran in 1980. The Obama Administration cannot forget what caused this tragic failure: systematic budget reductions in the aftermath of Vietnam. The special forces unit in Iran was operating helicopters they knew were old and ill-equipped, yet they were the best the military could provide. It may be unfair to assert that the mission would have been a success if newer equipment were available. Nevertheless, it is irresponsible to put America’s forces in harm’s way without the support and funding they require.

#### Budget cuts thump special ops—R&D funding

Beidel 12 (Eric, August 2012, "Budget Cuts Could Threaten Special Operations Innovation" National Defense) www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2012/August/Pages/BudgetCutsCouldThreatenSpecialOperationsInnovation.aspx

During the National Defense Industrial Association’s recent Special Operations Forces Industry Conference in Tampa, Fla., SOCOM Acquisition Executive James W. Cluck said he was worried that dwindling research-and-development funding could threaten the command’s ability to maintain its fast-paced innovation cycle. “You don’t need a lot of money to be innovative,” Cluck said. “But we’ve had a condition lately of declining R&D dollars squeezed out by the demand of operational tempo. My concern with that is we’re not able to turn and deploy and test things as quickly as we might be able to do if we had a little more research-and-development dollars.” The pressure is on, because government leaders will expect a return on their heavy investment in special operations, officials said. Additionally, tighter budgets could have an impact on an independent line of funding for acquisitions specific to special operations forces (SOF). The command has the ability to lean on the traditional military services when necessary but then go its own way to buy niche equipment and bypass lengthy procurement processes. As the defense budget decreases, the services may force SOCOM to dip more into its own funds and rely less on money directly from the military branches, said Rick “Ozzie” Nelson, director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ homeland security and counterterrorism program. The debate about what is and isn’t SOF-specific gear could heat up under this scenario, he said. The competition for dollars may even threaten the strong bonds formed between general purpose and special forces during the past decade, he added.

**Special ops are overstretched**

**Benson 12** (Pam, reporter, 7-27-12, "Special Operations forces risk being overused, misused, former chief says" CNN) security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/07/27/special-operations-forces-risk-being-overused-misused-former-chief-says/

The **use of military Special Operations Forces has been a proven success** in Iraq, Afghanistan and - with last year's raid on Osama bin Laden's compound - in Pakistan, **but that success has some people concerned. Will the forces become the tool of choice for a president? The former head of the** U.S. **Special Operations** Command **told the Aspen Security Forum** Thursday **he fears there could be a misuse of the highly trained specialists.** "It's a real danger," retired Adm. Eric Olson said. "**They come to be thought of as a utility infielder,** sometimes a utility infielder with guns, **and they may be asked to solve problems that are not necessarily special operations problems."** **Olson cited cases of Special Operations Forces being asked to provide security for individuals overseas. The high demand has strained the elite forces.** Last year, **Olson warned the units were "beginning to show some fraying around the edges."**

**Cred Ans: Alt Cause—NSA**

**PRISM**

**Migranyan 7/5** (Andranik is the director of the Institute for Democracy and Cooperation in New York. He is also a professor at the Institute of International Relations in Moscow, a former member of the Public Chamber and a former member of the Russian Presidential Council. “Scandals Harm U.S. Soft Power,” 2013, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/scandals-harm-us-soft-power-8695)

For the past few months, **the United States has been rocked by a series of scandals. It all started with the events in Benghazi, when Al Qaeda-affiliated terrorists attacked the General Consulate** there and murdered four diplomats, including the U.S. ambassador to Libya. **Then there was the scandal exposed when it was revealed that the Justice Department was monitoring the calls of the Associated Press. The Internal Revenue Service seems to have targeted certain political groups. Finally, there was the vast National Security Agency apparatus** for monitoring online activity **revealed by Edward Snowden.** Together, **these events provoke a number of questions about the path taken by** contemporary Western societies, and especially the one taken by **America**.¶ **Large and powerful institutions**, especially those in the security sphere, **have become unaccountable to the public**, even to representatives of the people themselves. Have George Orwell’s cautionary tales of total government control over society been realized?¶ At the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, my fellow students and I read Orwell’s 1984 and other dystopian stories and believed them to portray fascist Germany or the Soviet Union—two totalitarian regimes—but today it has become increasingly apparent that Orwell, Huxley and other dystopian authors had seen in their own countries (Britain and the United States) certain trends, especially as technological capabilities grew, that would ultimately allow governments to exert total control over their societies. The potential for this type of all-knowing regime is what Edward Snowden revealed, confirming the worst fears that the dystopias are already being realized.¶ **On a practical geopolitical level, the spying scandals have seriously tarnished the reputation of the United States. They have circumscribed its ability to exert soft power;** the same influence that made the U.S. model very attractive to the rest of the world. This former lustre is now diminished. **The blatant everyday intrusions** into the private lives of Americans, **and violations of individual rights and liberties** by runaway, unaccountable U.S. government agencies, **have deprived the United States of its authority to dictate how others must live and what others must do. Washington can no longer lecture others when its very foundational institutions and values are being discredited**—or at a minimum, when all is not well “in the state of Denmark.”¶ Perhaps precisely because not all is well, many American politicians seem unable to adequately address the current situation. Instead of asking what isn’t working in the government and how to ensure accountability and transparency in their institutions, they try, in their annoyance, to blame the messenger—as they are doing in Snowden’s case. Some Senators hurried to blame Russia and Ecuador for anti-American behavior, and threatened to punish them should they offer asylum to Snowden.¶ These threats could only cause confusion in sober minds, as every sovereign country retains the right to issue or deny asylum to whomever it pleases. In addition, the United States itself has a tradition of always offering political asylum to deserters of the secret services of other countries, especially in the case of the former Soviet Union and other ex-socialist countries. In those situations, the United States never gave any consideration to how those other countries might react—it considered the deserters sources of valuable information. As long as deserters have not had a criminal and murderous past, they can receive political asylum in any country that considers itself sovereign and can stand up to any pressure and blackmail.¶ Meanwhile, **the hysteria of some politicians**, if the State Department or other institutions of the executive branch join it, **can only accelerate the process of Snowden’s asylum. For any country he might ask will only be more willing to demonstrate its own sovereignty and dignity by standing up to a bully that tries to dictate conditions to it.** In our particular case, **political pressure on Russia and President Putin could turn out to be utterly counterproductive.** I believe that Washington has enough levelheaded people to understand that fact, and correctly advise the White House. The administration will need sound advice, as **many people in Congress fail to understand the consequences of their calls for punishment of sovereign countries or foreign political leaders that don’t dance to Washington’s tune.¶ Judging by the latest exchange between Moscow and Washington, it appears that the executive branches of both countries will find adequate solutions to the Snowden situation without attacks on each other’s dignity and self-esteem.** Russia and the United States are both Security Council members, and much hinges on their decisions, including a slew of common problems that make cooperation necessary.¶ Yet **the recent series of scandals has caused irreparable damage to the image and soft power of the United States.** I do not know how soon this damage can be repaired. But gone are the days when Orwell was seen as a relic of the Cold War, as the all-powerful Leviathan of the security services has run away from all accountability to state and society. **Today the world is looking at America—and its model for governance—with a more critical eye.**

## 2NR

### Noko D

**No impact to North Korea**

**Manning 13** (Robert, senior fellow of the Brent Scowcroft Center for International Security at the Atlantic Council, 4-12-13, "There's No North Korea Crisis" National Interest) nationalinterest.org/commentary/theres-no-north-korea-crisis-8341?page=1

**From the hysterical TV portrayals of goose-stepping North Korean troops, breathless news reports of North Korean warnings of war, and maps depicting the range of imminent missile launches** (complete with retired U.S. generals explaining the targets), **you might think there is a crisis on the Korean Peninsula. But there is no crisis**, only a farce. This time around, it is louder and more melodramatic. But **we have seen time and again North Korea throwing a political tantrum in response to annual U.S.-ROK military exercises** or the latest round of UN Security Council sanctions in response to Pyongyang testing a nuclear device or launching a missile. **The notion of a “crisis”—as in the 1962 Cuban Missile crisis—is nonsense. The world is not on the brink of an imminent nuclear confrontation. North Korean troops and artillery are not about to pour across the Demilitarized Zone. This is all nothing more than political theater. Kim may be dangerous, but he is not crazy: North Korea is not suicidal. Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile tests are not really “provocations.” They are part of a systematic military program that North Korea has been working on for more than forty years to obtain nuclear and missile capabilities.** Diplomatic concessions in the past have affected the timing and perhaps the amount of missile and nuclear tests. But they have gone and will continue to go forward because the North Koreans want to gain such weapons. In the past, North Korean actions have been designed to create tensions in order to extract concessions. But the Obama administration and that of the new ROK President Park Geun-hye have made it clear that they have both seen that movie before and are not buying it. So what is the point of it? The conventional wisdom to explain North Korea’s actions is that this is primarily about a new twenty-nine-year-old trying to consolidate his position by demonstrating how tough and courageous he is to the North Korean military and political elite. That may be part of the answer. But let me offer an explanation that has been noticeably absent in the sea of commentary on North Korea in recent weeks. It’s possible that **the core reason North Korea’s new leaders decided they needed to whip up a sense of crisis—**of a nation under siege and facing impending attack from outside enemies—**is because they are insecure and fear a fragile internal situation that is increasingly difficult to control. Since the end of the Cold War** (and Soviet aid) **North Korea’s economic system has steadily broken down.** Since the great famine in 1995, **there have been continual food shortages** facing by some estimates up to one-third of North Korea’s twenty-three million people. The breakdown of Pyongyang’s food-distribution system led the government to allow private markets and some private plots. **There has been a bottom-up second economy taking shape**. In recent years, markets have sprung up all over North Korea with a growing array of goods indulged by the regime as a coping mechanism. A fledgling merchant stratum has sprung up; it is occasionally harassed, but tolerated, and exists largely outside the government. At the same time, **despite efforts to keep the nation isolated, several factors—including economic trade and refugee flows to China, CDs and broadcasts from South Korea, and now some five million cellphones—have made its borders more porous and information flows more accessible. To the degree that North Koreans get a dose of reality about the outside world, the myths of a “socialist paradise” by which the regime misgoverns start to unravel. If the twenty-three million North Koreans realize the massive lies fed to them to sustain the world’s only hereditary Stalinist dictatorship, it could gradually undo the regime.** This is not to argue that the masses are poised to revolt. That is unlikely to happen anytime soon. Pyongyang still runs a terror state with some two hundred thousand in labor camps, and those caught trying to flee the country are frequently executed. But the current situation may be viewed by the regime as discomforting and fragile, with its efforts to seal off the country from reality increasingly more than fraying at the edges. At the onset of a new leader’s tenure, **how better to reassert tight control over its beleaguered citizens and whip up support for the regime than to instill fear and claim that the U.S. imperialists are on the verge of starting a nuclear war. This involved going to great lengths, including telling foreign embassies to evacuate Pyongyang and warning foreigners in South Korea to leave before the war starts. It’s great theater, and about as real as Orson Welles' 1938 radio broadcast of a Martian invasion.**

### Yes Russia War

**Russia won’t react rationally to american encroachment – will use nuclear weapons, war is likely**

Dr. Stephen J. **Blank**, "Resetting the Reset Button: Realism About Russia," Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 12--**09**, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=956, accessed 5-20-13.

Indeed, on October 9 and 14, 2009, Nikolai **Patrushev**, Chairman of the Security Council, **stated that the forthcoming defense doctrine will provide for preemptive and even preventative use of nuclear weapons in a first strike mode in a so called local and purely conventional war.** No rational strategic basis exists for such charges as have been made against the U.S. program and indeed, it can be argued that **Russia’s obsession with her status and ingrained anti-Americanism are self-reinforcing postulates for the continuation of its neo-Tsarist and neo-imperialist regime**. In addition, several **analysts have argued that Russia’s calculation is not based on a rational strategic assessment of costs and benefits of several policies as much as it is on the obsession with preserving great power and status.**