### 1

#### A. Interpretation: the affirmative must defend the hypothetical enactment of a topical plan by the United States federal government.

#### The United States federal government is the actor defined by the resolution, not individual debaters

**US Gov** Official Website 20**09**

http://www.usa.gov/Agencies/federal.shtml

U.S. Federal Government **The three branches of U.S. government—legislative, judicial, and executive—carry out governmental power and functions.** View a complete diagram (.PDF) of the U.S. government's branches.

#### “Resolved” expresses intent to implement the plan

**Merriam-Webster Dictionary** 19**96** [http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=resolved, downloaded 07/20/03]

“6. **To change or convert by resolution or formal vote**; -- **used only reflexively; as, the house resolved itself into a committee of the whole**.”

#### “Should” denotes an expectation of enacting a plan

**American Heritage Dictionary 2K**

[www.dictionary.com]

3 **Used to express** probability or **expectation**

#### B. Violation—the affirmative does not defend the implementation of a topical plan.

#### C. Vote negative

#### 1. Limits—their interpretation kills limits because it creates a strategic incentive to disregard the resolution. If teams can get away with being non-topical, there’s no reason to defend the resolution. Limits are good:

#### A. Deliberation—having a limited topic with equitable ground is necessary to foster decision-making and clash

**Steinberg & Freeley 8** \*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp 45-

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007. Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### B. Creativity—thinking “inside the box” forces teams to be creative about their positions and come up with innovative solutions. Absent constraints, debate becomes boring and stale—we link turn all of their offense.

**Intrator 10** (Intrator, David, President of The Creative Organization and musical composer, October 22, 2010, “Thinking Inside The Box: A Professional Creative Dispels A Popular Myth”, Training, http://www.trainingmag.com/article/thinking-inside-box) FS

**One of the most pernicious myths about creativity, one that seriously inhibits creative thinking and innovation, is the belief that one needs to “think outside the box.”** As someone who has worked for decades as a professional creative, **nothing could be further from the truth. This** a **is** view **shared by the vast majority of creatives, expressed** famously **by** the **modernist designer Charles Eames when he wrote, “Design depends largely upon constraints.”** The myth of thinking outside the box stems from a fundamental misconception of what creativity is, and what it’s not. In the popular imagination, creativity is **something weird and wacky.** The creative process is magical, or divinely inspired. But, in fact, **creativity is** not about divine inspiration or magic. It’s **about problem-solving, and by definition a problem is a constraint**, a limit, a box. One of the best illustrations of this is the work of **photographers**. They **create by excluding the great mass what’s before them**, choosing a small frame in which to work. Within that tiny frame, literally a box, they uncover relationships and establish priorities. What makes creative problem-solving uniquely challenging is that you, as the creator, are the one defining the problem**.** You’re the one choosing the frame. And **you alone determine what’s an effective solution**. **This can be quite demanding,** both intellectually and emotionally. **Intellectually, you are required to establish limits, set priorities**, and cull patterns and relationships from a great deal of material, much of it fragmentary. More often than not, this is the material you generated during brainstorming sessions. At the end of these sessions, you’re usually left with a big mess of ideas, half-ideas, vague notions, and the like. Now, chances are you’ve had a great time making your mess. You might have gone off-site, enjoyed a “brainstorming camp,” played a number of warm-up games. You feel artistic and empowered. **But to be truly** creative, you have to clean up your mess, organizing those fragments into something real, something useful, something that actually works. That’s the hard part. It takes a lot of energy, time, and willpower to make sense of the mess you’ve just generated. It also can be emotionally difficult. **You’ll need to throw out many ideas you originally thought were great, ideas you’ve become attached to, because they simply don’t fit into the rules you’re creating as you build your box.** You can always change the rules, but that also comes with an emotional price. Unlike many other kinds of problems, with creative problems there is no external authority to which you can appeal to determine whether you’re on the right track, whether one set of rules should have priority over another, or whether one box is better than another. There is no correct answer. Better said: There might be a number of correct answers. Or none at all. The responsibility of deciding the right path to take is entirely upon you. That’s a lot of responsibility, and it can be paralyzing. So it’s no wonder that the creative process often stalls after the brainstorming in many organizations. Whereas generating ideas is open-ended, and, in a sense, infinitely hopeful, having to pare those ideas down is restrictive, tedious, and, at times, scary. The good news, however, is that understanding the creative process as problem-solving is ultimately liberating. For one, all of those left-brainers with well-honed rational skills will find themselves far more creative than they ever thought. They’ll discover their talents for organization, abstraction, and clarity are very much what’s required to be a true creative thinker. **Viewing creativity as problem-solving also makes the whole process far less intimidating**, even though it might lose some of its glamour and mystery. Moreover, **since creative problems are open to rational analysis, they can be broken down into smaller components that are easier to address.** Best of all, **the very act of problem-solving, of organizing and trying making sense of things, helps generate new ideas.** Paradoxically, thinking within a box may be one of the most effective brainstorming techniques **there** is. That may be what Charles Eames meant when he added, “I welcome constraints.” **Without some sort of structure to your creative thinking**, you’re just flailing about. For a while you might feel like you’re making progress, generating a great mess of ideas that might hold some potential. But **to turn** those **ideas into something truly innovative, your best bet is to** build your box and **play by the rules** of your own creation.

#### 2. Switch-Side Debate—their interpretation allows teams to only debate one side of an issue. Switch-side debate is good:

#### A. Critical thinking—switching sides forces debaters to assess all possible outcomes of a policy and sharpens their analysis of complex situations

**Harrigan 8** NDT champion, debate coach at UGA (Casey, thesis submitted to Wake Forest Graduate Faculty for Master of Arts in Communication, “A defense of switch side debate”, http://dspace.zsr.wfu.edu/jspui/bitstream/10339/207/1/harrigancd052008, p. 57-59)

Along these lines, the greatest benefit of switching sides, which goes to the heart of contemporary debate, is its inducement of critical thinking. Defined as “reasonable reflective thinking that is focused on deciding what to believe or do” (Ennis, 1987, p. 10), critical thinking learned through debate teaches students not just how advocate and argue, but how to decide as well. Each and every student, whether in debate or (more likely) at some later point in life, will be placed in the position of the decision-maker. Faced with competing options whose costs and benefits are initially unclear, critical thinking is necessary to assess all the possible outcomes of each choice, compare their relative merits, and arrive at some final decision about which is preferable. In some instances, such as choosing whether to eat Chinese or Indian food for dinner, the importance of making the correct decision is minor. For many other decisions, however, the implications of choosing an imprudent course of action are potentially grave. As Robert Crawford notes, there are “issues of unsurpassed importance in the daily lives of millions upon millions of people…being decided to a considerable extent by the power of public speaking” (2003). Although the days of the Cold War are over, and the risk that “the next Pearl Harbor could be ‘compounded by hydrogen’” (Ehninger and Brockriede, 1978, p. 3) is greatly reduced, the manipulation of public support before the invasion of Iraq in 2003 points to the continuing necessity of training a well-informed and critically-aware public (Zarefsky, 2007).In the absence of debate-trained critical thinking, ignorant but ambitious politicians and persuasive but nefarious leaders would be much more likely to draw the country, and possibly the world, into conflicts with incalculable losses in terms of human well-being. Given the myriad threats of global proportions that will require incisive solutions, including global warming, the spread of pandemic diseases, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cultivating a robust and effective society of critical decision-makers is essential. As Louis Rene Beres writes, “with such learning, we Americans could prepare…not as immobilized objects of false contentment, but as authentic citizens of an endangered planet” (2003). Thus, it is not surprising that critical thinking has been called “the highest educational goal of the activity” (Parcher, 1998). While arguing from conviction can foster limited critical thinking skills, the element of switching sides is necessary to sharpen debate’s critical edge and ensure that decisions are made in a reasoned manner instead of being driven by ideology. Debaters trained in SSD are more likely to evaluate both sides of an argument before arriving at a conclusion and are less likely to dismiss potential arguments based on his or her prior beliefs (Muir 1993). In addition, debating both sides teaches “conceptual flexibility,” where decision-makers are more likely to reflect upon the beliefs that are held before coming to a final opinion (Muir, 1993, p. 290). Exposed to many arguments on each side of an issue, debaters learn that public policy is characterized by extraordinary complexity that requires careful consideration before action. Finally, these arguments are confirmed by the preponderance of empirical research demonstrating a link between competitive SSD and critical thinking (Allen, Berkowitz)

#### B. Tolerance—switching sides makes debaters more tolerant of arguments and ideas that are the opposite of their own—their one-sided approach promotes dogmatism

**Muir 93** (Star, Professor of Communication – George Mason U., “A Defense of the Ethics of Contemporary Debate”, Philosophy & Rhetoric, Vol. 26, No. 4, p. 288-289)

The role of **switch-side debate is especially important in the** oral **defense of arguments that foster tolerance** without accruing the moral complications of acting on such beliefs. **The forum is** therefore **unique in providing debaters with** attitudes of **tolerance** without committing them to active moral irresponsibility. As Freeley notes, **debaters are** indeed **exposed to a multivalued world**, both within and between the sides of a given topic. Yet this exposure hardly commits them to such "mistaken" values. In this view, **the divorce of the game from the "real world" can be** seen as **a means of gaining perspective** without obligating students to validate their hypothetical value structure through immoral actions.'s Values clarification, Stewart is correct in pointing out, does not mean that no values are developed. Two very important values— **tolerance and fairness—inhere to a significant degree in the ethics of switch-side debate**. A second point about the charge of relativism is that tolerance is related to the development of reasoned moral viewpoints. **The willingness to recognize** the existence of **other views, and to grant alternative positions** a degree of **credibility, is** a value **fostered by switch-side debate**: Alternately **debating both sides** of the same question . . . **inculcates a deep-seated** attitude of **tolerance** toward differing points of view. **To** be forced to **debate only one side leads to an ego-identification with that side**. , . . The other side in contrast is seen only as something to be discredited. Arguing as persuasively as one can for completely opposing views is one way of giving recognition to the idea that a strong case can generally be made for the views of earnest and intelligent men, however such views may clash with one's own. . . .**Promoting** this kind of **tolerance is** perhaps **one of the greatest benefits debating both sides has to offer**. 5' The activity should encourage debating both sides of a topic, reasons Thompson, because **debaters are "more likely to realize that propositions are bilateral. It is those who fail to recognize this** fact who **become intolerant, dogmatic, and bigoted**.""\* While Theodore Roosevelt can hardly be said to be advocating bigotry, his efforts to turn out advocates convinced of their rightness is not a position imbued with tolerance.

#### C. Activism—only switching sides teaches students to anticipate counter-arguments and build coalitions effectively, which is necessary for sustained activism

**Harrigan 8** - Casey Harrigan, Associate Director of Debate at UGA, Master’s in Communications, Wake Forest U., 2008, “A Defense of Switch Side Debate”, Master’s thesis at Wake Forest, Department of Communication, May, pp.49-50

Third, there is an important question of means. Even the best activist intentions have little practical utility as long as they remain purely cordoned off in the realm of theoretical abstractions. Creating programs of action that seek to produce material changes in the quality of life for suffering people, not mere wishful thinking in the ivory towers of academia, should be the goal of any revolutionary project. Frequently, for strategies for change, the devil lies in the details. It is not possible to simply click one’s ruby red slippers together and wish for alternatives to come into being. Lacking a plausible mechanism to enact reforms, many have criticized critical theory as being a “fatally flawed enterprise” (Jones 1999). For activists, learning the skills to successfully negotiate hazardous political terrain is crucial. They must know when to and when not to compromise, negotiate, and strike political alliances in order to be successful. The pure number of failed movements in the past several decades demonstrates the severity of the risk assumed by groups who do not focus on refining their preferred means of change. Given the importance of strategies for change, SSD is even more crucial. Debaters trained by debating both sides are substantially more likely to be effective advocates than those experienced only in arguing on behalf of their own convictions. For several reasons, SSD instills a series of practices that are essential for a successful activist agenda. First, SSD creates more knowledgeable advocates for public policy issues. As part of the process of learning to argue both sides, debaters are forced to understand the intricacies of multiple sides of the argument considered. Debaters must not only know how to research and speak on behalf of their own personal convictions, but also for the opposite side in order to defend against attacks of that position. Thus, when placed in the position of being required to publicly defend an argument, students trained via SSD are more likely to be able to present and persuasively defend their positions. Second, learning the nuances of all sides of a position greatly strengthens the resulting convictions of debaters, their ability to anticipate opposing arguments, and the effectiveness of their attempts to locate the crux, nexus and loci of arguments. As is noted earlier, conviction is a result, not a prerequisite of debate. Switching sides and experimenting with possible arguments for and against controversial issues, in the end, makes students more likely to ground their beliefs in a reasoned form of critical thinking that is durable and unsusceptible to knee-jerk criticisms. As a result, even though it may appear to be inconsistent with advocacy, SSD “actually created stronger advocates” that are more likely to be successful in achieving their goals (Dybvig and Iverson 2000). Proponents of abandoning SSD and returning to debating from conviction should take note. Undoubtedly, many of their ideas would be beneficial if enacted and deserve the support of activist energies. However, anti-SSD critics seem to have given little thought to the important question of how to translate good ideas into practice. By teaching students to privilege their own personal beliefs prior to a thorough engagement with all sides of an issue, debating from conviction produces activists that are more likely to be politically impotent. By positing that debaters should bring prior beliefs to the table in a rigid manner and assuming that compromising is tantamount to giving in to cooptation, the case of debating from conviction undercuts the tactics necessary for forging effective coalitional politics. Without such broad-based alliances, sustainable political changes will likely be impossible (Best & Kellner 2001).

#### 3. Topic Education—their interpretation diverts focus away from the topic. Topic education is good:

#### A. Policy relevance—learning about how theory relates to policy and discussing implementation is crucial to influence real policymakers—without tying advocacy to policy, debate becomes irrelevant

**Nye 09** - Joseph Nye, professor at Harvard University and former dean of the Harvard Kennedy School, 4-13-2009, Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/12/AR2009041202260\_pf.html 4-13-09

President Obama has appointed some distinguished academic economists and lawyers to his administration, but few high-ranking political scientists have been named. In fact, the editors of a recent poll of more than 2,700 international relations experts declared that "the walls surrounding the ivory tower have never seemed so high." While important American scholars such as Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski took high-level foreign policy positions in the past, that path has tended to be a one-way street. Not many top-ranked scholars of international relations are going into government, and even fewer return to contribute to academic theory. The 2008 Teaching, Research and International Policy (TRIP) poll, by the Institute for Theory and Practice in International Relations, showed that of the 25 scholars rated as producing the most interesting scholarship during the past five years, only three had ever held policy positions (two in the U.S. government and one in the United Nations). The fault for this growing gap lies not with the government but with the academics. Scholars are paying less attention to questions about how their work relates to the policy world, and in many departments a focus on policy can hurt one's career. Advancement comes faster for those who develop mathematical models, new methodologies or theories expressed in jargon that is unintelligible to policymakers. A survey of articles published over the lifetime of the American Political Science Review found that about one in five dealt with policy prescription or criticism in the first half of the century, while only a handful did so after 1967. Editor Lee Sigelman observed in the journal's centennial issue that "if 'speaking truth to power' and contributing directly to public dialogue about the merits and demerits of various courses of action were still numbered among the functions of the profession, one would not have known it from leafing through its leading journal." As citizens, academics might be considered to have an obligation to help improve on policy ideas when they can. Moreover, such engagement can enhance and enrich academic work, and thus the ability of academics to teach the next generation. As former undersecretary of state David Newsom argued a decade ago, "the growing withdrawal of university scholars behind curtains of theory and modeling would not have wider significance if this trend did not raise questions regarding the preparation of new generations and the future influence of the academic community on public and official perceptions of international issues and events. Teachers plant seeds that shape the thinking of each new generation; this is probably the academic world's most lasting contribution." Yet too often scholars teach theory and methods that are relevant to other academics but not to the majority of the students sitting in the classroom before them. Some academics say that while the growing gap between theory and policy may have costs for policy, it has produced better social science theory, and that this is more important than whether such scholarship is relevant. Also, to some extent, the gap is an inevitable result of the growth and specialization of knowledge. Few people can keep up with their subfields, much less all of social science. But the danger is that academic theorizing will say more and more about less and less. Even when academics supplement their usual trickle-down approach to policy by writing in journals, newspapers or blogs, or by consulting for candidates or public officials, they face many competitors for attention. More than 1,200 think tanks in the United States provide not only ideas but also experts ready to comment or consult at a moment's notice. Some of these new transmission belts serve as translators and additional outlets for academic ideas, but many add a bias provided by their founders and funders. As a group, think tanks are heterogeneous in scope, funding, ideology and location, but universities generally offer a more neutral viewpoint. While pluralism of institutional pathways is good for democracy, the policy process is diminished by the withdrawal of the academic community. The solutions must come via a reappraisal within the academy itself. Departments should give greater weight to real-world relevance and impact in hiring and promoting young scholars. Journals could place greater weight on relevance in evaluating submissions. Studies of specific regions deserve more attention. Universities could facilitate interest in the world by giving junior faculty members greater incentives to participate in it. That should include greater toleration of unpopular policy positions. One could multiply such useful suggestions, but young people should not hold their breath waiting for them to be implemented. If anything, the trends in academic life seem to be headed in the opposite direction.

#### B. Academic, institutions-based debate regarding war powers is critical to check excessive presidential authority---college students key

Kelly Michael Young 13, Associate Professor of Communication and Director of Forensics at Wayne State University, "Why Should We Debate About Restriction of Presidential War Powers", 9/4, public.cedadebate.org/node/13

Beyond its obviously timeliness, we believed debating about presidential war powers was important because of the stakes involved in the controversy. Since the Korean War, scholars and pundits have grown increasingly alarmed by the growing scope and techniques of presidential war making. In 1973, in the wake of Vietnam, Congress passed the joint War Powers Resolution (WPR) to increase Congress’s role in foreign policy and war making by requiring executive consultation with Congress prior to the use of military force, reporting within 48 hours after the start of hostiles, and requiring the close of military operations after 60 days unless Congress has authorized the use of force. Although the WPR was a significant legislative feat, 30 years since its passage, presidents have frequently ignores the WPR requirements and the changing nature of conflict does not fit neatly into these regulations. After the terrorist attacks on 9-11, many experts worry that executive war powers have expanded far beyond healthy limits. Consequently, there is a fear that continued expansion of these powers will undermine the constitutional system of checks and balances that maintain the democratic foundation of this country and risk constant and unlimited military actions, particularly in what Stephen Griffin refers to as a “long war” period like the War on Terror (http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674058286). In comparison, pro-presidential powers advocates contend that new restrictions undermine flexibility and timely decision-making necessary to effectively counter contemporary national security risks. Thus, a debate about presidential wars powers is important to investigate a number of issues that have serious consequences on the status of democratic checks and national security of the United States.¶ Lastly, debating presidential war powers is important because we the people have an important role in affecting the use of presidential war powers. As many legal scholars contend, regardless of the status of legal structures to check the presidency, an important political restrain on presidential war powers is the presence of a well-informed and educated public. As Justice Potter Stewart explains, “the only effective restraint upon executive policy and power…may lie in an enlightened citizenry – in an informed and critical public opinion which alone can protect the values of a democratic government” (http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC\_CR\_0403\_0713\_ZC3.html). As a result, this is not simply an academic debate about institutions and powers that that do not affect us. As the numerous recent foreign policy scandals make clear, anyone who uses a cell-phone or the internet is potential affected by unchecked presidential war powers. Even if we agree that these powers are justified, it is important that today’s college students understand and appreciate the scope and consequences of presidential war powers, as these students’ opinions will stand as an important potential check on the presidency.

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**The 1AC’s description of the ‘biopolitical body’ relies on a purely conceptual or representational determination of the nature of biopolitics and the body. This conception is insufficient- Bodies don’t undergo changes because of juridical determination, but as a result of real material practices, changes that include, but aren’t exhausted by biopower. There is no biopolitical body- only practices of biopower. Any claim to the existence of a biopolitical body reproduces the very violence it tries to confront by treating ontological difference as fundamentally the same. The K solves the aff by rejecting the notion that there is a biopolitical body in the first place and focusing on changing real practices.**

John **Protevi**, Professor of French Studies at Louisiana State University, Political Affect: Connecting the Social and the Somatic, **2009**, p. 122-124

I see two key problems in thinking through the Schiavo case with Agam­ ben's concepts, First. **Agamben's perspective does not provide a handle on a corporeal rather than an incorporeal** materialism, In addition. Agamben underemphasizes trapped bare life in favor of a ncar-exclusive focus on ex­ posed bare life,¶ CORPOREAl. MATERIALISM¶ To understand the Schiavo case. **we need a notion of ontological destrati­ fication** (Deleuze and GuatLari ] 987. 1 60). **that is. a notion of corporeal materialism**. for **the destruction of** Terri **Schiavo's cortex was a real change that preceded her diagnosis. which then removed her from the philosophi­ cal category of conscious subject** and its legal counterpart. the competent person. **With (de-)politicizing predication**. however, **Agamben gives us only a notion of** what Deleuze and Cuattari would call an "incorporeal transfor­ mation" (80) or **change in juridical status that exposes or protects bare life**. To understand the incorporeal nature of the (de-)politicizing predication. we might also here refer to whal Foucault calls in his inaugural address to the College de France an "incorporeal materialism," in which "the event is not of the order of bodies [I'evenemenl ,,'est pas de I'ordre des corps]" (Fou­ cault 1 9 72. 2 3 1 : translation modified from "the event is not corporeal").¶ **What we need** in the Schiavo case. though. **is preciscly a corporeal mate­ rialism in order to understand changes to a body in and through an event**. **A (de-)politicizing predication attaches itself to a body that remains materi­ ally unchanged by the act of predication. even though the exposure of bare life thus affected might open that body up to profound changes by means of the action of other bodies**, In other words. a change in incorporeal bio­ political status can open a body up to a ditTerent sct of corporeal biopower practices. Here are three examples of a quasi-legal (de-)polilicizing predica­ tion opening a body up to different material biopower pracLices.¶ A person is first named "non-Aryan," then '·Jew. " then ·'deportee." and then " camp prisoner." These are all ditterent grades of depoliticizing predication. producing different stotuses. **Shock. overwork. exhoustion.**¶ **and malnutrition might drive this person to the point where he is named Muselumm**, but **we must note two things here**: (i) **the term** " Muselmann" is informal concentration camp jargon. unique to Auschwitz, not an official biopolitical designation (Mills 2005): Oi) such informal naming **follows the physical changes** that follow upon the original official depoliticizing predi­ cations, In other words. **the term** "Musclmann" **functions like a diagnosis**. an evaluation of a state: **it is not a transforming predication but leaps what has already happened to a body**. rather than opening that body up to what is to come.¶ **The shunning of the Muselmann** could argue in reading Agamben 1999a, **was caused by the behavior of the bodies. not by their having been named as such**. While being named "camp prisoner" transformed the sta­tus of the person and allowed the exposure of bare life and degradation to the condition of Musellllm", (the last stage of degfildation. the "living dead" of the camps**). the act of being so named did not open the body up to differ­ ent treatment: it was an acknovledgment of their having been differently treated: it was an acknowledgment that nothing else could be done. that no further degradation of depoliticizing status or material condition was possible**. Agamben interrogates the figure of the Muselmalm of the camps as another zone of indistinction. The non-human who obstinately appears as human: he is the human that cannot be told apart from the inhuman" ( 1 9991.1. 56-59. 82). **Rather than Agamben's insistence on the representa­ tional/conceptual notion of indistinclion. a corporeal materialism uses the notion of physiological threshold to indicate the point at which an onto­ logical rather than juridical change occurs** (see also Vogt 2005 and Mills 2005).¶ (B) **A person is named by the government of the United States an enemy combatant. He or she might then be put into "stress positions" that can pro­ duce pain** as long as. in the words of then Counsel to the President Albert Gonzales in his August 1 . 2002. memo. "Standards of Conduct for Interro­ gation under 1 8 USC §§ 2 3 40-2 340A." the "specific intent" of the interro­ gator is not to cause pain "equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury. such as organ failure. impairment of bodily func­ tion or even death" (Greenberg and Orate! 2005, ] 72). **Other treatments might include forced watching of gay porn. exposure to strobe lights**. andI or excruciatingly loud American music (Brown 2006: ACLU 2006). since. again according to Gonzales. the " **mental harm**" of these practices does not come from " **threats of imminent death: threats of infliction of** the kind of **pain** that would amount to physical torture: infliction of such pain as a means of psychological torture; **use of drugs or other precedures designed**¶ **to deeply disrupt the senses**, or fundamentally alter an individual's person­ ality: or threatening to do any of these things to a third party" (Greenberg and Dratei 2005, ] 72). Someone with the sensibilities of a Donald Rums­ feld might discount the severity of these practices-just as he compared his work at a standing desk ( 2 3 63 7) to the standing punishment or Field Punishment No. 1 for the WWI-era British Army (BSC 2006)-but there is no gainsaying the psychophysical destruction that prolonged exposure to such treatments wreaks on persons in the detention facilities of the New World Order, as with. to cite just one instance of what happened to a u.s. citizen, the case of Jose Padilla (Richey 2007).¶ (C) **Agamben seems to be under the impression that a diagnosis** of brain death means that a body "must be abandoned to the extreme vicissitude of transplantation" (2004, 1 5). But to my knowledge, such a declaration of brain death only allows for the exercise of the person's previously expressed wishes regarding organ harvesting and transplantation. **Such a diagnosis is thus not a depoliticizing predication.** Furthermore, **the official** medical **diagnosis** of PVS that Terri Schiavo received, **like the informal social categorization of Muselmann follows upon real change: they are both diagnoses, and diagnoses do not themselves provoke change in the body**. The particular diagnosis of PVS is far from a depoliticizing predication. for the import of the Cruzan decision is that PVS, far from removing rights, does Hot remove the right to privacy involving refusal of life-sustaining medical treatment. including feeding tubes, The diagnosis of PVS leaves the per­ son's legal status unchanged and allows them the same exercise of rights as other citizens, albeit by proxy. It does not necessitate the removal of feeding tubes by state action any more than the diagnosis of brain death requires organ harvesting but only allows it. follmving appeal initiated by a person**. Agamben writes movingly of the physical changes suffered by the concentration camp prisoners, but he can only use everyday concepts to do so: there's nothing in his specifically philosophical concepts that covers these changes**, as there is in, for instance. Deleuzc's dynamic materi­ alist ontology of complex systems. But **it is precisely a corporeal materi­ alism that is needed to think of the material changes that occur in and through the action or a physiological event** such as that suffered by Terri Schiavo.

**The aff also focuses on how the resolution ‘hides’ bodies. The problem isn’t how bodies get hidden, but the reverse-how bodies become publicized- it is the visibility of bodies that enables the violence against them. The 1AC’s interrogation of the bopolitical body of the resolution not only focuses on an abstract, representational category, but masks the fact there is never a ‘biopolitical body,’ but bodies governed differently by biopower.**

John **Protevi**, Professor of French Studies at Louisiana State University, Political Affect: Connecting the Social and the Somatic, **2009**, p. 124-5

**My second point** in criticism of Agamben is that **it is not just judgments** **as to** brain death authorizing organ harvesting or **inferior quality of life** autho-rizing euthanasia **that concerns us in biopower** (again. any such judgment in this case was Terri Schiavo's own. and so, if anything. it was a matter of passive assisted suicide rather than euthanasia). **but also the construction of an inescapable state interest in fostering the life of the favored group, those graced with an implicit politicizing predication**. While it is true that the politicizing predication is part of **Agamben's conceptual system**. virtually all of his analyses in Homo Sacer and Remllants oj Auschwitz **concern the way in which bare life is exposed . excluded from law. threatened. while bios. politically informed life. is protected**. But in the Schiavo case**. we arc concerned not “with exclusion of zoe but with its inclusion. with a bare life that the law holds close. We find here a sphere of protected bare life. a bio­ sphere. into which the out-group cannot penetrate-its bare life is exposed via a depoliticizing predication-and from which the in-group can never escape**. Again. the relative neglect of the notion of trapped bare life is not so much a conceptual problem for Agamben as it is a matter of emphasis.¶ The limits that exclude the out-group-limits that create exposed bare life-are currently formed by the state of exception regarding the "enemy combatants" (so that the Guantanamo camp is the state of exception become rule. the spatialization of the state of exception): the limits of the in-group-trapped bare life-arc formed by the October 2 1 . 2 0 0 3 . Florida state law allowing the governor to order the reinsertion of the feeding tube in the Schiavo case. More precisely. **the bodies of those in the out-group are excluded from the protection of law so that the bare life inherent therein is exposed. while the bodies of those in the in-group are ordered by law to be subjected to the most intense medical interventions. In highlighting the subjection** of the in-group to medical intervention aimed at keeping trapped bare life going (to be distinguished from Agamben's analysis of the exposure of bare life of the "experimental persons" of the Nazi concentra­ tion camps for the sake of knowledge that would purify and strengthen the body politic of the German Volk). we see how we need Foucault's genealogy of materialist biopower. to which we now turn.

**3**

**restricting presidential authority causes adversaries to doubt the credibility of our threats – causes nuclear escalation**

Matthew **Waxman** 8/25/**13**, Professor of Law @ Columbia and Adjunct Senior Fellow for Law and Foreign Policy @ CFR, “The Constitutional Power to Threaten War,” Forthcoming in Yale Law Journal, vol. 123, August 25, 2013, SSRN

A claim previously advanced from a presidentialist perspective is that **stronger¶ legislative checks on war powers is harmful to coercive and deterrent strategies**, **because¶ it establishes easily-visible impediments to the President’s authority to follow through on¶ threats.** This was a common policy argument during the War Powers Resolution debates¶ in the early 1970s. Eugene Rostow, an advocate inside and outside the government for¶ executive primacy, remarked during consideration of legislative drafts that **any** serious**¶ restrictions on presidential use of force would mean in practice that “no President could¶ make a credible threat to use force as an instrument of deterrent diplomacy, even to head¶ off explosive confrontations**.”178 He continued:¶ In the tense and cautious diplomacy of our present relations with the Soviet¶ Union, as they have developed over the last twenty-five years, **the authority of the¶ President to set clear** and silent **limits** in advance **is** perhaps **the most important of**¶ **all the powers in our constitutional armory** **to prevent confrontations that could¶ carry nuclear implications. …¶** [I]t is the diplomatic power the President needs most under the¶ circumstance of modern life—**the power to make a credible threat to use force in¶ order to prevent a confrontation which might escalate**.179¶ In his veto statement on the War Powers Resolution, President Nixon echoed these¶ concerns, arguing that the law would undermine the credibility of U.S. deterrent and¶ coercive threats in the eyes of both adversaries and allies – they would know that¶ presidential authority to use force would expire after 60 days, so absent strong¶ congressional support they could assume U.S. withdrawal at that point.180 In short, those¶ who oppose tying the president’s hands with mandatory congressional authorization¶ requirements to use force sometimes argue that doing so incidentally and dangerously ties¶ his hands in threatening it. A critical assumption here is that **presidential flexibility**,¶ preserved in legal doctrine, **enhances the credibility of presidential threats to escalate**

**US drones sustain power projection --- key to hegemony**

**Reynolds** 6/26/**13** (Michael A, PhD, Near Eastern Studies, Princeton University, “Global Discourse: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Current Affairs and Applied Contemporary Thought”, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/23269995.2013.807603>, CMR)

Technology and the dilemma of counter-insurgency¶ **The U**nited **S**tates, although it may not have the equivalent of the mythological Maxim¶ gun, **has successfully leveraged tech**nology **to extend its power** and reach into foreign¶ societies **in ways** that would have been **inconceivable to** the **empires of the high-imperial**¶ **age**. **American military personnel**, often physically located in the interior of the continental United States, have **employ**ed **thousands of** unmanned aerial vehicles, UAVs, or¶ **drones** more popularly, **to surveil, track, and kill hostile individuals** literally **around the**¶ **globe**, particularly in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Libya. From 2004 through¶ 2012, American drone strikes in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia have killed nearly 3500¶ people (Zenko 2012).¶ Guerrillas, insurgents, and **terrorists have long protected themselves from** the **superior**¶ **firepower** of regular armies and police forces **by declining to wear uniforms** or other open¶ markers of identity **and** by **refusing to fight in the open. These tactics compel states to** do¶ one of the two things: either to **curb** their use of **firepower** and thereby neutralize their¶ own advantage, **or** to **employ force indiscriminately** and thereby risk **alienating** their¶ population and public opinion around **the world** with excessive violence. This is the¶ classic dilemma of counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism.¶ To American strategic planners, surveillance and **attack drones** hold out the promise¶ that they **can**, if not **overcome this dilemma**, at least mitigate it. By employing **drones** to¶ find, monitor, and track specific individuals, the United States **can** aspire to **identify**¶whether or not those **individuals** are hostile **and** then **seamlessly** employ an **attack** drone¶ to destroy that individual. Thus, **the U**nited **S**tates government **now** routinely **uses drones**¶ **to mount extended** and even around-the-clock **observation of foreign locales to identify**¶ **and kill suspected terrorists**. To be sure, non-combatants are all too often casualties of¶ such strikes and the use of drones has by no means dissolved the counter-insurgent¶ dilemma. Indeed, some observers argue that the so-called ‘collateral damage’ from¶ drone strikes generate more opponents of the United States than they could kill or¶ intimidate (International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic at Stanford Law¶ School and Global Justice Clinic at NYU School of Law 2012). Nonetheless, it seems¶ clearthat **drones have reduced the counter-insurgent dilemma**. In countries where they fly¶ they certainly have made life for armed opponents of the United States and its allies¶ significantly more difficult.¶ Alongside their utility in locating, tracking, targeting, and destroying individuals, **a**¶ **major appeal** of drones **is their cost**. **Drones pose no risk of death to** highly trained and¶ valuable **pilots and** they **are comparatively cheap**. The Predator, the best-known armed¶ drone, costs a little over $4 million. The more capable Reaper costs $37 million. By¶ comparison, an F-35 fighter costs on the order of $235 million. Relative to their capabilities, **drones will** likely **only grow cheaper** as design improves, economies of scale¶ drive costs down, and computer components continue to fall in price. Indeed, observation¶ drones are available for purchase to the general public for only several hundred dollars.¶ When combined with the increasingly sophisticated signals, intelligence capabilities of the¶ United States armed forces and intelligence agencies, **drones emerge as a potent tool for**¶ **monitoring unstable regions and meting out punishment to violent challengers**. **The drone**¶ **is,** in essence, **a tool well-suited to imperial policing**, on sea as well as on land.¶ Thus, **the withdrawal of American military forces** from Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere¶ in the greater Middle East due to war fatigue and financial constraints **will not necessarily**¶ **equate to an equivalent reduction in America’s coercive capabilities**. For better or for worse,¶ technology such as **drones**, satellite surveillance, and improved signals intelligence **provide**¶ **the world’s policeman with a more potent**, if not **bigger, baton for the buck**. Further advances¶ in computer technology, imaging, nano-technology, biotechnology, and other fields may be¶ translated into more powerful and effective systems of coercion. **Tech**nology **makes** many¶ **things possible. Empire** in an age of austerity **might well be one of them.**

**Hegemony reinvigorates democracy and solves conflcits that cause extinction**

Thomas P.M. **Barnett,** chief analyst, Wikistrat, “The New Rules: Leadership Fatigue Puts U.S. and Globalization, at Crossroads,” WORLD POLITICS REVIEW, 3—7—**11**, www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8099/the-new-rules-leadership-fatigue-puts-u-s-and-globalization-at-crossroads

Events in Libya are a further reminder for **Americans** that we **stand at a crossroads in our continuing evolution as the** world's sole full-service **superpower.** Unfortunately, we are increasingly seeking change without cost, and shirking from risk because we are tired of the responsibility. We don't know who we are anymore, and our president is a big part of that problem. Instead of leading us, he explains to us. Barack Obama would have us believe that he is practicing strategic patience. But many experts and ordinary citizens alike have concluded that he is actually beset by strategic incoherence -- in effect, a man overmatched by the job. It is worth first examining the larger picture: We live in a time of arguably the greatest structural change in the global order yet endured, with this historical moment's most amazing feature being its relative and absolute lack of mass violence. That is something to consider when Americans contemplate military intervention in Libya, because if we do take the step to prevent larger-scale killing by engaging in some killing of our own, we will not be adding to some fantastically imagined global death count stemming from the ongoing "megalomania" and "evil" of American "empire." We'll be engaging in the same sort of system-administering activity that has marked our stunningly successful stewardship of global order since World War II. Let me be more blunt: **As the guardian of globalization, the U.S. military has been the greatest force for peace the world has ever known. Had America been removed from the global dynamics** that governed the 20th century, the mass murder never would have ended. Indeed, it's entirely conceivable **there would now be no** identifiable **human civilization left, once nuclear weapons entered the killing equation. But the world did not keep sliding down** that path of **perpetual war**. Instead**, America** stepped up and **changed everything by ushering in** our now-perpetual **great-power peace. We introduced** the international liberal trade order known as **globalization** and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. **What resulted was the collapse of empires, an explosion of** **democracy**, the **persistent spread of** **human rights, the liberation of women, the doubling of life expectancy, a roughly 10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP and a profound and persistent reduction in battle deaths from state-based conflicts.** That is what American "hubris" actually delivgered. Please remember that the next time some TV pundit sells you the image of "unbridled" American military power as the cause of global disorder instead of its cure. With self-deprecation bordering on self-loathing, we now imagine a post-American world that is anything but. Just watch who scatters and who steps up as the Facebook revolutions erupt across the Arab world. While we might imagine ourselves the status quo power, we remain the world's most vigorously revisionist force. As for the sheer "evil" that is our military-industrial complex, again, let's examine what the world looked like before that establishment reared its ugly head. The last great period of global structural change was the first half of the 20th century, a period that saw a death toll of about 100 million across two world wars. That comes to an average of 2 million deaths a year in a world of approximately 2 billion souls. Today, with far more comprehensive worldwide reporting, researchers report an average of less than 100,000 battle deaths annually in a world fast approaching 7 billion people. Though admittedly crude, these **calculations suggest a 90 percent absolute drop and a 99 percent relative drop in deaths due to war**. We are clearly headed for a world order characterized by multipolarity, something the American-birthed system was designed to both encourage and accommodate. But given how things turned out the last time we collectively faced such a fluid structure, we would do well to keep U.S. power, in all of its forms, deeply embedded in the geometry to come. To continue the historical survey, after salvaging Western Europe from its half-century of civil war, the U.S. emerged as the progenitor of a new, far more just form of globalization -- one based on actual free trade rather than colonialism. America then successfully replicated globalization further in East Asia over the second half of the 20th century, setting the stage for the Pacific Century now unfolding.

**Two-thousand years of history and robust statistical analysis prove**

William **Wohlforth 8** Daniel Webster Professor of Government, Dartmouth. BA in IR, MA in IR and MPhil and PhD in pol sci, Yale, Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War, October 2008, World Politics Vol. 61, Iss. 1; pg. 28, 31 pgs, Proquest

Despite increasingly compelling findings concerning the importance of status seeking in human behavior, research on its connection to war waned some three decades ago.38 Yet **empirical studies of the relationship between** both systemic and dyadic **capabilities distributions and war have continued to cumulate. If the relationships implied by the status theory run afoul** of well-established patterns or general historical findings, **then there is little reason to continue investigating them. The clearest empirical implication** of the theory **is that** status **competition is unlikely to cause great power military conflict in unipolar systems. If status competition is an important contributory cause of great power war, then,** ceteris paribus, **unipolar systems should be markedly less war-prone** than bipolar or multipolar systems. And this appears to be the case. As Daniel Geller notes **in a review of the empirical literature: "The only polar structure that appears to influence conflict probability is unipolarity."**39 In addition, a larger number of studies at the dyadic level support the related expectation that narrow capabilities gaps and ambiguous or unstable capabilities hierarchies increase the probability of war.40 These studies are based entirely on post-sixteenth-century European history, and most are limited to the post-1815 period covered by the standard data sets. Though the systems coded as unipolar, near-unipolar, and hegemonic are all marked by a high concentration of capabilities in a single state, these studies operationalize unipolarity in a variety of ways, often very differently from the definition adopted here. **An ongoing collaborative project looking at ancient interstate systems over** the course of **two thousand years suggests** **that** **historical systems** **that come closest to** the definition of unipolarity used here **exhibit precisely the** **behavioral** **properties implied by the theory**. 41 As David C. Kang's research shows, the **East Asian system between 1300 and 1900 was** an unusually stratified **unipolar** structure, **with** an economic and militarily dominant **China interacting with** a small number of geographically proximate, clearly weaker East Asian **states**.42 Status politics existed, but actors were channeled by elaborate cultural understandings and interstate practices into clearly recognized ranks. **Warfare was exceedingly rare, and the major outbreaks occurred precisely when the theory would predict: when China's capabilities waned**, reducing the clarity of the underlying material hierarchy and increasing status dissonance for lesser powers. Much more research is needed, but initial exploration of other arguably unipolar systems-for example, Rome, Assyria, the Amarna system-appears consistent with the hypothesis.43 Status Competition and Causal Mechanisms **Both theory and evidence demonstrate convincingly that competition for status is a driver of human behavior, and social** identity **theory** and related literatures **suggest** the **conditions under which it might come to the fore in great power relations.** **Both the systemic and dyadic findings presented in large-N studies are broadly consistent with the theory**, but they are also consistent with power transition and other rationalist theories of hegemonic war.

**Heg decreases structural violence---any alt dooms humanity to deprivation**

Thomas P.M. **Barnett 11,** Former Senior Strategic Researcher and Professor in the Warfare Analysis & Research Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College American military geostrategist and Chief Analyst at Wikistrat, worked as the Assistant for Strategic Futures in the Office of Force Transformation in the Department of Defense, September 12, 2011, “The New Rules: The Rise of the Rest Spells U.S. Strategic Victory,” World Politics Review, online: <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/9973/the-new-rules-the-rise-of-the-rest-spells-u-s-strategic-victory>

First the absurdity: A few of the most **over-the-top Bush-Cheney neocons did** indeed **promote a vision of U.S. primacy by which America shouldn't be afraid to wage war to keep other rising powers at bay. It was a nutty concept then, and it remains a nutty concept today.** But since it feeds a lot of major military weapons system purchases, especially for the China-centric Air Force and Navy, don't expect it to disappear so long as the Pentagon's internal budget fights are growing in intensity. ¶ **Meanwhile**, the Chinese do their stupid best to fuel this outdated logic by building a force designed to keep America out of East Asia just as their nation's dependency on resources flowing from unstable developing regions skyrockets. **With America's fiscal constraints now abundantly clear, the world's primary policing force is pulling back, while that force's implied successor is nowhere close to being able to field a similar power-projection capacity -- and never will be.** So with NATO clearly stretched to its limits by the combination of Afghanistan and Libya, **a lot of future fires in developing regions will likely be left to burn on their own**. We'll just have to wait and see how much foreign commentators delight in that G-Zero dynamic in the years ahead. ¶ That gets us to the original "insult": **the U.S. did not lord it over the world in the 1990s. Yes, it did argue for and promote the most rapid spread of globalization possible. But the "evil" of the Washington Consensus only yielded the most rapid growth of a truly global middle class that the world has ever seen**. Yes, we can, in our current economic funk, somehow cast that development as the "loss of U.S. hegemony," in that the American consumer is no longer the demand-center of globalization's universe. But this is without a doubt the most amazing achievement of U.S. foreign policy, surpassing even our role in World War II. ¶ **Numerous world powers served as global or regional hegemons before we came along, and their record on economic development was painfully transparent: Elites got richer, and the masses got poorer. Then America showed up after World War II and engineered an international liberal trade order**, one that was at first admittedly limited to the West. But **within four decades it went virally global, and now for the first time in history, more than half of our planet's population lives in conditions of modest-to-mounting abundance -- after millennia of mere sustenance**. ¶ You may choose to interpret this as some sort of cosmic coincidence, but **the historical sequence is undeniable: With its unrivaled power, America made the world a far better place**. ¶ That spreading wave of global abundance has reformatted all sorts of traditional societies that lay in its path. Some, like the Chinese, have adapted to it magnificently in an economic and social sense, with the political adaptation sure to follow eventually. Others, being already democracies, have done far better across the board, like Turkey, Indonesia and India. But there are also numerous traditional societies where that reformatting impulse from below has been met by both harsh repression from above and violent attempts by religious extremists to effect a "counterreformation" that firewalls the "faithful" from an "evil" outside world.¶ Does this violent blowback constitute the great threat of our age? Not really. As I've long argued, this "friction" from globalization's tectonic advance is merely what's left over now that great-power war has gone dormant for 66 years and counting, with interstate wars now so infrequent and so less lethal as to be dwarfed by the civil strife that plagues those developing regions still suffering weak connectivity to the global economy. ¶ **Let's remember what the U.S. actually did across the 1990s** after the Soviet threat disappeared. **It went out of its way to police the world's poorly governed spaces, battling rogue regimes and answering the 9-1-1 call repeatedly when disaster and/or civil strife struck vulnerable societies. Yes, playing globalization's bodyguard made America public enemy No. 1 in the eyes of its most violent rejectionist movements**, including al-Qaida, **but we made the effort because**, in our heart of hearts, **we knew that this is what blessed powers are supposed to do**. ¶ Some, like the Bush-Cheney neocons, were driven by more than that sense of moral responsibility. They saw a chance to remake the world so as to assure U.S. primacy deep into the future. The timing of their dream was cruelly ironic, for it blossomed just as America's decades-in-the-making grand strategy reached its apogee in the peaceful rise of so many great powers at once. Had Sept. 11 not intervened, the neocons would likely have eventually targeted rising China for strategic demonization. Instead, they locked in on Osama bin Laden. The rest, as they say, is history. ¶ The follow-on irony of **the War on Terror** is that its operational requirements **actually revolutionized a major portion of the U.S. military -- specifically the Army, Marines and Special Forces -- in such a way as to redirect their strategic ethos from big wars to small ones**. It also forged a new operational bond between the military's irregular elements and that portion of the Central Intelligence Agency that pursues direct action against transnational bad actors. The up-front costs of this transformation were far too high, largely because the Bush White House stubbornly refused to embrace counterinsurgency tactics until after the popular repudiation signaled by the 2006 midterm election. But **the end result is clear: We now have the force we actually need to manage this global era.¶ But,** of course, **that can all be tossed into the dumpster if we convince ourselves that our "loss" of hegemony was somehow the result of our own misdeed, instead of being our most profound gift to world history. Again, we grabbed the reins of global leadership and patiently engineered not only the greatest redistribution -- and expansion -- of global wealth ever seen, but also the greatest consolidation of global peace ever seen. ¶ Now, if we can sensibly realign our strategic relationship with the one rising great power, China,** whose growing strength upsets us so much, **then in combination with the rest of the world's rising great powers we can collectively wield enough global policing power to manage what's yet to come.** ¶ As always, **the choice is ours.**

**democide kills millions- democracy key to solve**

Susan S. **Gibson**, Lt. Colonel, Judge Advocate General’s Corps, U.S. Army, “The Misplaced Reliance on Free and Fair Elections in Nation Building: The Role of Constitutional Democracy and the Rule of Law,” HOUSTON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW v. 21, Fall 19**98**, p. 12-13.

Soon after Bruce Russet published his seminal work on the democratic peace, 43 a new book by R.J. **Rummel laid out alarming evidence on "genocide and government mass murder," which Rummel calls "democide." 44 Rummel's results "clearly and decisively show that democracies commit less democide than other regimes. These results also well illustrate the principle underlying all his findings on war, collective violence, and democide: The less freedom people have, the greater the violence; the more freedom, the less the violence**." 45 As Rummel so aptly points out, "**Totalitarian communist governments slaughter their people by the tens of millions; in contrast, many democracies can barely bring themselves to execute even serial murderers**." 46 After eight years of painstaking, gruesome research, Rummel sums up his conclusions quite succinctly: **Preliminary research seemed to suggest, that there was a positive solution to all this killing and a clear course of political action and policy to end it. And the [\*13] results verify this. The problem is Power. The solution is democracy. The course of action is to foster freedom**. 47

### Case

**liberalism solves their biopower offense**

**Dickinson**, History Prof at UC Davis**, ‘4** (Edward, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Reflections On Our Discourse Concerning 'Modernity’” Central European History, Vol 37, p 1-48)

In short, **the continuities between early twentieth-century biopolitical discourse and the practices of the welfare state in our own time are unmistakable**. Both are instances of the "disciplinary society" and of biopolitical, regulatory, social-engineering modernity, and they share that genealogy with more authoritarian states, including the National Socialist state, but also fascist Italy, for example. And it is certainly fruitful to view them from this very broad perspective. **But that analysis can easily become superficial and misleading, because it obfuscates the profoundly different strategic and local dynamics of power in** the **two kinds of regimes**. Clearly **the democratic welfare state is not only formally but also substantively quite different from totalitarianism**. Above all, again, **it has nowhere developed the fateful, radicalizing dynamic that characterized National Socialism** (or for that matter Stalinism), the psychotic logic that leads from economistic population management to mass murder. Again, there is always the potential for such a discursive regime to generate coercive policies. In those cases in which the regime of rights does not successfully produce "health," such a system can — and historically does — create compulsory programs to enforce it. But again, **there are political and policy potentials and constraints in such a structuring of biopolitics that are very different from those of National Socialist Germany. Democratic biopolitical regimes require, enable, and incite a degree of self-direction and participation that is functionally incompatible with authoritarian or totalitarian structures**. And **this pursuit of biopolitical ends through a regime of democratic citizenship does appear**, historically, **to have imposed increasingly narrow limits on coercive policies, and to have generated a "logic" or imperative of increasing liberalization**. Despite limitations imposed by political context and the slow pace of discursive change, I think this is the unmistakable message of the really very impressive waves of legislative and welfare reforms in the 1920s or the 1970s in Germany.90 Of course it is not yet clear whether this is an irreversible dynamic of such systems. Nevertheless, **such regimes are characterized by sufficient degrees of autonomy** (and of the potential for its expansion) **for sufficient numbers of people that I think it becomes useful to conceive of them as productive of a strategic configuration of power relations that might fruitfully be analyzed as a condition of "liberty**," just as much as they are productive of constraint, oppression, or manipulation. At the very least, **totalitarianism cannot be the sole orientation point for our understanding of biopolitics**, the only end point of the logic of social engineering. This notion is not at all at odds with the core of Foucauldian (and Peukertian) theory. Democratic welfare states are regimes of power/knowledge no less than early twentieth-century totalitarian states; these systems are not "opposites," in the sense that they are two alternative ways of organizing the same thing. But they are two very different ways of organizing it. The concept "power" should not be read as a universal stifling night of oppression, manipulation, and entrapment, in which all political and social orders are grey, are essentially or effectively "the same." Power is a set of social relations, in which individuals and groups have varying degrees of autonomy and effective subjectivity. And discourse is, as Foucault argued, "tactically polyvalent." **Discursive elements** (like the various elements of biopolitics) **can be combined in different ways to form parts of quite different strategies (like totalitarianism or the democratic welfare state);** they cannot be assigned to one place in a structure, but rather circulate. The varying possible constellations of power in modern societies create "multiple modernities," modern societies with quite radically differing potentials.91 Biopolitics: Who Is Doing What To Whom? This understanding of the democratic and totalitarian potentials of biopolitics at the level of the state needs to be underpinned by a reassessment of how biopolitical discourse operates in society at large, at the "prepolitical" level. I would like to try to offer here the beginnings of a reconceptualization of biopolitical modernity, one that focuses less on the machinations of technocrats and experts, and more on the different ways that biopolitical thinking circulated within German society more broadly. It is striking, then, that the new model of German modernity is even more relentlessly negative than the old Sonderweg model. In that older model, premodern elites were constantly triumphing over the democratic opposition. But at least there was an opposition; and in the long run, time was on the side of that opposition, which in fact embodied the historical movement of modern- ization. In the new model, there is virtually a biopolitical consensus.92 And that consensus is almost always fundamentally a nasty, oppressive thing, one that partakes in crucial ways of the essential quality of National Socialism. Everywhere biopolitics is intrusive, technocratic, top-down, constraining, limiting. Biopolitics is almost never conceived of— or at least discussed in any detail — as creating possibilities for people, as expanding the range of their choices, as empowering them, or indeed as doing anything positive for them at all. Of course, at the most simple-minded level, it seems to me that **an assessment of the potentials of modernity that ignores the ways in which biopolitics has made life tangibly better is somehow deeply flawed**. To give just one example, **infant mortality in Germany in 1900 was just over 20 percent**; or, in other words, one in five children died before reaching the age of one year. By 1913, it was 15 percent; **and by 1929** (when average real purchasing power was not significantly higher than in 1913) **it was only 9.7 percent**.93 **The expansion of infant health programs** — **an enormously ambitious, bureaucratic, medicalizing, and sometimes intrusive, social engineering project** — **had a great deal to do with that change. It would be bizarre to write a history of biopolitical modernity that ruled out an appreciation for how absolutely wonderful and astonishing this achievement — and any number of others like it — really was**. There was a reason for the "Machbarkeitswahn" of the early twentieth century: many marvelous things were in fact becoming machbar. In that sense, it is not really accurate to call it a " Wahn" (delusion, craziness) at all; **nor is it accurate to focus only on the "inevitable" frustration of "delusions" of power**. Even in the late 1920s, many social engineers could and did look with great satisfaction on the changes they genuinely had the power to accomplish.

**Their political strategy fails and opens the door to right-wing tyranny**

Paul **Passavant**, Ph.D., Hobart and William Smith College Associate Professor of Political Science, December 20**10**, Yoo's Law, Sovereignty, and Whatever, Constellations Volume 17, Issue 4, pages 549–571

For some on **the left**, it has become conventional to **celebrate**, if not cultivate, **pluralism**, **whether this means multiple forms of being or multiple interpretive possibilities with regard to texts. It has** also **become conventional to be critical of “sovereignty” and of “law.”** **Multiplicity is thought to be a threat to sovereignty, and this threat is thought to be democratizing or a force that resists oppression**. The Italian philosopher Giorgio **Agamben exemplifies these tendencies** within contemporary political and legal theory. In some of his earlier and less well-known work, **he aspires toward a “coming community” that he calls “whatever being**.” Whatever being embraces the infinite communicative possibilities of language as pure means beyond a preoccupation with true or false propositions.

In his best-known work, **Agamben links sovereignty to the production of rightless subjects and the Nazi death camps**. **He urges us to rethink the very ontological basis of politics** in the West, creating a human being beyond sovereignty or law, in order to avoid perilous outcomes. One key to surpassing the logic of sovereignty, according to Agamben, is whatever being's positive relation to the singularities of life and the multiplicities of communication.

Whatever being is also being outside of law. If “law” persists in this “coming community,” it would be a “law” that has become deactivated and deposed from its prior purposes. “Law” will have become an object for play – something to be toyed with the way that children might come upon a disused object and play with it by putting it to uses disconnected from whatever purpose this object might once have had.

Why does the fact of playful communicative possibilities lead to either more democracy or a less brutal world? **The most conservative** United States Supreme Court **justices have recently embraced the fact that texts are open to multiple interpretations**. For example, Samuel Alito has suggested that the meaning of public monuments is open to multiple interpretations that may shift over time to avoid a potential First Amendment establishment clause problem over a monument of the Ten Commandments in a public park.1 Yet, as the late Justice Blackmun has written regarding state endorsement of religion, “government cannot be premised on the belief that all persons are created equal when it asserts that God prefers some.”2 **Recognizing the possibility of multiple interpretations,** as this instance shows, **does not lead** necessarily **to outcomes friendly to democracy**.

In this essay, I investigate how playing with the **multiplicity of communicative possibilities** can, **contrary to Agamben's expectations, actually facilitate aspirations for unitary sovereign power**. My argument unfolds in the context of the legal arguments put forward by Bush administration lawyer John Yoo, particularly those enabling torturous interrogations.

**Those, like Agamben**, who favor interpretive pluralism in itself **rarely, if ever, have right-wing supporters of unchecked presidentialism in mind**. Reading the scholarship and legal memoranda of **John Yoo**, formerly in the Bush administration's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) and presently a University of California, Berkeley law professor, **however, approaches an experience of pure mediality or of law that has become deposed or disconnected from its purposes**. Yoo is well known as the author of the key legal memoranda asserting the president's discretionary power to make war, to engage in warrantless surveillance, and, most infamously, justifying torturous methods of interrogation. Some scholars refer to Lewis Carroll's Alice in Wonderland to describe the experience of reading Yoo's legal memos.3 Is **John Yoo an exemplar of the whatever being** and pure mediality that Agamben describes and to which he contends politics should aspire?

In this paper, I describe how Yoo gestures toward pure mediality, as he indicates the experience of language itself as pure communicability or as pure means in his legal work when he emphasizes the openness of law to being exposed to new, different, flexible, or plural interpretive possibilities. I argue, however, that Yoo is not well described as whatever being. His work repeats too consistently in the direction of absolute presidential decisionism to be open to whatever.

Instead, Yoo's work may capture a broader development within our society that Agamben describes as the emergence of whatever being. Without saying that there has been no resistance to the Bush administration's warrantless wiretapping and policies of torturous interrogations, the contrast between the response to the Nixon administration and the Bush administration is striking. Richard Nixon resigned one step ahead of impeachment in the midst of mass protests against his presidency. The articles of impeachment, for instance, addressed how Nixon engaged in warrantless wiretapping, and refused to execute laws passed by Congress faithfully while repeatedly engaging in conduct that violated the constitutional rights of citizens. Congress also passed major acts of legislation to prevent a president such as Nixon from ever again abusing power the way he had. These laws include the War Powers Act of 1973, the Budget Impoundment and Control Act of 1974, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978.

In contrast, **almost no one seems to have noticed that the Bush administration claimed power to make war at the president's sole discretion**. Additionally, upon learning that the Bush administration engaged in criminal acts of surveillance, **Congress amended FISA** in the summer of 2008 **to expand the government's power to spy on Americans, while immunizing from legal accountability** non-state actors who collaborated with the then-criminal acts of government officials who followed Bush's illegal orders. Congress tried to make it impossible for those detained to question, legally, their detention or to bring the torturous treatment they endured to a court's attention, while allowing the intelligence agencies to continue to engage in torturous acts by passing the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA). This complicity on the part of Congress cannot be explained on partisan grounds as many Democrats voted in favor of the MCA, and upon becoming the majority party in Congress, they have not rescinded it. Indeed, it was a Democratic-controlled Congress that brushed the Bush administration's illegal surveillance under the rug in 2008.4 Moreover, upon taking power in 2006, the Democratic leadership immediately stated that they would not pursue impeachment. Former Reagan administration **Department of Justice lawyer** Bruce **Fein** has **decried the lack of outrage at the Bush administration's illegalities by suggesting that the nation has become a collection of constitutional “illiterates**.”5 **Perhaps law is being deposed as Agamben suggests**.

Both **Agamben's and Fein's observations** may also **indicate a failure of** what Michel Foucault would call **disciplinary power** – the power to constitute subjects capable of exercising power, here the powers of liberal democracy – a failure that Gilles Deleuze has identified with the emergence of societies of control, and a subjective and ontological diversity that Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri call the “multitude.”6 **They** also **indicate practices of textual “interpretation” where interpretative acts extricate legal texts from the narratives that once oriented their purposes and** **animated these texts for a republican and anti-monarchical polity**. Robert Cover argues, however, that law is part of a narrative practice constitutive of subjects and a way of life.7 Insofar as interpretive practices become extricated from the possibility of narrative, then, we may indeed doubt the continuing existence of “law,” as Agamben posits. Psychoanalytic theory also identifies a loss of a structuring meaning in contemporary society and describes this as the decline of symbolic efficiency.8

In sum, there appears to be a phenomenon emerging in contemporary society that a variety of different theoretical and political perspectives are struggling to grasp and evaluate. **While Agamben welcomes the failures of disciplinary powers as enabling the emergence of whatever being and the “coming community,” it is a cause for concern** among those seeking to keep the faith with republicanism, with liberal democracy, or with a Constitution representing these aspirations. In this light, we can be more specific than Agamben about the kind of threat that whatever being poses to the state or to sovereignty.

**Contrary to Agamben's contentions**, **I find** that **whatever being is no threat at all to** the kind of **unitary sovereignty** that Agamben uses to theorize the state in his book Homo Sacer. **Why would it be? Whatever being would be equally at ease with the legal justifications on behalf of a “unitary” sovereignty as it would anything else**. If we, however, give the achievements of the people their due and consider the question of sovereignty from the perspective of popular sovereignty, of the assemblies and assemblages of power through which liberal democratic states seek to extend themselves and to govern at a distance, then whatever being is very much a danger to this type of power. **Whatever being can be understood as facilitating a process of deposing this law and this state. A relation of whatever to the installation of a state of unchecked presidential powers and torture can be the death knell of popular sovereignty dedicated to the purpose of opposing tyranny. Whatever being is not the enemy of any state or form of “sovereignty.” It is the enemy of popular sovereignty. Whatever ruins democracy. If we want more than unchecked presidential power and torture, then we will have to dedicate ourselves to certain purposes, like resisting tyranny and recalling** that this was **the purpose of the U.S. Constitution**.

**The state of exception can be contained---no impact**

Jennifer **Mitzen 11**, PhD, University of Chicago, Associate Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, Michael E. Newell, “Crisis Authority, the War on Terror and the Future of Constitutional Democracy,” PDF

But **what Agamben has potentially overlooked is the conversation between the government, public and media concerning the state of exception**. Waever’s desecuritization theory tells us that it is possible for continued debate and media coverage to desecuritize a threat in whole or in part (Waever, 1995). **As the War on Terror progressed, more academics and government officials began to speak out against** the usefulness of interrogations, the reality of the terrorist threat and the morality of **the administration’s policies**. Some critics suggested that the terrorist threat was not as imminent as the Administration made it appear, and that “…fears of the omnipotent terrorist…may have been overblown, the threat presented within the United States by al Qaeda greatly exaggerated” (Mueller, 2006). Indeed, as Mueller points out, there have been no terrorist attacks in the United States five years prior and five years after September 11th. The resignation of administration officials, such as Jack Goldsmith, who, it was later learned, sparred with the administration over Yoo’s torture memos, their wiretapping program and their trial of suspected terrorists also contributed to this shift in sentiment (Rosen, 2007). The use of the terms “torture,” and “prisoner abuse,” that began to surface in critical media coverage of the War on Terror framed policies as immoral. **As the public gradually learned more from media coverage, academic discourse, and protests from government officials, the administration and its policies saw plummeting popularity in the polls**. Two-thirds of the country did not approve of Bush’s handling of the War on Terror by the end of his presidency (Harris Poll) and as of February 2009 two-thirds of the country wanted some form of investigation into torture and wiretapping policies (USA Today Poll, 2009).¶ **In November 2008 a Democratic President was elected and Democrats gained substantial ground in Congress partly on promises of changing the policies in the War on Terror. Republican presidential nominees**, such as Mitt Romney, **who argued for the continuance of many of the Bush administration’s policies in the War on Terror, did not see success at the polls**. Indeed, **this could be regarded as Waever’s “speech-act failure” which constitutes the moment of desecuritization** (Waever, 1995). In this sense, **Agamben’s warning of “pure de-facto rule” in the War on Terror rings hollow because** of one single important fact: **the Bush administration peacefully transferred power** to their political rivals **after the 2008 elections. The terrorist threat still lingers** in the far reaches of the globe, **and a strictly Agamben-centric analysis would suggest that the persistence of this threat would allow for the continuance of the state of exception. If Agamben was correct that the United States was under “pure de-facto rule” then** arguably **its rulers could decide to stay in office and to use the military to protect their position. Instead, Bush** and his administration **left, suggesting that popular sovereignty remained intact**.

**Humanism DA — it’s inescapable and giving up on it dooms the planet to extinction.**

Tony **Davies**, Professor of English, Birmingham University, Humanism, 19**97**, p. 130.

So there will not after all be, nor indeed could there be, any tidy definitions. **The several humanisms** – the civic humanism of the quattrocento Italian city-states, the Protestant humanism of sixteenth century northern Europe, the rationalistic humanism that attended at the revolutions of enlightened modernity, and the romantic and positivistic humanisms through which the European bourgeoisies established their hegemony over it, the revolutionary humanism that shook the world and the liberal humanism that sought to tame it, the humanism of the Nazis and the humanism of their victims and opponents, the antihumanist humanism of Heidegger and the humanist antihumanism of Foucault and Althusser – **are not reducible to one, or even to a single line or pattern**. Each has its distinctive historical curve, its particular discursive poetics, its own problematic scansion of the human. Each seeks, as all discourses must, to impose its own answer to the question of ‘which is to be master’. Meanwhile, **the problem of humanism remains, for the present, an inescapable horizon within which all attempts to think about the ways in which human being have, do, might live together in and on the world are contained.** Not that the actual humanisms described here necessarily provide a model, or even a useful history, least of all for those very numerous people, and peoples, for whom they have been alien and oppressive. Some, at least, offer a grim warning. Certainly it should no longer be possible to formulate phrases like ‘the destiny of man’ or ‘the triumph of human reason’ without an instant consciousness of the folly and brutality they drag behind them. **All humanisms, until now, have been imperial.** They speak of the human in the accents and the interests of a class, a sex, a ‘race’. **Their embrace suffocates those whom it does not ignore.** The first humanists scripted the tyranny of Borgias, Medicis and Tudors. Later humanisms dreamed of freedom and celebrated Frederick II, Bonaparte, Bismarck, Stalin. The liberators of colonial America, like the Greek and Roman thinkers they emulated, owned slaves. At various times, not excluding the present, the circuit of the human has excluded women, those who do not speak Greek or Latin or English, those whose complexions are not pink, children, Jews. It is almost impossible to think of a crime that has not been committed in the name of humanity. **At the same time, though it is clear that the master narrative of transcendental Man has outlasted its usefulness, it would be unwise simply to abandon the ground occupied by the historical humanisms. For one thing, some variety of humanism remains, on many occasions, the only available alternative to bigotry and persecution. The freedom to speak and write, to organize and campaign in defence of individual or collective interests, to protest and disobey: all these, and the prospect of a world in which they will be secured, can only be articulated in humanist terms. It is true that** the Baconian ‘Knowledge of Causes, and Secrett Motions of Things’, harnessed to an **overweening rationality** and an unbridled technological will to power, **has enlarged the bounds of human empire to the point of endangering the survival of the** violated **planet** on which we live. **But how, if not by mobilizing collective resources of human understanding and responsibility of ‘enlightened self-interest’ even, can that danger be turned aside?**

**Nazi DA—**

**a. Spanos’s ideology recreates the political Nazism of Heidegger.**

J. Russell **Perkin**, Professor of English, Saint Mary’s University, “Review Essay: Theorizing the Culture Wars,” POSTMODERN CULTURE, v 3 n 3, 19**93**, Muse.

**Spanos's extensive reliance on Heidegger raises a political question that he doesn't adequately face.** The humanists are lambasted for every ethnocentricity that they committed; Babbitt, perhaps not without justification, is described as having embodied "a totalitarian ideology" (84). But **the book is defensive and evasive on the topic of Heidegger's political commitments. Spanos seems to think he can testily dismiss those who bring up this matter as enemies of posthumanism**, and his treatment of the topic consists mainly in referring readers to an article he has published elsewhere. But **the problem remains: Heidegger's ontological critique, when translated into the political sphere, led him to espouse Nazi ideology.** If Heidegger is to be praised as the thinker who effected the definitive radical break with humanism, **surely the question of his politics** **should be faced directly** in this book.

**b. The impact is the recreation of Nazism and genocide.**

Emmanuel **Faye**, Associate Professor, University of Paris Ouest-Nanterra La Defense, HEIDEGGER, THE INTRODUCTION OF NAZISM INTO PHILISOPHY IN LIGHT OF THE UNPUBLISHED SEMINARS OF 1933-1935, ed. M.B. smith, 20**09**, p. 322.

**The** völkisch and fundamentally **racist principles Heidegger**'s Gesamtausgabe **transmits strive toward** the goal of **the eradication of all** the intellectual and **human** progress to which philosophy has contributed**. They are** therefore **as** destructive and **dangerous to current thought as the Nazi movement was to** the physical existence of the **exterminated peoples**. Indeed, **what can be the result of granting a future to a doctrine whose author desired to become the "spiritual Fuhrer" of Nazism, other than to pave the way to the same perdition**? In that respect, we now know that Martin Heidegger, in his unpublished seminar on Hegel and the state, meant to make the Nazi domination last beyond the next hundred years. **If his writings continue to proliferate** without our being able to stop this intrusion of Nazism into human education, **how can we not expect them to lead to** yet **another translation into** facts and **acts, from which** this time **humanity might not be able to recover**? § Marked 20:25 § Today more than ever, **it is philosophy's task to work to protect humanity** and alert men's minds; **failing this,** Hitlerism and **Nazism will continue to germinate through Heidegger's writings at the risk of spawning new attempts at the** complete destruction of thought and the **extermination of humankind.**

## 2NC

### Heg Good: Lk—Discourse 2NC

#### Their discourse spills over, collapses hegemony

Sowell (Rose and Milton Friedman Senior Fellow at The Hoover Institution) 2007 [Thomas “Taking America for Granted” July 4th (<http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=YzYyNjcxNjU0NDY1OTI2Y2M1MzExMDE3MjA3Nzc0MmQ>=)]

We all have a tendency to take for granted what we are used to, and to regard it as somehow natural or automatic -- and to be unduly impressed by what is unusual. Too many Americans take the United States for granted and are too easily impressed by what people in other countries say and do. That is especially true of the intelligentsia, and dangerously true of those Supreme Court justices who cite foreign laws when making decisions about American law. There is nothing automatic about the way of life achieved in this country. It is very unusual among the nations of the world today and rarer than four-leaf clovers in the long view of history. It didn't just happen. People made it happen -- and they and those who came after them paid a price in blood and treasure to create and preserve this nation that we now take for granted. More important, this country's survival is not automatic. What we do will determine that. Too many Americans today are not only unconcerned about what it will take to preserve this country but are busy dismantling the things that make it America. Our national motto, "E Pluribus Unum" -- from many, one -- has been turned upside down as educators, activists and politicians strive to fragment the American population into separate racial, social, linguistic and ideological blocs. Some are gung ho for generic "change" -- without the slightest concern that the change might be for the worse, even in a world where most nations that are different are also worse off. Most are worse economically and many are much worse off in terms of despotism, corruption, and bloodshed. History is full of nations and even whole civilizations that have fallen from the heights to destitution and disintegration. The Roman Empire is a classic example, but the great ancient Chinese dynasties, the Ottoman Empire and many others have met the same fate. These were not just political "changes." They were historic catastrophes from which whole peoples did not recover for centuries. It has been estimated that it was a thousand years before Europeans again achieved as high a standard of living as they had in Roman times. The Dark Ages were called dark for a reason. Today, whole classes of people get their jollies and puff themselves up by denigrating and denouncing American society. Such people are a major influence in our media, in our educational system and among all sorts of vocal activists. Nothing illustrates their power to distort reality like the way they seize upon slavery to denounce American society. Slavery was cancerous but does anybody regard cancer in the United States as an evil peculiar to American society? It is a worldwide affliction and so was slavery. Both the enslavers and the enslaved have included people on every inhabited continent -- people of every race, color, and creed. More Europeans were enslaved and taken to North Africa by Barbary Coast pirates alone than there were African slaves taken to the United States and to the colonies from which it was formed. Yet throughout our educational system, our media, and in politics, slavery is incessantly presented as if it were something peculiar to black and white Americans. What was peculiar about the United States was that it was the first country in which slavery was under attack from the moment the country was created. What was peculiar about Western civilization was that it was the first civilization to destroy slavery, not only within its own countries but in other countries around the world as well. Reality has been stood on its head so that a relative handful of people can feel puffed up or gain notoriety and power. Whatever they gain, the rest of us have everything to lose.

### Extinction Framing

#### Extinction outweighs – as long as there is some life there’s only a risk they retain ontological capacity

Hans Jonas (Former Alvin Johnson Prof. Phil. – New School for Social Research and Former Eric Voegelin Visiting Prof. – U. Munich) 1996 “Morality and Mortality: A Search for the Good After Auschwitz”, p. 111-112)

With this look ahead at an ethics for the future, we are touching at the same time upon the question of the future of freedom. The unavoidable discussion of this question seems to give rise to misunderstandings. My dire prognosis that not only our material standard of living but also our democratic freedoms would fall victim to the growing pressure of a worldwide ecological crisis, until finally there would remain only some form of tyranny that would try to save the situation, has led to the accusation that I am defending dictatorship as a solution to our problems. I shall ignore here what is a confusion between warning and recommendation. But I have indeed said that such a tyranny would still be better than total ruin; thus, I have ethically accepted it as an alternative. I must now defend this standpoint, which I continue to support, before the court that I myself have created with the main argument of this essay. For are we not contradicting ourselves in prizing physical survival at the price of freedom? Did we not say that freedom was the condition of our capacity for responsibility—and that this capacity was a reason for the survival of humankind?; By tolerating tyranny as an alternative to physical annihilation are we not violating the principle we established: that the How of existence must not take precedence over its Why? Yet we can make a terrible concession to the primacy of physical survival in the conviction that the ontological capacity for freedom, inseparable as it is from man's being, cannot really be extinguished, only temporarily banished from the public realm. This conviction can be supported by experience we are all familiar with. We have seen that even in the most totalitarian societies the urge for freedom on the part of some individuals cannot be extinguished, and this renews our faith in human beings. Given this faith, we have reason to hope that, as long as there are human beings who survive, the image of God will continue to exist along with them and will wait in concealment for its new hour. With that hope—which in this particular case takes precedence over fear—it is permissible, for the sake of physical survival, to accept if need be a temporary absence of freedom in the external affairs of humanity. This is, I want to emphasize, a worst-case scenario, and it is the foremost task of responsibility at this particular moment in world history to prevent it from happening. This is in fact one of the noblest of duties (and at the same time one concerning self-preservation), on the part of the imperative of responsibility to avert future coercion that would lead to lack of freedom by acting freely in the present, thus preserving as much as possible the ability of future generations to assume responsibility. But more than that is involved. At stake is the preservation of Earth's entire miracle of creation, of which our human existence is a part and before which man reverently bows, even without philosophical "grounding." Here too faith may precede and reason follow; it is faith that longs for this preservation of the Earth (fides quaerens intellectum), and reason comes as best it can to faith's aid with arguments, not knowing or even asking how much depends on its success or failure in determining what action to take. With this confession of faith we come to the end of our essay on ontology.

#### Extinction outweighs structural violence

Nick **Bostrom**, Professor, Philosophy, Oxford University, "We're Underestimating the Risk of Human Extinction," THE ATLANTIC, 3--26--**12**, http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/were-underestimating-the-risk-of-human-extinction/253821/.

Bostrom, who directs Oxford's Future of Humanity Institute, has argued over the course of several papers that human extinction risks are poorly understood and, worse still, severely underestimated by society. Some of these existential risks are fairly well known, especially the natural ones. But others are obscure or even exotic. Most worrying to Bostrom is the subset of existential risks that arise from human technology, a subset that he expects to grow in number and potency over the next century. Despite his concerns about the risks posed to humans by technological progress, Bostrom is no luddite. In fact, he is a longtime advocate of transhumanism---the effort to improve the human condition, and even human nature itself, through technological means. In the long run he sees technology as a bridge, a bridge we humans must cross with great care, in order to reach new and better modes of being. In his work, Bostrom uses the tools of philosophy and mathematics, in particular probability theory, to try and determine how we as a species might achieve this safe passage. What follows is my conversation with Bostrom about some of the most interesting and worrying existential risks that humanity might encounter in the decades and centuries to come, and about what we can do to make sure we outlast them. Some have argued that we ought to be directing our resources toward humanity's existing problems, rather than future existential risks, because many of the latter are highly improbable. You have responded by suggesting that existential risk mitigation may in fact be a dominant moral priority over the alleviation of present suffering. Can you explain why? Bostrom: Well suppose you have a moral view that counts future people as being worth as much as present people. You might say that fundamentally it doesn't matter whether someone exists at the current time or at some future time, just as many people think that from a fundamental moral point of view, it doesn't matter where somebody is spatially---somebody isn't automatically worth less because you move them to the moon or to Africa or something. A human life is a human life. If you have that moral point of view that future generations matter in proportion to their population numbers, then you get this very stark implication that existential risk mitigation has a much higher utility than pretty much anything else that you could do. There are so many people that could come into existence in the future if humanity survives this critical period of time---we might live for billions of years, our descendants might colonize billions of solar systems, and there could be billions and billions times more people than exist currently. Therefore, even a very small reduction in the probability of realizing this enormous good will tend to outweigh even immense benefits like eliminating poverty or curing malaria, which would be tremendous under ordinary standards.

**Heg Good: Struct Vio 2NC**

**Everything is getting better**

**Ridley**, visiting professor at Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory, former science editor of *The Economist*, and award-winning science writer, **10** (Matt, *The Rational Optimist*, pg. 13-15)

If my fictional family is not to your taste, perhaps you prefer statistics. **Since 1800**, **the population of the world has multiplied six times**, **yet average life expectancy has more than doubled and real income has risen more than nine times**. Taking a shorter perspective, **in 2005**, **compared with 1955**, **the average human being on Planet Earth earned nearly three times as much money** (corrected for inflation), **ate one-third more calories of food**, **buried one-third as many of her children and could expect to live one-third longer**. **She was less likely to die as a result of war**, **murder**, **childbirth**, **accidents**, **tornadoes**, **flooding**, **famine**, **whooping cough**, **tuberculosis**, **malaria**, **diphtheria**, **typhus**, **typhoid**, **measles**, **smallpox**, **scurvy or polio**. **She was less likely**, at any given age, **to get cancer**, **heart disease or stroke**. **She was more likely to be literate and to have finished school**. **She was more likely to own a telephone**, **a flush toilet**, **a refrigerator and a bicycle**. **All this during a half-century when the world population has more than doubled**, **so that far from being rationed by population pressure**, **the goods and services available to the people of the world have expanded**. It is, by any standard, an astonishing human achievement. **Averages conceal a lot**. **But even if you break down the world into bits**, **it is hard to find any region that was worse off in 2005 than it was in 1955**. Over that half-century, real income per head ended a little lower in only six countries (Afghanistan, Haiti, Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Somalia), life expectancy in three (Russia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe), and infant survival in none. In the rest they have rocketed upward. Africa’s rate of improvement has been distressingly slow and patchy compared with the rest of the world, and many southern African countries saw life expectancy plunge in the 1990s as the AIDS epidemic took hold (before recovering in recent years). There were also moments in the half-century when you could have caught countries in episodes of dreadful deterioration of living standards or life chances – China in the 1960s, Cambodia in the 1970s, Ethiopia in the 1980s, Rwanda in the 1990s, Congo in the 2000s, North Korea throughout. Argentina had a disappointingly stagnant twentieth century. But **overall**, **after fifty years**, **the outcome for the world is** remarkably, astonishingly, **dramatically positive**. The average South Korean lives twenty-six more years and earns fifteen times as much income each year as he did in 1955 (and earns fifteen times as much as his North Korean counter part). **The average Mexican lives longer now than the average Briton did in 1955**. **The average Botswanan earns more than the average Finn did in 1955**. **Infant mortality is lower today in Nepal than it was in Italy in 1951**. **The proportion of Vietnamese living on less than $2 a day has dropped from 90 per cent to 30 per cent in twenty years**. **The rich have got richer**, **but the poor have done even better**. **The poor in the developing world grew their consumption twice as fast as the world as a whole between 1980 and 2000**. The Chinese are ten times as rich, one-third as fecund and twenty-eight years longer-lived than they were fifty years ago. Even Nigerians are twice as rich, 25 per cent less fecund and nine years longer-lived than they were in 1955. **Despite a doubling of the world population**, even **the raw number of people living in absolute poverty** (defined as less than a 1985 dollar a day) **has fallen since the 1950s**. **The percentage living in such absolute poverty has dropped by more than half** – to less than 18 per cent. **That number is**, of course, **still** all **too** horribly **high**, **but** the trend is hardly a cause for despair: **at the current rate of decline**, **it would hit zero around 2035** – though it probably won’t. The United Nations estimates that poverty was reduced more in the last fifty years than in the previous 500.

### Ontology Alt Impact Turns: Strong Ontology DA 2AC

#### Strong Ontology DA –

#### a. The alt commits to a strong ontology

Stephen K. **White**, Professor, Political Theory, University of Virginia, THE STRENGTHS OF WEAK ONTOLOGY IN POLITICAL THEORY, **2K**, p. 6-8.

Strong are those ontologies that claim to show us “the way the world is,” or how God's being stands to human being, or what human nature is. It is by reference to this external ground that ethical and political life gain their sense of what is right; moreover, this foundation's validity is unchanging and of universal reach. For strong ontologies, the whole question of passages from ontological truths to moral-political ones is relatively clear. Some proponents do not, of course, assume that political principles or decisions can be strictly derived from their ontology; for example, there may be substantial discretionary space for the exercise of judgment. However, in contrast to weak ontologies, strong ones carry an underlying assumption of certainty that guides the whole problem of moving from the ontological level to the moral-political. But this very certainty—both about how things are and how political life should reflect it—allows such ontologies to provide what seem today (at least to some of us) to be answers to our late modern problems that demand too much initial forgetfulness of contingency and indeterminacy. Although terminology is extremely variable here, this last point could be stated thus, that strong ontologies involve too much “metaphysics.” Since World War II, there have been a number of prominent proponents of different forms of strong ontology in political theory. Such thinkers as Leo Strauss and Eric Voegelin, as well as adherents to the natural law tradition, have drawn on classical Greek or Christian models in order to contest the dominant modern ontology. Contemporary philosophers like Alasdair MacIntyre have developed novel ways of carrying some of these sorts of arguments forward.9 But the recent ontological turn that is the primary focus of my attention has taken place largely outside of this immediate sphere of influence. My term weak ontology is intended to highlight what is distinctive about this new phenomenon.10 The thinking I am interested in resists strong ontology, on the one hand, and the strategy of much of liberal thought, on the other. The latter has generally ignored or suppressed ontological reflection, sometimes tacitly affirming the Teflon self, sometimes expressing neutrality toward it. Weak ontology finds the costs of such strategies to outweigh the claimed benefits.

#### b. This results in a radical and violent elimination of the other

Louis E. **Howe**, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science and Planning, University of West Georgia, "Enchantment, Weak Ontologies, and Adminstrative Ethics," ADMINISTRATION & SOCIETY, 9--**06**, p. 427-428.

In this section, I will further explicate the notion of weak ontology. Although weak ontologists find much to contest in one another’s work, as ontologists they all share a commitment to a political and ethical practice that cultivates fundamental sources from which affirmative gestures of ethical life and liveliness might gain their strength. As weak ontologists, they all affirm the contestable nature of their onto-stories about these sources. Although all insist that fundamental conceptualizations of self, other, and the world are necessary to any adequately compelling ethical practice, they all also acknowledge that all such conceptualizations offered today are tinged with contingency and indeterminacy rather than certainty and that none can be simply demonstrated to be true or even universally compelling (White, 2000, pp. 6-10). In most renderings, this fundamental contingency can itself become a source of ethical care and forbearance. Weak ontology would differentiate itself from both those who want to make strong ontological claims and those who believe ontology should make no claims at all. White (2000) characterizes strong ontological claims as those that purport “to show ‘the way the world is,’ or how God’s being stands to human being, or what human nature is” (p. 6). We might think of Plato’s philosophy of Ideas or of most versions of theistic Christianity but also of the political theories of Eric Voegelin and Leo Strauss. These accounts, White notes, carry an assumption of certainty, or truth, that allows them to confidently articulate both a fundamental essence of the world and how that essence ought to be reflected in moral and political life. Against such certainties, weak ontologists insist on the fundamental experience of contingency and indeterminacy in modern life (p. 7). No story of strong ontology could capture, without remainder or violence, the multiplicity of today’s moral–political experiences and possibilities. This has led William Connolly (1995) to replace the term ontology itself with the term ontopolitcal interpretation (p. 1).

### Ontology Bad

**Prioritizing ontology over policy paralyzes problem solving measures and ensures short-term annihilation.**

David **Owen** Professor of Social & Political Philosophy and Deputy Director, Centre for Philosophy and Value, University of Southhampton, “Re-Orientating International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning” MILLENIUM: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, 20**02**, p. 655-7.

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for **words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’**, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. **The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power** as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while **the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is** not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is **by no means** clear that it is, in contrast, wholly **dependent on these philosophical commitments**. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theoryto recognise **that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons** in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that**, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us.** In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because **prioritisation of ontology and epistemology** promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it **cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR**. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, **‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’** in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, **this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity.** The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and **prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one** theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the **theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right**. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so **a** potentially **vicious circle arises.**

### Bare Life: 2NC

#### Liberalism doesn’t cause homo sacer – it rests on the assumption of universal inclusion

Mitchell, Geography Prof at UWash, ‘6 (Katharyne, Geographies of identity: the new exceptionalism” Progress in Human Geography, Vol 30 No 1, p 95-106, SagePub)

II Differenti'al exceptions There are many useful ideas here and their modern applicability is breathtaking. Nevertheless, Agamben's assumption of homo sacer as an undifferentiated, interchangeable (male) figure reproduces many of the problems associated with both liberal and early Marxist thought, and ends up limiting his argument in profound ways. One of the foundational premises undergirding liberal thought, especially from the late nineteenth century onwards, has been the belief that all rational human beings can be and will be included into the political community through time. Indeed, the universalist goals of political citizenship, widely conceived, did show remarkable forward momentum in certain quarters, prompting numerous optimistic assessments for the future by prominent midtwentieth- century liberals such as Marshall, Dewey, Keynes and Laski.2 For scholars such as these and many others, the real-world problems associated with political disenfranchisement or 'exceptionalism in the sphere of actually existing democratic citizenship were problems of implementation. In other words, despite the numerous 'accidents' of poor or unfair implementation, the principles of universalism were sound.

## 1NR

### FW: Limits—Decision-Making 2NC

#### Effective deliberation is the lynchpin of solving all existential global problems

**Lundberg 10** - Christian O. Lundberg 10 Professor of Communications @ University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, “Tradition of Debate in North Carolina” in Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century By Allan D. Louden, p311

The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. But the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speech—as indicated earlier, debate builds capacity for critical thinking, analysis of public claims, informed decision making, and better public judgment. If the picture of modem political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid scientific and technological change outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution, at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to rearticulation precisely because as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy such as Ocwey in The Public awl Its Problems place such a high premium on education (Dewey 1988,63, 154). Debate provides an indispensible form of education in the modem articulation of democracy because it builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed about policy decisions that impact them, to son rhroueh and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly infonnation-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them. The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy. John Larkin (2005, HO) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multimediatcd information environment (ibid-). Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources: To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instmction/no instruction and debate topic . . . that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned . . . students in the Instnictional [debate) group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so----These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in (debate).... These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144) Larkin's study substantiates Thomas Worthcn and Gaylcn Pack's (1992, 3) claim that debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthcn and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials. There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively, the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice in the classroom as a technology for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities. The unique combination of critical thinking skills, research and information processing skills, oral communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education, and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of meaningful political engagement and new articulations of democratic life. Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens that can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to produce revisions of democratic life that are necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive. Democracy faces a myriad of challenges, including: domestic and international issues of class, gender, and racial justice; wholesale environmental destruction and the potential for rapid climate change; emerging threats to international stability in the form of terrorism, intervention and new possibilities for great power conflict; and increasing challenges of rapid globalization including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. More than any specific policy or proposal, an informed and active citizenry that deliberates with greater skill and sensitivity provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with the existential challenges to democracy [in an] increasingly complex world.

### FW: A2 “Exceptionalism”/MOre

#### They’ve got it backwards—the reflexive nature of debate makes it impossible to promote exceptionalism. Even if heg affs are popular, there is always an opposing side present to criticize those values. Only debate makes this possible—in the outside world, students are never exposed to such oppositional ideas.

**Stannard 6** (Matt, Communication @ Wyoming and total badass, April 18, http://legalcommunication.blogspot.com/2006/08/deliberation-debate-and-democracy-in.html)

But the great thing about deliberation as a commitment is that these criticisms can become part of the overall process of deliberative democracy. In a world where interested parties have the opportunity to speak and debate in good faith, we can criticize the referendum process, or explain why we can’t always have open meetings. We can debate the rules themselves, in other words, debate the process itself. All of this suggests that, if deliberative ethics are an antidote to both authoritarianism and self-centeredness, we need more: More debate teams, more public discussion, more patient deliberation, more argument, more discourse, and more nurturing and promotion of the material entities that sustain them. Some of the most articulate criticisms of competitive, switch-side academic debate come from the debate community itself. These criticisms have lately centered on things like the specialized and esoteric practices of debate, the under-representation of minorities in the activity, and the way in which debate practices feed, rather than fight, structures of domination. In other words, internal criticism of academic debate is very much like internal criticisms of the Academy in general: We’re too specialized, we’re too white, and we’re exploited by hegemonic institutions. All of these criticisms are true, and yet, paradoxically, it is our experience in debate, along with our experience in thecritical thinking of university education, that teaches us how to articulate these arguments. The deliberative process is self-reflective and at least has the potential to be self-correcting. I wish to focus on one such criticism: the argument that the discursive practices of academic debate are reappropriated in the service of American hegemony. This is the focus of an article by Darren Hicks and Ron Greene in last year’s Cultural Studies. It is one of the most comprehensive critical treatments of debating ever to appear in a non-specialized journal, and it is written from the perspective of two former debaters and debate coaches who are now leading scholars in the field of rhetoric. Hicks and Greene argue that switch-side debate, the practice of making students advocate views they do not believe, creates "exceptional subjects," and separates speech from personal agency and conviction. This separation from conviction is crucial for spreading a liberal-capitalist idea of "freedom" around the world, since "the ability to distance one’s judgment from one’s first order convictions secures the knowledge class’s professionalization." They conclude: debating both sides helps liberalism to produce a governing field between a person's first order convictions and his/her commitment to the process norms of debate, discussion and persuasion. This field is then managed in and through the alteration of different communicative practices. The production and management of this field of governance allows liberalism to trade in cultural technologies in the global cosmopolitan marketplace at the same time as it creates a field of intervention to transform and change the world one subject (regime) at a time. The main strength of Hicks and Greene's argument is their cooptation trope. Clearly, the "civic engagement" of academic debate can be, and is, exploited in the service of soft-power imperialism. Indeed, this is not merely done through the psychological conditioning of the student elite, but is often based on a literal, material connection, as when The Center for Strategic and International Studies, a foreign policy think-tank with direct ties to the Central Intelligence Agency, directly recruits college debaters. If it is indeed true that debate inevitably produces other-oriented deliberative discourse at the expense of students' confidence in their first-order convictions, this would indeed be a trade-off worth criticizing. In all fairness, Hicks and Greene do not overclaim their critique, and they take care to acknowledge the important ethical and cognitive virtues of deliberative debating. When represented as anything other than a political-ethical concern, however, Hicks and Greene's critique has several problems: First, as my colleague J.P. Lacy recently pointed out, it seems a tremendous causal (or even rhetorical) stretch to go from "debating both sides of an issue creates civic responsibility essential to liberal democracy" to "this civic responsibility upholds the worst forms of American exceptionalism." Second, Hicks and Greene do not make any comparison of the potentially bad power of debate to any alternative. Their implied alternative, however, is a form of forensic speech that privileges personal conviction§ Marked 21:11 § . The idea that students should be able to preserve their personal convictions at all costs seems far more immediately tyrannical, far more immediately damaging to either liberal or participatory democracy, than the ritualized requirements that students occasionally take the opposite side of what they believe. Third, as I have suggested and will continue to suggest, while a debate project requiring participants to understand and often "speak for" opposing points of view may carry a great deal of liberal baggage, it is at its core a project more ethically deliberative than institutionally liberal. Where Hicks and Greene see debate producing "the liberal citizen-subject," I see debate at least having the potential to produce "the deliberative human being." The fact that some academic debaters are recruited by the CSIS and the CIA does not undermine this thesis. Absent healthy debate programs, these think-tanks and government agencies would still recruit what they saw as the best and brightest students. And absent a debate community that rewards anti-institutional political rhetoric as much as liberal rhetoric, those students would have little-to-no chance of being exposed to truly oppositional ideas. Moreover, if we allow ourselves to believe that it is "culturally imperialist" to help other peoples build institutions of debate and deliberation, we not only ignore living political struggles that occur in every culture, but we fall victim to a dangerous ethnocentrism in holding that "they do not value deliberation like we do." If the argument is that our participation in fostering debate communities abroad greases the wheels of globalization, the correct response, in debate terminology, is that such globalization is non-unique, inevitable, and there is only a risk that collaborating across cultures in public debate and deliberation will foster resistance to domination—just as debate accomplishes wherever it goes. Indeed, Andy Wallace, in a recent article, suggests that Islamic fundamentalism is a byproduct of the colonization of the lifeworld of the Middle East; if this is true, then one solution would be to foster cross-cultural deliberation among people on both sides of the cultural divide willing to question their own preconceptions of the social good. Hicks and Greene might be correct insofar as elites in various cultures can either forbid or reappropriate deliberation, but for those outside of that institutional power, democratic discussion would have a positively subversive effect.

**1st, Fair Play Short-Circuits their Offense: Topicality is NOT like genocide. NONE OF THEIR EVIDENCE assumes a Game situation mediating social Play. Rules within games need to be viewed in their Particularity… NOT by their epistemology or ontology.**

**Armstrong 2K**

(Paul B., Dean and Professor of Literature at Brown University, New Literary History, 31: 211–223, “The Politics of Play: The Social Implications of Iser’s Aesthetic Theory”)

From the early days of reader-response criticism, Wolfgang Iser’s literary theory has been accused of apolitical idealism. This charge represents a fundamental misunderstanding of his think- ing about the social functions of literature. The Fictive and the Imaginary, the culmination of his reﬂections about the art of representation, does not explicitly engage the question of the politics of literature, and its emphasis on the value of “play” and the “as if” might seem to disengage the aesthetic experience from worldly concerns. What Iser means by “**play,”** however, **is a profoundly important social activity that would facilitate productive uses of difference to create forms of community among decentered human beings whose dissonances and dislocations resist uniﬁcation.** As an instrument for staging various kinds of open-ended exploratory interactions, **Iser’s notion** of literature **offers a model of the emancipatory uses of power** in the service of communicative democracy**.** The politics ofIser’s theory of nonmimetic representation foregrounds the role of the “as if” in producing, questioning, and overturning different forms of life. **The playful, nonteleological** functioning of **ﬁctive acts of staging** in turn **makes possible the** reciprocal but nonconsensual **exchange of power on which democratic mutuality depends.** The Fictive and the Imaginary engages the question of power in representation in order to afﬁrm the liberating and community-building capacities of literature in a perpetually unstable, decentered world. **It is thus an important response to the political challenges of our time**. The Fictive and the Imaginary moves beyond Iser’s earlier concern with reading to offer a general theory of textuality in the service of what he calls “literary anthropology.” Two questions drive this anthropology: Why do human beings seem to need ﬁctions? And what does the capacity to make ﬁctions reveal about the being of human being? Iser approaches these questions not by undertaking a transcendental phe- nomenological reﬂection but by looking for patterns in several histori- cally and culturally speciﬁc domains that he thinks provide especially illuminating examples of how human beings have made and thought new literary history 212 about ﬁctions. Hence the long chapters that make up the bulk of the book on pastoral poetry, the role of ﬁctions in philosophy, and different theories of play and the imaginary. This procedure reﬂects in part the realization of hermeneutic phenomenology that **epistemological and ontological constants,** if they exist,cannot be grasped through immediate reﬂection but **must be teased out through cultural interpretation of their varying manifestations**.1 It also suggests Iser’s doubt that a single, univocal deﬁnition of ﬁction can be found: “**Context-bound, ﬁctions in general elude clear-cut deﬁnitions, let alone ontological grounding. Instead, they can be grasped only in terms of use**. As their use is potentially manifold, ﬁctionalizing manifests itself in constantly shifting modes of operation in accordance with the changing boundaries to be overcome.”2 The multiplicity of ﬁction not only eludes any essentialist characterization; it also suggests that a central task for a theory of ﬁctionality is to account for the variety of modes of ﬁction-making. Iser is interested in reading the literary as evidence of culture-forming processes. The seemingly boundless variety of the ﬁctional, which would seem to thwart any general theory, turns out to have enormous value as anthropological evidence of the capacity of human beings to generate versions of themselves: “Literature . . . has a substratum . . . of a rather featureless plasticity that manifests itself in a continual repatterning of the culturally conditioned shapes human beings have assumed. . . . If literature permits limitless patternings of human plasticity, it indicates the inveterate urge of human beings to become present to themselves; this urge, however, will never issue into a deﬁnitive shape. . . . [L]iterature reveals that human plasticity is propelled by the drive to gain shape, without ever imprisoning itself in any of the shapes obtained” (FI xi).

Empirically proven—the **best** advocates learned to debate **both sides first**

**Dybvig and Iverson 2K** (Kristin and Joel, Arizona State U., “Can Cutting Cards Carve into Our Personal Lives: An Analysis of Debate Research on Personal Advocacy”, http://debate.uvm.edu/dybvigiverson1000.html)

**Not all debate research appears to generate personal advocacy** and challenge peoples' assumptions. **Debaters must switch sides**, so they must inevitably debate against various cases. **While this may seem to be inconsistent with advocacy, supporting and researching both sides** of an argument **actually created stronger advocates. Not only did debaters learn both sides** of an argument, **so that they could defend their positions** against attack, **they also learned** the **nuances** of each position. **Learning** and the intricate nature of various policy proposals **helps debaters** to **strengthen their own stance** on issues.

#### Negotiated stasis is necessary for debate—without a starting point, teams just talk past each other

**O’Donnell 4** – PhD, director of debate at Mary Washington (Tim, WFU Debaters Research Guide, “Blue helmet blues”, ed. Bauschard& Lacy, http://groups.wfu.edu/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/DRGArtiarticlesIndex.htm)

The answer, I believe, resides deep in the rhetorical tradition in the often overlooked notion of stasis. Although the concept can be traced to Aristotle’s Rhetoric, it was later expanded by Hermagoras whose thinking has come down to us through the Roman rhetoricians Cicero and Quintillian. Stasis is a Greek word meaning to “stand still.” It has generally been considered by argumentation scholars to be the point of clash where two opposing sides meet in argument.Stasis recognizes the fact that interlocutors engaged in a conversation, discussion, or debate need to have some level of expectation regarding what the focus of their encounter ought to be. To reach stasis, participants need to arrive at a decision about what the issue is prior to the start of their conversation. Put another way, they need to mutually acknowledge the point about which they disagree. What happens when participants fail to reach agreement about what it is thatthey are arguing about? They talk past each other with little or no awareness of what the other is saying.The oft used cliché of two ships passing in the night, where both are in the dark about what the other is doing and neither stands still long enough to call out to the other, is the image most commonly used to describe what happens when participants in an argument fail to achieve stasis. In such situations, genuine engagement is not possible because participants have not reached agreement about what is in dispute. For example, when one advocate says that the United States should increase international involvement in the reconstruction of Iraq and their opponent replies that the United States should abandon its policy of preemptive military engagement, they are talking past each other. When such a situation prevails, it is hard to see how a productive conversation can ensue. I do not mean to suggest that dialogic engagement always unfolds along an ideal plain where participants always can or even ought to agree on a mutual starting point. The reality is that many do not. In fact, refusing to acknowledge an adversary’s starting point is itself a powerful strategic move. However, it must be acknowledged that when such situations arise, and participants cannot agree on the issue about which they disagree, the chances that their exchange will result in a productive outcome are diminished significantly. In an enterprise like academic debate, where the goals of the encounter are cast along both educational and competitive lines, the need to reach accommodation on the starting point is urgent. This is especially the case when time is limited and there is no possibility of extending the clock. The sooner such agreement is achieved, the better. Stasis helps us understand that we stand to lose a great deal when we refuse a genuine starting point.