## 1NC

### 1

#### Restrictions on authority prohibit- the aff is a condition

William Conner 78, former federal judge for the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York United States District Court, S. D. New York, CORPORACION VENEZOLANA de FOMENTO v. VINTERO SALES, http://www.leagle.com/decision/19781560452FSupp1108\_11379

Plaintiff next contends that Merban was charged with notice of the restrictions on the authority of plaintiff's officers to execute the guarantees. Properly interpreted, the "conditions" that had been imposed by plaintiff's Board of Directors and by the Venezuelan Cabinet were not "restrictions" or "limitations" upon the authority of plaintiff's agents but rather conditions precedent to the granting of authority. Essentially, then, plaintiff's argument is that Merban should have known that plaintiff's officers were not authorized to act except upon the fulfillment of the specified conditions.

#### “Authority” is the ex-ante allocation of decision rights

Garfagnini, ITAM School of Business, 10/15/2012

(Umberto, italics emphasis in original, “The Dynamics of Authority in Innovating Organizations,” https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db\_name=MWETFall2012&paper\_id=62)

Why do organizations change their internal allocation of authority over time? We propose a simple theory in which innovation with a new technology generates an *endogenous need for coordination* among divisions. A division manager has private information about the expected productivity of new technologies, which can be communicated strategically to headquarters. The organization has an advantage in coordinating technologies across divisions and can only commit to an ex-ante allocation of decision rights (i.e., authority). When the importance of cross-divisional externalities is small and the organization's coordination advantage is moderate, we show that an organization can optimally delegate authority to a division manager initially and then later centralize authority.

#### Vote neg limits - anything can indirectly affect war powers--also makes the topic bidirectional because conditions can enhance executive power

### 2

#### The Executive branch of the United States federal government should limit targeted killing and detention without charge to zones of active hostilities by issuing a memo of executive branch review policy for those practices; and in addition, by limiting targeted killing and detention without charge outside zones of active hostilities to reviewable operations guided by an individualized threat requirement, a least-harmful-means test, a feasibility test for criminal prosecution, procedural safeguards, and by issuing a memo of executive branch review policy for those practices.

**Executive action solves**

**Zenko 13** (Micah, Douglas Dillon fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, January 2013, “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies”, http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Drones\_CSR65.pdf, zzx)

**The president of the United States should** ■■ **limit targeted killings to** individuals who U.S. officials claim are being targeted—**the leadership of al-Qaeda and affiliated forces or individuals with a direct operational role in past or ongoing terrorist plots against the United States and its allies**—and bring drone strike practices in line with stated policies; ■■ either **end the practice of signature strikes** or provide a public accounting of how it meets the principles of distinction and proportionality that the Obama administration claims; ■■ review its current policy whereby the executive authority for drone strikes is split between the CIA and JSOC, as each has vastly different legal authorities, degrees of permissible transparency, and oversight; ■■ **provide information to the public, Congress, and UN special rapporteurs**— without disclosing classified information—**on what procedures exist to prevent harm to civilians**, including collateral damage mitigation, investigations into collateral damage, corrective actions based on those investigations, and amends for civilian losses; **and** ■■ **never conduct nonbattlefield targeted killings without an accountable human being authorizing the strike** (while retaining the potential necessity of autonomous decisions to use lethal force in warfare in response to ground-based antiaircraft fire or aerial combat).

#### Strong presidency is essential to avert nuclear annihilation

Paul 1998 (Joel- Professor at University of Connecticut School of Law, “The Geopolitical Constitution: Executive Expediency and Executive Agreements,” California Law Review, Jul)

Whatever the complexity of causes that led to the Cold War - ideology, economics, power politics, Stalin's personality, Soviet intrigue, or American ineptitude - the tension of the bipolar order seemed real, immutable, and threatening to the U.S. public. 135 The broad consensus of U.S. leadership held that the immediacy of the nuclear threat, the need for covert operations and intelligence gathering, and the complexity of U.S. relations with both democracies and dictatorships made it impractical to engage in congressional debate and oversight of foreign policy-making. 136 The eighteenth-century Constitution did not permit a rapidresponse to twentieth-century foreign aggression. The reality of transcontinental ballistic missiles collapsed the real time for decision-making to a matter of minutes. Faced with the apparent choice between the risk of nuclear annihilationor amending the constitutional process for policy-making, the preference for a powerful executive was clear. 137 Early in the Cold War one skeptic of executive power, C.C. Rossiter, acknowledged that [“]thesteady increase in executive power is unquestionably a cause for worry, but so, too, is the steady increase in the magnitude and complexity of the problems the president has been called uponby the American people to solve in their behalf. They still have more to fear from the ravages of depression, rebellion, and especially atomic war than they do from whatever decisive actionsmay issue from the White House in an attempt to put any such future crises to rout....It is not too much to say that the destiny of this nation in the Atomic Age will rest in the capacity of the Presidency as an institution of constitutional dictatorship.

**3**

**Obama pressure ensures debt limit will be raised now**

Edward **Dovere**, “Government Shutdown: President Obama Holds the Line,” POLITICO, **10—1**—13,

<http://www.politico.com/story/2013/10/government-shutdown-president-obama-holds-the-line-97646.html?hp=f3>

President Barack **Obama started September in an agonizing, extended display of how little sway he had in Congress. He ended the month with a display of resolve and strength that could redefine his presidency**. All it took was a government shutdown. This was less a White House strategy than simply staying in the corner the House GOP had painted them into — to the White House’s surprise, **Obama was forced to do what he so rarely has as president: he said no, and he didn’t stop saying no.** For two weeks ahead of Monday night’s deadline, Obama and aides rebuffed the efforts to kill Obamacare with the kind of firm, narrow sales pitch they struggled with in three years of trying to convince people the law should exist in the first place. There was no litany of doomsday scenarios that didn’t quite come true, like in the run-up to the fiscal cliff and the sequester. No leaked plans or musings in front of the cameras about Democratic priorities he might sacrifice to score a deal. After five years of what’s often seen as Obama’s desperation to negotiate — to the fury of his liberal base and the frustration of party leaders who argue that he negotiates against himself. Even his signature health care law came with significant compromises in Congress. Instead, **over and over and over again, Obama delivered the simple line: Republicans want to repeal a law that was passed and upheld by the Supreme Court** — to give people health insurance **— or they’ll do something that everyone outside the GOP caucus meetings**, including Wall Street bankers, **seems to agree would be a ridiculous risk.** “If we lock these Americans out of affordable health care for one more year,” Obama said Monday afternoon as he listed examples of people who would enjoy better treatment under Obamacare, “if we sacrifice the health care of millions of Americans — then they’ll fund the government for a couple more months. Does anybody truly believe that we won’t have this fight again in a couple more months? Even at Christmas?” The president and his advisers weren’t expecting this level of Republican melee, a White House official said. Only during Sen. Ted Cruz’s (R-Texas) 21-hour floor speech last week did the realization roll through the West Wing that they wouldn’t be negotiating because they couldn’t figure out anymore whom to negotiate with. And even then, they didn’t believe the shutdown was really going to happen until Saturday night, when the House voted again to strip Obamacare funding. This wasn’t a credible position, Obama said again Monday afternoon, but rather, bowing to “extraneous and controversial demands” which are “all to save face after making some impossible promises to the extreme right wing of their political party.” Obama and aides have said repeatedly that they’re not thinking about the shutdown in terms of political gain, but the situation’s is taking shape for them. Congress’s approval on dealing with the shutdown was at 10 percent even before the shutters started coming down on Monday according to a new CNN/ORC poll, with 69 percent of people saying the House Republicans are acting like “spoiled children.” “The Republicans are making themselves so radioactive that the president and **Democrats can win this debate in the court of public opinion” by waiting them out**, said Jim Manley, a Democratic strategist and former aide to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid who has previously been critical of Obama’s tactics. Democratic pollster Stan Greenberg said the Obama White House learned from the 2011 debt ceiling standoff, when it demoralized fellow Democrats, deflated Obama’s approval ratings and got nothing substantive from the negotiations. “They didn’t gain anything from that approach,” Greenberg said. “I think that there’s a lot they learned from what happened the last time they ran up against the debt ceiling.” While the Republicans have been at war with each other, the White House has proceeded calmly — a breakthrough phone call with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani Friday that showed him getting things done (with the conveniently implied juxtaposition that Tehran is easier to negotiate with than the GOP conference), his regular golf game Saturday and a cordial meeting Monday with his old sparring partner Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. White House press secretary Jay Carney said Monday that the shutdown wasn’t really affecting much of anything. “It’s busy, but it’s always busy here,” Carney said. “It’s busy for most of you covering this White House, any White House. We’re very much focused on making sure that the implementation of the Affordable Care Act continues.” Obama called all four congressional leaders Monday evening — including Boehner, whose staff spent Friday needling reporters to point out that the president hadn’t called for a week. According to both the White House and Boehner’s office, the call was an exchange of well-worn talking points, and changed nothing. **Manley advised Obama to make sure people continue to see Boehner and the House Republicans as the problem and not rush into any more negotiations until public outrage forces them to bend**. “He may want to do a little outreach, but not until the House drives the country over the cliff,” Manley said Monday, before the shutdown. “Once the House has driven the country over the cliff and failed to fund the government, then it might be time to make a move.” The White House believes Obama will take less than half the blame for a shutdown – with the rest heaped on congressional Republicans. The divide is clear in a Gallup poll also out Monday: over 70 percent of self-identifying Republicans and Democrats each say their guys are the ones acting responsibly, while just 9 percent for both say the other side is. **If Obama is able to turn public opinion against Republicans, the GOP won’t be able to turn the blame back on Obama**, Greenberg said. “Things only get worse once things begin to move in a particular direction,” he said. “They don’t suddenly start going the other way as people rethink this.”

**Plan guts Obama’s negotiating cred, spills over**

**Seeking Alpha 9-10**, 9-10-2013, “Syria Could Upend Debt Ceiling Fight,” http://seekingalpha.com/article/1684082-syria-could-upend-debt-ceiling-fight

Unless President Obama can totally change a reluctant public's perception of another Middle-Eastern conflict, it seems unlikely that he can get 218 votes in the House, though he can probably still squeak out 60 votes in the Senate. **This defeat would be to**tally **unprecedented as a President has never lost a military authorization vote** in American history. **To forbid the Commander-in-Chief** of his **primary power renders him** all but **impotent**. At this point, a rebuff from the House is a 67%-75% probability. I reach this probability by looking within the whip count. I assume the 164 declared "no" votes will stay in the "no" column. To get to 218, Obama needs to win over 193 of the 244 undecided, a gargantuan task. Within the "no" column, there are 137 Republicans. Under a best case scenario, Boehner could corral 50 "yes" votes, which would require Obama to pick up 168 of the 200 Democrats, 84%. Many of these Democrats rode to power because of their opposition to Iraq, which makes it difficult for them to support military conflict. The only way to generate near unanimity among the undecided Democrats is if they choose to support the President (recognizing the political ramifications of a defeat) despite personal misgivings. The idea that all undecided Democrats can be convinced of this argument is relatively slim, especially as there are few votes to lose. In the best case scenario, the House could reach 223-225 votes, barely enough to get it through. Under the worst case, there are only 150 votes. Given the lopsided nature of the breakdown, the chance of House passage is about one in four. While a failure in the House would put action against Syria in limbo, I have felt that the market has overstated the impact of a strike there, which would be limited in nature. Rather, investors should focus on the profound ripple through the power structure in Washington, which would greatly impact impending battles over spending and the debt ceiling. Currently, the government loses spending authority on September 30 while it hits the debt ceiling by the middle of October. Markets have generally felt that Washington will once again strike a last-minute deal and avert total catastrophe. Failure in the Syrian vote could change this. **For the Republicans to beat Obama on a President's strength (foreign military action), they will likely be emboldened that they can beat him on domestic** spending **issues**. Until now, consensus has been that the two sides would compromise to fund the government at sequester levels while passing a $1 trillion stand

**Thrashes the economy**

Paul **Krugman,** Nobel Prize winning economist, “Rebels without a Clue,” NEW YORK TIMES, **9—29**—13,

<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/30/opinion/krugman-rebels-without-a-clue.html>

Still, **a government shutdown looks benign compared** with the possibility that Congress might refuse **to** raise **the debt ceiling.**

First of all, **hitting the ceiling would force a huge, immediate spending cut**, almost surely **pushing America back into recession**. Beyond that, **failure to raise the ceiling would mean missed payments on existing U.S. government debt. And that might have terrifying consequences**.

Why? **Financial markets have long treated U.S. bonds as the ultimate safe asset; the assumption that America will always honor its debts is the bedrock on which the world financial system rests**. In particular, Treasury bills — short-term U.S. bonds — are what investors demand when they want absolutely solid collateral against loans. Treasury bills are so essential for this role that in times of severe stress they sometimes pay slightly negative interest rates — that is, they’re treated as being better than cash.

Now suppose it became clear that U.S. bonds weren’t safe, that America couldn’t be counted on to honor its debts after all. Suddenly, the whole system would be disrupted. Maybe, if we were lucky, financial institutions would quickly cobble together alternative arrangements. But it looks quite possible that **default would create a huge financial crisis, dwarfing the crisis set off by the failure of Lehman Brothers** five years ago.

**Nuclear war.**

Cesare **Merlini 11**, nonresident senior fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe and chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Italian Institute for International Affairs (IAI) in Rome. He served as IAI president from 1979 to 2001. Until 2009, he also occupied the position of executive vice chairman of the Council for the United States and Italy, which he co-founded in 1983. His areas of expertise include transatlantic relations, European integration and nuclear non-proliferation, with particular focus on nuclear science and technology. A Post-Secular World? Survival, 53:2, 117 – 130

Two neatly opposed scenarios for the future of the world order illustrate the range of possibilities, albeit at the risk of oversimplification. The first scenario entails **the premature crumbling of the post-Westphalian system**. One or more of the acute tensions apparent today **evolves into** an open and traditional conflict between **states**, perhaps even **involving** **the use of nuclear weapons**. **The crisis might be triggered by a collapse of the global economic** and financial **system**, the vulnerability of which we have just experienced, and the prospect of **a second Great Depression, with consequences for peace and democracy similar to those of the first.** Whatever the trigger, the unlimited exercise of national sovereignty, exclusive self-interest and rejection of outside interference would self-interest and rejection of outside interference would likely be amplified, emptying, perhaps entirely, the half-full glass of multilateralism, including the UN and the European Union. Many of the more likely conflicts, such as between Israel and Iran or India and Pakistan, have potential religious dimensions. Short of war, tensions such as those related to immigration might become unbearable. Familiar issues of creed and identity could be exacerbated. One way or another, the secular rational approach would be sidestepped by a return to theocratic absolutes, competing or converging with secular absolutes such as unbridled nationalism.

### 4

**The United States Federal Government should restrict the President's war making authority by limiting targeted killing without charge to zones of active hostilities by statutory codification of executive branch review policy for those practices; and in addition, by limiting targeted killing outside zones of active hostilities to reviewable operations guided by an individualized threat requirement, a least-harmful-means test, a feasibility test for criminal prosecution, procedural safeguards, and by statutory codification of executive branch review policy for those practices.**

### Executive Overreach

### Democracy

#### Democracy causes war:

#### Democratic/autocratic wars—Institutions, norms and security communities ensure conflict

Chris **Dasse 6** Professor of International Relations at the University of Munich. “Democratic Wars Looking at the Dark Side of Democratic Peace” p. 75

This hypothesis postulates a causal relationship between democratic community building, which draws on shared institutions, common values and security cooperation on the one hand, and democratic belligerence vis-à-vis non-democratic states on the other, which is based on non-recognition, exclusion and enmity. A process seems to be at work in international relations that works similarly to the mechanism Charles Tilly described as the state-building process in Europe, in which internal pacification was achieved through external war-making (Tilly, 1975a, 1985). In the international system of today, an analogous mechanism is contributing to democratic community building and the renunciation of violence through coalition warfare and collective conflict management (Cederman, 2001). That means that the very same reasons that generate peaceful relations among democracies also provoke democracies to wage war against non-democracies. If this is the case, it might be helpful to draw on explanations of democratic peace in order to generate hypotheses about ‘democratic war’ and to explain the war-proneness of democracies vis-à-vis nondemocratic states. Throughout this, it is important not to focus on the reasons for the use of force alone but also to look at the way in which military means are applied. For Alexis de Tocqueville observed that changing reasons for war also lead to changing forms of warfare. Therefore, to explain democratic war, Tocqueville seems to be more helpful than Kant. While Kant focuses on the singular decision to go to war, Tocqueville takes the processes into account by which democracies engage in military action. By doing so, he is able to analyse some of the dynamics that create the democratic war puzzle. In his famous book on ‘Democracy in America’ he summarized his findings: ‘There are two things which a democratic people will always find very difficult – to begin a war and to end it’ (Tocqueville, 1840, p. 393). In what follows, I will focus on three reasons why democracies might be peaceful to each other, but abrasive or even bellicose towards nondemocracies. The first reason is an institutional one: domestic institutions 76 Democratic Wars dampen conflicts among democracies but aggravate conflicts between democracies and non-democracies. The second reason is a normative one: shared social values and political ideals prevent wars between democracies but make wars between democracies and non-democracies more likely and savage. The third reason is a structural one: the search for safety encourages democracies to create security communities by renouncing violence among themselves but demands assertiveness against outsiders and the willingness to use military means if enlargement of that community cannot be achieved peacefully. To illustrate this, I will draw mainly on the United States as an example following a Tocquevillean tradition, but knowing that not all democracies behave in the same way or that the US is the only war-fighting democracy. It is clear that the hypotheses are first conjectures and that more case studies and quantitative tests are needed to reach more general conclusions

#### Autocratic peace true- DPT isn’t

Erik Gartzke, University of California, and Alex Weisiger 2013, University of Pennsylvania. “Permanent Friends? Dynamic Difference and the Democratic Peace” http://dss.ucsd.edu/~egartzke/publications/gartzke\_weisiger\_isq\_2013.pdf

The “autocratic peace” involves a class of arguments¶ about the conflictual consequences of regime similarity¶ and difference. Theories disagree over whether demo-¶ cratic and autocratic relations are distinct or equivalent.¶ Early studies of the autocratic peace typically focused on¶ certain geographic regions. Despite having little democ-¶ racy, low levels of economic development, arbitrary¶ national borders, and widespread civil conflict, Africa¶ experiences surprisingly little interstate war. Several stud-¶ ies attribute the “African peace” to historical norms and¶ to the strategic behavior of insecure leaders who recog-¶ nize that challenging existing borders invites continental¶ war while encouraging secessionist movements risks reci-¶ procal meddling in the country’s own domestic affairs¶ (Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Herbst 1989, 1990).¶ 6¶ How-¶ ever, these arguments fail to address tensions between¶ individual (state, leader) interests and social goods. The¶ security dilemma implies precisely that leaders act aggres-¶ sively despite lacking revisionist objectives (Jervis 1978).¶ Initial statistical evidence of an autocratic peace¶ emerged in a negative form with the observation that¶ mixed democratic¶ –¶ autocratic dyads are more conflict¶ prone than either jointly democratic or jointly autocratic¶ dyads (Gleditsch and Hegre 1997; Raknerud and Hegre¶ 1997). Studies have sought systematic evidence for or¶ against an autocratic peace. Oren and Hays (1997) evalu-¶ ate several data sets, finding that autocracies are less war¶ prone than democracy¶ –¶ autocracy pairs. Indeed, they find¶ that socialist countries with advanced industrialized econ-¶ omies are more peaceful than democracies. Werner¶ (2000) finds an effect of political similarity that coexists¶ with the widely recognized effect of joint democracy. She¶ attributes the result to shared preferences arising from a¶ reduced likelihood of disputes over domestic politics.¶ Peceny, Beer and Sanchez-Terry (2002) break down the¶ broad category of autocracy into multiple subgroups and¶ find evidence that shared autocratic type (personalistic¶ dictatorships, single-party regimes, or military juntas)¶ reduces conflict, although the observed effects are less¶ pronounced than for joint democracy. Henderson (2002)¶ goes further by arguing that there is no empirically verifi able democratic peace. Instead, political dissimilarity¶ causes conflict. Souva (2004) argues and finds that simi-¶ larity of both political and economic institutions encour-¶ ages peace. In the most sophisticated analysis to date,¶ Bennett (2006) finds a robust autocratic peace, though¶ the effect is smaller than for joint democracy and limited¶ to coherent autocratic regimes. Petersen (2004), in con-¶ trast, uses an alternate categorization of autocracy and¶ finds no support for the claim that similarity prevents or¶ limits conflict. Still, the bulk of evidence suggests that similar polities are associated with relative peace, even¶ among nondemocracies.¶ The autocratic peace poses unique challenges for demo-¶ cratic peace theories. Given that the democratic peace¶ highlights apparently unique characteristics of joint¶ democracy, many explanations are predicated on attributes¶ found only in democratic regimes. An autocratic peace¶ implies that scholars should focus on corollaries or conse-¶ quences of shared regime type, in addition to, or perhaps¶ even instead of democracy. In this context, arguments¶ about democratic norms (Maoz and Russett 1993; Dixon¶ 1994), improved democratic signaling ability (Fearon 1994;¶ Schultz 1998, 1999, 2001), the peculiar incentives imposed¶ on leaders by democratic institutions (Bueno de Mesquita¶ et al. 1999, 2003), and democratic learning (Cederman¶ 2001a) all invite additional scrutiny. While it is theoretically¶ possible that a democratic peace and an autocratic peace¶ could arise from independent causal processes, logical ele-¶ gance and the empirical similarities inherent in shared¶ regime type provide cause to explore theoretical argu-¶ ments that spring from regime similarity in general.¶

#### Diversionary wars

Christopher **Gelpi**, Center for International Affairs, Harvard, JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, April 19**97**, p. 261+. ASP.

Thus, in general, I conclude that democracies will prefer diversion as a solution to domestic unrest, but authoritarian states will prefer repression. These preferences have specific implications for states' tendencies to initiate force when they are involved in an international crisis. In particular, if a democratic state is involved in an international crisis and is also faced with domestic unrest, the leadership will view the crisis as an opportunity for diverting popular attention away from domestic problems and will become more likely to initiate the use of force in that crisis.

#### Democracy undermines deterrence casues war

John Norton **Moore**, Walter Brown Professor of Law, University of Virginia, “Beyond the Democratic Peace: Solving the War Puzzle,” VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION v. 44, Winter 20**04**, p. 390-391.

Given the likely principal path to war for democracies, does the evidence suggest that democracies are uniquely poor at deterrence? Certainly some visible features of democracies may contribute to misperceptions by potential aggressors. The healthy pluralism and robust free speech, the anti-war skepticism, the checks and balances, and diffusion of power between the executive and legislative branches may all contribute to undermining deterrence in specific settings. Hitler was certainly encouraged by the infamous 1933 Oxford Union pledge: "This House will under no circumstances fight for its King and Country" and the record of British and French diplomacy from 1935 to 1939 caving to Hitler's demands. Japan was certainly encouraged in its perception of a weak United States, little committed to its Pacific interests, by the pervasive isolationist mood in the United States as reflected in the 1934-36 Nye Commission, five "neutrality laws" passed from 1935 to 1939, the 1938 Ludlow Amendment, and the fact that when Congress finally reinstated the draft it did so by only one vote and on condition that no draftees fight outside this hemisphere. Examples of such misguided efforts to avoid war are legion. It is possible that settings of lessened public perception of war risk may generate political responses that can sometimes result in inadequate deterrence against the next major threat. Examples of such a cycle can be seen in the rapid U.S. demobilizations following World Wars I and II and, to a lesser extent, following the Cold War.

#### Democracy doesn’t cause peace – statistical models are spurious and don’t assume economic growth\*\*\*

Mousseau, 12 (Michael – Professor IR Koç University, “The Democratic Peace Unraveled: It’s the Economy” International Studies Quarterly, p 1-12)

Model 2 presents new knowledge by adding the control for economic type. To capture the dyadic expectation of peace among contract-intensive nations, the variable Contract- intensive EconomyL (CIEL) indicates the value of impersonal contracts in force per capita of the state with the lower level of CIE in the dyad; a high value of this measure indicates both states have contract-intensive economies. As can be seen, the coefficient for CIEL ()0.80) is negative and highly significant. This corroborates that impersonal economy is a highly robust force for peace. The coefficient for DemocracyL is now at zero. There are no other differences between Models 1 and 2, whose samples are identical, and no prior study corroborating the democratic peace has considered contractintensive economy. Therefore, the standard econometric inference to be drawn from Model 2 is the nontrivial result that all prior reports of democracy as a force for peace are probably spurious, since this result is predicted and fully accounted for by economic norms theory. CIEL and DemocracyL correlate only in the moderate range of 0.47 (Pearson’s r), so the insignificance of democracy is not likely to be a statistical artifact of multicollinearity. This is corroborated by the variance inflation factor for DemocracyL in Model 2 of 1.85, which is well below the usual rule-of-thumb indicator of multicollinearity of 10 or more. Nor should readers assume most democratic dyads have both states with impersonal economies: While almost all nations with contract-intensive economies (as indicated with the binary measure for CIE) are democratic (Polity2 > 6) (Singapore is the only long-term exception), more than half—55%—of all democratic nation-years have contract-poor economies. At the dyadic level in this sample, this translates to 80% of democratic dyads (all dyads where DemocracyBinary6 = 1) that have at least one state with a contract-poor economy. In other words, not only does Model 2 show **no evidence of causation from democracy to peace** (as reported in Mousseau 2009), but it also illustrates that this absence of democratic peace includes the vast majority—80%—of democratic dyad-years over the sample period. Nor is it likely that the causal arrow is reversed—with democracy being the ultimate cause of contract-intensive economy and peace. This is because correlations among independent variables are not calculated in the results of multivariate regressions: Coefficients show only the effect of each variable after the potential effects of the others are kept constant at their mean levels. If it was democracy that caused both impersonal economy and peace, then there would be some variance in DemocracyL remaining, after its partial correlation with CIEL is excluded, that links it directly with peace. The positive direction of the coefficient for DemocracyL informs us that no such direct effect exists (Blalock 1979:473–474). Model 3 tests for the effect of DemocracyL if a control is added for mixed-polity dyads, as suggested by Russett (2010:201). As discussed above, to avoid problems of mathematical endogeneity, I adopt the solution used by Mousseau, Orsun and Ungerer (2013) and measure regime difference as proposed by Werner (2000), drawing on the subcomponents of the Polity2 regime measure. As can be seen, the coefficient for Political Distance (1.00) is positive and significant, corroborating that regime mixed dyads do indeed have more militarized conflict than others. Yet, the inclusion of this term has no effect on the results that concern us here: CIEL ()0.85) is now even more robust, and the coefficient for DemocracyL (0.03) is above zero.7 Model 4 replaces the continuous democracy measure with the standard binary one (Polity2 > 6), as suggested by Russett (2010:201), citing Bayer and Bernhard (2010). As can be observed, the coefficient for CIEL ()0.83) remains negative and highly significant, while DemocracyBinary6 (0.63) is in the positive (wrong) direction. As discussed above, analyses of fatal dispute onsets with the far stricter binary measure for democracy (Polity = 10), put forward by Dafoe (2011) in response to Mousseau (2009), yields perfect prediction (as does the prior binary measure Both States CIE), causing quasi-complete separation and inconclusive results. Therefore, Model 5 reports the results with DemocracyBinary10 in analyses of all militarized conflicts, not just fatal ones. As can be seen, the coefficient for DemocracyBinary10 ()0.41), while negative, is not significant. Model 6 reports the results in analyses of fatal disputes with DemocracyL squared (after adding 10), which implies that the likelihood of conflict decreases more quickly toward the high values of DemocracyL. As can be seen, the coefficient for DemocracyL 2 is at zero, further corroborating that even very high levels of democracy do not appear to cause peace in analyses of fatal disputes, once consideration is given to contractintensive economy. Models 3, 4, and 6, which include Political Distance, were repeated (but unreported to save space) with analyses of all militarized interstate disputes, with the democracy coefficients close to zero in every case. Therefore, the conclusions reached by Mousseau (2009) are corroborated even with the most stringent measures of democracy, consideration of institutional distance, and across all specifications: The **democratic peace appears spurious**, with contract-intensive economy being the more likely explanation for both democracy and the democratic peace.

#### Democracies destroy the environment—statistically proven

**Midlarsky 98** (Democracy and the Environment: An Empirical Assessment Author(s): Manus I. Midlarsky Source: Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 35, No. 3, Special Issue on Environmental Conflict (May, 1998), pp. 341-361 Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/424940)

Yet one wonders if all of the preceding arguments do not constitute an idealization of democracy that ignores the rough and tumble of actual decision-making within the legislative and executive branches of government. Corporations and environmental groups can fight each other to a standstill, leaving a decision-making vacuum instead of a direct impact of democracy on the environment. Or as the result of budget constraints, democracies may not be responsive to environmental imperatives but to more pressing issues of the economic sustenance of major portions of the voting public. The nuts and bolts of daily democratic governance may turn out to be very different from the ideal. There are further difficulties in the hypothesized positive relationship between democracy and the environment. First is the problem of potential inequality, always a difficulty in practising democracy in the absence of draconian redistribution schemes. According to Lafferty & Meadowcroft (1996b): Environmental problems are typically experienced as external constraints which frustrate established expectations and which require an adjustment to existing social practices. They threaten a pre-existing structure of entitlements and raise questions concerning distributive justice. While the idea that a cleaner environment will benefit everyone that green policies are good for both rich and poor, industrialists and consumers - is attractive, in reality environmental problems touch dijferent groups in diffrerent ways As intimated earlier, stable democracies cannot long persist under conditions of extreme inequality. A second concern is the difficulty presented by the globalization of environmental issues. As Paehlke (1996: 28) put it, 'The great danger for both democracy and environment is that, while economy and environment are now global in character, democracy functions on only national and local decision levels and only within some nations.' The problems imposed by the Chernobyl disaster of course constitute an illustration in extremis. But even between democracies there are difficulties imposed by the sharing of a common environment. The acidification of Scandinavian lakes as the result of British industry is but one case in point. Despite the existence of two democratically elected governments accountable to their separate populations, the resolution of such environmental problems between the two countries requires negotiation and treaty making that would not necessarily be accountable to these populations.

#### Extinction

**Diner 94** – Judge Advocate General’s Corps [Major David N., United States Army Military Law Review Winter, lexis]

By causing widespread extinctions, humans have artificially simplified many ecosystems. As biologic simplicity increases, so does the risk of ecosystem failure. The spreading Sahara Desert in Africa, and the dustbowl conditions of the 1930s in the United States are relatively mild examples of what might be expected if this trend continues. Theoretically, each new animal or plant extinction, with all its dimly perceived and intertwined affects, could cause total ecosystem collapse and human extinction. Each new extinction increases the risk of disaster. Like a mechanic removing, one by one, the rivets from an aircraft's wings, n80 mankind may be edging closer to the abyss.

#### democracy ruins primacy

Chris **Zambelis**, policy analyst, Strategic Assessment Center, Hicks and Associates, Inc., “The Strategic Implications of Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Middle East,” PARAMETERS, Autumn 20**05**, pp. 87-102. Available from the World Wide Web at: [www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/05autumn/zambelis.htm](http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/05autumn/zambelis.htm), accessed 3/9/06.

Given the populist credentials of Islamists, the rise of Islamist governments may transform the political and foreign policy orientation of traditional allies. This possibility should be of concern considering the credibility problem Washington faces in the region. As mentioned earlier, public opinion surveys demonstrate that America’s poor credibility does not stem from a popular Arab and Muslim aversion to American culture and democracy. Instead, Muslims harbor deep resentments toward US foreign policy in the region.40 Since democratic governments are by definition accountable to their citizens, public opinion will play an increasingly influential role in the political and foreign policy orientation of countries where Islamists dominate. When Islamists come to power, they will likely act on their populist impulses, at least in the early stages of any transition.41 For example, incumbent governments may place conditions on the continued presence of American military forces on their soil, but still keep dialogue open. Others may limit cooperation or abandon agreements governing security collaboration with Washington. It is also possible that democratic governments will cater to public opinion and demand that American forces vacate military installations altogether. It is no surprise that the new Shia-dominated Iraq has hinted at the need for establishing a timetable for the withdrawal of Coalition forces. Other governments may reorient their foreign policies away from the United States and look to Europe, Russia, and even China or India. China has been active in cultivating closer ties to prominent energy producers in the region, namely Sudan and Iran, in order to secure energy sources to fuel its dynamic economic growth.42 Beijing also has boosted security cooperation with Pakistan.43 India is pursuing a similar strategy in the region.44

#### Democratization kills trade and growth

**Schweller 2K** (Randall Schweller, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, 2000, American Democracy Promotion, p. 53

First, free trade reinforces competition, and competition produces losers as well as winners. Fragile democratizing states are under enormous pressure to appease uncompetitive domestic distributional coalitions by adopting protectionist policies at the expense of the general national and cosmopolitan interests in free trade. In other words, there is no reason to expect that developing states will choose free trade and global liberalism over neomercantilist policies; and, indeed, there are good reasons to expect that they will choose the latter. Certainly, the shock-treatment approach to capitalism regardless of social consequences that was adopted by many nations recently liberated from communism placed at risk the fragile democratizing processes under way in these newly autonomous states. Second, while liberal democracy requires a market economy, capitalism does not require liberal democracy. Benjamin Barber correctly notes: The stealth rhetoric that assumes capitalist interests are not only compatible with but actively advance democratic ideals, translated into policy, is difficult to reconcile with the international realities of the last fifty years. Market economies have shown a remark¬able adaptability and have flourished in many tyrannical states from Chile to South Korea, from Panama to Singapore. Indeed, the state with one of the world’s least demo¬cratic governments—the People’s Republic of China—possesses one of the world’s fastest-growing market economies. Capitalism simply requires a stable political climate and consumers with access to markets. The unstable, even chaotic, conditions characteristic of emerging democracies are scarcely conducive to the development of a thriv¬ing market economy.

**Overreach: 1NC**

**ONE, No risk of entanglement**

**Hurrell ‘6** (Director of the Centre for International Studies at the University of Oxford and a Fellow of Nuffield College, Oxford (Andrew, Hegemony, liberalism and global order: what space for would-be great powers? (p 1-19), International Affairs, January 24, 2006)

The contrast with the United States is instructive. Much is made of the unique position of the United States and the degree to which, unlike all other modern great powers, it faced no geopolitical challenge from within its region and was able to prevent, or more accurately contain, the influence of extraregional powers. This is certainly true (even if the rise of the US to regional hegemony is often dated too early and its extent exaggerated). But **the** **other important regional aspect of US power is the ability to avoid excessively deep entanglement or involvement and**, for the most part**, to escape from ensnaring and diverting lower-level conflicts** within its ‘backyard’. It has been able to take the region for granted and, for long periods, to avoid having a regional policy at all (as has arguably been the case since 2001). It is this fact that, perhaps counterintuitively, provides Brazil with some capacity to develop a relatively autonomous regional role. Second, attempts to develop a global role can easily stir the animosity, or at least raise the concerns, of regional **Panama and the Gulf. A passive world-view encouraged American leaders to ignore troubling developments which eventually metastasized into full blown threats to American security**. Manuel Noriega and Saddam Hussein were given reason to believe that the United States did not consider its interests threatened by their behavior, only to discover that they had been misled. **In each case, a broader and more forward-leaning conception of the national interest might have made the later large and potentially costly interventions unnecessary**

**TWO, We wont start wars just because we can**

**Brooks 12**, Stephen, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College “Don’t Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/13), pp. 7–51

temptation. **For many advocates of retrenchment**, **the mere possession of peerless**, globe-girdling **military capabilities** leads inexorably to a dangerous expansion of U.S. definitions of national interest that then **drag the country into expensive wars**. 64 For example, **sustaining** ramified, long-standing **alliances such as NATO leads to mission creep**: the search for new roles to keep the alliance alive. Hence, critics allege that NATO’s need to “go out of area or out of business” led to reckless expansion that alienated Russia and then to a heedless broadening of interests to encompass interventions such as those in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Libya. In addition, peerless military power creates the temptation to seek total, non-Clausewitzian solutions to security problems, as allegedly occurred in Iraq and Afghanistan. 65 Only a country in possession of such awesome military power and facing no serious geopolitical rival would fail to be satisfied with partial solutions such as containment and instead embark on wild schemes of democracy building in such unlikely places. In addition, **critics contend, the U**nited **S**tates’ **outsized military creates a sense of obligation to use it if it might do good**, even in cases where no U.S. interests are engaged. As Madeleine Albright famously asked Colin Powell, “What’s the point of having this superb military you’re always talking about, if we can’t use it?” Undoubtedly, possessing global military intervention capacity expands opportunities to use force. If it were truly to “come home,” the United States would be tying itself to the mast like Ulysses, rendering itself incapable of succumbing to temptation. Any defense of deep engagement must acknowledge that it increases the opportunity and thus the logical probability of U.S. use of force compared to a grand strategy of true strategic disengagement. Of course, **if the alternative** to deep engagement **is an over-the-horizon intervention stance**, then **the temptation risk would persist after retrenchment**. The main problem with **the interest expansion argument**, however, is that it essentially **boils down to one case: Iraq**. Sixty-seven percent of all the casualties and 64 percent of all the budget costs of all the wars the United States has fought since 1990 were caused by that war. Twenty-seven percent of the causalities and 26 percent of the costs were related to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. **All the other interventions**—**the** 1990–91 Persian **Gulf War**, the subsequent **airstrike campaigns** in Iraq, **Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo, Libya, and so on**—**account for 3 percent of the casualties** and 10 percent of the costs. 66 **Iraq is the outlier** not only in terms of its human and material cost, but also in terms of the degree to which the overall burden was shouldered by the United States alone. As Beckley has shown, **in the other interventions allies** either **spent more than the U**nited **S**tates, **suffered greater** relative **casualties**, or both. **In the** 1990–91 Persian **Gulf War**, for example, **the U**nited **S**tates **ranked fourth in overall casualties** (measured relative to population size) and fourth in total expenditures (relative to GDP). **In Bosnia,** European Union (**EU**) budget outlays and personnel **deployments** ultimately **swamped** those of **the U**nited **S**tates as the Europeans took over postconflict peacebuilding operations**. In Kosovo, the U**nited **S**tates **suffered one combat fatality**, the sole loss in the whole operation, and it ranked sixth in relative monetary contribution. **In Afghanistan, the U**nited **S**tates is the number one financial contributor (it achieved that status only after the 2010 surge), but its **relative combat losses rank fifth**. 67 In short, the interest expansion argument would look much different without Iraq in the picture. There would be no evidence for the United States shouldering a disproportionate share of the burden, and the overall pattern of intervention would look “unrestrained” only in terms of frequency, not cost, with the debate hinging on whether the surge in Afghanistan was recklessly unrestrained. 68 How emblematic of the deep engagement strategy is the U.S. experience in Iraq? The strategy’s supporters insist that Iraq was a Bush/neoconservative aberration; certainly, there are many supporters of deep engagement who strongly opposed the war, most notably Barack Obama. Against this view, opponents claim that it or something close to it was inevitable given the grand strategy. Regardless, **the** more important **question is whether continuing the current grand strategy condemns the U**nited **S**tates **to more** such **wars**. **The Cold War experience suggests a negative answer**. **After the U**nited **S**tates **suffered** a major **disaster in Indochina** (to be sure, dwarfing Iraq in its human toll), **it responded by waging the rest of the Cold War using proxies and highly limited interventions**. Nothing changed in the basic structure of the international system, and U.S. military power recovered by the 1980s, yet the United States never again undertook a large expeditionary operation until after the Cold War had ended. All indications are that **Iraq has generated a similar effect** for the post–Cold War era. If there is **an Obama doctrine,** Dominic Tierney argues, it **can be reduced to “No More Iraqs**.” 69 Moreover, **the president’s thinking is reflected in the Defense Department’s current strategic guidance**, which asserts that “U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.” 70 **Those developments** in Washington **are** also **part of a wider rejection of the Iraq experience** across the American body politic, which political scientist John Mueller dubbed the “Iraq Syndrome.” 71 Retrenchment advocates would need to present much more argumentation and evidence to support their pessimism on this subject.

**THREE, Multiple checks prevent Executive overreach --- their impact is a myth**

John **Yoo 9**, Emanuel S. Heller Professor of Law @ UC-Berkeley Law, visiting scholar @ the American Enterprise Institute, former Fulbright Distinguished Chair in Law @ the University of Trento, served as a deputy assistant attorney general in the Office of Legal Council at the U.S. Department of Justice between 2001 and 2003, received his J.D. from Yale and his undergraduate degree from Harvard, “Crisis and Command,” E-Book

A second lesson of this book is that **the notion of an unchecked executive, wielding dictatorial powers to plunge the nation into disaster, is a myth born of Vietnam and Watergate. Congresses have always possessed ample ability to stalemate and check an executive run amok. Congress regularly ignores executive proposals for legislation, rejects nominees, and overrides vetoes. It can use its power over legislation, funding, and oversight to exercise significant control over the administrative state. There would be no agencies, no delegated powers, and no rule-making without Congress's basic decisions to create the federal bureaucracy. It can use these authorities even at the zenith of presidential power: foreign affairs. Congress can cut off war funding, shrink the military, stop economic aid, and block treaties. It used its sole control of the purse to limit the Mexican-American War and to end the Vietnam conflict, for example.**

#### Don’t solve drones: Poser is about ending all drone use in conflict- the plan explicitly carves a restriction to allow drone use in conflict

#### US action irrelevant to international norms on drones – other tech proves

**Etzioni 13** – professor of IR @ George Washington (Amitai, “The Great Drone Debate”, March/April, <http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20130430_art004.pdf>, CMR)

Other critics contend that by the United States ¶ using drones, it leads other countries into making and ¶using them. For example, Medea Benjamin, the cofounder of the anti-war activist group CODEPINK ¶ and author of a book about drones argues that, “The ¶ proliferation of drones should evoke reﬂection on the ¶ precedent that the United States is setting by killing ¶ anyone it wants, anywhere it wants, on the basis of ¶ secret information. Other nations and non-state entities are watching—and are bound to start acting in ¶ a similar fashion.”60 Indeed scores of countries are ¶ now manufacturing or purchasing drones. There can ¶ be little doubt that the fact that drones have served ¶ the United States well has helped to popularize them. ¶ However, it does not follow that United States ¶ should not have employed drones in the hope that ¶such a show of restraint would deter others. First ¶ of all, this would have meant that either the United ¶ States would have had to allow terrorists in hardto-reach places, say North Waziristan, to either ¶ roam and rest freely—or it would have had to use ¶ bombs that would have caused much greater collateral damage. ¶ Further, the record shows that even when the ¶United States did not develop a particular weapon, ¶others did. Thus, China has taken the lead in the ¶ development of anti-ship missiles and seemingly ¶ cyber weapons as well. One must keep in mind ¶ that the international environment is a hostile ¶ one. Countries—and especially non-state actors—¶ most of the time do not play by some set of selfconstraining rules. Rather, they tend to employ ¶whatever weapons they can obtain that will further ¶their interests. The United States correctly does ¶ not assume that it can rely on some non-existent ¶ implicit gentleman’s agreements that call for the ¶ avoidance of new military technology by nation X ¶ or terrorist group Y—if the United States refrains ¶ from employing that technology¶ I am not arguing that there are no natural norms ¶ that restrain behavior. There are certainly some ¶ that exist, particularly in situations where all parties beneﬁt from the norms (e.g., the granting of ¶ diplomatic immunity) or where particularly horrifying weapons are involved (e.g., weapons of ¶ mass destruction). However drones are but one ¶step—following bombers and missiles—in the ¶development of distant battleﬁeld technologies. ¶ (Robotic soldiers—or future ﬁghting machines—¶ are next in line). In such circumstances, the role ¶ of norms is much more limited.

#### No drones arms race – multiple checks

- narrow application – diplomatic and political costs – state defenses

**Singh 12** – researcher at the Center for a New American Security (Joseph, “Betting Against a Drone Arms Race”, 8/13, <http://nation.time.com/2012/08/13/betting-against-a-drone-arms-race/#ixzz2TxEkUI37>, CMR)

Bold predictions of a coming drones arms race are all the rage since the uptake in their deployment under the Obama Administration. Noel Sharkey, for example, argues in an August 3 op-ed for the Guardian that rapidly developing drone technology — coupled with minimal military risk — portends an era in which states will become increasingly aggressive in their use of drones.¶ As drones develop the ability to fly completely autonomously, Sharkey predicts a proliferation of their use that will set dangerous precedents, seemingly inviting hostile nations to use drones against one another. Yet, the narrow applications of current drone technology coupled with what we know about state behavior in the international system lend no credence to these ominous warnings.¶ Indeed, critics seem overly-focused on the domestic implications of drone use.¶ In a June piece for the Financial Times, Michael Ignatieff writes that “virtual technologies make it easier for democracies to wage war because they eliminate the risk of blood sacrifice that once forced democratic peoples to be prudent.”¶ Significant public support for the Obama Administration’s increasing deployment of drones would also seem to legitimate this claim. Yet, there remain equally serious diplomatic and political costs that emanate from beyond a fickle electorate, which will prevent the likes of the increased drone aggression predicted by both Ignatieff and Sharkey.¶ Most recently, the serious diplomatic scuffle instigated by Syria’s downing a Turkish reconnaissance plane in June illustrated the very serious risks of operating any aircraft in foreign territory.¶ States launching drones must still weigh the diplomatic and political costs of their actions, which make the calculation surrounding their use no fundamentally different to any other aerial engagement.¶ This recent bout also illustrated a salient point regarding drone technology: most states maintain at least minimal air defenses that can quickly detect and take down drones, as the U.S. discovered when it employed drones at the onset of the Iraq invasion, while Saddam Hussein’s surface-to-air missiles were still active.¶ What the U.S. also learned, however, was that drones constitute an effective military tool in an extremely narrow strategic context. They are well-suited either in direct support of a broader military campaign, or to conduct targeted killing operations against a technologically unsophisticated enemy.¶ In a nutshell, then, the very contexts in which we have seen drones deployed. Northern Pakistan, along with a few other regions in the world, remain conducive to drone usage given a lack of air defenses, poor media coverage, and difficulties in accessing the region.

#### The drone conflict impact is 10 years away

Micah Zenko 2013 (Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Previously, he worked for five years at the Harvard Kennedy School and in Washington, DC, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research Service, and State Department’s Office of Policy Planning, council on foreign relations, “Reforming US Drone Strike Policies” pdf)

Based on current trends, it is unlikely that most states will have, ¶ within ten years, the complete system architecture required to carry out ¶ distant drone strikes that would be harmful to U.S. national interests. ¶ However, those candidates able to obtain this technology will most ¶ likely be states with the financial resources to purchase or the industrial ¶ base to manufacture tactical short-range armed drones with limited ¶ firepower that lack the precision of U.S. laser-guided munitions; the ¶ intelligence collection and military command-and-control capabilities ¶ needed to deploy drones via line-of-sight communications; and cross-border adversaries who currently face attacks or the threat of attacks ¶ by manned aircraft, such as Israel into Lebanon, Egypt, or Syria; Russia ¶ into Georgia or Azerbaijan; Turkey into Iraq; and Saudi Arabia into ¶ Yemen. When compared to distant U.S. drone strikes, these contingen-cies do not require system-wide infrastructure and host-state support. ¶ Given the costs to conduct manned-aircraft strikes with minimal threat ¶ to pilots, it is questionable whether states will undertake the significant ¶ investment required for armed drones in the near term.

### Allies

**Other nations will still cooperate with the U.S. even if it’s unpopular – empirically proven by Bush   
Kagan, ‘6**

[Robert Kagan, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund, writes a monthly column for The Post., “Still the Colossus,” The Washington Post, January 15, 2006, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=17894&prog=zgp&proj=zusr]

**The striking thing about** the present international situation **is the degree to which America remains** what Bill Clinton once called "**the indispensable nation." Despite global opinion polls registering broad hostility to** George W. **Bush's** **U**nited **S**tates, **the behavior of governments and political leaders suggests America's position in the world is not** all that **different from what it was before Sept. 11 and** the **Iraq** war.  **The much-anticipated global effort to balance against** American **hegemony** -- which the realists have been anticipating for more than 15 years now -- **has** simply **not occurred**. On the contrary, in Europe the idea has all but vanished. European Union defense budgets continue their steady decline, and even the project of creating a common foreign and defense policy has slowed if not stalled. Both trends are primarily the result of internal European politics. But if they really feared American power, Europeans would be taking more urgent steps to strengthen the European Union's hand to check it.  **Nor are Europeans refusing to cooperate, even with an administration they allegedly despise**. Western Europe will not be a strategic partner as it was during the Cold War, because Western Europeans no longer feel threatened and therefore do not seek American protection. Nevertheless, **the current trend is toward closer cooperation**. **Germany's** new **government, while still dissenting from U.S. policy in Iraq, is working hard** and ostentatiously **to improve relations**. It is bending over backward to show support for the mission in Afghanistan, most notably by continuing to supply a small but, in German terms, meaningful number of troops. It even trumpets its willingness to train Iraqi soldiers. Chancellor Angela Merkel promises to work closely with Washington on the question of the China arms embargo, indicating agreement with the American view that China is a potential strategic concern. For Eastern and Central Europe, the growing threat is Russia, not America, and the big question remains what it was in the 1990s: Who will be invited to join NATO?

**Cooperation dependent on other facets of war on terrorism – detention controversies are periodic.**

**Archick ‘13**

(Kristin, Specialist in European Affairs @ CRS, “U.S.-EU Cooperation Against Terrorism”, May 21, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22030.pdf>, DZ)

U.S.-EU **cooperation against terrorism has led to a new dynamic** in U.S.-EU relations by fostering¶ dialogue on law enforcement and homeland security issues previously reserved for bilateral¶ discussions. **Nevertheless**, some **challenges persist** in fostering closer U.S.-EU cooperation in¶ these fields. Among **the most prominent are data privacy and data protection** concerns. The EU¶ considers the privacy of personal data a basic right and EU rules and regulations strive to keep¶ personal data out of the hands of law enforcement as much as possible. The negotiation of several¶ U.S.-EU information-sharing agreements, from those¶ related to tracking terrorist financial data to¶ sharing airline passenger information, has been complicated by ongoing EU concerns about¶ whether the United States could guarantee a sufficient level of protection for European citizens’¶ personal data. Other **issues that have** led to **periodic tensions include detainee policies**, differences¶ in the U.S. and EU terrorist designation lists (especially regarding Hezbollah), and balancing¶ measures to improve border controls and border se¶ curity with the need to facilitate legitimate¶ transatlantic travel and commerce. **Congressional decisions related to** improving **border controls and transport security**, in particular,¶ **may affect** how future U.S.-EU **cooperation** evolves. In addition, given the European Parliament’s¶ growing influence in many of these policy areas,¶ **Members of Congress may be able to help shape**¶ **Parliament’s views and responses** **through** ongoing **contacts and the** existing Transatlantic¶ Legislators’ Dialogue (**TLD**). This report exam¶ ines the evolution of U.S.-EU counterterrorism¶ cooperation and the ongoing challenges that may be of interest in the 113¶ th¶ Congress.

**No US-Europe tension over detention. Not close to enough to hamper coop.**

**Archick ‘13**

Kristin Archick; Specialist in European Affairs for the Congressional Research Service – “U.S.-EU Cooperation Against Terrorism” – CRS Reports – *September 4, 2013* – http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22030.pdf

**U.S.-EU friction**s **over terror**ist **detainee policies have subsided** to some degree **since** the start of **the Obama Administration**. **EU** and other European **officials welcomed** President Obama’s announcement in January 2009 that the United States intended to close the detention facility at Guantánamo within a year. They were also pleased with President **Obama’s e**xecutive **o**rder **banning torture and** his **initiative to review Bush** Administration **legal opinions regarding detention** **and interrogation methods**. In March 2009, **the U.S**. State Department **appointed a special envoy to work on closing the detention** facility**, tasked in particular with persuading countries in Europe** and elsewhere **to accept detainees cleared for release** but who could not be repatriated to their country of origin for fear of torture or execution. **Some EU members accepted** small numbers of released detainees, but others declined.

**Alt Causes to NATO co-op**

**Stevens, 8** (Stevens, CEO of Lockheed Martin, 7/15/2008 (Robert J., “The Current State of Transatlantic Defense Industrial Relations” Hampton Roads International Security Quarterly, Proquest)

**But the trends on today's horizon are not all positive. Most worrying is the continued gap in resources devoted to defense investment between the United States and our NATO allies. At a time when the demands** for real capabilities **are increasing**, when NATO forces are deployed on operational missions around the world and the need to sustain and support those deployed forces is constant, **the amount of resources devoted to obtaining capabilities is declining in real terms. Six countries provide 80% of Europe's defense spending**. Very few European members of NATO meet the nominal requirement of spending 2% of GDP on defense. **Growth in defense spending does not match the growth in the overall economy,** and I believe the amount of spending devoted to investment, rather than to personnel and infrastructure, remains inadequate. In contrast, **in the United States, spending continues at rates approaching 4% of GDP, devoting twice as much as the Europeans to procurement and approximately six times as much to defense R&D.** US spending, being concentrated in one market, has the additional benefit of being more efficient than European spending which is more diffused across multiple countries and interests. This is, as you know, an often-cited, long-discussed, recurring theme of concern. I'm sure I've heard it placed at the forefront of discussions for well more than a decade. But **there is a new implication: the cumulative effect of this differential, repeated year after year, is creating a capabilities gap across the Atlantic that threatens to become unbridgeable. Without investment, business cannot maintain and advance state-of-the-art tools, processes and systems.** We cannot create new and exciting emergent technologies and applications. And we cannot hire, retain, and develop the best and brightest talent in our workforce. **With insufficient resources, if there is not a common body of technological knowledge and practice among us, if there is a continuing disparity among the community of industrial partners such that one continues to advance and one does not, there can be no meaningful collaboration. If that were to occur, the prospect for a viable transatlantic defense industrial base would be lost.** There is no substitute for real expenditures on tangible programs **if the health of European industry is to be improved and if further transatlantic cooperation is to be possible. The very best way for European governments to protect European industry is to invest in it.**

**NATO is becoming increasing weak and ineffective in the 21st century**

**Sieff 9** (Martin, UPI Sr News Analyst, April 17, http://www.upi.com/Business\_News/Security-Industry/2009/04/17/21st-century-NATO-a-weak-hollow-giant/UPI-99071239994461/)

[WASHINGTON](http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2009/04/17/21st-century-NATO-a-weak-hollow-giant/UPI-99071239994461/##), April 17 (UPI) -- **The NATO alliance that confronted the collapse of the Soviet Union** from 1989-91 really **had teeth. Today, a far larger but also far weaker NATO resembles a 1930s airship -- huge, slow, unwieldy, vulnerable and filled with nothing** more than hot gas. Many military analysts believed that as late as the early 1980s, the Soviet Union and its satellite allies in the Warsaw Pact still had an overwhelming superiority in conventional forces, particularly in artillery and main battle tanks, over the assembled forces of NATO, especially on the expected main battlefield area between them of the North European plain. However, the decision of NATO leaders to push ahead with the deployment of their small, highly mobile, nuclear-armed U.S.-built Pershing II intermediate-range ballistic missiles changed the strategic equation. The Pershings gave deployed NATO forces in Western Europe a far more lethal and credible deterrent than anything they had previously fielded. Even at its time of greatest relative weakness in the face of the Red Army and its Soviet allies, there was no question during the Cold War that NATO was first and foremost a defensive military alliance. Its member states agreed that the military forces they put under the command of NATO at alliance headquarters outside Brussels were meant to defend their territories, not to project power outside them, however worthy the cause was. Therefore, the U.S. commitment in the 1950-53 Korean War, with allies such as Britain and Turkey sending military contingents to fight alongside U.S. forces, was never a NATO operation. Neither was the long U.S. military commitment in Vietnam. Nor was the 1991 Gulf War to liberate Kuwait from Iraq, although NATO allies, primarily Britain and France, sent significant forces to fight alongside U.S. troops. However, **in the years following the collapse of communism and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the nature of the alliance gradually changed. It eventually grew to its present size of 28 member states** -- one more in number than the 27-nation European Union. All the former member states of the Warsaw Pact eventually joined NATO. So did even three former Soviet republics, the small Baltic nations of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia that had been swallowed by the Soviet Union against their will in 1940. Successive U.S. presidents, both Republican and Democratic, enthusiastically backed by [British governments](http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2009/04/17/21st-century-NATO-a-weak-hollow-giant/UPI-99071239994461/##), welcomed the new NATO member states one and all. There was a happy, almost universally shared agreement across the political spectrum in Washington that expanding the alliance was a good thing that would spread peace and security, as well as democracy and free markets, throughout Central and [Eastern Europe](http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2009/04/17/21st-century-NATO-a-weak-hollow-giant/UPI-99071239994461/##). However**, all the new member states were net consumers of NATO and U.S. security; they could not add to it themselves. This was dramatically demonstrated after the al-Qaida terrorist attacks on the United States of Sept. 11,** 2001, that killed 3,000 Americans. **To the astonishment of U.S. and European leaders alike, the first time the Article 5 clause for mutual defense in the alliance's founding 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, also known as the Treaty of Washington, was ever activated, it was for the Europeans to help America rather than the other way around.** But this support, while emotionally important and welcome, was symbolic rather than practical. **In the 21st century, the United States remained the single military giant on whom the defense of an ever-increasing number of much smaller and weaker NATO member states rested.**

**NATO is obsolete – heg solves better**

Robert **Guttman** (Director of the Center on politics and foreign relations at Johns Hopkins) May 1 **09** “Happy 60th Birthday NATO; time to go out of business?” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-guttman/happy-60th-birthday-nato\_b\_181734.html]

**But, the Soviet Union is gone and has been for a long time. The main threat from Russia comes not from their military but from their economic role as a provider of natural gas and oil to Europe. Europeans fear a cutoff of energy from Russia more than any type of military action. NATO was successful in its original goal and Europe is a peaceful place these days; the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact no longer exist; and the European Union now encompasses most of the countries of Europe. It is a completely different situation now than in the 1940s and during the Cold War years. NATO was successful and NATO was competent and NATO kept the peace but a new era is upon us and NATO is grasping for a new role and it may not have a role to play in 2009 and beyond.** The main threat today to Europe and the United States is the economic meltdown and the huge financial crisis we are all facing. **Certainly we are facing terrorist threats but is NATO really the organization to keep terrorists at bay?** The crunch for President Obama will come in Strasbourg when he asks for more troops for the NATO mission in Afghanistan. And, the reply from many of our **NATO allies will be sorry but we will not provide any more troops because we do not see Afghanistan as that large of a problem. Europeans are more inward looking today. They see no huge threat to their countries from Afghanistan. President Obama is seeking more NATO troops from countries who do not want to provide them and if they do provide them have certain restrictions--not going into battle in the southern part of the country--that makes them almost useless. We now have a military alliance where many of the members do not want to engage in military operations. This is hardly a recipe for a successful future for NATO**. When I interviewed NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer several years ago he told me: "We cannot lose in Afghanistan. We have to succeed in Afghanistan. If we fail, then who will have confidence in us again? Our credibility as NATO, as the Euro-Atlantic community is on the line. And our credibility is one of our strongest assets. To preserve it, we have no choice but to succeed. NATO has a tradition to keep. NATO has never made empty promises. So NATO should not make empty promises now." Well, NATO is not succeeding in Afghanistan at the moment and the political will seems to be missing from many of our NATO allies to continue the mission in that war torn nation. There are many military threats in the world today that will rear their ugly head and take over the headlines from the economic crisis in the near future but the question is: Is NATO the right military organization to deal with these crises? Maybe **we should call NATO a huge success, pat every one on the back and dissolve the military organization and move on**. Could the European Union take on the military role? Could a new military organization take the place of NATO? Instead of planning new missions around the globe for NATO **why not ask the basic question: Is NATO still necessary anymore**? NATO did its original job and the peace was kept in Europe and Soviet tanks did not attack during the Cold War--its goals were met and met successfully so why keep coming up with new out of area missions that do not have the full backing of most of the members. Re-think NATO. **It may be time to say happy birthday and goodbye.**

**No impact to piracy, NATO is irrelevant, and will decline no matter what**

**Mugridge 13** (David, maritime security consultant and former British Royal Navy officer, 4-12-13 “Private navies exaggerate the maritime piracy threat”

http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/private-navies-exaggerate-the-maritime-piracy-threat#page2

**If we are honest about the effect o**f Somali **piracy on global shipping, then our analysis must be this: the threat has been exaggerated by a media frenzy.** Somali piracy is alive and still represents a threat to old, slow, unprotected merchant and fishing vessels that do not adhere to the reasoned advice and guidance of embarked security teams or the plethora of antipiracy guides. But **the rate of piracy is down**, and political initiatives inside the Horn of Africa are now turning a legal tide against the organised criminals who sponsored the activities of pirates during Somali piracy's heyday of 2010-2012. Indeed, ever **tightening banking regulation has targeted money laundering from these gangs and important regional political influence will come to bear as time advances.** All of this means **there are fewer and fewer safe havens from which pirates can operate.** Given these trends, questions should be asked about plans by international investors to establish a private navy to escort merchant ships through the Gulf of Aden. As The National reported last month, a company called Typhon hopes to base its operations in the UAE. To be sure, **the international maritime presence led by Nato and the EU is set to decline, given member** nations' finances and savage **defence cuts.** Certainly the market is ripe for this type of private initiative. But is it necessary? Typhon's bold entry into the market is timed to coincide with the seasonal spike in pirate action in the Indian Ocean, and their approach is marketed as a comprehensive operational solution to the activities of pirate groups. Yet many questions about the commercial venture must be asked. What is the target market for this service, which appears to be the brain child of London based insurance underwriters, private security companies and shipping brokers? Surely only those companies that own modern ships and transport high value or high risk cargoes could afford to subscribe to this initiative. The likes of LNG carriers, large container ships and super yachts (with owner embarked) would warrant such a service, but at what cost? Some might argue that this commercial initiative comes more than a year too late, as **the threat of piracy on regional shipping has clearly diminished.** According to the International Chamber of Commerce International Maritime Bureau, **2012 saw the fewest number of pirate attacks in three years.** Additionally, the maritime industry is going through a particularly severe recession with shipping rates cut to the bone, costs rising and a steady procession of new ships, ordered during the boom years, now becoming operational. **The market for older ships - those most at risk from piracy - has collapsed and hulls are being broken up for rock-bottom prices.** Even during the worst periods of piracy, the maritime industry actively disliked the convoy system being proposed by Typhon unless it became an absolute necessity. **The Nato/EU patrolled corridor was successful up to a point, but even then many operators ignored it because the sailing times and speeds just did not fit their commercial time frames.**

**No impact to trade –**

**ONE, it’s resilient**

**Rodrik ‘9** Dani Rodrik, Rafiq Hariri Professor of International Political Economy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. “The Myth of Rising Protectionism”. 2009. http://relooney.fatcow.com/0\_New\_5973.pdf

**The reality is that the international trade regime has passed its greatest test since the Great Depression with flying colors. Trade economists who complain about minor instances of protectionism sound like a child whining about a damaged toy in the wake of an earthquake that killed thousands. Three things explain this remarkable resilience : ideas, politics , and institutions** . **Economists have been extraordinarily successful in conveying their message to policymakers** – even if ordinary people still regard imports with considerable suspicion. **Nothing reflects this better than how “protection” and “protectionists” have become terms of derision**. After all, governments are generally expected to provide protection to its citizens. But **if you say that you favor protection from imports , you are painted into a corner with** Reed **Smoot and** Willis C. **Hawley**, authors of the infamous 1930 US tariff bill. But **economists’ ideas would not have gone very far without significant changes in the underlying configuration of political interests in favor of open trade. For every worker and firm affected adversely by import competition, there is one or more worker and firm expecting to reap the benefits of access to markets abroad. The latter have become increasingly vocal and powerful, often represented by large multinational corporations**. In his latest book, Paul Blustein recounts how a former Indian trade minister once asked his American counterpart to bring him a picture of an American farmer: “I have never actually seen one,” the minister quipped. “I have only seen US conglomerates masquerading as farmers.” But **the relative docility of rank-and-file workers on trade issues must ultimately be attributed to** something else altogether: **the safety nets erected by the welfare state. Modern industrial societies now have a wide array of social protections** – unemployment compensation, adjustment assistance, and other labor-market tools, as well as health insurance and family support – **that mitigate demand for cruder forms of protection**. The welfare state is the flip side of the open economy. **If the world has not fallen off the protectionist precipice during the crisis, as it did during the 1930’s, much of the credit must go the social programs** that conservatives and market fundamentalists would like to see scrapped. The battle against trade protection has been won – so far. But, before we relax, let’s remember that we still have not addressed the central challenge the world economy will face as the crisis eases: the inevitable clash between China’s need to produce an ever-growing quantity of manufactured goods and America’s need to maintain a smaller current-account deficit. Unfortunately, there is little to suggest that policymakers are yet ready to confront this genuine threat.

**no trade wars, won’t affect econ**

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The curious thing about the concept of **trade war** is that, **unlike actual shooting war**, it **has no historical precedent**. In fact, **there has never been a significant trade war,** "significant" **in the sense of having done serious economic damage**. **All history records are minor skirmishes at best**. **Go ahead. Try and name a trade war**. The Great Trade War of 1834? Nope. The Great Trade War of 1921? Nope Again. **There isn't one**. The standard example free traders give is that America's **Smoot-Hawley** tariff of 1930 either caused the Great Depression or made it spread around the world. But this canard **does not survive serious examination**, **and has** actually **been denied by** almost **every economist who has actually researched the question in depth** -- a group ranging **from** Paul **Krugman** on the left **to** Milton **Friedman** on the right. **The Depression's cause was monetary**. **The Fed allowed the money supply to balloon during the late 1920s, piling up in the stock market as a bubble. It then panicked, miscalculated, and let it collapse by a third by 1933, depriving the economy of the liquidity it needed to breathe. Trade had nothing to do with it.** **As for the charge that Smoot caused the Depression to spread worldwide: it was**

**too small a change to have plausibly so large an effect.** For a start, **it only applied to about one-third of America's trade:** about 1.3 percent of our GDP. Our average tariff on dutiable goods went from 44.6 to 53.2 percent -- not a terribly big jump. **Tariffs were higher in almost every year from 1821 to 1914. Our tariff went up in 1861, 1864, 1890, and 1922 without producing global depressions, and the recessions of 1873 and 1893 managed to spread worldwide without tariff increases.** As the economic historian (and free trader!) William Bernstein puts it in his book A Splendid Exchange: How Trade Shaped the World, Between 1929 and 1932, real GDP fell 17 percent worldwide, and by 26 percent in the United States, but **most economic historians now believe that only a miniscule part of that huge loss of both world GDP and the U**nited **S**tates' **GDP can be ascribed to the tariff** **wars**. .. **At the time of Smoot-Hawley's passage, trade volume accounted for only about 9 percent of world economic output**. Had all international trade been eliminated, and had no domestic use for the previously exported goods been found, world GDP would have fallen by the same amount -- 9 percent. Between 1930 and 1933, worldwide trade volume fell off by one-third to one-half. Depending on how the falloff is measured, this computes to 3 to 5 percent of world GDP, and these losses were partially made up by more expensive domestic goods. Thus, **the damage done could not** possibly **have exceeded 1 or 2 percent of world GDP -- nowhere near the 17 percent falloff seen during the Great Depression**... The inescapable conclusion: contrary to public perception, **Smoot-Hawley did not cause, or even significantly deepen, the Great Depression. The oft-bandied idea that Smoot-Hawley started a global trade war of endless cycles of tit-for-tat retaliation is** also **mythical**. According to the official State Department report on this very question in 1931: With the exception of discriminations in France, **the extent of discrimination against American commerce is very slight**...**By far the largest number of countries do not discriminate against the commerce of the U**nited **S**tates **in any way**. That is to say, **foreign nations did indeed raise their tariffs after the passage of Smoot, but this was a broad-brush response to the Depression itself**, aimed at all other foreign nations without distinction, **not a retaliation against the U.S. for its own tariff**. **The doom-loop of spiraling tit-for-tat retaliation between trading partners that paralyzes free traders with fear today simply did not happen.** "Notorious" **Smoot-Hawley is a** deliberately **fabricated myth, plain and simple**. We should not allow this myth to paralyze our policy-making in the present day.

## 2NC

### A2 “Demo Inevitable”

#### Uniqueness disproves- backsliding/authoritarianism now

#### Democracy will inevitably disappear- the aff is ethnocentric

**Gat 9** (Democracy's Victory Is Not Preordained. By: Gat, Azar, Foreign Affairs, 00157120, Jul/Aug2009, Vol. 88, Issue 4 Database: Business Source Complete Democracy's Victory Is Not Preordained Section: Responses: Which Way Is History Marching? Debating the Authoritarian Revival, Azar Gat is Ezer Weizman Professor of National Security at Tel Aviv University and the author of War in Human Civilization.

Two recent articles in these pages-- "The Myth of the Autocratic Revival" (January/February 2009) and "How Development Leads to Democracy" (March/April 2009)--have taken issue with my July/August 2007 essay, "The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers." In the first, Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry dispute my argument that the authoritarian capitalist great powers Germany and Japan were defeated in both world wars largely because of contingent factors rather than structural inefficiencies. As I have argued, these countries were too small in comparison to the United States. With respect to the challenge posed by China and Russia, Deudney and Ikenberry insist that developed nondemocratic capitalist societies will not be viable in the long run. They restate modernization theory-- most recently amplified by the political scientists Francis Fukuyama and Michael Mandelbaum--according to which there is only one sustainable route to modernity: the liberal democratic path. Seen in this light, those countries unfortunate enough to have strayed from the path originally taken by the United Kingdom and the United States eventually must converge on the road to liberalism, either because they are inferior to democracies in terms of power or because their intractable internal contradictions will eventually usher in democratic transformation. Liberal democracy is presumed to possess intrinsic advantages, a presumption that confers an air of inevitability on the past as well as on the future. If "world history is the world's court," as Hegel put it, then history's verdict is clear. But is it really? Or might the owl of Minerva, due to its current flight path, be encountering optical illusions? SIZE MATTERS Deudney and Ikenberry believe--like Hegel--that accidents happen to those who are accident-prone. They insist that Germany and Japan were defeated in World War II due to their deep-seated structural problems. It is true that Germany suffered from a critical production failure in 1940-42, but this was remedied from 1942 on. In World War I, it had experienced no similar failure. Nor did Japan's industrial war machine suffer extraordinary failure in World War II. In both world wars, the nondemocratic capitalist great powers performed great feats and initially won shattering victories. On the other side, the democracies repeatedly blundered: they were dangerously late in rising to the challenge; their armed forces, particularly during the 1930s, were ill prepared; their initial defeats were potentially catastrophic; and their conduct thereafter was not free of serious errors. Contrary to the comforting notion that the democratic system eventually proved superior, the reason for Germany's and Japan's defeats lies in the fact that the two countries were simply smaller than their adversaries and less tolerant of failure. For Germany to have broken out of its limited territorial confines and fatally crippled the superior coalition assembled against it in either of the world wars, it would have needed a consecutive string of major successes. Indeed, it came remarkably close to achieving that goal in both world wars. By contrast, the colossal power of the United States meant that the democracies were able to sustain catastrophic failures-- such as the loss of Russia as an ally in World War I and the fall of France and the destruction of the U.S. Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor in World War II--and still recover. Thus, without the United States as their ally, France and the United Kingdom would probably have lost to Germany in both world wars. The remainder of the twentieth century would have been very different, and political scientists would have had a far less rosy story to tell about democracy. The constructed grand narrative of the twentieth century would have emphasized the superior cohesiveness of authoritarian regimes, not the triumph of freedom. For grand narratives, like history, are written by the victors.

### A2 “Choose Winnable Wars”

#### No statistical support

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Victory

For the victory mechanism lo explain ihe democratic peace there must be good evidence thai democracies win most of their wars and that their victory propensity can be attributed to the fact that they carefully select wars they can win. All else equal, democracies are not more likely to win their wars than autocracies. As Alexander Downes (2009) has shown, the evidence that

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democracies are more likely to win their wars is critically affected by two debatable choices: the decision to code all states that did not initiate a war as targets and the exclusion of all wars that ended in draws. When he divides states into initiators, targets and joiners, and adds draws to the dataset, he finds that democracies are not significantly more likely to win their wars. Thus the finding does not appear to be robust. Desch (2002) reaches a similar conclusion using a different approach. Focusing only on cases that provide fair tests of the war-winning proposition, he concludes that the "historical data do not strongly support the triumphalists" claim that democracies are more likely to win wars than nondemocracies\*' (Desch 2002, p. 20).

Nor is there strong support for the claim that democratic leaders carefully select wars that they can win because they are aware of their domestic accountability. In his statistical analysis of war decisions. Desch (2003, pp. 187-92) finds that democracy has one of the smallest effects of any variable on whether a state wins a war that it initiates. His case studies of democratic war initiations buttress this finding: in half of the cases, democratic leaders\* decisions for war were not affected by calculations of accountability or the operation of a robust marketplace of ideas. Meanwhile. Downes (2009) finds little evidence for the corollary of the careful selection argument, namely that democracies will shy away from wars that they are not confidenl of winning. Finally, democracies appear to engage in as many costly wars as autocracies, thereby suggesting that they are not especially selective about the wars that they fight.

### Overview

### War: Ext1--Demo-Auto—Overview 2NC

#### Democratic/autocratic wars outweigh, 3 reasons

Escalate faster

Last longer

Preemption

Chris **Dasse 6** Professor of International Relations at the University of Munich. “Democratic Wars Looking at the Dark Side of Democratic Peace” 89

As far as the form of warfare is concerned, democratic wars differ markedly from other wars. The domestic structure of democracies tends to devalue traditional limits on military ends and means. Democratic wars, it seems, have a specific propensity to escalate, since institutions designed for the control of the military are overruled in times of war. The normative justifications of democratic war tend to favour ‘regime change’ as a war aim, thus dissolving another limitation of traditional warfare. Finally, the political reasons for democratic war call for proactive rather than reactive policy choices and allow the preventive use of force in order to expand the security community of democratic states.

### War: Ext1—Norms (:40

#### The democratic culture makes wars of democratization inevitable

Chris **Dasse 6** Professor of International Relations at the University of Munich. “Democratic Wars Looking at the Dark Side of Democratic Peace” 82-84

The same mechanism, however, which contributes to the mutual recognition of democracies, and by implication to democratic peace, also leads to rejection and exclusion of non-democratic states and under certain circumstances to democratic war. Because non-democracies are not based on the free consent of their population, they cannot be seen as ‘just’ and ‘legitimate’ and lack the credibility and trustworthiness of responsible members of the international community (Roth, 1999). Disputes between democracies and non-democracies therefore easily escalate into more fundamental conflicts over individual human rights, civil liberties and the right form of government. Typically, democracies in such cases do not condemn states but regimes and draw a fine line between undemocratic governments and their populations. Woodrow Wilson made this very clear in his war message before Congress in 1917: ‘We have no quarrel with the German people. We have no feeling toward them but one of sympathy and friendship. It was not upon their impulse that their government acted in entering this war. It was not with their previous knowledge or approval’ (Wilson, 1917). It is easy to replace the ‘German people’ with the people of Panama, Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan or North Korea and insert Manuel Noriega, Colonel Qaddafi, the Taliban or Kim Il Sung instead of the Kaiser in order to see the scheme. For democracies do not quarrel with peoples or wage war against nations, but fight against evil governments and use military violence to achieve regime change and establish democratic statehood. It has been shown in history that since 1898 American presidents have consistently linked military interventions with the aim to expand democracy (Peceny, 1995). Even in cases in which national security reasons were dominant at first, the war aims have often been altered to regime change during the war. The basis for this is the assumption that democracy is not only an ideal worth to be defended militarily but also to be spread globally. To quote Samuel Huntington again who explains the American attitude towards war: ‘This extremism [to embrace war wholeheartedly or reject it completely] is required by the nature of the liberal ideology. Since liberalism deprecates the moral validity of the interests of the state in security, war must be either condemned as incompatible with liberal goals or justified as an ideological movement in support of those goals’ (Huntington, 1957, p. 151). Democracies draw their very identity and legitimacy from their representation of cosmopolitan values and global liberties and establish their own credibility through the denunciation of the political ‘other’. Not surprisingly, in the 1990s with the constraints of the Cold War gone, we see a much more activist and interventionist foreign policy on the part of democratic countries, especially the United States (Mayall, 1996; Morales, 1994). The reason is that according to the liberal creed universal values such as human rights and civil liberties have to be defended, restored and strengthened wherever possible – with military force and without UN authorization if necessary (Reisman, 1999/2000; Tesón, 2003). The wave of so-called ‘humanitarian interventions’ in the 1990s had exactly this aim: to reinforce global humanitarian standards 84 Democratic Wars and to promote democratic values (Gallant, 1992; Wheeler, 2000; Holzgrefe and Keohane, 2003). Even if there is still a long way to go in order to establish a legal ‘norm’ of humanitarian intervention, the military interference into hitherto sacrosanct sovereignty rights of states in cases of blatant human rights abuses is probably the most prevalent form of democratic war on the basis of liberal values. However, the debate on the justification for democratic war does not end here. Some international lawyers and political scientists have argued that a right to democratic governance exists that endows each and every individual with the right to be ruled by democratically elected leaders (Franck, 1992; Fox and Nolte, 2000). Michael Reisman has extrapolated from that assumption the right, if not the obligation, for democratic states to work actively for the promotion of democracy and to establish democratic governments even with the help of forceful military intervention (Reisman, 2000). The US and UK governments have resorted to that argument when they found out that the original justification for the war against Iraq – the existence of weapons of mass destruction – did not hold. Even if democratization has so far been used mainly as a substitute where better arguments for the use of force have been absent or disappeared, there is a growing acceptance of linking democracy and the benevolent use of force. If this trend coincides with a further deterioration of the non-intervention norm, we might expect more wars of democratization in the future (Byers and Chesterman, 2000).

### War: Ext1—Institutions (:25

#### Institutions cause war- 1NC Dasse

#### Institutions cause war but can’t stop it- get overruled in crisis

Chris **Dasse 6** Professor of International Relations at the University of Munich. “Democratic Wars Looking at the Dark Side of Democratic Peace” 81-2

In sum, democratic institutions, designed to limit governmental power, do not always have pacifying effects. They inculcate restraints in conflicts with other democracies but they can be circumvented by determined governments by using covert warfare. What is more, they may even contribute to the escalation of conflict by providing incentives for democratic governments to use force as diversionary action or to expand war aims in order to secure domestic consensus. Finally, democratic institutions allow for the relatively unfettered use of force since peacetime provisions for civil control of the military are lifted in times of war – at least in the American variant of civil–military relations. 82 Democratic Wars Thus, democratic war is partly due to the institutional disposition of

democratic states.

### War: Ext1--Security (:35

#### Democracies create security communities- locks in preemption doctrine

Chris **Dasse 6** Professor of International Relations at the University of Munich. “Democratic Wars Looking at the Dark Side of Democratic Peace” 87-88

It is important to note that democracies tend to define their security needs so extensively that they subsume more and more issue areas (Daase, 1991; Waever, 1995). Shortly after the fall of the Berlin wall, NATO acknowledged that the direct threat posed by the armies of the Warsaw Pact had diminished but that new risks and challenges had emerged that made the new security environment even more dangerous: the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, organized crime, terrorism and so on (NATO, 1990, p. 20). The New Strategic Concept adopted at the North Atlantic Council in 1999 focuses on these new and emerging threats. This indicates a paradigm shift in security policy and a new emphasis on proactive risk management (Wallander and Keohane, 1999). What makes a policy proactive is not to wait for the materialization of damage but to act in advance, either by taking preventive measures in order to stop damage from happening or by taking precautionary measures in order to limit the damage if it occurs (Daase, 2002). Prevention (loosely used to encompass both preventive and precautionary measures) has therefore become the buzzword of the new security policy. The new US National Security Strategy argues: The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the 88 Democratic Wars enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively. (NSS, 2002, p. 15) But also the draft version of a new security concept for the European Union, the so-called Solana paper, acknowledged the need ‘to act before a crisis occurs. (. . .) We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention’ (Solana, 2003, pp. 12–13). Even if the European leaders scaled back the emphasis on preventive intervention, proactive security policy is clearly on the agenda. The US and UK governments made clear when they invaded Iraq in 2003, how democratic states implement preventive strategies against the spread of nuclear weapons. Doing so, they falsified an old assumption in political science, namely that democracies do not wage preventive wars. George Kennan made the statement in the early 1950s that democracies could not plan preventive wars because of their transparency and openness (Gaddis, 1982, p. 49). Bernard Brodie seconded this by stressing that a policy of preventive war had always been unrealistic for the United States (Brodie, 1965, p. 237). And still in 1992 Randall Schweller maintained that only non-democratic states would be inclined to use preventive force against a rising adversary (Schweller, 1992, p. 238). However, not only Israel’s pre-emptive attack in 1956 (see Levy and Gochal, 2001/2), but also the preventive war against Iraq proves that a fundamental aversion of democracies against preventive war does not exist. And again it has been shown that a reason which is said to contribute to democratic peace, can also enable democratic war. Renouncing military means and building common institutions among democratic states leads to democratic security communities and to the advancement of democratic peace. At the same time, it enables democratic states to wage war more effectively against non-democracies and to enlarge the democratic community of states.

### War: Ext2--Autocratic Peace 2NC (1:20

#### Autocratic peace turn- peace is based on regime type- autocrats band together to preserve stability- specifically stabilizes Africa- that’s Gartzke

#### \*\*Africa war escalates

Glick ‘7(Dec. 10, 2007 Caroline Glick , THE JERUSALEM POST)

The Horn of Africa is a dangerous and strategically vital place. Small wars, which rage continuously, can easily escalate into big wars. Local conflicts have regional and global aspects. All of the conflicts in this tinderbox, which controls shipping lanes from the Indian Ocean into the Red Sea, can potentially give rise to regional, and indeed global conflagrations between competing regional actors and global powers.

#### Group constraints deter autocratic aggression- 4 reasons

War finance- wars are expensive, threaten autocratic control- democracies change leadership so much it doesn’t matter

CMR- civilian autorcats are afraid of coups- want weak militaries

Domestic focus- the military has to be used internally AND autocrats have to appease groups

Higher costs of losing- death v losing office

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There is also little evidence for Ihe other implication of the group constraint claim, namely that group constraints must be weaker in autocracies than in democracies. If the mechanism is to explain why democracies remain at peace but autocracies do not, then there must be good evidence that democratic leaders face greater group constraints. The evidence suggests, however, that autocratic leaders often respond to groups - themselves or their supporters that have powerful incentives to avoid war. One reason for autocrats to shy away from conflict is that wars are expensive and the best way to pay for them is to move to a system of consensual taxation, which in turn requires the expansion of the franchise. In other words, autocratic leaders have a powerful incentive to avoid wars lest they trigger political changes that may destroy their hold on power. Another reason to avoid war is that it allows civilian autocrats to maintain weak military establishments, thereby reducing the chances that they will be overthrown. Different considerations inhibit the war proneness of military dictators. First, because they must often devote considerable effort to domestic repression, they have fewer resources available for prosecuting foreign wars. Second, because they are used for repression their militaries often have little societal support, which makes them ill equipped to fight external wars. Third, military dictators are closely identified with the military and will therefore be cautious about waging war for fear that they will be blamed for any subsequent defeat. Finally, time spent fighting abroad is time away from other tasks on which a dictator's domestic tenure also depends. Thus there may be fewer groups with access to the foreign policy process in autocracies - in extreme cases only the autocrat himself has a say - but these often have a vested interest in avoiding war. This being the case, it is not clear that group constraints are weaker in autocracies than they are in democracies

#### Autocracies are more accountable and highly risk averse—studes prove

higher costs of losing

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In assessing whether leaders are accountable, proponents of the democratic peace focus exclusively on their chances of losing office as a result of waging a losing or costly war (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999, p. 794). Logically, however, accountability depends on a leader's likelihood of removal and the costs that he or she will incur when removed. It is not clear, for example, that leaders who are likely to be voted out of office for prosecuting a losing or costly war, but arc unlikely to be exiled, imprisoned or killed in the process will feel more accountable than leaders who are unlikely lo lose office, but can expect severe punishment in the unlikely event that they are in fact removed. Put somewhat differently, it is not clear that their expected costs, which are a function of the likelihood that they will be removed and the costs they will incur if they are removed, are substantially different.20

If we focus on expected costs, democrats do not appear to be more accountable than autocrats. An analysis of the fate of all leaders in all the wars in the Correlates of War (COW) dataset, reveals that democratic leaders who lose a war or embroil their state in a costly war arc marginally more likely to be removed from office than their autocratic counterparts (37 percent to 35 percent), but considerably less likely to be exiled, imprisoned, or killed (5 percent to 28 percent).21

Thus there is little evidence that democratic leaders face greater expected costs for waging losing or costly wars and are therefore more accountable than their autocratic counterparts. Giacomo Chiozza and Hein Goemans reach a similar conclusion in their examination of how defeat in war affects the tenure of democratic and nondemocratic leaders between 1919 and 1999. Defeat in war does not significantly affect the tenure of democrats, but does significantly reduce the tenure of autocrats (Chiozza and Goemans 2004, p. 613). Similarly, in her analysis of domestic audience costs, Jessica Weeks (2008, p. 59) finds that leaders in most nondemocracies are just as accountable as their democratic counterparts.

### War: Ext3--Diversionary Wars 2NC (:40

#### \*\*autocratic leaders will not engage in diversionary wars

Gregory **Hess**, Economics, Oberlin College, JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY v. 109 n. 4, August 20**01**, p. 776+, ASP.

Next, we consider the frequency of war under nondemocratic regimes in order to provide some comparisons with our democratic world benchmark. To keep the analysis simple, we assume that nondemocratic governments face a constant probability of remaining in office an additional period, independent of their economic and war-handling abilities. This implies that nondemocratic leaders will have no incentive to, and therefore will not, engage in diversionary wars such as the avoidable conflicts some democratic leaders may engage in to increase the probability of their political survival. Gelpi (1997) provides supporting evidence for this claim. He finds that, in fact, democracies are more prone to use diversionary international uses of force to externalize weak domestic support than authoritarian regimes.

### War: Ext4--Deterrence 2NC (:20

#### Democracy kills deterrence- public pandering shifts military spending, mixed signals make clear signaling impossible- historically proven – hitler was encouraged by british and French diplomacy, japan was encouraged by US congressional gridlock, ww1 happened because Britain didn’t immediately declare support for france—that’s Moore

#### The democratic peace theory ignores deterrence

John Norton **Moore**, Walter Brown Professor of Law, University of Virginia, “Beyond the Democratic Peace: Solving the War Puzzle,” VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION v. 44, Winter 20**04**, p. 341+.

If democratic nations are getting into major war predominantly as a result of aggression or democide by nondemocratic regimes, n116 then the evidence strongly suggests, at least for purposes of continuing our search for a more comprehensive hypothesis about war, that the key missing link in democratic peace theory is the importance of external deterrence. That is, are democracies getting into war predominantly in settings where they fail adequately to deter a potential nondemocratic decision elite willing to engage in high-risk behavior? Considerable evidence suggests that the answer is yes.

### Demo Bad: Trade DA—Link 2NC (:45+

#### Democracy kills trade and global growth

**Garten 4** DEAN OF THE YALE SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT The Trouble With Freedom By Jeffrey E. Garten | NEWSWEEK From the magazine issue dated May 10, 2004, http://www.newsweek.com/2004/05/09/the-trouble-with-freedom.html

The growth of democracy could, for example, slow the expansion of international trade. Reason: a democratic government cannot decree the dropping of barriers but must listen to the views of farmers, workers, manufacturers, nongovernmental organizations and others. In many countries, the voice of public opinion will play a larger role than ever before. At best, this is likely to delay international trade talks as governments attempt to reach delicate compromises among competing interests at home. At worst, it could lead to rising protectionism as anti-trade groups scream the loudest. Democracies also tend to favor easy money, even when it's not the technically correct prescription for sound economic policies; it's a sure way for politicians to curry favor with the masses. The danger is that when several countries do this, the world economy develops a bias toward inflation--which ultimately is destructive to long-term growth. It is therefore vital to establish fiercely independent central banks with governors strong enough to withstand political pressure. Right now, for example, the finance ministers from Germany and France are in a highly visible f

ight with Jean-Claude Trichet, the president of the European Central Bank, over his insistence that now is not the right time to lower interest rates in the eurozone. This kind of confrontation is sure to be played out in many countries over the next few years. Speaking of easy money, democracies like to open the spending spigot, even when they shouldn't. Case in point: Brazil's president, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, is right now under intense public pressure to abandon his admirable fiscal conservatism in order to gun the economic engines. The temptation may be politically irresistible and even understandable, but international financial markets will not be pleased. Even the most advanced democracies, such as the United States, France and Germany, have demonstrated an inability to build the necessary long-term safety nets to prosper in a hypercompetitive global economy. Obviously, so too will less sophisticated democracies. Think about America's inability to rein in its enormous fiscal deficits, despite the certainty of massive upcoming expenses relating to Social Security and health care for its aging population. Or about the inability of major European nations to establish economically viable pension and unemployment compensation systems.

### DPT False: 1NC (Long) (:45

#### Stats disprove

Econ a/c

Their gat ev- deterrence, trade, growth-

#### DPT either empirically disproven or not statistically significant

**Rosato 11** PhD, Department of Political Science, The University of Chicago, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame. The Handbookon the Political Economy of War By Christopher J. Coyne, Rachel L. Mathers

Democratic wars There is considerable evidence that the absence of war claim is incorrect. As Christopher Laync(2001, p. 801) notes, 'The most damning indictment of democratic peace theory, is that it happens not to be true: democratic states have gone to war with one another." For example, categorizing a state as democratic if it achieves a democracy score of six or more in the Polity dataset on regime type - as several analysts do - yields three inter-dcmocratic wars: the American Civil War. the Spanish American War and the Boer War/' This is something defenders of the theory readily admit - adopting relatively inclusive definitions of democracy, they themselves generate anywhere between a dozen and three dozen cases of inter-democratic war. In order to exclude these anomalies and thereby preserve the absence of war claim, the theory's defenders restrict their definitions of democracy. In the most compelling analysis to date, Ray (1993, pp. 256-9, 269) argues that no two democracies have gone to war with one another as long as a democracy is defined as follows: the members of the executive and legislative branches arc determined in fair and competitive elections, which is to say that at least two independent parties contest the election, half of the adult population is eligible to vole and the possibility that the governing party can lose has been established by historical precedent. Similarly, Doyle (1983a, pp. 216-17) rescues the claim by arguing that states" domestic and foreign policies must both be subject to the control of the citizenry if they are to be considered liberal. Russett, meanwhile, argues that his no war claim rests on defining democracy as a stale wilh a voting franchise for a substantial fraction of the population, a government brought to power in elections involving two or more legally recognized parties, a popularly elected executive or one responsible to an elected legislature, requirements for civil liberties including free speech and demonstrated longevity of at least three years (Russett 1993, pp. 14-16). Despite imposing these definitional restrictions, proponents of the democratic peace cannot exclude up to five major wars, a figure which, if confirmed, would invalidate the democratic peace by their own admission (Ray 1995, p. 27). The first is the War of 1812 between Britain and the United States. Ray argues that it does not contradict the claim because Britain does not meet bis suffrage requirement. Yet this does not make Britain any less democratic than the United States at the time where less than half the adult population was eligible to vote. In fact, as Laync (2001, p. 801) notes, "the United States was not appreciably more democratic than un re formed Britain." This poses a problem for the democratic peace; if the United States was a democracy, and Ray believes it was, then Britain was also a democracy and the War of 1812 was an inter-democratic war. The second case is the American Civil War. Democratic peace theorists believe the United States was a democracy in 1861, but exclude the case on the grounds that it was a civil rather than interstate war (Russett 1993, pp. 16-17). However, a plausible argument can be made that the United Stales was not a stale but a union of stales, and thai this was therefore a war between states rather than within one. Note, for example, that the term "United States" was plural rather than singular at the time and the conflict was known as the "War Between the States."7 This being the case, the Civil War also contradicts the claim.8 The Spanish-American and Boer wars constitute two further exceptions to the rule. Ray excludes the former because half of the members of Spain's upper house held their positions through hereditary succession or royal appointment. Yet this made Spain little different to Britain, which he classifies as a democracy at the time, thereby leading to the conclusion that the Spanish-American War was a war between democracies. Similarly, it is hard to accept his claim that the Orange Free State was not a democracy during the Boer War because black Africans were not allowed to vote when he is content to classify the United States as a democracy in the second half of the nineteenth century (Ray 1993. pp. 265, 267; Layne 2001. p. 802). In short, defenders of (he democratic peace can only rescue their core claim through the selective application of highly restrictive criteria. Perhaps the most important exception is World War I, which, by virtue of the fact that Germany fought against Britain, France, Italy, Belgium and the United States, would count as five instances of war between liberal states in most analyses of the democratic peace.9 As Ido Oren (1995, pp. 178-9) has shown. Germany was widely considered lo be a liberal state prior to World War I: "Germany was a member of a select group of the most politically advanced countries, far more advanced than some of the nations that arc currently coded as having been "liberal' during that period." In fact, Germany was consistently placed toward the top of that group, "either as second only to the United States ... or as positioned below England and above France." Moreover, Doyle\*s assertion that the case ought to be excluded because Germany was liberal domestically, but not in foreign affairs, does not stand up lo scrutiny. As Layne (1994, p. 42) points out. foreign policy was "insulated from parliamentary control" in both France and Britain, two purportedly liberal states (see also Mcarshcimcr 1990, p. 51, fn. 77; Layne 2001, pp. 803 807). Thus it is difficult to classify Germany as non-liberal and World War I constitutes an imporiant exception to Ihe finding. Small numbers Even if restrictive definitions of democracy enable democratic peace theorists to uphold their claim, they render it unsurprising by reducing the number of democracies in any analysis. As several scholars have noted, there were only a dozen or so democracies in the world prior to World War I, and even fewer in a position to fight one another. Therefore, since war is a rare event for any pair of states, the fact that democracies did not fight one another should occasion little surprise (Mearsheimer 1990, p. 50; Cohen 1994, pp. 214, 216; Layne 1994, p. 39; Henderson 1999, p. 212).10 It should be a source of even less surprise as the number of democracies and the potential for conflict among them falls, something that is bound to happen as the democratic bar rises. Ray\*s suffrage criterion, for example, eliminates two great powers - Britain and the United States - from the democratic ranks before World War I. thereby making the absence of war between democracies eminently predictable." A simple numerical example should serve to illustrate the point. Using a Polity score of six or more to designate a state as a democracy yields 716 purely democratic dyads out of a total 23240 politically relevant dyads between 1816 and 1913. Assuming that wars arc distributed according to the proportion of democratic dyads in the population and knowing that there were 86 dyads at war during this period, we should expect to observe three democratic-democratic wars between the Congress of Vienna and World War I. If we actually observed no wars between democracies, the democratic peace phenomenon might be worth investigating further even though the difference between three and zero wars is barely statistically significant." Increasing the score required for a state to be coded as a democracy to eight - a score that would make Britain democratic from 1901 onwards only and eliminate states like Spain and the Orange Free State from the ranks of the democracies - makes a dramatic difference. The number of democratic dyads falls to 171. and the expected number of wars is now between zero and one. Now the absence of war finding is to be expected. In short, by adopting restrictive definitions of democracy, proponents of the democratic peace render their central claim wholly unexceptional. In sum, proponents of the democratic peace have unsuccessfully attempted to tread a fine line in order to substantiate their claim that democracies have rarely if ever waged war against one another. On the one hand, they admit that inter-democratic war is not an unusual phenomenon if they adopt relatively inclusive definitions of democracy. On the other hand, in their attempts to restrict the definition of democracy and thereby save the finding they inadvertently make the absence of war between democracies trivial.

### Demo Bad: Envt DA—Link 2NC (1:15

#### no turns—democracies make a lot of commitments but don’t follow through

Democracy, climate change and global governance David **Held &** Angus Fane **Hervey 9** Policy Network. David Held is Graham Wallas Professor of Political Science and Co-Director of LSE Global Governance at the London School of Economics. Angus Fane Hervey is a Doctoral Student and Ralph Miliband Scholar in the Department of Government at the London School of Economics.

On balance, while evidence on the link between political institutions and environmental sustainability does seem to suggest that democracies are preferable to authoritarian regimes, we might expect the effect to be far greater than it actually is. Why is this the case? Part of the reason might be attributed to the different types of transmission mechanisms that translate policy commitment into policy outcomes. Battig & Bernauer (2009), for example, find that while the effect of democracy on political commitment to climate change is positive, the effect on policy outcomes, measured in terms of emissions and trends, is ambiguous. They observe that the causal chain from environmental risks to public perceptions of such risks, to public demand for risk mitigation, and to policy output is shorter than the one leading from risk via policy output to policy outcome. Because of that, outcomes are influenced by a range of other factors, such as the properties of the resource in question, mitigation costs, and the efficiency of implementing agencies. Politicians might easily declare a set of public policy commitments to climate change mitigation, but the outcome of such efforts is affected by factors that are often outside of their control. The result is that policymakers respond quite well to public demands for more environmental protection, but tend to discount implementation problems, hoping that voters will not be able to identify these within a short enough time period to use their votes as a punishment for any failure to deliver.

#### authoritarianism solves environment

Mark **Beeson** 8 April 20**10**, Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of WesternAustralia, Perth, “The coming of environmental authoritarianism” http://www.academia.edu/539179/The\_coming\_of\_environmental\_authoritarianism

The East Asian region generally and Southeast Asia in particular have longbeen associated with authoritarian rule. It is argued that the intensiﬁcationof a range of environmental problems means that authoritarian rule islikely to become even more commonplace there in the future. Countrieswith limited state capacity will struggle to deal with the consequences of population expansion, economic development and the environmentaldegradation with which they are associated. A resurgence of authoritarianrule is made even more likely by China’s ‘successful’ developmentalexample and the extent of the region’s existing environmental problems.The dispiriting reality may be that authoritarian regimes – unattractive asthey may be – may even prove more capable of responding to the complexpolitical and environmental pressures in the region than some of its democracies. Keywords: authoritarianism; environment; Southeast Asia; China;development; path dependency Introduction The environment has become the deﬁning public policy issue of the era. Notonly will political responses to environmental challenges determine the healthof the planet, but continuing environmental degradation may also aﬀect political systems. This interaction is likely to be especially acute in parts of theworld where environmental problems are most pressing and the state’s ability to respond to such challenges is weakest. One possible consequence of environmental degradation is the development or consolidation of authoritar-ian rule as political elites come to privilege regime maintenance and internalstability over political liberalisation. Even eﬀorts to mitigate the impact of, orrespond to, environmental change may involve a decrease in individual liberty as governments seek to transform environmentally destructive behaviour. As a result, ‘environmental authoritarianism’ may become an increasingly common response to the destructive impacts of climate change in an age of diminishedexpectations.Long before the recent global economic crisis inﬂicted such a blow onAnglo-American forms of economic organisation, it was apparent that therewere other models of economic development and other modes of politicalorganisation that had admirers around the world. The rise of illiberal forms of capitalism and an apparent ‘democratic recession’ serve as a powerful remin-ders that there was nothing inevitable about the triumph of ‘Western’ politicaland economic practices or values (Zakaria 2003, Diamond 2008).

### Demo Bad: Envt DA—Impact 2NC

#### prefer environment impacts—there’s an invisible threshold and it is irreversible

Diner 94 (Major David N., Judge Advocate General's Corps – United States Army, “The Army and The Endangered Species Act: Who's Endangering Whom?”, Military Law Review, Winter, 143 Mil. L. Rev. 161, Lexis)

The prime reason is theworld's survival. Like all animal life, humans live off of other species. At some point, the number of species could decline to the point at which the ecosystem fails, and then humans also would become extinct. No one knows how many [\*171]  species the world needs to support human life, and to find out -- byallowing certain species to become extinct -- would not be sound policy. In addition to food, species offer many direct and indirect benefits to mankind. [68](http://www.truthnews.net/world/2004080046.htm?_m=15aac6482af89f930a3e32f7a8def8da&csvc=le&cform=byCitation&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlW-zSkAA&_md5=37ae2564ed6a714dcd205b0ee5431e9a#n68) 2.Ecological Value. -- Ecological value is the value that species have in maintaining the environment. Pest, [69](http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/490945main_10-10_TFPD.pdf?_m=15aac6482af89f930a3e32f7a8def8da&csvc=le&cform=byCitation&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlW-zSkAA&_md5=37ae2564ed6a714dcd205b0ee5431e9a#n69) erosion, and flood control are prime benefits certain species provide to man. Plants and animals also provide additional ecological services-- pollution control, [70](http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/432577main_Earth_Science_R1.pdf?_m=15aac6482af89f930a3e32f7a8def8da&csvc=le&cform=byCitation&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlW-zSkAA&_md5=37ae2564ed6a714dcd205b0ee5431e9a#n70)oxygen production, sewage treatment, and biodegradation.[71](http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2003/05/58966?_m=15aac6482af89f930a3e32f7a8def8da&csvc=le&cform=byCitation&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlW-zSkAA&_md5=37ae2564ed6a714dcd205b0ee5431e9a#n71) 3.Scientific and Utilitarian Value. -- Scientific value is the use of species for research into the physical processes of the world. [72](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=15aac6482af89f930a3e32f7a8def8da&csvc=le&cform=byCitation&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlW-zSkAA&_md5=37ae2564ed6a714dcd205b0ee5431e9a" \l "n72" \t "_self) Without plants and animals, a large portion of basic scientific research would be impossible. Utilitarian value is the direct utility humans draw from plants and animals. [73](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=15aac6482af89f930a3e32f7a8def8da&csvc=le&cform=byCitation&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlW-zSkAA&_md5=37ae2564ed6a714dcd205b0ee5431e9a" \l "n73" \t "_self) Only a fraction of the  [\*172]  earth's species have been examined, and mankind may someday desperately need the species that it is exterminating today. To accept that the snail darter, harelip sucker, or Dismal Swamp southeastern shrew [74](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=15aac6482af89f930a3e32f7a8def8da&csvc=le&cform=byCitation&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlW-zSkAA&_md5=37ae2564ed6a714dcd205b0ee5431e9a" \l "n74" \t "_self) could save mankind may be difficult for some. Many, if not most, species are useless to man in a direct utilitarian sense. Nonetheless, they may be critical in an indirect role, because their extirpations could affect a directly useful species negatively. In a closely interconnected ecosystem, the loss of a species affects other species dependent on it. [75](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=15aac6482af89f930a3e32f7a8def8da&csvc=le&cform=byCitation&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlW-zSkAA&_md5=37ae2564ed6a714dcd205b0ee5431e9a" \l "n75" \t "_self) Moreover, as the number of species decline, the effect of each new extinction on the remaining species increases dramatically. [76](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=15aac6482af89f930a3e32f7a8def8da&csvc=le&cform=byCitation&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlW-zSkAA&_md5=37ae2564ed6a714dcd205b0ee5431e9a" \l "n76" \t "_self) 4.Biological Diversity. -- The main premise of species preservation is that diversity is better than simplicity. [77](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=15aac6482af89f930a3e32f7a8def8da&csvc=le&cform=byCitation&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlW-zSkAA&_md5=37ae2564ed6a714dcd205b0ee5431e9a" \l "n77" \t "_self)As the current mass extinction has progressed, the world's biological diversity generally has decreased. This trend occurs within ecosystems by reducing the number of species, and within species by reducing the number of individuals. Both trends carry serious future implications. [78](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=15aac6482af89f930a3e32f7a8def8da&csvc=le&cform=byCitation&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlW-zSkAA&_md5=37ae2564ed6a714dcd205b0ee5431e9a" \l "n78" \t "_self) [\*173]  Biologicallydiverse ecosystems are characterized by a large number of specialist species, filling narrow ecological niches. These ecosystems inherently are more stable than less diverse systems. "The more complex the ecosystem, the more successfully it can resist a stress. . . . [l]ike a net, in which each knot is connected to others by several strands, such a fabric can resist collapse better than a simple, unbranched circle of threads -- which if cut anywhere breaks down as a whole." [79](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=15aac6482af89f930a3e32f7a8def8da&csvc=le&cform=byCitation&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlW-zSkAA&_md5=37ae2564ed6a714dcd205b0ee5431e9a#n79) By causing widespread extinctions, humans have artificially simplified many ecosystems. As biologic simplicity increases, so does the risk of ecosystem failure. The spreading Sahara Desert in Africa, and the dustbowl conditions of the 1930s in the United States are relatively mild examples of what might be expected if this trend continues. Theoretically, each new animal or plant extinction, with all its dimly perceived and intertwined affects, could cause total ecosystem collapse and human extinction. Each new extinction increases the risk of disaster. Like a mechanic removing, one by one, the rivets from an aircraft's wings, n80 mankind may be edging closer to the abyss.

### Demo Bad: Heg DA—Link 2NC (:45/1:10

#### Democracy spread kills primacy—specifically kills alliances

CIAO DATE: 03/03 Democratic Divergence: A Challenge to U.S. Primacy? Donald K. **Emmerson 3** \* onald K. Emmerson is Senior Fellow, Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. The PacNet Newsletter 2003 January 30, 2003 The Center for Strategic and International Studies http://www.ciaonet.org/pbei/csis/pac03/emd01/index.html

The consequences of democratization will pose the chief and most enduring challenge to U.S. primacy. Never have there been more electoral democracies in the world - 121 today, by Freedom House's latest count, up from 66 in 1987. So far, this trend has been cause mainly for American celebration. Viewed from the United States, democratization has been easy to construe as imitation - the sincerest form of flattery. American politicians routinely project U.S. democratic values as not just humane but human: what, deep in their hearts, everyone thinks and wants or, at any rate, would if they knew what was best. Whatever the accuracy of this presumption, it is at least less fantastic than the idea that installing the right to vote in a formerly authoritarian state will necessarily instill, among the newly enfranchised, sympathy for U.S. foreign policy - what Washington does as opposed to what Americans may believe. gis' extensive air defense capability, and joint operability. It is no coincidence that recently elected governments in Turkey and South Korea are not cheerleaders for confronting Iraq and North Korea, respectively. Living adjacent to the “evil axis” makes Turks and South Koreans uniquely vulnerable to the consequences of belligerence. Their electoral democracies assure that public fears based on this vulnerability cannot be ignored. As a senior adviser to Turkey's new prime minister recently observed, “Everybody knows that 80 to 85 percent of the Turkish people would say no to war in Iraq. As a democratic country, how can we say yes?” Gerhard Schröder's decision to comply with such logic in Germany's latest election is a main reason he remains chancellor of that country. And these countries are U.S. allies. Nor is the prospect of democratic divergence limited to these admittedly special cases. In foreign democracies generally, other things being equal, it is implausible that candidates and voters should consistently favor U.S. positions. Most Muslims, for example, are moderate. But in countries with large Muslim majorities and without strong secular traditions, it is not hard to envision an election whose results reduce the distance between state and religion, regardless of what the U.S. constitution's first amendment recommends. Nor is the chance of such outcomes limited to balloting among Muslims, witness the recent electoral success of hardline Hindus in the Indian state of Gujarat. Democratization need not be inimical to U.S. foreign policies. But democratic divergence in a more and more democratic world can be expected to limit the ability of U.S. administrations to act unilaterally in ways that significantly threaten or burden other countries. What is an election, after all, if not a multilateral consultation, among voters rather than states? Qualifications are needed: Democracies may diverge not only from the U.S. but also from each other. European disunity over Iraq is an illustration. An irony of unilateralist American rhetoric is that it can help stimulate a multilateral façade - a coalition of the somewhat willing - by motivating foot-dragging governments to move closer to Washington lest they lose all leverage and favor in the event of superpower success. Under mounting American pressure to become a launching pad for war against Baghdad, Ankara's “no” already has modulated to “yes” with reservations. And then there is British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who has been willing to ignore his own constituency's reluctance to say “yes” to President Bush - convergence at the top despite divergence from below. The implications of democratic divergence for U.S. power, therefore, are not its overthrow but its complication - and, prospectively, its erosion. In his State of the Union message to Congress on Jan. 28, 2003, President Bush emphasized U.S. power. “The course of this nation,” he said, “does not depend on the decisions of others.” An especially loud ovation followed. But one can wonder how much of the applause represented conviction as opposed to hope. U.S. history has not been impervious to the decisions of others. As for the future, events will rescue or refute the president's claim. In the meantime, it would be helpful to think clearly not only about threats from tyrants and terrorists, but also about how democracy could affect supremacy. Two illustrations: On Jan. 16 in The New York Times, commenting on Turkish reluctance to back a U.S. war in Iraq, columnist William Safire wrote: “Paradoxically, the growth of democracy in Turkey - which America cheers - has introduced an element of uncertainty” into the Turkish-American alliance. Paradoxically? Not by the logic of democratic divergence. In an adjacent op-ed, former National Security Adviser Richard Allen bemoaned South Korean divergence from a U.S. policy of confronting North Korea as “a serious breach of faith.” Breach of faith? Not if one's faith is in democracy, including the right to disagree. In a democratizing world, even a superpower may discover that the compliance of allies is no longer an element of certainty or a matter of faith, but a condition to be earned.

### Overreach: Ext3—No Overreach

#### Reject their hyperbolic claims --- tyranny never materializes

John Yoo 9, Emanuel S. Heller Professor of Law @ UC-Berkeley Law, visiting scholar @ the American Enterprise Institute, former Fulbright Distinguished Chair in Law @ the University of Trento, served as a deputy assistant attorney general in the Office of Legal Council at the U.S. Department of Justice between 2001 and 2003, received his J.D. from Yale and his undergraduate degree from Harvard, “Crisis and Command,” Book, p. x-xi

This book is also written out of respect for Congress as well as the President. I have had the honor to serve as general counsel of the Senate Judiciary Committee under the chairmanship of Senator Orrin G. Hatch of Utah, a good and decent man as well as a strward of the Senate. I have the greatest respect for the awesome powers of Congress and the ways in which Congress and the broader political system can check any Chief Executive. It was Congress that forced the resignation of Richard Nixon through hearings, political pressure, spending constraints, and ultimately, the threat of impeachment. Today’s critics of the Presidency underestimate the power of politics to corral any branch of government that goes too far. They give too much credit to appeals to abstract notions of constitutional balance to restrain a truly out-of-control President, or misread active responses to unprecedented challenges as challenges to the Constitution. The hyperbole in such rhetoric is manifest in overwrought yet commonplace invocations of “treason” or “tramplings” of the Constitution. Has the Constitution indeed been trampled on? History provides us with a guide.¶ Certainly, the fear that a President might abuse power for personal gain or to maintain his or her position has haunted America from her birth. Executive power, as the Founding Fathers well knew, always carries the possibility of dictatorship. In their own day, the great Presidents were all accused of wielding power tyrannically. Yet, they were not dictators. They used their executive powers to the benefit of the nation. Once the emergency subsided, presidential power receded and often went into remission under long periods of congressional leadership. When chief executives misused their powers, the political system blocked or eventually ejected the President. No dictator has ever ruled in the United States, yet critics of contemporary presidential power wish to work radical change in current practice out of fear of impending dictatorship.

#### Structural factors prevent Executive overreach without constraining flexibility

Eric Posner 7, the Kirkland and Ellis Professor of Law @ U-Chicago, and Adrian Vermeule, the John H. Watson, Jr. Professor of Law @ Harvard, Jan 4, “Terror in the Balance: Security, Liberty, and the Courts,” Book, p. 53

\*gender modified

Four points are critical, and they suggest that the concern is either greatly overblown or does not support civil libertarian prescriptions, or both: presidential or executive preferences need not systematically favor increased executive power during emergencies; political constraints will rule out abuses that the politically engaged public does not favor; even if increased executive power in emergencies creates abuses, the security gains may be greater still; and in any event civil libertarian judicial review is a feeble bulwark against a truly imperial executive. ¶ First, the executive-despotism concern supposes that executive officials desire, above all, to maximize their power. As Daryl Levinson has emphasized, both for officials generally and for executive officials in particular, it is hardly obvious that this is so,

at least in any systematic way. Lower—level executive officials and administrative agencies have many other possible goals or maximands, including the desire to enjoy leisure or to advance programmatic or ideological goals—goals which will usually be orthogonal to the tradeoff between security and liberty and which might even include the protection of civil liberties. The same is true for presidents: some have been power maximizers; some have not. Moreover, even with respect to power-maximizing presidents, critics fail to distinguish the [person] man from the office. Presidents as individuals do not internalize all of the gains from expanding the power of the presidency as an institution, because those gains are shared with future presidents and senior executive officials. Conversely, presidents as individuals do not fully internalize harms to the institution and may thus acquiesce its limitations on executive power for partisan or personal advantage. The latter point may be more pronounced in emergencies than in normal times, because emergencies shorten the relevant time horizon: policymaking for the short run looms larger than in normal times. (We bracket for now the question of whether this is bad, an issue taken up in chapter 2.) Emergencies thus increase the divergence between the utility of individual officeholders and the institutional power of their offices, which extends into the remote future, beyond the horizon of the emergency.¶ Second, whatever the intrinsic preferences of presidents and executive officials, politics sharply constrains their opportunities for aggrandizement, especially in times of emergency. The president is elected from a national constituency (ignoring the low probability that the Electoral College will make a difference). A first—term president who seeks reelection to a second term, or even a second—term president who seeks to leave a legacy, will try to appeal to the median voter, or at least to some politically engaged constituency that is unlikely to be extremist in either direction. If the national median or the political center favors increased executive authority during emergencies, them the president will push the bounds of his power, but if it does not, then he will not: there is no general reason to think that national politics will always push executive authority as far as possible, even during emergencies.¶ Of course, during emergencies, the public will often favor increased executive power, and this may be fully sensible, given the executive’s relative decisiveness, secrecy, centralization, and other advantages over Congress and other institutions. Note, in this connection, the important finding that political constraints on the executive are associated with increased terrorism; shackling the executive has real security costs. The critics of executive power typically assume that executive power not only expands during emergencies, but expands too far. However, the critics supply no general reason to think this is so; they systematically conflate increases in executive power with “aggrandizement,” a normatively loaded concept which connotes an unjustified increase. We return to this point shortly. Here, the point is just that the expansion of presidential power during emergencies may reflect nothing more than the demands of the politically effective public, rather than intrinsic opportunism.¶ The political constraints on the executive branch and the president are partisan as well as institutional. The president is the leader of a political party but is also beholden to it. The party constrains the president in various ways, and it is not necessarily in the interest of a single party to enhance the power of the executive during emergencies. For one thing, the president’s party may not win the next presidential election; for another, his party may have many other bases of power, including Congress, the judiciary, and local institutions. Expanding the president’s personal or institutional power need not be in the interest of partisan politicians who govern behind the scenes. Opposition parties, of course, have powerful incentives to criticize the expansion of presidential power during emergencies, portraying small adjustments to the legal rules as omens of a putsch. In emergencies, partisan criticism can make the political constraints on presidents even tighter than during normal times, a point we emphasize in chapter 5. Governmental decisionmaking is often more visible during emergencies than during normal times; emergency policymaking is more centralized, even within the executive branch, and more closely associated with the president; the resulting polices often present a larger target for political attack. ¶ Third, the critics of executive power in emergencies are usually unclear about their normative premises. Suppose that executive power increases during emergencies and that this results in abuses. In terms of the tradeoff thesis, however, such abuses are just a cost to be measured against the benefits of increased security, given the finding, reported above, that a constrained executive is associated with higher levels terrorism. If the gains on the security margin exceed the costs, then the expansion of executive power improves social welfare overall, and no special opprobrium should attach to the executive’s behavior, although it would be nice to also prevent the abuses if possible. The critics treat executive abuses of civil liberties as something to be minimized, down to zero. But this is quixotic, and even if it were feasible, it would not be desirable. Some rate of abuse is inevitable once an executive branch is created, and an increase in abuses is inevitable when executive discretion expands during emergencies but both shifts may be worth it; the critics fail to account for the gains side of the ledger. Granting the executive extensive powers during emergencies has many benefits, about which the critics are often silent.¶ Concerns about increasing executive power often rest on an implicit status quo bias, or naturalistic fallacy. The assumption is that the scope or level of executive power before the emergency was optimal. But this need not be so, and there is no general reason to think it will be so; consider the finding that the 7/7 attacks in London went unprevented because the United Kingdom’s intelligence services, who knew something about the plotters, had too few resources to investigate them adequately. Emergencies may release the polity from a sclerotic equilibrium in which executive power was too feeble to meet new challenges, as we illustrate in Chapter 4. One interpretation of history is that emergencies allow presidents to obtain powers that are necessary to cope with new problems. Our original constitutional structure, with a relatively weak presidency, reflects the concerns of the eighteenth century and is not well adapted to current conditions.¶ Finally, to the extent that the critics of executive power envision judicial review as the solution, they are whistling in the wind, especially during times of emergency. The critics envision an imperial executive, who is either backed by a sustained national majority or else has slipped the political leash, and who enjoys so much agency slack as to be heedless of the public’s preferences. Its either case, it is not obvious what the critics suppose the judges will or can do about it. As we will recount in more detail in later chapters, the judges proved largely powerless to stem the tide of the New Deal, in conditions of economic emergency, or to stop Japanese internment during World War II, or to block aggressive punishment and harassment of communists during the Cold War. What is more, many of the judges had no desire to block these programs. Judges are people too and share in national political sentiments: they are also part of the political elite and will rally ‘round the flag in times of emergency just as much as others do.¶ Critics of executive power implicitly appeal to a slippery—slope argument: once executive power is increased to meet an emergency in a manner that is necessary and reasonable, it will unavoidably expand beyond what is necessary and reasonable. As we emphasize in chapters 4 and 5, the problem with this argument is that there is no evidence for it and no mechanism that generates such a slope. The critics focus obsessively on pathological polities like Weimar, ignoring that current well-functioning liberal democracies do not present the same conditions that led to dictatorship in 1933. More recent work in comparative politics suggests that grants of emergency powers or of decree authority to executives do no systematically end in dictatorship.

### Modeling: Ext1A—US Not Key 2NC

#### All their “precedent” evidence relies on the assertion that there’s a causal link between U.S. drone doctrine and other’ countries choices---that’s not true---no tangible evidence

Kenneth Anderson 11, Professor of International Law at American University, 10/9/11, “What Kind of Drones Arms Race Is Coming?,” <http://www.volokh.com/2011/10/09/what-kind-of-drones-arms-race-is-coming/#more-51516>

New York Times national security correspondent Scott Shane has an opinion piece in today’s Sunday Times predicting an “arms race” in military drones. The methodology essentially looks at the US as the leader, followed by Israel – countries that have built, deployed and used drones in both surveillance and as weapons platforms. It then looks at the list of other countries that are following fast in US footsteps to both build and deploy, as well as purchase or sell the technology – noting, correctly, that the list is a long one, starting with China. The predicament is put this way:

Eventually, the United States will face a military adversary or terrorist group armed with drones, military analysts say. But what the short-run hazard experts foresee is not an attack on the United States, which faces no enemies with significant combat drone capabilities, but the political and legal challenges posed when another country follows the American example. The Bush administration, and even more aggressively the Obama administration, embraced an extraordinary principle: that the United States can send this robotic weapon over borders to kill perceived enemies, even American citizens, who are viewed as a threat.

“Is this the world we want to live in?” asks Micah Zenko, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. “Because we’re creating it.”

By asserting that “we’re” creating it, this is a claim that there is an arms race among states over military drones, and that it is a consequence of the US creating the technology and deploying it – and then, beyond the technology, changing the normative legal and moral rules in the international community about using it across borders. In effect, the combination of those two, technological and normative, forces other countries in strategic competition with the US to follow suit. (The other unstated premise underlying the whole opinion piece is a studiously neutral moral relativism signaled by that otherwise unexamined phrase “perceived enemies.” Does it matter if they are not merely our “perceived” but are our actual enemies? Irrespective of what one might be entitled to do to them, is it so very difficult to conclude, even in the New York Times, that Anwar al-Awlaki was, in objective terms, our enemy?)

It sounds like it must be true. But is it? There are a number of reasons to doubt that moves by other countries are an arms race in the sense that the US “created” it or could have stopped it, or that something different would have happened had the US not pursued the technology or not used it in the ways it has against non-state terrorist actors. Here are a couple of quick reasons why I don’t find this thesis very persuasive, and what I think the real “arms race” surrounding drones will be.

Unmanned aerial vehicles have clearly got a big push from the US military in the way of research, development, and deployment. But the reality today is that the technology will transform civil aviation, in many of the same ways and for the same reasons that another robotic technology, driverless cars (which Google is busily plying up and down the streets of San Francisco, but which started as a DARPA project). UAVs will eventually move into many roles in ordinary aviation, because it is cheaper, relatively safer, more reliable – and it will eventually include cargo planes, crop dusting, border patrol, forest fire patrols, and many other tasks. There is a reason for this – the avionics involved are simply not so complicated as to be beyond the abilities of many, many states. Military applications will carry drones many different directions, from next-generation unmanned fighter aircraft able to operate against other craft at much higher G stresses to tiny surveillance drones. But the flying-around technology for aircraft that are generally sizes flown today is not that difficult, and any substantial state that feels like developing them will be able to do so.

But the point is that this was happening anyway, and the technology was already available. The US might have been first, but it hasn’t sparked an arms race i

n any sense that absent the US push, no one would have done this. That’s just a fantasy reading of where the technology in general aviation was already going; Zenko’s ‘original sin’ attribution of this to the US opening Pandora’s box is not a credible understanding of the development and applications of the technology. Had the US not moved on this, the result would have been a US playing catch-up to someone else. For that matter, the off-the-shelf technology for small, hobbyist UAVs is simple enough and available enough that terrorists will eventually try to do their own amateur version, putting some kind of bomb on it.

Moving on from the avionics, weaponizing the craft is also not difficult. The US stuck an anti-tank missile on a Predator; this is also not rocket science. Many states can build drones, many states can operate them, and crudely weaponizing them is also not rocket science. The US didn’t spark an arms race; this would occur to any state with a drone. To the extent that there is real development here, it lies in the development of specialized weapons that enable vastly more discriminating targeting. The details are sketchy, but there are indications from DangerRoom and other observers (including some comments from military officials off the record) that US military budgets include amounts for much smaller missiles designed not as anti-tank weapons, but to penetrate and kill persons inside a car without blowing it to bits, for example. This is genuinely harder to do – but still not all that difficult for a major state, whether leading NATO states, China, Russia, or India. The question is whether it would be a bad thing to have states competing to come up with weapons technologies that are … more discriminating.

### Modeling: Ext2—No Arms Race 2NC

#### No arms race – our Singh evidence says states won’t pursue drones due to their narrow applications, enormous diplomatic and political costs, and credible state defenses

#### AND, the costs outweigh the benefits – reject aff alarmism

**Singh 12** – researcher at the Center for a New American Security (Joseph, “Betting Against a Drone Arms Race”, 8/13, <http://nation.time.com/2012/08/13/betting-against-a-drone-arms-race/#ixzz2TxEkUI37>, CMR)

In short, the doomsday drone scenario Ignatieff and Sharkey predict results from an excessive focus on rapidly-evolving military technology.¶ Instead, we must return to what we know about state behavior in an anarchistic international order. Nations will confront the same principles of deterrence, for example, when deciding to launch a targeted killing operation regardless of whether they conduct it through a drone or a covert amphibious assault team.¶ Drones may make waging war more domestically palatable, but they don’t change the very serious risks of retaliation for an attacking state. Any state otherwise deterred from using force abroad will not significantly increase its power projection on account of acquiring drones.¶ What’s more, the very states whose use of drones could threaten U.S. security – countries like China – are not democratic, which means that the possible political ramifications of the low risk of casualties resulting from drone use are irrelevant. For all their military benefits, putting drones into play requires an ability to meet the political and security risks associated with their use.¶ Despite these realities, there remain a host of defensible arguments one could employ to discredit the Obama drone strategy. The legal justification for targeted killings in areas not internationally recognized as war zones is uncertain at best.¶ Further, the short-term gains yielded by targeted killing operations in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen, while debilitating to Al Qaeda leadership in the short-term, may serve to destroy already tenacious bilateral relations in the region and radicalize local populations.¶ Yet, the past decade’s experience with drones bears no evidence of impending instability in the global strategic landscape. Conflict may not be any less likely in the era of drones, but the nature of 21st Century warfare remains fundamentally unaltered despite their arrival in large numbers.

#### Realist theory disproves the advantage

JM Greico- professor of political science at Duke University, 1993 “Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate”¶ edited by David Allen Baldwin, chapter entitled “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism” p. 116-118

Realism has dominated international relations theory at least since World War II.' For realists, international anarchy fosters competition and conflict among states and inhibits their willingness to cooperate even when they share common interests. Realist theory also argues that international institutions are unable to mitigate anarchy's constraining effects on interstate cooperation. Realism, then, presents a pessimistic analysis of the prospects for international cooperation and of the capabilities of international institutions.2¶ The major challenger to realism has been what I shall call liberal institutionalism. Prior to the current decade, it appeared in three successive presentations—functionalist integration theory in the 1940s and early 1950s, neofunctionalist regional integration theory in the 1950s and 1960s, and interdependence theory in the 1970s.3 All three versions rejected realism's propositions about states and its gloomy understanding of world politics. Most significantly, they argued that international institutions can help states cooperate. Thus, compared to realism, these earlier versions of liberal institutionalism offered a more hopeful prognosis for international cooperation and a more optimistic assessment of the capacity of institutions to help states achieve it.¶ International tensions and conflicts during the 1970s undermined liberal institutionalism and reconfirmed realism in large measure. Yet that difficult decade did not witness a collapse of the international system, and in the light of continuing modest levels of interstate cooperation, a new liberal institutionalist challenge to realism came forward during the early 1980s (Stein 1983:115-40; Axelrod 1984; Keohane 1984; Lipson 1984; Axelrod and Keohane 1985). What is distinctive about this newest liberal institutionalism is its claim that it accepts a number of core realist propositions, including, apparently, the realist argument that anarchy impedes the achievement of international cooperation. However, the core liberal arguments—that realism overemphasizes conflict and underestimates the capacities of international institutions to promote cooperation—remain firmly intact. The new liberal institutionalists basically argue that even if the realists are correct in believing that anarchy constrains the willingness of states to cooperate, states nevertheless can work together and can do so especially with the assistance of international institutions.¶ This point is crucial for students of international relations. If neo-liberal institutionalists are correct, then they have dealt realism a major blow while providing ine intellectual justification for treating their own approach, and the tradition from which it emerges, as the most effective for understanding world politics.¶ This essay's principal argument is that, in fact, neoliberal institutionalism misconstrues the realist analysis of international anarchy and therefore it misunderstands the realist analysis of the impact of anarchy on the preferences and actions of states. Indeed, the new liberal institutionalism fails to address a major constraint on the willingness of states to cooperate which is generated by international anarchy and which is identified by realism. As a result, the new theory's optimism about international cooperation is likely to be proven wrong.¶ Neoliberalism's claims about cooperation are based on its belief that states are atomistic actors. It argues that states seek to maximize their individual absolute gains and are indifferent to the gains achieved by others. Cheating, the new theory suggests, is the greatest impediment to cooperation among rationally egoistic states, but international institutions, the new theory also suggests, can help states overcome this barrier to joint action. Realists understand that states seek absolute gains and worry about compliance. However, realists¶ find that states are positional, not atomistic, in character, and therefore realists argue that, in addition to concerns about cheating, states in cooperative arrangements also worry that their partners might gain more from cooperation that they do. For realists, a state will focus both on its absolute and relative gains from cooperation, and a state that is satisfied with a partner's compliance in a joint arrangement might nevertheless exit from it because the partner is achieving relatively greater gains. Realism, then, finds that there are at least two major barriers to international cooperation: state concerns about cheating and state concerns about relative achievements of gains. Neoliberal institutionalism pays attention exclusively to the former and is unable to identify, analyze, or account for the latter.¶ Realism's identification of the relative gains problem for cooperation is based on its insight that states in anarchy fear for their survival as independent actors. According to realists, states worry that today's friend may be tomorrow's enemy in war, and fear that achievements of joint gains that advantage a friend in the present might produce a more dangerous potential foe in the future. As a result, states must give serious attention to the gains of partners. Neoliber-als fail to consider the threat of war arising from international anarchy, and this allows them to ignore the matter of relative gains and to assume that states only desire absolute gains. Yet in doing so, they fail to identify a major source of state inhibitions about international cooperation.¶ In sum, I suggest that realism, its emphasis on conflict and competition notwithstanding, offers a more complete understanding of the problem of international cooperation than does its latest liberal challenger. If that is true, then realism is still the most powerful theory of international politics.

### Drones

#### Hard power key- drones are good, solve war—sopo irrel

Sheridan 12 (Greg, Foreign Editor @ the Australian, “Soft power reaps only a hard fall”, Sept 22, <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/opinion/columnists/soft-power-reaps-only-a-hard-fall/story-e6frg76f-1226479045323>, CMR)

The US's standing in the Middle East, and the Muslim world more widely, is just as bad as it ever was under Bush.¶ Here is a hard truth. Islamist extremists didn't hate America because of Bush. They hated Bush because of America. And now they hate Obama, because of America.¶ On the upside, Obama has given us almost everything we might have hoped for in a McCain presidency in terms of the Asia Pacific and a renewed emphasis on alliances. Indeed, although Asian political elites tend to be more comfortable with Republicans, most of them broadly, if relatively lukewarmly, want Obama to win re-election.¶ Asians are worried about the departure of Hillary Clinton and the Assistant Secretary of State, Kurt Campbell, who have been extremely good for Asia.¶ Obama's successes in national security have come almost entirely from the use of hard power, drone strikes on specific terrorists in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the Navy Seal mission that killed Osama bin Laden.¶ The failure, however, of his soft power in the Middle East is extraordinary.

It is not necessarily a fatal setback, but it holds some important lessons.¶ If ever a US president was going to garner goodwill in the Muslim world it was surely going to be Barack Hussein Obama, with his Kenyan father, his post-colonial consciousness, his years of childhood in Muslim Indonesia, his eloquence on racial issues, the global pop star vibe he generated.¶ It wasn't only his identity and global media adulation that Obama had going for him. He made every conceivable effort in making overtures to the Muslim world. He tiptoed around Iranian sensibilities, extended an open hand to the ayatollahs, refrained even from voicing any early criticism when they stole an election. In Cairo Obama made an eloquent plea for reconciliation between the Muslim world and America. He beat up on Israel, even at one point refusing to be seen in public with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and he made an elaborate bow to a Saudi royal.¶ But none of it has won anything from the Middle East. It may be that Bush overestimated what hard power could achieve. But in his first year in office, Obama certainly overestimated what soft power, and his own personality and eloquence, could achieve.¶ After a pretty dismal first year, Obama got much tougher and much more effective. On the Middle East, his policy has been pretty ineffective but I am at a loss to imagine what a more effective policy might have looked like.

## 1NR

### China: 1NC

#### Credibility means we pressure china

**Washington Post 10** (“Clinton, Gates offer distinct messages on human rights in Asia”, 7/22/10, <http://voices.washingtonpost.com/checkpoint-washington/2010/07/perhaps_it_is_a_coincidence.html>)

Clinton, on her first overseas trip, caused waves when she said promotion of human rights in China would have to take a back seat issues such as climate change and the financial crisis. Administration officials at the time said the White House was taking a more subtle approach on human rights, first seeking to reestablish U.S. credibility by pledging to close the detention center at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and then working behind the scenes to advance change overseas.

#### Increasing pressure kills relations and causes a china-US war

Bandow 12 (nov 7, Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to President Ronald Reagan. “The U.S. And China: Seeking Cooperation, But Finding Confrontation” http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/us-china-seeking-cooperation-finding-confrontation

In short, the Obama administration appears to have handled a difficult situation reasonably well, despite the exaggerated criticism from those like Mitt Romney, who denounced the “day of shame for the Obama administration.” While Chen was in the U.S. embassy Washington had a moral obligation, irrespective of Beijing’s desires, not to turn him over for likely prosecution or persecution. (The situation was different than for Wang Lijun, Bo’s top cop who fell afoul of his political mentor and sought refuge at an American consulate in February; the U.S. owes nothing to those with blood on their hands.) If the Chinese government would not let Chen leave the country, he should have been allowed to stay in the embassy as long as he wished. In fact, after Tiananmen Square the late astrophysicist Fang Lizhi and his wife remained at the U.S. embassy for 13 months before being allowed to depart China.¶ However, once Chen left the embassy—the exact circumstances remain in dispute—U.S. officials could do little for him. Rep. Chris Smith (R-NJ) proclaimed that Chen’s status was “a test to the United States of whether or not human rights really matter.” The Washington Post editorialized: “the United States must defend him and his family—and not allow business as usual in U.S.-Chinese relations.” If only it was that easy.¶ Even had the embassy sent someone to the hospital with him, it could not watch over him day and night for the rest of his life. Nor could Washington effectively protest every new sanction imposed by Beijing for every new offense, real or imagined. Washington cannot dictate how another country treats a particular citizen or enforce another government’s promise to treat him a certain way. In fact, in 2006 the Bush administration unsuccessfully pushed for Chen’s release on criminal charges, for which he spent nearly four years in prison. Chen’s apparent change of heart, deciding that he wanted to leave China, was understandable, but left Washington with little leverage. The “study abroad” tactic probably was the best option available.¶ Nevertheless, there are some who seem prepared to sacrifice the entire bilateral relationship in an attempt to advance human rights. For instance, The Patriot Post, a conservative online publication, lamented that “Obama’s lack of leadership on the world stage has repeatedly left democracy activists around the world at the mercy of their repressive regimes.” Actually, the chief miscreant in such cases is “their repressive regimes.” Anyway, what, one wonders, would the critics have the president do to such governments—including several important American allies—if they resist U.S. pressure? Nuke ‘em?¶ Human rights cannot become the sum of America’s relationship with China. First, the U.S. has a range of interests at stake. Economic ties are important and involve more than just corporate profits: job creation and economic growth also matter. Beijing also can advance or impede important American geopolitical interests, including nuclear proliferation, international conflict, and human rights—consider issues involving Burma, Iran, North Korea, and Sudan, to name a few.¶ Most important is the maintenance of peace. One of the most dangerous international moments occurs when a new weltmacht challenges established powers. In the case of Germany two world wars resulted. This history must not be repeated with China. That requires fostering a cooperative rather than confrontational relationship, despite sometimes important differences.

#### Global nuclear war

Hunkovic 09 (Lee J, American Military University, “The Chinese-Taiwanese Conflict: Possible Futures of a Confrontation between China, Taiwan and the United States of America”, [http://www.lamp-method.org/eCommons/ Hunkovic.pdf](http://www.lamp-method.org/eCommons/Hunkovic.pdf))

A war between China, Taiwan and the United States has the potential to escalate into a nuclear conflict and a third world war, therefore, many countries other than the primary actors could be affected by such a conflict, including Japan, both Koreas, Russia, Australia, India and Great Britain, if they were drawn into the war, as well as all other countries in the world that participate in the global economy, in which the United States and China are the two most dominant members. If China were able to successfully annex Taiwan, the possibility exists that they could then plan to attack Japan and begin a policy of aggressive expansionism in East and Southeast Asia, as well as the Pacific and even into India, which could in turn create an international standoff and deployment of military forces to contain the threat. In any case, if China and the United States engage in a full-scale conflict, there are few countries in the world that will not be economically and/or militarily affected by it. However, China, Taiwan and United States are the primary actors in this scenario, whose actions will determine its eventual outcome, therefore, other countries will not be considered in this study.

#### RELATIONS solve everytying

KOREA

TAIWAN

SOUTH ASIA

ENVIRONMENT (WARMING/SPECIES)

John **Desperes**, analyst, RAND Corporation, CHINA, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, ed. Shuxun Chen & Charles Wolf, 20**01**, p. 227-228.

Nevertheless, America’s main interests in China have been quite constant, namely peace, security, and prosperity, and a healthy environment. Chinese interests in the United States have also been quite constant and largely compatible, notwithstanding sharp differences over Taiwan, strategic technology transfers, trade, and human rights. Indeed, U.S.-Chinese relations have been consistently driven by strong common interests in preventing mutually damaging wars in Asia that could involve nuclear weapons; in ensuring that Taiwan’s relations with the mainland remain peaceful; in sustaining the growth of the U.S., China, and other Asian-Pacific economies; and, in preserving natural environments that sustain healthy and productive lives.

What happens in China matters to Americans. It affects America’s prosperity. China’s growing economy is a valuable market to many workers, farmers, and businesses across America, not just to large multinational firms like Boeing, Microsoft, and Motorola, and it could become much more valuable by opening its markets further. China also affects America’s security. It could either help to stabilize or destabilize currently peaceful but sometimes tense and dangerous situations in Korea, where U.S. troops are on the front line; in the Taiwan Straits, where U.S. democratic values and strategic credibility may be at stake; and in nuclear-armed South Asia, where renewed warfare could lead to terrible consequences. It also affects America’s environment. Indeed, how China meets its rising energy needs and protects its dwindling habitats will affect the global atmosphere and currently endangered species.

#### Human rights pressure is a nationalist trump card- causes crackdown within china and kills relations

Bandow 12 (nov 7, Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to President Ronald Reagan. “The U.S. And China: Seeking Cooperation, But Finding Confrontation” <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/us-china-seeking-cooperation-finding-confrontation>

Second, Washington’s human rights pressure may help one person whileparadoxically hurting others. Chen apparently will get to leave, but this verypublic battle may encourage Beijing to crack down more ferociously on other opposition figures—at least to ensure that next time house arrest is not so easily evaded. Already the regime apparently has detained or placed under house arrest some activists who aided Chen’s flight to the embassy. The Financial Times declared this to be “unacceptable,” without suggesting a practical response. Other human rights activists fear that the PRC might target them to discourage further challenges. Warned Liu Feiyue, “after the Chen Guangcheng incident, the situation for us will just become worse and worse.”¶ Moreover, it is difficult to gauge the impact of Washington’s high-profile involvement on the leadership dynamic within Zhongnanhai. For instance, Bo Xilai’s fall appeared to embolden more pragmatic reformers. Indeed, one of Bo’s allies thought to face increased pressure is Zhou Yongkang, a hard-liner in charge of internal security. Yet the Chen imbroglio may have dealt a nationalist trump card to him and others like him. The official Chinese media has been busily bashing America for interfering in Chinese affairs.¶ This doesn’t mean Chen did anything wrong. To the contrary, the villain is an authoritarian state that fears its own people. However, in responding U.S. officials have an obligation to consider more than any particular case in front of them. Finding the right balance is rarely likely to be easy. Washington will do best if it practices its own ideals—for instance, Chinese citizens have noticed when American officials act with humility, contra Chinese political elites—and gets its own economic house in order.¶ Much is at stakein the evolving relationship between the globe’s superpower and the likely next superpower.The PRC is not an inevitable adversary, but much could go wrong between two great nations. Washington and Beijing together must prevent that from happening. To the contrary, both countries could do much working together to promote economic growth, advance geopolitical stability, and confront global problems. And—hopefully, some day—together promote respect for the life and dignity of every human being. As Bob Fu of the China Aid Association put it, “China will move toward the ‘right side of history’ only when it recognizes that people like Chen are its strength, not its enemy.”

#### Low credibility key to NGO distancing—that’s key to human rights

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(Mark, “Washington's Lost Credibility on Human Rights,” 3-11<http://www.cepr.net/index.php/op-eds-&-columns/op-eds-&-columns/washingtons-lost-credibility-on-human-rights/>) atw

U.S.-based human rights organizations will undoubtedly see the erosion of Washington's credibility on these issues as a loss – and understandably so, since the United States is still a powerful country, and they hope to use this power to pressure other countries on human rights issues. **But they tooshould be careful to avoid the kind of politicization that has earned notoriety for the State Department's annual report – which clearly discriminates between allies and "adversary" countries in its evaluations.** The case of the recent Human Rights Watch report on Venezuela illustrates the dangers of this spillover of the politicization of human rights from the U.S. government to Washington-based non-governmental organizations (NGO's). More than 100 scholars and academics wrote a letter complaining about the report, arguing that it did not meet "minimal standards of scholarship, impartiality, accuracy, or credibility." For example, the report alleges that the Venezuelan government discriminates against political opponents in the provision of government services; but as evidence for this charge it provides only one alleged incident involving one person, in programs that serve many millions of Venezuelans. Human Rights Watch responded with a defense of its report, but the exchange of letters indicates that HRW would have been better off acknowledging the report's errors and prejudice, and taking corrective measures. **Independence from Washington will be increasingly important for international human rights organizationsgoing forward if they don't want to suffer the same loss of international legitimacy on human rights that the U.S. government has**. Amnesty International's report last month calling for an arms embargo on both Israel and Hamas following Israel's assault on Gaza – emphasizing that the Obama administration should "immediately suspend U.S. military aid to Israel" until "there is no longer a substantial risk that such equipment will be used for serious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights abuses" – is a positive example. The report's statement that "Israel's military intervention in the Gaza Strip has been equipped to a large extent by U.S.-supplied weapons, munitions and military equipment paid for with U.S. taxpayers' money," undoubtedly didn't win friends in the U.S. government. **But this is the kind of independent advocacy that strengthens the international credibility of human rights groups, and it is badly needed.**

#### IMPACT EMPIRICALLY DENIED- THOUSANDS OF YEARS OF ABUSES DISPROVE ESCALATION

### NATO Impact

#### NATO has been empirically unsuccessful dealing with peacekeeping, expansion, Russia, and counter-proliferation.

Robert Blackwill (faculty at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government) Ronald D. Asmus and F. Stephen Larrabee (senior analysts in the International Policy Department at RAND) Spring, 96 Can NATO Survive?, The Washington Quarterly

An interim report card on NATO in the post-cold war period, however, shows much worse marks when one measures the alliance's rhetoric against its performance. This is especially true for many of its new missions. Until late 1995, NATO's peacekeeping/peacemaking efforts in Bosnia were largely ineffective. The future of the implementation force remains uncertain. Although a decision on enlargement has been taken, the alliance consensus remains shaky, and the road ahead is littered with obstacles. NATO's attempt to build a new cooperative relationship with Russia is foundering. The U.S. initiative on counter-proliferation has made some progress in risk assessment and discussion of needed military capabilities. But consensus is far from being at hand in the alliance that NATO should be the prime Western military instrument to deal with proliferating rogue states. And the Mediterranean outreach is at present only vague talk.