**Hegemony Bad: 1NC**

**ONE--heg is unsustainable**

Christopher **Layne**, Professor, National Security, Texas A&M University, “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and *Pax Americana,*”INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, 20**12**, Wiley, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00704.x/full, accessed 6-9-12.

Before the Great Recession’s foreshocks in fall 2007, most American security studies scholars believed that unipolarity—and perforce American hegemony—would be enduring features of international politics far into the future. However, in the Great Recession’s aftermath, it is apparent that much has changed since 2007. **Predictions of continuing unipolarity have been superseded by premonitions of American decline and geopolitical transformation**. The **Great Recession** has had a two-fold impact. First, it **highlighted the shift of global** wealth—and **power—from West to East, a trend illustrated by China’s breathtakingly rapid rise to great power status.** Second**, it has raised doubts about the robustness of US primacy’s economic and financial underpinnings.** This article argues that **the unipolar moment is over, and** the **Pax Americana**—the era of American ascendancy in international politics that began in 1945—**is fast winding down**. This article challenges the conventional wisdom among International Relations/Security Studies scholars on three counts. First, it shows that **contrary to the claims of unipolar stability theorists, the distribution of power in the international system no longer is unipolar**. Second, this article revisits the 1980s’ debate about American decline and demonstrates that **the Great Recession has vindicated the** so-called **declinists** of that decade. Finally, this article takes on the institutional lock-in argument, which holds that by strengthening the Pax Americana’s legacy institutions, the United States can perpetuate the essential elements of the international order it constructed following World War II even as the material foundations of American primacy erode.

**TWO, turn—regionalization**

**a. Decline spurs it, more stable than dominance**

Leon T. **Hadar**, Cato Institute, "Welcome to the Post-Unipolar World: Great for the U.S. and for the Rest," HUFFINGTON POST, 7--8--**10**, <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11967>

Moreover, in the context of the evolving international system under which America is gradually losing its post-Cold War unipolar status, trying to reset U.S. relationship with Russia as part of an overall policy to improve ties with other rising global players, like China, India, Brazil and Turkey makes a lot of sense. This is a cost-effective strategy that could help Washington win support from Russia for policies that actually strengthen U.S. national security and economic interests. At the same time, the fact that Georgia is also improving its ties with Iran and Turkey — and Russia — should not be considered a "loss" for Washington. By establishing close economic ties with Iran and Turkey, Georgia is helping facilitate economic cooperation in the region that could lead to diplomatic collaboration and provide for more stability in the Caucasus and the Middle East. Why should Washington be opposed to such a process that brings more economic prosperity and secure a regional stable balance of power? Georgia may or may not regain control of its lost territories, not unlike, say, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Serbia, etc., who seemed to have been able to cope with their territorial contraction. But the U.S. does not have the strategic interest or the moral obligation to change the new status quo, or for that matter, to invite Georgia to join NATO — remind me again why that organization still exists? — and commit American military power to provide that country with what would amount to disincentives for improving its relations with its close neighbors. In a way, the collapse of the American-controlled unipolar system — and before that, the end of the bipolar system of the Cold War — should help us recognize that **international relations have ceased to be a zero-sum-game** under which gains of other global powers become by definition a loss for America, and vice versa. It was inevitable that former members of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Bloc like Ukraine, Poland, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia will try to stabilize their diplomatic and economic ties with Russia, while at the same time deterring powerful Russia by expanding cooperation with other players: Poland with Ukraine with Germany; Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia with Turkey and Iran, and all of these countries with the U.S and the European Union (EU). Similarly, Washington should welcome — not discourage — the growing diplomatic and economic role that Turkey is playing in the Middle East, which could help bring stability to Iraq (and allow for American military to start withdrawing from there), moderate the policies of Iran (and prevent a military conflict with the U.S.), encourage negotiations between Israel and Syria, and lead eventually to the creation of a more stable Middle East where Turkey, Iran, the Arabs states and Israel will be more secure and prosperous. It is not surprising those representatives of economic and bureaucratic interests in Washington, and some of America's client states that draw benefits from American interventionist policy, operate under **the axiom that the U.S. should always be prepared to "do somethin**g" to "resolve" this or that conflict, here, there, and everywhere. That kind of never-ending American interventionism **only discourages regional powers, counting on Washington to come to their aid, from** actually **taking steps to resolve** those **conflicts that end-up drawing-in other regional and global players**, ensuring that America will never leave Japan and Korea (to help contain China), Iraq (to deter Iran), Afghanistan (to deal with Pakistan). And that is exactly what the pro-interventionists in Washington want when they suggested that America is the "indispensable power." In any case, **the notion that American hegemony is a precondition for global peace and security** and that Washington needs therefore to extend its military commitments in Europe, the Middle East, Caucus, East Asia and elsewhere **is not very practical** **— America does not have the resources** in order to play that ambitious role — and is not very helpful, considering the most recent U.S. experience in the Middle East. The U.S. should not retreat from the world. But **by embracing a policy of "constructive disengagement"** from some parts of the world, **America could help itself and the rest of the world.**

**b. Solves terror, war, climate change**

Krishnan **Srinivasan**, "International Conflict and Cooperation in the 21st Century," THE ROUND TABLE v. 98 n. 400, 2--**09**, pp. 37-47.

The new world order of the ﬁrst half of the present century will be one of peaceful mutual accommodation between the big powers located in the East and West, North and South. The priority for these powers will be for economic progress and regional order, with defence expenditure being used to build technological capacity for deterrence against the other big powers and as an enabler for their self-appointed but globally recognized role as regional enforcers. In this neo-Hobbesian world system, the lesser states will come to their own bilateral arrangements with the local regional hegemon upon whom they will be dependent not only for their security but for economic, technical and trading facilitation. Some of these lesser entities will enjoy economic prosperity, depending on their ability to maintain internal cohesion, to turn globalization to their advantage, and to control the socio-economic consequences of climate change, but they will not be able to mount a challenge to the hierarchical nature of international society. They will have far greater recourse to the United Nations than the major powers, who will prefer to apply unilateral methods with the connivance and consent of their peers. The debate between Westphalian national sovereignty and the right to intervene to breach the sovereignty of other states on the grounds of preventing threats to international peace and security will not be resolved. Political and economic inequality between nations will be drawn in ever sharper focus. Regional institutions will be dominated by the local big power. Reform of the United Nations will be incomplete and unappealing to the vast majority of member states. The world’s hegemonic powers will lose faith in the Security Council as an effective mechanism to deliberate issues of peace and security. World bodies will be used for discussion of global issues such as the environment and climate change, pandemic disease, energy and food supplies, and development, but resulting action will primarily devolve on the big powers in the affected regions. This will particularly be the case in the realm of peace and security in which only the **regional hegemon will have the means, the will and the obligation**, for the sake of its own status and security, **to ensure resolution** or retribution as each case may demand. Even in a globalized world, regional and local action will be the prime necessity and such action will be left to the power best equipped to understand the particular circumstances, select the appropriate remedy and execute the action required to administer it. **Conﬂict will be contained and localized. There will be no menace of war on a world-wide scale and little fear of international terrorism**. Private-enterprise **terrorist actions will** continue to manifest political, social and economic frustrations, but they will **be** parochial, **ineffective and not state-sponsored**. There will be far less invocation of human rights in international politics, since these will be identiﬁed with a western agenda and western civilization: there will be an equal recognition of community rights and societal values associated with Eastern and other traditions. Chinese artists, Indian entrepreneurs, Russian actors, Iranian chefs, South African song-writers and Brazilian designers will be household names; models on the fashion cat-walk and sporting teams from all major countries will be distinctly multi-racial, reﬂecting the immigration to, but also the purchasing power of, the new major powers. National populations will show evidence of mixed race more than ever before in history. **Climate change will be an acknowledged global challenge and all countries, led by the regional hegemons, will undertake binding restraints on carbon emissions**. The world will become acutely conscious of the essentiality of access to fresh water. The pace of technological innovation will accelerate at dizzying speed, further accentuating inequalities. **There will be very rapid steps taken to develop alternative** sources of **energy** in the face of dwindling and costly oil supplies. Western industrialized nations, to remain competitive, will vacate vast areas of traditional manufacturing in favour of new technologies and green engineering. The world will be a safer and stable place until one of the hegemons eventually develops an obvious ascendancy ﬁrst regionally, then continentally and ﬁnally globally over all the others.

**c. warming causes Extinction**

Ronnie **Cummins** and Will Allen, Organic Consumers Association, "Climate Catastrophe: Surviving the 21st Century," 2--14--**10,** http://www.commondreams.org/view/2010/02/14-6

The hour is late. **Leading climate scientists** such as James Hansen **are** literally **shouting** at the top of their lungs **that the world needs to reduce emissions** by 20-40% **as soon as possible**, and 80-90% by the year 2050, **if we are to avoid climate chaos, crop failures, endless wars, melting of the polar icecaps, and a disastrous rise in ocean levels. Either we radically reduce CO2** and carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e, which includes all GHGs, not just CO2) pollutants (currently at 390 parts per million and rising 2 ppm per year) to 350 ppm, including agriculture-derived methane and nitrous oxide pollution, **or else survival for the present and future generations is in jeopardy**. As scientists warned at Copenhagen, business as usual and a corresponding 7-8.6 degree Fahrenheit rise in global temperatures means that the carrying capacity of the Earth in 2100 will be reduced to one billion people. Under this hellish scenario, **billions will die** of thirst, cold, heat, disease, war, and starvation.

**terrorism sparks global nuclear war**

**- Hellman ‘8** (Martin Hellman, Stanford Professor Emeritus, 2008, “Why worry about nuclear weapons now? Isn’t the Cold War over?”, http://nuclearrisk.org/1why\_now.php,)

**One of the possible triggers for a full-scale nuclear war is** an act of **nuclear terrorism**. Particularly if directed against an American or Russian city, **the resultant chaos has the potential to push the world over the nuclear cliff, much as a terrorist act in Sarajevo in 1914 was the spark that set off the First World War.** Conversely, **the danger of nuclear terrorism is increased by the large number of nuclear weapons.** **With over 25,000 still in existence** and thousands of people involved in their maintenance, storage and security, **the chance for error, theft or illicit sale is much too high**.

**THREE--no offense, states can handle their own security**

Leon T. **Hadar**, research fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, Cato Institute, "Saving U.S. Mideast Policy," NATIONAL INTEREST, 7--1--**11**, <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=13259>, accessed 9-4-11.

To do so, however, requires abandoning the mindset that any significant change in the foreign-policy status quo would signal isolationism and lead in short order to global chaos. Unless one assumes that there are no other capable powers in the world whose interests overlap with those of the United States — or, alternatively, that those nations would be catatonic and not seek to maintain stability in their own regions despite an obvious security interest in doing so — **the thesis of global chaos absent perpetual U.S. hegemony is utter nonsense**. America's **allies** and clients **free ride** on Washington's security exertions **because it is convenient** for them to do so, **not because they have no alternative**. The member states of the **E**uropean **U**nion, for example**, are certainly capable of handling any likely security problems** that might emerge in their neighborhood**. It is preposterous to assert that the EU, an entity that has both a larger population and a larger economy** than the United States, **cannot deal with new troubles i**n the Balkans — the most likely arena for instability.

**FOUR, transition now is key**

**A. Vital to stability**

Christopher **Layne**, Professor, National Security, Texas A&M University, “The Global Power Shift from West to East,” THE NATIONAL INTERST, May/June 20**12**, p. 31.

During the next two decades, **the** **U**nited **S**tates **will face** some **difficult** choices between bad outcomes and worse ones. But **such decisions could determine whether America will manage a graceful decline that conserves as much power and global stability as possible**. **A more ominous possibility is a precipitous power collapse** that reduces U.S. global influence dramatically. In any event, **Americans will have to adjust to the new order**, accepting the loss of some elements of national life they had taken for granted. In an age of austerity, **national resources will be limited, and competition for them will be intense**. If the country wants to do more at home, it will have to do less abroad**. It may have to choose between attempting to preserve American hegemony or repairing the U.S. economy a**nd maintaining the country’s social safety net. **The constellation of world power is changing, and U.S. grand strategy will have to change with it.** American elites must come to grips with the fact that the West does not enjoy a predestined supremacy in international politics that is locked into the future for an indeterminate period of time. The Euro-Atlantic world had a long run of global dominance, but it is coming to an end. The future is more likely to be shaped by the East. At the same time, Pax Americana also is winding down. The **U**nited **S**tates **can manage this relative decline effectively over the next couple of decades only if it first acknowledges the fundamental reality of decline**. The problem is that many Americans, particularly among the elites, have embraced the notion of American exceptionalism with such fervor that they can’t discern the world transformation occurring before their eyes.

**B. Key to multipolarity**

Christopher **Layne**, Professor, National Security, Texas A&M University, THE PEACE OF ILLUSIONS: AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY FROM 1940 TO PRESENT, 20**06**, p. 158.

At the same time, it doubtless is true that it will take some time for others’ balancing efforts to realize their intended outcome. Although the United States, contrary’ to my 1993 prediction, probably will not he challenged by great power rivals as early as 2010, it is even more doubtful that U.S. hegemony will endure until the early 2030s. **Is it worthwhile paying the price to hang onto unipolarity** for, at best, another two decades? **Given** that **American hegemony’ is destined to end sooner rather than later and that the costs of trying to “shape the international system” to America’s liking will rise (even as the benefits** of doing so **diminish), it would make more sense** grand strategically for the United States **to retrench and husband its resources for the long haul.** The United States can do this by adopting an offshore balancing grand strategy.

**C. Prevents extended deterrence breakdowns and nuclear war**

Christopher **Layne**, Professor, National Security, Texas A&M University, THE PEACE OF ILLUSIONS: AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY FROM 1940 TO PRESENT, 20**06**, p. 169.

Proponents of U.S. hegemony like to say that America’s military commitments in Eurasia are an insurance policy against the purportedly damaging consequences of a Eurasian great power war by preventing it from happening in the first place or limiting its harmful effects if it does happen. This is a dubious analogy, because insurance policies neither prevent, nor limit, damage to policyholders. Rather, they compensate the policyholder for damage incurred. Even on its own terms, however, the insurance policy argument is not persuasive. Both Californians and Floridians know that some types of insurance are either unaffordable or unobtainable at any price. The chances of the “Big One”—a catastrophic earthquake on the San Andreas Fault—jolting Los Angeles or San Francisco, or a Force 5 hurricane making a direct hit on Miami, are small. But if either were to happen the consequences could be catastrophic, which is why insurance companies don’t want to offer earthquake and hurricane insurance. Prospective great power wars in Eurasia represent a similar dynamic: the risk of such a **war breaking out** may be low, but if it does it **could be prohibitively expensive for the U**nited **S**tates **to be involved**. Rather than being instruments of regional pacification, today **America’s alliances** are transmission belts for war that **ensure** that **the U.S. would be embroiled in Eurasian wars.** In deciding whether to go war in Eurasia, the United States should not allow its hands to be tied in advance. For example, **a non—great power war** on the Korean Peninsula—**even if nuclear weapons were not involved**—would be very costly. **The dangers** of being entangled in a great power war in Eurasia, of course, **are even greater, and could expose the American homeland to nuclear attack.** An offshore balancing grand strategy would extricate the United States from the danger of being entrapped in Eurasian conflicts by its alliance commitments.

**FIVE, China**

**A. Holding on ensures a war--multiple scenarios**

Christopher **Layne**, Professor, National Security, Texas A&M University, “The Global Power Shift from West to East,” THE NATIONAL INTERST, May/June 20**12**, p. 28.

Beyond the U.S. financial challenge, the world is percolating with emerging nations bent on exploiting the power shift away from the West and toward states that long have been confined to subordinate status in the global power game. (Parag Khanna explores this phenomenon at length further in this issue.) By far the biggest test for the United States will be its relationship with China, which views itself as effecting a restoration of its former glory, before the First Opium War of 1839–1842 and its subsequent “century of humiliation.” After all, China and India were the world’s two largest economies in 1700, and as late as 1820 China’s economy was larger than the combined economies of all of Europe. The question of why the West emerged as the world’s most powerful civilization beginning in the sixteenth century, and thus was able to impose its will on China and India, has been widely debated. Essentially, the answer is firepower. As the late Samuel P. Huntington put it, “The West won the world not by the superiority of its ideas or values or religion . . . but rather by its superiority in applying organized violence. Westerners often forget this fact; non- Westerners never do.” Certainly, the Chinese have not forgotten. Now **Beijing aims to dominate its own** East and Southeast Asian b**ackyard**, just as a rising America sought to dominate the Western Hemisphere a century and a half ago. The United States and China now are competing for supremacy in East and Southeast Asia. Washington has been the incumbent hegemon there since World War II, and many in the American foreignpolicy establishment view China’s quest for regional hegemony as a threat that must be resisted. **This contest** for regional dominance **is fueling escalating tensions and** possibly **could lead to war**. In geopolitics, **two great cannot powers simultaneously be hegemonic in the same region**. **Unless one of them abandons its aspirations, there is a high probability of hostilities. Flashpoints that could spark a Sino-American conflict include** the unstable **Korea**n Peninsula; the disputed status of **Taiwan; competition for** control of oil and other natural **resources; and the burgeoning naval rivalry** between the two powers.

**B. Global nuclear**

**Johnson ’01** [Chalmers, “Time to Bring the Troops Home”, The Nation, May 14, LN]]

China is another matter. **No sane figure** in the Pentagon **wants a war with China**, and all serious US militarists know that China's minuscule nuclear capacity is not offensive but a deterrent against the overwhelming US power arrayed against it (twenty archaic Chinese warheads versus more than 7,000 US warheads). Taiwan, whose status constitutes the still incomplete last act of the Chinese civil war, remains the most dangerous place on earth. Much as the 1914 assassination of the Austrian crown prince in Sarajevo led to a war that no one wanted, **a misstep** in Taiwan **by any side could bring the United States and China into a conflict that neither wants**. Such a war would bankrupt the United States, deeply divide Japan and probably end in a Chinese victory, given that China is the world's most populous country and would be defending itself against a foreign aggressor. More seriously, **it could easily escalate into a nuclear holocaust**. However, given the nationalistic challenge to China's sovereignty of any Taiwanese attempt to declare its independence formally, **forward-deployed US forces** on China's borders **have virtually no deterrent effect.**

**Data disproves heg impacts**

**Fettweis, 11** Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO

It is perhaps worth noting that **there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between** the relative level of **U.S. activism and international stability**. In fact, **the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true**. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially**. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990**.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, **if** the pacific **trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but** **a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence.** The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: **The world grew more peaceful while the U**nited **S**tates **cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable U**nited **S**tates **military**, or at least **none took any action that would suggest** **such a belief**. **No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished**. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, **even if it is true that either U.S. commitments** or relative spending **account for global** pacific **trends**, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that **there is in fact a level of engagement below which the U**nited **S**tates **cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined**. **Grand strategic decisions are never final**; continual **adjustments can** and must **be made** as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled**. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should** at least **pose a problem**. As it stands, **the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending**. Evidently **the rest of the world can operate** quite **effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.**

**Preemption Advantage**

**No impact to human rights regime**

**McDonald** 6/14/**13** - UK-based international research analyst, with a specialist interest in the Balkans, writing for the Global Coalition for Conflict Transformation (James, 6/14/13, “The fallacy of “stability” – impunity, human rights and the meaning of the Haradinaj ruling,” http://www.transconflict.com/2013/06/the-fallacy-of-stability-impunity-human-rights-and-the-meaning-of-the-haradinaj-ruling-146/)JCP

If it is true that one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter, then for Ramush Haradinaj’s defence lawyer, at least, his acquittal on 29 November 2012 represented the victory of a liberation hero, proving “beyond the slightest doubt that he was a war hero and not a war criminal.” Ben Emmerson added: “Even to suggest that there was some kind of equivalence between the genocidal policies of the Milošević regime and the resistance of a people’s army seeking liberation and self-determination for the people of Kosova was a travesty from the start. It was the equivalent of putting the leaders of the French resistance in the dock at Nuremburg alongside the henchmen of Hitler’s Third Reich.” In an earlier interview Emmerson told the Independent newspaper that, although he “abhorred” violence and was a “pacifist by nature,” he had been driven to distinguish “between dishonourable violence and the use of violence as a last resort in support of an honourable cause such as leading a liberation struggle without targeting civilians.” Declaring that “legitimate violence” was sometimes “unavoidable,” Haradinaj, he declared, “fought an honourable war.”

This is not a view shared by many ICTY prosecutors or human rights organisations; at the same time, **there can be few indicted war criminals who have received so many glowing references from international statesmen and whose prosecution so many have fought so hard to prevent**. **When Haradinaj was indicted for war crimes and crimes against humanity** in March 2005 – **chiefly, for allegations that he had been involved in the “cruel treatment, torture and murder” of prisoners in the KLA camp at Jablanica, including the rape of women and young girls** – **officials in the province and Anglo-American politicians lined up to offer plaudits**. Joe **Biden praised his “dignified departure**” and politics of tolerance while Robin Cook who had helped lead the drive for war against Yugoslavia in 1999 as UK Foreign Minister lamented the loss of an “advocate of tolerance.” Likewise, **the UN special representative** to Kosovo Soren Jessen-Petersen who **pointed out that the indictment had been issued at a time when Kosovo was “closer than ever to achieving its aspirations” to independence**. **This last fact led Ben Emmerson to allege that his indictment was a deliberate strategy on the part of the authorities in Belgrade to “stifle a functioning independence for Kosovo.”** According to Florence Hartmann, Del Ponte’s former chief spokeswoman, the US State Department Chargé d’Affaires for Europe Kathleen Stevens even asked Del Ponte whether her evidence had been supplied to her by Belgrade.

In fact, **UN officials put considerable pressure on The Hague to abandon the charges**, repeatedly blocked attempts to indict him and, once he had been indicted, pressured the ICTY to release him on bail so he could continue his functions as prime minister. **Rather than a politicised trial taking place in the absence of evidence, then, it is more likely that it was political obstructions that made the prospect of a successful conviction almost impossible**. As Del Ponte herself stated with evident frustration, the trial of Haradinaj was one which “some did not want to see bought and that few supported by their co-operation at both the international and local level.” Indeed, even those prosecution lawyers most critical of Del Ponte’s decision to prosecute Haradinaj admitted that “it was a very difficult case to investigate on the ground, harder than in any other place in the former Yugoslavia.” **During the course of Haradinaj’s retrial – which was ordered because witnesses in the original trial had been threatened and others had been murdered – as many as eighteen witnesses met untimely and mysterious deaths.** **Haradinaj’s release from custody merely increased opportunities for the intimidation of witnesses.** According to prosecutors, the attempts by the UN authorities and western diplomats to prevent his prosecution created a sense of impunity around Haradinaj. “There was a general atmosphere of intimidation; they did nothing to change this atmosphere,” Jean-Daniel Ruche, a political advisor to the chief prosecutor later testified, pointing out that senior UN officials had met with Haradinaj both before his departure to The Hague and when he returned there to stand trial. “This had a chilling effect on our witnesses.”

**The saga of the trial and acquittal of Haradinaj serves as a microcosm of the failure of international justice** in Kosovo, **the impact of placing “stability” above human rights standards** and the opaque relationships between members of the Quint and the Kosovo political and criminal elite. For years, there have been rumours that US officials have sought to protect Haradinaj, Thaci and other prominent politicians from possible prosecution in the belief that they can deliver a stable rule-of-law state and also because it is thought that many of them can provide important details about the presence of Islamist terror groups in Kosovo and more widely in the region. US officials were alleged to be instrumental in ensuring that Haradinaj was not prosecuted for a fire fight in Western Kosovo in 2000. According to Frederick Pascoe and Stu McKellock, both of whom served with the UN as police investigators, Haradinaj was evacuated by US personnel operating out of Camp Bondsteel, the main US Army base in Kosovo, to a US military hospital in Germany; for good measure, they also removed evidence of the shootout from the walls. And while Serb monks in southern Kosovo credited Haradinaj with preventing mobs burning down their monasteries in the anti-Serb riots of 2004, he has also been linked to a series of crimes, including murder, abduction and drug trafficking as well as war crimes and crimes against humanity stretching back as far as 1998.

Although British officials have referred to Haradinaj admiringly as “one of the few former commanders of the KLA who can deliver,” members of their armed forces have described him as a “psychopath” who terrorised his own men as well as the local population into supporting him. Far from a simple soldier of military honour, they paint a picture of a man who “would beat his own men” in order to maintain discipline. “Someone would pass him some information and he would disappear for two hours. The end result would be several bodies in a ditch,” one of them recalled. Military reports also linked him to leading gangs which interrogated, beat, abducted and murdered Albanians accused of “collaborating” with the Yugoslav police even where that “collaboration” extended no further than letting Yugoslav police into their homes at a time when Yugoslav police were the official police force in Kosovo.

After Haradinaj and his fellow indictees’ acquittal in November Amnesty International asked: “If they are not guilty, who committed the war crimes?” In his blog, the director of the US branch of Amnesty John Dalhousie pointed out that since 1998 “an estimated 800 members of minority communities in Kosovo” had been “abducted and murdered by members of the KLA.” While few of the victims’ relatives had had the bodies of their loved ones returned to them, Dalhousie added that, to date, equally “few of those suspected of criminal responsibility for these abductions have been brought to justice in Kosovo.” Since the responsibility for the investigation of these crimes had been passed from EULEX to local prosecution offices in 2009, there had been few prosecutions. Worse, the Kosovo authorities had “demonstrated a total lack of political will to support the investigation and prosecution of such abductions” and had committed “blatant political interference” in the course of justice. When it is taken into account that Amnesty’s figures represent a conservative estimate and the real number of victims of the KLA could be much higher, Emmerson’s description of the KLA as a “people’s liberation army which does not target civilians” or Haradinaj as a “war hero” appears highly questionable, to say the least. It certainly does not suggest, as Haradinaj claimed after his acquittal, that “our struggle was just and clean.”

It is now twelve years since the Niš Express-Podujevo bus bombing which claimed the lives of eleven Kosovo Serb refugees, including a number of children, en route to visit relatives’ graves. Within hours US troops were paving over the crater destroying valuable DNA evidence; the main suspect Florim Ejupi was also able to escape from custody at US Bondsteel, fuelling rumours that he was on the CIA payroll while two other suspects, members of the Kosovo Protection Corps, were quickly released due to a lack of DNA evidence linking them to the bomb blast. For good measure, the US also failed to arrest another prime suspect Sami Lushtaku, with a former US diplomat and deputy head of the UN mission Jock Covey allegedly “instrumental” in blocking Lushtaku’s arrest on at least two occasions. The apparent reasoning Covey gave was that the arrest and possible imprisonment of the “popular” Lushtaku could destabilise the province on the eve of municipal elections and “bolster hardliners in Serbian parliamentary elections.” The Swedish prosecutor Christer Karphammar confirmed rumours of attempts by the international authorities to obstruct justice. The first western judge to sit in Kosovo, he told a newspaper that “UN and KFOR senior officials opposed or blocked prosecutions of former Kosovo Liberation Army members, including some now in the Kosovo Protection Corps.” This meant that former members of the KLA enjoyed “immunity” with investigations blocked at a “high level.” Allegedly, one of those who worked most assiduously to prevent prosecutions of leading Kosovo political players was Bernard Kouchner, governor of Kosovo, who instructed staff that all requests for arrests of high-ranking political figures in Kosovo should come through him for approval.

**Whatever the benefits of “stability” claimed by offering impunity for those suspected of crimes against humanity, it is clear that, even judged on these coldly-pragmatic terms, this policy has failed badly, both in the past and now**. Three years after the Podujevo bus bombing, violent anti-Serb riots stoked by inflammatory untrue news reports on Kosovo Radio Television led to the flight of 20,000 Serbs and other minorities, multiple deaths and widespread destruction of property. Despite the fact that a subsequent KFOR report showed quite clearly that it had been orchestrated from above, there were few arrests and even fewer prosecutions. On the contrary, many of those who organised the pogroms from above have been personally rewarded. Thus, when Kosovo won independence in 2008, it was not because there had been any tangible improvement in human rights or progress towards the construction of a pluralistic tolerant society – the essential minimum “standards” Kosovo was supposed to meet before it could gain independence – but because international officials feared the consequences for “stability” if it did not.

**How little progress in basic human rights and governance standards has been made since then was illustrated in** a recent opinion piece in Der Spiegel authored by an anonymous German police officer stationed in **Kosovo**. In what amounted to a scathing attack on the past fifteen years of “nation building,” he claimed that despite the various “sugar-coated reports,” **the international community had “achieved almost nothing” in bringing the rule of law, respect for human rights or transparency anywhere near European standards while the political culture in the province was dominated by a clan mentality,** **organised crime and chronic levels of political and legal corruption.** His basic argument was brought into sharp focus by a series of contemporaneous news stories. In December 2012, for example, in one of a pattern of frequent arbitrary arrests of Serbs and members of other minority communities, a number of young Serb men were arrested by the Kosovo Protection Corps after attending an Orthodox Christmas service at Gracanica on the basis that they were “Serb agent provocateurs” and a threat to internal security. They were held for a few days before being released, with at least one of them requiring hospital treatment for injuries sustained during interrogation. In early 2013, in response to the removal by the Serbian police of a monument in the Preševo Valley commemorating a violent Albanian insurgent organisation, a series of attacks across southern Kosovo, some of them led by members of the Protection Corps, resulted in the desecration of Serb cemeteries and graveyards. Predictably, Kosovo Radio Television alleged that the Serbs had destroyed their own monuments to “blacken” the name of Kosovo; meanwhile, the desecration of another Serb graveyard was blamed on a member of the Ashkalli minority.

**Rule of Law: Collapse Inevitable 1NC**

**The broader US legal system has tanked**

Jonathan **Turley 10**, the Shapiro Professor of Public Interest Law at George Washington University, member of USA TODAY's Board of Contributors, 6/14/10, “Do laws even matter today?,” http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/opinion/forum/2010-06-15-column15\_ST\_N.htm

Though I am a critic of the Arizona law, I do not view its supporters in such one-dimensional terms. Indeed, I do not view the public response in purely immigration terms. **Whether it is illegal immigration or the mortgage crisis or corporate bailouts, there seems to be a growing sense among many citizens that they are expected to play by the rules while others are exempt.¶** With polls showing about 60% of people supporting the Arizona law and almost half supporting similar laws in their states, it is implausible to suggest that all these people are racists or extremists — let alone fascists. Notably, a majority of Americans also opposed the bank bailouts and mortgage forgiveness. In each of these controversies, there is a sense that the government was stepping in to protect people from the consequences of their actions.¶ In the mortgage crisis, tens of thousands of people accepted high-risk, low-interest loans while other citizens either declined to buy homes or agreed to higher monthly payments to avoid such deals. When Congress intervened with mortgage relief, some of those who had acted responsibly wondered whether they acted stupidly by rejecting low rates and later federal support.¶ Bailouts and immigration¶ Then there were the corporate bailouts. For citizens to secure a loan, they have to meet exacting terms and disclosures. Yet, **when banks and firms concealed risks or engaged in financial wrongdoing, Congress bailed them out** and allowed their executives to reap fat bonuses. **The laws on fraud and deceptive practices simply did not seem to apply to them.** Just as several companies were declared "too big to fail," many of their executives appeared too big to lose money — unlike the millions of citizens burned by their business practices.¶ **Those prior controversies coalesced with the immigration debate. The last time Congress granted amnesty to illegal immigrants was 1986** — and it was criticized at the time for rewarding those who had evaded deportation. Complaints over the lack of federal enforcement had been percolating for years but exploded along Arizona's long desert border. When a law mandated state enforcement of federal laws, the Obama administration moved to block it.¶ Indeed, **high-ranking** Obama **officials** such as John Morton, head of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement, **have suggested that they might refuse to deport** those arrested under the Arizona law. **While we continue to tell millions around the world that they must wait for years to immigrate legally, Congress** and the White House **are considering a new amnesty proposal** to benefit an additional 11 million illegal immigrants.¶ In each of these areas, **the perception is that the law says one thing but actually means different things for different people.** It § Marked 15:12 § is a dangerous perception, and it is not entirely unfounded. **Such double-standards have become common** as Congress and presidents seek to avoid unpopular legal problems.¶ •**Torture**: While acknowledging that waterboarding is torture and that torture violates domestic and international law, President **Obama and** members of **Congress have barred any investigation or prosecution of those crimes.¶** •**Pollution**: **While citizens are subject to pay for** the full damage they cause to their neighbors and are routinely fined for their **environmental damage** for everything from dumping in rivers to leaf burning, **Congress capped the liability for massive corporations such as BP and Exxon** at a ridiculous $75 million. Though BP is likely to spend much more in litigation (particularly if prosecuted criminally), the current law requires citizens to pay the full cost of their environmental damage while capping the costs for companies producing massive destruction.¶ •**Privacy: When the telecommunications companies found themselves on the losing end of citizen suits** over the violation of privacy laws, **Congress** (including then-Sen. Obama) and President Bush simply **changed the law** to legislatively kill the citizen suits and protect the companies.¶ An arbitrary system¶ **The message across these areas is troubling.** To paraphrase Animal Farm, **all people are equal, but some people are more equal than others.¶** A legal system cannot demand the faith and fealty of the governed when **rules are seen as arbitrary and deceptive. Our leaders have led us** not to an economic crisis or an immigration crisis or an environmental crisis or a civil liberties crisis. They have led us **to a crisis of faith** **where citizens no longer believe that laws have any determinant meaning. It is politics, not the law, that appears to drive outcomes — a self-destructive trend for a nation supposedly defined by the rule of law.**

**SOP: Alt Causes 1NC**

**Plan can’t solve separation of powers – too many alt causes –**

**A. Drones**

**Noonan 13** (Raymond, “Law School prof addresses drone legality”, 2/22, http://yaledailynews.com/blog/2013/02/22/law-school-prof-addresses-drone-legality/)

**Hathaway**, who **directs the Center for Global Legal Challenges at Yale Law School, said drone strikes are difficult to defend legally**, though she added that some uses of drones by the American military could be justified under international law. She said the drone strikes in Pakistan could be one such example because Pakistan has probably consented to the strikes, although the country has denied such allegations. Hathaway also warned that **the U**nited **S**tates’ **drone strike policy compromises the government’s separation of powers.** “[**Drone strikes] make it easier for the president to exercise war-making power without any checks**,” she said. “[**Drone strikes] threaten to very much upset traditional powers** over use of military force.”

**B. NSA Surveillance**

**Brito 13** (Jenny, “NSA Scandal: How Leaks Advance Liberty and Resist Tyranny”, 7/18, http://reason.com/archives/2013/06/18/nsa-scandal-how-leaks-advance-liberty-an)

**If the secret surveillance itself is any indication, then the separation of powers is not up to the task.** According to President Obama, **domestic surveillance programs** are **“**under very strict supervision by all three branches of government.” Yet **it doesn’t seem very strict when more than half of the Senate couldn’t be bothered to show up last week for a major briefing by the government’s top intelligence officials.** “**Strict supervision” also doesn’t seem very meaningful** when you consider that **the FISA Court is a hand-picked non-adversarial specialist court that approved every surveillance request** it got last year. Experience suggests that specialist courts tend to get captured by their bar, and in the case of the FISA Court, that means just the government. More to the point, a **secret court issuing secret orders based on secret interpretations of the law makes any debate or commentary impossible**. **Even when there is a will on the part of some lawmakers to carry out oversight, executive branch officials will apparently lie under oath.** So if not on the Constitution and its institutions, **on what can we rely to keep government power in check**?

**C. Detention**

**Siegel 12** (Ashley – J.D., Boston University School of Law, “SOME HOLDS BARRED: EXTENDING EXECUTIVE DETENTION HABEAS LAW BEYOND GUANTANAMO BAY”, 2012, 92 B.U.L. Rev. 1405, lexis)

The Supreme Court created a vastly different landscape for alien detainees' rights and habeas petitions through the Boumediene line of cases. **Starting with Hamdi, the Supreme Court has demonstrated an unwillingness to place a stamp of approval on the Executive's actions,** despite the broad powers traditionally reserved for the Executive with regard to the military. n206 Instead, the **Court has recognized the important separation-of-powers issues implicated by** the Executive's **indefinite detention of prisoners captured in the war on terror** and the Court's own important role in preventing the Executive from assuming too much power. n207 The Court embraced its role as protector of the fundamental right of habeas review, recognizing that **the Executive could not sidestep compliance with the law by reinventing categories of prisoners or locating them in offshore facilities**. n208

**SOP: No Impact 1NC**

**No impact (to SOP violations)**

**Constitutional Commentary 96** (Michael Rosman, Winter, p. 343-345, LN)

A second, perhaps more interesting, difficulty with **the prophylactic approach** is that it may rely on a too judicialocentric view of the workings of government **that exaggerates the Court's role in the separation-of-powers struggle**. Professor Redish's argument rests on the notion that it is vitally important that the Court get its separation-of-powers jurisprudence right. The argument runs something like this: Separation of powers is a bulwark of liberty - without it, the individual protections of the Bill of Rights are nothing but paper. The Court defines separation-of-powers law. If it messes up, then so much for liberty. The Court is bound to mess up if it adopts anything other than a prophylactic approach to separation of powers. It is therefore urgent that the Court adopt this approach. Fortunately, the Framers' design is probably stronger than this argument presupposes. **Separation-of-powers gives each branch tools which enable ambition to counteract ambition.** The Court gets to decide cases. It justifies its decisions with opinions which the other branches and the citizenry generally follow as authoritative. Thus, although the Court does not have guns or money, it has words. These words are the Court's tools in the separation-of-powers struggle. **Any time the Court writes an opinion on separation of powers, it self-consciously uses its particular power to shove the boundaries of branch power** - sometimes to profound effect, as a simple hypothetical illustrates. Suppose Chief Justice Marshall had ended Marbury v. Madison with the following paragraph: Then again, Congress has just as much right to interpret the Constitution as I do - perhaps even more, because Congress is the branch closest to the people, and it is the people's Constitution. I was just kidding about that judicial review stuff. History would be very different, partially because such a result in Marbury would have grossly undermined the Court's future ability to compete in the separation-of-powers struggle successfully. On a more general level, Supreme Court opinions on any topic can affect the balance of branch power. For instance, the Supreme Court can undermine its authority by producing poorly reasoned opinions - or, much worse from a realpolitik point of view, unpopular opinions. The power, however, of any given decision to damage a Court staffed by relatively sane Justices is probably limited. This is an institution that has survived Dred Scott and Plessy v. Ferguson. Of course, the other branches also shove at the boundaries of branch power - FDR's Court-packing plan being one notable example of this practice. Sometimes the law of unintended consequences grabs hold. Perhaps the Court-packing plan concentrated the Justices' minds on finding ways to hold New Deal legislation constitutional, but it also blew up in FDR's face politically. **At least for the last two hundred years,**

**however, no branch has managed to expand its power to the point of delivering an obvious knock-out blow to another branch**. Seen from this broader perspective, cases such as Morrison, Bowsher v. Synar, and Mistretta v. United States surely alter the balance of branch power at a given historical moment, but do not change the fundamental and brute fact that the Constitution puts three institutional heavyweights into a ring where they are free to bash each other. Judicialocentrism tends to obscure this obvious point because it causes people to dwell on the hard cases that reach the Supreme Court. The power of separation of powers, however, largely resides in its ability to keep the easy cases from ever occurring. For instance, Congress, although it tries to weaken the President from time to time, has not tried to reduce the President to a ceremonial figurehead a la the Queen of England. Similarly, Congress does not make a habit of trying cases that have been heard by the courts. This list could be continued indefinitely. **The Supreme Court has had two hundred years to muck about with separation-of-powers doctrine. Over that time, scores of Justices - each with his or her own somewhat idiosyncratic view of the law - have sat on the bench. Scholars have denounced separation-of-powers jurisprudence as a mess. But the Republic endures, at least more or less. These historical facts tend to indicate that the Court need not rush to change its approach to separation of powers to prevent a slide into tyranny.**

**SOP: Resilient 1NC**

**SOP resilient**

**Rosman 96** [Michael E. Rosman (General Counsel @ Center for Individual Rights; JD from Yale); Review of “FIGHTING WORDS: INDIVIDUALS, COMMUNITIES AND LIBERTIES OF SPEECH”; Constitutional Commentary 96 (Winter, p. 343-345)]

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**India-Pakistan--1NC**

No war – mutually assured destruction

**Economic Times 11** (May 17th, 2011 “No chance of Indo-Pak nuclear war despite 'sabre rattling': Pak nuclear scientist A Q Khan”) http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-05-17/news/29552014\_1\_nuclear-blackmail-nuclear-secrets-india-and-pakistan

NEW YORK: Pakistan's disgraced nuclear scientist A Q Khan has said that despite "sabre rattling" between Islamabad and New Delhi, there is no chance of a nuclear war between the two neighbours. Khan, who has been accused of selling nuclear secrets to Iran, Libya and Syria, wrote in Newsweek magazine that nuclear weapons in both countries had prevented war for the last 40 years. "**India doesn't need more than five weapons to hurt us badly, and we wouldn't need more than 10 to return the favour," he said. "India and Pakistan understand the old principle that ensured peace in the Cold War: mutually assured destruction," he said. "The two (India and Pakistan) can't afford a nuclear war, and despite our sabre rattling, there is no chance of a nuclear war that would send us both back to the Stone Age," he said.** He claimed that Pakistan had to invest in a nuclear programme "to ward off nuclear blackmail from India". "I would like to make it clear that it was an Indian nuclear explosion in May 1974 that prompted our nuclear program, motivating me to return to Pakistan to help create a credible nuclear deterrent and save my country from Indian nuclear blackmail," he said. "We are forced to maintain this deterrence until our differences with India are resolved. That would lead to a new era of peace for both countries," Khan wrote. "I hope I live to see Pakistan and India living harmoniously in the same way as the once bitter enemies Germany and France live today," he said. Khan blasted various governments in Pakistan as well as "successive incompetent and ignorant rulers" for not engaging in basic development of the country, and raising the people's standard of living. "We are far worse off now than we were 20, or even 40, years ago when we were subjected to embargoes," he said.

**Failed States**

**No impact to failed states**

Patrick**,** senior fellow, director – program on international institutions and global governance @ CFR, 4/15/’11

(Stewart M, “Why Failed States Shouldn’t Be Our Biggest National Security Fear,” <http://www.cfr.org/international-peace-and-security/why-failed-states-shouldnt-our-biggest-national-security-fear/p24689>)

In truth, while **failed states** may be worthy of America's attention on humanitarian and development grounds, most of them **are irrelevant to** U.S. **national security.** The **risks they pose are mainly to their own inhabitants. Sweeping claims to the contrary are not only inaccurate but distracting and unhelpful, providing little guidance to policymakers** seeking to prioritize scarce attention and resources.

In 2008, I collaborated with Brookings Institution senior fellow Susan E. Rice, now President Obama's permanent representative to the United Nations, on **an index of state weakness** in developing countries. The study **ranked** all **141 developing nations on 20 indicators of state strength**, such as the government's ability to provide basic services. More recently, **I've examined whether** these **rankings reveal anything about each nation's role in** major **global threats:** transnational **terrorism**, **prolif**eration of weapons of mass destruction, international **crime and** infectious **disease.**

**The findings are** startlingly **clear.** Only a handful of the world's failed states pose security concerns to the United States. Far **greater dangers emerge from stronger developing countries** that may suffer from corruption and lack of government accountability but come **nowhere near** qualifying as **failed states.**

**The link between failed states and** transnational **terrorism**, for instance, **is tenuous. Al-Qaeda franchises are** concentrated in South Asia, North Africa, the Middle East and Southeast Asia but are markedly **absent in most failed states**, including in sub-Saharan Africa. Why? From a terrorist's perspective, t**he notion of** finding **haven in a failed state is an oxymoron. Al-Qaeda discovered this in** the 1990s when seeking a foothold in anarchic **Somalia.** In intercepted cables, **operatives bemoaned** the insuperable **difficulties of working under chaos, given their need for security and** for **access to** the global **financial** and communications **infrastructure.** Al-Qaeda has generally found it easier to maneuver in corrupt but functional states, such as Kenya, where sovereignty provides some protection from outside interdiction.

**Pakistan and Yemen became sanctuaries** for terrorism **not** only **because they are weak but because their governments lack the will to launch** sustained counterterrorism **operations** against militants whom they value for other purposes. Terrorists also need support from local power brokers and populations. Along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, al-Qaeda finds succor in the Pashtun code of pashtunwali, which requires hospitality to strangers, and in the severe brand of Sunni Islam practiced locally. Likewise in Yemen, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has found sympathetic tribal hosts who have long welcomed mujaheddin back from jihadist struggles.

Al-Qaeda has met less success in northern Africa's Sahel region, where a moderate, Sufi version of Islam dominates. But **as the organization evolves** from a centrally directed network **to a diffuse movement** with autonomous cells in dozens of countries, **it is as likely to find haven in** the banlieues of **Paris** or high-rises of Minneapolis **as** in remote **Pakistani valleys.**

What about **failed states and w**eapons of **m**ass **d**estruction? Many U.S. analysts worry that poorly governed countries will pursue nuclear, biological, chemical or radiological weapons; be unable to control existing weapons; or decide to share WMD materials.

These **fears are misplaced.** With two notable exceptions — North Korea and Pakistan — **the world's weakest states pose minimal proliferation risks,since they have limited stocks of fissile** or other WMD **material and are unlikely to pursue them. Far more threatening are capable countries** (say, Iran and Syria) intent on pursuing WMD, **corrupt** nations (such as Russia) that possess loosely secured nuclear arsenals **and poorly policed nations** (try Georgia) through which proliferators can smuggle illicit materials or weapons.

When it comes to crime, the story is more complex. Failed states do dominate production of some narcotics: Afghanistan cultivates the lion's share of global opium, and war-torn Colombia rules coca production. The tiny African failed state of Guinea-Bissau has become a transshipment point for cocaine bound for Europe. (At one point, the contraband transiting through the country each month was equal to the nation's gross domestic product.) And Somalia, of course, has seen an explosion of maritime piracy. Yet **failed states have little or no connection with** other categories of **transnational crime, from human trafficking to money laundering**, intellectual **property theft, cyber-crime or counterfeiting** of manufactured goods.

**Criminal networks** typically **prefer** operating in **functional countries that provide baseline political order as well as opportunities to corrupt authorities.They** also **accept higher risks to work in nations straddling major commercial routes.** Thus narco-trafficking has exploded in Mexico, which has far stronger institutions than many developing nations but borders the United States. **South Africa presents** its own **advantages.** It is a country where “the first and the developing worlds exist side by side,” author Misha Glenny writes. “The first world provides good roads, 728 airports . . . the largest cargo port in Africa, and an efficient banking system. . . . **The developing world accounts for** the **low tax revenue, overstretched** social **services, high levels of corruption** throughout the administration, **and** 7,600 kilometers of **land and sea borders** that have more holes than a second-hand dartboard.” Weak and **failing** African **states**, such as Niger, simply **cannot compete.**

Nor do failed states pose the greatest threats of pandemic disease. Over the past decade, outbreaks of SARS, avian influenza and swine flu have raised the specter that fast-moving pandemics could kill tens of millions worldwide. Failed states, in this regard, might seem easy incubators of deadly viruses. In fact, recent fast-onset pandemics have bypassed most failed states, which are relatively isolated from the global trade and transportation links needed to spread disease rapidly.

Certainly, the world's **weakest states** — particularly in sub-Saharan Africa — suffer disproportionately from disease, with infection rates higher than in the rest of the world. But their principal **health challenges are endemic diseases with local effects, such as malaria, measles and tuberculosis. While** U.S. national security **officials** and Hollywood screenwriters **obsess over** the gruesome **Ebola and Marburg** viruses, **outbreaks** of these hemorrhagic fevers **are rare and self-contained.**

I do not counsel complacency. The world's richest nations have a moral obligation to bolster health systems in Africa, as the Obama administration is doing through its Global Health Initiative. And they have a duty to ameliorate the challenges posed by HIV/AIDS, which continues to ravage many of the world's weakest states. But **poor performance** by developing countries **in preventing**, detecting and responding to infectious **disease is** often **shaped less by budgetary and infrastructure constraints than** by conscious **decisions by unaccountable** or unresponsive **regimes. Such** deliberate **inaction has occurred** not only in the world's weakest states but also **in stronger developing countries, even in** promising **democracies.** The list is long. It includes **Nigeria's** feckless **response to** a 2003-05 **polio** epidemic, **China's lack of candor about** the 2003 **SARS** outbreak, **Indonesia's** obstructionist **attitude to** addressing **bird flu** in 2008 and South Africa's denial for many years about the causes of HIV/AIDS.

Unfortunately, **misperceptions about** the **dangers of failed states have transformed budgets and bureaucracies.** U.S. intelligence agencies are mapping the world's “ungoverned spaces.” The Pentagon has turned its regional Combatant Commands into platforms to head off state failure and address its spillover effects. The new Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review completed by the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development depicts fragile and conflict-riddled states as epicenters of terrorism, proliferation, crime and disease.

Yet such **preoccupations reflect more hype than analysis.** U.S. national **security officials would be better served** — and would serve all of us better — **if they turned their strategic lens** toward stronger developing countries, from which transnational threats are more likely to emanate.

**Russia--Expansionism—1NC**

**Russian expansionist predictions are all hype – stability is Russia’s goal, not conquest.**

**Rivera 3** (David, assistant prof of government @ Hamilton College, Spring, *Political Science Quarterly*, 118(1), p. 101-102)JM

Nevertheless, the weight of **evidence** more strongly **supports** those who defended **Moscow against the imperialist charge. For every** former **republic that fell** victim **to Russian intervention, an equal number** successfully **rid themselves of a Russian military presence without falling victim to such intervention**. The military **interventions** that did occur **were all small-scale** operations§ Marked 15:14 § . Discontented ethnic Russians received military protection in only one of the fourteen non-Russian states, and **the** Yeltsin **administration did not pursue territorial aggrandizement** at the expense of any former Soviet republics. In addition, **the second half of the 1990s witnessed heightened Russian conciliation and peacemaking as** well as the consolidation of the tenuous independence of several of Eurasia's previously “failed states.” Why Russia's neighbors so strongly supported Yeltsin during his campaign for reelection in 1996 and throughout his presidency is now apparent.[ 100] Consideration of the policies that Moscow did and did not pursue makes clear that Russia was, at most, selectively imperialist and that **charges of Russian imperialism are exaggerated**. The predominance of a nonimperialist orientation of Russian foreign policy is further shown by the fact that a **central prediction made by analysts who viewed Russian policy as imperialist did not come to pass.** The Yeltsin administration continued to ignore Crimea's ethnic Russian insurgents even after Ukraine denuclearized. Zbigniew Brzezinski similarly had warned that “Ukraine is on the brink of disaster: the economy is in a free-fall, while Crimea is on the verge of a Russia-abetted ethnic explosion. Either crisis might be exploited to promote the breakup or the reintegration of Ukraine in a larger Moscow-dominated framework.”[ 101] Now that the decade has closed it is evident that Russia under Yeltsin was not interested in exploiting such opportunities. **The Kremlin** thereby **passed what was** widely regarded as “**the test case of whether Russia will remain a nation-state or seek to become again a multinational empire.**”[ 102]

### R2P

syria disproves great power conflict and obama push—hasn’t been implemented

**R2P prevents wars from escalating**

**Pape 2/2** (Robert, PHD U Chicago in Poli Sci, “Why We Shouldn’t Attack Syria (Yet)” 2/2/12, New York Times) http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/03/opinion/why-we-shouldnt-attack-syria-yet.html

**AS the death toll in Syria has climbed** to perhaps 7,000, **proponents of humanitarian intervention are asking**, quite reasonably, **why the West does not intervene** as it did in Libya last year. Not only was Libya’s dictator, Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi, ousted with relatively few Western casualties, but the NATO campaign also set a precedent for successful humanitarian intervention. **In the 63 years since the United Nations adopted a genocide convention in the wake of the Holocaust, world leaders have failed to prevent the deaths of millions, from Biafra and Cambodia to Rwanda and Darfur** — not just because they have lacked the political will to intervene, but also **because of the norm of genocide itself. By setting the bar for intervention so high** — unmistakable evidence of clear intent to destroy a national, ethnic, racial or religious group — **the international community has stuck itself in a Catch-22: by the time it is clear that genocide is occurring, it is often too late to stop it.**  **A new standard for humanitarian intervention is needed. If a continuing government-sponsored campaign of mass homicide** — in which thousands have died and many thousands more are likely to die — **is occurring**, a coalition of **countries**, sanctioned by major international and regional institutions, **should intervene to stop it,** as long as they have

**Food Scarcity--1NC**

**Tech development solves**

**Thompson** 5/13/**11** – Dr. Robert L. Thompson is a senior fellow for The Chicago Council on Global Affairs and professor emeritus at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. “Proving Malthus Wrong, Sustainable agriculture in 2050” http://scienceblogs.com/tomorrowstable/2011/05/proving\_malthus\_wrong\_sustaina.php

**Tools available today**, including plant breeding and biotechnology, **can make presently unusable soils productive and increase the genetic potential of individual crops - enhancing drought and stress tolerance,** for example - while also producing gains in yields. **Existing tools can also internalize plants' resistance to disease, and even improve a plant's nutritional content** - meaning consumers can get more nutritional value without increasing their consumption. Furthermore, **modern high-productivity agriculture minimizes farmers' impact on the environment**. Failure to embrace these technologies will result in further destruction of remaining forests. **Adoption of technologies that produce more output from fewer resources has been hugely successful from an economic standpoint**: prior to the price spike in 2008, there was a 150-year downward trend in the real price of food. The jury is still out on whether the long-term downward trend will resume, prices will flatten out on a new higher plateau, or they will trend upward in the future. The key is investing in research in the public and private sectors to increase agricultural productivity faster than global demand grows. Long ago, British scholar Thomas **Malthus predicted that the human population would eventually outgrow its ability to feed itself**. However, **Malthus has been proven wrong for more than two centuries precisely because he underestimated the power of agricultural research and technology to increase productivity faster than demand. There is no more reason for Malthus to be right in the 21st century than he was in the 19th or 20th - but only if we work to support, not impede, continued agricultural research and adoption of new technologies around the world.**

**Disease--1NC**

**burnout**

The **Independent** **3** [UK “Future Tense: Is Mankind Doomed?”, http://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/0725-04.htm 7/25/03]

Maybe - though plenty of experienced graduate students could already have a stab. But nature knows that **infectious diseases are very hard to get right**. Only HIV/Aids has 100 per cent mortality, and takes a long time to achieve it. By definition, **lethal diseases kill their host. If they kill too quickly, they aren't passed on; if too slowly, we can detect them and isolate the infected. Any mutant smallpox or other handmade germ would certainly be too deadly or too mild**. And even **Sars killed fewer people worldwide than die on Britain's roads in a week.** **As scares go, this one is** ideal - **overblown and unrealistic**.

## 2NC

### ER Solv: Announcement

#### All 2ac solvency deficits are solved by Obama publicly renouncing his legal authority - the distinction is key

Posner, 9/3 (eric,Eric Professor of Law at Chicago Law School. An editor of The Journal of Legal Studies, he has also published numerous articles and books on issues in international law, Slate Magazine, 9/3/13, http://www.slate.com/articles/news\_and\_politics/view\_from\_chicago/2013/09/obama\_going\_to\_congress\_on\_syria\_he\_s\_actually\_strengthening\_the\_war\_powers.html)

President Obama’s surprise announcement that he will ask Congress for approval of a military attack on Syria is being hailed as a vindication of the rule of law and a revival of the central role of Congress in war-making, even by critics. But all of this is wrong. Far from breaking new legal ground, President Obama has reaffirmed the primacy of the executive in matters of war and peace. The war powers of the presidency remain as mighty as ever.¶ It would have been different if the president had announced that only Congress can authorize the use of military force, as dictated by the Constitution, which gives Congress alone the power to declare war. That would have been worthy of notice, a reversal of the ascendance of executive power over Congress. But the president said no such thing. He said: “I believe I have the authority to carry out this military action without specific congressional authorization.” Secretary of State John Kerry confirmed that the president “has the right to do that”—launch a military strike—“no matter what Congress does.”¶ Thus, the president believes that the law gives him the option to seek a congressional yes or to act on his own. He does not believe that he is bound to do the first. He has merely stated the law as countless other presidents and their lawyers have described it before him.

### Ptx

#### The CP triggers Congressional follow-on and avoids confrontation

Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security advisor under U.S. President Jimmy Carter, 12/3/12, Obama's Moment, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/12/03/obamas\_moment

In foreign affairs, the central challenge now facing President Barack Obama is how to regain some of the ground lost in recent years in shaping U.S. national security policy. Historically and politically, in America's system of separation of powers, it is the president who has the greatest leeway for decisive action in foreign affairs. He is viewed by the country as responsible for Americans' safety in an increasingly turbulent world. He is seen as the ultimate definer of the goals that the United States should pursue through its diplomacy, economic leverage, and, if need be, military compulsion. And the world at large sees him -for better or for worse -as the authentic voice of America.

To be sure, he is not a dictator. Congress has a voice. So does the public. And so do vested interests and foreign-policy lobbies. The congressional role in declaring war is especially important not when the United States is the victim of an attack, but when the United States is planning to wage war abroad. Because America is a democracy, public support for presidential foreign-policy decisions is essential. But no one in the government or outside it can match the president's authoritative voice when he speaks and then decisively acts for America.

This is true even in the face of determined opposition. Even when some lobbies succeed in gaining congressional support for their particular foreign clients in defiance of the president, for instance, many congressional signatories still quietly convey to the White House their readiness to support the president if he stands firm for "the national interest." And a president who is willing to do so publicly, while skillfully cultivating friends and allies on Capitol Hill, can then establish such intimidating credibility that it is politically unwise to confront him. This is exactly what Obama needs to do now.

### Heg Bad: Regionalism--2NC

#### And, more ev—decline key to global energy diffusion

Michael **Levi**, Senior Fellow, Energy and Envirronment et al., "Globalizing the Energy Revolution," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, November/December 20**10**, ASP.

The success of other nations in clean energy does not imply U.S. failure. The United States can benefit greatly from clean-energy innovation around the world, so long as it also pursues its own robust efforts at home. Each major economy has its own natural advantages when it comes to energy technology innovation and development. An enlightened U.S. strategy should aim to create a global innovation environment that weaves together those distinct strengths in pursuit of common energygoals. Not everyone will like every part of the package. Some U.S. firms will chafe at efforts that might help competitors in the developing world. Some emerging economies will resist opening up their markets to those same U.S. firms. Only by enlarging clean-energy markets can everyone enjoy a bigger piece of the pie. The alternative is not a world in which the United States dominates the clean-energy field alone, or even one in which another country solves the United States' problems for it. It is more likely to be one in which the cost of clean energy does not drop as quickly as needed, particularly in the developing world, and in which massive markets for clean-energy technologies do not materialize. In that case, the United States and the world will both lose.

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### Heg Bad: China--2NC

#### Next, China

#### U.S. efforts to exert dominance ensure a war between the two states—the rise of China is inevitable and attempting to contain them causes wars that escalate globally—that’s Bandow and Hunkovic

#### Decline prevents inevitable war over Taiwan

Gao **Chonglun**, "Will the United States Give Up on Its Commitment to Taiwan Security," translated Lisa Ferguson, 3--29--**11**, <http://watchingamerica.com/News/96212/special-column-by-guo-chonglun-will-the-united-states-give-up-on-its-commitment-to-taiwan-security>

In the tide of the Jasmine Revolution, it appeared that the United States couldn’t decide initially which path to take; when it first started, the United States appeared to welcome it warmly, but by the time it had spread to Bahrain, Yemen and Saudi Arabia, the United States had begun to hesitate. Although it was at the request of many European countries, the United States reluctantly agreed to use military force in Libya, but refused to send in ground troops. Moreover, the United States is in a hurry to transfer command of the allied armies to NATO. Many are calling this intervention in Libya “humanitarian intervention,” but the attitude of the American government is far from being a model example of this. Instead, it is making other countries in the world begin to suspect whether — because of Iraq and Afghanistan — U.S. hegemony has begun to deteriorate. Is U.S. foreign policy shrinking back into isolationism? All along, the U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s security was not only reaffirmed by the Taiwan Relations Act and all previous presidents, but it was also the United States making an associated pledge: a commitment to the security of the Asia-Pacific region. Now, however, there is a sound emerging that perhaps the United States will eliminate Taiwan from its security commitments. 2010 was a pivotal year in China-U.S. relations, first with joint U.S.-Korea exercises in the Yellow Sea, which triggered China’s protest. Then came the China-Japan sovereignty dispute over the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands; the United States, in the spirit of security cooperation, took the position of supporting Japan. Afterward, in the dispute in the South China Sea, the U.S., on behalf of Southeast Asian nations, told China it would intervene. All of these controversies related to territorial waters never happened in the past because China had yet to build up strength. But now, following China’s rise, its military might and economic strength have already created friction between it and other powers. Over the course of China’s rise, many have been looking forward to it becoming more docile, little by little, within the U.S.-led international order; they await the day when Beijing becomes a “responsible shareholder.” Yet 2010 proved that China will not follow in accordance with the rules set by the West, not only because it finds the rules to be unfair, but also because the legitimacy of U.S. leadership has no ground left to stand on after the financial economic crisis. For the sake of its own interests, the U.S. will often shift its troubles onto its neighbors — the quantitative easing (monetary) policy is just one example of this. Consequently, the second pessimistic view emerged, maintaining that conflict between China and the U.S. is unavoidable. They look down upon the research of past sinologists and think that China or the Chinese Communist Party’s so-called “special characteristics” are simply secondary; what really has an effect is international power structure, which does not shift with individual willpower. If China really wants to rise and challenge the American hegemony, then there is bound to be conflict. Lately, however, a third way of thinking has arisen. Professor Charles Glaser of America’s George Washington University wrote an article in the most recent edition of the periodical Foreign Affairs, advocating that the security dilemma between China and the U.S. is not at all absolute. If a few secondary tensions are able to be dealt with properly, then it’s not necessarily the case that automatic mutual confrontation will arise; a military conflict is avoidable. He thinks that just because there are oceans of difference between the two countries as well as mutual nuclear deterrence, this does not mean that they are each other’s enemy. China’s rise will not go so far as to threaten the United States, but it could threaten the security of its Asia-Pacific allies and the U.S. military garrison there. Glaser thinks that China will not push the United States out of the Asia-Pacific in pursuit of greater security. In reality, what he didn’t say is that the U.S. military power deployed in the Asia-Pacific can inhibit the expansion of the Japanese and Korean militaries. In other words, China doesn’t need to worry about Japanese, or even South and North Korean, military conflict, because America’s security coalition in the Asia-Pacific can actually promote security in the region. But there is one exception to this — the U.S. security commitment to Taiwan. He believes that Taiwan is not in the same category as Japan and South Korea. Until now, China still has not given up on using military force against Taiwan, focusing all its resources on intervening in Taiwanese and U.S. military affairs and increasing its threats. As the pace of the People’s Liberation Army’s modernization accelerates, the danger of bilateral conflict also rises. According to the calculations of a realist like Glaser, since China will not change its intentions and the risk of conflict is so great, the U.S. should consider withdrawing its security commitment to Taiwan. This drastic measure could move us away from the conflict’s detonator, while also laying a smooth path for relations between the two nations for future decades. Of course there will be critics who say this would mean the U.S. had yielded to China’s military might. Other than costing the United States its credibility in the Asia-Pacific, it could also whet China’s appetite. But “not all adversaries are Hitler,” as Glaser points out. Looking through the lens of negotiation and compromise, this could help reach a new equilibrium, and tensions would thus recede. Moreover, when announcing the decision to give up on the Taiwan security commitment, the U.S. could still reaffirm its security commitments with other nations and strengthen its exercises with other countries, thus reducing the unease about discarding Taiwan.

### Heg Bad: A2 “U.S. Lashout”

#### No lashout or power vacuum—retrenchement likely

* Empirically true – other sates takeover – fear of risk taking/overextension

Paul K. **MacDonald**, Assistant Professor, Political Science, Willians College **and** Joseph M. **Parent,** Assistant Professor, Political Science, University of Miami, "Resurrecting Retrenchment: The Grand Strategic Consequences of U.S. Decline," POLICY BRIEF, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 5--**11,** http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/macdonald-parent-may-2011-is-%20brief.pdf

To date, there has been no comprehensive study of great power retrenchment and no study that defends retrenchment as a probable or practical policy. Using historical data on gross domestic product, we identify eighteen cases of "acute relative decline" since 1870. Acute relative decline happens when a great power loses an ordinal ranking in global share of economic production, and this shift endures for five or more years. A comparison of these periods yields the following findings: Retrenchment is the most common response to decline. Great powers suffering from acute decline, such as the United Kingdom, used retrenchment to shore up their fading power in eleven to fifteen of the eighteen cases that we studied (61–83 percent). The rate of decline is the most important factor for explaining and predicting the magnitude of retrenchment. The faster a state falls, the more drastic the retrenchment policy it is likely to employ. The rate of decline is also the most important factor for explaining and predicting the forms that retrenchment takes. The faster a state falls, the more likely it is to renounce risky commitments, increase reliance on other states, cut military spending, and avoid starting or escalating international disputes. In more detail, secondary findings include the following: Democracy does not appear to inhibit retrenchment. Declining states are approximately equally likely to retrench regardless of regime type. Wars are infrequent during ordinal transitions. War broke out close to the transition point in between one and four of the eighteen cases (6–22 percent). Retrenching states rebound with some regularity. Six of the fifteen retrenching states (40 percent) managed to recapture their former rank. No state that failed to retrench can boast similar results. Declining great powers cut their military personnel and budgets significantly faster than other great powers. Over a five-year period, the average nondeclining state increased military personnel 2.1 percent—as compared with a 0.8 percent decrease in declining states. Likewise, the average nondeclining state increased military spending 8.4 percent—compared with 2.2 percent among declining states. Swift declines cause greater alliance agreements. Over a five-year period, the average great power signs 1.75 new alliance agreements—great powers undergoing large declines sign an average of 3.6 such agreements. Declining great powers are less likely to enter or escalate disputes. Compared to average great powers, they are 26 percent less likely to initiate an interstate dispute, 25 percent less likely to be embroiled in a dispute, and markedly less likely to escalate those disputes to high levels. IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICYMAKERS From the analysis above, three main implications follow for U.S. policy. First, we are likely to see retrenchment in U.S. foreign policy. With a declining share of relative power, the United States is ripe to shift burdens to allies, cut military expenditures, and stay out of international disputes. This will not be without risks and costs, but retrenchment is likely to be peaceful and is preferable to nonretrenchment. In short, U.S. policymakers should resist calls to maintain a sizable overseas posture because they fear that a more moderate policy might harm U.S. prestige or credibility with American allies. A humble foreign policy and more modest overseas presence can be as (if not more) effective in restoring U.S. credibility and reassuring allies. Second, any potential U.S.-Sino power transition is likely to be easier on the United States than pessimists have advertised. If the United States acts like a typical retrenching state, the future looks promising. Several regional allies—foremost India and Japan—appear capable of assuming responsibilities formerly shouldered by the United States, and a forward defense is no longer as valuable as it once was. There remains ample room for cuts in U.S. defense spending. And as China grows it will find, as the United States did, that increased relative power brings with it widening divisions at home and fewer friends overseas. In brief, policymakers should reject arguments that a reduction in U.S. overseas deployments will embolden a hostile and expansionist China. Sizable forward deployments in Asia are just as likely to trap the United States in unnecessary clashes as they are to deter potential aggression. Third, the United States must reconsider when, where, and how it will use its more modest resources in the future. A sensible policy of retrenchment must be properly prepared for—policymakers should not hastily slash budgets and renounce commitments. A gradual and controlled policy of reprioritizing goals, renouncing commitments, and shifting burdens will bring greater returns than an improvised or imposed retreat. To this end, policymakers need to engage in a frank and serious debate about the purposes of U.S. overseas assets. Our position is that the primary role of the U.S. military should be to deter and fight conventional wars against potential great power adversaries, rather than engage in limited operations against insurgents and other nonstate threats. This suggests that U.S. deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan should be pared down; that the United States should resist calls to involve itself in internal conflicts or civil wars, such as those in Libya and elsewhere in North Africa; and that the Asia-Pacific region should have strategic priority over Europe and the greater Middle East. Regardless of whether one accepts these particular proposals, the United States must make tough choices about which regions and threats should have claim to increasingly scarce resources. CONCLUSION Retrenchment is probable and pragmatic. Great powers may not be prudent, but they tend to become so when their power ebbs. Regardless of regime type, declining states routinely renounce risky commitments, redistribute alliance burdens, pare back military outlays, and avoid ensnarement in and escalation of costly conflicts. Husbanding resources is simply sensible. In the competitive game of power politics, states must unsentimentally realign means with ends or be punished for their profligacy. Attempts to maintain policies advanced when U.S. relative power was greater are outdated, unfounded, and imprudent. Retrenchment policies—greater burden sharing with allies, less military spending, and less involvement in militarized disputes—hold the most promise for arresting and reversing decline.

#### No lashout--peaceful decline through retrenchment, history proves

Paul K. **MacDonald**, Assistant Professor, Political Science, Willians College **and** Joseph M. **Parent,** Assistant Professor, Political Science, University of Miami, "Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment," INTERNATIONAL SECURITY v. 35 n. 4, Spring 20**11**, pp. 7-44.

These arguments have grim implications for contemporary international politics. With the rise of new powers, such as China, the international pecking order will be in increasing flux in the coming decades. 8 Yet, if the pessimists are correct, politicians and interests groups in the United States will be unwilling or unable to realign resources with overseas commitments. Perceptions of weakness and declining U.S. credibility will encourage policymakers to hold on to burdensome overseas commitments, despite their high costs in blood and treasure. 9 Policymakers in Washington will struggle to retire from profitless military engagements and restrain ballooning current accounts and budget deficits. 10 For some observers, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan represent the ill-advised last gasps of a declining hegemon seeking to bolster its plummeting position. 11 In this article, we question the logic and evidence of the retrenchment pessimists. To date there has been neither a comprehensive study of great power retrenchment nor a study that lays out the case for retrenchment as a practical or probable policy. This article fills these gaps by systematically examining the relationship between acute relative decline and the responses of great powers. We examine eighteen cases of acute relative decline since 1870 and advance three main arguments. First, we challenge the retrenchment pessimists’ claim that domestic or international constraints inhibit the ability of declining great powers to retrench. In fact, when states fall in the hierarchy of great powers, peaceful retrenchment is the most common response, even over short time spans. Based on the empirical record, we find that great powers retrenched in no less than eleven and no more than fifteen of the eighteen cases, a range of 61–83 percent. When international conditions demand it, states renounce risky ties, increase reliance on allies or adversaries, draw down their military obligations, and impose adjustments on domestic populations. Second, we find that the magnitude of relative decline helps explain the extent of great power retrenchment. Following the dictates of neorealist theory, great powers retrench for the same reason they expand: the rigors of great power politics compel them to do so. 12 Retrenchment is by no means easy, but necessity is the mother of invention, and declining great powers face powerful incentives to contract their interests in a prompt and proportionate manner. Knowing only a state’s rate of relative economic decline explains its corresponding degree of retrenchment in as much as 61 percent of the cases we examined. Third, we argue that the rate of decline helps explain what forms great power retrenchment will take. How fast great powers fall contributes to whether these retrenching states will internally reform, seek new allies or rely more heavily on old ones, and make diplomatic overtures to enemies. Further, our analysis suggests that great powers facing acute decline are less likely to initiate or escalate militarized interstate disputes. Faced with diminishing resources, great powers moderate their foreign policy ambitions and offer concessions in areas of lesser strategic value. Contrary to the pessimistic conclusions of critics, retrenchment neither requires aggression nor invites predation. Great powers are able to rebalance their commitments through compromise, rather than conflict. In these ways, states respond to penury the same way they do to plenty: they seek to adopt policies that maximize security given available means. Far from being a hazardous policy, retrenchment can be successful. States that retrench often regain their position in the hierarchy of great powers. Of the fifteen great powers that adopted retrenchment in response to acute relative decline, 40 percent managed to recover their ordinal rank. In contrast, none of the declining powers that failed to retrench recovered their relative position.

#### Decline peaceful--empirically true, no incentive for China or U.S. to fight

Paul K. **MacDonald**, Assistant Professor, Political Science, Willians College **and** Joseph M. **Parent,** Assistant Professor, Political Science, University of Miami, "Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment," INTERNATIONAL SECURITY v. 35 n. 4, Spring 20**11**, pp. 7-44.

Implications for Sino-U.S. Relations Our findings are directly relevant to what appears to be an impending great power transition between China and the United States. Estimates of economic performance vary, but most observers expect Chinese GDP to surpass U.S. GDP sometime in the next decade or two.91 This prospect has generated considerable concern. Many scholars foresee major conflict during a Sino-U.S. ordinal transition. Echoing Gilpin and Copeland, John Mearsheimer sees the crux of the issue as irreconcilable goals: China wants to be America's superior and the United States wants no peer competitors. In his words, "[N]o amount [End Page 40] of goodwill can ameliorate the intense security competition that sets in when an aspiring hegemon appears in Eurasia."92 Contrary to these predictions, our analysis suggests some grounds for optimism. Based on the historical track record of great powers facing acute relative decline, theUnited States should be able to retrench in the coming decades. In the next few years, the United States is ripe to overhaul its military, shift burdens to its allies, and work to decrease costly international commitments. It is likely to initiate and become embroiled in fewer militarized disputes than the average great power and to settle these disputes more amicably. Some might view this prospect with apprehension, fearing the steady erosion of U.S. credibility. Yet our analysis suggests that retrenchment need not signal weakness. Holding on to exposed and expensive commitments simply for the sake of one's reputation is a greater geopolitical gamble than withdrawing to cheaper, more defensible frontiers. Some observers might dispute our conclusions, arguing that hegemonic transitions are more conflict prone than other moments of acute relative decline. We counter that there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this argument. Theoretically, hegemonic powers should actually find it easier to manage acute relative decline. Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability, which threatensgrave harm toany state that tries to cross them. Further, they are no longer the top target for balancing coalitions, and recovering hegemons may be influential because they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation. In addition, hegemonic powers, almost by definition, possess more extensive overseas commitments; they should be able to more readily identify and eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities or exciting domestic populations. We believe the empirical record supports these conclusions. In particular, periods of hegemonic transition do not appear more conflict prone than those of acute decline. The last reversal at the pinnacle of power was the Anglo-American transition, which took place around 1872 and was resolved without armed confrontation. The tenor of that transition may have been influenced by a number of factors: both states were democratic maritime empires, the United States was slowly emerging from the Civil War, and Great Britain could likely coast on a large lead in domestic capital stock. Although China and the United States differ in regime type, similar factors may work to cushion the impending Sino-American transition. Both are large, relatively secure continental great powers, a fact that mitigates potential geopolitical competition.93 China faces a variety of domestic political challenges, including strains among rival regions, whichmay complicate its ability to sustain its economic performance or engage in foreign policy adventurism.94 Most important, the United States is not in free fall. Extrapolating the data into the future, we anticipate the United States will experience a "moderate" decline, losing from 2 to 4 percent of its share of great power GDP in the five years after being surpassed by China sometime in the next decade or two.95 Given the relatively gradual rate of U.S. decline relative to China, the incentives for eitherside to run risks by courting conflict are minimal.The United States would still possess upwards of a third of the share of great power GDP, and would have little to gain from provoking a crisis over a peripheral issue. Conversely, China has few incentives to exploit U.S. weakness.96 Given the importance of the U.S. market to the Chinese economy, in addition to the critical role played by the dollar as a global reserve currency, it is unclear how Beijing could hope to consolidate or expand its increasingly advantageous position through direct confrontation. In short, the United States should be able to reduce its foreignpolicy commitments in East Asia in the coming decades without inviting Chinese expansionism. Indeed, there is evidence that a policy of retrenchment could reap potential benefits. The drawdown and repositioning of U.S. troops in South Korea, for example, rather than fostering instability, has resulted in an improvement in the occasionally strained relationship between Washington and Seoul.97 U.S. moderation on Taiwan, rather than encouraging hard-liners in [End Page 42] Beijing, resulted in an improvement in cross-strait relations and reassured U.S. allies that Washington would not inadvertently drag them into a Sino-U.S. conflict.98 Moreover, Washington's support for the development of multilateral security institutions, rather than harming bilateral alliances, could work to enhance U.S. prestige while embedding China within a more transparent regional order.99 A policy of gradual retrenchment need not undermine the credibility of U.S. alliance commitments or unleash destabilizing regional security dilemmas. Indeed, even if Beijing harbored revisionist intent, it is unclear that China will have the force projection capabilities necessary to take and hold additional territory.100 By incrementally shifting burdens to regional allies and multilateral institutions, the United States can strengthen the credibility of its core commitments while accommodating the interests of a rising China. Not least among the benefits of retrenchment is that it helps alleviate an unsustainable financial position. Immense forward deployments will only exacerbate U.S. grand strategic problems and risk unnecessary clashes.101 Conclusion This article has advanced three main arguments. First, retrenchment pessimists are incorrect when they suggest that retrenchment is an uncommon policy response to great power decline. States often curtail their commitments and mellow their ambitions as they fall in the ranks of great powers. Second and related, declining great powers react in a prompt and proportionate manner to their dwindling fortunes. They do this for the same reason that they tend to seize opportunities to expand: international incentives are strong inducements. [End Page 43] In the high-stakes world of great power politics, states can seldom afford to fool themselves or pamper parochial interests when relative power is perilously slipping away. Third, the rate of relative decline explains not only the extent of retrenchment but also the form. The faster the rate of decline, the more likely states are to reform their militaries, increase reliance on allies, and refrain from using force in international disputes. Taken together, these findings suggest that retrenchment is an attractive strategy for dealing with great power decline. Although we make no claim that the rate of relative decline explains everything, we suggest that our study represents a solid first cut and that domestic political factors loom too large in discussions of power transitions and hegemonic change.

#### Public weariness blocks future interventions

Ivan **Eland**, Senior Fellow, "Cut Back on Bad Policy or Quit Altogether?" Independent Institute, 8--31--**11**, <http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=3150>, accessed 10-3-11.

More important, U.S. interventionism in foreign affairs is often justified by high-testosterone proclamations that the exceptional United States must lead the world, usually by attacking or invading weak countries that are misbehaving. If the United States fails to get involved militarily in a crisis in the developing world or takes a backseat role, as in the crises previously mentioned, the interventionists start playing the “wimp” card. After disastrous and prolonged conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and a longer than expected war to depose the already weakened Gadhafi, the war-weary public is less likely to buy this overheated rhetoric. The public should realize—as it seems to be—that when the “need for American leadership” is hyped, a hand should be kept on the collective wallet so that it is not lifted.

### Heg Bad: A2 "Re-Engagement Turn"

#### U.S. won’t be ‘sucked back in’—offshore balancing allows it to pick its fights.

**LAYNE** (Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M) **‘06**

[Christopher, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to Present, Cornell University Press (Ithica), p. 163 //wyo-tjc]

The historical record does not support the claim that European and Asian wars invariably compel the United States to intervene. The United States does not get “sucked into” Eurasian wars. Wars are not forces of nature that magnetically draw states into conflict against their will. Policymakers have volition. They decide whether to go to war. The United States could have allowed an offshore balancing strategy and probably remained out of both world wars (and certainly out of World War I). However, although America’s interests would have allowed it to remain safely on the sidelines, America’s ambitions—and its ideology—caused it to become involved iii these conflicts. In this sense, far from enhancing America’s security, the grand strategic internationalism to which those ambitions has given rise has contributed to American insecurity.

### Heg Unsustain: A2 “Allies”

#### Allies claims are wrong--they can't or won't help us

Ted Galen **Carpenter**, Vice President, Defense and Foreign Policy Studies, Cato Institute, "America Alone," AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE, 1--**11**, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=12694, accessed 6-20-12.

British Prime Minister David Cameron recently reassured President Obama that Britain would remain a "robust ally" — America's wingman — in confronting threats around the world. Of course, that comment might have been a little more comforting if it had not come on the heels of his government's decision to cut Britain's already modest defense budget by another 8 percent. Cameron and his colleagues approved that reduction despite Washington's frantic lobbying. London's decision to pare down military spending as part of its strategy to close the government's huge budget deficit is symptomatic of what's happening with many of America's security partners, but Britain's maneuver was especially painful to hawks in the United States. Even as other allies became less and less willing to follow Washington's lead on military interventions in recent years, Britain remained doggedly loyal. Indeed, former prime minister Tony Blair endured the label "America's lap dog" with the proverbial stiff upper lip as the war in Iraq became increasingly unpopular in his country. And unlike some allies, Britain did more than provide rhetorical support for Washington's global adventures. It put boots on the ground and planes in the air. Now, though, there are doubts not only whether a British government would assist future U.S.-led interventions, given the negative tenor of domestic opinion, but also whether London would have the troops and hardware to do so even if it wanted to help. It's as if the Lone Ranger could no longer count on Tonto — or Don Quixote was being abandoned by Sancho Panza. American leaders seem to be in denial about what is happening in various allied countries. How clueless Washington has become was apparent when the Obama administration issued its first National Security Strategy document last May. The United States, the NSS stressed, cannot afford to be the world's sole policeman; it needs partners who are willing and able to meet security challenges. But Washington will increasingly look in vain for partners who are willing or able, much less both. America's $700 billion military budget, which consumes about 5 percent of our gross domestic product, has soared over the past decade. In contrast, allied defense spending has been in free fall. With the new budget, London's outlays will decline to a mere 2.7 percent of GDP. And Britain is a veritable Sparta compared to other NATO members. Germany's once credible defense force is now a shrunken husk, with Berlin's spending down to 1.4 percent of GDP. Such key countries as Italy and Spain skimp even more. The administration can't count on newer NATO members to fill that gap. The military efforts of many of those countries are too small even to matter. Such nations as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia, and Albania, which joined the alliance in the last two rounds of enlargement, collectively spend less on defense in a year than the United States spends in Afghanistan in three weeks. Whatever their desires, they are incapable of providing more than token military deployments. That might be useful for political symbolism — Washington can create the illusion that an intervention is multilateral — but such commitments are useless from a military standpoint. Washington doesn't have much reason for optimism about help from its East Asian allies either. Japan, by far the most significant friendly power in the region, strictly adheres to spending no more than 1 percent of GDP on the military. South Korea devotes less than 3 percent to defense. And both Tokyo and Seoul are largely concerned about possible security threats from North Korea or China. Neither the governments nor the populace in those countries show much interest in helping the United States in any future nation-building mission in the Middle East or Africa. Even when allied forces have been deployed in such missions, the results have ranged from frustrating to comical. Japan sent members of its Self-Defense Force to Iraq in 2003, but Tokyo required them to be non-combat personnel. That meant that Japanese forces had to be surrounded and protected by the troops of other countries in the U.S.-led coalition. South Korea sent true combat units, but Seoul insisted that they be stationed only in Iraqi Kurdistan — the northern portion of Iraq that was so peaceful that there were very few incidents, in marked contrast to the chaos that gripped the rest of the country. Several allied governments have imposed similar restrictions regarding their units in Afghanistan. Berlin, for example, did not allow its troops to be deployed outside of northern Afghanistan, far away from Kandahar and other Taliban-infested portions of the country. That was probably just as well: a 2008 Bundestag investigation found that German troops were so out of shape, in part because of excessive beer consumption, that they would be useless in a combat setting. Unfortunately for those forces, though, their seemingly safe, comfortable assignment did not entirely turn out that way. Taliban units infiltrated into northern Afghanistan, and German troops, much to their surprise, found themselves under fire. Other NATO countries placed various requirements on the use of their forces. In some cases, night missions were deemed off-limits. In others, troops could not be deployed at all in situations in which combat was likely. Such limitations drove U.S. military commanders to distraction. But they merely reflected how unpopular U.S.-led counterinsurgency or nation-building missions in faraway lands have become in most allied countries. Opinion polls among NATO members show majorities — usually strong majorities — opposed to having their troops involved in such interventions. With the partial exception of Britain, the Iraq War was unpopular in those nations from the beginning and became dramatically more so as the original justifications for the invasion proved false and hopes for a smooth transition to a pro-Western, democratic Iraq proved delusional. There was initially more support among Europeans for the mission in Afghanistan. Indeed, following the terrorist attacks on 9/11, NATO states for the first time in the history of the alliance invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which proclaims that an attack on one member is considered an attack on all. There was little public opposition to that move, even though it was evident that the United States would take military action against Afghanistan as al-Qaeda's principal base of operations. But as the war dragged on and the violence continued to mount with little evidence of positive results, Europeans became more negative. An opinion survey conducted by the German Marshall Fund of the United States and several other think tanks in the summer of 2010 found strong support — some 64 percent — in 11 major European Union countries for withdrawing their troops from Afghanistan, or at least greatly reducing their numbers. In several key countries, including Germany and Poland, majorities favored full withdrawal. The only way that NATO governments could keep their increasingly restless populations from open rebellion against policies that supported the U.S. war in Afghanistan was to place more rigorous restrictions on the use of their troops. But even that strategy has become noticeably less effective in the past year. Europeans want their forces removed from harm's way, and leaders in democratic political systems ignore such sentiment at their peril. Allied governments around the world have discovered that the hard way. Early on, opposition to the U.S.-led war in Iraq contributed to the electoral ouster of Spain's conservative government and the victory of the opposition Socialists. More recently, dissatisfaction over his support for Washington's wars played a role in the defeat of Australian prime minister John Howard. Tony Blair's reputation as a U.S. foreign policy lackey undermined his political position to the point that he was forced to give up his leadership of the Labour Party and his post

as prime minister. The combination of declining military capabilities and dwindling public support for murky interventions in the Third World means that Washington cannot count on allied participation in future crusades. Even the loyal Brits are blunt on that point. Despite its new, downsized budget, Britain remains something more than a military pushover. It still has a capable navy and air force as well as a small, but potent, nuclear deterrent. That force is adequate to deter aggression against the British homeland and deal with security contingencies in the European theater. But venturing far afield is another matter. Key elements of Cameron's budget reduction included a 10 percent cut in uniformed personnel and whopping slashes in weapons systems, such as artillery, crucial to ground force deployments.

#### Realist theory disproves the advantage

JM Greico- professor of political science at Duke University, 1993 “Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate”¶ edited by David Allen Baldwin, chapter entitled “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism” p. 116-118

Realism has dominated international relations theory at least since World War II.' For realists, international anarchy fosters competition and conflict among states and inhibits their willingness to cooperate even when they share common interests. Realist theory also argues that international institutions are unable to mitigate anarchy's constraining effects on interstate cooperation. Realism, then, presents a pessimistic analysis of the prospects for international cooperation and of the capabilities of international institutions.2¶ The major challenger to realism has been what I shall call liberal institutionalism. Prior to the current decade, it appeared in three successive presentations—functionalist integration theory in the 1940s and early 1950s, neofunctionalist regional integration theory in the 1950s and 1960s, and interdependence theory in the 1970s.3 All three versions rejected realism's propositions about states and its gloomy understanding of world politics. Most significantly, they argued that international institutions can help states cooperate. Thus, compared to realism, these earlier versions of liberal institutionalism offered a more hopeful prognosis for international cooperation and a more optimistic assessment of the capacity of institutions to help states achieve it.¶ International tensions and conflicts during the 1970s undermined liberal institutionalism and reconfirmed realism in large measure. Yet that difficult decade did not witness a collapse of the international system, and in the light of continuing modest levels of interstate cooperation, a new liberal institutionalist challenge to realism came forward during the early 1980s (Stein 1983:115-40; Axelrod 1984; Keohane 1984; Lipson 1984; Axelrod and Keohane 1985). What is distinctive about this newest liberal institutionalism is its claim that it accepts a number of core realist propositions, including, apparently, the realist argument that anarchy impedes the achievement of international cooperation. However, the core liberal arguments—that realism overemphasizes conflict and underestimates the capacities of international institutions to promote cooperation—remain firmly intact. The new liberal institutionalists basically argue that even if the realists are correct in believing that anarchy constrains the willingness of states to cooperate, states nevertheless can work together and can do so especially with the assistance of international institutions.¶ This point is crucial for students of international relations. If neo-liberal institutionalists are correct, then they have dealt realism a major blow while providing ine intellectual justification for treating their own approach, and the tradition from which it emerges, as the most effective for understanding world politics.¶ This essay's principal argument is that, in fact, neoliberal institutionalism misconstrues the realist analysis of international anarchy and therefore it misunderstands the realist analysis of the impact of anarchy on the preferences and actions of states. Indeed, the new liberal institutionalism fails to address a major constraint on the willingness of states to cooperate which is generated by international anarchy and which is identified by realism. As a result, the new theory's optimism about international cooperation is likely to be proven wrong.¶ Neoliberalism's claims about cooperation are based on its belief that states are atomistic actors. It argues that states seek to maximize their individual absolute gains and are indifferent to the gains achieved by others. Cheating, the new theory suggests, is the greatest impediment to cooperation among rationally egoistic states, but international institutions, the new theory also suggests, can help states overcome this barrier to joint action. Realists understand that states seek absolute gains and worry about compliance. However, realists¶ find that states are positional, not atomistic, in character, and therefore realists argue that, in addition to concerns about cheating, states in cooperative arrangements also worry that their partners might gain more from cooperation that they do. For realists, a state will focus both on its absolute and relative gains from cooperation, and a state that is satisfied with a partner's compliance in a joint arrangement might nevertheless exit from it because the partner is achieving relatively greater gains. Realism, then, finds that there are at least two major barriers to international cooperation: state concerns about cheating and state concerns about relative achievements of gains. Neoliberal institutionalism pays attention exclusively to the former and is unable to identify, analyze, or account for the latter.¶ Realism's identification of the relative gains problem for cooperation is based on its insight that states in anarchy fear for their survival as independent actors. According to realists, states worry that today's friend may be tomorrow's enemy in war, and fear that achievements of joint gains that advantage a friend in the present might produce a more dangerous potential foe in the future. As a result, states must give serious attention to the gains of partners. Neoliber-als fail to consider the threat of war arising from international anarchy, and this allows them to ignore the matter of relative gains and to assume that states only desire absolute gains. Yet in doing so, they fail to identify a major source of state inhibitions about international cooperation.¶ In sum, I suggest that realism, its emphasis on conflict and competition notwithstanding, offers a more complete understanding of the problem of international cooperation than does its latest liberal challenger. If that is true, then realism is still the most powerful theory of international politics.

#### Sopo Doesn’t solve inevitable decline

Quinn 11 Adam Quinn, Lecturer in International Studies at the University of Birmingham, “The art of declining politely: Obama’s prudent presidency and the waning of American power”, 7/1/2011, International Affairs 87:4 (2011) 803–824, Wiley Online, CMR

Nevertheless, this qualification demands two further qualifications of its own. The first is that if we consider ‘soft power’ as a national attribute then it is difficult to separate it with confidence from the economic and military dimensions of power. Is it really likely that America’s ideological and cultural influence will endure undiminished in the absence of the platform of military and economic primacy upon which it has been constructed? It may be overstatement to suggest that, borrowing Marxist terminology, hard power represents the ‘base’ and soft power mere ‘superstructure’. But one could plausibly argue that even America’s non-coercive power and political appeal are inextricably entwined with the status conferred upon it by possession of a preponderance of material resources. While vestigial soft power may delay or mitigate the consequences of relative material decline, it is surely unrealistic to expect it to override them such as to allow the US to continue to exercise the same influence in a multipolar or non-polar world as it did in a unipolar one.¶ The second qualification is that the definition of power as control over behaviour or outcomes is not the only plausible one, or the only one that matters. In his seminal Theory of international politics, Kenneth Waltz criticized the relational definition of power, which in his words ‘equates power with control’ and ‘confuses process with outcome’.38 Defining power by reference to whether or not one can engineer one’s preferred outcomes, Waltz argued, logically collapses the space needed for consideration of how judicious strategy is required to translate raw power into results, because under the relational definition being powerful is simply the same thing as achieving one’s desired outcomes, and weakness equates with the failure to do so. Instead, Waltz commended the ¶ and simple notion that an agent is powerful to the extent that he affects others more than they affect him. The weak understand this; the strong may not. Prime Minister Trudeau once said that, for Canada, being America’s neighbour ‘is in some ways like sleeping with an elephant. No matter how friendly or even-tempered is the beast … one is affected by every twitch and grunt.’39¶ This definition makes eminent intuitive sense, and captures something important which the relational conception of power does not. In addressing the declinist argument, it is something of a detour to argue that the US may continue to exercise influence through other means even as its relative resource advantage diminishes. This may be true, but it remains the case that, simply put, the ‘size of the elephant’, which is to say the relative disproportionate effect of America’s actions upon others, will be decreasing. This in all likelihood has implications for the realization of those goals with which it identifies itself. But even if the United States should somehow play its hand so well that it continues to obtain many desired outcomes, such a change would remain significant in its own right.

### Heg Bad: Inevitability--2NC

#### NEXT, hegemony

#### ONE, a rapid decline is inevitable—the fallout of the Great recession, enormous budget deficits, coming entitlement crash, and a decline in soft power ensure that the U.S. dominance strategy is doomed to fail in the short-term--that's Layne. Our evidence is newer, better qualified, and cites the most recent trends

#### Means all their offense is nonunique—question is whether we can transition soon enough to avoid great power war

#### And, economic factors prove

Christopher **Layne**, Professor, National Security, Texas A&M University, “The Global Power Shift from West to East,” THE NATIONAL INTERST, May/June 20**12**, p. 27-28.

Indeed, looking forward a decade, the two biggest domestic threats to U.S. power are the country’s bleak fiscal outlook and deepening doubts about the dollar’s future role as the international economy’s reserve currency. Economists regard a 100 percent debt-to-gdp ratio as a flashing warning light that a country is at risk of defaulting on its financial obligations. The nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office (cbo) has warned that the U.S. debt-to-gdp ratio could exceed that level by 2020—

and swell to 190 percent by 2035. Worse, the CBO recently warned of the possibility of a “sudden credit event” triggered by foreign investors’ loss of confidence in U.S. fiscal probity. In such an event, foreign investors could reduce their purchases of Treasury bonds, which would force the United States to borrow at higher interest rates. This, in turn, would drive up the national debt even more. America’s geopolitical preeminence hinges on the dollar’s role as reserve currency. If the dollar loses that status, U.S. primacy would be literally unaffordable. There are reasons to be concerned about the dollar’s fate over the next two decades. U.S. political gridlock casts doubt on the nation’s ability to address its fiscal woes; China is beginning to internationalize the renminbi, thus laying the foundation for it to challenge the dollar in the future; and history suggests that the dominant international currency is that of the nation with the largest economy. (In his piece on the global financial structure in this issue, Christopher Whalen offers a contending perspective, acknowledging the dangers posed to the dollar as reserve currency but suggesting such a change in the dollar’s status is remote in the current global environment.)

#### U.S. military lead is eroding—declining domestic investments, other nations are becoming more powerful—threatens overall leadership

Christopher **Layne**, Professor, National Security, Texas A&M University, “The Global Power Shift from West to East,” THE NATIONAL INTERST, May/June 20**12**, p. 22-23.

Since the Cold War’s end, America’s military superiority has functioned as an entry barrier designed to prevent emerging powers from challenging the United States where its interests are paramount. But the country’s ability to maintain this barrier faces resistance at both ends. First, the deepening financial crisis will compel retrenchment, and the United States will be increasingly less able to invest in its military. Second, as ascending powers such as China become wealthier, their military expenditures will expand. The Economist recently projected that China’s defense spending will equal that of the United States by 2025. Thus, over the next decade or so a feedback loop will be at work, whereby internal constraints on U.S. global activity will help fuel a shift in the distribution of power, and this in turn will magnify the effects of America’s fiscal and strategic overstretch. With interests throughout Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Europe and the Caucasus—not to mention the role of guarding the world’s sea-lanes and protecting U.S. citizens from Islamist terrorists—a strategically overextended United States inevitably will need to retrench. Further, there is a critical linkage between a great power’s military and economic standing, on the one hand, and its prestige, soft power and agenda-setting capacity, on the other. As the hard-power foundations of Pax Americana erode, so too will the U.S. capacity to shape the international order through influence, example and largesse. This is particularly true of America in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis and the subsequent Great Recession. At the zenith of its military and economic power after World War II, the United States possessed the material capacity to furnish the international system with abundant financial assistance designed to maintain economic and political stability. Now, this capacity is much diminished.

#### U

### Heg Bad: Defense--2NC

#### NEXT, our defense

#### U.S. hegemony serves no stabilizing role--other countries free ride now, they can handle their own security--that's Hadar

#### Their impacts are threat inflation, creates a self fulfilling prophecy

Leon **Hadar**, Cato Institute, SANDSTORM: POLICY FAILURE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, 20**05**, p. 9-12.

Challenging the American public and policymakers to break out of the mold of obsolete and costly thinking and take a fresh look at taken-for-granted premises of US foreign policy, in general, and in the Middle East, in particular, can sometimes be an impossible mission. To paraphrase and apply what General Douglas MacArthur once said about old generals, aging foreign policy paradigms do not simply fade away. It takes time for great powers and their elites and publics to re-adjust their foreign policy paradigms to changes in the geo-strategic and geo-economic balance of power. It is usually the outcomes of international crises and wars that make it clear that a great power lost the game, and that another great power is emerging. And even then, there could be a long lag before we recognize the construction of a new foreign policy and the ensuing conventional wisdom about "who is up, and who is down" in the international systemm. Reading old copies of the New York Times or other major newspapers from the late 1940s and early 1950s one could get the impression that Britain and France were still great world powers at that time, despite the fact that World War II had decimated those two empires militarilarly and economically. It was only following the 1956 Suez debacle, the French withdrawal from Southeast Asia and North Africa, and the loss of the last British imperial outposts in the Persian Gurf, that Britain and France were starting to be perceived as nothing more than mid-sized European powers, occupying a space far below the American and Soviet top dogs in the global ranking order. At the same time, the United States and the Soveiet Union, through the process of building their economic and military power through their competition in the Middle East and elsewhere, were identified as the "superpowers" with Britain and France relegated to the role of allies of the American superpower. The foreign policy paradigm of multipolarity was replaced with one based on the notion of bipolarity. Sheer inertia that is so much a part of human nature may explain why we sometimes continue to obsess with that with which we are familiar and accept the status quo. Piolitical, bureaucratic, commercial and media players have vested interests in ensuring that certain international issue-areas remain on the top of the policy agenda. These international issue-areas continue to receive presidential attention, budget spending, and press coverage, even if most Americans cease to be affected directly by them. After all, it was quite difficult for the members of the inside-the-beltway crowd in Washington, ranting from the Foreign Service and the military to think tankers and journalists to get used to the idea that the Cold War was over. They have yet to recover from their post-Cold War depression, having been forced to live in a dull world without checkpoint Charlie, arms control summits, Soviet studies, and other Cold World thrills, not to mention those huge budgets that went to pay for big and small wars, intelligence games, and aid packages to this or that "friendly" dictator. All of which explains perhaps why these former Cold War warriors seem to be afflicted by what could be described as the Enemy-Deprivation Syndrome, as they search for new "threats" to analyze, cover, and contain, whether it's China, Saddam Hussein, or Islamic terrorism. The media and opinion makers transmit the foreign policy paradigm to the general public, who in turn absorb it as conventional wisdom. Not surprisingly, many Americans probably assume now that the United States has always been involved in the Middle East in protecting "Oil and Israel" and in trying to make peace between Arabs and Jews. They would probably be surprised to learn that there has never been a formal military alliance between Israel and the United States and that Americans do not receive most of their energy imports from the Middle East. We sometimes assume that foreign policymaking is a process in that leaders try to make decisions in a rational way, based on cost-effective calculations. It is also often assumed that political scientists, policy analysts, and journalists help leaders make decisions by providing them with all the necessary information and "right" ideas that develop eventually into coherent foreign policy paradigms. But there is a crucial difference between the evolution of a foreign policy paradigm and that of scientific paradigms that Kuhn proposed. A shift in profession commitments to shared assumption, or to a scientific paradigm takes place when an anomaly "subverts the existing tradition of scientific practice" leading to what Kuhn described as a "scientific revolution," that is, "the tradition-shattering complements to the tradition-bound activity of normal science." Kuhn noted that new scientific paradigms require the reconstruction of prior assumptions and the re-evaluation of prior fact. That can be a difficult and time-consuming process that is strongly resisted by the established scientific community. Changes in scientific paradigms take place in response to observations of a certain reality that is not influenced directly by the work of the scientist. The scientist does not make objects gravitate to earth. He or she can observe them doing this while recognizing that the process of observing the phenomenon will not change the physical reality. But when it comes to politics and other areas of human action, including foreign policy, the experts who generate the paradigms that become the basis for the formulation and implementation of policy are not only involved in a process of observing reality. In fact, by disseminating information and constructing ideas that are then transformed into policies, these experts help shape political reality. Unlike the physical scientists, they can make objects fall. It is their paradigms that help create the stage for international crises and encourage nations to go to war. Discussions of US foreign policy decisions tend to create the impression that such decisions were rational responses to events beyond the control of the policymaker and that he or she was simply reacting to a natural phenomenaon. The terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center supposedly came out of the clear blue sky and US policymakers were forced to come up with a policy, with military and diplomatic responses. But those who were being asked to draw the outlines of such a policy and implement it were the same policy analysts and policymakers who had shaped the long-standing US approach in the Middle East and shared this policy paradigm, the MEP. It was this paradigm that led to the creation of the Islamic Mujaheddin in Afghanistan, to the US military presence in Saudi Arabia to the American support for Israel. It was those earlier US policies in the Middle East and South Asia that helped set the stage for the events of 9/11. To put it differently, the events of 9/11 were in part a result of specific policies and the paradigms that produced them, much as the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan led to its own unraveling and the release of centrifugal forces that continue to threaten the Russian Federation. Only when the costs of maintaining a certain foreign policy prove to be higher than its benefits in terms of national interests and as measured in lives and money, - and when that reality becomes obvious to both the elites and the public - are policymakers forced to bid reluctant farewells to the outdated and expensive diplomatic and national security paradigms that they took for granted. It is difficult to imagine that those who had promoted these policies and existing paradigms would have been ready to admit after 9/11 that they observed an anomaly that subverted the existing tradition of the American MEP and were ready now to welcome a revolution in American foreign policy, In fact, as the post-9/11 events demonstrated, when it comes to foreign policy, the tendency among practitioners is to invest even more resources in sustaining the existing paradigm. That process helps create the conditions for new international crises and wars which require policy analysts and policymakers to continue to circle the wagons around the vulnerable paradigm. The promotion of an even higher level of US intervention in the Middle East after 9/11 is just another example of policy analysts and makers trying to protect the MEP. So it is not surprising that if and when an individual dares to challenge the MEP, to suggest that it should be reassessed and propose a new MEP base on the notion of American disengagement front he Middle East, he or she is treated at best as a political Cassandra, or at worst as a political extremist as an "isolationist" the term that members of Washington's foreign policy establishment usually use to bash those who disagree with them. Disengagement from the Middle East, you say? But what about "the oil?" Or "Israel?" Or "terrorism?" The United States is supposed to "do something" about that. At least, that is what the old MEP conditioned Americans to expect.

#### And, the administration is committed to managed decline

James **Holmes**, Associate Professor, Strategy, US Naval War College, “Offshore Balancing and Taiwan,” TAIPEI TIMES, 6—3—**11**, <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2011/06/03/2003504821>, accessed 10-15-11.

Such arguments parallel those of “realist” international relations academics in the US. Such academics concentrate on raw power politics, as manifest in the balance of power. Backing Taipei is a loser in realists’ austere cost-benefit calculus. Taiwan’s aspirations to de facto independence threaten to bring two great powers to blows, imposing potentially catastrophic costs. And, they ask, for what possible gain? Chen may get his way if such thinking wins out in Washington. And it might. Shedding risky, high-cost ventures makes eminent sense to thinkers of realist leanings. Furthermore, US President Barack Obama’s administration came to office intent on reducing the overseas entanglements undertaken by its predecessor, cutting costs while lowering the US’ profile in the world. Officials portray themselves as clear-thinking realists, not given to ideological crusades. Some realists would go further. “Offshore balancing” is an offshoot of realism that has swiftly gained ground in recent years. Admiral Gary Roughead, the US’ top naval officer, has appeared alongside offshore-balancing proponents such as University of Chicago professor Robert Pape. Roughead has taken to pushing an “offshore option” by which a weary US withdraws ground forces from Eurasia, entrusting important functions to the sea services.

#### And, Libya proves we are right, both globally and in the context of MENA

David **Axe**, journalist, “America’s Somalia Experiment,” THE DIPLOMAT, 9—5—**11**, <http://the-diplomat.com/2011/09/05/america%E2%80%99s-somalia-experiment/>, accessed 10-16-11.

The tide seemed to turn in an instant. After six months of fighting and thousands of NATO air sorties, the Libyan civil war rapidly reached its endgame late last month, as internationally-backed rebel fighters stormed Tripoli. Mostly, it was a victory for the Libyan people, who have long suffered under Muammar Gaddafi’s dictatorial rule. But the fall of Tripoli was also an apparent success for a new US military strategy, one gaining favour as the bloody, expensive land wars in Iraq and Afghanistan slowly wind down. It’s called ‘offshore balancing,’ and it’s an approach meant to minimize long-term deployments of large ground armies by emphasizing air and naval forces working in conjunction with local and regional ‘proxy’ armies. In coming years, offshore balancing could guide the United States’ interventions in world crises, particularly in the Asia-Pacific. Any US president thinking of fighting another land war in Asia should ‘have his head examined,’ former US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said in February. In 2009, Vice President Joe Biden famously proposed quickly off-shoring the Afghanistan war, a notion Barack Obama rejected in favour of a slowly-shrinking major ground presence through 2014, with a likely shift to offshore balancing after that date. ‘The Libyan intervention, which involves only air and naval assets and no ground forces, is an excellent example of offshore balancing,’ wrote Lawrence Korb, a veteran analyst with the Center for American Progress in Washington, D.C. But there’s an even better example, one that could either reinforce support for offshore balancing or doom the concept – and at the very least serves as an important test case.

#### Public opinion can drive a shift towards a balancing strategy

-public hates leadership strat

-similar thought process

Patrick **Porter**, Reader, Strategic Studies, University of Reading, SHARING POWER: PROSPECTS FOR A U.S. CONCERT-BALANCE STRATEGY, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 4--**13**, p. 42-44.

One trend that could work in favor of retrenchment and a change in grand strategy lies in domestic public opinion. Some primacists argue that the Wilsonian strain of muscular liberal crusading is the only authentic American tradition in the Republic’s DNA. They object that American domestic opinion and strategic culture would obstruct any shift to a power-sharing strategy. The United States sees itself as exceptional. It is the only historical case of a truly unipolar world power. Others (like the Romans, Hapsburgs, Mongols, British, or French) in some measure were accustomed to co-existing with other powers. But the U.S. foreign policy establishment has been reared for decades on the Pax Americana, an unusually strong domestic cultural constraint. Some observers attribute a similar idealism among the American people, asking whether a more restrained strategy can retain the support of a democratic culture long drawn to viewing world politics as a Manichean struggle between good and evil.77 According to Robert Kagan, this tradition of messianic idealism makes America a “Neocon Nation” that is historically bound to an activist foreign policy. This is both ahistorical and misleading in the present. Consider recent empirical work by the likes of Dan Drezner and Christopher Preble into the gaps between elite and mass opinion on foreign policy, particularly in relation to the U.S. military-strategic posture and its diplomatic commitments abroad, the extent to which the United States should “burden shift,” and the extent to which it should play the role of “sheriff” or “global cop.” The evidence both analysts offer suggests that majority popular opinion is actually more averse to the current grand strategy of “leadership” than is often realized. Most Americans lean toward a focus on national interests narrowly conceived and toward priorities such as territorial and homeland security and regional hegemony, as well as protecting jobs and energy supplies. They support burden sharing onto other countries. Democracy promotion, human rights, or humanitarian peacekeeping—the agendas of active liberal internationalism—enthuses them substantially less. When it comes to the use of force, the Chicago Council on Global Affairs “found Americans think- ing about the use of force in the same way as offshore balancers.” They could be more receptive to change than elite opinion would be. More recent opinion poll data support their findings. Recent polls suggest that Americans worry more about their jobs, their homes, their pensions, and health care than about export of American values or even dangers from abroad. Americans by substantial majorities favor burden sharing, believe the United States should not assume the role of preeminent world leader in solving international problems, and that it is playing “global cop” more than it should be. According to the Pew Research Center and the Council on Foreign Relations, the percentage of respondents who say the United States should “mind its own business internationally” has risen higher than at any point in 50 years. We do not have to embrace this absolute, isolationist message to recognize that these responses follow the logic that for America to do more at home, it will have to do less abroad. This is hardly surprising, given the interlocking factors of economic hardship and the lack of an obvious major adversary against which to mobilize. Emphatically, it is not unAmerican to prefer a strategy that retrenches some commitments, minimizes conflicts, redefines interests, shifts burdens, and frees up resources for domestic investment.

#### confidence crisis—doubt over american leadership causes multipolarity now

**LAYNE** (Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M) **‘06**

[Christopher, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to Present, Cornell University Press (Ithica), p. 151 //wyo-tjc]

Up until now, other states have foregone overt counterbalancing because they benefit from American hegemony. However, Washington’s ability to provide other major states with collective goods—in both the security and economic spheres—is a wasting asset. Although other states have relied on U.s. security guarantees to protect them against regional rivals and instability, the credibility of America’s extended deterrence commitments is increasingly problematic. As other major states experience growing doubts about whether they can count on the United States to protect them, they will move—and, indeed, in some cases already have—to acquire military capabilities so that, if necessary, they can defend themselves without U.S. assistance.67 When other major states build up militarily as a hedge against abandonment by the United States, they open a second avenue to multipolarity. Regardless of how multipolarity comes about—as the result of balancing against the United States, or as a result of others balancing against themselves as a hedge against regional rivals—the consequences for America’s hegemonic grand strategy are the same

### Heg Bad: Defense—Stats 2NC

#### Heg impacts empirically disproven—when the US cut engagement stability in the international system increased—studies prove—that’s fettweis

#### AND – The best statistical evidence proves – prefer statistics because its easy to write overly rhetorical cards but hard to cite facts

Montiero 12 [Nuno P. Monteiro is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is Not Peaceful”, International Security, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Winter 2011/12), pp. 9–40]

Wohlforth claims not only that the unipole can stave off challenges and preclude major power rivalries, but also that it is able to prevent conflicts among other states and create incentives for them to side with it. 39 The unipole’s advantage is so great that it can settle any quarrel in which it intervenes. As Wohlforth writes, “For as long as unipolarity obtains....second-tier states are less likely to engage in conflict-prone rivalries for security or prestige. Once the sole pole takes sides, there can be little doubt about which party will prevail.” 40 This is the core logic of Wohlforth’s argument that unipolarity is peaceful. But what specifically does his argument say about each of the six possible kinds of war I identified in the previous section? Clearly, great power war is impossible in a unipolar world. In Wohlforth’s famous formulation: “Two states measured up in 1990. One is gone. No new pole has appeared: 2 1 1.” 41 Furthermore, by arguing that unipolarity precludes hegemonic rivalries, Wohlforth makes no room for wars between the sole great power and major powers. These are, according to him, the two main reasons why a unipolar world is peaceful. Unipolarity, he writes, “means the absence of two big problems that bedeviled the statesmen of past epochs: hegemonic rivalry and balance-of-power politics among major powers.” 42 I agree with Wohlforth on these two points, but they are only part of the picture. Granted, the absence of great power wars is an important contribution toward peace, but great power competition—and the conflict it might engender—would signal the emergence of one or more peer competitors to the unipole, and thus indicate that a transition to a bipolar or multipolar system was already under way. In this sense, great power conflict should be discussed within the context of unipolar durability, not unipolar peace. Indeed, including this subject in discussions of unipolar peacefulness parallels the mistakes made in the debate about the Cold War bipolar system. Then, arguments about how the two superpowers were unlikely to fight each other were often taken to mean that the system was peaceful. This thinking ignored the possibility of wars between a superpower and a lesser state, as well as armed conflicts among two or more lesser states, often acting as great power proxies. 43 In addition, Wohlforth claims that wars among major powers are unlikely, because the unipole will prevent conflict from erupting among important states. He writes, “The sole pole’s power advantages matter only to the degree that it is engaged, and it is most likely to be engaged in politics among the other major powers. 44 I agree that if the unipole were to pursue a strategy of defensive dominance, major power wars would be unlikely. Yet, there is no compelling reason to expect that it will always follow such a course. Should the unipole decide to disengage, as Wohlforth implies, major power wars would be possible. At the same time, Wohlforth argues that the unipole’s power preponderance makes the expected costs of balancing prohibitive, leading minor powers to bandwagon. This is his explanation for the absence of wars between the sole great power and minor powers. But, as I show, the costs of balancing relative to bandwagoning vary among minor powers. So Wohlforth’s argument underplays the likelihood of this type of war. Finally, Wohlforth’s argument does not exclude all kinds of war. Although power preponderance allows the unipole to manage conflicts globally, this argument is not meant to apply to relations between major and minor powers, or among the latter. As Wohlforth explains, his argument “applies with less force to potential security competition between regional powers, or between a second-tier state and a lesser power with which the system leader lacks close ties.” 45 Despite this caveat, Wohlforth does not fully explore the consequences of potential conflict between major and minor powers or among the latter for his view that unipolarity leads to peace. How well, then, does the argument that unipolar systems are peaceful account for the first two decades of unipolarity since the end of the Cold War? Table 1 presents a list of great powers divided into three periods: 1816 to 1945, multipolarity; 1946 to 1989, bipolarity; and since 1990, unipolarity. 46 Table 2 presents summary data about the incidence of war during each of these periods. Unipolarity is the most conflict prone of all the systems, according to at least two important criteria: the percentage of years that great powers spend at war and the incidence of war involving great powers. In multipolarity, 18 percent of great power years were spent at war. In bipolarity, the ratio is 16 percent. In unipolarity, however, a remarkable 59 percent of great power years until now were spent at war. This is by far the highest percentage in all three systems. Furthermore, during periods of multipolarity and bipolarity, the probability that war involving a great power would break out in any given year was, respectively, 4.2 percent and 3.4 percent. Under unipolarity, it is 18.2 percent—or more than four times higher. 47 These figures provide no evidence that unipolarity is peaceful. 48 In sum, the argument that unipolarity makes for peace is heavily weighted toward interactions among the most powerful states in the system. This should come as no surprise given that Wohlforth makes a structural argument: peace flows from the unipolar structure of international politics, not from any particular characteristic of the unipole. 49 Structural analyses of the international system are usually centered on interactions between great powers. 50 As Waltz writes, “The theory, like the story, of international politics is written in terms of the great powers of an era.” 51 In the sections that follow, however, I show that in the case of unipolarity, an investigation of its peacefulness must consider potential causes of conflict beyond interactions between the most important states in the system.

### OSB Good: Top—1NC

#### Offshore balancing will promote stability

-can form concerts; joint response

-solves terror, prolif, climate change

Patrick **Porter**, Reader, Strategic Studies, University of Reading, SHARING POWER: PROSPECTS FOR A U.S. CONCERT-BALANCE STRATEGY, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 4--**13**, p. 27-28.

According to more optimistic appraisals, an American retreat from hegemony would lead to a manageable level of strife that would benefit U.S. security interests. The withdrawal of America’s military supervision would see the re-emergence of natural checks against predatory behavior—namely a return to the logic of balancing and equilibrium, should any state threaten its neighbors. In addition, any competition would be limited and bounded by today’s military technology. Nuclear weapons have made conquest by other states virtually impossible and prohibitively costly. They generally dampen security competition among major powers. As cooperation is imperative and competition increasingly costly, never before have there been such strong incentives for interstate peace, stability, and cooperation. In this new space, a new security regime of collaboration could be forged, hammered out, and negotiated with emerging powers such as India and China. There are new, transnational threats that require joint response and could form the basis for a concert. Just as the 19th-century concert was bound together by a common fear of mass revolution and the wars that attended it, so too could the major powers of the 21st century organize and collaborate around the unifying force of common threats such as catastrophic terrorism, WMD proliferation, and threats to the global commons such as climate change.

**Food Scarcity--1NC**

**Food insecurity won’t cause war**

**Allouche 11** The sustainability and resilience of global water and food systems: Political analysis of the interplay between security, resource scarcity, political systems and global trade ☆ Jeremy Allouche Institute of Development Studies, Brighton, UK Available online 22 January 2011.

**At sub-national scales** (i.e. the intra-state level and the local level), **the link between scarcity and conflict is more complex**. At the intra-state level, **recent research** on civil wars **shows that countries suffering from environmental degradation** (soil degradation, deforestation and freshwater supply linked to high population density) **were indeed more likely to experiance civil war, but that the magnitude of the effects was secondary to political and economic factors** (see for example [Urdal, 2005] and [Hauge and Ellingsen, 1998]). **The same is true for hunger and food insecurity as a cause of conflict**. The work of Collier and the US State Failure Task Force seems to suggest a possible correlation between food insecurity and civil wars. Collier found a strong relationship between indicators of deprivation (such as low per capita income; economic stagnation and decline; high income inequality; and slow growth in food production per capita) and violent civil strife (Collier, 1999). The US State Failure Task Force found that infant mortality, a surrogate measure of food insecurity and standard of living, was one of three variables most highly correlated with civil war (Goldstone et al., 2003). However, **a number of specialists have challenged the notion that food insecurity is a proximate cause of conflict and prefer to emphasize ethnic and political rivalry** (Paalberg, 1999). Nonetheless, most analysts would agree that structural conditions of inequality and hunger are among the underlying causes of conflict. But again, ‘**physical resource scarcity’ is not in most cases the result of insufficient production or availability but is usually linked to the politics of inequality**.

### Dz

**Risk is decreasing, its hype and cures solve**

**Ridley** 8/17/**12** [Matt Ridley, columnist for The Wall Street Journal and author of *The Rational Optimist: How Prosperity Evolves,* “Apocalypse Not: Here’s Why You Shouldn’t Worry About End Times,” <http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2012/08/ff_apocalypsenot/all/>]

The emergence of **AIDS led to a theory that other viruses would spring from** tropical **rain forests to wreak revenge on humankind** for its ecological sins. That, at least, was the implication of Laurie Garrett’s 1994 book, The Coming Plague: Newly Emerging Diseases in a World Out of Balance. The most prominent candidate was Ebola, the hemorrhagic fever that starred in Richard Preston’s The Hot Zone, published the same year. Writer Stephen King called the book “one of the most horrifying things I’ve ever read.” Right on cue, **Ebola appeared** again **in the Congo in 1995, but it soon disappeared**. Far from being a harbinger, **HIV was the only new tropical virus to go pandemic in 50 years**.¶ In the 1980s British cattle began dying from **mad cow disease**, caused by an infectious agent in feed that was derived from the remains of other cows. When people, too, began to catch this disease, **predictions** of the scale of the epidemic quickly **turned terrifying**: Up to 136,000 would die, according to one study. A pathologist warned that the British “have to prepare for perhaps thousands, tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands, of cases of vCJD [new variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, the human manifestation of mad cow] coming down the line.” Yet **the total number of deaths so far** in the UK **has been 176**, **with** just five occurring in 2011 and **none** so far **in 2012**.¶ In 2003 it was **SARS**, a virus from civet cats, that ineffectively but inconveniently **led to** quarantines in Beijing and Toronto **amid predictions of global Armageddon**. SARS subsided within a year, after **killing just 774** people. In 2005 it was **bird flu**, described at the time by a United Nations official as being “like a combination of global warming and HIV/AIDS 10 times faster than it’s running at the moment.” The World Health Organization’s official forecast was 2 million to 7.4 million dead. In fact, by late 2007, when the disease petered out, the **death toll was roughly 200**. In 2009 it was Mexican **swine flu**. WHO director general Margaret Chan said: “It really is all of humanity that is under threat during a pandemic.” The outbreak **proved to be a normal flu episode**.¶The truth is, **a new global pandemic is growing less likely, not more. Ma**

**ss migration to cities means the opportunity for viruses to jump from wildlife to the human species has** not risen and has possibly even **declined, despite media hype** to the contrary. **Water- and insect-borne infections**—generally the most lethal—**are declining as living standards** slowly **improve**. It’s true that casual-contact **infections** such as colds **are thriving**—but **only by being mild enough that their victims can soldier on** with work and social engagements, thereby allowing the virus to spread. Even **if a lethal virus does go global, the ability of medical science to sequence its genome and devise a vaccine or cure is getting better** all the time.

## 1NR

### Debt: Overview 2NC

#### B. Timeframe ---- collapse by November if we don’t raise the debt ceiling

Sahadi 9/10 Jeanne, “Debt ceiling 'X date' could hit Oct. 18”, <http://money.cnn.com/2013/09/10/news/economy/debt-ceiling-bills-coming-due/index.html>, MCR

A new analysis by a think tank shows that Washington's drop-dead deadline for the debt ceiling could hit as soon as Oct. 18.¶ Estimating exactly when the Treasury Department will be unable to pay all the bills coming due if Congress fails to raise the nation's legal borrowing limit is notoriously difficult.¶ That's why, in an analysis released Tuesday, the Bipartisan Policy Center put the "X date" between Oct. 18 and Nov. 5.¶ Treasury Secretary Jack Lew has warned that by mid-October the agency will have only $50 billion in cash **on top of incoming revenue.**¶That may sound like a lot. But, as the Bipartisan Policy Center details, **it won't last very long**.¶ If the "X" date turns out to be Oct. 18, Treasury would run about $106 billion short of the money it owes between then and Nov.15. That means it wouldn't be able to pay the equivalent of a third of all the bills due during that period.¶ Here's why: Treasury handles about 80 million payments a month. Those payments are not evenly spaced out so on some days more is owed than on others. And the revenue flowing into federal coffers is unpredictable and varies from day to day.¶ Payments include IRS refunds, Social Security and veterans benefits, Medicare reimbursements for doctors and hospitals, bond interest owed investors, payments to contractors and paychecks for federal workers and military personnel.¶ If Congress fails to act in time, Treasury will have to make difficult -- and legally questionable -- decisions about who should get paid and who should be stiffed. It may decide to pay some bills in full and on time and not others.¶ Or it may decide to delay all payments due on a given day until it has sufficient revenue on hand to pay in full. in a Treasury Inspector General's report that this might be the most plausible and least harmful approach.¶ But under that scenario, delays would grow **over time** from a day or two to several weeks. For example, the payments due to seniors, veterans and active duty military personnel on Nov. 1 wouldn't go out until Nov. 13.¶ In any case, the expectation is that the agency will try to prioritize payments to bond investors over everyone else, lest the financial markets go haywire. Politically, of course, that carries risk, said Steve Bell, the senior director of the Bipartisan Policy Center's economic policy project.¶ "There's a political danger you'll be accused of paying bondholders over Social Security recipients," Bell said.¶ On both Oct. 23 and Nov. 14, $12 billion in Social Security benefits come due, while another $25 billion comes due on Nov. 1, according to the analysis.¶ Meanwhile, on Oct. 24, Treasury will have to roll over $57 billion in outstanding debt and another $115 billion on Oct. 31. Normally that's not a problem, because U.S. Treasury auctions attract a lot of buyers willing to purchase bonds at low rates.¶ But if those rollover dates come after the "X" date, and the **perception is that the United States is defaulting on some of its obligations,** Treasury could have trouble finding enough buyers **or investors could demand higher interest rates**.¶ The debt ceiling is currently set at $16.7 trillion. That ceiling was reached on May 19, and ever since Treasury has been using a host of special measures to keep the country's borrowing at or below that ceiling. But those measures will be exhausted by mid-October, according to Treasury.¶ If lawmakers want to raise the ceiling enough to get past the 2014 midterm elections in November, the Bipartisan Policy Center estimates they will have to raise it by $1.1 trillion to $17.8 trillion. To top of page

#### C. Controlling impact --- only economic collapse can make major war fashionable again.

Donald Kagan, Senior Associate @ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Summer 1999 [“Is Major War obsolete? An Exchange," Survival]

There is yet another more critical factor that cannot be taken for granted: the continuous prosperity that underlies the current situation. It is 70 years since the last world-wide depression began. Will this prosperous condition without such world-wide depressions last forever? What will happen if it does not? Europe and the world had trouble sin the 1920s, but it took the Great Depression to blow away liberal regimes in Germany and Japan, and to unleash monstrous bellicose forces. Are we sure that would not happen again? Since we cannot be sure that it will not, we must face the real possibility that major war may yet again come into fashion, and that it will take considerable effort, especially by the US, to keep it at bay.

t/case

--makes all conflicts more likely

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### Debt Impact: Economy Wall

**Economic decline causes war – studies prove**

**Royal**, Department of Defense Cooperative threat reduction director, 20**10** [Jedediah, Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises, in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, p.213-4]

Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However**, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources**. **Crises could** potentially **be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states**.4 Third, others have considered **the link between economic decline and external armed conflict** at a national level. Bloomberg and Hess (2002) **find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn.** They write, **The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing**. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other (Bloomberg & Hess, 2002, p.89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. ‘**Diversionary theory’ suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts** to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995), and Bloomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics arc greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that **periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force**. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas **political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict** at systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

### Ptx Lx: Congress 2NC

#### Fighting to defend his war power will sap Obama’s capital, trading off with rest of agenda

Kriner, 10 --- assistant professor of political science at Boston University

(Douglas L. Kriner, “After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War”, University of Chicago Press, Dec 1, 2010, page 68-69)

While congressional support leaves the president’s reserve of political capital intact, congressional criticism saps energy from other initiatives on the home front by forcing the president to expend energy and effort defending his international agenda. Political capital spent shoring up support for a president’s foreign policies is capital that is unavailable for his future policy initiatives. Moreover, any weakening in the president’s political clout may have immediate ramifications for his reelection prospects, as well as indirect consequences for congressional races.59 Indeed, Democratic efforts to tie congressional Republican incumbents to President George W. Bush and his war policies paid immediate political dividends in the 2006 midterms, particularly in states, districts, and counties that had suffered the highest casualty rates in the Iraq War. 60 In addition to boding ill for the president’s perceived political capital and reputation, such partisan losses in Congress only further imperil his programmatic agenda, both international and domestic. Scholars have long noted that President Lyndon Johnson’s dream of a Great Society also perished in the rice paddies of Vietnam. Lacking the requisite funds in a war-depleted treasury and the political capital needed to sustain his legislative vision, Johnson gradually let his domestic goals slip away as he hunkered down in an effort first to win and then to end the Vietnam War. In the same way, many of President Bush’s highest second-term domestic proprieties, such as Social Security and immigration reform, failed perhaps in large part because the administration had to expend so much energy and effort waging a rear-guard action against congressional critics of the war in Iraq.61 When making their cost-benefit calculations, presidents surely consider these wider political costs of congressional opposition to their military policies. If congressional opposition in the military arena stands to derail other elements of his agenda, all else being equal, the president will be more likely to judge the benefits of military action insufficient to its costs than if Congress stood behind him in the international arena.

### Ptx Lx: A2 “Winners Win” [Losers Lose]

#### ONE, Plan isn’t a win – it’s not supported by Obama – the 1NC says it would be an external action that would go against the president. Plan doesn’t get pushed by Obama - don’t allow them to make a new 1AR argument that it is

#### TWO, Obama will fight the plan – means it won’t be a win

Posner 13 (Eric, “Don’t be fooled by Obama’s speech. On executive power, he’s just like Bush.”, 5/23, <http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2013/05/obama_s_speech_he_s_just_like_bush_in_pushing_the_limits_of_executive_power.single.html>, CMR)

This argument echoes the Bush administration’s dubious claim that waterboarding is not “torture” because it does not exceed the necessary threshold of pain. But presidents have always advanced strained interpretations of statutes that conflict with what they see as their constitutional powers to make war and conduct foreign policy. This is a polite way for the president to do what he wants without explicitly defying Congress. (There is even a legal doctrine that reflects this principle; it’s called the “canon of avoidance”). For good or ill, it is a practice that is rooted in tradition going back to the founders.¶ In parliamentary systems, the executive is bound by the decisions of the legislature (at least in theory). People with vague memories of junior high civics class might think the same principle applies in the United States. It doesn’t. The Constitution gives the executive independence from Congress. Madison, who like other founders feared tyrannous legislatures as much as tyrannous executives, made this explicit in his famous statement in The Federalist Papers. “The great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachment of the others.” The president resists encroachment from Congress by refusing to obey, or by narrowly interpreting, statutes that infringe on his constitutional powers, including war powers. When Congress and the executive clash about the meaning of those powers, there is no neutral way to decide who is right.¶ That is why precedent looms so large in determining the actual allocation of powers. Presidents disregard the Constitution’s mandate to obtain the advice of the Senate when making treaties because George Washington decided that the injunction was impractical and the Senate acquiesced. The president’s power to interpret or disregard treaties likewise reflects long-standing practice: One clear example is President Carter’s withdrawal of the United States from a treaty with Taiwan in 1979. Other presidents have also narrowly interpreted, or simply violated, the War Powers Resolution, as President Clinton did during the conflict with Serbia in 1999. Even targeted killing outside of warfare is not new: Consider Clinton’s cruise missile strike in 1998 against a Sudanese pharmaceutical factory that allegedly manufactured chemical weapons. By allowing such examples of executive muscle flexing, Congress has ratified them. That is how our system works.¶ When the Bush administration was at the bench press, the left managed to create a narrative, largely accepted by the media, that the president was lawless. Now that it’s Obama’s turn, has the story changed? Friedersdorf takes the both-are-lawless path, and gets points for consistency, but he is tilting at windmills—both parties and mainstream public opinion support a president who can forcefully counter threats. Harold Koh, by contrast, argued in a recent speech that Obama is different and better than Bush was. He said that a “critical difference between this Administration and its predecessor is the Obama Administration’s determination not to address Al Qaeda and the Taliban solely through the tools of war.” Also:¶ “The Obama Administration has not treated the post-9/11 conflict as a Global War on Terror to which no law applies, in which the United States is authorized to use force anywhere, against anyone. Instead, it has acknowledged that its authority under domestic law derives from Acts of Congress, not just the President’s vague constitutional powers.” (I have added the emphases.)¶ But as national security law expert Ben Wittes points out, these statements are false. Bush did not solely use the tools of war; he also used civilian law enforcement, for example, by prosecuting Jose Padilla—indeed, more than Obama has. Bush did not just rely on presidential powers; he also relied on domestic law, just as Obama has. Similarities between the two presidents in overall legal approach dwarf the differences in rhetoric, atmospherics, and a few narrow legal questions.¶ Certainly, Obama is every bit as ruthless as his predecessors in pursuing what he sees as the requirements of national security. The apparent decision within his administration to kill enemy combatants with drones rather than capture them (detailed once again in Mark Mazzetti’s book Way of the Knife) is one of many examples. The hard line on leaks is another. The rhetorical smiley faces in Obama’s speech should fool no one.

### Debt Uq: Will Pass 2NC

#### Strong Obama negotiating position allows him to force the GOP to raise the debt ceiling now—that’s Dovere

#### Debt limit will be raised now—but political capital is key

VOA News 10-5-13 "Obama Expects Congress to Raise Debt Ceiling Before Deadline" VOA News) www.voanews.com/content/obama-expects-congress-to-raise-debt-ceiling-before-headline/1

U.S. President Barack Obama says he does not think Congress will breach a mid-October deadline to increase the country's borrowing limit so the United States does not default on its financial obligations. With the U.S. government in the fifth day of a partial shutdown, it also faces running out of money to pay its bills on October 17, including interest on government bonds held by China, Japan and other overseas investors. In a wide-ranging interview with the Associated Press released Saturday, Obama said he expects Congress will increase the country's $16.7 trillion debt ceiling so the United States can borrow more money. "America has never not paid its bills. And I've said repeatedly that that's not something anybody should be threatening," the president said. "The potential default of the United States, where we are essentially deadbeats, that's never happened." Obama, a Democrat in his fifth year as the American leader, is locked in a political stalemate with Republican opponents in Congress over government spending policies and implementation of his signature legislative achievement, wide-ranging health care changes that are now taking effect.

#### Stand firm is key to get Boehner to capitulate on the debt ceiling

Madhani 10-4-13 (Aamer, staff writer, "Obama hammers Boehner on shutdown, debt ceiling" www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/10/03/obama-boehner-shutdown-debt-limit/2918545/

President Obama continued to hammer House Speaker John Boehner on Thursday as no new signs of a resolution to a federal government shutdown emerged and the country teetered closer to the $16.7 trillion debt ceiling due to be reached in two weeks. In a speech at a construction company in the nearby Maryland suburbs, Obama placed the blame for the crisis squarely on Boehner, offering no shelter to the Republican leader with whom he has had a hot-and-cold relationship since the Ohio lawmaker won the speakership in 2010. "Speaker John Boehner won't even let the bill get a yes-or-no vote, because he doesn't want to anger the extremists in his party," Obama said. "That's all. That's what this whole thing is about." But as the government shutdown enters its fourth day, Obama and White House officials will have to weigh carefully just how hard they want to push Boehner, who is under intense pressure from the most conservative lawmakers in his party to not capitulate to a president who says he will not negotiate over either a short-term continuing resolution to keep the government open or the looming debt limit. In the end, political analysts say, it is in the interest of the White House to find a way for Boehner to emerge out of the crisis with some credibility with his rank-and-file, as the alternative to the Ohio lawmaker that could emerge from the Republican caucus may be far less tolerable. "There is an old Spanish saying, " said Steve Bell, a former Senate Republican aide and analyst at Bipartisan Policy Center in Washington. "When you go to dig a grave for your enemy dig two — one for him and one for you. " In perhaps a small sign of progress in the impasse, Boehner signaled on Thursday that he may be willing to hold a vote to raise the debt ceiling even if Obama refuses to agree to the Republican demand of delaying implementation of the president's signature health care law by a year. Jared Bernstein, who served as top economic adviser to Vice President Biden in the first term, said that by taking the debt ceiling debate off the table. Boehner could potentially gain some negotiating leverage in the budget fight, but he does it at the risk of the Republican base "throwing him under the bus." Bernstein said the best way forward for the White House is continuing to be "very explicit" with Boehner that it remains open on long term budget issues, while standing pat on the condition that a short-term budget and debt limit vote is passed without conditions. "You essentially tell him by putting clean votes on the floor right now buys a ticket to robust negotiations on the other side," Bernstein said. "At the point, it's perfectly legitimate for him to go into any negotiation with any asks that he wants." Even as Boehner showed signs of flexibility on a debt limit vote, House Republicans continued to pursue a piecemeal shutdown strategy to pass targeted funding bills for popular government services. House Majority Leader Eric Cantor, R-Va., wrote to rank-and-file Republicans in a memo Thursday that he was confident Obama and congressional Democrats would eventually bow to negotiations if Republicans hold the line. "While no one can predict with certainty how the current shutdown will be resolved, I am confident that if we keep advancing common-sense solutions to the problems created by the shutdown that Senate Democrats and President Obama will eventually agree to meaningful discussions that would allow us to ultimately resolve this impasse," Cantor wrote, "The American people have elected a divided government and they expect us to work together and they will not countenance one party simply refusing to negotiate." The House spent much of Thursday trying to develop smaller funding bills that would pay for popular government programs closed by the shutdown. House Republicans have scheduled a meeting for Friday morning to discuss their negotiating positions. Obama, meanwhile, made clear, at least for now, he is going to use the bully pulpit to keep the pressure on Boehner. "The longer this goes on, the worse it will be," Obama said. "And it makes no sense. The American people elected their representatives to make their lives easier, not harder."

### Debt Uq: A2 “Thumper—Shutdown”

#### Shutdown was a win for Obama – mobilizes his agenda

Michael O’Brien, “Winners and Losers of the Government Shutdown,” NBC NEWS, 10—1—13,

<http://nbcpolitics.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/10/01/20763839-winners-and-losers-of-the-government-shutdown?lite>

Here is a look at some of the shutdown's winners and losers. Winners: President Barack Obama At the end of the day, Obama's signature domestic achievement — the Affordable Care Act — survived this fight intact. What's more, the president didn't have to offer any concessions in exchange for leaving his namesake "Obamacare" law alone. Unlike the 2011 debt-ceiling fight, when the administration agreed to the automatic spending cuts that would eventually form the basis of the sequester, this time the administration held the line and didn't yield much ground to Republicans. The developments mark a somewhat stunning turnaround for Obama's political fortunes over the last month. Just a few week's ago, the administration was struggling badly to win congressional approval for intervention in Syria — an initiative which had no less than Obama's second-term relevance riding on it. Now, Obama has dispensed with the Syria issue (for now) through diplomacy, and scored a major win over Republicans -- a rare victory, given the waning prospects for immigration reform or major gun control legislation during his presidency.

### Shutdown Aff Ix: Econ Takeouts

#### It’s temporary and empirically no impact

Andrew Taylor, “Here’s the Truth: The Government Doesn’t Shut Down,” WTNH, Associated Press, 9—19—13,

<http://www.wtnh.com/news/politics/heres-the-truth-the-government-doesnt-shut-down-nd13-jgr>

From a practical perspective, shutdowns usually aren't that big a deal. They happened every year when Jimmy Carter was president, averaging 11 days each. During President Reagan's two terms, there were six shutdowns, typically just one or two days apiece. Deals got cut. Everybody moved on. In 1995-96, however, shutdowns morphed into political warfare, to the dismay of Republicans who thought they could use them to drag Clinton to the negotiating table on a balanced budget plan. Republicans took a big political hit, but most Americans suffered relatively minor inconveniences like closed parks and delays in processing passport applications. Some 2,400 workers cleaning up toxic waste sites were sent home, and there were short delays in processing veterans' claims. Under a precedent-setting memorandum by Reagan budget chief David Stockman, federal workers are exempted from furloughs if their jobs are national security-related or if they perform essential activities that "protect life and property."

### Debt Uq: A2 “Thumper—Syria”

#### Syria problems are a distant memory - strength in the current fight gives him a major political edge

Michael O’Brien, “Winners and Losers of the Government Shutdown,” NBC NEWS, 10—1—13,

<http://nbcpolitics.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/10/01/20763839-winners-and-losers-of-the-government-shutdown?lite>

Nonetheless, after two-and-a-half years of standoffs and gridlock, the fact that a shutdown has finally come to pass — 17 days before Congress must also raise the debt ceiling, no less — could upend politics with unforeseen consequences for many of this fight's key players. Here is a look at some of the shutdown's winners and losers. Winners: President Barack Obama At the end of the day, Obama's signature domestic achievement — the Affordable Care Act — survived this fight intact. What's more, the president didn't have to offer any concessions in exchange for leaving his namesake "Obamacare" law alone. Unlike the 2011 debt-ceiling fight, when the administration agreed to the automatic spending cuts that would eventually form the basis of the sequester, this time the administration held the line and didn't yield much ground to Republicans. The developments mark a somewhat stunning turnaround for Obama's political fortunes over the last month. Just a few week's ago, the administration was struggling badly to win congressional approval for intervention in Syria — an initiative which had no less than Obama's second-term relevance riding on it. Now, Obama has dispensed with the Syria issue (for now) through diplomacy, and scored a major win over Republicans -- a rare victory, given the waning prospects for immigration reform or major gun control legislation during his presidency.

### Debt Internal: PC Key

#### Obama pushing now—capital key to success

Pace 9/12 Julie, AP White House correspondent, Syria debate on hold, Obama refocuses on agenda, The Fresno Bee, 9/12/13, http://www.fresnobee.com/2013/09/12/3493538/obama-seeks-to-focus-on-domestic.html

With a military strike against Syria on hold, President Barack Obama tried Thursday to reignite momentum for his second-term domestic agenda. But his progress could hinge on the strength of his standing on Capitol Hill after what even allies acknowledge were missteps in the latest foreign crisis.¶ "It is still important to recognize that we have a lot of things left to do here in this government," Obama told his Cabinet, starting a sustained White House push to refocus the nation on matters at home as key benchmarks on the budget and health care rapidly approach.¶ "The American people are still interested in making sure that our kids are getting the kind of education they deserve, that we are putting people back to work," Obama said.¶ The White House plans to use next week's five-year anniversary of the 2008 financial collapse to warn Republicans that shutting down the government or failing to raise the debt limit could drag down the still-fragile economy. With Hispanic Heritage Month to begin Monday, Obama is also expected to press for a stalled immigration overhaul and urge minorities to sign up for health care exchanges beginning Oct. 1.¶ Among the events planned for next week is a White House ceremony highlighting Americans working on immigrant and citizenship issues. Administration officials will also promote overhaul efforts at naturalization ceremonies across the country. On Sept. 21, Obama will speak at the Congressional Black Caucus Gala, where he'll trumpet what the administration says are benefits of the president's health care law for African-Americans and other minorities.¶ Two major factors are driving Obama's push to get back on track with domestic issues after three weeks of Syria dominating the political debate. Polls show the economy, jobs and health care remain Americans' top concerns. And Obama has a limited window to make progress on those matters in a second term, when lame-duck status can quickly creep up on presidents, particularly if they start losing public support.¶ Obama already is grappling with some of the lowest approval ratings of his presidency. A Pew Research Center/USA Today poll out this week put his approval at 44 percent. That's down from 55 percent at the end of 2012.¶ Potential military intervention in Syria also is deeply unpopular with many Americans, with a Pew survey finding that 63 percent opposing the idea. And the president's publicly shifting positions on how to respond to a deadly chemical weapons attack in Syria also have confused many Americans and congressional lawmakers.¶ "In times of crisis, the more clarity the better," said Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., a strong supporter of U.S. intervention in Syria. "This has been confusing. For those who are inclined to support the president, it's been pretty hard to nail down what the purpose of a military strike is."¶ For a time, the Obama administration appeared to be barreling toward an imminent strike in retaliation for the Aug. 21 chemical weapons attack. But Obama made a sudden reversal and instead decided to seek congressional approval for military action.¶ Even after administration officials briefed hundreds of lawmakers on classified intelligence, there appeared to be limited backing for a use-of-force resolution on Capitol Hill. Rather than face defeat, Obama asked lawmakers this week to postpone any votes while the U.S. explores the viability of a deal to secure Syria's chemical weapons stockpiles.¶ That pause comes as a relief to Obama and many Democrats eager to return to issues more in line with the public's concerns. The most pressing matters are a Sept. 30 deadline to approve funding to keep the government open — the new fiscal year begins Oct. 1 — and the start of sign-ups for health care exchanges, a crucial element of the health care overhaul.¶ On Wednesday, a revolt by tea party conservatives forced House Republican leaders to delay a vote on a temporary spending bill written to head off a government shutdown. Several dozen staunch conservatives are seeking to couple the spending bill with a provision to derail implementation of the health care law.¶ The White House also may face a fight with Republicans over raising the nation's debt ceiling this fall. While Obama has insisted he won't negotiate over the debt limit, House Speaker John Boehner on Thursday said the GOP will insist on curbing spending.

### Debt Internal: A2 “Compartmentalization”

#### Vote switching happens—even on unrelated legislation

Dmitri **Simes**, Executive Director, Nixon Center and Paul Saunders, “START of a Pyrrhic Victory,” NATIONAL INTEREST, 20**10**, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/start-pyrrhic-victory-4626, accessed 10-2-11.

Had the lame-duck session not already been so contentious, this need not have been a particular problem. Several Senate Republicans indicated openness to supporting the treaty earlier in the session, including Senator Lindsey Graham and Senator John McCain. Senator Jon Kyl—seen by many as leading Republican opposition to the agreement—was actually quite careful to avoid saying that he opposed New START until almost immediately prior to the vote. Our own conversations with Republican Senate sources during the lame duck session suggested that several additional Republicans could have voted to ratify New START under other circumstances; Senator Lamar Alexander is quoted in the press as saying that Republican anger over unrelated legislation cost five to ten votes. By the time the Senate reached New START, earlier conduct by Senate Democrats and the White House had alienated many Republicans who could have voted for the treaty. That the administration secured thirteen Republican votes (including some from retiring Senators) for the treaty now—and had many more potentially within its grasp—makes clear what many had believed all along: it would not have been so difficult for President Obama to win the fourteen Republican votes needed for ratification in the new Senate, if he had been prepared to wait and to work more cooperatively with Senate Republicans. Senator Kerry’s comment that “70 votes is yesterday’s 95” ignores the reality that he and the White House could have secured many more than 70 votes had they handled the process differently and attempts to shift the blame for the low vote count onto Republicans.

#### Political capital key to coalition building, horse-trading

Steven E. **Schier**, Professor, Political Science, Carleton College, “Understanding the Obama Presidency,” THE FORUM v. 7 n. 1, 20**09**.

At the heart of any presidency lie events and the political skills of the president and his administration. Presidents have discretion to create some events, but they also are subject to nondiscretionary events that just happen to them. Such events create positive and negative political impact for presidents. Presidents must demonstrate their personal skills in response to such events. ‘Professional reputation” is an important aspect of a president’s political capital (Neustadt 1990, 50-55). What are the component skills that create a strong presidential reputation? • A president’s rhetorical skills can buoy public support and facilitate his dominance of national politics. Ronald Reagan, the “great communicator,” developed a public persona attractive to many Americans through his skilled use of rhetorical occasions. Obama is definitely in Reagan’s rhetorical league. • Coalitional skills require a president to maintain the support of fellow partisans while occasionally reaching beyond them to build broader public and congressional support for his initiatives. Coalitional skills involve both partisan maintenance and situational outreach beyond fellow partisans. Obama’s brief legislative record yields little advance indication about his coalitional skills in practice. Internationally, major initiatives on matters as diverse as military action in Afghanistan and international environmental protection require ability at coalition formation and maintenance. The international goodwill greeting Obama’s election gives him an opportunity to develop coalitional skills in an internationally supportive public environment. • A related bargaining skill allows a president to bring together rival power holders to gain necessary support. This can involve splitting differences among lawmakers over taxation and spending or hammering out consensus language among differing nations about U.N resolutions or international treaties. Obama demonstrated occasional ability to strike bipartisan bargains as a legislator. He will need to do much more of that as president. • Managerial skills require clear lines of organization and accountability within the executive branch. The effective implementation of foreign and domestic policy is the consequence of able management. Obama, with no executive experience, will have to rely on skilled appointees to help him exercise such skills. • Finally, heresthetic skills involve a “deliberate attempt to structure political situations so that opponents will either have to submit or be trapped. There is also the possibility of redefining political conflicts to permit new coalitions to be created. . . [this is] the science of manipulation and strategy of winning” (Hargrove 1998, 32; Riker 1986).

#### They are wrong—capital drives the agenda

Matthew N. **Beckermann**, Associate Professor, Political Science, UC-Irvine and Vimal Kumar, “How Presidents Push, When Presidents Win: A Model of Positive Presidential Power in US Lawmaking,” JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS v. 23 n. 3, 20**11**, Ebsco.

Agreeing that presidents’ strategic options in Congress do indeed depend heavily on factors beyond their control, our model’s first insight is explicating the two systematic strategies presidents have available for exerting influence in Congress: they can target marginal voters to shift the preference distribution on roll-call votes and they can target congressional leaders to censor the policy alternatives making it that far. While the first of these is widely recognized and studied, the second is not. By detailing the actual mechanisms of president-led coalition building on Capitol Hill, ours is a theory that puts positive presidential power on a firmer conceptual footing; legislative opportunities are predictable (if not controllable) and capitalizing on them depends on nothing more heroic than the normal grist of legislative politics: arm-twisting, brow-beating, and horse-trading. In this way, we subscribe to President Eisenhower’s observation: ‘I’ll tell you what leadership is: it’s persuasion, and conciliation, and education, and patience. It’s long, slow, tough work’ (Hughes, 1963: 124).

#### Empirically disproven – vote-trading occurs all the time

Charles Kershaw **Rowley**, Professor, Economics, George Mason University, et al., THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RENT-SEEKING, 19**98**, p. 455.

The U.S. Congress is hindered with respect to vote trading opportunities both by its bicameral structure and by the geographic representation basis of both its chambers. Under such constraints, the rules of the legislative process tend to be important as a determinant of the "efficiency" of pork-barrel politics. In one respect, these rules have always encouraged vote-trading in the U.S. to a greater degree than is the case with most European parliamentary democracies: party discipline is much looser and policy cross-overs by individual congressmen always much more frequent. However, this stimulus to interest group rent-seeking is a consistent feature of the U.S. policy, and not an especial development of the past quarter century. To explain the dynamic of vote-trading in the U.S. over the period in question, it is necessary, therefore, to scrutinize developments in the complex structure of internal decision-making institutions to which Congress delegates substantial authority. Choices registered in these institutions constrain the influence of House or Senate majorities, preventing comparisons between certain collective choice alternatives, while facilitating others. Preeminent among these institutions is the committee/subcommittee system. Committees are endowed with considerable authority to initiate legislation within their defined jurisdictions. In some instances, amendments to their proposals are confined, by convention, to the particular subject matter of such proposals. Bills, as amended, are usually voted up or down, though amendments from the floor are not completely precluded. In the event of disagreement between the House and the Senate, the committees select the conference representatives, whose compromises are protected from amendment.

#### Ideology doesn’t outweigh – presidential success dictates votes

Matthew J. **Lebo**, Associate Professor, Political Science, SUNY-Stony Brook and Andrew O’Geen, Phd Candidate, “The President’s Role in the Partisan Congressional Arena,” JOURNAL OF POLITICS, 20**10**.

Keeping this centrality in mind, we use established theories of congressional parties to model the president’s role as an actor within the constraints of the partisan environment of Congress. We also find a role for the president's approval level, a variable of some controversy in the presidential success literature. Further, we are interested in both the causes and consequences of success. We develop a theory that views the president’s record as a key component of the party politics that are so important to both the passage of legislation and the electoral outcomes that follow. Specifically, theories of partisan politics in Congress argue that cross-pressured legislators will side with their parties in order to enhance the collective reputation of their party (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005), but no empirical research has answered the question: "of what are collective reputations made?" We demonstrate that it is the success of the president – not parties in Congress – that predicts rewards and punishments to parties in Congress. This allows us to neatly fit the president into existing theories of party competition in Congress while our analyses on presidential success enable us to fit existing theories of party politics into the literature on the presidency.

#### Studies prove issues spillover—the president is key

M. **Eshbaugh-Soha**, Policy Priorities and Presidential Success in Congress, Conference Paper, American Policial Science Association, 20**08**, Political Science Complete.

Presidential-congressional relations are a central topic in the scientific study of politics. The literature is clear that a handful of variables strongly influence the likelihood of presidential success on legislation. Of these variables, party control of Congress is most important (Bond and Fleisher 1990), in that conditions of unified government increase, while conditions of divided government decrease presidential success, all else equal. The president’s approval ratings (Edwards 1989) and a favorable honeymoon (Dominguez 2005) period may also increase presidential success on legislation. In addition, presidential speeches that reference policies or roll-call votes tend to increase the president’s legislative success rate (Barrett 2004; Canes-Wrone 2001; Eshbaugh-Soha 2006). In their landmark examination of presidential success in Congress, Bond and Fleisher (1990, 230) identify yet another condition that may facilitate presidential success on legislation when they write that “the president’s greatest influence over policy comes from the agenda he pursues and the way it is packaged.” Moreover, the policies that the president prioritizes have “a major impact on the president’s relationship with Congress.” Taken together, these assertions strongly suggest that the policy content of the president’s legislative agenda—what policies the president prioritizes before Congress—should be a primary determinant of presidential success in Congress.

#### Dickinson concludes neg

**Dickinson 9** “Matthew Dickinson, professor of political science at Middlebury College. He taught previously at Harvard University, where he also received his Ph.D., working under the supervision of presidential scholar Richard Neustadt, We All Want a Revolution: Neustadt, New Institutionalism, and the Future of Presidency Research, Presidential Studies Quarterly 39 no4 736-70”

Small wonder, then, that initial efforts to find evidence of presidential power centered on explaining legislative outcomes in Congress. Because scholars found it difficult to directly and systematically measure presidential influence or "skill," however, they often tried to estimate it indirectly, after first establishing a baseline model that explained these outcomes on other factors, including party strength in Congress, members of Congress's ideology, the president's electoral support and/or popular approval, and various control variables related to time in office and political and economic context. With the baseline established, one could then presumably see how much of the unexplained variance might be attributed to presidents, and whether individual presidents did better or worse than the model predicted. Despite differences in modeling assumptions and measurements, however, these studies came to remarkably similar conclusions: individual presidents did not seem to matter very much in explaining legislators' voting behavior or lawmaking outcomes (but see Lockerbie and Borrelli 1989, 97-106). As Richard Fleisher, Jon Bond, and B. Dan Wood summarized, "[S]tudies that compare presidential success to some baseline fail to find evidence that perceptions of skill have systematic effects" (2008, 197; see also Bond, Fleisher, and Krutz 1996, 127; Edwards 1989, 212). To some scholars, these results indicate that Neustadt's "president-centered" perspective is incorrect (Bond and Fleisher 1990, 221-23). In fact, the aggregate results reinforce Neustadt's recurring refrain that presidents are weak and that, when dealing with Congress, a president's power is "comparably limited" (Neustadt 1990, 184). The misinterpretation of the findings as they relate to PP stems in part from scholars' difficulty in defining and operationalizing presidential influence (Cameron 2000b; Dietz 2002, 105-6; Edwards 2000, 12; Shull and Shaw 1999). But it is also that case that scholars often misconstrue Neustadt's analytic perspective; his description of what presidents must do to influence policy making does not mean that he believes presidents are the dominant influence on that process. Neustadt writes from the president's perspective, but without adopting a president-centered explanation of power. Nonetheless, if Neustadt clearly recognizes that a president's influence in Congress is exercised mostly, as George Edwards (1989) puts it, "at the margins," his case studies in PP also suggest that, within this limited bound, presidents do strive to influence legislative outcomes. But how? Scholars often argue that a president's most direct means of influence is to directly lobby certain members of Congress, often through quid pro quo exchanges, at critical junctures during the lawmaking sequence. Spatial models of legislative voting suggest that these lobbying efforts are most effective when presidents target the median, veto, and filibuster "pivots" within Congress. This logic finds empirical support in vote-switching studies that indicate that presidents do direct lobbying efforts at these pivotal voters, and with positive legislative results. Keith Krehbiel analyzes successive votes by legislators in the context of a presidential veto and finds "modest support for the sometimes doubted stylized fact of presidential power as persuasion" (1998,153-54). Similarly, David Brady and Craig Volden look at vote switching by members of Congress in successive Congresses on nearly identical legislation and also conclude that presidents do influence the votes of at least some legislators (1998, 125-36). In his study of presidential lobbying on key votes on important domestic legislation during the 83rd (1953-54) through 108th (2003-04) Congresses, Matthew Beckman shows that in addition to these pivotal voters, presidents also lobby leaders in both congressional parties in order to control what legislative alternatives make it onto the congressional agenda (more on this later). These lobbying efforts are correlated with a greater likelihood that a president's legislative preferences will come to a vote (Beckmann 2008, n.d.).

### 1RN card Debt Impact: A2 “XO Solves”

#### Obama won’t use 14th Amendment—doesn’t think he can.

Adam Liptak, 10/4 NY Times “Experts See Potential Ways Out for Obama in Debt Ceiling Maze” http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/04/us/politics/experts-see-potential-ways-out-for-obama-in-debt-ceiling-maze.html

That is the broadest option for Mr. Obama. The second is based on the actual text of the Constitution, though there is a dispute about what the words in question mean. Section 4 of the 14th Amendment says: “The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned.” The provision, adopted in 1868, was meant to ensure the payment of Union debts after the Civil War. But it was written in more general terms, as the Supreme Court once noted in passing. “While this provision was undoubtedly inspired by the desire to put beyond question the obligations of the government issued during the Civil War,” Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes wrote in 1935, “its language indicates a broader connotation.” On Thursday, Mr. Carney dismissed the argument, popular in some legal circles, that the amendment authorized the president to raise the debt ceiling. “We do not believe that the 14th Amendment provides that authority to the president,” he said. He added that the meaning of the provision had divided constitutional scholars. That alone, Mr. Carney said, “means that it would not be a credible alternative.”

#### Wont’ do it

New York Times, 10/3, (Jackie Calmes, “Obama Will Not Unilaterally Raise Debt Limit”, 10/3/2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/news/fiscal-crisis/2013/10/03/obama-will-not-unilaterally-raise-debt-limit/>)

President Obama will not invoke a constitutional amendment to unilaterally increase the nation’s debt limit if an impasse with House Republicans causes that ceiling to be breached Oct. 17, his spokesman said. “We do not believe that the 14th amendment provides that authority to the president,” the White House press secretary, Jay Carney, said on Thursday. The president, he added, “completely” agrees with his advisers’ legal reasoning. The administration, and Mr. Obama himself, have said in past confrontations with Republicans that the president does not have the constitutional power to act without Congress. But the issue has surfaced yet again, as another and seemingly more intractable impasse between the White House and Republicans threatens a debt crisis. After Oct. 17, the Treasury Department has said, it will no longer be able to borrow money to cover the nation’s obligations, including to creditors, precipitating a potential financial and economic crisis with global ramifications. “Look,” Mr. Carney said, sounding slightly exasperated to reporters, “our view is, the Constitution gives Congress, not the president, the authority to borrow money, and only Congress can increase the debt ceiling. Which is why it’s time that they do their job and raise the debt ceiling – you know, authorize the Treasury to pay the bills that Congress racked up.” The fact that the question of the president’s 14th amendment authority is controversial, with constitutional scholars in disagreement, “means that it would not be a credible alternative,” Mr. Carney said. Treasury officials have described a potential situation in which if the president unilaterally raised the borrowing limit, and Treasury then held an auction for new bonds to raise money, few if any buyers would participate for fear that the bonds ultimately would be deemed illegal.