## 1NC

**1**

**A. Interpretation: the affirmative must defend the hypothetical enactment of a topical plan by the United States federal government.**

**The United States federal government is the actor defined by the resolution, not individual debaters**

**US Gov** Official Website 20**09**

http://www.usa.gov/Agencies/federal.shtml

U.S. Federal Government **The three branches of U.S. government—legislative, judicial, and executive—carry out governmental power and functions.** View a complete diagram (.PDF) of the U.S. government's branches.

**“Resolved” expresses intent to implement the plan**

**Merriam-Webster Dictionary** 19**96** [http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=resolved, downloaded 07/20/03]

“6. **To change or convert by resolution or formal vote**; -- **used only reflexively; as, the house resolved itself into a committee of the whole**.”

**“Should” denotes an expectation of enacting a plan**

**American Heritage Dictionary 2K**

[www.dictionary.com]

3 **Used to express** probability or **expectation**

**Restricting authority requires reducing the permission to act, not the ability to act.**

**Taylor**, 19**96**  (Ellen, 21 Del. J. Corp. L. 870 (1996), Hein Online)

The term authority is commonly thought of in the context of the law of agency, and the Restatement (Second) of Agency defines both power and authority.'89 **Power refers to an agent's** ability or **capacity to produce a change** in a legal relation (whether or not the principal approves of the change), **and authority refers to the power given (permission granted) to the agent** by the principal to affect the legal relations of the principal; **the distinction is between what the agent can do and what the agent may do**.

**B. Violation—the affirmative says they affirm the topic through reversing the seer/seen binary, but they do not defend government action or restrictions on the president.**

**C. Vote negative**

**1. In-round abuse: by picking an advocacy only tangentially related to the resolution, the affirmative skirts core negative ground such as the presidential flexibility disad and circumvention solvency arguments. This is the war powers topic, not the drones topic, and as per 1NC cross-x, they don’t even defend that they decrease those! Negative ground is key to fairness—letting them get away with defending only the least controversial parts of the resolution rigs the game in favor of the aff.**

**2. Limits: their interpretation kills limits because it creates a strategic incentive to pick any number of different actors other than the USFG. If teams can get away with being non-topical, there’s no reason to defend the resolution. Limits are good:**

**A. Decision-making—only a limited topic narrows the focus of the debate in a way necessary for clash. Clash produces the best form of education because we can see how arguments interact, which is unique to debate.**

**B. Creativity—thinking “inside the box” forces teams to be creative about their positions and come up with innovative solutions. Absent constraints, debate becomes boring and stale—we link turn all of their offense.**

**Intrator 10** (Intrator, David, President of The Creative Organization and musical composer, October 22, 2010, “Thinking Inside The Box: A Professional Creative Dispels A Popular Myth”, Training, http://www.trainingmag.com/article/thinking-inside-box) FS

**One of the most pernicious myths about creativity, one that seriously inhibits creative thinking and innovation, is the belief that one needs to “think outside the box.”** As someone who has worked for decades as a professional creative, **nothing could be further from the truth. This** a **is** view **shared by the vast majority of creatives, expressed** famously **by** the **modernist designer Charles Eames when he wrote, “Design depends largely upon constraints.” The myth of thinking outside the box stems from a fundamental misconception of what creativity is**, and what it’s not. In the popular imagination, creativity is **something weird and wacky.** The creative process is magical, or divinely inspired. But, in fact, **creativity is** not about divine inspiration or magic. It’s **about problem-solving, and by definition a problem is a constraint**, a limit, a box. One of the best illustrations of this is the work of **photographers**. They **create by excluding the great mass what’s before them**, choosing a small frame in which to work. Within that tiny frame, literally a box, they uncover relationships and establish priorities. What makes creative problem-solving uniquely challenging is that you, as the creator, are the one defining the problem. You’re the one choosing the frame. And you alone determine what’s an effective solution. This can be quite demanding, both intellectually and emotionally. Intellectually, you are required to establish limits, set priorities, and cull patterns and relationships from a great deal of material, much of it fragmentary. More often than not, this is the material you generated during brainstorming sessions. At the end of these sessions, you’re usually left with a big mess of ideas, half-ideas, vague notions, and the like. Now, chances are you’ve had a great time making your mess. You might have gone off-site, enjoyed a “brainstorming camp,” played a number of warm-up games. You feel artistic and empowered. But to be truly creative, you have to clean up your mess, organizing those fragments into something real, something useful, something that actually works. That’s the hard part. It takes a lot of energy, time, and willpower to make sense of the mess you’ve just generated. It also can be emotionally difficult. You’ll need to throw out many ideas you originally thought were great, ideas you’ve become attached to, because they simply don’t fit into the rules you’re creating as you build your box. You can always change the rules, but that also comes with an emotional price. Unlike many other kinds of problems, with creative problems there is no external authority to which you can appeal to determine whether you’re on the right track, whether one set of rules should have priority over another, or whether one box is better than another. There is no correct answer. Better said: There might be a number of correct answers. Or none at all. The responsibility of deciding the right path to take is entirely upon you. That’s a lot of responsibility, and it can be paralyzing. So it’s no wonder that the creative process often stalls after the brainstorming in many organizations. Whereas generating ideas is open-ended, and, in a sense, infinitely hopeful, having to pare those ideas down is restrictive, tedious, and, at times, scary. The good news, however, is that understanding the creative process as problem-solving is ultimately liberating. For one, all of those left-brainers with well-honed rational skills will find themselves far more creative than they ever thought. They’ll discover their talents for organization, abstraction, and clarity are very much what’s required to be a true creative thinker. **Viewing creativity as problem-solving also makes the whole process far less intimidating**, even though it might lose some of its glamour and mystery. Moreover, **since creative problems are open to rational analysis, they can be broken down into smaller components that are easier to address.** Best of all, **the very act of problem-solving, of organizing and trying making sense of things, helps generate new ideas.** Paradoxically, **thinking within a box may be one of the most effective brainstorming techniques there** is. That may be what Charles Eames meant when he added, “I welcome constraints.” **Without some sort of structure to your creative thinking, you’re just flailing about.** For a while you might feel like you’re making progress, generating a great mess of ideas that might hold some potential. But **to turn** those **ideas into something truly innovative, your best bet is to** build your box and **play by the rules** of your own creation.

**3. Policy relevance—learning about how theory relates to policy and discussing implementation is crucial to influence real policymakers—without tying advocacy to policy, debate becomes irrelevant**

**Nye 09** - Joseph Nye, professor at Harvard University and former dean of the Harvard Kennedy School, 4-13-2009, Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/12/AR2009041202260\_pf.html 4-13-09

President Obama has appointed some distinguished academic economists and lawyers to his administration, but few high-ranking political scientists have been named. In fact, the editors of a recent poll of more than 2,700 international relations experts declared that "**the walls surrounding the ivory tower have never seemed so high**." While important American scholars such as Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski took high-level foreign policy positions in the past, that path has tended to be a one-way street. **Not many top-ranked scholars** of international relations **are going into government**, and even fewer return to contribute to academic theory. The 2008 Teaching, Research and International Policy (TRIP) poll, by the Institute for Theory and Practice in International Relations, showed that of the 25 scholars rated as producing the most interesting scholarship during the past five years, only three had ever held policy positions (two in the U.S. government and one in the United Nations). **The fault** for this growing gap **lies** not with the government but **with** the **academics**. **Scholars** are **pay**ing **less attention to** questions about **how their work relates to the policy world**, and in many departments a focus on policy can hurt one's career. Advancement comes faster for those who develop mathematical models, new methodologies or theories expressed in jargon that is unintelligible to policymakers. A survey of articles published over the lifetime of the American Political Science Review found that about one in five dealt with policy prescription or criticism in the first half of the century, while only a handful did so after 1967. Editor Lee Sigelman observed in the journal's centennial issue that "if 'speaking truth to power' and contributing directly to public dialogue about the merits and demerits of various courses of action were still numbered among the functions of the profession, one would not have known it from leafing through its leading journal." As citizens, **academics might be considered to have an obligation to help improve on policy ideas when they can**. Moreover, **such engagement can enhance** and enrich **academic work, and** thus **the ability of academics to teach the next generation**. As former undersecretary of state David Newsom argued a decade ago, "**the** growing **withdrawal of** university **scholars behind curtains of theory** and modeling **would** not have wider significance if this trend did not **raise questions regarding the preparation of new generations and the future influence of the academic community on public and official perceptions of international issues** and events. **Teachers plant seeds that shape the thinking of each new generation**; **this is** probably **the academic world's most lasting contribution**." Yet too often scholars teach theory and methods that are relevant to other academics but not to the majority of the students sitting in the classroom before them. **Some** academics **say that while the** growing **gap between theory and policy may have costs for policy**, **it** has **produced better social science theory**, and that **this is more important than whether such scholarship is relevant**. Also, to some extent, the gap is an inevitable result of the growth and specialization of knowledge. Few people can keep up with their subfields, much less all of social science. But **the danger is** that **academic theorizing will say more and more about less and less**. Even when **academics** supplement their usual trickle-down approach to policy by writing in journals, newspapers or blogs, or by consulting for candidates or public officials, they **face** many **competitors for attention**. More than 1,200 **think tanks** in the United States **provide not only ideas but also experts ready to comment** or consult **at a moment's notice**. Some of these new transmission belts serve as translators and additional outlets for academic ideas, but **many add a bias** provided by their founders and funders. As a group, think tanks are heterogeneous in scope, funding, ideology and location, but **universities generally offer a more neutral viewpoint.** While pluralism of institutional pathways is good for democracy, **the policy process is diminished by the withdrawal of the academic community**. **The solutions must come via a reappraisal within the academy itself**. Departments should give greater weight to real-world relevance and impact in hiring and promoting young scholars. Journals could place greater weight on relevance in evaluating submissions. Studies of specific regions deserve more attention. Universities could facilitate interest in the world by giving junior faculty members greater incentives to participate in it. That should include greater toleration of unpopular policy positions. One could multiply such useful suggestions, but young people should not hold their breath waiting for them to be implemented. If anything, the trends in academic life seem to be headed in the opposite direction.

4. Extratopicality—they defend thea ff as a metaphor

**2**

**The aff’s knee-jerk opposition to drones and the assumption of a se-er/seen binary is techno-pessimism--Embracing the positive potential in technology is critical to our survival**

Mark **Walker**, “Ship of Fools: Why Transhumanism is the Best Bet to Prevent the Extintion of Civilization,” GLOBAL SPIRAL, Metanexus Institute, 2—5—**09**, [www.metanexus.net/magazine/tabid/68/id/10682/Default.aspx](http://www.metanexus.net/magazine/tabid/68/id/10682/Default.aspx)

Option: transhumanism future. **The transhumanist future is one where both world-engineering and person-engineering are permitted.** Specifically, as noted, **the transhumanist view is that we should create persons who are smarter and more virtuous than we are.** The application to our problem is obvious: **our fears about the misuse of 21st century technology reduce down to fears about stupidity or viciousness.** Like the Australian research scientists, **the worry is that we may be the authors of an accident, but this time one of apocalyptic proportions: the end of civilization**. Likewise, **our moral natures may also cause our demise. Or, to put a more positive spin on it, the best candidates amongst us to lead civilization through such perilous times are the brightest and most virtuous: posthumans.**17 It is worth pointing out that there is no need to deny what Fukuyama claims: there are real dangers in creating posthumans. The problem with the transhumanist project, says Fukuyama, comes when we think seriously about what characteristics to change: Our good characteristics are intimately connected to our bad ones**: If we weren’t violent and aggressive, we wouldn’t be able to defend ourselves; if we didn’t have feelings of exclusivity, we wouldn’t be loyal to those close to us; if we never felt jealousy, we would never feel love. Even morality plays a critical function in allowing our species as a whole to survive and adapt**…. Modifying any one of our key characteristics inevitably entails modifying a complex, interlinked package of traits, and we will never be able to anticipate the ultimate outcome.18 So, although Fukuyama sees the pull of transhumanism, how it might look “downright reasonable”, **the fact that traits we might hope to modify are interconnected means that “we will never be able to anticipate the ultimate outcome.”** What Fukuyama fails to address in any systematic way is the fact that **there are even greater dangers associated with not creating posthumans. So, a prudential and moral reason for creating posthumans is not that this is without risk, rather, it is less risky than the alternative here: steady-as-she-goes.** If forced to put some hard numbers to these scenarios, I would venture to suggest **there is a 90% chance of civilization surviving the next two centuries if we follow the transhumanist path, while I would put the chances of civilization surviving a steady-as-she-goes policy at less than 20%.** But then, **I am an optimist.**

**The alternative is to reject the se-er/seen binary and embrace the positive technological potential of drones**

**This solves the aff, democratizes technological development**

James **Hughes**, PhD, Public Policy Studies, DEMOCRATIC TRANSHUMANISM 2.0, last modified 1—26—**06**, [www.changesurfer.com/Acad/DemocraticTranshumanism.htm](http://www.changesurfer.com/Acad/DemocraticTranshumanism.htm),

**Luddism is a political dead-end for progressive politics. Progressives must revive the techno-optimist tradition if they want to achieve the goals of furthering liberty, equality and solidarity.** First, **left Luddism inappropriately equates technologies with the power relations around those technologies. Technologies do not determine power relations, they merely create new terrains for organizing and struggle**. Most **new technologies open up new possibilities for both expanded liberty and equality, just as they open new opportunities for oppression and exploitation. Since the technologies will most likely not be stopped, democrats need to engage with them,** articulate policies that maximize social benefits from the technologies, **and find liberatory uses for the technologies**. **If biotechnology is to be rejected simply because it is a product of capitalism, adopted in class society, then every technology must be rejected.** The mission of the Left is to assert democratic control and priorities over the development and implementation of technology. **But establishing democratic control over technological innovation is not the same as Luddism. In fact, to the extent that advocates for the democratic control of technology do not guarantee benefits from technology, and attempt to suppress technology altogether, they will lose public support.** Second, **technology can help us transcend some of the fundamental causes of inequalities of power. Although we will never eliminate inequalities of intelligence and knowledge, the day is not far off when all humans can be guaranteed sufficient intelligence to function as active citizens.** One of the most important progressive demands will be to ensure universal access to genetic choice technologies which permit parents to guarantee their children biological capacities equal to those of other children. **Technologically assisted birth, eventually involving artificial wombs, will free women from being necessary, vulnerable vessels for the next generation. Morphological freedom, the ability to change one’s body, including one’s abilities, weight, gender and racial characteristics, will reduce body-based oppressions (disability, fat, gender and race) to aesthetic prejudices.** Third, **Left Luddism is boring and depressing; it has no energy to inspire movements to create a new and better society. The Left was built by people inspired by millenial visions, not by people who saw a hopeless future of futile existential protest.** Most people do not want to live in a future without telecommunications, labor-saving devices, air travel and medicine. **The Next Left needs to rediscover its utopian imagination if it is to renew itself, reconnect with the popular imagination, and remain relevant.** The Next Left needs visionary projects worthy of a united transhuman world, such as guaranteeing health and longevity for all, eliminating work, and colonizing the Solar System.

### Case

**US drones sustain power projection --- key to hegemony**

**Reynolds** 6/26/**13** (Michael A, PhD, Near Eastern Studies, Princeton University, “Global Discourse: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Current Affairs and Applied Contemporary Thought”, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/23269995.2013.807603>, CMR)

Technology and the dilemma of counter-insurgency¶ **The U**nited **S**tates, although it may not have the equivalent of the mythological Maxim¶ gun, **has successfully leveraged tech**nology **to extend its power** and reach into foreign¶ societies **in ways** that would have been **inconceivable to** the **empires of the high-imperial**¶ **age**. **American military personnel**, often physically located in the interior of the continental United States, have **employ**ed **thousands of** unmanned aerial vehicles, UAVs, or¶ **drones** more popularly, **to surveil, track, and kill hostile individuals** literally **around the**¶ **globe**, particularly in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Libya. From 2004 through¶ 2012, American drone strikes in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia have killed nearly 3500¶ people (Zenko 2012).¶ Guerrillas, insurgents, and **terrorists have long protected themselves from** the **superior**¶ **firepower** of regular armies and police forces **by declining to wear uniforms** or other open¶ markers of identity **and** by **refusing to fight in the open. These tactics compel states to** do¶ one of the two things: either to **curb** their use of **firepower** and thereby neutralize their¶ own advantage, **or** to **employ force indiscriminately** and thereby risk **alienating** their¶ population and public opinion around **the world** with excessive violence. This is the¶ classic dilemma of counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism.¶ To American strategic planners, surveillance and **attack drones** hold out the promise¶ that they **can**, if not **overcome this dilemma**, at least mitigate it. By employing **drones** to¶ find, monitor, and track specific individuals, the United States **can** aspire to **identify**¶whether or not those **individuals** are hostile **and** then **seamlessly** employ an **attack** drone¶ to destroy that individual. Thus, **the U**nited **S**tates government **now** routinely **uses drones**¶ **to mount extended** and even around-the-clock **observation of foreign locales to identify**¶ **and kill suspected terrorists**. To be sure, non-combatants are all too often casualties of¶ such strikes and the use of drones has by no means dissolved the counter-insurgent¶ dilemma. Indeed, some observers argue that the so-called ‘collateral damage’ from¶ drone strikes generate more opponents of the United States than they could kill or¶ intimidate (International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic at Stanford Law¶ School and Global Justice Clinic at NYU School of Law 2012). Nonetheless, it seems¶ clearthat **drones have reduced the counter-insurgent dilemma**. In countries where they fly¶ they certainly have made life for armed opponents of the United States and its allies¶ significantly more difficult.¶ Alongside their utility in locating, tracking, targeting, and destroying individuals, **a**¶ **major appeal** of drones **is their cost**. **Drones pose no risk of death to** highly trained and¶ valuable **pilots and** they **are comparatively cheap**. The Predator, the best-known armed¶ drone, costs a little over $4 million. The more capable Reaper costs $37 million. By¶ comparison, an F-35 fighter costs on the order of $235 million. Relative to their capabilities, **drones will** likely **only grow cheaper** as design improves, economies of scale¶ drive costs down, and computer components continue to fall in price. Indeed, observation¶ drones are available for purchase to the general public for only several hundred dollars.¶ When combined with the increasingly sophisticated signals, intelligence capabilities of the¶ United States armed forces and intelligence agencies, **drones emerge as a potent tool for**¶ **monitoring unstable regions and meting out punishment to violent challengers**. **The drone**¶ **is,** in essence, **a tool well-suited to imperial policing**, on sea as well as on land.¶ Thus, **the withdrawal of American military forces** from Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere¶ in the greater Middle East due to war fatigue and financial constraints **will not necessarily**¶ **equate to an equivalent reduction in America’s coercive capabilities**. For better or for worse,¶ technology such as **drones**, satellite surveillance, and improved signals intelligence **provide**¶ **the world’s policeman with a more potent**, if not **bigger, baton for the buck**. Further advances¶ in computer technology, imaging, nano-technology, biotechnology, and other fields may be¶ translated into more powerful and effective systems of coercion. **Tech**nology **makes** many¶ **things possible. Empire** in an age of austerity **might well be one of them.**

**Hegemony solves conflicts that cause extinction**

Thomas P.M. **Barnett,** chief analyst, Wikistrat, “The New Rules: Leadership Fatigue Puts U.S. and Globalization, at Crossroads,” WORLD POLITICS REVIEW, 3—7—**11**, www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8099/the-new-rules-leadership-fatigue-puts-u-s-and-globalization-at-crossroads

Events in Libya are a further reminder for **Americans** that we **stand at a crossroads in our continuing evolution as the** world's sole full-service **superpower.** Unfortunately, we are increasingly seeking change without cost, and shirking from risk because we are tired of the responsibility. We don't know who we are anymore, and our president is a big part of that problem. Instead of leading us, he explains to us. Barack Obama would have us believe that he is practicing strategic patience. But many experts and ordinary citizens alike have concluded that he is actually beset by strategic incoherence -- in effect, a man overmatched by the job. It is worth first examining the larger picture: We live in a time of arguably the greatest structural change in the global order yet endured, with this historical moment's most amazing feature being its relative and absolute lack of mass violence. That is something to consider when Americans contemplate military intervention in Libya, because if we do take the step to prevent larger-scale killing by engaging in some killing of our own, we will not be adding to some fantastically imagined global death count stemming from the ongoing "megalomania" and "evil" of American "empire." We'll be engaging in the same sort of system-administering activity that has marked our stunningly successful stewardship of global order since World War II. Let me be more blunt: **As the guardian of globalization, the U.S. military has been the greatest force for peace the world has ever known. Had America been removed from the global dynamics** that governed the 20th century, the mass murder never would have ended. Indeed, it's entirely conceivable **there would now be no** identifiable **human civilization left, once nuclear weapons entered the killing equation. But the world did not keep sliding down** that path of **perpetual war**. Instead**, America** stepped up and **changed everything by ushering in** our now-perpetual **great-power peace. We introduced** the international liberal trade order known as **globalization** and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. **What resulted was the collapse of empires, an explosion of** **democracy**, the **persistent spread of** **human rights, the liberation of women, the doubling of life expectancy, a roughly 10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP and a profound and persistent reduction in battle deaths from state-based conflicts.** That is what American "hubris" actually delivgered. Please remember that the next time some TV pundit sells you the image of "unbridled" American military power as the cause of global disorder instead of its cure. With self-deprecation bordering on self-loathing, we now imagine a post-American world that is anything but. Just watch who scatters and who steps up as the Facebook revolutions erupt across the Arab world. While we might imagine ourselves the status quo power, we remain the world's most vigorously revisionist force. As for the sheer "evil" that is our military-industrial complex, again, let's examine what the world looked like before that establishment reared its ugly head. The last great period of global structural change was the first half of the 20th century, a period that saw a death toll of about 100 million across two world wars. That comes to an average of 2 million deaths a year in a world of approximately 2 billion souls. Today, with far more comprehensive worldwide reporting, researchers report an average of less than 100,000 battle deaths annually in a world fast approaching 7 billion people. Though admittedly crude, these **calculations suggest a 90 percent absolute drop and a 99 percent relative drop in deaths due to war**. We are clearly headed for a world order characterized by multipolarity, something the American-birthed system was designed to both encourage and accommodate. But given how things turned out the last time we collectively faced such a fluid structure, we would do well to keep U.S. power, in all of its forms, deeply embedded in the geometry to come. To continue the historical survey, after salvaging Western Europe from its half-century of civil war, the U.S. emerged as the progenitor of a new, far more just form of globalization -- one based on actual free trade rather than colonialism. America then successfully replicated globalization further in East Asia over the second half of the 20th century, setting the stage for the Pacific Century now unfolding.

**Heg decreases structural violence---any alt dooms humanity to deprivation**

Thomas P.M. **Barnett 11,** Former Senior Strategic Researcher and Professor in the Warfare Analysis & Research Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College American military geostrategist and Chief Analyst at Wikistrat, worked as the Assistant for Strategic Futures in the Office of Force Transformation in the Department of Defense, September 12, 2011, “The New Rules: The Rise of the Rest Spells U.S. Strategic Victory,” World Politics Review, online: <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/9973/the-new-rules-the-rise-of-the-rest-spells-u-s-strategic-victory>

First the absurdity: A few of the most **over-the-top Bush-Cheney neocons did** indeed **promote a vision of U.S. primacy by which America shouldn't be afraid to wage war to keep other rising powers at bay. It was a nutty concept then, and it remains a nutty concept today.** But since it feeds a lot of major military weapons system purchases, especially for the China-centric Air Force and Navy, don't expect it to disappear so long as the Pentagon's internal budget fights are growing in intensity. ¶ **Meanwhile**, the Chinese do their stupid best to fuel this outdated logic by building a force designed to keep America out of East Asia just as their nation's dependency on resources flowing from unstable developing regions skyrockets. **With America's fiscal constraints now abundantly clear, the world's primary policing force is pulling back, while that force's implied successor is nowhere close to being able to field a similar power-projection capacity -- and never will be.** So with NATO clearly stretched to its limits by the combination of Afghanistan and Libya, **a lot of future fires in developing regions will likely be left to burn on their own**. We'll just have to wait and see how much foreign commentators delight in that G-Zero dynamic in the years ahead. ¶ That gets us to the original "insult": **the U.S. did not lord it over the world in the 1990s. Yes, it did argue for and promote the most rapid spread of globalization possible. But the "evil" of the Washington Consensus only yielded the most rapid growth of a truly global middle class that the world has ever seen**. Yes, we can, in our current economic funk, somehow cast that development as the "loss of U.S. hegemony," in that the American consumer is no longer the demand-center of globalization's universe. But this is without a doubt the most amazing achievement of U.S. foreign policy, surpassing even our role in World War II. ¶ **Numerous world powers served as global or regional hegemons before we came along, and their record on economic development was painfully transparent: Elites got richer, and the masses got poorer. Then America showed up after World War II and engineered an international liberal trade order**, one that was at first admittedly limited to the West. But **within four decades it went virally global, and now for the first time in history, more than half of our planet's population lives in conditions of modest-to-mounting abundance -- after millennia of mere sustenance**. ¶ You may choose to interpret this as some sort of cosmic coincidence, but **the historical sequence is undeniable: With its unrivaled power, America made the world a far better place**. ¶ That spreadin

g wave of global abundance has reformatted all sorts of traditional societies that lay in its path. Some, like the Chinese, have adapted to it magnificently in an economic and social sense, with the political adaptation sure to follow eventually. Others, being already democracies, have done far better across the board, like Turkey, Indonesia and India. But there are also numerous traditional societies where that reformatting impulse from below has been met by both harsh repression from above and violent attempts by religious extremists to effect a "counterreformation" that firewalls the "faithful" from an "evil" outside world.¶ Does this violent blowback constitute the great threat of our age? Not really. As I've long argued, this "friction" from globalization's tectonic advance is merely what's left over now that great-power war has gone dormant for 66 years and counting, with interstate wars now so infrequent and so less lethal as to be dwarfed by the civil strife that plagues those developing regions still suffering weak connectivity to the global economy. ¶ **Let's remember what the U.S. actually did across the 1990s** after the Soviet threat disappeared. **It went out of its way to police the world's poorly governed spaces, battling rogue regimes and answering the 9-1-1 call repeatedly when disaster and/or civil strife struck vulnerable societies. Yes, playing globalization's bodyguard made America public enemy No. 1 in the eyes of its most violent rejectionist movements**, including al-Qaida, **but we made the effort because**, in our heart of hearts, **we knew that this is what blessed powers are supposed to do**. ¶ Some, like the Bush-Cheney neocons, were driven by more than that sense of moral responsibility. They saw a chance to remake the world so as to assure U.S. primacy deep into the future. The timing of their dream was cruelly ironic, for it blossomed just as America's decades-in-the-making grand strategy reached its apogee in the peaceful rise of so many great powers at once. Had Sept. 11 not intervened, the neocons would likely have eventually targeted rising China for strategic demonization. Instead, they locked in on Osama bin Laden. The rest, as they say, is history. ¶ The follow-on irony of **the War on Terror** is that its operational requirements **actually revolutionized a major portion of the U.S. military -- specifically the Army, Marines and Special Forces -- in such a way as to redirect their strategic ethos from big wars to small ones**. It also forged a new operational bond between the military's irregular elements and that portion of the Central Intelligence Agency that pursues direct action against transnational bad actors. The up-front costs of this transformation were far too high, largely because the Bush White House stubbornly refused to embrace counterinsurgency tactics until after the popular repudiation signaled by the 2006 midterm election. But **the end result is clear: We now have the force we actually need to manage this global era.¶ But,** of course, **that can all be tossed into the dumpster if we convince ourselves that our "loss" of hegemony was somehow the result of our own misdeed, instead of being our most profound gift to world history. Again, we grabbed the reins of global leadership and patiently engineered not only the greatest redistribution -- and expansion -- of global wealth ever seen, but also the greatest consolidation of global peace ever seen. ¶ Now, if we can sensibly realign our strategic relationship with the one rising great power, China,** whose growing strength upsets us so much, **then in combination with the rest of the world's rising great powers we can collectively wield enough global policing power to manage what's yet to come.** ¶ As always, **the choice is ours.**

**drones enhance the reality of warfare and increase attentiveness to human suffering**

**Brooks 12** – law professor at Georgetown University and a Schwartz senior fellow at the New America Foundation (Rosa, “What's Not Wrong With Drones?”, Sept 5, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/05/whats_not_wrong_with_drones?page=full>, CMR)

3. Drones Turn Killing into a Video Game.¶ Writing in the Guardian, Phillip Allston (the United Nations special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions) and Hina Shamsi of the ACLU decry "the PlayStation mentality" created by drone technologies. "Young military personnel raised on a diet of video games now kill real people remotely using joysticks. Far removed from the human consequences of their actions, how will this generation of fighters value the right to life?"¶ But **are drones more "video game-like" than**, say, **having cameras in the noses of cruise missiles**? Those old enough to remember the first Gulf War will recall the shocking novelty of images taken by cameras inside U.S. Tomahawk missiles, the jolting, grainy images in the crosshairs before everything went ominously black.¶ Regardless, **there's little evidence that drone technologies "reduce" their operators' awareness of human suffering**. **If anything, drone operators may be far more keenly aware of the suffering they help inflict than any distant sniper or bomber pilot could be**.¶ Journalist Daniel **Klaidman reports the words of one CIA drone operator, a former Air Force pilot: "I used to fly my own air missions.... I dropped bombs, hit my target load, but had no idea who I hit. [With drones], I can look at their faces... see these guys playing with their kids and wives.... After the strike, I see the bodies being carried out of the house. I see the women weeping and in positions of mourning. That's not PlayStation; that's real**."¶ **Increasingly**, **there's evidence that drone pilots,** just like combat troops, **can suffer from p**ost-**t**raumatic **s**tress **d**isorder: watching a man play with his children, then seeing his mangled body takes a psychological toll. A recent Air Force study found that 29 percent of drone pilots suffered from "burnout," with 17 percent "clinically distressed."

**Drones good – U.S. military action *inevitable* but drones are *superior to alternatives* and *minimize civilian casualties* – solves *humanitarian intervention***

**Singh & Wittes 12** (Ritika Singh – Research Assistant, Governance Studies, AND Benjamin Wittes – Senior Fellow, Governance Studies, “Drones Are a Challenge — and an Opportunity”, Jan 11, The Cato Institute, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/01/11-drones-wittes>, CMR)

Indeed, Cortright may argue that “terrorism is more a political and law enforcement challenge than a threat that can be addressed by military means,” but it is worth remembering that **the opposite of targeted killing is not usually law enforcement. It is often** less-targeted—that is, **more indiscriminate—killing**. The important flip side to Cortright’s anxiety that drones will lower our inhibition to go to war is that **drones can** also **limit the scope and scale of military action**. **The U**nited **S**tates **is not going to take a hands-off approach to states like Pakistan and Yemen**, **where law enforcement is not a feasible option**. **Drone warfare permits a highly calibrated military response to situations in which the alternative may involve** not lesser but far **greater** uses of **military violence**. This is a good trade. Conversely, **drones** also **allow militaries to contemplate** certain **humanitarian interventions where they might never contemplate risking actual forces**; **consider** whether the recent NATO **Libya**n intervention—**which** probably **saved a considerable number of lives**—would have been politically possible had U.S. forces been seriously at risk.¶ In other words, while the rise of drone warfare has changed the face of American counterterrorism efforts and promises far greater change in years to come, this does not present the simple and terrible moral equation that Cortright describes. **What began as a surveillance tool** that could, on occasion, deliver lethal force, **has evolved in a short space of time into a principal means of following enemy forces onto territory in which the U**nited **S**tates **is reluctant to put large numbers of boots on the ground—and striking at them there in a limited fashion that protects innocent civilians** **to an unprecedented level**.¶ **The logic of these weapons is so overpowering**, both as a means of conducting surveillance and as a means of striking at enemy targets, **that their growth as an element of U.S. force will resist moral hand-wringing of a sort that**, if taken at face value, **would lead to greater uses of force**, civilian death, and risk to U.S. forces.

**Their political strategy fails and opens the door to right-wing tyranny**

Paul **Passavant**, Ph.D., Hobart and William Smith College Associate Professor of Political Science, December 20**10**, Yoo's Law, Sovereignty, and Whatever, Constellations Volume 17, Issue 4, pages 549–571

For some on **the left**, it has become conventional to **celebrate**, if not cultivate, **pluralism**, **whether this means multiple forms of being or multiple interpretive possibilities with regard to texts. It has** also **become conventional to be critical of “sovereignty” and of “law.”** **Multiplicity is thought to be a threat to sovereignty, and this threat is thought to be democratizing or a force that resists oppression**. The Italian philosopher Giorgio **Agamben exemplifies these tendencies** within contemporary political and legal theory. In some of his earlier and less well-known work, **he aspires toward a “coming community” that he calls “whatever being**.” Whatever being embraces the infinite communicative possibilities of language as pure means beyond a preoccupation with true or false propositions.

In his best-known work, **Agamben links sovereignty to the production of rightless subjects and the Nazi death camps**. **He urges us to rethink the very ontological basis of politics** in the West, creating a human being beyond sovereignty or law, in order to avoid perilous outcomes. One key to surpassing the logic of sovereignty, according to Agamben, is whatever being's positive relation to the singularities of life and the multiplicities of communication.

Whatever being is also being outside of law. If “law” persists in this “coming community,” it would be a “law” that has become deactivated and deposed from its prior purposes. “Law” will have become an object for play – something to be toyed with the way that children might come upon a disused object and play with it by putting it to uses disconnected from whatever purpose this object might once have had.

Why does the fact of playful communicative possibilities lead to either more democracy or a less brutal world? **The most conservative** United States Supreme Court **justices have recently embraced the fact that texts are open to multiple interpretations**. For example, Samuel Alito has suggested that the meaning of public monuments is open to multiple interpretations that may shift over time to avoid a potential First Amendment establishment clause problem over a monument of the Ten Commandments in a public park.1 Yet, as the late Justice Blackmun has written regarding state endorsement of religion, “government cannot be premised on the belief that all persons are created equal when it asserts that God prefers some.”2 **Recognizing the possibility of multiple interpretations,** as this instance shows, **does not lead** necessarily **to outcomes friendly to democracy**.

In this essay, I investigate how playing with the **multiplicity of communicative possibilities** can, **contrary to Agamben's expectations, actually facilitate aspirations for unitary sovereign power**. My argument unfolds in the context of the legal arguments put forward by Bush administration lawyer John Yoo, particularly those enabling torturous interrogations.

**Those, like Agamben**, who favor interpretive pluralism in itself **rarely, if ever, have right-wing supporters of unchecked presidentialism in mind**. Reading the scholarship and legal memoranda of **John Yoo**, formerly in the Bush administration's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) and presently a University of California, Berkeley law professor, **however, approaches an experience of pure mediality or of law that has become deposed or disconnected from its purposes**. Yoo is well known as the author of the key legal memoranda asserting the president's discretionary power to make war, to engage in warrantless surveillance, and, most infamously, justifying torturous methods of interrogation. Some scholars refer to Lewis Carroll's Alice in Wonderland to describe the experience of reading Yoo's legal memos.3 Is **John Yoo an exemplar of the whatever being** and pure mediality that Agamben describes and to which he contends politics should aspire?

In this paper, I describe how Yoo gestures toward pure mediality, as he indicates the experience of language itself as pure communicability or as pure means in his legal work when he emphasizes the openness of law to being exposed to new, different, flexible, or plural interpretive possibilities. I argue, however, that Yoo is not well described as whatever being. His work repeats too consistently in the direction of absolute presidential decisionism to be open to whatever.

Instead, Yoo's work may capture a broader development within our society that Agamben describes as the emergence of whatever being. Without saying that there has been no resistance to the Bush administration's warrantless wiretapping and policies of torturous interrogations, the contrast between the response to the Nixon administration and the Bush administration is striking. Richard Nixon resigned one step ahead of impeachment in the midst of mass protests against his presidency. The articles of impeachment, for instance, addressed how Nixon engaged in warrantless wiretapping, and refused to execute laws passed by Congress faithfully while repeatedly engaging in conduct that violated the constitutional rights of citizens. Congress also passed major acts of legislation to prevent a president such as Nixon from ever again abusing power the way he had. These laws include the War Powers Act of 1973, the Budget Impoundment and Control Act of 1974, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978.

In contrast, **almost no one seems to have noticed that the Bush administration claimed power to make war at the president's sole discretion**. Additionally, upon learning that the Bush administration engaged in criminal acts of surveillance, **Congress amended FISA** in the summer of 2008 **to expand the government's power to spy on Americans, while immunizing from legal accountability** non-state actors who collaborated with the then-criminal acts of government officials who followed Bush's illegal orders. Congress tried to make it impossible for those detained to question, legally, their detention or to bring the torturous treatment they endured to a court's attention, while allowing the intelligence agencies to continue to engage in torturous acts by passing the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA). This complicity on the part of Congress cannot be explained on partisan grounds as many Democrats voted in favor of the MCA, and upon becoming the majority party in Congress, they have not rescinded it. Indeed, it was a Democratic-controlled Congress that brushed the Bush administration's illegal surveillance under the rug in 2008.4 Moreover, upon taking power in 2006, the Democratic leadership immediately stated that they would not pursue impeachment. Former Reagan administration **Department of Justice lawyer** Bruce **Fein** has **decried the lack of outrage at the Bush administration's illegalities by suggesting that the nation has become a collection of constitutional “illiterates**.”5 **Perhaps law is being deposed as Agamben suggests**.

Both **Agamben's and Fein's observations** may also **indicate a failure of** what Michel Foucault would call **disciplinary power** – the power to constitute subjects capable of exercising power, here the powers of liberal democracy – a failure that Gilles Deleuze has identified with the emergence of societies of control, and a subjective and ontological diversity that Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri call the “multitude.”6 **They** also **indicate practices of textual “interpretation” where interpretative acts extricate legal texts from the narratives that once oriented their purposes and** **animated these texts for a republican and anti-monarchical polity**. Robert Cover argues, however, that law is part of a narrative practice constitutive of subjects and a way of life.7 Insofar as interpretive practices become extricated from the possibility of narrative, then, we may indeed doubt the continuing existence of “law,” as Agamben posits. Psychoanalytic theory also identifies a loss of a structuring meaning in contemporary society and describes this as the decline of symbolic efficiency.8

In sum, there appears to be a phenomenon emerging in contemporary society that a variety of different theoretical and political perspectives are struggling to grasp and evaluate. **While Agamben welcomes the failures of disciplinary powers as enabling the emergence of whatever being and the “coming community,” it is a cause for concern** among those seeking to keep the faith with republicanism, with liberal democracy, or with a Constitution representing these aspirations. In this light, we can be more specific than Agamben about the kind of threat that whatever being poses to the state or to sovereignty.

**Contrary to Agamben's contentions**, **I find** that **whatever being is no threat at all to** the kind of **unitary sovereignty** that Agamben uses to theorize the state in his book Homo Sacer. **Why would it be? Whatever being would be equally at ease with the legal justifications on behalf of a “unitary” sovereignty as it would anything else**. If we, however, give the achievements of the people their due and consider the question of sovereignty from the perspective of popular sovereignty, of the assemblies and assemblages of power through which liberal democratic states seek to extend themselves and to govern at a distance, then whatever being is very much a danger to this type of power. **Whatever being can be understood as facilitating a process of deposing this law and this state. A relation of whatever to the installation of a state of unchecked presidential powers and torture can be the death knell of popular sovereignty dedicated to the purpose of opposing tyranny. Whatever being is not the enemy of any state or form of “sovereignty.” It is the enemy of popular sovereignty. Whatever ruins democracy. If we want more than unchecked presidential power and torture, then we will have to dedicate ourselves to certain purposes, like resisting tyranny and recalling** that this was **the purpose of the U.S. Constitution**.

**No impact to Bare Life and the alt fails**

Cesare **Casarino**, professor of cultural studies and comparative literature at the University of Minnesota AND Antonio Negri, author of numerous volumes of philosophy and political theory. “It’s a Powerful Life: A Conversation on Contemporary Philosophy” Cultural Critique 57. **2004**

AN: I believe Giorgio is writing a sequel to Homo Sacer, and I feel that this new work will be resolutive for his thought—in the sense that he will be forced in it to resolve and find a way out of the ambiguity that has qualified his understanding of naked life so far. He already attempted something of the sort in his recent book on Saint Paul, but I think this attempt largely failed: as usual, this book is extremely learned and elegant; it remains, however, somewhat trapped within Pauline exegesis, rather than constituting a full-fledged attempt to reconstruct naked life as a potentiality for exodus, to rethink naked life fundamentally in terms of exodus. I believe that the concept of naked life is not an impossible, unfeasible one. I believe it is possible to push the image of power to the point at which a defenseless human being [un povero Cristo] is crushed, to conceive of that extreme point at which power tries to [End Page 173] eliminate that ultimate resistance that is the sheer attempt to keep oneself alive. From a logical standpoint, it is possible to think all this: the naked bodies of the people in the camps, for example, can lead one precisely in this direction. But this is also the point at which this concept turns into ideology: to conceive of the relation between power and life in such a way actually ends up bolstering and reinforcing ideology. **Agamben**, in effect, **is saying** that such is the nature of power: in the final instance, **power reduces** each and **every human being to** such a state of **powerlessness**. **But this is absolutely not true!** On the contrary: **the historical process takes place** and is produced **thanks** to a **continuous constitution and construction, which** undoubtedly **confronts the limit over and over** again—but **this is an extraordinarily rich limit, in which desires expand, and** in which **life becomes** increasingly **fuller**. Of course it is possible to conceive of the limit as absolute powerlessness, especially when it has been actually enacted and enforced in such a way so many times. And yet, isn't such a conception of the limit precisely what the limit looks like from the standpoint of constituted power as well as from the standpoint of those who have already been totally annihilated by such a power—which is, of course, one and the same standpoint? Isn't this the story about power that power itself would like us to believe in and reiterate? **Isn't it far more politically useful to conceive of this limit from the standpoint of those** who are not yet or **not completely crushed by power**, from the standpoint of those still struggling to overcome such a limit, from the standpoint of the process of constitution, from the standpoint of power [potenza]? I am worried about the fact that **the concept of naked life** as it is conceived by Agamben might be **taken up by political movements** and in political debates: I find this prospect quite troubling, which is why I felt the need to attack this concept in my recent essay. Ultimately, I feel that nowadays the logic of traditional eugenics is attempting to saturate and capture the whole of human reality—even at the level of its materiality, that is, through genetic engineering—and **the ultimate result of such a process of saturation and capture is a capsized production of subjectivity within which ideological undercurrents continuously try to subtract or neutralize our resistanc**e. [End Page 174]

**Liberalism good**

**Dickinson**, History Prof at UC Davis**, ‘4** (Edward, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Reflections On Our Discourse Concerning 'Modernity’” Central European History, Vol 37, p 1-48)

In short, **the continuities between early twentieth-century biopolitical discourse and the practices of the welfare state in our own time are unmistakable**. Both are instances of the "disciplinary society" and of biopolitical, regulatory, social-engineering modernity, and they share that genealogy with more authoritarian states, including the National Socialist state, but also fascist Italy, for example. And it is certainly fruitful to view them from this very broad perspective. **But that analysis can easily become superficial and misleading, because it obfuscates the profoundly different strategic and local dynamics of power in** the **two kinds of regimes**. Clearly **the democratic welfare state is not only formally but also substantively quite different from totalitarianism**. Above all, again, **it has nowhere developed the fateful, radicalizing dynamic that characterized National Socialism** (or for that matter Stalinism), the psychotic logic that leads from economistic population management to mass murder. Again, there is always the potential for such a discursive regime to generate coercive policies. In those cases in which the regime of rights does not successfully produce "health," such a system can — and historically does — create compulsory programs to enforce it. But again, **there are political and policy potentials and constraints in such a structuring of biopolitics that are very different from those of National Socialist Germany. Democratic biopolitical regimes require, enable, and incite a degree of self-direction and participation that is functionally incompatible with authoritarian or totalitarian structures**. And **this pursuit of biopolitical ends through a regime of democratic citizenship does appear**, historically, **to have imposed increasingly narrow limits on coercive policies, and to have generated a "logic" or imperative of increasing liberalization**. De

spite limitations imposed by political context and the slow pace of discursive change, I think this is the unmistakable message of the really very impressive waves of legislative and welfare reforms in the 1920s or the 1970s in Germany.90 Of course it is not yet clear whether this is an irreversible dynamic of such systems. Nevertheless, **such regimes are characterized by sufficient degrees of autonomy** (and of the potential for its expansion) **for sufficient numbers of people that I think it becomes useful to conceive of them as productive of a strategic configuration of power relations that might fruitfully be analyzed as a condition of "liberty**," just as much as they are productive of constraint, oppression, or manipulation. At the very least, **totalitarianism cannot be the sole orientation point for our understanding of biopolitics**, the only end point of the logic of social engineering. This notion is not at all at odds with the core of Foucauldian (and Peukertian) theory. Democratic welfare states are regimes of power/knowledge no less than early twentieth-century totalitarian states; these systems are not "opposites," in the sense that they are two alternative ways of organizing the same thing. But they are two very different ways of organizing it. The concept "power" should not be read as a universal stifling night of oppression, manipulation, and entrapment, in which all political and social orders are grey, are essentially or effectively "the same." Power is a set of social relations, in which individuals and groups have varying degrees of autonomy and effective subjectivity. And discourse is, as Foucault argued, "tactically polyvalent." **Discursive elements** (like the various elements of biopolitics) **can be combined in different ways to form parts of quite different strategies (like totalitarianism or the democratic welfare state);** they cannot be assigned to one place in a structure, but rather circulate. The varying possible constellations of power in modern societies create "multiple modernities," modern societies with quite radically differing potentials.91 Biopolitics: Who Is Doing What To Whom? This understanding of the democratic and totalitarian potentials of biopolitics at the level of the state needs to be underpinned by a reassessment of how biopolitical discourse operates in society at large, at the "prepolitical" level. I would like to try to offer here the beginnings of a reconceptualization of biopolitical modernity, one that focuses less on the machinations of technocrats and experts, and more on the different ways that biopolitical thinking circulated within German society more broadly. It is striking, then, that the new model of German modernity is even more relentlessly negative than the old Sonderweg model. In that older model, premodern elites were constantly triumphing over the democratic opposition. But at least there was an opposition; and in the long run, time was on the side of that opposition, which in fact embodied the historical movement of modern- ization. In the new model, there is virtually a biopolitical consensus.92 And that consensus is almost always fundamentally a nasty, oppressive thing, one that partakes in crucial ways of the essential quality of National Socialism. Everywhere biopolitics is intrusive, technocratic, top-down, constraining, limiting. Biopolitics is almost never conceived of— or at least discussed in any detail — as creating possibilities for people, as expanding the range of their choices, as empowering them, or indeed as doing anything positive for them at all. Of course, at the most simple-minded level, it seems to me that **an assessment of the potentials of modernity that ignores the ways in which biopolitics has made life tangibly better is somehow deeply flawed**. To give just one example, **infant mortality in Germany in 1900 was just over 20 percent**; or, in other words, one in five children died before reaching the age of one year. By 1913, it was 15 percent; **and by 1929** (when average real purchasing power was not significantly higher than in 1913) **it was only 9.7 percent**.93 **The expansion of infant health programs** — **an enormously ambitious, bureaucratic, medicalizing, and sometimes intrusive, social engineering project** — **had a great deal to do with that change. It would be bizarre to write a history of biopolitical modernity that ruled out an appreciation for how absolutely wonderful and astonishing this achievement — and any number of others like it — really was**. There was a reason for the "Machbarkeitswahn" of the early twentieth century: many marvelous things were in fact becoming machbar. In that sense, it is not really accurate to call it a " Wahn" (delusion, craziness) at all; **nor is it accurate to focus only on the "inevitable" frustration of "delusions" of power**. Even in the late 1920s, many social engineers could and did look with great satisfaction on the changes they genuinely had the power to accomplish.

**Humanism DA — it’s inescapable and giving up on it dooms the planet to extinction.**

Tony **Davies**, Professor of English, Birmingham University, Humanism, 19**97**, p. 130.

So there will not after all be, nor indeed could there be, any tidy definitions. **The several humanisms** – the civic humanism of the quattrocento Italian city-states, the Protestant humanism of sixteenth century northern Europe, the rationalistic humanism that attended at the revolutions of enlightened modernity, and the romantic and positivistic humanisms through which the European bourgeoisies established their hegemony over it, the revolutionary humanism that shook the world and the liberal humanism that sought to tame it, the humanism of the Nazis and the humanism of their victims and opponents, the antihumanist humanism of Heidegger and the humanist antihumanism of Foucault and Althusser – **are not reducible to one, or even to a single line or pattern**. Each has its distinctive historical curve, its particular discursive poetics, its own problematic scansion of the human. Each seeks, as all discourses must, to impose its own answer to the question of ‘which is to be master’. Meanwhile, **the problem of humanism remains, for the present, an inescapable horizon within which all attempts to think about the ways in which human being have, do, might live together in and on the world are contained.** Not that the actual humanisms described here necessarily provide a model, or even a useful history, least of all for those very numerous people, and peoples, for whom they have been alien and oppressive. Some, at least, offer a grim warning. Certainly it should no longer be possible to formulate phrases like ‘the destiny of man’ or ‘the triumph of human reason’ without an instant consciousness of the folly and brutality they drag behind them. **All humanisms, until now, have been imperial.** They speak of the human in the accents and the interests of a class, a sex, a ‘race’. **Their embrace suffocates those whom it does not ignore.** The first humanists scripted the tyranny of Borgias, Medicis and Tudors. Later humanisms dreamed of freedom and celebrated Frederick II, Bonaparte, Bismarck, Stalin. The liberators of colonial America, like the Greek and Roman thinkers they emulated, owned slaves. At various times, not excluding the present, the circuit of the human has excluded women, those who do not speak Greek or Latin or English, those whose complexions are not pink, children, Jews. It is almost impossible to think of a crime that has not been committed in the name of humanity. **At the same time, though it is clear that the master narrative of transcendental Man has outlasted its usefulness, it would be unwise simply to abandon the ground occupied by the historical humanisms. For one thing, some variety of humanism remains, on many occasions, the only available alternative to bigotry and persecution. The freedom to speak and write, to organize and campaign in defence of individual or collective interests, to protest and disobey: all these, and the prospect of a world in which they will be secured, can only be articulated in humanist terms. It is true that** the Baconian ‘Knowledge of Causes, and Secrett Motions of Things’, harnessed to an **overweening rationality** and an unbridled technological will to power, **has enlarged the bounds of human empire to the point of endangering the survival of the** violated **planet** on which we live. **But how, if not by mobilizing collective resources of human understanding and responsibility of ‘enlightened self-interest’ even, can that danger be turned aside?**

## 2NC

### Anthro

**Case outweighs—nuclear war destroys the environment, causes extinction**

Ramachandra **Guha**, Center for Ecological Sciences, “Radical American Environmentalism and Wilderness Preservation: A Third World Critique,” ENVIORNMENTAL ETHICS, Spring 19**89**, http://www.eci.ox.ac.uk/~dliverma/articles/Guha%20on%20radical%20environmentalism.pdf

Insofar as it has begun to act as a check on man’s arrogance and ecological hubris, the transition from an anthropocentric (human-centered) to a biocentric (humans as only one element in the ecosystem) view in both religious and scientific traditions is only to be welcomed.4 What is unacceptable are the radical conclusions drawn by **deep ecology**, in particular, that intervention in nature should be guided primarily by the need to preserve biotic integrity rather than by the needs of humans. The latter for deep ecologists is anthropocentric, the former biocentric. This dichotomy **is**, however, **of very little use in understanding t**he dynamics of **environmental degradation. The two fundamental ecological problems facing the globe are** (i) overconsumption by the industrialized world and by urban elites in the Third World and (ii) growing **militarization,** both in a short-term sense **(i.e., o**ngoing regional **wars) and i**n a long-term sense (i.e., the arms race and the prospect of **nuclear annihilation). Neither of these problems has any** tangible **connection to** the **anthropocentric**-biocentric **distinction**. Indeed, **the agents of these processes would barely comprehend this** philosophical **dichotomy. The proximate causes** of the ecologically wasteful characteristics of industrial society and of militarization **are far more mundane**: at an aggregate level, the dialectic of economic and political structures, and at a micro-level, the life-style choices of individuals. These causes cannot be reduced, whatever the level of analysis, to a deeper anthropocentric attitude toward nature; on the contrary, **by constituting a grave threat to human survival, the ecological degradation they cause does not even serve the best interests of human beings!** If my identification of the major dangers to the integrity of the natural world is correct, **invoking the bogy of anthropocentricism is** at best **irrelevant and** at worst **a dangerous obfuscation.**

### Heg link

#### Dissenting against American imperialism collapses current US hegemony

Robert Kagan (senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and is director of its U.S. Leadership Project) Spring 98 “The Benevolent Empire” http://fparchive.ceip.org/Ning/archive/archive/111/empire.pdf

Those contributing to the growing chorus of antihegemony and multipolarity may know they are playing a dangerous game, one that needs to be conducted with the utmost care, as French leaders did dur- ing the Cold War, lest the entire intemational system come crashing down around them. What they may not have adequately calculated, however, is the possibility that Americans will not respond as wisely as they generally did during the Cold War. Americans and their leaders should not take all this sophisticated whining about U.S. hegemony too seriously. They certainly should not take it more seriously than the whiners themselves do. But, of course, Americans are taking it seriously. In the United States these days, the lugubrious guilt trip of post-Vietnam liberalism is echoed even by con- servatives, with William Buckley, Samuel Huntington, and James Schlesinger all decrying American "hubris," "arrogance," and "imperialism." Clinton administration officials, in between speeches exalting America as the "indispensable" nation, increasingly behave as if what is truly indispensable is the prior approval of China, France, and Russia for every military action. Moreover, at another level, there is a stirring of neo-isolationism in America today, a mood that nicely complements the view among many Europeans that America is meddling too much in everyone else's business and taking too little time to mind its own. The existence of the Soviet Union disciplined Americans and made them see that their enlightened self-interest lay in a relatively generous foreign policy. Today, that discipline is no longer present. In other words, foreign grumbling about American hegemony would be merely amusing, were it not for the very real possibility that too many Americans will forget--even ff most of the rest of the world does not-- just how important continued American dominance is to the preserva- tion of a reasonable level of international security and prosperity. World leaders may want to keep this in mind when they pop the champagne corks in celebration of the next American humbling

**Two-thousand years of history prove**

William **Wohlforth 8** Daniel Webster Professor of Government, Dartmouth. BA in IR, MA in IR and MPhil and PhD in pol sci, Yale, Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War, October 2008, World Politics Vol. 61, Iss. 1; pg. 28, 31 pgs, Proquest

Despite increasingly compelling findings concerning the importance of status seeking in human behavior, research on its connection to war waned some three decades ago.38 Yet **empirical studies of the relationship between** both systemic and dyadic **capabilities distributions and war have continued to cumulate. If the relationships implied by the status theory run afoul** of well-established patterns or general historical findings, **then there is little reason to continue investigating them. The clearest empirical implication** of the theory **is that** status **competition is unlikely to cause great power military conflict in unipolar systems. If status competition is an important contributory cause of great power war, then,** ceteris paribus, **unipolar systems should be markedly less war-prone** than bipolar or multipolar systems. And this appears to be the case. As Daniel Geller notes **in a review of the empirical literature: "The only polar structure that appears to influence conflict probability is unipolarity."**39 In addition, a larger number of studies at the dyadic level support the related expectation that narrow capabilities gaps and ambiguous or unstable capabilities hierarchies increase the probability of war.40 These studies are based entirely on post-sixteenth-century European history, and most are limited to the post-1815 period covered by the standard data sets. Though the systems coded as unipolar, near-unipolar, and hegemonic are all marked by a high concentration of capabilities in a single state, these studies operationalize unipolarity in a variety of ways, often very differently from the definition adopted here. **An ongoing collaborative project looking at ancient interstate systems over** the course of **two thousand years suggests** **that** **historical systems** **that come closest to** the definition of unipolarity used here **exhibit precisely the** **behavioral** **properties implied by the theory**. 41 As David C. Kang's research shows, the **East Asian system between 1300 and 1900 was** an unusually stratified **unipolar** structure, **with** an economic and militarily dominant **China interacting with** a small number of geographically proximate, clearly weaker East Asian **states**.42 Status politics existed, but actors were channeled by elaborate cultural understandings and interstate practices into clearly recognized ranks. **Warfare was exceedingly rare, and the major outbreaks occurred precisely when the theory would predict: when China's capabilities waned**, reducing the clarity of the underlying material hierarchy and increasing status dissonance for lesser powers. Much more research is needed, but initial exploration of other arguably unipolar systems-for example, Rome, Assyria, the Amarna system-appears consistent with the hypothesis.43 Status Competition and Causal Mechanisms **Both theory and evidence demonstrate convincingly that competition for status is a driver of human behavior, and social** identity **theory** and related literatures **suggest** the **conditions under which it might come to the fore in great power relations.** Both the systemic and dyadic findings presented in large-N studies are broadly consistent with the theory, but they are also consistent with power transition and other rationalist theories of hegemonic war.

**US pursuit of hegemony inevitable**

**Kagan**, 1/24/20**11**, (Robert Kagan, [American](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States)historian, author and foreign policy commentator at the[Brookings Institution](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brookings_Institution)) ‘The Price of Power: The benefits of U.S. defense spending far outweigh the costs’, VOL. 16, NO. 18, <http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/price-power_533696.html?page=3>

In theory, the United States could refrain from intervening abroad. But, in practice, will it? Many assume today that the American public has had it with interventions, and Alice Rivlin certainly reflects a strong current of opinion when she says that “much of the public does not believe that we need to go in and take over other people’s countries.” That sentiment has often been heard after interventions, especially those with mixed or dubious results. It was heard after the four-year-long war in the Philippines, which cost 4,000 American lives and untold Filipino casualties. It was heard after Korea and after Vietnam. It was heard after Somalia. Yet **the reality has been that after each intervention, the sentiment against foreign involvement has faded, and the United States has intervened again. Depending on how one chooses to count, the United States has undertaken roughly 25 overseas interventions since 1898**:Cuba, 1898The Philippines, 1898-1902China, 1900Cuba, 1906Nicaragua, 1910 & 1912Mexico, 1914Haiti, 1915Dominican Republic, 1916Mexico, 1917World War I, 1917-1918Nicaragua, 1927World War II, 1941-1945Korea, 1950-1953Lebanon, 1958Vietnam, 1963-1973Dominican Republic, 1965Grenada, 1983Panama, 1989First Persian Gulf war, 1991Somalia, 1992Haiti, 1994Bosnia, 1995Kosovo, 1999Afghanistan, 2001-presentIraq, 2003-presentThat is one intervention every 4.5 years on average. Overall, **the United States has intervened or been engaged in combat somewhere in 52 out of the last 112 years, or roughly 47 percent of the time. Since the end of the Cold War**, it is true, **the rate of U.S. interventions has increased, with an intervention roughly once every 2.5 years and American troops intervening or engaged in combat in 16 out of 22 years, or over 70 percent of the time**, since the fall of the Berlin Wall.The argument for returning to “normal” begs the question: What is normal for the United States? The historical record of the last century suggests that it is not a policy of nonintervention. This record ought to raise doubts about the theory that American behavior these past two decades is the product of certain unique ideological or doctrinal movements, whether “liberal imperialism” or “neoconservatism.” **Allegedly “realist” presidents in this era have been just as likely to order interventions as their more idealistic colleagues**. George H.W. Bush was as profligate an intervener as Bill Clinton. He invaded Panama in 1989, intervened in Somalia in 1992—both on primarily idealistic and humanitarian grounds—which along with the first Persian Gulf war in 1991 made for three interventions in a single four-year term. Since 1898 the list of presidents who ordered armed interventions abroad has included William McKinley, Theodore Roose-velt, William Howard Taft, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush. **One would be hard-pressed to find a common ideological or doctrinal thread among them—unless it is the doctrine and ideology of a mainstream American foreign policy that leans more toward intervention than many imagine or would care to admit**.Many don’t want to admit it, and **the only thing as consistent as this pattern of American behavior has been the claim by contemporary critics that it is abnormal and a departure from American traditions.** The anti-imperialists of the late 1890s, the isolationists of the 1920s and 1930s, the critics of Korea and Vietnam, and the critics of the first Persian Gulf war, the interventions in the Balkans, and the more recent wars of the Bush years have all insisted that the nation had in those instances behaved unusually or irrationally. And yet the behavior has continued.To note this consistency is not the same as justifying it. The United States may have been wrong for much of the past 112 years. Some critics would endorse the sentiment expressed by the historian Howard K. Beale in the 1950s, that “the men of 1900” had steered the United States onto a disastrous course of world power which for the subsequent half-century had done the United States and the world no end of harm. But **whether one lauds or condemns this past century of American foreign policy—and one can find reasons to do both—the fact of this consistency remains.It would require not just a modest reshaping of American foreign policy priorities but a sharp departure from this tradition to bring about the kinds of changes that would allow the United States to make do with a substantially smaller force structure.**Is such a sha

rp departure in the offing? It is no doubt true that many Americans are unhappy with the on-going warfare in Afghanistan and to a lesser extent in Iraq, and that, if asked, a majority would say the United States should intervene less frequently in foreign nations, or perhaps not at **all. It may also be true that the effect of long military involvements in Iraq and Afghanistan may cause Americans and their leaders to shun further interventions at least for a few years—as they did for nine years after World War I, five years after World War II, and a decade after Vietnam. This may be further reinforced by the difficult economic times in which Americans are currently suffering. The longest period of nonintervention in the past century was during the 1930s, when unhappy memories of World War I combined with the economic catastrophe of the Great Depression to constrain American interventionism to an unusual degree and produce the first and perhaps only genuinely isolationist period in American history**.So are we back to the mentality of the 1930s? It wouldn’t appear so. There is no great wave of isolationism sweeping the country. There is not even the equivalent of a Patrick Buchanan, who received 3 million votes in the 1992 Republican primaries. Any isolationist tendencies that might exist are severely tempered by continuing fears of terrorist attacks that might be launched from overseas. Nor are the vast majority of Americans suffering from economic calamity to nearly the degree that they did in the Great Depression.Even if we were to repeat the policies of the 1930s, however, **it is worth recalling that the unusual restraint of those years was not sufficient to keep the United States out of war. On the contrary, the United States took actions which ultimately led to the greatest and most costly foreign intervention in its history. Even the most determined and in those years powerful isolationists could not prevent it**.Today there are a number of obvious possible contingencies that might lead the United States to substantial interventions overseas, notwithstanding the preference of the public and its political leaders to avoid them. **Few Americans want a war with Iran, for instance. But it is not implausible that a president—indeed, this president—might find himself in a situation where military conflict at some level is hard to avoid.** The continued success of the international sanctions regime that the Obama administration has so skillfully put into place, for instance, might eventually cause the Iranian government to lash out in some way—perhaps by attempting to close the Strait of Hormuz. Recall that Japan launched its attack on Pearl Harbor in no small part as a response to oil sanctions imposed by a Roosevelt administration that had not the slightest interest or intention of fighting a war against Japan but was merely expressing moral outrage at Japanese behavior on the Chinese mainland. Perhaps in an Iranian contingency, the military actions would stay limited. But perhaps, too, they would escalate. One could well imagine an American public, now so eager to avoid intervention, suddenly demanding that their president retaliate. Then there is the possibility that a military exchange between Israel and Iran, initiated by Israel, could drag the United States into conflict with Iran. Are such scenarios so farfetched that they can be ruled out by Pentagon planners?Other possible contingencies include a war on the Korean Peninsula, where the United States is bound by treaty to come to the aid of its South Korean ally; and possible interventions in Yemen or Somalia, should those states fail even more than they already have and become even more fertile ground for al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. And what about those “humanitarian” interventions that are first on everyone’s list to be avoided? Should another earthquake or some other natural or man-made catastrophe strike, say, Haiti and present the looming prospect of mass starvation and disease and political anarchy just a few hundred miles off U.S. shores, with the possibility of thousands if not hundreds of thousands of refugees, can anyone be confident that an American president will not feel compelled to send an intervention force to help?Some may hope that a smaller U.S. military, compelled by the necessity of budget constraints, would prevent a president from intervening. More likely, however, it would simply prevent a president from intervening effectively. This, after all, was the experience of the Bush administration in Iraq and Afghanistan. Both because of constraints and as a conscious strategic choice, the Bush administration sent too few troops to both countries. The results were lengthy, unsuccessful conflicts, burgeoning counterinsurgencies, and loss of confidence in American will and capacity, as well as large annual expenditures. Would it not have been better, and also cheaper, to have sent larger numbers of forces initially to both places and brought about a more rapid conclusion to the fighting? The point is, it may prove cheaper in the long run to have larger forces that can fight wars quickly and conclusively, as Colin Powell long ago suggested, than to have smaller forces that can’t. Would a defense planner trying to anticipate future American actions be wise to base planned force structure on the assumption that the United States is out of the intervention business? Or would that be the kind of penny-wise, pound-foolish calculation that, in matters of national security, can prove so unfortunate?The debates over whether and how the United States should respond to the world’s strategic challenges will and should continue. Armed interventions overseas should be weighed carefully, as always, with an eye to whether the risk of inaction is greater than the risks of action. And as always, these judgments will be merely that: judgments, made with inadequate information and intelligence and no certainty about the outcomes. No foreign policy doctrine can avoid errors of omission and commission. But **history has provided some lessons, and for the United States the lesson has been fairly clear: The world is better off, and the United States is better off, in the kind of international system that American power has built and defended.**

### K: Ontology 1AR

**Prioritizing ontology over policy paralyzes problem solving measures and ensures short-term annihilation.**

David **Owen** Professor of Social & Political Philosophy and Deputy Director, Centre for Philosophy and Value, University of Southhampton, “Re-Orientating International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning” MILLENIUM: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, 20**02**, p. 655-7.

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for **words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’**, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. **The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power** as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while **the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is** not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is **by no means** clear that it is, in contrast, wholly **dependent on these philosophical commitments**. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theoryto recognise **that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons** in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that**, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us.** In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because **prioritisation of ontology and epistemology** promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it **cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR**. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, **‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’** in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, **this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity.** The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and **prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one** theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the **theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right**. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so **a** potentially **vicious circle arises.**

### Ext1--Videogames 2NC

**It feels like you’re killing your neighbor**

Anderson 13

(Kenneth, is professor of law at Washington College of Law, American University; a visiting fellow of the Hoover Institution and member of its Task Force on National Security and Law; and a non-resident senior fellow of the Brookings Institution. He writes on international law, the laws of war, and national security, ”The case for drones,” 05/24/13, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2013/05/24/the\_case\_for\_drones\_118548.html) RC

The most offensively foolish (though endlessly repeated) objection raised against drones was the one made by Jane Mayer in her influential 2009 New Yorker article, “The Predator War”: that drone pilots are so distant from their targets that they encourage a “push-button,” video-game mentality toward killing. The professional military find the claim bizarre, and it fails to take into account the other kinds of weapons and platforms in use. Note, the pilot of a manned craft is often thousands of feet away and a mile above a target looking at a tiny coordinates screen. And what of the sailor, deep in the below-decks of a ship, or a submarine, firing a cruise missile with no awareness of any kind about the target hundreds of miles away?¶ For that matter, the common perception of drones as a sci-fi combination of total surveillance and complete discretion in where and when to strike is simply wrong. The drone pilot might sit in Nevada, but the drone itself has a limited range, requires an airstrip, fuel, repairs, and 200 or so personnel to keep it in the air. All this physical infrastructure must be close to the theater of operations. Stress rates among drone pilots are at least as high as those of manned aircraft pilots; they are far from having a desensitized attitude toward killing. This appears to be partially because these are not mere combat operations but fundamentally and primarily intelligence operations. Drone pilots engaged in targeted killing operations watch their targets from a very personal distance via sensor technology, through which they track intimate, daily patterns of life to gather information and, perhaps, to determine precisely the best moment to strike, when collateral damage might be least.¶ As one drone operator told me, it is not as if one sees the terrible things the target is engaged in doing that made him a target in the first place; instead, it feels, after a few weeks of observation, as though you are killing your neighbor. ¶ In any case, the mentality of drone pilots in targeted-killing ops is irrelevant to firing decisions; they do not make decisions to fire weapons. The very existence of a remote platform, one with long loiter times and maximum tactical surveillance, enables decisions to fire by committee. And deliberately so, notes Gregory McNeal, a professor of law at Pepperdine University, who has put together the most complete study of the still largely secret decision-making process—the so-called disposition lists and kill matrix the New York Times has described in front page stories. It starts from the assessment of intelligence through meetings in which determinations, including layers of legal review, are made about whether a potential target has sufficient value and, finally, whether and when to fire the weapon in real time. The drone pilot is just a pilot.

#### Aff has it backwards – Drones represent a moral paradigm shift that challenges the mystification and glorification of warfare

**Brennan-Marquez** 5/24 – Visiting Human Rights Fellow at Yale Law School (Kiel, “A progressive defense of drones”, 2013, <http://www.salon.com/2013/05/24/a_progressive_defense_of_drones/>, CMR)

But there is another moral dimension to drone warfare, running in the opposite direction, which I fear has been lost in the haze of (rightful) outcry. For the same reason that drone warfare stands to make violence easier to deploy — none of our lives are on the line — it also makes violence harder to rationalize. The pain and death of drone strikes, unlike the pain and death of traditional missions, can draw no comfort from narratives of heroism. Destruction wrought by machines is neither noble nor grand. It’s asinine, and unfailingly repugnant. This means that drone strikes must be justified on their own terms, without recourse to war’s long-standing mystification. In a world where we apotheosize soldiers, and rope off their actions from everyday opprobrium, it’s important to consider whether the banal violence of machines might be preferable to the lionized violence of men.¶ A year ago, Tom Engelhardt published a memorable essay in the Nation on the vileness of drone warfare. Taking a healthily incredulous view of the Obama administration’s assurance that it would use its lurid toy for exclusively virtuous ends, Engelhardt concluded with a flourish of outrage: “What [our leaders] can’t see in the haze of exceptional self-congratulation is this: they are transforming the promise of America into a promise of death. And death, visited from the skies, isn’t precise. It isn’t glorious. It isn’t judicious. It certainly isn’t a shining vision. It’s hell.” Magnificently put: The only trouble is that these same critiques would apply just as forcefully, if not more so, to traditional warfare. War isn’t precise. It isn’t glorious. It isn’t judicious. It isn’t a shining vision. It’s hell.¶ The difference between traditional warfare and drone strikes is that the latter can be clearly identified as hellacious. Not just by poets and philosophers – but by everyone, everywhere, in the immediacy of its horror. When innocent people end up dead as the result of a drone strike, we easily recognize that outcome as morally lamentable. Undaunted by the symbolic distortion of the battlefield, we confront drones with the skepticism — and, as the case may be, the outrage — that accompanies moral clarity. The burden of proof inverts. Unlike traditional warfare, when the loss of life on the other side is presumptively acceptable, and it only becomes unacceptable if circumstances render it so, in the case of drone strikes, the loss of lives on the other side is presumptively unacceptable, and it only becomes acceptable if a persuasive rationale can be offered. Such rationales are not impossible to formulate, but it faces a steep upward grade. It’s an argument of last resort, defensive rather than triumphant.¶ Before exploring what practical light this observation can shed on drone strikes, it’s worth pausing to ask why moral judgment comes under strain during wartime. The answer is simple: we prize our own lives over enemy lives. This state of affairs is not necessarily justifiable on moral grounds. In fact, it seems plainly unjustified on moral grounds. But it’s also a social fact. A helpful analogy can be drawn to familial relations. Moral philosophers have encountered notorious difficulty in trying to rationalize the treatment of family members differently than the treatment of strangers. In both settings — family and war — the basic problem is the same. Justice makes no claim on love. Membership in a particular polity, no less than membership in a particular family, is a feature of the world to which we are attached – a condition inherited rather than chosen, which, despite its randomness, cannot be overcome by wordplay or will. Confronted with a question like, “Why should their soldiers die before ours?” an objective vantage point — the abstract stance of morality — is simply unavailable.¶ The dynamic of attachment at play in traditional warfare has persisted since time immemorial, and it is unlikely to relent soon. Nor am I trying to criticize it. Moral judgment is harsh, taut and withering; with good reason do we shield things we love from its gaze. At the same time, the difficulty involved in making sense of violence wrought by our troops also illuminates something important about the interpretation of wartime acts: The task of justifying an act of violence before the fact is distinct from the task of interpreting an act of violence after the fact. For example, in the face of a mission that made strategic sense but ended up yielding massive casualties, it would strike us as perfectly reasonable for an observer to say: “I was in favor of this mission, but now that I see the results, I am horrified.” The first thought — “I was in favor of this mission” — goes to whether, ex ante, the predicates of legitimate force existed. The second thought — “but now that I see the results, I am horrified” — goes to whether, ex post, the externalities can be rationalized.¶ And even more familiar is the inverse style of claim, in response to a mission that seemed heinous or imprudent but, for reasons outside of the observer’s control, was pursued: “Much as I opposed the mission to begin with, once our troops were on the ground, I believe they did what they had to do.” This commonplace formulation speaks to the way the battlefield consternates moral judgment. It’s one thing to advocate against the deployment of troops – but once the troops are deployed, a switch flips. Because soldiers make the ultimate sacrifice, their actions are not subject to typical moral analysis. What goes on “over there” stands beyond the comprehension — and beyond the everyday reproach — of civilians. This is not to say that soldiers act with moral impunity. Of course they do not. But the moral constraints of the battlefield are of an attenuated kind, very far off, and shrouded in mystique.¶In this respect, drones represent a welcome shift of paradigm: they stand to clarify the moral stakes of state-sponsored violence by eliminating the dynamic of attachment that has traditionally accompanied it. By itself, of course, this proposition does not entail that drone strikes are preferable to traditional troop deployments. What it does entail, however, is that the benefits of moral clarity should be weighed, in practice, against the drawbacks of less circumspect decision-making. As much as drones are liable to desensitize leaders, making violence easier to employ, the outrage they produce is also likely to have a chilling effect in the other direction. Which way will this calculus ultimately run? We exercise an important threshold of control over this question. Whether the anesthetic effect of machine-induced violence will outstrip the sense of outrage that violence-by-machines provoke, or vice versa, is not a static political fact to which we must be resigned – it’s a hard issue for us to deliberate with care. One thing, however, is certain. Moral clarity in the face of drone strikes, as compared to troop deployments, is only politically worthwhile — indeed, only possible — insofar as members of the public are kept informed about when drone strikes are happening, and what damage they cause. Transparency is a precondition of outrage – and of accountability.

## 1NR

A limited topic over war powers authority is key to solving the harms of the 1AC – it allows for an engaged public that can expose the hypocrisy of the federal government – only focus on specific policy questions can actualize change by making it relevant to policy-makers – the aff is more likely to cause disengagement and moral quietude than actual change

**Mellor 13**

The Australian National University, ANU College of Asia and the Pacific, Department Of International Relations,   
“Why policy relevance is a moral necessity: Just war theory, impact, and UAVs,” European University Institute, Paper Prepared for BISA Conference 2013, DOA: 8-14-13

**This** section of the paper **considers** more generally **the need for** just war **theorists to engage with policy debate** **about the use of force**, **as** **well as to engage with the** more **fundamental moral and philosophical principles** of the just war tradition. **It draws on** John **Kelsay’s** **conception of just war thinking as being a social practice**,35 **as well as on** Michael **Walzer’s understanding of the role of the social critic in society**.36 It argues that the just war tradition is a form of “practical discourse” which is concerned with questions of “how we should act.”37 Kelsay argues that: **[T]he criteria of jus ad bellum and jus in bello provide a framework for structured participation in a public conversation about the use of military force** . . . **citizens who choose to speak in just war terms express commitments** . . . [i**]n the process of giving and asking for** **reasons for going to war**, **those who argue** in just war terms **seek to influence policy** **by persuading others that their analysis provides a way to express and fulfil the desire that military actions be** both **wise and just.38** He also argues that “**good just war thinking involves continuous and complete deliberation**, in the sense that one attends to all the standard criteria at war’s inception, at its end, and **throughout the course of the conflict**.”39 **This** is important as it **highlights the need for** just war **scholars to engage** **with the ongoing operations in war and the specific policies that are involved**. **The question of** **whether a particular** war is just or unjust, and the question of whether a particular **weapon (like drones**) **can be used in accordance with the jus in bello criteria**, only **cover a part of the overall justice of the war**. **Without an engagement with the reality of war**, **in** **terms of the policies used** in waging it, **it is impossible to engage with the “moral reality of war,”40 in terms of being able to discuss it and judge it in moral terms** Kelsay’s § Marked 12:46 § description of just war thinking as a social practice is similar to Walzer’s more general description of social criticism. The just war theorist, **as a social critic, must be involved with his or her own society and its practices**. In the same way that the social critic’s distance from his or her society is measured in inches and not miles,41 the just war **theorist must be close to and must understand the language through which war is constituted, interpreted and reinterpreted**.**42 It is only by understanding the values and language that their own society purports to live by that the social critic can hold up a mirror to that society to** **demonstrate** its **hypocrisy** **and to show the gap that exists** between its practice and its values.43 **The tradition** itself **provides a set of** **values and principles and**, as argued by Cian O’Driscoll, **constitutes a “language of engagement**” **to spur participation in public and political debate**.44 This language is part of “our common heritage, the product of many centuries of arguing about war.”45 **These principles and this language provide the terms through which people understand and come to interpret war, not in a deterministic way but by providing the categories necessary for moral understanding and moral argument about the legitimate and illegitimate uses of force**.46 **By spurring and providing the basis for political engagement the just war tradition ensures that the acts that occur within war are considered according to just war criteria and allows policy-makers to be held to account on this basis. Engaging with the reality of war requires** recognising that war is, as Clausewitz stated, **a continuation of policy**. **War**, according to Clausewitz, **is subordinate to politics and to political choices and these political choices can, and must, be judged and critiqued**.47 **Engagement and political debate are morally necessary** **as the alternative is disengagement and moral quietude**, **which is a sacrifice of the obligations of citizenship**.48 **This engagement must bring** just war **theorists into contact with the policy makers** **and** **will require work that is** accessible and **relevant to policy makers**, **however this does not mean a sacrifice of critical distance or an abdication of truth in the face of power.** **By engaging in detail** **with the policies being pursued** and their concordance or otherwise with **the principles of the just war tradition the policy-makers will be forced to account for their decisions and justify them in just war language.** **In contrast to the view**, **suggested** by Kenneth **Anderson, that “the public cannot be made part of the debate**” **and that “[w]e are** necessarily **committed into the hands of our political leadership**”,49 it is incumbent upon just war theorists to ensure that the public are informed and are capable of holding their political leaders to account. **To accept the idea that the political leadership are stewards and that accountability will not benefit the public, on whose behalf action is undertaken, but will only benefit al Qaeda,50 is a grotesque act of intellectual irresponsibility**. As Walzer has argued, it is precisely because it is “our country” that we are “especially obligated to criticise its policies.”51 This paper has discussed the empirics of the policies of drone strikes in the ongoing conflict with those associate with al Qaeda. It has demonstrated that there are significant moral questions raised by the just war tradition regarding some aspects of these policies and it has argued that, thus far, just **war scholars have not paid sufficient attention or engaged in sufficient detail with the policy implications of drone use.** **As such it has been argued that it is necessary for just war theorists to engage more directly with these issues and to ensure that their work is policy relevant**, **not in a utilitarian sense of abdicating from speaking the truth in the face of power**, **but by forcing policy makers to justify** their **actions according to the principles of the just war tradition, principles which they invoke themselves in formulating policy.** **By highlighting hypocrisy and providing the tools and language** **for the interpretation of action**, **the just war tradition provides the basis for the public engagement and political activism that are necessary for democratic politics.52**

#### Government is not the people

Costello and Thomas 2K

(George A. and Kenneth R., Congressional Research Service, The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation, http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data/constitution~preamble/#annotations)

Article Text I Annotations We the People of the United States. in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America. Annotations PURPOSE AND EFFECT OF THE PREAMBLE Although the preamble is not a source of power for any department of the Federal Government, 1 the Supreme Court has often referred to it as evidence of the origin, scope, and purpose of the Constitution. 2 "Its true office," wrote Joseph Story in his COMMENTARIES, "is to expound the nature and extent and application of the powers actually conferred by the Constitution, and not substantively to create them. For example, the preamble declares one object to be, 'to provide for the common defense.'