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**They misdiagnose imperialism—history proves that it is the result of global capital—traditional responses to imperialism fail**

**John Bellamy Foster, Editor of the Monthly Review and professor of sociology at the University of Oregon in Eugene, September 2005. “Naked Imperialism” Monthly Review, http://www.monthlyreview.org/0905jbf.htm**

The global actions of the United States since September 11, 2001, are often seen as constituting a “new militarism” and a “new imperialism.” Yet, **neither militarism nor imperialism is new to the U**nited **S**tates, which has been an expansionist power—continental, hemispheric, and global—since its inception. **What has changed is the nakedness with which this is being promoted**, and the unlimited, planetary extent of U.S. ambitions. Max Boot, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, insists that the “greatest danger” facing the United States in Iraq and around the world “is that we won’t use all of our power for fear of the ‘I’ word—imperialism....Given the historical baggage that ‘imperialism’ carries, there’s no need for the U.S. government to embrace the term. But it should definitely embrace the practice.” The United States, he says, should be “prepared to embrace its imperial rule unapologetically.” If Washington is not planning on “permanent bases in Iraq...they should be....If that raises hackles about American imperialism, so be it” (“American Imperialism?: No Need t3 Run from the Label,” *USA Today,*May 6, 2003). Similarly, Deepak Lal, James S. Coleman Professor of International Development Studies at the University of California, Los Angeles, states: “The primary task of a Pax Americana must be to find ways to create a new order in the Middle East....It is accusingly said by many that any such rearrangement of the status quo would be an act of imperialism and would largely be motivated by the desire to control Middle Eastern oil. But far from being objectionable, imperialism is precisely what is needed to restore order in the Middle East” (“In Defense of Empires,” in Andrew Bacevich, ed., *The Imperial Tense*, 2003). **These views**, although emanating from neoconservatives, **are fully within the mainstream of U.S. foreign policy.** Indeed, there is little dissent in U.S. ruling circles about current attempts to expand the American Empire. For Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, senior fellows at the Brookings Institution, “the real debate...is not whether to have an empire, but what kind” (New York Times, May 10, 2003). Michael Ignatieff, director of Harvard University’s Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, states unequivocally: “This new imperialism...is humanitarian in theory but imperial in practice; it creates ‘subsovereignty,’ in which states possess independence in theory but not in fact. The reason the Americans are in Afghanistan, or the Balkans, after all, is to maintain imperial order in zones essential to the interest of the United States. They are there to maintain order against a barbarian threat.” As “the West’s last military state” and its last “remaining empire,” the United States has a responsibility for “imperial structuring and ordering” in “analogy to Rome....We have now awakened to the barbarians....Retribution has been visited on the barbarians, and more will follow” (“The Challenges of American Imperial Power,”*Naval War College Review*, Spring 2003). All of this reflects the realities of U.S. imperial power. In his preamble to the*National Security Strategy of the United States*, released in fall 2002, President George W. **Bush declared that since the fall of the Soviet Union there was now “a single sustainable model** for national success: freedom, democracy and free enterprise,” as **embodied concretely in U.S. capitalism. Any society that rejected the guidance of that model was destined to fail—and would,** it was implied**, be declared a security threat** to the United States. **The main body of the document that followed was an open declaration of Washington’s goal of strategic dominance** over the entire planet for the indefinite future. It announced U.S. intentions of waging “preemptive” (or preventive) war against nations that threatened or in the future could conceivably threaten U.S. dominance directly—or that might be considered a threat indirectly through dangers they posed to U.S. friends or allies anywhere on the globe. Preventive actions would be taken, the new *National Security Strategy*emphasized, to ensure that no power would be allowed to rise up to rival the United States in military capabilities anytime in the future. On April 13, 2004, President Bush proclaimed that the United States needed to “go on the offensive and stay on the offensive,” waging an unrelenting war against all those it considered its enemies. Since September 11, 2001, **the U**nited **S**tates **has waged wars** in Afghanistan and Iraq, **expanded the global reach of its military base system, and increased the level of its military spending** to the point that it now spends about as much on the military as all other nations of the world combined. Glorying in the U.S. blitzkrieg in Iraq, journalist Greg Easterbrook proclaimed in the *New York Times*(April 27, 2003) that U.S. military forces are “the strongest the world has ever known...stronger than the Wehrmacht in 1940, stronger than the legions at the height of Roman power.” Numerous **critics on the** U.S. **left have responded by declaring, in effect, “Let’s throw the bastards out.”** The U.S. government under the Bush administration, so the argument goes, has been taken over by a neoconservative cabal that has imposed a new policy of militarism and imperialism. For example, University of California at Los Angeles sociologist Michael Mann argues at the end of his *Incoherent Empire*(2003) that “a neoconservative chicken-hawk coup...seized the White House and the Department of Defense” with George W. Bush’s rise to the presidency. For Mann the end solution is simply to “throw the militarists out of office.” The argument advanced here points to a different conclusion. **U.S. militarism and imperialism have deep roots in U.S. history and the political-economic logic of capitalism**. As even supporters of U.S. imperialism are now willing to admit, the United States has been an empire from its inception. “**The United States**,” Boot writes in “American Imperialism?,” “**has been an empire since at least 1803, when Thomas Jefferson purchased the Louisiana Territory**. Throughout the 19th century, what Jefferson called the ‘empire of liberty’ expanded across the continent.” **Later the United States conquered and colonized lands overseas in the Spanish-American War of 1898 and the brutal Philippine-American War** that immediately followed—justified as an attempt to exercise the “white man’s burden.” **After the Second World War the United States and other major imperialist states relinquished their formal political empires, but retained informal economic empires** backed up by the threat and not infrequently the reality of military intervention. The Cold War obscured this neocolonial reality but never entirely hid it. **The growth of empire is neither peculiar to the United States nor a mere outgrowth of the policies of particular states. It is the systematic result of the entire history and logic of capitalism**. Since its birth in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries **capitalism has been a globally expansive system—one that is hierarchically divided** between metropole and satellite, center and periphery. **The objective of the imperialist system of today as in the past is to open up peripheral economies to investment from the core capitalist countries, thus ensuring both a continual supply of raw materials at low prices, and a net outflow of economic surplus from periphery to center of the world system.** In addition, **the third world is viewed as a source of cheap labor, constituting a global reserve army of labor. Economies of the periphery are structured to meet the external needs of the United States and the other core capitalist countries rather than their own internal needs. This has resulted** (with a few notable exceptions) **in conditions of unending dependency and debt peonage in the poorer regions of the world.** If the “new militarism” and the “new imperialism” are not so new after all, but in line with the entire history of U.S. and world capitalism, the crucial question then becomes: Why has U.S. imperialism become more naked in recent years to the point that it has suddenly been rediscovered by proponents and opponents alike? Only a few years ago some theorists of globalization with roots in the left, such as Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri in their book *Empire*(2000), were arguing that the age of imperialism was over, that the Vietnam War was the last imperialist war. Yet, **today, imperialism is more openly embraced by the U.S. power structure than at any time since the 1890s. This shift can only be understood by examining the historical changes that have occurred in the last three decades since the end of the Vietnam War.** When the Vietnam War finally ended in 1975 **the United States had suffered a major defeat** in what, Cold War ideology notwithstanding, was clearly an imperialist war. **The defeat coincided with a sudden slowdown in the rate of growth of the U.S. and world capitalist economy** in the early 1970s, as the system’s old nemesis of secular stagnation reappeared. The vast export of dollars abroad associated with the war and the growth of empire created a huge Eurodollar market, which played a central role in President Richard Nixon’s decision to de-link the dollar from gold in August 1971, ending the dollar-gold standard. **This marked the decline of U.S. economic hegemony.** The energy crisis that hit the United States and other leading industrial states when the Persian Gulf countries cut their oil exports in response to Western support for Israel in the Yom Kippur War of 1973 exposed U.S. vulnerability due to its dependence on foreign oil. What conservatives labeled **the “Vietnam Syndrome**”—or the reluctance of the American population to support U.S. military interventions in third world countries—**prevented the United States in this period from responding to the world crisis by setting its gargantuan military machine in motion**. U.S. interventions were consequently reduced and breakaways from the imperialist system spread rapidly: Ethiopia in 1974, Portugal’s African colonies (Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea Bissau) in 1974–75, Grenada in 1979, Nicaragua in 1979, Iran in 1979, and Zimbabwe in 1980. **The most serious defeat experienced by U.S. imperialism** in the late 1970s **was the Iranian Revolution** of 1979 that **overthrew the Shah of Iran, who had been a lynchpin of U.S. military dominance** over the Persian Gulf and its oil. Coming in the wake of the energy crisis, the Middle East became an overriding concern of U.S. global strategy. President Jimmy Carter issued in January 1980 what came to be known as the Carter Doctrine: “An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.” This was worded so as to parallel the Monroe Doctrine, which had established U.S. claims to dominance over the Americas, and had been employed as a putative “legal principle” with which to justify U.S. military invasions of other states in the hemisphere. **The Carter Doctrine said**, in effect, **that the United States claimed military dominance of the Persian Gulf**, which was to be brought fully within the American empire “by any means necessary.” **This assertion of U.S. power in the Middle East was accompanied by the onset of the CIA-sponsored war against Soviet troops** in Afghanistan (the largest covert war in history), in which the United States enlisted fundamentalist Islamic forces including Osama Bin Laden in a holy war or jihad against Soviet occupying forces. **The blowback from this war and the subsequent Gulf War was to lead directly to the terrorist attacks** of September 11, 2001. **During the Reagan era** in the 1980s **the United States expanded its offensive, renewing the Cold War arms race while at the same time seeking to overturn** the **revolutions** of the 1970s. **In addition to prosecuting the covert war against the Soviets in Afghanistan, it provided military and economic assistance to** Saddam Hussein’s **Iraq, supporting it in the Iraq-Iran War** of 1980–1988; increased its direct military involvement in the Middle East, **intervening unsuccessfully in Lebanon** in the early 1980s (withdrawing only after the devastating 1983 bombing of the marine barracks); **and sponsored covert operations** designed to overcome unfriendly states and revolutionary movements throughout the globe. Major covert wars were instigated against the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and against revolutionary forces in Guatemala and El Salvador. In 1983 the United States invaded the tiny island of Grenada, and under Reagan’s successor, President George H. W. Bush, it invaded Panama in December 1989 as part of a campaign to reassert control over Central America. But it was the **collapse of the Soviet bloc in** 1989 that **represented the real sea change for U.S. imperialism.** As Andrew Bacevich wrote in *American Empire* (2002), “**just as victory in 1898** [in the Spanish-American War] **transformed the Caribbean into an American lake, so too victory** [in the Cold War] **in 1989** **brought the entire globe within the purview of the United States**; henceforth American interests knew no bounds” (177). Suddenly, with the Soviet Union withdrawing from the world stage (soon to collapse itself in the summer of 1991), **the possibility of a full-scale U.S. military intervention in the Middle East was opened up. This occurred almost immediately** with the Gulf War, commencing in the spring of 1991. The United States, although aware in advance of the impending Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, did not strongly oppose it until after it had taken place (see the transcript of Saddam Hussein’s statement and U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie’s response, *New York Times International*, September 23, 1990). The Iraqi invasion offered the United States a pretext for a full-scale war in the Middle East. Between 100,000 and 200,000 Iraqi soldiers were killed in the Gulf War and at least 15,000 Iraqi civilians died directly from U.S. and British bombing of Iraq (Research Unit for Political Economy,[Behind the Invasion of Iraq](http://www.monthlyreview.org/behindiraq.htm), 2003). Commenting on what he believed to be one of the chief gains of the war, President Bush declared in April 1991, “By God, we’ve licked the Vietnam Syndrome.” Nevertheless, **the United States at the time chose not to pursue its advantage and invade and occupy Iraq.** Although there were undoubtedly numerous reasons for that decision, including the fact that it would probably not have been supported by the Arab members of the Gulf War coalition, the primary one was the geopolitical shift resulting from the collapse of the Soviet bloc. By then the Soviet Union itself was tottering. Uncertainty about the future of the Soviet Union and the geopolitical sphere it had controlled was such that Washington could not then afford the commitment of troops that a continuing occupation of Iraq would have entailed. The end of the Soviet Union came only months later. During the remainder of the 1990s the United States (chiefly under Democratic President Bill Clinton) was to engage in major military interventions in the Horn of Africa, the Middle East, the Caribbean, and Eastern Europe. This culminated in 1999 with the war **in Yugoslavia** (Kosovo) in which **the United States, leading NATO, bombed for eleven weeks**, followed by the insertion of NATO ground troops. **Purportedly carried out to stop “ethnic cleansing,” the war in the Balkans was geopolitically about the extension of U.S. imperial power** into an area formerly within the Soviet sphere of influence. Already by the close of the twentieth century the power elite in the United States had therefore moved toward a policy of naked imperialism to a degree not seen since the opening years of the century—with the U.S. empire now conceived as planetary in scope. **Even as a massive antiglobalization movement was emerging**, notably with the protests in Seattle in November 1999, **the U.S. establishment was moving energetically toward an imperialism for the twenty-first century; one that would promote neoliberal globalization**, while resting on U.S. world dominance. “**The hidden hand of the market**,” Thomas Friedman, the Pulitzer-prize-winning foreign policy columnist for the *New York Times*, opined, “**will never work without a hidden fist—McDonald’s cannot flourish without a McDonnell Douglas**, the builder of the F-15. And **the hidden fist that keeps the world safe for Silicon Valley’s technologies is called the United States Army,** Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps” (New *York Times Magazine*, March 28, 1999). The “hidden fist,” however, was only partly hidden, and was to become even less so in the ensuing years. To be sure, **the shift toward a more openly militaristic imperialism occurred only gradually, in stages.** For most of the 1990s the U.S. ruling class and national security establishment had waged a debate behind the scenes on what to do now that the Soviet Union’s disappearance had left the United States as the sole superpower. Naturally, **there was never any doubt about what was to be the main economic thrust of the global empire ruled over by the United States. The** **1990s saw the strengthening of neoliberal globalization**: the removal of barriers to capital throughout the world in ways that directly enhanced the power of the rich capitalist countries of the center of the world economy vis-à-vis the poor countries of the periphery. **A key development was the introduction of the W**orld **T**rade **O**rganization **to accompany the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund as organizations enforcing the monopoly capitalist rules** of the game. From the standpoint of most of the world, **a more exploitative economic imperialism had raised its ugly head**. Yet for the powers that be at the center of the world economy **neoliberal globalization was regarded as a resounding success**—notwithstanding signs of global financial instability as revealed by the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98. U.S. ruling circles continued to debate, however, the manner and extent to which the United States should push its ultimate advantage—using its vast military power as a means of promoting U.S. global supremacy in the new “unipolar” world. If neoliberalism had arisen in response to economic stagnation, transferring the costs of economic crisis to the world’s poor, the problem of declining U.S. economic hegemony seemed to require an altogether different response: the reassertion of U.S. power as military colossus of the world system. Immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union the Defense Department under the administration of George H.W. Bush initiated a reconsideration of U.S. national security policy in light of the changing global situation. The report, completed in March 1992 and known as the *Defense Planning Guidance*, was written under the supervision of Paul Wolfowitz, then undersecretary of policy in the Defense Department. It indicated that the chief national-security goal of the United States must be one of “precluding the emergence of any potential global competitor” (*New York Times*, March 8, 1992). The ensuing debate within the U.S. establishment over the 1990s focused less on whether the United States was to seek global primacy than whether it should adopt a more multilateral (“sheriff and posse,” as Richard Haass dubbed it) or unilateral approach. Some of the dominant actors in what was to become the administration of George W. Bush, including Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz, were to organize the Project for the New American Century, which in anticipation of Bush winning the White House, issued, at then vice-presidential candidate Dick Cheney’s request, a foreign policy paper, entitled *Rebuilding America’s Defenses* (September 2000), reaffirming the unilateral and nakedly aggressive strategy of the *Defense Planning Guidance*of 1992. Following September 11, 2001, this approach became official U.S. policy in *The National Security Strategy of the United States* of 2002. The beating of the war drums for an invasion of Iraq coincided with the release of this new declaration on national security—effectively a declaration of a new world war. **It is common**, as we have noted, **for critics to attribute these dramatic changes simply to the seizure of the political and military command centers** of the U.S. state by a neoconservative cabal (brought into power by the disputed 2000 election), which, when combined with the added opportunity provided by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, led to a global imperial offensive and a new militarism. Yet, **the expansion of American empire**, in the wake of the Soviet Union’s demise was, as the foregoing argument has demonstrated, **already well advanced at that time and had been a bipartisan project from the start.** Under the Clinton administration the United States waged war in the Balkans, formerly part of the Soviet sphere in Eastern Europe, while also initiating the process of establishing U.S. military bases in Central Asia, formerly part of the Soviet Union itself. Iraq in the late 1990s was being bombed by the United States on a daily basis. When John Kerry as the Democratic presidential candidate in the 2004 election insisted that he would prosecute the war on Iraq and the war on terrorism if anything with greater determination and military resources—and that he differed only on the degree to which the United States adopted a lone vigilante as opposed to a sheriff and posse stance—he was merely continuing what had been the Democratic stance on empire throughout the 1990s and beyond: an all but naked imperialism. **From the longer view offered by a historical-materialist critique of capitalism, the direction that would be taken by U.S. imperialism following the fall of the Soviet Union was never in doubt. Capitalism by its very logic is a globally expansive system. The contradiction between its transnational economic aspirations and the fact that politically it remains rooted in particular nation states is insurmountable** for the system. Yet, **ill-fated attempts by individual states to overcome this contradiction are just as much a part of its fundamental logic**. In present world circumstances, when one capitalist state has a virtual monopoly of the means of destruction, the temptation for that state to attempt to seize full-spectrum dominance and to transform itself into the de facto global state governing the world economy is irresistible. As the noted Marxian philosopher István Mészáros observed in*Socialism or Barbarism?*(2001)—written, significantly, before George W. Bush became president: “[**W]hat is at stake** today **is** not the control of a particular part of the planet—no matter how large—putting at a disadvantage but still tolerating the independent actions of some rivals, but **the control of its totality by one hegemonic economic and military superpower, with all means—even the most extreme authoritarian and, if needed, violent military ones—at its disposal**.”

**Their focal point kills any chance at change—capital is transnational and imperialism is a byproduct—this ends any chance at a perm and makes the impacts worse by affirming institutions of global capital**

William I. **Robinson**, University of California, 20**07**. “Beyond the Theory of Imperialism: Global Capitalism and the Transnational State” Societies Without Borders, 2 (2007) 5-26 p. 9-16

**The hallmark of “new imperialism” theories is the assumption that world capitalism in the 21st century is made up of “domestic capitals” and distinct national economies** that interact with one another, and a concomitant “realist” analysis of world politics as driven by the pursuit by governments of their “national interest.” Gowan, for instance, in his oft -cited study The Global Gamble: Washington’s Bid for World Dominance,6 refers incessantly to an “American capitalism,” a “German capitalism,” an “Italian capitalism,” a “French capitalism,” and so on, each a discernible and discrete economic system featuring distinctly organized national capitalist classes involved in sets of national competitive relationships. In another leading treatise on the “new imperialism,” Empire of Capital, Ellen Meiksins Wood asserts that “the national organization of capitalist economies has remained stubbornly persistent.”7 **Are we to assume**, as Wood, Gowan, and others do, although they provide not a shred of empirical evidence, **that capital remains organized**, as it was in earlier moments of the world capitalist system, **along national lines** and that the development of capital has stopped frozen in its nation-state form? **The inter-state/nation-state framework obliges “new imperialism” scholars to advance this unproblematized notion of “national interests” to explain global political dynamics.** What does “national interests” mean? **Marxists have historically rejected notions of “national interests” as an ideological subterfuge for class** and social group interests. **What is a “national economy**”? Is it a country with a closed market? Protected territorially-based production circuits? The predominance of national capitals? An insulated national fi nancial system? **No capitalist country in the world fits this description. There is a mounting body of empirical evidence that demonstrates the transnationalization of capital.** This evidence strongly suggests that the giant conglomerates of the Fortune 500 ceased to be “US” corporations in the latter part of the 20th century and increasingly represented transnational capitalist groups.8 This reality of transnationalization can no longer be disputed, nor can its signifi cance for macro-social theories and for analysis of world political-economic dynamics. One need only glean daily headlines from the world media to discover endless reams of anecdotal evidence to complement the accumulation of systematic data on transnationalization. IBM’s chair and CEO, Samuel Palmisano, affi rms in a June 2006 article in the Financial Times of London, for instance, that use of the very word “multinational corporation” suggests “how antiquatedour thinking about it is.” He continues: The emerging business model of the 21st century is not, in fact ‘multinational’. This new kind of organization – at IBM we call it ‘the globally integrated enterprise’ – is very different in its structure and operations. . . . In the multinational model, companies built local production capacity within key markets, while performing other tasks on a global basis . . . American multi nationals such as General Motors, Ford and IBM built plants and established local workforce policies in Europe and Asia, but kept research and development and product design principally in the ‘home country’.9 The spread of multinationals in this way constituted internationalization, in contrast to more recent transnationalization: The globally integrated enterprise, in contrast, fashions its strategy, management and operations to integrate production – and deliver value to clients – worldwide. That has been made possible by shared technologies and shared business standards, built on top of a global information technology and communications infrastructure. . . . Today, innovation is inherently global.10 In turn, IBM is one of the largest investors in India, which has become a major platform for transnational service provision to the global economy. If the decentralization and dispersal around the world of manufacturing processes represented the leading edge of an earlier wave of globalization, the current wave involves the decentralization and global dispersal of such services as data processing, insurance claims, phone operators, call centers, soft ware production, marketing, journalism and publishing, advertising, and banking – which are now undertaken through complex webs of outsourcing, subcontracting and transnational alliances among fi rms. IBM went from 9,000 employees in India in 2004 to 43,000 (out of 329,000 worldwide) in 2006, and this does not include thousands of workers in local fi rms that have been subcontracted by IBM or by Indian IBM partner fi rms.11 Some of IBM’s growth in India has come from mergers between IBM and companies previously launched by Indian investors as outsourcing fi rms, such as Dagsh eSErvices of New Delhi, which went from 6,000 to 20,000 back-offi ce employees aft er its merger with IBM. In this way, and in countless other examples across the globe, national capitalist groups become swept up into global circuits of accumulation and into TCC formation. My global capitalism approach shares little or nothing with Karl Kautsky’s earlier “ultraimperialism” or “superimperialism” thesis. Kautsy, in his 1914 essay Ultra-Imperialism,12 assumed capital would remain national in its essence and suggested that national capitals would collude internationally instead of compete, whereas my theory on the TCC emphasizes that **conflict among capitals is endemic to the system but that such competition takes on new forms** in the age of globalization not necessarily expressed as national rivalry. The TCC thesis does not suggest there are no longer national and regional capitals, or that the TCC is internally unifi ed, free of confl ict, and consistently acts as a coherent political actor. Nonetheless, **the TCC has established itself as a class group without a national identity and in competition with nationally-based capitals. There is confl ict between national and transnational fractions of capital. Moreover, rivalry and competition are fi erce among transnational conglomerations that turn to numerous institutional channels**, including multiple national states, to pursue their interests. For instance, IBM and its local Indian shareholders and partners compete for service outsourcing contracts, explains Rai, with Cognizant Technology Solutions, a company based in Teaneck, New Jersey and of IBM’s chief rivals in the Indian subcontinent. The rivalry between IBM and Cognizant cannot be considered competition between national capitals of distinct countries and both groups turn to the US and the Indian state to seek advantage over competitors. Reifi cation and Theoreticism in “New Imperialism” Theories: The Antinomies of David Harvey Most “new imperialism” theorists acknowledge to varying degrees that changes have taken place, and particularly, that capital has become more global. Yet capital in these accounts has not transnationalized; it has “internationalized.” These accounts are concerned with explaining the international order, which by defi nition places the focus on inter-state dynamics exclusive of the trans-national. This need to accommodate the reality of transnationalizing capital within a nation-state centric framework for analyzing world political dynamics leads “new imperialism” theories to a dualism of the economic and the political. David Harvey, in perhaps the landmark treatise among this literature, **The New Imperialism**, argues that capital is economic and globalizes but states are political and pursue a self-interested territorial logic.13 Harvey’s **theory starts with the notion that the fundamental point is to see the territorial and the capitalist logic of power as distinct from each other**. . . . **The relation between these two logics should be seen, therefore, as problematic and oft en contradictory** . . . rather than as functional or one-sided. This dialectical relation sets the stage for an analysis of capitalist imperialism in terms of the intersection of these two distinctive but intertwined logics of power.14 Harvey’s is not, however, a dialectical but a mechanical approach. The diff erent dimensions of social reality in the dialectical approach do not have an “independent” status insofar as each aspect of reality is constituted by, and is constitutive of, a larger whole of which it is an internal element. Distinct dimensions of social reality may be analytically distinct yet are internally interpenetrated and mutually constitutive of each other as internal elements of a more encompassing process, so that, for example, **the economic/capital and the political/state are internal to capitalist relations. It is remarkable that Harvey proposes such a separation since the history of modern critical thought** – from Polanyi to Poulantzas and Gramsci, among others, not to mention 50 years of historical materialist theorizing on the state – **has demonstrated both the formal** (apparent) **separation of the economic and the political under the capitalist mode of production and the illusion that such a separation is organic** or real.15 This separation has its genealogy in the rise of the market and its apparently “pure” economic compulsion. **This separation appears in social thought with the breakup of political economy, the rise of classical economics and bourgeois social science, and disciplinary fragmentation**.16 Such a separation of the economic from the political was a hallmark of the structural functionalism that dominated much of mid-20th century social science. Structural functionalism separated distinct spheres of the social totality and conferred a functional autonomy to each subsphere which was seen as externally related to other subspheres in a way similar to Harvey’s notion of separate state and capital logics that may or may not coincide. Harvey off ers no explicit conception of the state but he acknowledges that state behavior has “depended on how the state has been constituted and by whom.”17 Yet **dual logics of state and capital ignore the real-world policymaking process in which the state extends backward, is grounded in the forces of civil society, and is fused in a myriad of ways with capital itself**. It is incumbent to ask in what ways transnational social forces may infl uence a reconstitution of state institutions. To the extent that civil society – social forces – and capital are transnationalizing our analysis of the state cannot remain frozen at a nation-state level. **The essential problematic that should concern us in attempting to explain phenomena associated with the “new imperialism” is the political management** – or rule – **of global capitalism. The theoretical gauntlet is how to understand the exercise of political domination in relation to the institutions available to dominant groups** and sets of changing historical relations among social forces – that is, how are the political and the economic articulated in the current era? This requires a conception of agency and institutions. But instead of off ering an ontology of agency and how it operates through historically constituted institutions, much of **the “new imperialism” literature reifi es these institutions. Institutions are but institutionalized** – that is, codifi ed – **patterns of interaction among social forces that structure diff erent aspects of their material relations. When we explain global dynamics in terms of institutions that have an existence or agency independent of social forces we are reifying these institutions**. Critical state theories and Gramscian IPE18 have taught us, despite their limitations, that the story starts – and ends – with historically situated social forces as collective agents. To critique a nation-state framework of analysis as I do, is not, as my critics claim19 to dismiss the nation-state but to dereify it. Reifying categories leads to realist analyses of state power and the inter-state system. **Realism presumes that the world economy is divided up into distinct national economies that interact with one another.** Each national economy is a billiard ball banging back and forth on each other. This billiard image is then applied to explain global political dynamics in terms of nation-states as discrete interacting units (the inter-state system). The state, says Harvey, in reverting to the realist approach, “struggles toassert its interests and achieve its goals in the world at large.”20 But Harvey does not stop with this reifi cation of the state. **He introduces an additional territorial reifi cation**, so that territorial relations become immanent to social relations. “The wealth and well-being of particular territories are augmented at the expense of others,” writes Harvey.21 This is a remarkably reifi ed image – “territories” rather than social groups have “wealth” (accumulated values) and enjoy “well being.” Harvey gives space in this way an independent existence as a social/political force in the form of territory in order to advance his thesis of the “new imperialism.” It is not how social forces are organized both in space and through institutions that is the focus. Rather, for Harvey, territory acquires a social existence of its own, an agentic logic. We are told that “territorial entities” engage in practices of production, commerce, and so on. Do “territorial entities” really do these things? Or is it not that in the real world, individuals and social groups engage in production, commerce, and so on? And they do so via institutions through which they organize, systematize, and demarcate their activities as agents. Social groups became aggregated and organized in the modern era through the particular institu tional form of the territorial-based nation state. But this particular institutional form does not acquire a life of its own and neither is it immutable. Nation-states continue to exist but their nature and meaning evolve as social relations and structures become transformed; particular, as they transnationalize. Drawing on insights from Lafebvre, Marx, Luxemburg, and others, Harvey earlier introduced the highly fertile notion of spatial (or spatial-temporal) fi xes to understand how capital momentarily resolves contradictions (particularly, crises of overaccumulation) in one place by displacing them to other places through geographic expansion and spatial reorganization. Following Marx’ famous observation that the expanded accumulation of capital involves the progressive “annihilation of space through time,” he also coined the term “time-space compression” in reference to globalization as a process involving a new burst of time-space compression in the world capitalist system.22 But “places” have no existence or meaning in and of themselves. It is people living in particular spaces that do this dis-placing (literally), these spatiotemporal fi xes. The “asymmetric exchange relations” that are at the heart of Harvey’s emphasis on the territorial basis of the “new imperialism” must be for Harvey territorial exchange relations. But not only that: they must be nation-state territorial exchanges. But exchange relations are social relations, exchanges among particular social groups. **There is** nothing in the concept of asymmetric exchanges that by fi at gives them a territorial expression; **no reason to assume that uneven exchanges are necessarily exchanges that take place between distinct territories, much less specifi cally between distinct nationstates.** That they do or do not acquire such an expression is one of historical, empirical, and conjunctural analysis. Certainly spatial relations among social forces have historically been mediated in large part by territory; spatial relations have been territorially-defi ned relations. But this **territorialization is in no way immanent to social relations and may well be fading in signifi cance** as globalization advances. Any theory of globalization must address the matter of place and space, including changing spatial relations among social forces and how social relations are spatialized. This has not been satisfactorily accomplished, despite a spate of theoretical proposition, ranging from Castell’s “space of fl ows” replacing the “space of place.”23 and Giddens “time-space distanciation” as the “lift ing” of social relations from territorial place and their stretching around the globe in ways that may eliminate territorial friction.24 This notion of ongoing and novel reconfi gurations of time and social space is central to a number of globalization theories. It in turn points to the larger theoretical issue of the relationship of social structure to space, the notion of space as the material basis for social practices, and the changing relationship under globalization between territoriality/geography, institutions, and social structures. The crucial question here is the ways in which globalization may be transforming the spatial dynamics of accumulation and the institutional arrangements through which it takes place. The subject – literally, that is, the agents/makers of the social world – is not global space but people in those spaces. What is central, therefore, is a spatial reconfi guration of social relations beyond a nation-state/inter-state framework, if not indeed even beyond territory. States are institutionalized social relations and territorial actors to the extent that those social relations are territorialized. **Nation-states are social relations that have historically been territorialized but those relations are not by defi nition territorial. To the extent that the US and other national states promote deterritorializing social and economic processes they are not territorial actors.** The US state can hardly be considered as acting territorially when it promotes the global relocation of accumulation processes that were previously concentrated in US territory**.** **Harvey’s approach is at odds to explain such behavior since by his defi nition the US state must promote its own territorial aggrandizement.** Harvey observes that as local banking was supplanted by national banking in the development of capitalism “the free fl ow of money capital across the national space altered regional dynamics.”25 In the same vein we can argue that the free fl ow of capital across global space alters these dynamics on a worldwide scale. Let us return to the question: why would Harvey propose separate logics for the economic and the political – for capital and the state? By separating the political and the economic he is able to claim that indeed globaliza - tion has transformed the spatial dynamics of accumulation – hence capital globalizes – but that the institutional arrangements of such global accumulation remain territorial as nation-states. The state has its own independent logic that brings it into an external relation to globalizing capital. Here we arrive at the pitfall of theoreticism. **If one starts with the theoretical assumption that the world is made up of independent, territorial-based nation states and that this particular institutional-political form is something immanent to the modern world** – Wood makes the assumption explicit, a law of capitalism; for Harvey it seems implicit – **then the changing world of the 21st century must be explained by theoretical fi at in these terms. Reality must be made to conform to the theoretical conception of an immutable nation-state based, inter-state political and institutional order.** But since Harvey acknowledges the reality of globalizing capital he is therefore forced to separate the logic of that globalizing capital from that of territorially-based states; he is forced either to abandon the theoretical construct altogether or to build it upon a dualism of the economic and the political, of capital and the state. **Theory needs to illuminate reality, not make reality conform to it.** The pitfall of this theoreticism is to develop analyses and propositions to fi t theoretical assumptions. Since received theories establish a frame of an inter-state system made up of competing national states, economies and capitals then 21st century reality must be interpreted so that it fi ts this frame one way or another. **Such theoreticism forces theorists of the “new imperialism” into a schizophrenic dualism of economic and political logics. In any event Harvey has trapped himself in a blind alley** that underscores the pitfall. Despite his acknowledgement of capital’s transnationalization he concludes that the US state’s political/territorial logic is driven now by an eff ort to open up space vis-à-vis competitor nation-states for unloading national capital surplus, hence the new US imperialism. This inconsistency in Harvey’s argumentation refl ects a general contradiction in the “new imperialism” literature: the dualism of the economic and political, of capital and the state, is negated by the claim that the US state functions to serve (US national) capital.

#### Migrant flows are fundamentally created and sustained by global displacement created by the neoliberal restructuring of Latin American countries—understanding this is key to bucking xenophobia

**Bacon 08**

[David, journalist, New Labor Forum, “The Political Economy of Migration”, 1.13.2008, p. online]

**In December 2005, Wisconsin Congressman James Sensenbrenner convinced his Republican colleagues** (and to their shame, 35 Democrats) **to pass one of the most repressive immigration proposals of the last hundred years. His bill**, HR 4437, **would have made federal felons of all 12 million undocumented immigrants in the U.S., criminalized teachers, nurses or priests who helped them, and built a 700-mile wall** on the U.S. Mexico border to keep people from crossing. Representative **Sensenbrenner is more than just a leader of Congressional xenophobes, however. His family is intimately involved in creating the conditions that cause migration, and then profits from the labor it makes available. In fact, the Sensenbrenner family connections are a microcosm of the political economy of migration itself**. James Sensenbrenner's grandfather started Kimberley Clark, one of the world's largest paper companies, and Sensenbrenner and the family trust remain important stockholders. The company's Mexican counterpart, Kimberley Clark de Mexico, is a close associate of the Mexican mining giant, Grupo Mexico. One of K-C's former executives, J. Eduardo Gonzalez, sits on its board. Grupo Mexico was a big winner in the neoliberal economic reforms that transformed the Mexican economy over the last twenty years. In the 1990s, the corporation became the owner of two of the world's largest copper mines, in Cananea and Nacozari, which were formerly nationally-owned enterprises. The mines lie just a few dozen miles south of the Arizona border. In 1998, Grupo Mexico provoked a strike in Cananea, over moves to reduce its workforce and labor costs. Close to a thousand miners lost their jobs. Many were blacklisted and left for "the other side." Then last year the mining giant prevailed on the Mexican government to depose the president of the country's miners union, Napoleon Gomez Urrutia. Gomez had accused the company of industrial homicide after the terrible Pasta de Conchos disaster, when 68 men died in a coalmine explosion. Grupo Mexico also didn't like his drive to raise mining wages beyond government-set limits. Miners in Cananea and Nacozari stopped work for months to force Gomez' reinstatement. Finally, last summer, the government gave Grupo Mexico the green light to fire all 2500 miners in Nacozari. Since there are no other jobs in tiny Sonoran mining towns the displaced families had to leave to survive. With the border just a few miles north, many sought their survival by crossing it. The profits of Grupo Mexico and its business partners went up as they destroyed unions, terminated thousands of workers, and forced their families into the migrant stream. During those very months **when workers began to go north, Sensenbrenner organized a series of rump Congressional hearings to defend his bill. He fulminated against undocumented immigrants, claiming they had no place in the United States and should leave.** No one asked the Congressman about those miners from Cananea and Nacozari, however. Where did he think they would go? **Other voices in Congress criticized the Representative, arguing that the labor of migrants was needed in the U.S. economy. Not even Sensenbrenner could deny this**. Some 16 million immigrants live in the U.S. with documents, and 12 million without them. **If they actually did go home, whole industries would collapse. Some of the country's largest corporations, completely dependent on the work of immigrants, would go bankrupt**. **One of these dependent corporations is Mr. Sensenbrenner's family business**. **Every year, Kimberley Clark, a large paper company, . converts tons of wood pulp into leading brands of toilet paper. Deep in U.S. forests thousands of immigrant workers plant and tend the trees that produce that pulp**.. **Every year, laborers from Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean are recruited for this job**. In towns like La Democracia, Guatemala, where the global fall in coffee prices has driven families to the edge of hunger, recruiters promise jobs paying more in an hour than a coffee farmer can make in a day. They offer to arrange visas to come to the U.S. as guest workers. For their services they charge thousands of dollars. Hungry families will mortgage homes and land, just to put one person on the airplane north. In the U.S., recruiters hand the workers over to labor contractors. They, in turn, work for land management companies, who tend the forests for their owners. The landowners grow the trees, and sell them to the paper companies. The debts of guest workers are so crushing that in 1998, 14 men drowned as the van carrying them to work careened off a bridge into the Alagash River in a Maine forest. They were speeding because it had rained the day before, keeping them from working. Carrying that load of debt, even one lost day puts a family in jeopardy. No one gets overtime, regardless of the law. Companies charge for everything from tools to food and housing. Guest workers are routinely cheated of much of their pay. If they protest, they're put on a blacklist and won't be hired the following year. Protesting wouldn't do much good anyway. The U.S. Department of Labor sees no problem with this abuse. It almost never decertifies a guest worker contractor, no matter how many complaints are filed against it. **The paper industry depends on this system. Twenty years ago, it stopped hiring unemployed workers domestically, and began recruiting guest workers**. **As a result, labor costs in the forests have remained flat, while paper profits have soared. Mr. Sensenbrenner's family business didn't invent this, but the low price of labor allows landowners to sell their trees for less. Kimberley Clark certainly profits from that**. Displaced People - an International Reserve Army of Labor In Latin America, **the neoliberal system displaces workers**, from miners to coffee pickers, **who join a huge flood moving north. When they arrive in the U.S., displaced workers become an indispensable part of the workforce, whether they are undocumented or laboring under work visas, in conditions of virtual servitude**. **The U.S. immigration debate needs a vocabulary that describes what happens to them before they cross borders - the factors that force them into motion**. **In this political debate, people like the miners or pine tree planters are called job seekers, rather than political refugees.** It would be more accurate to call them migrants, and the process migration. **The miner fired in Cananea or Nacozari is as much a victim of the denial of human and labor rights as he or she is a person needing to find a job in the U.S. to survive**. This year, teachers and farmers left Oaxaca, in southern Mexico, seeking a viable economic future, after they were beaten in the streets for protesting that their state's government can't and won't provide one. Oaxaca's poverty is worse than almost anywhere in Mexico, and last year teachers struck, and the capital erupted in a virtual insurrection because of it. An intransigent political elite, benefiting from the existing order, not only refused to consider any change, but tried to stop criticism with police attacks, arrests and even assassinations. **Are the fleeing Oaxacans job seekers or refugees? They're both, of course**. **But in the U.S.** and other wealthy countries, **economic rights are not considered human rights. In this official view, hunger doesn't create political refugees. In effect, the whole process that pushes people north is outside the parameters of political debate**. **The key part of that process is displacement, an unmentionable word in the Washington discourse. Not one immigration proposal** in Congress last year **tried to come to grips with those policies that uprooted miners, teachers, tree planters and farmers, in spite of the fact that Congress' members in many cases voted for them**. Whether acknowledged or not, **displacement has been indispensable to the growth of capitalism**. **As early as the 1700s, the English enclosure acts displaced home weavers** by fencing off the commons where they raised sheep for wool. **Hunger then drove weavers into the new textile mills, where they became some of the world's first wage workers**. **The textile mills produced the wealth of the first British capitalists. At the same time, displacement created the beginnings of the British working class**. **Not long after, Karl Marx called Africa "a warren for the hunting of black skins," describing the bloody displacement of communities by the slave traders**. **Uprooted African farmers were then transported to the Americas,** where they became an enslaved plantation workforce from Colombia and Brazil to the U.S. south. **Their labor created the wealth that made the growth of capitalism possible in the U.S. and much of Latin America and the Caribbean**. **Displacement and enslavement produced more than wealth. As slaveowners sought to differentiate slaves from free people, they created the first racial categories**. Society was divided into those with greater and fewer rights, using skin color and origin. When Mr. Sensenbrenner called modern migrants "illegals," he used a category inherited and developed from slavery. **Today displacement and inequality are just as deeply ingrained in capitalism today as they were during the slave trade and the enclosure acts of English in the 1700s when the system was born**. **In the global economy, people are displaced because the economies of their countries of origin are transformed. That transformation enables corporations and elites to transfer value, or wealth, out of those countries**. **After World War Two, the former colonies** of the U.S., Europe and Japan **sought to stop that export of wealth**. In countries like Iraq, Mexico and the Philippines, they embraced national economic development plans, which encouraged industries and enterprises producing for their own people. Creating stable jobs and income helped build a national market where workers and farmers could buy what was produced. Foreign investors were kept out, and important industries like oil were nationalized. **The economic reforms that followed the end of the cold war, imposed by rich countries and institutions like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, destroyed those systems of national development. It was a very brutal and chaotic process for those at the bottom of the income scale, but for those at the top, immensely profitable**. **Mexico created more billionaires during the 1990s than the United States, while at the same time the government documented an official poverty rate of 40%,** and an extreme poverty rate of 25%. **Mexican mines like Cananea and Nacozari, along with factories, railroads and other industrial enterprises were sold off to private investors.** New owners then increased profits by attacking unions and laying off thousands of workers. The oil industry, nationalized with the contributions of schoolchildren in the 1930s, no longer produced money for loans to small farmers or enterprises. Instead, in 1994 as the North American Free Trade Agreement went into effect, US President Bill Clinton demanded that Mexico use oil exports to pay off U.S. banks, who bailed out U.S. investors in Mexican government securities. **NAFTA rules required the Mexican government to dissolve the Conasupo stores**. **This government enterprise** bought corn from small farmers at subsidized prices to enable them to keep farming and stay on the land. Then the stores **sold tortillas made from the corn, along with milk and other farm products, to poor urban consumers at subsidized prices. NAFTA rules called this form of social welfare a barrier to the free market**. **Without price supports** or rural credit, **hundreds of thousands of small farmers found it impossible to sell corn or other farm products,** even for what it cost to produce them. **When NAFTA pulled down customs barriers, large U.S. corporations** (receiving U.S. subsidies) **dumped agricultural products** on the Mexican market at low prices. **Rural families went hungry when they couldn't find buyers for their crops**. One company, Gruma, monopolized tortilla production, while the largest retailer in Mexico became Wal-Mart. In February the price of tortillas doubled. A small group of investors in both countries got even richer. But **where did they expect the people displaced by this process to go**?

#### intersectionality link- the aff’s appeal to personal experience and portraying class as one of a laundry list of oppressions naturalizes inequality and precludes a universal starting point to challenge capitalism

Gimenez (Prof. Sociology at UC Boulder) 01 [Martha, “Marxism and Class; Gender and Race”, Race, Gender and Class, Vol. 8, p. online: http://www.colorado.edu/Sociology/gimenez/work/cgr.html]

There are many competing theories of race, gender, class, American society, political economy, power, etc. but no specific theory is invoked to define how the terms race, gender and class are used, or to identify how they are related to the rest of the social system. To some extent, race, gender and class and their intersections and interlockings have become a mantra to be invoked in any and all theoretical contexts, for a tacit agreement about their ubiquitousness and meaning seems to have developed among RGC studies advocates, so that all that remains to be dome is empirically to document their intersections everywhere, for everything that happens is, by definition, raced, classed, and gendered. This pragmatic acceptance of race, gender and class, as givens, results in the downplaying of theory, and the resort to experience as the source of knowledge. The emphasis on experience in the construction of knowledge is intended as a corrective to theories that, presumably, reflect only the experience of the powerful. RGC seems to offer a subjectivist understanding of theory as simply a reflection of the experience and consciousness of the individual theorist, rather than as a body of propositions which is collectively and systematically produced under historically specific conditions of possibility which grant them historical validity for as long as those conditions prevail. Instead, knowledge and theory are pragmatically conceived as the products or reflection of experience and, as such, unavoidably partial, so that greater accuracy and relative completeness can be approximated only through gathering the experiential accounts of all groups. Such is the importance given to the role of experience in the production of knowledge that in the eight page introduction to the first section of an RGC anthology, the word experience is repeated thirty six times (Andersen and Collins, 1995: 1-9).

I agree with the importance of learning from the experience of all groups, especially those who have been silenced by oppression and exclusion and by the effects of ideologies that mystify their actual conditions of existence. To learn how people describe their understanding of their lives is very illuminating, for "ideas are the conscious expression -- real or illusory -- of (our) actual relations and activities" (Marx, 1994: 111), because "social existence determines consciousness" (Marx, 1994: 211). Given that our existence is shaped by the capitalist mode of production, experience, to be fully understood in its broader social and political implications, has to be situated in the context of the capitalist forces and relations that produce it. Experience in itself, however, is suspect because, dialectically, it is a unity of opposites; it is, at the same time, unique, personal, insightful and revealing and, at the same time, thoroughly social, partial, mystifying, itself the product of historical forces about which individuals may know little or nothing about (for a critical assessment of experience as a source of knowledge see Sherry Gorelick, "Contradictions of feminist methodology," in Chow, Wilkinson, and Baca Zinn, 1996; applicable to the role of experience in contemporary RGC and feminist research is Jacoby's critique of the 1960s politics of subjectivity: Jacoby, 1973: 37- 49). Given the emancipatory goals of the RGC perspective, it is through the analytical tools of Marxist theory that it can move forward, beyond the impasse revealed by the constant reiteration of variations on the "interlocking" metaphor. This would require, however, a) a rethinking and modification of the postulated relationships between race, class and gender, and b) a reconsideration of the notion that, because everyone is located at the intersection of these structures, all social relations and interactions are "raced," "classed," and "gendered."

In the RGC perspective, race, gender and class are presented as equivalent systems of oppression with extremely negative consequences for the oppressed. It is also asserted that the theorization of the connections between these systems require "a working hypothesis of equivalency" (Collins, 1997:74). Whether or not it is possible to view class as just another system of oppression depends on the theoretical framework within class is defined. If defined within the traditional sociology of stratification perspective, in terms of a gradation perspective, class refers simply to strata or population aggregates ranked on the basis of standard SES indicators (income, occupation, and education) (for an excellent discussion of the difference between gradational and relational concepts of class, see Ossowski, 1963). Class in this non-relational, descriptive sense has no claims to being more fundamental than gender or racial oppression; it simply refers to the set of individual attributes that place individuals within an aggregate or strata arbitrarily defined by the researcher (i.e., depending on their data and research purposes, anywhere from three or four to twelve "classes" can be identified).

From the standpoint of Marxist theory, however, class is qualitatively different **from gender and race** and cannot be considered just another system of oppression**. As Eagleton points out,** whereas racism and sexism are unremittingly bad, class is not entirely a "bad thing" **even** though socialists would like to abolish it. The bourgeoisie in its revolutionary stage was instrumental in ushering a new era in historical development, one which liberated the average person from the oppressions of feudalism and put forth the ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity. Today, however, it has an unquestionably negative role to play as it expands and deepens the rule of capital over the entire globe. The working class, on the other hand, is pivotally located to wage the final struggle against capital and, consequently, it is "an excellent thing" (Eagleton, 1996: 57). While racism and sexism have no redeeming feature, class relations are, dialectically, a unity of opposites; both a site of exploitation and, objectively, a site where the potential agents of social change are forged. To argue that the working class is the fundamental agent of change does not entail the notion that it is the only agent of change. The working class is of course composed of women and men who belong to different races, ethnicities, national origins, cultures, and so forth, so that gender and racial/ethnic struggles have the potential of fueling class struggles because, given the patterns of wealth ownership and income distribution in this and all capitalist countries, those who raise the banners of gender and racial struggles are overwhelmingly propertyless workers, technically members of the working class, people who need to work for economic survival whether it is for a wage or a salary, for whom racism, sexism and class exploitation matter. But this vision of a mobilized working class where gender and racial struggles are not subsumed but are nevertheless related requires a class conscious effort to link RGC studies to the Marxist analysis of historical change. In so far as the "class" in RGC remains a neutral concept, open to any and all theoretical meanings, just one oppression among others, intersectionality will not realize its revolutionary potential.

Nevertheless, I want to argue against the notion that class should be considered equivalent to gender and race. I find the grounds for my argument not only on the crucial role class struggles play in processes of epochal change but also in the very assumptions of RGC studies and the ethnomethodological insights put forth by West and Fenstermaker (1994). The assumption of the simultaneity of experience (i.e., all interactions are raced, classed, gendered) together with the ambiguity inherent in the interactions themselves, so that while one person might think he or she is "doing gender," another might interpret those "doings" in terms of "doing class," highlight the basic issue that Collins accurately identifies when she argues that ethnomethodology ignores power relations. Power relations underlie all processes of social interaction and this is why social facts are constraining upon people. But the pervasiveness of power ought not to obfuscate the fact that some power relations are more important and consequential than others. For example, the power that physical attractiveness might confer a woman in her interactions with her less attractive female supervisor or employer does not match the economic power of the latter over the former. In my view, the flattening or erasure of the qualitative difference between class, race and gender in the RGC perspective is the foundation for the recognition that it is important to deal with "basic relations of domination and subordination" which now appear disembodied, outside class relations. In the effort to reject "class reductionism," by postulating the equivalence between class and other forms of oppression, the RGC perspective both negates the fundamental importance of class but it is forced to acknowledge its importance by postulating some other "basic" structures of domination. Class relations -- whether we are referring to the relations between capitalist and wage workers, or to the relations between workers (salaried and waged) and their managers and supervisors, those who are placed in "contradictory class locations," (Wright, 1978) -- are of paramount importance, for most people's economic survival is determined by them. Those in dominant class positions do exert power over their employees and subordinates and a crucial way in which that power is used is through their choosing the identity they impute their workers. Whatever identity workers might claim or "do," employers can, in turn, disregard their claims and "read" their "doings" differently as "raced" or "gendered" or both, rather than as "classed," thus downplaying their class location and the class nature of their grievances. To argue, then, that class is fundamental is not to "reduce" gender or racial oppression to class, but to acknowledge that the underlying basic and "nameless" power at the root of what happens in social interactions grounded in "intersectionality" is class power.

#### liberal inclusion link- their reliance on [gender/race/sexuality] as the site of political contestation is not an accidental instance of ignoring class. The demand arises out of the crisis of liberalism—such politics particularizes the oppressions of capitalism to the point that the universal system is naturalized. Attaining white, male bourgeoisse privilege becomes the bench-mark of success, re-entrenching the foundation of the system

Wendy Brown, Professor & genuis, “Wounded Attachments,” POLITICAL THEORY, August 1993, ASP.

Although this détente between universal and particular within liberalism is potted with volatile conceits, it is rather thoroughly unraveled by two features of late modernity, spurred by developments in what Marx and Foucault, respectively, reveal as liberalism's companion powers: capitalism and disciplinarity. On one side, the state loses even its guise of universality as it becomes ever more transparently invested in particular economic interests, political ends, and social formations. This occurs as it shifts from a relatively minimalist "night watchman" state to a heavily bureaucratized, managerial, fiscally complex, and highly interventionist welfare-warfare state, a transmogrification occasioned by the combined imperatives of capital and the autoproliferating characteristics of bureaucracy.6 On the other side, a range of economic and political forces increasingly disinter the liberal subject from substantive nation-state identification: deterritorializing demo- graphic flows; disintegration from within and invasion from without of family and community as (relatively) autonomous sites of social production and identification; consumer capitalism's marketing discourse in which individual (and subindividual) desires are produced, commodified, and mo- bilized as identities; and disciplinary productions of a fantastic array of behavior-based identities ranging from recovering alcoholic professionals to unrepentant crack mothers. These disciplinary productions work to conjure and regulate subjects through classificatory schemes, naming and normaliz- ing social behaviors as social positions. Operating through what Foucault calls "an anatomy of detail," "disciplinary power" produces social identifies (available for politicization because they are deployed for purposes of political regulation) that crosscut juridical identities based on abstract right. Thus, for example, the welfare state's production of welfare subjects-themselves subdi- vided through the socially regulated categories of motherhood, disability, race, age, and so forth-potentially produce political identity through these categories, produce identities as these categories. In this story, the always imminent but increasingly politically manifest failure of liberal universalism to be universal-the transparent fiction of state universality-combines with the increasing individuation of social subjects through capitalist disinternments and disciplinary productions. Together, they breed the emergence of politicized identity rooted in disciplinary pro- ductions but oriented by liberal discourse toward protest against exclusion from a discursive formation of universal justice. This production, however, is not linear or even but highly contradictory: although the terms of liberalism are part of the ground of production of a politicized identity that reiterates yet exceeds these terms, liberal discourse itself also continuously recolonizes political identity as political interest-a conversion that recasts politicized identity's substantive and often deconstructive cultural claims and critiques as generic claims of particularism endemic to universalist political culture. Similarly, disciplinary power manages liberalism's production of politicized subjectivity by neutralizing (re-depoliticizing) identity through normalizing practices. As liberal discourse converts political identity into essentialized private interest, disciplinary power converts interest into normativized social identity manageable by regulatory regimes. Thus disciplinary power politi- cally neutralizes entitlement claims generated by liberal individuation, whereas liberalism politically neutralizes rights claims generated by disciplinary identities. In addition to the formations of identity that may be the complex effects of disciplinary and liberal modalities of power, I want to suggest one other historical strand relevant to the production of politicized identity, this one hewn more specifically to recent developments in political culture. Although sanguine to varying degrees about the phenomenon they are describing, many on the European and North American Left have argued that identity politics emerges from the demise of class politics consequent to post-Fordism or pursuant to May 1968. Without adjudicating the precise relationship between the breakup of class politics and the proliferation of other sites of political identification, I want to refigure this claim by suggesting that what we have come to call identity politics is partly dependent on the demise of a critique of capitalism and of bourgeois cultural and economic values. In a reading that links the new identity claims to a certain relegitimation of capitalism, identity politics concerned with race, sexuality, and gender will appear not as a supplement to class politics, not as an expansion of Left categories of oppression and emancipation, not as an enriching complexification of pro- gressive formulations of power and persons-all of which they also are-but as tethered to a formulation of justice which, ironically, reinscribes a bour- geois ideal as its measure.

If it is this ideal that signifies educational and vocational opportunity, upward mobility, relative protection against arbitrary violence, and reward in proportion to effort, and if it is this ideal against which many of the exclusions and privations of people of color, gays and lesbians, and women are articulated, then the political purchase of contemporary American identity politics would seem to be achieved in part through a certain discursive renaturalization of capitalism that can be said to have marked progressive discourse since the 1970s. What this suggests is that identity politics may be partly configured by a peculiarly shaped and peculiarly disguised form of resentment-class resent- ment without class consciousness or class analysis. This resentment is displaced onto discourses of injustice other than class but, like all resent- ments, retains the real or imagined holdings of its reviled subject-in this case, bourgeois male privileges-as objects of desire. From this perspective, it would appear that the articulation of politicized identities through race, gender, and sexuality require, rather than incidentally produce, a relatively limited identification through class. They necessarily rather than incidentally abjure a critique of class power and class norms precisely because the injuries suffered by these identities are measured by bourgeois norms of social acceptance, legal protection, relative material comfort, and social indepen- dence. The problem is that when not only economic stratification but other injuries to body and psyche enacted by capitalism (alienation, cornmodifica- tion, exploitation, displacement, disintegration of sustaining, albeit contra- dictory, social forms such as families and neighborhoods) are discursively normalized and thus depoliticized, other markers of social difference may come to bear an inordinate weight. Absent an articulation of capitalism in the political discourse of identity, the marked identity bears all the weight of the sufferings produced by capitalism in addition to that bound to the explicitly politicized marking.

#### The material determinism of capital is responsible for the instrumentalization of all life—makes all oppression inevitable and causes extinction

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**For capitalism, the use of machines as organs of “will over nature” is an imperative**. The great insight of the Frankfurt School—an insight subsequently improved and amplified by feminists and ecologists—was that capital’s dual project of dominating both humanity and nature was intimately tied to the cultivation of “instrumental reason” that systematically objectifies, reduces, quantifies and fragments the world for the purposes of technological control. Business’s systemic need to cheapen labor, cut the costs of raw materials, and expand consumer markets gives it an inherent bias toward the piling-up of technological power. This priority—enshrined in phrases such as “progress,” “efficiency,” “productivity,” “modernization,” and “growth”—assumes an automatism that is used to override any objection or alternative, regardless of the environmental and social consequences. Today, we witness global vistas of toxification, deforestation, desertification, dying oceans, disappearing ozone layers, and disintegrating immune systems, all interacting in ways that perhaps threaten the very existence of humanity and are undeniably inflicting social collapse, disease, and immiseration across the planet. The degree to which this project of mastery has backfired is all too obvious.

#### Vote Negative to validate and adopt the method of structural/historical criticism that is the 1NC.

#### one must understand the existing social totality before one can act on it—grounding the sites of political contestation or knowledge outside of labor and surplus value merely serve to humynize capital and prevent a transition to a society beyond oppression

**Tumino** (Prof. English @ Pitt) **01**

[Stephen, “What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever”, Red Critique]

Any effective political theory will have to do at least two things: it will have to offer an integrated understanding of social practices and, based on such an interrelated knowledge, offer a guideline for praxis. My main argument here is that among all contesting social theories now, only Orthodox Marxism has been able to produce an integrated knowledge of the existing social totality and provide lines of praxis that will lead to building a society free from necessity. But first I must clarify what I mean by Orthodox Marxism. Like all other modes and forms of political theory, the very theoretical identity of Orthodox Marxism is itself contested—not just from non-and anti-Marxists who question the very "real" (by which they mean the "practical" as under free-market criteria) existence of any kind of Marxism now but, perhaps more tellingly, from within the Marxist tradition itself. I will, therefore, first say what I regard to be the distinguishing marks of Orthodox Marxism and then outline a short polemical map of contestation over Orthodox Marxism within the Marxist theories now. I will end by arguing for its effectivity in bringing about a new society based not on human rights but on freedom from necessity. I will argue that to know contemporary society—and to be able to act on such knowledge—one has to first of all know what makes the existing social totality. I will argue that the dominant social totality is based on inequality—not just inequality of power but inequality of economic access (which then determines access to health care, education, housing, diet, transportation, . . . ). This systematic inequality cannot be explained by gender, race, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, or nationality. These are all secondary contradictions and are all determined by the fundamental contradiction of capitalism which is inscribed in the relation of capital and labor. All modes of Marxism now explain social inequalities primarily on the basis of these secondary contradictions and in doing so—and this is my main argument—legitimate capitalism. Why? Because such arguments authorize capitalism without gender, race, discrimination and thus accept economic inequality as an integral part of human societies. They accept a sunny capitalism—a capitalism beyond capitalism. Such a society, based on cultural equality but economic inequality, has always been the not-so-hidden agenda of the bourgeois left—whether it has been called "new left," "postmarxism," or "radical democracy." This is, by the way, the main reason for its popularity in the culture industry—from the academy (Jameson, Harvey, Haraway, Butler,. . . ) to daily politics (Michael Harrington, Ralph Nader, Jesse Jackson,. . . ) to. . . . For all, capitalism is here to stay and the best that can be done is to make its cruelties more tolerable, more humane. This humanization (not eradication) of capitalism is the sole goal of ALL contemporary lefts (marxism, feminism, anti-racism, queeries, . . . ). Such an understanding of social inequality is based on the fundamental understanding that the source of wealth is human knowledge and not human labor. That is, wealth is produced by the human mind and is thus free from the actual objective conditions that shape the historical relations of labor and capital. Only Orthodox Marxism recognizes the historicity of labor and its primacy as the source of all human wealth. In this paper I argue that any emancipatory theory has to be founded on recognition of the priority of Marx's labor theory of value and not repeat the technological determinism of corporate theory ("knowledge work") that masquerades as social theory.

#### \*\*the alt solves- relentless criticism informed by praxis can trigger rapid cascades rupturing the system

Joel **Kovel**, Alger Hiss Professor, Social Studies, Bard College, THE ENEMY OF NATURE: THE END OF CAPITALISM OR THE END OF THE WORLD, 20**02**, p. 224.

Relentless criticism can delegitimate the system and release people into struggle. And as struggle develops, victories that are no more than in­cremental by their own terms — stopping a meeting of the IMF, the hopes stirred forth by a campaign such as Ralph Nader’s in 2000 — can have a symbolic effect far greater than their external result, and constitute points of rupture with capital. This rupture is not a set of facts added to our knowledge of the world, but a change in our relation to the world. Its effects are dynamic, not incremental, and like all genuine insights it changes the balance of forces and can propagate very swiftly Thus the release from inertia can trigger a rapid cascade of changes, so that it could be said that the forces pressing towards radical change need not be linear and incre­mental, but can be exponential in character. In this way, conscientious and radical criticism of the given, even in advance of having blueprints for an alternative, can be a material force, because it can seize the mind of the masses of people. There is no greater responsibility for intellectuals.

### 2

#### A. Interpretation: the affirmative must defend the hypothetical enactment of a topical plan by the United States federal government.

#### The United States federal government is the actor defined by the resolution, not individual debaters

**US Gov** Official Website 20**09**

http://www.usa.gov/Agencies/federal.shtml

U.S. Federal Government **The three branches of U.S. government—legislative, judicial, and executive—carry out governmental power and functions.** View a complete diagram (.PDF) of the U.S. government's branches.

#### “Resolved” expresses intent to implement the plan

**Merriam-Webster Dictionary** 19**96** [http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=resolved, downloaded 07/20/03]

“6. **To change or convert by resolution or formal vote**; -- **used only reflexively; as, the house resolved itself into a committee of the whole**.”

#### “Should” denotes an expectation of enacting a plan

**American Heritage Dictionary 2K**

[www.dictionary.com]

3 **Used to express** probability or **expectation**

#### B. Violation—the affirmative does not defend the implementation of a topical plan.

#### C. Vote negative

#### 1. Limits—their interpretation kills limits because it creates a strategic incentive to disregard the resolution. If teams can get away with being non-topical, there’s no reason to defend the resolution. Limits are good:

#### A. Deliberation—having a limited topic with equitable ground is necessary to foster decision-making and clash

**Steinberg & Freeley 8** \*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp 45-

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007. Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### B. Creativity—thinking “inside the box” forces teams to be creative about their positions and come up with innovative solutions. Absent constraints, debate becomes boring and stale—we link turn all of their offense.

**Intrator 10** (Intrator, David, President of The Creative Organization and musical composer, October 22, 2010, “Thinking Inside The Box: A Professional Creative Dispels A Popular Myth”, Training, http://www.trainingmag.com/article/thinking-inside-box) FS

**One of the most pernicious myths about creativity, one that seriously inhibits creative thinking and innovation, is the belief that one needs to “think outside the box.”** As someone who has worked for decades as a professional creative, **nothing could be further from the truth. This** a **is** view **shared by the vast majority of creatives, expressed** famously **by** the **modernist designer Charles Eames when he wrote, “Design depends largely upon constraints.”** The myth of thinking outside the box stems from a fundamental misconception of what creativity is, and what it’s not. In the popular imagination, creativity is **something weird and wacky.** The creative process is magical, or divinely inspired. But, in fact, **creativity is** not about divine inspiration or magic. It’s **about problem-solving, and by definition a problem is a constraint**, a limit, a box. One of the best illustrations of this is the work of **photographers**. They **create by excluding the great mass what’s before them**, choosing a small frame in which to work. Within that tiny frame, literally a box, they uncover relationships and establish priorities. What makes creative problem-solving uniquely challenging is that you, as the creator, are the one defining the problem**.** You’re the one choosing the frame. And **you alone determine what’s an effective solution**. **This can be quite demanding,** both intellectually and emotionally. Intellectually, you are required to establish limits, set priorities, and cull patterns and relationships from a great deal of material, much of it fragmentary. More often than not, this is the material you generated during brainstorming sessions. At the end of these sessions, you’re usually left with a big mess of ideas, half-ideas, vague notions, and the like. Now, chances are you’ve had a great time making your mess. You might have gone off-site, enjoyed a “brainstorming camp,” played a number of warm-up games. You feel artistic and empowered. **But to be truly** creative, you have to clean up your mess, organizing those fragments into something real, something useful, something that actually works. That’s the hard part. It takes a lot of energy, time, and willpower to make sense of the mess you’ve just generated. It also can be emotionally difficult. **You’ll need to throw out many ideas you originally thought were great, ideas you’ve become attached to, because they simply don’t fit into the rules you’re creating as you build your box.** You can always change the rules, but that also comes with an emotional price. Unlike many other kinds of problems, with creative problems there is no external authority to which you can appeal to determine whether you’re on the right track, whether one set of rules should have priority over another, or whether one box is better than another. There is no correct answer. Better said: There might be a number of correct answers. Or none at all. The responsibility of deciding the right path to take is entirely upon you. That’s a lot of responsibility, and it can be paralyzing. So it’s no wonder that the creative process often stalls after the brainstorming in many organizations. Whereas generating ideas is open-ended, and, in a sense, infinitely hopeful, having to pare those ideas down is restrictive, tedious, and, at times, scary. The good news, however, is that understanding the creative process as problem-solving is ultimately liberating. For one, all of those left-brainers with well-honed rational skills will find themselves far more creative than they ever thought. They’ll discover their talents for organization, abstraction, and clarity are very much what’s required to be a true creative thinker. **Viewing creativity as problem-solving also makes the whole process far less intimidating**, even though it might lose some of its glamour and mystery. Moreover, **since creative problems are open to rational analysis, they can be broken down into smaller components that are easier to address.** Best of all, **the very act of problem-solving, of organizing and trying making sense of things, helps generate new ideas.** Paradoxically, thinking within a box may be one of the most effective brainstorming techniques **there** is. That may be what Charles Eames meant when he added, “I welcome constraints.” Without some sort of structure to your creative thinking, you’re just flailing about. For a while you might feel like you’re making progress, generating a great mess of ideas that might hold some potential. But to turn those ideas into something truly innovative, your best bet is to build your box and play by the rules of your own creation.

#### 2. Switch-Side Debate—their interpretation allows teams to only debate one side of an issue. Switch-side debate is good:

#### A. Critical thinking—switching sides forces debaters to assess all possible outcomes of a policy and sharpens their analysis of complex situations

**Harrigan 8** NDT champion, debate coach at UGA (Casey, thesis submitted to Wake Forest Graduate Faculty for Master of Arts in Communication, “A defense of switch side debate”, http://dspace.zsr.wfu.edu/jspui/bitstream/10339/207/1/harrigancd052008, p. 57-59)

Along these lines, the greatest benefit of switching sides, which goes to the heart of contemporary debate, is its inducement of critical thinking. Defined as “reasonable reflective thinking that is focused on deciding what to believe or do” (Ennis, 1987, p. 10), critical thinking learned through debate teaches students not just how advocate and argue, but how to decide as well. Each and every student, whether in debate or (more likely) at some later point in life, will be placed in the position of the decision-maker. Faced with competing options whose costs and benefits are initially unclear, critical thinking is necessary to assess all the possible outcomes of each choice, compare their relative merits, and arrive at some final decision about which is preferable. In some instances, such as choosing whether to eat Chinese or Indian food for dinner, the importance of making the correct decision is minor. For many other decisions, however, the implications of choosing an imprudent course of action are potentially grave. As Robert Crawford notes, there are “issues of unsurpassed importance in the daily lives of millions upon millions of people…being decided to a considerable extent by the power of public speaking” (2003). Although the days of the Cold War are over, and the risk that “the next Pearl Harbor could be ‘compounded by hydrogen’” (Ehninger and Brockriede, 1978, p. 3) is greatly reduced, the manipulation of public support before the invasion of Iraq in 2003 points to the continuing necessity of training a well-informed and critically-aware public (Zarefsky, 2007).In the absence of debate-trained critical thinking, ignorant but ambitious politicians and persuasive but nefarious leaders would be much more likely to draw the country, and possibly the world, into conflicts with incalculable losses in terms of human well-being. Given the myriad threats of global proportions that will require incisive solutions, including global warming, the spread of pandemic diseases, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cultivating a robust and effective society of critical decision-makers is essential. As Louis Rene Beres writes, “with such learning, we Americans could prepare…not as immobilized objects of false contentment, but as authentic citizens of an endangered planet” (2003). Thus, it is not surprising that critical thinking has been called “the highest educational goal of the activity” (Parcher, 1998). While arguing from conviction can foster limited critical thinking skills, the element of switching sides is necessary to sharpen debate’s critical edge and ensure that decisions are made in a reasoned manner instead of being driven by ideology. Debaters trained in SSD are more likely to evaluate both sides of an argument before arriving at a conclusion and are less likely to dismiss potential arguments based on his or her prior beliefs (Muir 1993). In addition, debating both sides teaches “conceptual flexibility,” where decision-makers are more likely to reflect upon the beliefs that are held before coming to a final opinion (Muir, 1993, p. 290). Exposed to many arguments on each side of an issue, debaters learn that public policy is characterized by extraordinary complexity that requires careful consideration before action. Finally, these arguments are confirmed by the preponderance of empirical research demonstrating a link between competitive SSD and critical thinking (Allen, Berkowitz)

#### B. Tolerance—switching sides makes debaters more tolerant of arguments and ideas that are the opposite of their own—their one-sided approach promotes dogmatism

**Muir 93** (Star, Professor of Communication – George Mason U., “A Defense of the Ethics of Contemporary Debate”, Philosophy & Rhetoric, Vol. 26, No. 4, p. 288-289)

The role of **switch-side debate is especially important in the** oral **defense of arguments that foster tolerance** without accruing the moral complications of acting on such beliefs. **The forum is** therefore **unique in providing debaters with** attitudes of **tolerance** without committing them to active moral irresponsibility. As Freeley notes, **debaters are** indeed **exposed to a multivalued world**, both within and between the sides of a given topic. Yet this exposure hardly commits them to such "mistaken" values. In this view, **the divorce of the game from the "real world" can be** seen as **a means of gaining perspective** without obligating students to validate their hypothetical value structure through immoral actions.'s Values clarification, Stewart is correct in pointing out, does not mean that no values are developed. Two very important values— **tolerance and fairness—inhere to a significant degree in the ethics of switch-side debate**. A second point about the charge of relativism is that tolerance is related to the development of reasoned moral viewpoints. **The willingness to recognize** the existence of **other views, and to grant alternative positions** a degree of **credibility, is** a value **fostered by** switch-side debate: Alternately **debating both sides** of the same question . . . **inculcates a deep-seated** attitude of **tolerance** toward differing points of view. **To** be forced to **debate only one side leads to an ego-identification with that side**. , . . The other side in contrast is seen only as something to be discredited. Arguing as persuasively as one can for completely opposing views is one way of giving recognition to the idea that a strong case can generally be made for the views of earnest and intelligent men, however such views may clash with one's own. . . .**Promoting** this kind of **tolerance is** perhaps **one of the greatest benefits debating both sides has to offer**. 5' The activity should encourage debating both sides of a topic, reasons Thompson, because debaters are "more likely to realize that propositions are bilateral. It **is those who fail to recognize this** fact who **become intolerant, dogmatic, and bigoted**.""\* While Theodore Roosevelt can hardly be said to be advocating bigotry, his efforts to turn out advocates convinced of their rightness is not a position imbued with tolerance.

#### C. Activism—only switching sides teaches students to anticipate counter-arguments and build coalitions effectively, which is necessary for sustained activism

**Harrigan 8** - Casey Harrigan, Associate Director of Debate at UGA, Master’s in Communications, Wake Forest U., 2008, “A Defense of Switch Side Debate”, Master’s thesis at Wake Forest, Department of Communication, May, pp.49-50

Third, there is an important question of means. Even the best activist intentions have little practical utility as long as they remain purely cordoned off in the realm of theoretical abstractions. Creating programs of action that seek to produce material changes in the quality of life for suffering people, not mere wishful thinking in the ivory towers of academia, should be the goal of any revolutionary project. Frequently, for strategies for change, the devil lies in the details. It is not possible to simply click one’s ruby red slippers together and wish for alternatives to come into being. Lacking a plausible mechanism to enact reforms, many have criticized critical theory as being a “fatally flawed enterprise” (Jones 1999). For activists, learning the skills to successfully negotiate hazardous political terrain is crucial. They must know when to and when not to compromise, negotiate, and strike political alliances in order to be successful. The pure number of failed movements in the past several decades demonstrates the severity of the risk assumed by groups who do not focus on refining their preferred means of change. Given the importance of strategies for change, SSD is even more crucial. Debaters trained by debating both sides are substantially more likely to be effective advocates than those experienced only in arguing on behalf of their own convictions. For several reasons, SSD instills a series of practices that are essential for a successful activist agenda. First, SSD creates more knowledgeable advocates for public policy issues. As part of the process of learning to argue both sides, debaters are forced to understand the intricacies of multiple sides of the argument considered. Debaters must not only know how to research and speak on behalf of their own personal convictions, but also for the opposite side in order to defend against attacks of that position. Thus, when placed in the position of being required to publicly defend an argument, students trained via SSD are more likely to be able to present and persuasively defend their positions. Second, learning the nuances of all sides of a position greatly strengthens the resulting convictions of debaters, their ability to anticipate opposing arguments, and the effectiveness of their attempts to locate the crux, nexus and loci of arguments. As is noted earlier, conviction is a result, not a prerequisite of debate. Switching sides and experimenting with possible arguments for and against controversial issues, in the end, makes students more likely to ground their beliefs in a reasoned form of critical thinking that is durable and unsusceptible to knee-jerk criticisms. As a result, even though it may appear to be inconsistent with advocacy, SSD “actually created stronger advocates” that are more likely to be successful in achieving their goals (Dybvig and Iverson 2000). Proponents of abandoning SSD and returning to debating from conviction should take note. Undoubtedly, many of their ideas would be beneficial if enacted and deserve the support of activist energies. However, anti-SSD critics seem to have given little thought to the important question of how to translate good ideas into practice. By teaching students to privilege their own personal beliefs prior to a thorough engagement with all sides of an issue, debating from conviction produces activists that are more likely to be politically impotent. By positing that debaters should bring prior beliefs to the table in a rigid manner and assuming that compromising is tantamount to giving in to cooptation, the case of debating from conviction undercuts the tactics necessary for forging effective coalitional politics. Without such broad-based alliances, sustainable political changes will likely be impossible (Best & Kellner 2001).

#### 3. Topic Education—their interpretation diverts focus away from the topic. Topic education is good:

#### A. Policy relevance—learning about how theory relates to policy and discussing implementation is crucial to influence real policymakers—without tying advocacy to policy, debate becomes irrelevant

**Nye 09** - Joseph Nye, professor at Harvard University and former dean of the Harvard Kennedy School, 4-13-2009, Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/12/AR2009041202260\_pf.html 4-13-09

President Obama has appointed some distinguished academic economists and lawyers to his administration, but few high-ranking political scientists have been named. In fact, the editors of a recent poll of more than 2,700 international relations experts declared that "the walls surrounding the ivory tower have never seemed so high." While important American scholars such as Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski took high-level foreign policy positions in the past, that path has tended to be a one-way street. Not many top-ranked scholars of international relations are going into government, and even fewer return to contribute to academic theory. The 2008 Teaching, Research and International Policy (TRIP) poll, by the Institute for Theory and Practice in International Relations, showed that of the 25 scholars rated as producing the most interesting scholarship during the past five years, only three had ever held policy positions (two in the U.S. government and one in the United Nations). The fault for this growing gap lies not with the government but with the academics. Scholars are paying less attention to questions about how their work relates to the policy world, and in many departments a focus on policy can hurt one's career. Advancement comes faster for those who develop mathematical models, new methodologies or theories expressed in jargon that is unintelligible to policymakers. A survey of articles published over the lifetime of the American Political Science Review found that about one in five dealt with policy prescription or criticism in the first half of the century, while only a handful did so after 1967. Editor Lee Sigelman observed in the journal's centennial issue that "if 'speaking truth to power' and contributing directly to public dialogue about the merits and demerits of various courses of action were still numbered among the functions of the profession, one would not have known it from leafing through its leading journal." As citizens, academics might be considered to have an obligation to help improve on policy ideas when they can. Moreover, such engagement can enhance and enrich academic work, and thus the ability of academics to teach the next generation. As former undersecretary of state David Newsom argued a decade ago, "the growing withdrawal of university scholars behind curtains of theory and modeling would not have wider significance if this trend did not raise questions regarding the preparation of new generations and the future influence of the academic community on public and official perceptions of international issues and events. Teachers plant seeds that shape the thinking of each new generation; this is probably the academic world's most lasting contribution." Yet too often scholars teach theory and methods that are relevant to other academics but not to the majority of the students sitting in the classroom before them. Some academics say that while the growing gap between theory and policy may have costs for policy, it has produced better social science theory, and that this is more important than whether such scholarship is relevant. Also, to some extent, the gap is an inevitable result of the growth and specialization of knowledge. Few people can keep up with their subfields, much less all of social science. But the danger is that academic theorizing will say more and more about less and less. Even when academics supplement their usual trickle-down approach to policy by writing in journals, newspapers or blogs, or by consulting for candidates or public officials, they face many competitors for attention. More than 1,200 think tanks in the United States provide not only ideas but also experts ready to comment or consult at a moment's notice. Some of these new transmission belts serve as translators and additional outlets for academic ideas, but many add a bias provided by their founders and funders. As a group, think tanks are heterogeneous in scope, funding, ideology and location, but universities generally offer a more neutral viewpoint. While pluralism of institutional pathways is good for democracy, the policy process is diminished by the withdrawal of the academic community. The solutions must come via a reappraisal within the academy itself. Departments should give greater weight to real-world relevance and impact in hiring and promoting young scholars. Journals could place greater weight on relevance in evaluating submissions. Studies of specific regions deserve more attention. Universities could facilitate interest in the world by giving junior faculty members greater incentives to participate in it. That should include greater toleration of unpopular policy positions. One could multiply such useful suggestions, but young people should not hold their breath waiting for them to be implemented. If anything, the trends in academic life seem to be headed in the opposite direction.

#### B. Academic, institutions-based debate regarding war powers is critical to check excessive presidential authority---college students key

Kelly Michael Young 13, Associate Professor of Communication and Director of Forensics at Wayne State University, "Why Should We Debate About Restriction of Presidential War Powers", 9/4, public.cedadebate.org/node/13

Beyond its obviously timeliness, we believed debating about presidential war powers was important because of the stakes involved in the controversy. Since the Korean War, scholars and pundits have grown increasingly alarmed by the growing scope and techniques of presidential war making. In 1973, in the wake of Vietnam, Congress passed the joint War Powers Resolution (WPR) to increase Congress’s role in foreign policy and war making by requiring executive consultation with Congress prior to the use of military force, reporting within 48 hours after the start of hostiles, and requiring the close of military operations after 60 days unless Congress has authorized the use of force. Although the WPR was a significant legislative feat, 30 years since its passage, presidents have frequently ignores the WPR requirements and the changing nature of conflict does not fit neatly into these regulations. After the terrorist attacks on 9-11, many experts worry that executive war powers have expanded far beyond healthy limits. Consequently, there is a fear that continued expansion of these powers will undermine the constitutional system of checks and balances that maintain the democratic foundation of this country and risk constant and unlimited military actions, particularly in what Stephen Griffin refers to as a “long war” period like the War on Terror (http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674058286). In comparison, pro-presidential powers advocates contend that new restrictions undermine flexibility and timely decision-making necessary to effectively counter contemporary national security risks. Thus, a debate about presidential wars powers is important to investigate a number of issues that have serious consequences on the status of democratic checks and national security of the United States.¶ Lastly, debating presidential war powers is important because we the people have an important role in affecting the use of presidential war powers. As many legal scholars contend, regardless of the status of legal structures to check the presidency, an important political restrain on presidential war powers is the presence of a well-informed and educated public. As Justice Potter Stewart explains, “the only effective restraint upon executive policy and power…may lie in an enlightened citizenry – in an informed and critical public opinion which alone can protect the values of a democratic government” (http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC\_CR\_0403\_0713\_ZC3.html). As a result, this is not simply an academic debate about institutions and powers that that do not affect us. As the numerous recent foreign policy scandals make clear, anyone who uses a cell-phone or the internet is potential affected by unchecked presidential war powers. Even if we agree that these powers are justified, it is important that today’s college students understand and appreciate the scope and consequences of presidential war powers, as these students’ opinions will stand as an important potential check on the presidency.

## 2NC

### Impsm L

#### this means Perm kills praxis—causes the death of left politics- why you can’t perm method- theory is key

answers anti-americanism bad too

**Dmitryev 11** Marxist-humanist views of the world The Arab Spring Posted on May 7, 2011 From the new issue of NEWS & LETTERS, May-June 2011 <http://dmitryev.wordpress.com/2011/05/07/the-arab-spring/>

DISORIENTATION ON THE LEFT This disorientation reflected the Left’s longstanding philosophic void. How is it that revolutionaries are so in awe of state powers, especially the superpower U.S., that revolution itself becomes a secondary consideration, and the real determinant is the urge to oppose the U.S.? Nothing could make clearer the pitfalls of being stuck at first negativity. While many participants dissented, speakers at Chicago’s March 19 anti-war protest presented the view that the “core principle” is “anti-intervention.” Libyan state television used footage of the march with calls for “Hands off Libya,” as if that were the whole point of the march. Many such calls did not even mention Qaddafi or the revolutionary mass uprising against him! The U.S., France, Italy and Britain will try to take advantage of the intervention for their own imperialist purposes. But facile comparisons with Bush’s 2003 invasion of Iraq disregard the existence of an uprising calling for aid. That does not mean that our position is to “support the intervention”; it is to support the revolution.[7] The subordination of revolution once state powers intervene reflects how the activist and intellectual Left is permeated with the capitalistic concept of the backwardness of the masses. That includes those who have broken with the vanguard party-to-lead. Those who cannot grasp “the relationship of theory to history as a historical relationshipmade by masses in motion“[8] cannot fill the philosophic void. It is impos-sible to confront this morass of disorientation without challenging what Raya Dunayevskaya, founder of Marxist-Humanism and of News and Letters Committees, called post-Marx Marxism–not as a chronological category but as the way Marxism has truncated Karl Marx’s total philosophy of revolution in permanence. For “without a philosophy of revolution activism spends itself in mere anti-imperialism and anti-capitalism, without ever revealing what it is for.”[9] C. Revolts across the Arab world Protesters in Syria call for the overthrow of President Bashar as-Assad, April 2011 Photo by Jan Sefti, http://www.flickr.com/photos/kurdistan4all/ The fire unleashed by the revolution in Tunisia has encouraged revolts also outside the Arab world, as in Azerbaijan and Iran, and even spooked China’s rulers after calls for a “Jasmine Revolution” there. All of North Africa and the Middle East is feeling the heat. Bahrain‘s Feb. 14 Day of Rage, called by youth inspired by Egypt and Tunisia, began days of non-violent protests, which overcame deadly police repression and eventually created a massive occupation of Pearl Square. The movement is overwhelmingly supported by the 70% Shiite majority and finds some support among the Sunnis who are not part of the ruling elite. Despite a few concessions, continuing repression led to ever more radical demands from the youth and a move toward the centers of finance and government. Emboldened by Libya’s bloodshed and under cover of Japan’s earthquake, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates sent in 2,000 troops to smash the movement, with tacit support from the U.S., whose naval Fifth Fleet is based in Bahrain. King Hamad declared a three-month state of emergency. With hundreds detained, unrest is stymied for now but is still simmering. Yemen has been rocked by a movement that began as protests of unemployment and corruption, with calls for the resignation of President Ali Abdullah Saleh, a brutal ruler long supported by the U.S. as an ally against Al Qaeda, one of whose strongest chapters is in Yemen. Despite shootings, main squares hold protest camps all across the country, and part of the Army has come over to their side. In the capital, Sana’a, what the protesters call Change Square, modeled after Egypt’s revolutionary occupation of Tahrir Square, is breaking down divisions between tribes and sects.As in other Arab countries, women are prominent. (See “Women in Yemen show revolutionary way.”) Thousands of women marched in Taiz on April 3, calling for Saleh’s ouster, and were beaten by police. As one young woman demonstrator, Afrah Nasser, wrote, women are fighting “oppression both at home and in the public sphere.” She added, “Usually in Yemen, women get harassed all the time, but in Change Square nobody touches me.” When Saleh called women’s participation in protests “haram” (sinful), thousands of women took to the streets of Sana’a undaunted, calling for his ouster. Syria has also conducted a bloody counter-revolution, killing hundreds. The turning point came on March 6, when several boys under 15 were arrested and tortured in Daraa for writing graffiti calling for the downfall of the regime. Daraa became a center of resistance, with march after march, each time in the face of police violence, and by March 15 thousands turned out in cities across the country–even in Hama, where President Assad’s father put down a 1982 Islamist revolt by butchering 20,000 and razing the city. The depth of revolt is shown by the execution of several soldiers for refusing to shoot protesters. In Palestine the ruling Hamas in Gaza and Fatah in the West Bank were already on edge after the Gaza Youth’s Manifesto for Change last December.[10] Hamas, Fatah, and the Israeli government could all agree that they did not want the Arab revolts to spread to occupied Palestine. What could divert from the revolt is the heating up of shelling and bombing exchanges between Israel and Gaza, threatening another war. At this very time, Judge Richard Goldstone retracted one assertion from his UN report on the 2008-09 Gaza War, in which hundreds of Palestinian civilians were killed and tremendous destruction was wrought in Gaza. The Israeli government and its ideologues tried to use that to discredit the whole report. Goldstone, however, backed off only from the one assertion that Israel had a policy of targeting civilians. He did not retract the other findings: Israel had a policy of collective punishment, targeting the civilian infrastructure; war crimes had been committed by both sides; Israel had tortured detainees and used Palestinians, including children, as human shields.[11] The other three authors of the UN report indicated they had been pressured to sanitize their conclusions but that they stood by them in the interests of justice “to the hundreds of innocent civilians killed during the Gaza conflict, the thousands injured, and the hundreds of thousands whose lives continue to be deeply affected by the conflict and the blockade.” Matters were further complicated by the outrageous U.S. veto of a UN resolution demanding a halt to Israel’s construction of illegal settlements in Palestine. In the face of Israel’s intransigence–most concretely measured by the steady construction of West Bank settlements–the Palestinian Authority has had to admit the fruitlessness of peace talks and turned to a campaign for admission as a member state of the UN. But what both Fatah and Hamas appear to fear most is revolt from the Palestinian masses. (See “Counter-revolution targets Palestine.”) When revolutions struggle under counter-revolution, what becomes clear is the need to work out the philosophy of revolution in permanence as an integral part of revolution and solidarity. This makes urgent a new edition of a Marxist-Humanist pamphlet on the Middle East. That pamphlet highlights the need for philosophy to prevent revolution stopping halfway–a pull that comes from within revolution itself and not only from the rulers. The Marxist-Humanist analyses of the 1979 Iranian Revolution show how philosophy can be a force of revolution, as Marxist-Humanism fought to help women, workers, youth and oppressed nationalities open a second chapter of revolution as against the seizure of power by Ayatollah Khomeini. Learning the lessons of history cannot mean only avoiding the same political mistakes but rather being philosophically prepared for the new and unexpected.

### indigenous

#### indigenism sets up a binary between indigenous/non-indigenous—fractures coalitions and is a bad history

James **Herod** Getting Free: A sketch of an association of democratic, autonomous neighborhoods and how to create it Fourth Edition, January **2004** <http://site.www.umb.edu/faculty/salzman_g/Strate/GetFre/index.htm> 2

The human race is one incredibly jumbled up affair. A people has always called itself something, always has had a name for itself, which is one thing we mean by ethnicity. But the more general concept of indigenous people is of more recent origin. In fact I believe it is of very recent origin, dating from the sixties. I think it is part of the Identity Politics that emerged out of the New Left in the United States. The New Left, in its determined blindness to the working class, invented a whole set of new categories, and built movements on them -- women, gays and lesbians, blacks, old people, welfare mothers, youth, Latinos -- and, of course, Native Americans. There was a movement here, AIM, the American Indian Movement, of which Leonard Peltier was a member. Native Americans became one of the many categories (replacing that of class) that made up Identity Politics. Fortunately, we are currently witnessing, after nearly thirty dreary years, the demise of this orientation. Not to say that there weren't positive things accomplished by this focus, but it couldn't, and didn't, overthrow capitalism. Obviously, the idea of an indigenous people sets up a contrast with non-indigenous peoples. And in our present historical situation we all know who that refers to -- Europeans. We certainly never see it used with regard to the Japanese colonizing Southeast Asia, or the Chinese colonizing Tibet. No, it is a current, but badly misguided, attempt to conceptualize the expansion of capitalism to all corners of the earth. This is actually a mis-conceptualization, because it blames all Europeans for something that only a few of them have done. It sets up a conflict between Europeans and the rest of humanity, ignoring the fact that European peasants were among the first to be colonized, dispossessed, uprooted, and sent packing, as well as ignorning the fact that local ruling classes have helped affix the ball and chain of capitalism to every nook and cranny of the earth. We must remember that the great migrations of people out of Europe that have taken place under capitalism were not all composed of imperialists and colonizers. Many of those leaving were such, of course, but they were very far from being in the majority. Australia was founded as a prison colony. The ruling class of England expelled its criminals and undesirables from England and deposited them in Australia. Millions came to the United States as indentured servants. Tens of millions more came as the result of the enclosures movement in Europe. They had been forced off their lands and had to go elsewhere to live. Blacks of course were brought here as slaves (and it's interesting that Blacks are never considered, by Indigenists, as non-indigenous people, no matter where they live; this is a slur that is reserved for European whites). The great wave of Irish immigration to this country was caused by the colonization of Ireland by the English, who seized the farms there and used them for export crops, thus starving millions of Irish peasants, who had to leave -- a process that is going on now again all over the world on a vast scale. Millions of eastern European Jews came to this country to escape the pogroms, in 1905 especially, but also at other times. The vast migrations to Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay were for similar reasons.

### RC Women

#### women oppression relegation of reproduction to the private sphere are not ahistorical products of sexism or patriarchy, but historical productions of the emergence of a classed society founded on the logic of surplus accumulation. This shift from necessity to surplus solidified the pre-existing division of labor based on need and then sexed it to justify inequality

**Cloud** (Prof. Comm at UT) **03**

[Dana, “Marxism and Oppression”, Talk for Regional Socialist Conference, April 19, 2003, p. online]

In order to challenge oppression, it is important to know where it comes from. Historians, archaeologists, and anthropologists tell us that in pre-class societies such as hunter-gatherer societies, racism and sexism were unheard of. Because homosexuality was not an identifiable category of such societies, discrimination on that basis did not occur either. In fact, it is clear that racism, sexism, and homophobia have arisen in particular kinds of societies, namely class societies. Women’s oppression originated in the first class societies, while racism came into prominence in the early periods of capitalism when colonialism and slavery drove the economic system. The prohibition against gays and lesbians is a relatively modern phenomenon. But what all forms of oppression have in common is that they did not always exist and are not endemic to human nature. They were created in the interest of ruling classes in society and continue to benefit the people at the top of society, while dividing and conquering the rest of us so as to weaken the common fight against the oppressors. The work of Marx’s collaborator Friederich Engels onThe Origins of the Family, Private Property, and the State in some respects reflects the Victorian times in which in was written. Engels moralizes about women’s sexuality and doesn’t even include gay and lesbian liberation in his discussion of the oppressive family. However, anthropologists like the feminist Rayna Reiter have confirmed his most important and central argument that it was in the first settled agricultural societies that women became an oppressed class. In societies where for the first time people could accumulate a surplus of food and other resources, it was possible for some people to hoard wealth and control its distribution. The first governments or state structures formed to legitimate an emerging ruling class. As settled communities grew in size and became more complex social organizations, and, most importantly, as the surplus grew, the distribution of wealth became unequal—and a small number of men rose above the rest of the population in wealth and power. In the previous hunter-gatherer societies, there had been a sexual division of labor, but one without a hierarchy of value.

There was no strict demarcation between the reproductive and productive spheres. All of that changed with the development of private property in more settled communities. The earlier division of labor in which men did the heavier work, hunting, and animal agriculture, became a system of differential control over resource distribution. The new system required more field workers and sought to maximize women’s reproductive potential. Production shifted away from the household over time and women became associated with the reproductive role, losing control over the production and distribution of the necessities of life. It was not a matter of male sexism, but of economic priorities of a developing class system. This is why Engels identifies women’s oppression as the first form of systematic class oppression in the world. Marxists since Engels have not dismissed the oppression of women as secondary to other kinds of oppression and exploitation. To the contrary, women’s oppression has a primary place in Marxist analysis and is a key issue that socialists organize around today. From this history we know that sexism did not always exist, and that men do not have an inherent interest in oppressing women as domestic servants or sexual slaves. Instead, women’s oppression always has served a class hierarchy in society. In our society divided by sexism, ideas about women’s nature as domestic caretakers or irrational sexual beings justify paying women lower wages compared to men, so that employers can pit workers against one another in competition for the same work. Most women have always had to work outside the home to support their families. Today, women around the world are exploited in sweatshops where their status as women allows bosses to pay them very little, driving down the wages of both men and women. At the same time, capitalist society relies on ideas about women to justify not providing very much in the way of social services that would help provide health care, family leave, unemployment insurance, access to primary and higher education, and so forth—all because these things are supposed to happen in the private family, where women are responsible. This lack of social support results in a lower quality of life for many men as well as women. Finally, contemporary ideologies that pit men against women encourage us to fight each other rather than organizing together.

### (A2 “Perm”)

#### AND, the Perm gets hijacked by capitalists in semi-colonized countries—that entrenches capital

Arbeitsgruppe Marximus, No Date, “1. Capitalism and Imperialism” http://www.agmarxismus.net/english/english2.htm

In the struggle for the crumbs left on the table of multinationals and banks, more and more people are driven into nationalistic, „ethnic'', or „religious'' wars. Their real aims are often nothing more than a re-definition of spheres of influence among groups of capital. At the same time, in semi-colonial countries it has become obvious that bourgeois-nationalistic liberation movements, trying to implement their own „national"-oriented policy within capitalism, are doomed to fail due to the pressure exerted by international financial capital and IMF/World Bank. Again and again, the anti-imperialism of bourgeois forces in the semi-colonial countries has proved half-hearted and wavering. They occasionally tried to improve their profit prospects even against imperialist powers. However they shrink back from a consequent mobilisation of the masses because they fear the possibility of anti-imperialist struggles resulting in a social revolution which could be directed also against the capitalists of semi-colonial countries.

#### Second

#### praxis DA: This is why you can’t perm a method…They strip all of the conceptual theory that allows us to understand the world—worse than the aff or the alt alone. Perm will become like occupy wall street—it’s also a rejection of capitalism but doesn’t have a praxis because the movement is fractured, no one knows what they are fighting for—this is why it will never catch on.

Tumino (Prof. English @ Pitt) 01

[Stephen, “What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever”, Red Critiqu]

Orthodox Marxism has become a test-case of the "radical" today. Yet, what passes for orthodoxy on the left—whether like Smith and Zizek they claim to support it, or, like Butler and Rorty they want to "achieve our country" by excluding it from "U.S. Intellectual life" ("On Left Conservatism"), is a parody of orthodoxy which hybridizes its central concepts and renders them into flexodox simulations. Yet, even in its very textuality, however, the orthodox is a resistance to the flexodox. Contrary to the common-sensical view of "orthodox" as "traditional" or "conformist" "opinions," is its other meaning: ortho-doxy not as flexodox "hybridity," but as "original" "ideas." "Original," not in the sense of epistemic "event," "authorial" originality and so forth, but, as in chemistry, in its opposition to "para," "meta," "post" and other ludic hybridities: thus "ortho" as resistance to the annotations that mystify the original ideas of Marxism and hybridize it for the "special interests" of various groups. The "original" ideas of Marxism are inseparable from their effect as "demystification" of ideology—for example the deployment of "class" that allows a demystification of daily life from the haze of consumption. Class is thus an "original idea" of Marxism in the sense that it cuts through the hype of cultural agency under capitalism and reveals how culture and consumption are tied to labor, the everyday determined by the workday: how the amount of time workers spend engaging in surplus-labor determines the amount of time they get for reproducing and cultivating their needs. Without changing this division of labor social change is impossible. Orthodoxy is a rejection of the ideological annotations: hence, on the one hand, the resistance to orthodoxy as "rigid" and "dogmatic" "determinism," and, on the other, its hybridization by the flexodox as the result of which it has become almost impossible today to read the original ideas of Marxism, such as "exploitation"; "surplus-value"; "class"; "class antagonism"; "class struggle"; "revolution"; "science**"** (i.e., objective knowledge); "ideology**"** (as "false consciousness"). Yet, it is these ideas alone that clarify the elemental truths through which theory ceases to be a gray activism of tropes, desire and affect, and becomes, instead, a red, revolutionary guide to praxis for a new society freed from exploitation and injustice. Marx's original scientific discovery was his labor theory of value. Marx's labor theory of value is an elemental truth of Orthodox Marxism that is rejected by the flexodox left as the central dogmatism of a "totalitarian" Marxism. It is only Marx's labor theory of value, however, that exposes the mystification of the wages system that disguises exploitation as a "fair exchange" between capital and labor and reveals the truth about this relation as one of exploitation. Only Orthodox Marxism explains how what the workers sell to the capitalist is not labor, a commodity like any other whose price is determined by fluctuations in supply and demand, but their labor-power—their ability to labor in a system which has systematically "freed" them from the means of production so they are forced to work or starve—whose value is determined by the amount of time socially necessary to reproduce it daily. The value of labor-power is equivalent to the value of wages workers consume daily in the form of commodities that keep them alive to be exploited tomorrow. Given the technical composition of production today this amount of time is a slight fraction of the workday the majority of which workers spend producing surplus-value over and above their needs. The surplus-value is what is pocketed by the capitalists in the form of profit when the commodities are sold. Class is the antagonistic division thus established between the exploited and their exploiters. Without Marx's labor theory of value one could only contest the after effects of this outright theft of social labor-power rather than its cause lying in the private ownership of production. The flexodox rejection of the labor theory of value as the "dogmatic" core of a totalitarian Marxism therefore is a not so subtle rejection of the principled defense of the (scientific) knowledge workers need for their emancipation from exploitation because only the labor theory of value exposes the opportunism of knowledges (ideology) that occult this exploitation. Without the labor theory of value socialism would only be a moral dogma that appeals to the sentiments of "fairness" and "equality" for a "just" distribution o**f** the social wealth that does the work of capital by naturalizing the exploitation of labor under capitalism giving it an acceptable "human face."

## 1NR

**Students deterred—unpredictability—necessarily exclusionary**

**Empirical evidence**

Robin **Rowland**, University of Kansas, “Topic Selection in Debate,” AMERICAN FORENSICS IN PERSPECTIVE, ed. D.Parson, 19**84**, p. 53-54.

The first major problem identified by the work group as relating to topic selection is the decline in participation in the National Debate Tournament (NDT) policy debate. As Boman notes: There is a growing dissatisfaction with academic debate that utilizes a policy proposition. Programs which are oriented toward debating the national policy debate proposition, so-called “NDT” programs, are diminishing in scope and size.4 This **decline in** policy **debate is tied**, many in the work group believe, **to excessively broad topics**. The most obvious characteristic of some recent policy debate topics is extreme breath. A resolution calling for regulation of land use literally and figuratively covers a lot of ground. Naitonal debate topics have not always been so broad. Before the late 1960s the topic often specified a particular policy change.5 The move from narrow to **broad topics** has had, according to some, the effect of **limit**ing **the number** of students **who participate** in policy debate. First, **the breadth of the topics has all but destroyed novice debate**. Paul Gaske argues that because the stock issues of policy debate are clearly defined, it is superior to value debate as a means of introducing students to the debate process.6 Despite this advantage of policy debate, Gaske belives that NDT debate is not the best vehicle for teaching beginners. The problem is that **broad** policy **topics terrify novice debaters**, especially those who lack high school debate experience. **They are unable to cope with the breadth** of the topic **and** experience “negophobia,”7 the **fear** of **debating negative**. As a consequence, the educational advantages associated with teaching novices through policy debate are lost: “Yet all of these benefits fly out the window as rookies in their formative stage quickly experience humiliation at being caugh without evidence or substantive awareness of the issues that confront them at a tournament.”8 The ultimate result is that fewer novices participate in NDT, thus lessening the educational value of the activity and limiting the number of debaters or eventually participate in more advanced divisions of policy debate. In addition to noting the effect on novices, participants argued that broad topics also discourage experienced debaters from continued participation in policy debate. Here, the claim is that **it takes so much** times and **effort** to be competitive **on a broad topic that students** who are concerned with doing more than just debate **are forced out of the activity**.9 Gaske notes, that “broad topics discourage participation because of insufficient time to do requisite research.”10 **The final effect may be that entire programs** either **cease functioning** or shift to value debate as a way to avoid unreasonable research burdens. Boman supports this point: “It is this **expanding** necessity of evidence, and thereby **research**, which **has created a competitive imbalance** between institutions that participate in academic debate.”11 In this view, it is the competitive imbalance resulting from the use of broad topics that has led some small schools to cancel their programs.

### FW: Rationality Good

#### Even if truths aren’t absolute, they are necessary for problem-solving—we should view certain facts as “true” for the purpose of policy—the K causes policy paralysis and gets us nowhere. Pragmatism is self-correcting and solves for all their critiques of rationality

**Rowland 95** – professor of communication at the University of Kansas (10/1, Robert, Philosophy & Rhetoric, 28.4, “In defense of rational argument: A pragmatic justification of argumentation theory and response to the postmodern critique”, BESCO, credit to LDK)

The first step in developing a justifiable theory of rational argument that can account for the epistemological and axiological attacks is to recognize the performative contradiction at the heart of the postmodern critique. Postmodernists rely on rational argument in order to attack rational argument and they consistently claim that their positions are in some way superior to those of their modernist opponents. Writing of post-structuralism, Amanda Anderson notes "the incommensurability between its epistemological stance and its political aims, between its descriptions and its prescriptions, between the pessimism of its intellect and, if not the optimism, at least the intrusiveness of its moral and political will" (1992, 64).¶ The performative contradiction at the heart of postmodernism is nowhere more evident than in the epistemological critique of modernism. The two most important points made by postmodernists in relation to epistemology are that humans can understand the world only through their symbols and that there is no means of using "reality" to test a symbolic description. Advocates of traditional approaches to rationality have not been able to satisfactorily answer these positions, precisely because they seem to be "true" in some sense. This "truth," however, suggests that a theory of rational argument may be salvageable. If postmodernists can defend their views as in some sense "truer" than those of their modernist opponents, then there must be some standard for judging "truth" that can withstand the postmodern indictment. That standard is pragmatic efficacy in fulfilling a purpose in relation to a given problem.¶ Both modernists and postmodernists generally assume that truth and fact are equivalent terms. Thus, a "true" statement is one that is factually correct in all circumstances. By this standard, of course, there are no totally "true" statements. However, if no statement can be proved factually true, then a focus on facts is an inappropriate standard for judging truth.¶ I suggest that knowledge and truth should be understood not as factual statements that are certain, but as symbolic statements that function as useful problem-solving tools. When we say that a view is true, we really mean that a given symbolic description consistently solves a particular problem. Thus, the statement "the sun will come up tomorrow" can be considered "true," despite ambiguities that a postmodernist might point to in regard to the meaning of sun or tomorrow, because it usefully and consistently solves a particular epistemic problem.¶ The standard for "truth" is pragmatic utility in fulfilling a purpose in relation to a particular problem. A true statement is one that "works" to solve the problem. Both the nature of the problem and the arguer's purpose in relation to that problem infiuence whether a given statement is viewed as true knowledge. This explains why biological researchers and physicians often seem to have different definitions of truth in regard to medical practice. The researcher is concerned with fully understanding the way that the body works. His or her purpose dictates application of rigorous standards for evaluating evidence and causation. By contrast, the physician is concerned with treating patients and therefore may apply a much lower standard for evaluating new treatments. The pragmatic theory of argument I am defending draws heavily on the work of William James, who believed that "the only test of probable truth is what works" (1982, 225). Alan Brinton explains that for jEunes "the ultimate question of truth is a question about the concepts and their fruitfulness in serving the purposes for which they were created and imposed. Ideas are true insofar as they serve these purposes, and false insofar as they fail to do so" (1982, 163). Some contemporary pragmatists take a similar view. For example, Nicholas Rescher writes in relation to methodology that "the proper test for the correctness or appropriateness of anything methodological in nature is plainly and obviously posed by the paradigmatically pragmatic questions: Does it work? Does it attain its intended purposes?" (1977, 3). Similarly, Celeste Condit Railsback argues that "truth is . . . relative to the language and purposes of the persons who are using it" (1983, 358-59). At this point, someone like Derrida might argue that while the pragmatic approach accounts for the symbolic nature of truth, it does not deal with the inability of humans to get at reality directly. Although the postmodern critique denies that humans can directly experience "the facts," it does not deny that a real-world exists.¶ Thus, a pragmatist endorses a given scientific theory because the symbolic description present in that theory does a better job than its competitors of fulfilling a set of purposes in a given context. Because it fulfills those purposes, we call the theory "true." We cannot attain knowledge about "the facts," but we can test the relative adequacy of competing problem-solving statements against those facts. Michael Redhead, a professor of history and philosophy of science at Cambridge University, notes that "we can always conjecture, but there is some control. The world kicks back" (in Peterson 1992,175; emphasis added). Knowledge is not about "facts." It is about finding symbolic descriptions of the world that work, that is, avoiding nature's kicks in fulfilling a given purpose.¶ The foregoing suggests that a principled pragmatic theory of argument sidesteps the postmodern critique. Argumentation theory ¶ should be understood as a set of pragmatic rules of thumb about the kinds of symbolic statements that effectively solve ¶ problems. These statements exist at varying levels of generality. A consistency principle , for example, is really a rule of thumb stating something like "All other things being equal, consistent symbolic descriptions are more likely to prove useful for solving a particular problem in relation to a given purpose than are inconsistent descriptions." Other principles are linked to narrower purposes in more specific contexts. Thus, the standards for evaluating arguments in a subfield of physics will be tied to the particular purposes and problems found in that subfield. The key point is that all aspects of a theory of argument can be justified pragmatically, based on their value for producing useful solutions to problems .¶ A pragmatic theory of argument can be understood as operating at three levels, all of which are tied to functionality. At the first or definitional level, argument is best understood as a kind of discourse or interaction in which reasons and evidence are presented in support of a claim. Argument as a symbolic form is valued based on its ability to deal with problems; the business of argument is problem solving. At a second or theoretical level, what Toulmin would call fieldinvariant, general principles of rational argument are justified pragmatically based on their capacity to solve problems. Thus, tests of evidence, general rules for describing argument, standards relating to burden of proof or presumption, and fallacies, all can be justified pragmatically based on the general problem-solving purpose served by all argument. For example, the requirement that claims must be supported with evidence can be justified as a general rule of thumb for distinguishing between strong and weak (that is, useful and useless) arguments. Certainly, there are cases in which unsupported assertions are "true" in some sense. However, the principle that any claim on belief should be supported with evidence of some type is a functional one for distinguishing between claims that are likely to be useful and those that are less likely to be useful.¶ At a third level, that of specific fields or subfields, principles of argumentation are linked to pragmatic success in solving problems in the particular area (see Rowland 1982). Thus, for instance, the rules of evidence found in the law are linked directly to the purposes served by legal argument. This explains why the burden of proof in a criminal trial is very different from that found in the civil law. The purpose of protecting the innocent from potential conviction requires that a higher standard of proof be applied in this area than elsewhere.¶ The pragmatic perspective I have described is quite different from that of interpretive pragmatists such as Richard Rorty (1979, 1982, 1985, 1987) and Stanley Fish (1980, 1989a, 1989b). Rorty, while denying the existence of legitimate formal or content-based standards for "proof" (1982,277), endorses a processual epistemology based on "the idea of [substituting] 'unforced agreement' for that of 'objectivity' " (41-42). Janet Home summarizes Rorty's views, noting that "the difference between 'certified knowledge' and 'mere belief is based upon intersubjective agreement rather than correspondence" (1989, 249). By contrast. Fish grounds reason in the practices of particular "interpretive communities" (1989b, 98). In this view, "Particular facts are firm or in question insofar as the perspective . . . within which they emerge is firmly in place, settled" (Fish 1989a, 308).¶ Unfortunately, a theory of argumentation cannot be salvaged merely by grounding reason in conversational practice or community assent. If there are no agreed upon standards, then how does one "rationally" test a claim intersubjectively or in process? Fish and Rorty beg the question when they ground reason in community and conversational process. Unlike Rorty and Fish, who reject the ideas of "truth" and "knowledge," I argue that those concepts must be redefined in relation to problem solving.¶ The pragmatic theory of argument that I have advanced provides a principled means of choosing among competing alternatives, regardless of the context. One always should ask whether or not a particular symbolic description of the world fulfills its purposes. In so doing, methodological principles for testing knowledge claims, such as tests of evidence, fallacies, and more precise field standards, can be justified, and then they can be applied within the conversation or by the community. The approach, therefore, provides standards to be applied in Rorty's process or by Fish's community and avoids the tautology that otherwise confronts those approaches. The perspective neatly avoids the problems associated with modernism, but also provides a principled approach to argument that does not lead to relativism.¶ In defense of rational argument¶ When argument is viewed as a pragmatic problem-solving tool, the power of the postmodern critique largely dissipates. At the most basic level, a pragmatic theory of argument is based on premises such as the following:¶ 'Statements supported by evidence and reasoning are more likely to be useful for satisfactorily solving a problem than ones that lack that support.¶ 'Consistent arguments are more likely to be generalizable than inconsistent ones.¶ 'Experts are more likely to have useful viewpoints about technical questions tied to a particular field than nonexperts. These statements are not "true" in the factual sense, but they are universally recognized as useful, a point that is emphasized in the work of even the most committed postmodernist. Even someone like Derrida demands that his opponents support their claims with evidence and consistent reasoning. In so doing, Derrida clearly recognizes the functional utility of general standards for testing argument form and process.¶ Arguing should be understood as a pragmatic process for locating solutions to problems. The ultimate justification of argument as a discipline is that it produces useful solutions. Of course, not all arguments lead to successful solutions because the world is a complex place and the people who utilize the form/process are flawed. However, the general functional utility of argument as a method of ¶ invention or discovery and the method of justification is undisputed. The pragmatic approach to argument also provides a means of answering the axiological objections to traditional reason. Initially, the view that argument is often a means of enslaving or disempowering people is based on a misunderstanding of how argument as a form of discourse functions. In fact, the danger of symbolic oppression is less applicable to argument as a type of symbol use than to other forms. Argument tells us how to solve problems. It can be a force for enslavement only to the degree that a successful problem-solution is enslaving. This is a rare event in any society grounded in democratic ethics.¶ Additionally, argument as a form and process is inherently person-respecting because in argument it is not status or force that matters, but only the reasoning (see Brockriede 1972). In a pure argumentative encounter, it does not matter whether you are President of the United States or a college junior; all that is relevant is what you have to say. Of course, this ideal is rarely realized, but the principle that humans should test their claims against standards of argumentation theory that are tied to pragmatic problem solving (and not base conclusions on power) is one that recognizes the fundamental humanity in all people.¶ Furthermore, argument is one of the most important means of protecting society from symbolic oppression. Argument as an internal process within an individual and external process within society provides a method of testing the claims of potential oppressors. Therefore, training in argument should be understood as a means of providing pragmatic tools for breaking out of terministic or disciplinary prisons.¶ Against this view, it could be argued that pragmatism, because of its "practical" bent, inevitably degenerates into "hegemonic instrumental reason" in which technocratic experts control society. In Eclipse of Reason, Max Horkheimer takes the position that "in its instrumental aspect, stressed by pragmatism," reason "has become completely harnessed to the social process. Its operational value, its role in the domination of men and nations has been made the sole criterion" (1947, 21). Later, he notes that "pragmatism is the counterpart of modern industrialism for which the factory is the prototype of human existence" (50).¶ The claims that pragmatism reduces reason to a mere instrument of production or leads to undemocratic technocratic control of society are, however, misguided. Initially, it is worth noting that Horkeimer's aim is not to indict rationality per se, but to focus on the inadequacy of a purely instrumental form of rationality, which he labels "subjective reason." Near the conclusion of Eclipse of Reason, Horkheimer defends "objective reason": "This concept of truth—the adequation of name and thing—inherent in every genuine philosophy, enables thought to withstand if not to overcome the demoralizing and mutilating effects of formalized reason" (1947, 180). The goal of this essay, to develop a theory of rational argument that can withstand the postmodern indictment, is quite consistent with Horkheimer's view that humans need "objective reason" in order to "unshackle . . . independent thought" and oppose "cynical nihilism" (127, 174). While there can be no purely "objective reason," field-invariant and field-dependent principles of argumentation can be justified pragmatically to serve the aims that Horkheimer assigns to that form.¶ Moreover, a pragmatic theory of argument should not be confused with a decision-making approach based on mere practicality or self-interest. Principles of argument are justified pragmatically, that is, because they work consistently to solve problems. But after justification, the invariant and relevant field-dependent principles may be used to test the worth of any argument and are not tied to a simple utilitarian benefit/loss calculus. The misconception that a pragmatic theory of truth is tied to a simplistic instrumentalism is a common one. John Dewey notes, for instance, that William James's reference to the "cash value" of reasoning was misinterpreted by some "to mean that the consequences themselves of our rational conceptions must be narrowly limited by their pecuniary value" (1982, 33). In fact, pragmatism "concerns not the nature of consequences but the nature of knowing" (Dewey 1960,331). Or as James himself put it, "The possession of true thoughts means everywhere the possession of invaluable instruments of action" (1948, 161). Pragmatism "is a method only," which "does not stand for any special result" (James 1982, 213), but that method can be used to justify principles of argument that in turn can be used to check the excesses of instrumental reason. Moreover, a pragmatic approach to argument is self-correcting. According to James, pragmatism "means the open air and possibilities of nature, as against dogma, artificiality and the pretense of finality in truth" (213). Dewey makes the same point when he claims that pragmatic theory involves "the use of intelligence to liberate and liberalize action" (1917,63). Nor does pragmatism necessarily lead to expert domination. A pragmatic argumentation theory endorses deference to the opinion of experts only on questions for which the expert possesses special knowledge relevant to a particular problem. And even on such issues, the views of the expert would be subject to rigorous testing. It would be quite unpragmatic to defer to expert opinion, absent good reasons and strong evidence.¶ The previous analysis in no way denies the risks associated with technical reason. It is, however precisely because of such risks that a principled pragmatic theory of argument is needed. Given that we live in an advanced technological society, it is inevitable that technical reason will play a role. Postmodernism points to the dangers of technical reason, but provides no means of avoiding those risks. A pragmatic theory of argument, by contrast, justifies principles of rationality that can be used to protect society from the nihilistic excesses of a purely instrumental reason.¶¶

**Intersectionality 1NC**

**Intersectionality reproduces a one—it requires the self-referential center to define how they are intersectional**

**Puar** 20**11** (Jasbir, 01 2011, ‘I would rather be a cyborg than a goddess’: Intersectionality, Assemblage, and Affective Politics, EIPCP, European Institute for Progressive Cultural Politics, <http://eipcp.net/transversal/0811/puar/en>)

A final concern is that **intersectionality functions as a problematic reinvestment in the subject**, in particular, the subject X. Rey Chow has produced the most damning critique of what she calls “poststructuralist significatory incarceration”[[10]](http://eipcp.net/transversal/0811/puar/en/" \l "_ftn10), seriously questioning whether the marginalized subject is still a viable site from which to produce politics, much less whether the subject is a necessary precursor for politics. **"Difference" produces new subjects of inquiry that then infinitely multiplies exclusion in order to promote inclusion. Difference now proceeds and defines identity**. Part of her concern is that **poststructuralist efforts to attend to the specificity of Others has become one, a universalizing project and two, always beholden to the self-referentiality of the “center”, ironic given that intersectionality has now come to be deployed as a call for and a form of anti-essentialism**. [[11]](http://eipcp.net/transversal/0811/puar/en/" \l "_ftn11) **The poststructuralist fatigue Chow describes is simple: Subject X may be different in content, but shows up, time and again, the same in form**. (We can see