# 1NC

## Offcase

### 1NC

#### a. Interpretation and violation---the affirmative should defend the desirability of topical government action.

#### “USFG should” indicates a debate about hypothetical government action

Jon M Ericson 3, Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action through governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### Restrictions are prohibitions on action

Jean Schiedler-Brown 12, Attorney, Jean Schiedler-Brown & Associates, Appellant Brief of Randall Kinchloe v. States Dept of Health, Washington, The Court of Appeals of the State of Washington, Division 1, http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/Briefs/A01/686429%20Appellant%20Randall%20Kincheloe%27s.pdf

3. The ordinary definition of the term "restrictions" also does not include the reporting and monitoring or supervising terms and conditions that are included in the 2001 Stipulation.

Black's Law Dictionary, 'fifth edition,(1979) defines "restriction" as;

A limitation often imposed in a deed or lease respecting the use to which the property may be put. The term "restrict' is also cross referenced with the term "restrain." Restrain is defined as; To limit, confine, abridge, narrow down, restrict, obstruct, impede, hinder, stay, destroy. To prohibit from action; to put compulsion on; to restrict; to hold or press back. To keep in check; to hold back from acting, proceeding, or advancing, either by physical or moral force, or by interposing obstacle, to repress or suppress, to curb.

In contrast, the terms "supervise" and "supervisor" are defined as; To have general oversight over, to superintend or to inspect. See Supervisor. A surveyor or overseer. . . In a broad sense, one having authority over others, to superintend and direct. The term "supervisor" means an individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibility to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but required the use of independent judgment.

Comparing the above definitions, it is clear that the definition of "restriction" is very different from the definition of "supervision"-very few of the same words are used to explain or define the different terms. In his 2001 stipulation, Mr. Kincheloe essentially agreed to some supervision conditions, but he did not agree to restrict his license.

#### Statutory restrictions require legislative action

The Law Dictionary 13 “What is Statutory Restriction?, The Law Dictionary: **Featuring Black’s Law Dictionary Free Online Legal Dictionary 2nd Edition**, http://thelawdictionary.org/statutory-restriction/

What is STATUTORY RESTRICTION?

Limits or controls that have been place[d] on activities by its ruling legislation.

#### Judicial restrictions require a court --- we’ll read evidence if they question this factual statement

#### A general subject isn’t enough—debate requires a specific point of difference in order to promote effective exchange

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Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a controversy, a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a feet or value or policy, there is no need or opportunity for debate; the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four,” because there is simply no controversy about this state­ment. Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions of issues, there is no debate. Controversy invites decisive choice between competing positions. Debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants live in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity to gain citizenship? Does illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? How are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification card, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this “debate” is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies are best understood when seated clearly such that all parties to the debate share an understanding about the objec­tive of the debate. This enables focus on substantive and objectively identifiable issues facilitating comparison of competing argumentation leading to effective decisions. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor deci­sions, general feelings of tension without opportunity for resolution, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the U.S. Congress to make substantial progress on the immigration debate. Of course, arguments may be presented without disagreement. For exam­ple, claims are presented and supported within speeches, editorials, and advertise­ments even without opposing or refutational response. Argumentation occurs in a range of settings from informal to formal, and may not call upon an audi­ence or judge to make a forced choice among competing claims. Informal dis­course occurs as conversation or panel discussion without demanding a decision about a dichotomous or yes/no question. However, by definition, debate requires "reasoned judgment on a proposition. The proposition is a statement about which competing advocates will offer alternative (pro or con) argumenta­tion calling upon their audience or adjudicator to decide. The proposition pro­vides focus for the discourse and guides the decision process. Even when a decision will be made through a process of compromise, it is important to iden­tify the beginning positions of competing advocates to begin negotiation and movement toward a center, or consensus position. It is frustrating and usually unproductive to attempt to make a decision when deciders are unclear as to what the decision is about. The proposition may be implicit in some applied debates (“Vote for me!”); however, when a vote or consequential decision is called for (as in the courtroom or in applied parliamentary debate) it is essential that the proposition be explicitly expressed (“the defendant is guilty!”). In aca­demic debate, the proposition provides essential guidance for the preparation of the debaters prior to the debate, the case building and discourse presented during the debate, and the decision to be made by the debate judge after the debate. Someone disturbed by the problem of a growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, “Public schools are doing a terri­ble job! They' are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do some­thing about this” or, worse, “It’s too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as “What can be done to improve public education?”—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies, The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities” and “Resolved; That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. This focus contributes to better and more informed decision making with the potential for better results. In aca­demic debate, it provides better depth of argumentation and enhanced opportu­nity for reaping the educational benefits of participation. In the next section, we will consider the challenge of framing the proposition for debate, and its role in the debate. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about a topic, such as ‘"homeless­ness,” or “abortion,” Or “crime,” or “global warming,” we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish a profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement “Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword” is debatable, yet by itself fails to provide much basis for dear argumen­tation. If we take this statement to mean Iliad the written word is more effec­tive than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose, perhaps promoting positive social change. (Note that “loose” propositions, such as the example above, may be defined by their advocates in such a way as to facilitate a clear contrast of competing sides; through definitions and debate they “become” clearly understood statements even though they may not begin as such. There are formats for debate that often begin with this sort of proposition. However, in any debate, at some point, effective and meaningful discussion relies on identification of a clearly stated or understood proposition.) Back to the example of the written word versus physical force. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, web­site development, advertising, cyber-warfare, disinformation, or what? What does it mean to be “mightier" in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be, “Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Laurania of our support in a certain crisis?” The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as “Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treaty with Laurania.” Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advo­cates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Preparation and clash—changing the topic post facto manipulates balance of prep, which structurally favors the aff because they speak last and permute alternatives—strategic fairness is key to engaging a well-prepared opponent which internal link turns all education claims.

#### Topical fairness requirements are key to meaningful dialogue—monopolizing strategy and prep makes the discussion one-sided and subverts any meaningful neg role

Ryan Galloway 7, Samford Comm prof, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007

Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure.¶ Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table.¶ When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. **Far from** being **a banal request for links** to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon **months of preparation**, research, and critical thinking not be silenced.¶ Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms **operate to exclude** particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). Hugh Duncan furthers this line of reasoning:¶ Opponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other because in doing so they enhance their own chances of thinking better and reaching sound decisions. Opposition is necessary because it sharpens thought in action. We assume that argument, discussion, and talk, among free an informed people who subordinate decisions of any kind, because it is only through such discussion that we reach agreement which binds us to a common cause…If we are to be equal…relationships among equals must find expression in many formal and informal institutions (Duncan, 1993, p. 196-197).¶ **Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintains equality for the sake of the conversation** (Farrell, 1985, p. 114).¶ For example, an affirmative case on the 2007-2008 college topic might defend neither state nor international action in the Middle East, and yet claim to be germane to the topic in some way. The case essentially denies the arguments that state action is oppressive or that actions in the international arena are philosophically or pragmatically suspect. Instead of allowing for the dialogue to be modified by the interchange of the affirmative case and the negative response, the affirmative subverts any meaningful role to the negative team, preventing them from offering effective “counter-word” and undermining the value of a meaningful exchange of speech acts. **Germaneness and other substitutes for topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits** of topical advocacy.

#### The impact outweighs—deliberative debate models impart skills vital to respond to existential threats

Christian O. Lundberg 10 Professor of Communications @ University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, “Tradition of Debate in North Carolina” in Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century By Allan D. Louden, p. 311

The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. But the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speech—as indicated earlier, debate builds capacity for critical thinking, analysis of public claims, informed decision making, and better public judgment. If the picture of modem political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid scientific and technological change outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution, at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to rearticulation precisely because as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy such as Ocwey in The Public awl Its Problems place such a high premium on education (Dewey 1988,63, 154). Debate provides an indispensible form of education in the modem articulation of democracy because it builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed about policy decisions that impact them, to sort through and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly information-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them.

The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy. John Larkin (2005, HO) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multimediated information environment (ibid-). Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources:

To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instmction/no instruction and debate topic . . . that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned . . . students in the Instnictional [debate) group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so----These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in (debate).... These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144)

Larkin's study substantiates Thomas Worthcn and Gaylcn Pack's (1992, 3) claim that debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthcn and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials.

There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively, the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice in the classroom as a technology for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities. The unique combination of critical thinking skills, research and information processing skills, oral communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education, and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of meaningful political engagement and new articulations of democratic life.

Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens that can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to produce revisions of democratic life that are necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive. Democracy faces a myriad of challenges, including: domestic and international issues of class, gender, and racial justice; wholesale environmental destruction and the potential for rapid climate change; emerging threats to international stability in the form of terrorism, intervention and new possibilities for great power conflict; and increasing challenges of rapid globalization including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. More than any specific policy or proposal, an informed and active citizenry that deliberates with greater skill and sensitivity provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with the existential challenges to democracy [in an] increasingly complex world.

### 1NC

#### Evan and I affirm the transformative legal genealogies, cartographies, and counter-archives of Nde memory and pictographs that rupture the carceral architecture of containment while retaining current Presidential war powers authority over indefinite detention under the Authorization for Use of Military Force of 2001.

#### We believe the pictographs handed out before the round can support our counterplan just as they can support the plan.

#### And, we will also introduce a reading of “The Birth of Thought Woman”

Children shrink from blood

Relations whose faces dictate them trust

Whose hands and words peck

The order like sport

Relatives say

Maize saves people from themselves

This food is medicine

Says the road man

But the medicine is laced uranium rape DDT lynching

Toxaphene apartheid radiation blood violence

And the seed keeper rapes his wife like

Pistons ram inside pipes

And his sons rape her daughter like

Scissors want to be cut

Smash her son’s head as tidal waves

Pound the shore

We didn’t count on that but were warned and English says

Little in long sounds with no air

The fetus inside the moon curdles in her

Milkysoft placenta we’re going back in

Time to the end of the barbed world

English says

Little in long sounds

No air

I tell the rapist’s words to my grandmothers

To my grandmothers to my grandmothers

Splitting my body

Making me unnatural

When I walk away from

The shove of wounds

I am sound before language

Before language

Before all language until

Spider’s web spins and unfurls her next move

Thought…it’s your turn to be born

War is at hand[[1]](#endnote-1)

#### Solves the entirety of the aff --- they have NO reason why ending indefinite detention in the context of the current war on terror is required to resolve any of their impacts which are all about natives.

#### Reforms to ID result in catastrophic terrorists attacks --- releases individuals who will commit terrorist acts

Jack Goldsmith 9, Henry L. Shattuck Professor at Harvard Law School, 2/4/09, “Long-Term Terrorist Detention and Our National Security Court,” http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2009/2/09%20detention%20goldsmith/0209\_detention\_goldsmith.pdf

These three concerns challenge the detention paradigm. They do nothing to eliminate the need for detention to prevent detainees returning to the battlefield. But many believe that we can meet this need by giving trials to everyone we want to detain and then incarcerating them under a theory of conviction rather than of military detention. I disagree. For many reasons, it is too risky for the U.S. government to deny itself the traditional military detention power altogether, and to commit itself instead to try or release every suspected terrorist. ¶ For one thing, military detention will be necessary in Iraq and Afghanistan for the foreseeable future. For another, we likely cannot secure convictions of all of the dangerous terrorists at Guantánamo, much less all future dangerous terrorists, who legitimately qualify for non-criminal military detention. The evidentiary and procedural standards of trials, civilian and military alike, are much higher than the analogous standards for detention. With some terrorists too menacing to set free, the standards will prove difficult to satisfy. Key evidence in a given case may come from overseas and verifying it, understanding its provenance, or establishing its chain of custody in the manners required by criminal trials may be difficult. This problem is exacerbated when evidence was gathered on a battlefield or during an armed skirmish. The problem only grows when the evidence is old. And perhaps most importantly, the use of such evidence in a criminal process may compromise intelligence sources and methods, requiring the disclosure of the identities of confidential sources or the nature of intelligence-gathering techniques, such as a sophisticated electronic interception capability. ¶ Opponents of non-criminal detention observe that despite these considerations, the government has successfully prosecuted some Al Qaeda terrorists—in particular, Zacharias Moussaoui and Jose Padilla. This is true, but it does not follow that prosecutions are achievable in every case in which disabling a terrorist suspect represents a surpassing government interest. Moreover, the Moussaoui and Padilla prosecutions highlight an under-appreciated cost of trials, at least in civilian courts. The Moussaoui and Padilla trials were messy affairs that stretched, and some observers believe broke, our ordinary criminal trial conceptions of conspiracy law and the rights of the accused, among other things. The Moussaoui trial, for example, watered down the important constitutional right of the defendant to confront witnesses against him in court, and the Padilla trial rested on an unprecedentedly broad conception of conspiracy.15 An important but under-appreciated cost of using trials in all cases is that these prosecutions will invariably bend the law in ways unfavorable to civil liberties and due process, and these changes, in turn, will invariably spill over into non-terrorist prosecutions and thus skew the larger criminal justice process.16¶ A final problem with using any trial system, civilian or military, as the sole lawful basis for terrorist detention is that the trials can result in short sentences (as the first military commission trial did) or even acquittal of a dangerous terrorist.17 In criminal trials, guilty defendants often go free because of legal technicalities, government inability to introduce probative evidence, and other factors beyond the defendant's innocence. These factors are all exacerbated in terrorist trials by the difficulties of getting information from the place of capture, by classified information restrictions, and by stale or tainted evidence. One way to get around this problem is to assert the authority, as the Bush administration did, to use non-criminal detention for persons acquitted or given sentences too short to neutralize the danger they pose. But such an authority would undermine the whole purpose of trials and would render them a sham. As a result, putting a suspect on trial can make it hard to detain terrorists the government deems dangerous. For example, the government would have had little trouble defending the indefinite detention of Salim Hamdan, Osama Bin Laden's driver, under a military detention rationale. Having put him on trial before a military commission, however, it was stuck with the light sentence that Hamdan is completing at home in Yemen.¶ As a result of these considerations, insistence on the exclusive use of criminal trials and the elimination of non-criminal detention would significantly raise the chances of releasing dangerous terrorists who would return to kill Americans or others. Since noncriminal military detention is clearly a legally available option—at least if it is expressly authorized by Congress and contains adequate procedural guarantees—this risk should be unacceptable. In past military conflicts, the release of an enemy soldier posed risks. But they were not dramatic risks, for there was only so much damage a lone actor or small group of individuals could do.18 Today, however, that lone actor can cause far more destruction and mayhem because technological advances are creating ever-smaller and ever-deadlier weapons. It would be astounding if the American system, before the advent of modern terrorism, struck the balance between security and liberty in a manner that precisely reflected the new threats posed by asymmetric warfare. We face threats from individuals today that are of a different magnitude than threats by individuals in the past; having government authorities that reflect that change makes sense.

#### Nuclear terrorism is feasible --- high risk of theft and attacks escalate

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Hundreds of scientific papers and reports have been published on nuclear terrorism. International conferences have been held on this threat with participation of Russian organizations, including IMEMO and the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies. Recommendations on how to combat the threat have been issued by the International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe, Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, Russian-American Elbe Group, and other organizations. The UN General Assembly adopted the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in 2005 and cooperation among intelligence services of leading states in this sphere is developing.¶ At the same time, these efforts fall short for a number of reasons, partly because various acts of nuclear terrorism are possible. Dispersal of radioactive material by detonation of conventional explosives (“dirty bombs”) is a method that is most accessible for terrorists. With the wide spread of radioactive sources, raw materials for such attacks have become much more accessible than weapons-useable nuclear material or nuclear weapons. The use of “dirty bombs” will not cause many immediate casualties, but it will result into long-term radioactive contamination, contributing to the spread of panic and socio-economic destabilization.¶ Severe **consequences can be caused by sabotaging nuclear power plants, research reactors, and radioactive materials storage facilities. Large cities are especially vulnerable to such attacks. A large city may host dozens of research reactors with a nuclear power plant or a couple of spent nuclear fuel storage facilities and dozens of large radioactive materials storage facilities located nearby.** The past few years have seen significant efforts made to enhance organizational and physical aspects of security at facilities, especially at nuclear power plants. Efforts have also been made to improve security culture. But these efforts do not preclude the possibility that well-trained terrorists may be able to penetrate nuclear facilities.¶ Some estimates show that sabotage of a research reactor in a metropolis may expose hundreds of thousands to high doses of radiation. A formidable part of the city would become uninhabitable for a long time.¶ Of all the scenarios, it is building an improvised nuclear device by terrorists that poses the maximum risk. **There are no engineering problems that cannot be solved if terrorists decide to build a simple “gun-type” nuclear device.** Information on the design of such devices, as well as implosion-type devices, is available in the public domain. It is the acquisition of weapons-grade uranium that presents the sole serious obstacle. Despite numerous preventive measures taken, we cannot rule out the possibility that such materials can be bought on the black market. Theft of weapons-grade uranium is also possible. Research reactor fuel is considered to be particularly vulnerable to theft, as it is scattered at sites in dozens of countries. There are about 100 research reactors in the world that run on weapons-grade uranium fuel, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).¶ A terrorist “gun-type” uranium bomb can have a yield of least 10-15 kt, which is comparable to the yield of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. The explosion of such a bomb in a modern metropolis can kill and wound hundreds of thousands and cause serious economic damage. There will also be long-term sociopsychological and political consequences.¶ The vast majority of states have introduced unprecedented security and surveillance measures at transportation and other large-scale public facilities after the terrorist attacks in the United States, Great Britain, Italy, and other countries. These measures have proved burdensome for the countries’ populations, but the public has accepted them as necessary. A nuclear terrorist attack will make the public accept further measures meant to enhance control even if these measures significantly restrict the democratic liberties they are accustomed to. Authoritarian states could be expected to adopt even more restrictive measures.¶ If a nuclear terrorist act occurs, nations will delegate tens of thousands of their secret services’ best personnel to investigate and attribute the attack. Radical Islamist groups are among those capable of such an act. We can imagine what would happen if they do so, given the anti-Muslim sentiments and resentment that conventional terrorist attacks by Islamists have generated in developed democratic countries. Mass deportation of the non-indigenous population and severe sanctions would follow such an attack in what will cause **violent protests in the Muslim world**. **Series of armed clashing terrorist attacks may follow**. The prediction that Samuel Huntington has made in his book “The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order” may come true. Huntington’s book clearly demonstrates that it is not Islamic extremists that are the cause of the Western world’s problems. Rather there is a deep, intractable conflict that is rooted in the fault lines that run between Islam and Christianity. This is especially dangerous for Russia because these fault lines run across its territory. To sum it up, the political leadership of Russia has every reason to revise its list of factors that could undermine strategic stability.  BMD does not deserve to be even last on that list because its effectiveness in repelling massive missile strikes will be extremely low. BMD systems can prove useful only if deployed to defend against launches of individual ballistic missiles or groups of such missiles. Prioritization of other destabilizing factors—that could affect global and regional stability—merits a separate study or studies. But even without them I can conclude that nuclear terrorism should be placed on top of the list. The threat of nuclear terrorism is real, and a successful nuclear terrorist attack would lead to a radical transformation of the global order.  All of the threats on the revised list must become a subject of thorough studies by experts. States need to work hard to forge a common understanding of these threats and develop a strategy to combat them.

#### Terrorism studies are epistemologically and methodologically valid --- our authors are self-reflexive

Michael J. Boyle 8, School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews, and John Horgan, International Center for the Study of Terrorism, Department of Psychology, Pennsylvania State University, April 2008, “A Case Against Critical Terrorism Studies,” Critical Studies On Terrorism, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 51-64

Jackson (2007c) calls for the development of an explicitly CTS on the basis of what he argues preceded it, dubbed ‘Orthodox Terrorism Studies’. The latter, he suggests, is characterized by: (1) its poor methods and theories, (2) its state centricity, (3) its problemsolving orientation, and (4) its institutional and intellectual links to state security projects. Jackson argues that the major defining characteristic of CTS, on the other hand, should be ‘a skeptical attitude towards accepted terrorism “knowledge”’. **An implicit presumption from this is that terrorism scholars have laboured for all of these years without being aware that their area of study has an implicit bias, as well as definitional and methodological problems.** In fact, **terrorism scholars are** not only well aware of these problems, but also have provided their own searchingcritiques of the field at various points during the last few decades (e.g. Silke 1996, Crenshaw 1998, Gordon 1999, Horgan 2005, esp. ch. 2, ‘Understanding Terrorism’). **Some of those scholars** most associated with the critique of empiricismimplied in ‘Orthodox Terrorism Studies’ **have also engaged in** deeply critical examinations **of the nature of sources, methods, and data in the study of terrorism**. For example, Jackson (2007a) regularly cites the handbook produced by **Schmid and Jongman** (1988) to support his claims that theoretical progress has been limited. But this fact was well recognized by the authors; indeed, in the introduction of the second edition they **point out** that they have not revised their chapter on theories of terrorism from the first edition, because the **failure to address** persistent conceptual and **data problems** has undermined progress in the field. The point of their handbook was to sharpen and make more comprehensive the result of research on terrorism, not to glide over its methodological and definitional failings (Schmid and Jongman 1988, p. xiv). Similarly, **Silke’s** (2004) **volume on the state of the field of terrorism research performed a similar function**, highlighting the shortcomings of the field, in particular the lack of rigorous primary data collection. **A non-reflective community of scholars does not produce such scathing indictments of its own work.**

#### Extinction---equivalent to full-scale nuclear war

Owen B. Toon 7, chair of the Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences at CU-Boulder, et al., April 19, 2007, “Atmospheric effects and societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts and acts of individual nuclear terrorism,” online: http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/acp-7-1973-2007.pdf

To an increasing extent, **people are congregating in the world’s great urban centers, creating megacities with populations exceeding 10 million individuals**. At the same time, **advanced technology has designed nuclear explosives of such small size they can be easily transported in a car**, small plane or boat **to the heart of a city**. We demonstrate here that **a single detonation in the 15 kiloton range can produce urban fatalities approaching one million** in some cases, **and casualties** exceeding one million. Thousands of small weapons still exist in the arsenals of the U.S. and Russia, and there are at least six other countries with substantial nuclear weapons inventories. In all, thirty-three countries control sufficient amounts of highly enriched uranium or plutonium to assemble nuclear explosives. A conflict between any of these countries involving 50-100 weapons with yields of 15 kt has the potential to create fatalities rivaling those of the Second World War. Moreover, **even a single surface nuclear explosion**, or an air burst in rainy conditions, **in a city center is likely to cause the entire metropolitan area to be abandoned at least for decades** owing to infrastructure damage and radioactive contamination. As the aftermath of hurricane Katrina in Louisiana suggests, **the economic consequences of even a localized nuclear catastrophe would most likely have severe national and** international economic consequences. Striking effects result even from relatively small nuclear attacks because low yield detonations are most effective against city centers where business and social activity as well as population are concentrated. Rogue nations and terrorists would be most likely to strike there. Accordingly, an organized **attack on the U.S. by a small nuclear state, or terrorists** supported by such a state, could generate casualties comparable to those once predicted for a full-scale nuclear “counterforce” exchange in a superpower conflict. Remarkably, the **estimated quantities of smoke generated by attacks totaling about one megaton of nuclear explosives** could lead to significant global climate perturbations (Robock et al., 2007). While we did not extend our casualty and damage predictions to include potential medical, social or economic impacts following the initial explosions, such analyses have been performed in the past for large-scale nuclear war scenarios (Harwell and Hutchinson, 1985). Such a study should be carried out as well for the present scenarios and physical outcomes.

## On Case

### 1NC

#### The 1AC’s use of decolonization as a metaphor for debate is a way to assuage our guilt and entrench the status quo---playing Indian is the oldest move in the imperialist book---reject the 1ac to force the aff to face the complicity of their gesture

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Decolonization as metaphor allows people to equivocate these contradictory decolonial desires because it turns decolonization into an empty signifier to be filled by any track towards liberation. In reality, the tracks walk all over land/people in settler contexts. Though the details are not fixed or agreed upon, in our view, decolonization in the settler colonial context must involve the repatriation of land simultaneous to the recognition of how land and relations to land have always already been differently understood and enacted; that is, all of the land, and not just symbolically. This is precisely why decolonization is necessarily unsettling, especially across lines of solidarity. “Decolonization never takes place unnoticed” (Fanon, 1963, p. 36). Settler colonialism and its decolonization implicates and unsettles everyone.¶ Playing Indian and the erasure of Indigenous peoples¶ Recently in a symposium on the significance of Liberal Arts education in the United States, Eve presented an argument that Liberal Arts education has historically excluded any attention to or analysis of settler colonialism. This, Eve posited, makes Liberal Arts education complicit in the project of settler colonialism and, more so, has rendered the truer project of Liberal Arts education something like trying to make the settler indigenous to the land he occupies. The attendees were titillated by this idea, nodding and murmuring in approval and it was then that Eve realized that she was trying to say something incommensurable with what they expected her to say. She was completely misunderstood. Many in the audience heard this observation: that the work of Liberal Arts education is in part to teach settlers to be indigenous, as something admirable, worthwhile, something wholesome, not as a problematic point of evidence about the reach of the settler colonial erasure.¶ Philip Deloria (1998) explores how and why the settler wants to be made indigenous, even if only through disguise, or other forms of playing Indian. Playing Indian is a powerful U.S. pastime, from the Boston Tea Party, to fraternal organizations, to new age trends, to even those aforementioned Native print underwear. Deloria maintains that, “From the colonial period to the present, the Indian has skulked in and out of the most important stories various Americans have told about themselves” (p. 5). ¶ The indeterminacy of American identities stems, in part, from the nation’s inability to deal with Indian people. Americans wanted to feel a natural affinity with the continent, and it was Indians who could teach them such aboriginal closeness. Yet, in order to control the landscape they had to destroy the original inhabitants. (Deloria, 1998, p.5)¶ L. Frank Baum (author of The Wizard of Oz) famously asserted in 1890 that the safety of white settlers was only guaranteed by the “total annihilation of the few remaining Indians” (as quoted in Hastings, 2007). D.H. Lawrence, reading James Fenimore Cooper (discussed at length later in this article), Nathaniel Hawthorne, Hector St. John de Crevecoeur, Henry David Thoreau, Herman Melville, Walt Whitman and others for his Studies in Classic American Literature (1924), describes Americans’ fascination with Indigeneity as one of simultaneous desire and repulsion (Deloria, 1998).¶ “No place,” Lawrence observed, “exerts its full influence upon a newcomer until the old inhabitant is dead or absorbed.” Lawrence argued that in order to meet the “demon of the continent” head on and this finalize the “unexpressed spirit of America,” white Americans needed either to destroy Indians of assimilate them into a white American world...both aimed at making Indians vanish from the landscape. (Lawrence, as quoted in Deloria, 1998, p. 4).¶ Everything within a settler colonial society strains to destroy or assimilate the Native in order to disappear them from the land - this is how a society can have multiple simultaneous and conflicting messages about Indigenous peoples, such as all Indians are dead, located in faraway reservations, that contemporary Indigenous people are less indigenous than prior generations, and that all Americans are a “little bit Indian.” These desires to erase - to let time do its thing and wait for the older form of living to die out, or to even help speed things along (euthanize) because the death of pre-modern ways of life is thought to be inevitable - these are all desires for another kind of resolve to the colonial situation, resolved through the absolute and total destruction or assimilation of original inhabitants.¶ Numerous scholars have observed that Indigeneity prompts multiple forms of settler anxiety, even if only because the presence of Indigenous peoples - who make a priori claims to land and ways of being - is a constant reminder that the settler colonial project is incomplete (Fanon, 1963; Vine Deloria, 1988; Grande, 2004; Bruyneel, 2007). The easy adoption of decolonization as a metaphor (and nothing else) is a form of this anxiety, because it is a premature attempt at reconciliation. The absorption of decolonization by settler social justice frameworks is one way the settler, disturbed by her own settler status, tries to escape or contain the unbearable searchlight of complicity, of having harmed others just by being one’s self. The desire to reconcile is just as relentless as the desire to disappear the Native; it is a desire to not have to deal with this (Indian) problem anymore.¶ Settler moves to innocence¶ We observe that another component of a desire to play Indian is a settler desire to be made innocent, to find some mercy or relief in face of the relentlessness of settler guilt and haunting (see Tuck and Ree, forthcoming, on mercy and haunting). Directly and indirectly benefitting from the erasure and assimilation of Indigenous peoples is a difficult reality for settlers to accept. The weight of this reality is uncomfortable; the misery of guilt makes one hurry toward any reprieve. In her 1998 Master’s thesis, Janet Mawhinney analyzed the ways in which white people maintained and (re)produced white privilege in self-defined anti-racist settings and organizations.8 She examined the role of storytelling and self-confession - which serves to equate stories of personal exclusion with stories of structural racism and exclusion - and what she terms ‘moves to innocence,’ or “strategies to remove involvement in and culpability for systems of domination” (p. 17). Mawhinney builds upon Mary Louise Fellows and Sherene Razack’s (1998) conceptualization of, ‘the race to innocence’, “the process through which a woman comes to believe her own claim of subordination is the most urgent, and that she is unimplicated in the subordination of other women” (p. 335).¶ Mawhinney’s thesis theorizes the self-positioning of white people as simultaneously the oppressed and never an oppressor, and as having an absence of experience of oppressive power relations (p. 100). This simultaneous self-positioning afforded white people in various purportedly anti-racist settings to say to people of color, “I don’t experience the problems you do, so I don’t think about it,” and “tell me what to do, you’re the experts here” (p. 103). “The commonsense appeal of such statements,” Malwhinney observes, enables white speakers to “utter them sanguine in [their] appearance of equanimity, is rooted in the normalization of a liberal analysis of power relations” (ibid.).¶ In the discussion that follows, we will do some work to identify and argue against a series of what we call ‘settler moves to innocence’. Settler moves to innocence are those strategies or positionings that attempt to relieve the settler of feelings of guilt or responsibility without giving up land or power or privilege, without having to change much at all. In fact, settler scholars may gain professional kudos or a boost in their reputations for being so sensitive or self-aware. Yet settler moves to innocence are hollow, they only serve the settler. This discussion will likely cause discomfort in our settler readers, may embarrass you/us or make us/you feel implicated. Because of the racialized flights and flows of settler colonial empire described above, settlers are diverse - there are white settlers and brown settlers, and peoples in both groups make moves to innocence that attempt to deny and deflect their own complicity in settler colonialism. When it makes sense to do so, we attend to moves to innocence enacted differently by white people and by brown and Black people. ¶ In describing settler moves to innocence, our goal is to provide a framework of excuses, distractions, and diversions from decolonization. We discuss some of the moves to innocence at greater length than others, mostly because some require less explanation and because others are more central to our initial argument for the demetaphorization of decolonization. We provide this framework so that we can be more impatient with each other, less likely to accept gestures and half-steps, and more willing to press for acts which unsettle innocence, which we discuss in the final section of this article.

#### The aff’s claim to emancipation collapses the real material difference between our position as debaters and oppressed individuals for whom resistance is not a simple language-game---their deployment of an unproblematic posture of victimization spotlights the aff’s righteousness while robbing the oppressed of protest

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\*We do not endorse ableist language

Until the very end of the novel, Jane is always excluded from every available form of social power. Her survival seems to depend on renouncing what power might come to her as teacher, mistress, cousin, heiress, or missionary's wife. She repeatedly flees from such forms of inclusion in the field of power, as if her status as an exemplary subject, like her authority as narrator, depends entirely on her claim to a kind of truth which can only be made from a position of powerlessness. By creating such an unlovely heroine and subjecting her to one form of harassment after another, Brontë demonstrates the power of words alone. 18¶ This reading of Jane Eyre highlights her not simply as the female underdog who is often identified by feminist and Marxist critics, but as the intellectual who acquires power through a moral rectitude that was to become the flip side of Western imperialism's ruthlessness. Lying at the core of Anglo­American liberalism, this moral rectitude would accompany many territorial and economic conquests overseas with a firm sense of social mission. When Jane Eyre went to the colonies in the nineteenth century, she turned into the Christian missionary. It is this understanding—that Brontë's depiction of a socially marginalized English woman is, in terms of ideological production, fully complicit with England's empire­building ambition rather than opposed to it—that prompted Gayatri Spivak to read Jane Eyre as a text in the service of imperialism. Referring to Brontë's treatment of the "madwoman" Bertha Mason, the white Jamaican Creole character, Spivak charges Jane Eyre for, precisely, its humanism, in which the "native subject" is not created as an animal but as "the object of what might be termed the terrorism of¶ 12¶ the categorical imperative." This kind of creation is imperialism's use/travesty of the Kantian metaphysical demand to "make the heathen into a human so that he can be treated as an end in himself." 19 In the twentieth century, as Europe's former colonies became independent, Jane Eyre became the Maoist. Michel de Certeau describes the affinity between her two major reincarnations, one religious and the other political, this way:¶ The place that was formerly occupied by the Church or Churches vis­à­vis the established powers remains recognizable, over the past two centuries, in the functioning of the opposition known as leftist….¶ [T]here is vis­à­vis the established order, a relationship between the Churches that defended an other world and the parties of the left which, since the nineteenth century, have promoted a different future. In both cases, similar functional characteristics can be discerned….20¶ The Maoist retains many of Jane's awesome features, chief of which are a protestant passion to turn powerlessness into "truth" and an idealist intolerance of those who may think differently from her. Whereas the great Orientalist blames the living "third world" natives for the loss of the ancient non­Western civilization, his loved object, the Maoist applauds the same natives for personifying and fulfilling her ideals. For the Maoist in the 1970s, the mainland Chinese were, in spite of their "backwardness," a puritanical alternative to the West in human form—a dream come true.¶ In the 1980s and 1990s, however, the Maoist is disillusioned to watch the China they sanctified crumble before their eyes. This is the period in which we hear disapproving criticisms of contemporary Chinese people for liking Western pop music and consumer culture, or for being overly interested in sex. In a way that makes her indistinguishable from what at first seems a political enemy, the Orientalist, the Maoist now mourns the loss of her loved object—Socialist China—by pointing angrily at living "third world" natives. For many who have built their careers on the vision of Socialist China, the grief is tremendous. In the "cultural studies" of the American academy in the 1990s, the Maoist is reproducing with prowess. We see this in the way¶ 13¶ terms such as "oppression," "victimization," and "subalternity" are now being used. Contrary to Orientalist disdain for contemporary native cultures of the non­West, the Maoist turns precisely the "disdained'' other into the object of his/her study and, in some cases, identification. In a mixture of admiration and moralism, the Maoist sometimes turns all people from non­Western cultures into a generalized "subaltern" that is then used to flog an equally generalized "West." 21¶ Because the representation of "the other" as such ignores (1) the class and intellectual hierarchies within these other cultures, which are usually as elaborate as those in the West, and (2) the discursive power relations structuring the Maoist's mode of inquiry and valorization, it produces a way of talking in which notions of lack, subalternity, victimization, and so forth are drawn upon indiscriminately, often with the intention of spotlighting the speaker's own sense of alterity and political righteousness. A comfortably wealthy white American intellectual I know claimed that he was a "third world intellectual," citing as one of his credentials his marriage to a Western European woman of part­Jewish heritage; a professor of English complained about being "victimized" by the structured time at an Ivy League institution, meaning that she needed to be on time for classes; a graduate student of upper­class background from one of the world's poorest countries told his American friends that he was of poor peasant stock in order to authenticate his identity as a radical "third world" representative; male and female academics across the U.S. frequently say they were "raped" when they report experiences of professional frustration and conflict. Whether sincere or delusional, such cases of self­dramatization all take the route of self­subalternization, which has increasingly become the assured means to authority and power. What these intellectuals are doing is robbing the terms of oppression of their critical and oppositional import, and thus depriving the oppressed of even the vocabulary of protest and rightful demand. The oppressed, whose voices we seldom hear, are robbed twice—the first time of their economic chances, the second time of their language, which is now no longer distinguishable from those of us who have had our consciousnesses "raised."¶ In their analysis of the relation between violence and representation, Armstrong and Tennenhouse write: "[The] idea of violence ¶ 14¶ as representation is not an easy one for most academics to accept. It implies that whenever we speak for someone else we are inscribing her with our own (implicitly masculine) idea of order." 22 At present, this process of "inscribing" often means not only that we "represent" certain historic others because they are/were ''oppressed"; it often means that there is interest in representation only when what is represented can in some way be seen as lacking. Even though the Maoist is usually contemptuous of Freudian psychoanalysis because it is "bourgeois," her investment in oppression and victimization fully partakes of the Freudian and Lacanian notions of "lack." By attributing "lack," the Maoist justifies the "speaking for someone else" that Armstrong and Tennenhouse call "violence as representation."¶ As in the case of Orientalism, which does not necessarily belong only to those who are white, the Maoist does not have to be racially "white" either. The phrase "white guilt" refers to a type of discourse which continues to position power and lack against each other, while the narrator of that discourse, like Jane Eyre, speaks with power but identifies with powerlessness. This is how even those who come from privilege more often than not speak from/of/as its "lack." What the Maoist demonstrates is a circuit of productivity that draws its capital from others' deprivation while refusing to acknowledge its own presence as endowed. With the material origins of her own discourse always concealed, the Maoist thus speaks as if her charges were a form of immaculate conception.¶ The difficulty facing us, it seems to me, is no longer simply the "first world" Orientalist who mourns the rusting away of his treasures, but also students from privileged backgrounds Western and non­Western, who conform behaviorally in every respect with the elitism of their social origins (e.g., through powerful matrimonial alliances, through pursuit of fame, or through a contemptuous arrogance toward fellow students) but who nonetheless proclaim dedication to "vindicating the subalterns." My point is not that they should be blamed for the accident of their birth, nor that they cannot marry rich, pursue fame, or even be arrogant. Rather, it is that they choose to see in others' powerlessness an idealized image of themselves and refuse to hear in the dissonance between the content and manner of their speech their own complicity with violence. Even though these descendents of the Maoist may be quick to point¶ 15¶ out the exploitativeness of Benjamin Disraeli's "The East is a career," 23 they remain blind to their own exploitativeness as they make "the East" their career. How do we intervene in the productivity of this overdetermined circuit?

#### This is especially true in this context---debate too easily becomes a narcotic that eases our anxiety about colonization

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Describing acts of passing, Sara Ahmed (2000) asserts the importance of being able to replace “the stranger”, or take the place of the other, in the consolidation and (re)affirmation of white identity. To “become without becoming,” is to reproduce “the other as ‘not-I’ within rather than beyond the structure of the ‘I’” (p. 132). Sherene Razack, reading Ahmed, tells us that appropriating the other’s pain occurs when, “we think we are recognizing not only the other’s pain but his or her difference. Difference becomes the conduit of identification in much the same way as pain does” (Razack, 2007, p. 379). Discussing the film Dances with Wolves (a cinematic fiction of a Union soldier in the post-bellum Civil War era who befriends and protects the Lakota Sioux, who are represented as a noble, dying race), Ahmed critically engages the narrative, in which a white man (played by Kevin Costner) comes to respect the Sioux,¶ to the point of being able to dance their dances...the white man in this example is able to ‘to become without becoming’ (Ahmed, 2000, p. 32)...He alone is transformed through his encounter with the Sioux, while they remain the mechanism for his transformation. He becomes the authentic knower while they remain what is to be known and consumed, and spit out again, as good Indians who confirm the white man’s position as hero of the story...the Sioux remain objects, while Kevin Costner is able to go anywhere and be anything. (Ahmed’s analysis, as discussed by Razack, 2007, p. 379).¶ For the purposes of this article, we locate the desire to become without becoming [Indian] within settler adoption fantasies. These fantasies can mean the adoption of Indigenous practices and knowledge, but more, refer to those narratives in the settler colonial imagination in which the Native (understanding that he is becoming extinct) hands over his land, his claim to the land, his very Indian-ness to the settler for safe-keeping. This is a fantasy that is invested in a settler futurity and dependent on the foreclosure of an Indigenous futurity.¶ Settler adoption fantasies are longstanding narratives in the United States, fueled by rare instances of ceremonial “adoptions”, from John Smith’s adoption in 1607 by Powhatan (Pocahontas’ father), to Lewis Henry Morgan’s adoption in 1847 by Seneca member Jimmy Johnson, to the recent adoption of actor Johnny Depp by the family of LaDonna Harris, a Comanche woman and social activist. As sovereign nations, tribes make decisions about who is considered a member, so our interest is not in whether adoptions are appropriate or legitimate. Rather, because the prevalence of the adoption narrative in American literature, film, television, holidays and history books far exceeds the actual occurrences of adoptions, we are interested in how this narrative spins a fantasy that an individual settler can become innocent, indeed heroic and indigenized, against a backdrop of national guilt. The adoption fantasy is the mythical trump card desired by critical settlers who feel remorse about settler colonialism, one that absolves them from the inheritance of settler crimes and that bequeaths a new inheritance of Native-ness and claims to land (which is a reaffirmation of what the settler project has been all along).¶ <cont>¶ In this fantasy, Hawkeye is both adopter and adoptee. The act of adopting indigenous ways makes him ‘deserving’ to be adopted by the Indigenous. Settler fantasies of adoption alleviate the anxiety of settler un-belonging. He adopts the love of land and therefore thinks he belongs to the land. He is a first environmentalist and sentimentalist, nostalgic for vanishing Native ways. In today’s jargon, he could be thought of as an eco-activist, naturalist, and Indian sympathizer. At the same time, his cultural hybridity is what makes him more ‘fit’ to survive - the ultimate social Darwinism - better than both British and Indian; he is the mythical American. Hawkeye, hybrid white and Indian, becomes the reluctant but nonetheless rightful inheritor of the land and warden of its vanishing people.¶ Similarly, the settler intellectual who hybridizes decolonial thought with Western critical traditions (metaphorizing decolonization), emerges superior to both Native intellectuals and continental theorists simultaneously. With his critical hawk-eye, he again sees the critique better than anyone and sees the world from a loftier station 14. It is a fiction, just as Cooper’s Hawkeye, just as the adoption, just as the belonging.¶ In addition to fabricating historical memory, the Tales serve to generate historical amnesia. The books were published between 1823-1841, at the height of the Jacksonian period with the Indian Removal Act of 1830 and subsequent Trail of Tears 1831-1837. During this time, 46,000 Native Americans were removed from their homelands, opening 25 million acres of land for re-settlement. The Tales are not only silent on Indian Removal but narrate the Indian as vanishing in an earlier time frame, and thus Indigenous people are already dead prior to removal.¶ Performing sympathy is critical to Cooper’s project of settler innocence. It is no accident that he is often read as a sympathizer to the Indians (despite the fact that he didn’t know any) in contrast to Jackson’s policies of removal and genocide. Cooper is cast as the ‘innocent’ father of U.S. ideology, in contrast to the ‘bad white men’ of history.¶ Performing suffering is also critical to Cooper’s project of settler innocence. Hawkeye takes on the (imagined) demeanor of the vanishing Native - brooding, vengeful, protecting a dying way of life, and unsuccessful in finding a mate and producing offspring. Thus sympathy and suffering are the tokens used to absorb the Native Other’s difference, coded as pain, the ‘not- I’ into the ‘I’.¶ The settler’s personal suffering feeds his fantasy of mutuality. The 2011 film, The Descendants, is a modern remake of the adoption fantasy (blended with a healthy dose of settler nativism). George Clooney’s character, “King” is a haole hypo-descendant of the last surviving princess of Hawai’i and reluctant inheritor of a massive expanse of land, the last wilderness on the Island of Kauai. In contrast to his obnoxious settler cousins, he earns his privilege as an overworked lawyer rather than relying on his unearned inheritance. Furthermore, Clooney’s character suffers - he is a dysfunctional father, heading a dysfunctional family, watching his wife wither away in a coma, learning that she cheated on him - and so he is somehow Hawaiian at heart. Because pain is the token for oppression, claims to pain then equate to claims of being an innocent non-oppressor. By the film’s end, King goes against the wishes of his profiteering settler cousins and chooses to “keep” the land, reluctantly accepting that his is the steward of the land, a responsibility bequeathed upon him as an accident of birth. This is the denouement of reconciliation between the settler-I and the interiorized native-not-I within the settler. Sympathy and suffering are profoundly satisfying for settler cinema: The Descendants was nominated for 5 Academy Awards and won for Best Adapted Screenplay in 2012.¶ The beauty of this settler fantasy is that it adopts decolonization and aborts it in one gesture. Hawkeye adopts Uncas, who then conveniently dies. King adopts Hawai’i and negates the necessity for ea, Kanaka Maoli sovereignty. Decolonization is stillborn - rendered irrelevant because decolonization is already completed by the indigenized consciousness of the settler. Now ‘we’ are all Indian, all Hawaiian, and decolonization is no longer an issue. ‘Our’ only recourse is to move forward, however regretfully, with ‘our’ settler future.

#### Decolonizing the academy is an attempt to proclaim innocence and assuage our guilt---proposing specific reforms is necessary to overcome the temptations of this palliative---also proves T version of aff

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Fanon told us in 1963 that decolonizing the mind is the first step, not the only step toward overthrowing colonial regimes. Yet we wonder whether another settler move to innocence is to focus on decolonizing the mind, or the cultivation of critical consciousness, as if it were the sole activity of decolonization; to allow conscientization to stand in for the more uncomfortable task of relinquishing stolen land. We agree that curricula, literature, and pedagogy can be crafted to aid people in learning to see settler colonialism, to articulate critiques of settler epistemology, and set aside settler histories and values in search of ethics that reject domination and exploitation; this is not unimportant work. However, the front-loading of critical consciousness building can waylay decolonization, even though the experience of teaching and learning to be critical of settler colonialism can be so powerful it can feel like it is indeed making change. Until stolen land is relinquished, critical consciousness does not translate into action that disrupts settler colonialism. So, we respectfully disagree with George Clinton and Funkadelic (1970) and En Vogue (1992) when they assert that if you “free your mind, the rest (your ass) will follow.”¶ Paulo Freire, eminent education philosopher, popular educator, and liberation theologian, wrote his celebrated book, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, in no small part as a response to Fanon’s Wretched of the Earth. Its influence upon critical pedagogy and on the practices of educators committed to social justice cannot be overstated. Therefore, it is important to point out significant differences between Freire and Fanon, especially with regard to de/colonization. Freire situates the work of liberation in the minds of the oppressed, an abstract category of dehumanized worker vis-a-vis a similarly abstract category of oppressor. This is a sharp right turn away from Fanon’s work, which always positioned the work of liberation in the particularities of colonization, in the specific structural and interpersonal categories of Native and settler. Under Freire’s paradigm, it is unclear who the oppressed are, even more ambiguous who the oppressors are, and it is inferred throughout that an innocent third category of enlightened human exists: “those who suffer with [the oppressed] and fight at their side” (Freire, 2000, p. 42). These words, taken from the opening dedication of Pedagogy of the Oppressed, invoke the same settler fantasy of mutuality based on sympathy and suffering. Fanon positions decolonization as chaotic, an unclean break from a colonial condition that is already over determined by the violence of the colonizer and unresolved in its possible futures. By contrast, Freire positions liberation as redemption, a freeing of both oppressor and oppressed through their humanity. Humans become ‘subjects’ who then proceed to work on the ‘objects’ of the world (animals, earth, water), and indeed read the word (critical consciousness) in order to write the world (exploit nature). For Freire, there are no Natives, no Settlers, and indeed no history, and the future is simply a rupture from the timeless present. Settler colonialism is absent from his discussion, implying either that it is an unimportant analytic or that it is an already completed project of the past (a past oppression perhaps). Freire’s theories of liberation resoundingly echo the allegory of Plato’s Cave, a continental philosophy of mental emancipation, whereby the thinking man individualistically emerges from the dark cave of ignorance into the light of critical consciousness. ¶ By contrast, black feminist thought roots freedom in the darkness of the cave, in that well of feeling and wisdom from which all knowledge is recreated. These places of possibility within ourselves are dark because they are ancient and hidden; they have survived and grown strong through darkness. Within these deep places, each one of us holds an incredible reserve of creativity and power, of unexamined and unrecorded emotion and feeling. The woman's place of power within each of us is neither white nor surface; it is dark, it is ancient, and it is deep. (Lorde, 1984, pp. 36-37)¶ Audre Lorde’s words provide a sharp contrast to Plato’s sight-centric image of liberation: “The white fathers told us, I think therefore I am; and the black mothers in each of us - the poet - whispers in our dreams, I feel therefore I can be free” (p. 38). For Lorde, writing is not action upon the world. Rather, poetry is giving a name to the nameless, “first made into language, then into idea, then into more tangible action” (p. 37). Importantly, freedom is a possibility that is not just mentally generated; it is particular and felt.¶ Freire’s philosophies have encouraged educators to use “colonization” as a metaphor for oppression. In such a paradigm, “internal colonization” reduces to “mental colonization”, logically leading to the solution of decolonizing one’s mind and the rest will follow. Such philosophy conveniently sidesteps the most unsettling of questions: The essential thing is to see clearly, to think clearly - that is, dangerously and to answer clearly the innocent first question: what, fundamentally, is colonization? (Cesaire, 2000, p. 32)¶ Because colonialism is comprised of global and historical relations, Cesaire’s question must be considered globally and historically. However, it cannot be reduced to a global answer, nor a historical answer. To do so is to use colonization metaphorically. “What is colonization?” must be answered specifically, with attention to the colonial apparatus that is assembled to order the relationships between particular peoples, lands, the ‘natural world’, and ‘civilization’. Colonialism is marked by its specializations. In North America and other settings, settler sovereignty imposes sexuality, legality, raciality, language, religion and property in specific ways. Decolonization likewise must be thought through in these particularities.¶ To agree on what [decolonization] is not: neither evangelization, nor a philanthropic enterprise, nor a desire to push back the frontiers of ignorance, disease, and tyranny... (Cesaire, 2000, p. 32)¶ We deliberately extend Cesaire’s words above to assert what decolonization is not. It is not converting Indigenous politics to a Western doctrine of liberation; it is not a philanthropic process of ‘helping’ the at-risk and alleviating suffering; it is not a generic term for struggle against oppressive conditions and outcomes. The broad umbrella of social justice may have room underneath for all of these efforts. By contrast, decolonization specifically requires the repatriation of Indigenous land and life. Decolonization is not a metonym for social justice.¶ We don’t intend to discourage those who have dedicated careers and lives to teaching themselves and others to be critically conscious of racism, sexism, homophobia, classism, xenophobia, and settler colonialism. We are asking them/you to consider how the pursuit of critical consciousness, the pursuit of social justice through a critical enlightenment, can also be settler moves to innocence - diversions, distractions, which relieve the settler of feelings of guilt or responsibility, and conceal the need to give up land or power or privilege.¶ Anna Jacobs’ 2009 Master’s thesis explores the possibilities for what she calls white harm reduction models. Harm reduction models attempt to reduce the harm or risk of specific practices. Jacobs identifies white supremacy as a public health issue that is at the root of most other public health issues. The goal of white harm reduction models, Jacobs says, is to reduce the harm that white supremacy has had on white people, and the deep harm it has caused non-white people over generations. Learning from Jacobs’ analysis, we understand the curricular pedagogical project of critical consciousness as settler harm reduction, crucial in the resuscitation of practices and intellectual life outside of settler ontologies. (Settler) harm reduction is intended only as a stopgap. As the environmental crisis escalates and peoples around the globe are exposed to greater concentrations of violence and poverty, the need for settler harm reduction is acute, profoundly so. At the same time we remember that, by definition, settler harm reduction, like conscientization, is not the same as decolonization and does not inherently offer any pathways that lead to decolonization.

#### Individuals who are indefinitel detailed aren’t not bare life

Halit Tagma 09, Professor of Political Science, Arizona State , “Homo Sacer vs. Homo Soccer Mom: Reading Agamben and Foucault in the War on Terror,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Oct.-Dec. 2009), pp. 407-435

Thus in some respects, prisoners of the "war on terror" might be understood as homo sacer. However, there are also particularities in the way the prisoners are handled that call for a critical re-evaluation of the (non) space of Guántanamo. If in the classical Foucauldian teminology sovereign power is about "taking or granting life," and biopower is about "letting live and making life," then what can be said about the power operating in Guántanamo that "forces to live" when prisoners are carefully controlled to prevent them from committing suicide. Indeed, the prisoners of Guántanamo are force fed and even given mandatory health checks so as to insure they are kept, barely, alive. Unlike the homo sacer who may be killed but not sacrificed, the prisoners in Guantánamo may not be killed or sacrificed. In fact, extensive efforts are spent to keep the prisoners at Guantánamo alive, such as the creation of operating rooms for major health emergencies as well as facilities for dentistry. The prisoners are given health treatment similar to that provided to the troops at the base.60 No doubt the display of such "health benefits" could be read as window dressing conducted by the camp administrators. However, it is important to note that there are indeed serious efforts to keep the prisoners (often barely, but nevertheless) alive. Furthermore, punishment and interro- gation are orchestrated so that the use of violence does not result in death. Extensive efforts are made to prevent the prisoners from com- mitting suicide. In other cases, hunger-striking inmates have met with brutal forced feeding.61 Thus, in a striking unclassified army document that outlines procedures in Guántanamo Bay, guards are ordered to "defend detainees as you would yourself against a hostile act or intent, death, or serious bodily harm."62 Therefore it is correct to say that what goes in Guantánamo Bay is neither "letting live" nor "taking life," but instead "making live,"

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or even "forcing to live."¶ Agamben argues that camps are places where sovereign "power confronts nothing but pure life."63 Guantánamo Bay, declared as being beyond the reach of law, is, in fact, regulated by many petty regulations that are characteristic of disciplinary power. Reading the re- ports of the Joint Task Force and prisoner testimonies, one comes to the conclusion that there is a plethora of rules and procedures that govern the treatment of Guántanamo prisoners.64 Whereas Agamben's statement on "zones of indistinction" would lead us to think that any- thing goes in the camp, this is far from the reality of Guántanamo. Every minuscule element of the lives of Guántanamo prisoners been planned and is, for the most part, regulated by a written a code of conduct. Many foreseeable and probable occurrences that would be expected in a prison population have been forethought and written into a manual. Titled Standard Operating Procedures this 250-page manual outlines the rules, regulations, and procedures for treatment of prisoners in many probable circumstances.65 The manual outlines, for example, what to do if there is a petty riot, when and how to spray pepper spray on rioters, religious burials rituals for prisoners, and so on.66 This clearly hints that it is not just an exceptional sovereign power at work in Guántanamo, as exemplified in Rumsfeldian rhetorical salvos on "exceptional times requiring exceptional measures." In- stead, there are multiple technologies of power that are at work in the day-to-day administration of this space.67

# 2NC

### AT: Churchill

#### Churchill’s observation that we are living on stolen land doesn’t mean all action in the present is morally tainted

Hendrix 5 (Burke, Assistant Professor at cornell in the Department of Government and Program on Ethics and Public Life, American Indian Quarterly, Volume 23, “Moral Minimalism in American Indian Land Claims”, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/american\_indian\_quarterly/v029/29.3hendrix.html)

I am not sure how to solve these issues or even how to think clearly about the limits and relative weight of culpability in political inaction. It does seem to me, however, that the culpability of living non-Indians must generally be fairly limited, particularly among those who have no direct connections to the recent theft or exploitation of Indian lands. It seems to me that most non-Indians are more like Newcomers than Invaders. If they have through their moral failures weakened their claims to possess their current properties somewhat, it does not seem to me that they have forfeited them entirely. If so, it follows that a statute of limitations should apply to historical thefts when the suffering caused to current inhabitants in returning land would be very high. Where the suffering [End Page 549] caused would be low, on the other hand, the statute of limitations applies weakly if at all. Being forcibly ejected from one's home can clearly create serious suffering. Homes are, after all, filled with the memories of one's life, including the birth and growth of children and the passing of parents. Homes also help to provide both shape and expression to individual character in complex ways. Moreover, the notion of "home" entails more than simply a house—it also entails fields, forestlands, and fences in rural areas. Perhaps most important, communities have a particular character that derives not only from their physical shape but also from the relationships that they foster and maintain over time. It is very hard to uproot a community and rebuild it elsewhere and far more difficult if the community has nowhere to go as a group but must separate into individual families and seek new lives apart.

#### Giving back the land is net-unethical and makes material conditions worse for everyone---default to consequentialism

Waldron 92 – Jeremy Waldron is University Professor at New York University School of Law, and teaches legal and political philosophy. He was previously University Professor in the School of Law at Columbia University. (“Superseding Historic Injustice”, Ethics 103.1, October 1992, EBSCO)

V. CONCLUSION It is important that defenders of aboriginal claims face up to the possibility of the supersession of historic injustice. Even if this particular thesis about supersession is mistaken, some account has to be given of the impact on aboriginal claims and on the reparation of generations- old injustices of the demographic and ecological changes that have taken place. Apart from anything else, the changes that have taken place over the past two hundred years mean that the costs of respecting primeval entitlements are much greater now than they were in 1800. Two hundred years ago, a small aboriginal group could have exclusive domination of “a large and fruitful Territory” without much prejudice to the needs and interests of very many other human beings. Today, such exclusive rights would mean many people going hungry who might otherwise be fed and many people living in poverty who might otherwise have an opportunity to make a decent life. Irrespective of the occurrence of past injustice, this imbalance would have to be rectified sooner or later. That is the basis for my argument that claims about historic injustice predicated on the status quo ante may be superseded by our determination to distribute the resources of the world in a way that is fair to all of its existing inhabitants. Behind the thesis of supersession lies a determination to focus upon present and prospective costs—the suffering and the deprivation over which we still have some control. The idea is that any conception of justice which is to be made practically relevant for the way we act now must be a scheme that takes into account modern circumstances and the way those affect the conditions under which people presently live their lives. Arguments for reparation take as conclusive claims of entitlement oriented toward circumstances that are radically different from those we actually face: claims of entitlement based on the habitation of a territory by a small fraction of its present population, and claims of entitlement based on the determination to ignore the present dispersal of persons and peoples on the face of the earth, simply because the historic mechanisms of such dispersal were savagely implicated in injustice. And yet, here we all are. The present circumstances are the ones that are real: it is in the actual world that people starve or are hurt or degraded if the demands of justice in relation to their circumstances are not met. Justice, we say, is a matter of the greatest importance. But the importance to be accorded it is relative to what may actually happen if justice ¡s not done, not to what might have happened if injustice in the past had been avoided.

#### GBTL results in new genocides against natives

Bradford 5 – William is a Chiricahua Apache and Associate professor of Law at the Indiana University School of Law. (“Beyond Reparations”, Ohio State Law Journal, 2005, HeinOnline)

\*JAR = Justice as Restoration = Give Back the Land

Still, while JAR is the most normatively attractive of the three theoretical clusters, JAR theory is not the final stop on the theoretical journey to justice for Indians. JAR theory is susceptible to criticism on several grounds. As compelling as the argument that non-Indian land owners are obligated to vacate their entitlements in favor of the descendants of their Indian predecessors-in-title may be, principles of equity, as JAS theory is quick to assert, should proscribe the wholescale evacuation of millions of acres of land and the forced relocation of innocent and newly-homeless non-Indians to places uncertain. Even if equity alone is not sufficient to counsel prudence, the prospect that non-Indians threatened in the security of their property interests might organize to induce political action resulting in further abridgement of Indian resources and rights° must be accounted for in any theory of Indian justice. If the only remedy for a past injustice is a present injustice, a perpetual cycle of bloody conflict over land is inevitable 341 However, the most radical of JAR theorists are practically oblivious to the broad externalities the restorative clement of their philosophy might spawn: despite warnings that it is now much too late to “give back Manhattan,” some insist that nothing short of the dissolution of the U.S. will suffice if we are to “takfc] seriously. . . morality and justice.” If politics is the art of the possible, a theory that insists on the dismemberment of the modem-day U.S. or other forms of “radical social surgery” is too fantastic to be given serious consideration as a political proposal.

#### The military would use nuclear weapons against the natives

Hailwood, Liverpool University Philosophy Lecturer, 2003

[Simon, "Eco-Anarchism and Liberal Reformism," Ecotheology 8.2 (2003) 224-241, EBSCO, accessed: 9-14-12]

Perhaps it will be thought I am hiding behind an abstract (bourgeois) conception of voluntarism and simply ignoring the greater radical edge of eco-anarchism, wherein lies its greater appeal. But the more the greater radicalness of eco-anarchist, over eco-reformist, activity is emphasized, the more it slides back into unrealistic utopianism. Take the following ‘major problem’ for eco-reformers (who produce policy suggestions that state personnel ﬁnd too radical) identiﬁed by Carter: ‘How can the state be employed to put such radical policies into effect when the whole complex structure appears to have been developed in order to pursue as effectively as possible the opposite course?’(Carter 1999: 294). Eco-reformism therefore seems doomed to failure. But although reactionary tendencies of state personnel are a problem for ecoreformists (as are illiberal tendencies of many state personnel within ‘liberal’ states a problem for liberals), it is hard to see Carter’s ecoanarchist alternative as anything but more problematic. Eco-anarchists need to oppose the state and the other elements of the environmentally hazardous dynamic. This seems to cash out in the aforementioned ‘preﬁguring cooperative autonomy’, with a general ‘radical disobedience’ as its most effectively transformative feature (Carter 1999: 304-6). I want to emphasize two problems with this.

Firstly, it is not just state personnel who tend to balk at radical activity that seems to undermine their immediate material interests. We can expect many needing to make a living for themselves and their family to be reluctant to ‘radically disobey’ the competitive, hierarchical and difﬁdent relationships and ‘hard’, ‘non-convivial’, technologies constituting their immediately available opportunities. This ‘situational logic’ applies even when they have Green sympathies. Secondly, widespread radical disobedience is problematic for just the reason it is supposed to be necessary: one cannot just explain the situation to state personnel (and other powerful actors in the dynamic), with any hope they will act accordingly. They are too locked into the dynamic for it to be rational to expect them to be rational (or moral), other than in ways internal to the dynamic. But then they are likely to view any truly widespread upsurge in radical disobedience as a huge threat requiring a military response. Perhaps they will not succeed in suppressing the disobedience, and they will feel their backs against the wall. But it is unclear how the presence of radically de-stabilized and well-armed hierarchical power structures (viewed with hungry interest by other such structures) will help. War (especially nuclear war) is the greatest threat to the environment, as Carter knows. Thus it is necessary to assume some degree of rationality on the part of the powerful in order for the strategy of widespread radical disobedience itself to be rational. If we assume that then it is reasonable also to present the case for change within the system, and ﬁnd as many ways as possible to encourage thinking in the right direction as a precursor to radical policy change. Carter apparently thinks this is to increase the likelihood of a military coup, such being the probable result of focusing on eco-reform with a view to radicalizing state policy in a Green direction (Carter 1999: 294- 95). But surely a military coup is more likely as a result of a large-scale, if non-violent (although complete non-violence is unlikely), confrontation with the state and those other elements of the dynamic involved in maintaining the supremacy of its coercive forces.

### AT: Reality

Steven Best 97, Assoc Professor and Chair of Philosophy at U-Texas, El Paso and Douglas Kellner, chair in the philosophy of education at UCLA, The Postmodern Turn, 1997, 112-113

Hence, we subscribe to Debord's Hegelian-Marxian distinction between appearance and reality and the need for critical thought to continue to probe behind appearances. Whereas Baudrillard surrenders to the surface of the simulacrum, Debord maintains a commitment to critical hermeneutics, attempting to get at the roots of human suffering and oppression through analysis of the capitalist mode of production and reproduction. Just as Marx discovered congealed human value in the commodity form, and from there identified the whole social basis of exploitation, Debord critically deciphers the congealed image object, the spectacle; penetrates its reified surface; and situates it within its context of social and historical relations. Although he maps out an advanced stage of reification, Debord argues that no object is fully opaque or inscrutable, standing outside of a social context that it cannot ultimately refer to, betray, and be interpreted against.

Where Debord's strategy reminds us of the ultimately antagonistic, con-flictual, and contradictory aspects of a social reality open to critique and transformation, Baudrillard's radical rejection of referentiality is premised upon a one-dimensional, No-Exit world of self-referring simulacra. Baudrillard is right: "Reality" has become increasingly difficult to identify in "the empire of signs." But however reified and self-referential postmodern semiotics is, signs do not simply move in their own signifying orbit. They are historically produced and circulated, and though they may not translucently refer to some originating world, they nonetheless can be sociohistorically contextualized, interpreted, and criticized. Thus, even Warhol's "Diamond Dust Shoes" and other paradigms of postmodern flatness, seemingly purely self-referential (see Jameson, 1991), ultimately refer to a whole world, one, in this case, of advanced commodification and of the assimilation of art to media culture and the market (see Chapter 4).

Through Debord's work, we can grasp a point of singular importance: Self-referentiality does not entail hyperreality. Signs, images, and objects are not inscrutable and hermetic simply because they no longer stand within a classical space of representation. It is not that one signifier brings us a "real" world and another doesn't but that one occludes a larger social context more than does another, that contextualization may be more difficult in one case than in another. However self-referential and abstract the signifiers, a critical hermeneutics can uncover their repressed or mystified social content and social relations.13

Moreover, in a sense, Baudrillard's hyperreality is itself an illusion, the projection of a realer-than-real, constructed by the powers that be to obscure the deprivations, ugliness, and oppressiveness of social reality. Critical hermeneutics can always uncover the constructedness of the hyperreal, which is, after all, nothing more than a construct and model of the real; the hyperreal can always be contextualized, deconstructed, and unmasked. Indeed, the hyperreal is a challenge to critical hermeneutics to see precisely what realities and interests lie behind it, how it is constructed, and what it is concealing and mystifying and why.

Debord is right then to insist that "the spectacle is not [just] a collection of images, but a social relation among people, mediated by images" (#4). While Debord did not provide as powerful an account of postmodern media and signification as did Baudrillard, he correctly insists that the spectacle is "the other side of money" (#34) and so of capitalist social relations. For Baudrillard, however, the sign develops according to its own autonomous logic, and his one-sided analysis is decontextualizing and depoliticizing, serving to exonerate the "captains of consciousness" and media moguls of the present.

While critical hermeneutics does not posit a Ding-an-sich discoverable beyond a historical horizon and unmediated by ideology or language, it rightly tries to recover the distinction between reality and illusion as the preliminary basis for a sociopolitical criticism. It is the work of the culture industry to erase this distinction, and it should be the task of radical criticism to recover it, requiring a reconstructed notion of "representation." Though Baudrillard cogently problematizes certain realist views of representation (e.g., those developed in the 17th century, which see language as the "mirror of nature"; see Foucault, 1973; Rorty, 1979) or the realist fictions of our present-day media, he wrongly rejects the illuminating potential of other forms of "representation," such as Jameson (1988, 1991) has attempted to develop in his notion of "cognitive mapping." And while Baudrillard illuminates recent mutations in the sign brought on by media and advertising (which Foucault has failed to consider; see Baudrillard, 1986), he mystifies media culture by severing its dynamics from political economy and current political struggles.

To pass from the collapse of the classical episteme to the thesis of radical simulation and implosion, from the fragmentation of meaning to the "end of meaning," is far too hasty a move and obscures the ways in which we still can and must configure our world, not in an act of pictured reflection but, rather, in a theoretical and critical analysis that attempts to grasp the constitutive relations of society and to decode their ideological operations. In a critical hermeneutics, the surface appearance of things is unmasked to reveal not the "real" itself, which remains a dialectically mediated category, but the social forces behind these appearances: the actors, groups, policy makers, spin doctors, and institutions still identifiable and subject to a critically informed resistance. This suggests that "simulation" can be critically deconstructed and resolved into "dissimulation," an activity that reveals simulation to be wholly constructed, serving the interests of specific social groups and hiding certain alternative realities.

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## Counterplan

### Impact Calculus

**Maximizing all lives is the only way to affirm equality**

**Cummiskey 90** – Professor of Philosophy, Bates (David, Kantian Consequentialism, Ethics 100.3, p 601-2, p 606, jstor)

We must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract "social entity." It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive "overall social good." Instead, the question is whether some persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons. Nozick, for example, argues that "to use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has."30 Why, however, is this not equally true of all those that we do not save through our failure to act? By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act, one fails to sufficiently respect and take account of the many other separate persons, each with only one life, who will bear the cost of our inaction. In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational beings, choose? We have a duty to promote the conditions necessary for the existence of rational beings, but both choosing to act and choosing not to act will cost the life of a rational being. Since the basis of Kant's principle is "rational nature exists as an end-in-itself' (GMM, p. 429), the reasonable solution to such a dilemma involves promoting, insofar as one can, the conditions necessary for rational beings. If I sacrifice some for the sake of other rational beings, I do not use them arbitrarily and I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings. **Persons** may **have "dignity**, an unconditional and incomparable value" that transcends any market value (GMM, p. 436), **but**, as rational beings, persons **also** have **a fundamental equality which dictates that some must** sometimes **give way for the sake of others.** The formula of the end-in-itself thus does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others. If one focuses on the equal value of all rational beings, then equal consideration dictates that one sacrifice some to save many. [continues] According to Kant, the objective end of moral action is the existence of rational beings. Respect for rational beings requires that, in deciding what to do, one give appropriate practical consideration to the unconditional value of rational beings and to the conditional value of happiness. Since agent-centered constraints require a non-value-based rationale, the most natural interpretation of the demand that one give equal respect to all rational beings lead to a consequentialist normative theory. We have seen that there is no sound Kantian reason for abandoning this natural consequentialist interpretation. In particular, a consequentialist interpretation does not require sacrifices which a Kantian ought to consider unreasonable, and it does not involve doing evil so that good may come of it. It simply requires an uncompromising commitment to the equal value and equal claims of all rational beings and a recognition that, in the moral consideration of conduct, one's own subjective concerns do not have overriding importance.

#### Our nuclear war impacts outweigh their value to life claims – even if individual life is rendered meaningless, that can’t be true for all of humanity

Hannah Arendt, former visiting scholar at UC Berkeley, Columbia, and Northwestern and former professor at U Chicago, Yale, Wesleyan and Princeton, 1954 “Europe and the Atom Bomb” The Commonweal 60:578-580 \*gender modified

Ultimately, this argument rests on the conviction that it is better to be dead than to be a slave. It is based on a political philosophy that, since the ancients, has considered courage to be the political virtue par excellence, the one virtue without which political freedom is wholly impossible. Originally, the time-honored conviction that courage is the highest political virtue was based on a pre-Christian philosophy which deemed that life is not the most sacred good and that there are conditions on which it is not worth having. For the ancients such conditions existed whenever the individual man was utterly delivered to the necessities of preserving sheer animal life, and therefore was judged incapable of freedom. This could happen in the case of slavery, say, or in the case of incurable illness; in both instances, suicide was considered to be the appropriate solution demanded by courage as well as by human dignity. With the victory of Christianity in the Western World and especially of the originally Hebrew conviction of the sacredness of life as such, this code of individual morality as it had been known throughout the ancient world lost its absolute validity. Wars could be justified on religious grounds, but not on the ground of secular political freedom as such. By the same token wholesale slaughter, so well known in the ancient world, might happen, but it could no longer be justified. By and large, Western civilization was agreed that, in the words of Kant, nothing should happen during a war that would make a future peace impossible. This agree­ment is no longer universal. With the appearance of atomic weapons, both the Hebrew-Christian limitation on violence and the an­cient appeal to courage have for all practical purposes become meaningless, and with them, the whole political and moral vocabulary in which we are accustomed to discuss these matters. Limitations can be applied in reality only to foreseeable developments; they cannot reckon with that "surprise technique" which Raymond Aron recently analyzed as the central event of the first World War, and which, as long as we are caught in the process of progressing technicalization, will inev­itably produce new "miracle" weapons. Under existing circumstances, as a matter of fact, nothing is more probable than these "miracles." In fact, of course, even our present potentialities for destruction have already far outstripped the matter-of­course limitations of previous wars. And this situation has placed in jeopardy the very value of courage itself. The fundamental human condition of courage is that [hu]man[ity] is not immortal, that he sacrifices a life that one day will be taken from him in any case. No human courage would be conceivable if the condition of in­dividual life were the same as that of the species. Greece's immortal gods had to leave this one virtue, courage, to mortal men; all other human virtues could appear in divine shape, could be deified and wor­shipped as divine gifts. Courage alone is denied to the immortals; because of the everlasting presence of their existence, the stakes are never high enough. If life were not normally taken from mortal man one day anyhow, he could never risk it. The stakes would be too high, the courage required would be literally inhuman, and life would not only appear to be the highest good, it would become the central human concern, overruling all other considerations. CLOSELY connected with this fact is another limitation of human courage—the conviction that posterity will understand, remember and respect the individual mortal's sacrifice. Man can be courageous only as long as he knows he is survived by those who are like him, that he fulfills a role in something more permanent than himself, "the enduring chronicle of mankind," as Faulkner once put it. Thus in antiquity, when wars were likely to end with the extermination or enslavement of whole peoples, the victor felt obliged to preserve for posterity the deeds and the greatness of the enemy. So Homer sang the praise of Hector, and Herodotus reported the history of the Persians. Courage, under the circumstances of modern war­fare, has lost much of its old meaning. By putting in jeopardy the survival of [hu]mankind and not only indi­vidual life or at the most the life of a whole people, modern warfare is about to transform the individual mortal [hu]man into a conscious member of the human race, of whose immortality he [or she] needs to be sure in order to be courageous at all and for whose survival he [or she] must care more than for anything else. Or, to put it another way, while there certainly are conditions under which individual life is not worth having, the same cannot be true for [hu]mankind. The moment a war can even conceivably threaten the continued existence of [hu]man[ity] on earth, the alternative between liberty and death has lost its old plausibility

### AT: Jackson

#### Empiricism is adequate to make claims about the world—Jackson’s critique makes interpreting any type of reality impossible

Jonathan **Rodwell 5**, PhD from Manchester Met. \* candidate at the time\*, Trendy But Empty: A Response to Richard Jackson, http://www.49thparallel.bham.ac.uk/back/issue15/rodwell1.htm

The larger problem is that **without clear causal links between material**ly identifiable **events and factors any assessment within** **the argument** actually **becomes nonsensical**. Mirroring the early inability to criticise, **if we have no** traditional **causational discussion how can we know what is happening**? For example, **Jackson details how the rhetoric of anti-terrorism** and fear **is obfuscating the real problems**. It is proposed that **the real** world **killers are not terrorism**, **but disease or** illegal drugs or **environmental issues.** The problem is **how do we know this**? It seems we know this because there is evidence that illustrates as much – Jackson himself quoting to Dr David King who argued global warming is a greater that than terrorism. The only problem of course is that discourse analysis has established (as argued by Jackson) that King’s argument would just be self-contained discourse designed to naturalise another arguments for his own reasons. Ultimately it would be no more valid than the argument that excessive consumption of Sugar Puffs is the real global threat. It is worth repeating that I don’t personally believe global terrorism is the world’s primary threat, nor do I believe that Sugar Puffs are a global killer. But without the ability to identify real facts about the world we can simply say anything, or we can say nothing. This is clearly ridiculous and many post-structuralists can see this. Their argument is that there “are **empirical**lymore persuasive **explanations**.”[xi] The phrase ‘empirically persuasive’ is however the final undermining of post-structural discourse analysis. It is a seemingly fairly obvious reintroduction of traditional methodology and causal links. It **implies things** that **can be seen** to be right **regardless of perspective or discourse**. It again goes without saying that logically **in this case if such an** **assessment is possible then undeniable material factors** about the word **are real and are knowable outside of any cultural definition**. **Language** or culture **then does not** wholy **constitute reality**. **How do we know** in the end that **the world not** **threatened by** the onslaught of an oppressive and dangerous **breakfast cereal**? **Because empirical**lypersuasive **evidence tells us** this is the case. **The question must then be asked, is** our understanding of **the world born of evidential assessment, or** born **of discourse** **analysis**? Or perhaps it’s actually born of utilisation of many different possible explanations.

#### Their critique is based on a poorly-researched caricature of terrorism studies --- they over-focus on minute biases while ignoring our overwhelming, objective, and self-reflexive evidence

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\*We do not endorse ableist language

The editors accuse, in their introduction  “the orthodox field” of orthodox terrorism studies of functioning “ideologically in the service of existing power structures”, with their academic research. Furthermore, they claim that orthodox scholars are frequently being used “to legitimise coercive intervention in the global South….” (p.6). The present volume is edited by three authors associated with the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence (CSRV) in the Department of International Politics in Aberystwyth (Wales, UK). They also happen to be editors of a new Routledge journal “Critical Studies on Terrorism’ . The “critical” refers principally but not exclusively to the “Frankfurt-via-Welsh School Critical Theory Perspective”. The twelve contributors are not all equally “critical” in aHabermasian sense. The programmatic introduction of the editors is followed by two solid chapters from Magnus Ranstorp (former Director of CSTPV, St. Andrews, and currently Director of the Centre for Asymmetric Threat Studies at the Swedish National Defence College) and Andrew Silke (formerly with the UK Home Office and now Field Leader for Criminology at the University of East London). They both rightfully criticize some of the past sins and present shortcomings of the field of Terrorism Studies. One of them approvingly quotes Marc Sageman who observed that “disagreements among experts are the driving force of the scientific enterprise”. Such disagreements, however, exist among “orthodox” scholars like Sageman and  Hoffman or Pape and Abrams. In that sense, the claim by some critical theorists that the field of traditional Terrorism Studies is ossified without them, is simply is not true. One of the problems with many of the adherents of the “critical” school is that the focus is almost exclusively on the strawman they set up to shoot – “orthodox” terrorism discourse rather than on the practitioners of terrorism. Richard Jackson claims that “…most of what is accepted as well-founded ‘knowledge’ in terrorism studies is, in fact, highly debatable and unstable” (p.74), dismissing thereby almost four decades of scholarship as “based on a series of ‘virulent myths’, ‘half-truths’ and contested claims…biased towards Western state priorities” (p.80). For him “terrorism is…a social fact rather than a brute fact” and “…does not exist outside of the definitions and practices which seek to enclose it, including those of the terrorism studies field” (pp.75-76). He objects to prevailing “problem-solving theories of terrorism” in favour of an approach that questions “ the status quo and the dominant acts within it” (p.77). Another contributor, J.A. Sluka, argues, without offering any proof,  that “terrorism is fundamentally a product of social inequality and state politics” (p. 139). Behind many of the critical theorists who blame mainstream terrorism research for taking ‘the world as it finds it’ there is an agenda for changing the status quo and overthrowing existing power structures. There is, in itself, nothing wrong with wanting a new and better world order. However, it is not going to be achieved by using an alternative discourse on terrorism and counter-terrorism. Toros and Gunning, contributors of another chapter, state that “the sine qua non of Critical Theory is emancipation” (p. 99) and M. McDonald als puts “emancipation as central to the study of terrorism” (p.121). However, there is not a single word on the non-emancipated position of women under Islam in general or among the Taliban and their friends from al-Qaeda in particular. One of the strength (some argue weakness) of Western thinking is its ability for self-criticism – something largely absent in the Muslim world. In that sense, this volume falls within a Western tradition. However, self-criticism should not come at the cost of not criticising   adversaries by using the same yardstick. In this sense, this volume is strangely silent about the worldview of those terrorists who have no self-doubts and attack the Red Cross,  the United Nations, NGOs and their fellow Muslims with equal lack of scruples. A number of authors in the volume appear to equate terrorism uncritically with political violence in general while in fact it is more usefully thought of as one of some twenty sub-categories of  political violence - one characterized by deliberate attacks on civilians and non-combatants in order to intimidate, coerce or otherwise manipulate  various audiences and parties to a conflict. Part of the volume advocates reinventing the wheel. J. Gunning, for instance, recommends to employ Social Movement Theory for the study of terrorism. However, that theory has been employed already explicitly or implicitly by a number of more orthodox scholars, e.g. Donatella della Porta. Many “critical” statements in the volume are unsupported by convincing evidence, e.g. when C. Sylvester and S. Parashar state “The September 11 attacks and the ongoing war on terror reinforce gender hierarchy and power in international relations” (p.190). Jackson claims that the key question  for critical terrorism theory is “who is terrorism research for and how does terrorism knowledge support particular interests?” (p.224) It does not seem to occur to him that he could have studied this question by looking at the practitioners of terrorism and study al-Qaeda’s ideological writings and its training  and  recruiting manuals. If CTS is a call for “making a commitment to emancipatory praxis central to the research enterprise” (R. Jackson et al, p. 228), CTS academics should be the first on the barricades against jihadists who treat women not as equals and who would, if they get their way, eradicate freedom of thought and religion for all mankind. It is sad that some leading proponents of Critical Terrorism Studies appear to be in fact uncritical and blind on one eye.

### AT: Linear Scenario Planning

#### If their linear scenario planning argument is true, reject the aff on presumption---we can never discern the impacts of voting aff then

#### The complexity thesis is wrong---makes policymaking impossible

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We live in a world of unprecedented complexity, or so we are told. President Obama’s words above echo an increasingly common narrative in the American foreign policy and national security establishments: the forces of globalization, rising nonstate actors, irregular conflict, and proliferating destructive technologies have made crafting sound national security strategy more elusive than ever before. 2 If “strategy is the art of creating power” by specifying the relationship among ends, ways, and means, 3 then the existence of unprecedented complexity would seem to make this art not only uniquely difficult today but also downright dangerous, inasmuch as choosing any particular course of action would preclude infinitely adaptive responses in the future. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates memorably described, the pre-9/11 challenges to American national security were “amateur night compared to the world today.” 4 And as former State Department Director of Policy Planning Anne-Marie Slaughter recently stated, there is a “universal awareness that we are living through a time of rapid and universal change,” one in which the assumptions of the twentieth century make little sense. 5 The “Mr. Y” article that occasioned her comments argued that, in contrast to the “closed system” of the twentieth century that could be controlled by mankind, we now live in an “open system” defined by its supremely complex and protean nature. 6 Unparalleled complexity, it seems, is the hallmark of our strategic age.¶ These invocations of complexity permeate today’s American national security documents and inform Washington’s post-Cold War and -9/11 strategic culture. The latest Quadrennial Defense Review begins its analysis with a description of the “complex and uncertain security landscape in which the pace of change continues to accelerate. Not since the fall of the Soviet Union or the end of World War II has the international terrain been affected by such farreaching and consequential shifts.” 7 In a similar vein, the National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends 2025 argues that the international system is trending towards greater degrees of complexity as power is diffused and actors multiply. 8 The Director of National Intelligence’s Vision 2015 terms our time the “Era of Uncertainty,” one “in which the pace, scope, and complexity of change are increasing.” 9 Disturbingly, the younger generation of foreign policy and national security professionals seems to accept and embrace these statements declaiming a fundamental change in our world and our capacity to cope with it. The orientation for the multi-thousand-member group of Young Professionals in Foreign Policy calls “conquering complexity” the fundamental challenge for the millennial generation. Complexity, it appears, is all the rage. ¶ We challenge these declarations and assumptions—not simply because they are empirically unfounded but, far more importantly, because they negate the very art of strategy and make the realization of the American national interest impossible. We begin by showing the rather unsavory consequences of the current trend toward worshipping at complexity’s altar and thus becoming a member of the “Cult of Complexity.” Next, we question whether the world was ever quite as simple as today’s avowers of complexity suggest, thus revealing the notion of today’s unprecedented complexity to be descriptively false. We then underscore that this idea is dangerous, given the consequences of an addiction to complexity. Finally, we offer an escape from the complexity trap, with an emphasis on the need for prioritization in today’s admittedly distinctive international security environment. Throughout, we hope to underscore that today’s obsession with complexity results in a dangerous denial of the need to strategize.

### AT: Homogenous

#### Their argument essentializes terror scholarship – it’s not a monolithic entity – defer to specific research

Michael J. Boyle 8, School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews, and John Horgan, International Center for the Study of Terrorism, Department of Psychology, Pennsylvania State University, April 2008, “A Case Against Critical Terrorism Studies,” Critical Studies On Terrorism, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 51-64

Some CTS advocates have positioned the CTS project against something usually called ‘terrorism studies’, ‘Orthodox terrorism studies’ or, alternatively, ‘terrorology’. Whatever these bodies of literature are (or at least are imagined by those who have created them as such), they are recent intellectual constructions, the product of an over-generalization that has emerged from the identification of (1) the limitations associated with terrorism research to date, coupled with (2) a less than complete understanding of the nature of research on terrorism. **A cursory review of the terrorism literature reveals that attempts to generalize about something called Orthodox Terrorism Studies are deeply problematic. Among terrorism scholars, there are wide disagreements about, among others, the definition of terrorism, the causes of terrorism, the role and value of the concept of ‘radicalization’ and ‘extremism’, the role of state terror, the role that foreign policy plays in motivating or facilitating terrorism, the ethics of terrorism, and the proper way to conduct ‘counter-terrorism’**. A cursory examination of the contents of the two most well-known terrorism journals Terrorism and Political Violence and Studies in Conflict and Terrorism quickly reveals this. **These differences, and the concomitant disagreements that result in the literature, cut across disciplines** – principally political science and psychology, but also others, such as anthropology, sociology, theology, and philosophy – **and even within disciplines wide disagreements about methods** (for example, discourse analysis, rational choice, among others) **persist. To suggest that they can be lumped together as something called ‘terrorology’ or ‘Orthodox Terrorism Studies’ belies a narrow reading of the literature. This is, in short, a ‘straw man’ which helps position CTS in the field but is not based on a well-grounded critique of the current research on terrorism.**

#### None of their impacts are true---black swans, butterfly effects, etc don’t disprove the need or utility of prioritizing threats and acting to address them---accepting the complexity thesis collapses all efforts to address threats

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These competing views of America’s national security concerns indicate an important and distinctive characteristic of today’s global landscape: prioritization is simultaneously very difficult and very important for the United States. Each of these threats and potential threats—al Qaeda, China, nuclear proliferation, climate change, global disease, and so on—can conjure up a worstcase scenario that is immensely intimidating. Given the difficulty of combining estimates of probabilities with the levels of risk associated with these threats, it is challenging to establish priorities. Such choices and trade-offs are difficult, but not impossible. 30 In fact, they are the stock-in-trade of the strategist and planner. If the United States is going to respond proactively and effectively to today’s international environment, prioritization is the key first step—and precisely the opposite reaction to the complacency and undifferentiated fear that the notion of unprecedented complexity encourages.

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Complexity suggests a maximization of flexibility and minimization of commitment; but prioritization demands wise allotment of resources and attention in a way that commits American power and effort most effectively and efficiently. Phrased differently, complexity induces deciding not to decide; prioritization encourages deciding which decisions matter most. Today’s world of diverse threats characterized by uncertain probabilities and unclear risks will overwhelm us if the specter of complexity seduces us into either paralysis or paranoia. Some priorities need to be set if the United States is to find the resources to confront what threatens it most. 31 As Michael Doran recently argued in reference to the Arab Spring, “the United States must train itself to see a large dune as something more formidable than just endless grains of sand.”32¶ This is not to deny the possibility of nonlinear phenomena, butterfly effects, self-organizing systems that exhibit patterns in the absence of centralized authority, or emergent properties. 33 If anything, these hallmarks of complexity theory remind strategists of the importance of revisiting key assumptions in light of new data and allowing for tactical flexibility in case of unintended consequences. Sound strategy requires hard choices and commitments, but it need not be inflexible. We can prioritize without being procrustean. But a model in which everything is potentially relevant is a model in which nothing is.

#### CTS is makes sweeping, unevidence generalizations --- evaluate our specific, qualified evidence --- there’s no bias

Michael J. Boyle 8, School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews, and John Horgan, International Center for the Study of Terrorism, Department of Psychology, Pennsylvania State University, April 2008, “A Case Against Critical Terrorism Studies,” Critical Studies On Terrorism, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 51-64

One of the tensions within CTS concerns the issue of ‘policy relevance’. At the most basic level, **there are some** sweeping generalizations **made by CTS scholars, often with** little evidence. For example, Jackson (2007c) describes ‘the core terrorism scholars’ (without explicitly saying who he is referring to) as ‘intimately connected – institutionally, financially, politically, and ideologically – with a state hegemonic project’ (p. 245). **Without giving any details of who these ‘core’ scholars are, where they are, what they do, and exactly who funds them, his arguments are** tantamount to conjecture **at best. We do not deny that governments fund terrorism research and terrorism researchers, and that this can influence the direction** (and even the findings) of the research. But **we are suspicious of over-generalizations of this count on two grounds: (1) accepting government funding or information does not necessarily obviate one’s** independent scholarly judgment **in a particular project; and (2) having policy relevance is not always a sin.** On the first point, we are in agreement with some CTS scholars. Gunning provides a sensitive analysis of this problem, and calls on CTS advocates to come to terms with how they can engage policy-makers without losing their critical distance. He recognizes that CTS can (and should) aim to be policy-relevant, but perhaps to a different audience, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs), civil society than just governments and security services. In other words, CTS aims to whisper into the ear of the prince, but it is just a different prince.

Gunning (2007a) also argues that **research should be assessed** on its own merits**, for ‘just because a piece of research comes from RAND does not invalidate it; conversely,** a “critical” study is not inherently good’ (p. 240). We agree entirely with this. Not all sponsored or contract research is made to ‘toe a party line’, and **much of the work coming out of** official **government agencies** or affiliated government agencies **has** little agenda **and can be** analytically **useful. The task of the scholar is to retain one’s sense of critical judgment and integrity, and we believe that there is no prima facie reason to assume that this cannot be done in sponsored research projects.** What matters here are the details of the research – what is the purpose of the work, how will it be done, how might the work be used in policy – and for these questions the scholar must be self-critical and insistent on their intellectual autonomy. The scholar must also be mindful of the responsibility they bear for shaping a government’s response to the problem of terrorism. **Nothing – not the source of the funding, purpose of the research or prior empirical or theoretical commitment – obviates the need of the scholar to consider his or her own conscience carefully when engaging in work with any external actor. But simply engaging with governments on discrete projects does not make one an ‘embedded expert’ nor does it imply sanction to their actions**. But we also believe that the **study of political violence lends itself to policy relevance and** that **those who seek to produce research that might help policy-makers reduce the rates of terrorist attack are committing no sin**, provided that they retain their independent judgment and report their findings candidly and honestly. In the case of terrorism, we would go further to argue that being policy relevant is in some instances an entirely justifiable moral choice. For example, neither of us has any problem producing research with a morally defensible but policy relevant goal (for example, helping the British government to prevent suicide bombers from attacking the London Underground) and we do not believe that engaging in such work tarnishes one’s stature as an independent scholar. **Implicit in the CTS literature is a deep suspicion about the state** and those who engage with it. **Such a suspicion may** blind some CTS scholars to good work done by those associated with the state. But to assume that being ‘embedded’ in an institution linked to the ‘establishment’ consists of being captured by a state hegemonic project is too simple. We do not believe that scholars studying terrorism must all be policy-relevant, but equally we do not believe that being policy relevant should always be interpreted as writing a blank cheque for governments or as necessarily implicating the scholar in the behaviour of that government on issues unrelated to one’s work. Working for the US government, for instance, does not imply that the scholar sanctions or approves of the abuses at Abu Ghraib prison. **The assumption that those who do not practice CTS are all ‘embedded’ with the ‘establishment’ and that this somehow gives the green light for states to engage in illegal activity is in our view unwarranted, to say the very least.**

1. ### 1NC

   #### The 1AC’s use of decolonization as a metaphor for debate is a way to assuage our guilt and entrench the status quo---playing Indian is the oldest move in the imperialist book---reject the 1ac to force the aff to face the complicity of their gesture

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   Decolonization as metaphor allows people to equivocate these contradictory decolonial desires because it turns decolonization into an empty signifier to be filled by any track towards liberation. In reality, the tracks walk all over land/people in settler contexts. Though the details are not fixed or agreed upon, in our view, decolonization in the settler colonial context must involve the repatriation of land simultaneous to the recognition of how land and relations to land have always already been differently understood and enacted; that is, all of the land, and not just symbolically. This is precisely why decolonization is necessarily unsettling, especially across lines of solidarity. “Decolonization never takes place unnoticed” (Fanon, 1963, p. 36). Settler colonialism and its decolonization implicates and unsettles everyone.¶ Playing Indian and the erasure of Indigenous peoples¶ Recently in a symposium on the significance of Liberal Arts education in the United States, Eve presented an argument that Liberal Arts education has historically excluded any attention to or analysis of settler colonialism. This, Eve posited, makes Liberal Arts education complicit in the project of settler colonialism and, more so, has rendered the truer project of Liberal Arts education something like trying to make the settler indigenous to the land he occupies. The attendees were titillated by this idea, nodding and murmuring in approval and it was then that Eve realized that she was trying to say something incommensurable with what they expected her to say. She was completely misunderstood. Many in the audience heard this observation: that the work of Liberal Arts education is in part to teach settlers to be indigenous, as something admirable, worthwhile, something wholesome, not as a problematic point of evidence about the reach of the settler colonial erasure.¶ Philip Deloria (1998) explores how and why the settler wants to be made indigenous, even if only through disguise, or other forms of playing Indian. Playing Indian is a powerful U.S. pastime, from the Boston Tea Party, to fraternal organizations, to new age trends, to even those aforementioned Native print underwear. Deloria maintains that, “From the colonial period to the present, the Indian has skulked in and out of the most important stories various Americans have told about themselves” (p. 5). ¶ The indeterminacy of American identities stems, in part, from the nation’s inability to deal with Indian people. Americans wanted to feel a natural affinity with the continent, and it was Indians who could teach them such aboriginal closeness. Yet, in order to control the landscape they had to destroy the original inhabitants. (Deloria, 1998, p.5)¶ L. Frank Baum (author of The Wizard of Oz) famously asserted in 1890 that the safety of white settlers was only guaranteed by the “total annihilation of the few remaining Indians” (as quoted in Hastings, 2007). D.H. Lawrence, reading James Fenimore Cooper (discussed at length later in this article), Nathaniel Hawthorne, Hector St. John de Crevecoeur, Henry David Thoreau, Herman Melville, Walt Whitman and others for his Studies in Classic American Literature (1924), describes Americans’ fascination with Indigeneity as one of simultaneous desire and repulsion (Deloria, 1998).¶ “No place,” Lawrence observed, “exerts its full influence upon a newcomer until the old inhabitant is dead or absorbed.” Lawrence argued that in order to meet the “demon of the continent” head on and this finalize the “unexpressed spirit of America,” white Americans needed either to destroy Indians of assimilate them into a white American world...both aimed at making Indians vanish from the landscape. (Lawrence, as quoted in Deloria, 1998, p. 4).¶ Everything within a settler colonial society strains to destroy or assimilate the Native in order to disappear them from the land - this is how a society can have multiple simultaneous and conflicting messages about Indigenous peoples, such as all Indians are dead, located in faraway reservations, that contemporary Indigenous people are less indigenous than prior generations, and that all Americans are a “little bit Indian.” These desires to erase - to let time do its thing and wait for the older form of living to die out, or to even help speed things along (euthanize) because the death of pre-modern ways of life is thought to be inevitable - these are all desires for another kind of resolve to the colonial situation, resolved through the absolute and total destruction or assimilation of original inhabitants.¶ Numerous scholars have observed that Indigeneity prompts multiple forms of settler anxiety, even if only because the presence of Indigenous peoples - who make a priori claims to land and ways of being - is a constant reminder that the settler colonial project is incomplete (Fanon, 1963; Vine Deloria, 1988; Grande, 2004; Bruyneel, 2007). The easy adoption of decolonization as a metaphor (and nothing else) is a form of this anxiety, because it is a premature attempt at reconciliation. The absorption of decolonization by settler social justice frameworks is one way the settler, disturbed by her own settler status, tries to escape or contain the unbearable searchlight of complicity, of having harmed others just by being one’s self. The desire to reconcile is just as relentless as the desire to disappear the Native; it is a desire to not have to deal with this (Indian) problem anymore.¶ Settler moves to innocence¶ We observe that another component of a desire to play Indian is a settler desire to be made innocent, to find some mercy or relief in face of the relentlessness of settler guilt and haunting (see Tuck and Ree, forthcoming, on mercy and haunting). Directly and indirectly benefitting from the erasure and assimilation of Indigenous peoples is a difficult reality for settlers to accept. The weight of this reality is uncomfortable; the misery of guilt makes one hurry toward any reprieve. In her 1998 Master’s thesis, Janet Mawhinney analyzed the ways in which white people maintained and (re)produced white privilege in self-defined anti-racist settings and organizations.8 She examined the role of storytelling and self-confession - which serves to equate stories of personal exclusion with stories of structural racism and exclusion - and what she terms ‘moves to innocence,’ or “strategies to remove involvement in and culpability for systems of domination” (p. 17). Mawhinney builds upon Mary Louise Fellows and Sherene Razack’s (1998) conceptualization of, ‘the race to innocence’, “the process through which a woman comes to believe her own claim of subordination is the most urgent, and that she is unimplicated in the subordination of other women” (p. 335).¶ Mawhinney’s thesis theorizes the self-positioning of white people as simultaneously the oppressed and never an oppressor, and as having an absence of experience of oppressive power relations (p. 100). This simultaneous self-positioning afforded white people in various purportedly anti-racist settings to say to people of color, “I don’t experience the problems you do, so I don’t think about it,” and “tell me what to do, you’re the experts here” (p. 103). “The commonsense appeal of such statements,” Malwhinney observes, enables white speakers to “utter them sanguine in [their] appearance of equanimity, is rooted in the normalization of a liberal analysis of power relations” (ibid.).¶ In the discussion that follows, we will do some work to identify and argue against a series of what we call ‘settler moves to innocence’. Settler moves to innocence are those strategies or positionings that attempt to relieve the settler of feelings of guilt or responsibility without giving up land or power or privilege, without having to change much at all. In fact, settler scholars may gain professional kudos or a boost in their reputations for being so sensitive or self-aware. Yet settler moves to innocence are hollow, they only serve the settler. This discussion will likely cause discomfort in our settler readers, may embarrass you/us or make us/you feel implicated. Because of the racialized flights and flows of settler colonial empire described above, settlers are diverse - there are white settlers and brown settlers, and peoples in both groups make moves to innocence that attempt to deny and deflect their own complicity in settler colonialism. When it makes sense to do so, we attend to moves to innocence enacted differently by white people and by brown and Black people. ¶ In describing settler moves to innocence, our goal is to provide a framework of excuses, distractions, and diversions from decolonization. We discuss some of the moves to innocence at greater length than others, mostly because some require less explanation and because others are more central to our initial argument for the demetaphorization of decolonization. We provide this framework so that we can be more impatient with each other, less likely to accept gestures and half-steps, and more willing to press for acts which unsettle innocence, which we discuss in the final section of this article.

   #### The aff’s claim to emancipation collapses the real material difference between our position as debaters and oppressed individuals for whom resistance is not a simple language-game---their deployment of an unproblematic posture of victimization spotlights the aff’s righteousness while robbing the oppressed of protest

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   \*We do not endorse ableist language

   Until the very end of the novel, Jane is always excluded from every available form of social power. Her survival seems to depend on renouncing what power might come to her as teacher, mistress, cousin, heiress, or missionary's wife. She repeatedly flees from such forms of inclusion in the field of power, as if her status as an exemplary subject, like her authority as narrator, depends entirely on her claim to a kind of truth which can only be made from a position of powerlessness. By creating such an unlovely heroine and subjecting her to one form of harassment after another, Brontë demonstrates the power of words alone. 18¶ This reading of Jane Eyre highlights her not simply as the female underdog who is often identified by feminist and Marxist critics, but as the intellectual who acquires power through a moral rectitude that was to become the flip side of Western imperialism's ruthlessness. Lying at the core of Anglo­American liberalism, this moral rectitude would accompany many territorial and economic conquests overseas with a firm sense of social mission. When Jane Eyre went to the colonies in the nineteenth century, she turned into the Christian missionary. It is this understanding—that Brontë's depiction of a socially marginalized English woman is, in terms of ideological production, fully complicit with England's empire­building ambition rather than opposed to it—that prompted Gayatri Spivak to read Jane Eyre as a text in the service of imperialism. Referring to Brontë's treatment of the "madwoman" Bertha Mason, the white Jamaican Creole character, Spivak charges Jane Eyre for, precisely, its humanism, in which the "native subject" is not created as an animal but as "the object of what might be termed the terrorism of¶ 12¶ the categorical imperative." This kind of creation is imperialism's use/travesty of the Kantian metaphysical demand to "make the heathen into a human so that he can be treated as an end in himself." 19 In the twentieth century, as Europe's former colonies became independent, Jane Eyre became the Maoist. Michel de Certeau describes the affinity between her two major reincarnations, one religious and the other political, this way:¶ The place that was formerly occupied by the Church or Churches vis­à­vis the established powers remains recognizable, over the past two centuries, in the functioning of the opposition known as leftist….¶ [T]here is vis­à­vis the established order, a relationship between the Churches that defended an other world and the parties of the left which, since the nineteenth century, have promoted a different future. In both cases, similar functional characteristics can be discerned….20¶ The Maoist retains many of Jane's awesome features, chief of which are a protestant passion to turn powerlessness into "truth" and an idealist intolerance of those who may think differently from her. Whereas the great Orientalist blames the living "third world" natives for the loss of the ancient non­Western civilization, his loved object, the Maoist applauds the same natives for personifying and fulfilling her ideals. For the Maoist in the 1970s, the mainland Chinese were, in spite of their "backwardness," a puritanical alternative to the West in human form—a dream come true.¶ In the 1980s and 1990s, however, the Maoist is disillusioned to watch the China they sanctified crumble before their eyes. This is the period in which we hear disapproving criticisms of contemporary Chinese people for liking Western pop music and consumer culture, or for being overly interested in sex. In a way that makes her indistinguishable from what at first seems a political enemy, the Orientalist, the Maoist now mourns the loss of her loved object—Socialist China—by pointing angrily at living "third world" natives. For many who have built their careers on the vision of Socialist China, the grief is tremendous. In the "cultural studies" of the American academy in the 1990s, the Maoist is reproducing with prowess. We see this in the way¶ 13¶ terms such as "oppression," "victimization," and "subalternity" are now being used. Contrary to Orientalist disdain for contemporary native cultures of the non­West, the Maoist turns precisely the "disdained'' other into the object of his/her study and, in some cases, identification. In a mixture of admiration and moralism, the Maoist sometimes turns all people from non­Western cultures into a generalized "subaltern" that is then used to flog an equally generalized "West." 21¶ Because the representation of "the other" as such ignores (1) the class and intellectual hierarchies within these other cultures, which are usually as elaborate as those in the West, and (2) the discursive power relations structuring the Maoist's mode of inquiry and valorization, it produces a way of talking in which notions of lack, subalternity, victimization, and so forth are drawn upon indiscriminately, often with the intention of spotlighting the speaker's own sense of alterity and political righteousness. A comfortably wealthy white American intellectual I know claimed that he was a "third world intellectual," citing as one of his credentials his marriage to a Western European woman of part­Jewish heritage; a professor of English complained about being "victimized" by the structured time at an Ivy League institution, meaning that she needed to be on time for classes; a graduate student of upper­class background from one of the world's poorest countries told his American friends that he was of poor peasant stock in order to authenticate his identity as a radical "third world" representative; male and female academics across the U.S. frequently say they were "raped" when they report experiences of professional frustration and conflict. Whether sincere or delusional, such cases of self­dramatization all take the route of self­subalternization, which has increasingly become the assured means to authority and power. What these intellectuals are doing is robbing the terms of oppression of their critical and oppositional import, and thus depriving the oppressed of even the vocabulary of protest and rightful demand. The oppressed, whose voices we seldom hear, are robbed twice—the first time of their economic chances, the second time of their language, which is now no longer distinguishable from those of us who have had our consciousnesses "raised."¶ In their analysis of the relation between violence and representation, Armstrong and Tennenhouse write: "[The] idea of violence ¶ 14¶ as representation is not an easy one for most academics to accept. It implies that whenever we speak for someone else we are inscribing her with our own (implicitly masculine) idea of order." 22 At present, this process of "inscribing" often means not only that we "represent" certain historic others because they are/were ''oppressed"; it often means that there is interest in representation only when what is represented can in some way be seen as lacking. Even though the Maoist is usually contemptuous of Freudian psychoanalysis because it is "bourgeois," her investment in oppression and victimization fully partakes of the Freudian and Lacanian notions of "lack." By attributing "lack," the Maoist justifies the "speaking for someone else" that Armstrong and Tennenhouse call "violence as representation."¶ As in the case of Orientalism, which does not necessarily belong only to those who are white, the Maoist does not have to be racially "white" either. The phrase "white guilt" refers to a type of discourse which continues to position power and lack against each other, while the narrator of that discourse, like Jane Eyre, speaks with power but identifies with powerlessness. This is how even those who come from privilege more often than not speak from/of/as its "lack." What the Maoist demonstrates is a circuit of productivity that draws its capital from others' deprivation while refusing to acknowledge its own presence as endowed. With the material origins of her own discourse always concealed, the Maoist thus speaks as if her charges were a form of immaculate conception.¶ The difficulty facing us, it seems to me, is no longer simply the "first world" Orientalist who mourns the rusting away of his treasures, but also students from privileged backgrounds Western and non­Western, who conform behaviorally in every respect with the elitism of their social origins (e.g., through powerful matrimonial alliances, through pursuit of fame, or through a contemptuous arrogance toward fellow students) but who nonetheless proclaim dedication to "vindicating the subalterns." My point is not that they should be blamed for the accident of their birth, nor that they cannot marry rich, pursue fame, or even be arrogant. Rather, it is that they choose to see in others' powerlessness an idealized image of themselves and refuse to hear in the dissonance between the content and manner of their speech their own complicity with violence. Even though these descendents of the Maoist may be quick to point¶ 15¶ out the exploitativeness of Benjamin Disraeli's "The East is a career," 23 they remain blind to their own exploitativeness as they make "the East" their career. How do we intervene in the productivity of this overdetermined circuit?

   #### This is especially true in this context---debate too easily becomes a narcotic that eases our anxiety about colonization

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   Describing acts of passing, Sara Ahmed (2000) asserts the importance of being able to replace “the stranger”, or take the place of the other, in the consolidation and (re)affirmation of white identity. To “become without becoming,” is to reproduce “the other as ‘not-I’ within rather than beyond the structure of the ‘I’” (p. 132). Sherene Razack, reading Ahmed, tells us that appropriating the other’s pain occurs when, “we think we are recognizing not only the other’s pain but his or her difference. Difference becomes the conduit of identification in much the same way as pain does” (Razack, 2007, p. 379). Discussing the film Dances with Wolves (a cinematic fiction of a Union soldier in the post-bellum Civil War era who befriends and protects the Lakota Sioux, who are represented as a noble, dying race), Ahmed critically engages the narrative, in which a white man (played by Kevin Costner) comes to respect the Sioux,¶ to the point of being able to dance their dances...the white man in this example is able to ‘to become without becoming’ (Ahmed, 2000, p. 32)...He alone is transformed through his encounter with the Sioux, while they remain the mechanism for his transformation. He becomes the authentic knower while they remain what is to be known and consumed, and spit out again, as good Indians who confirm the white man’s position as hero of the story...the Sioux remain objects, while Kevin Costner is able to go anywhere and be anything. (Ahmed’s analysis, as discussed by Razack, 2007, p. 379).¶ For the purposes of this article, we locate the desire to become without becoming [Indian] within settler adoption fantasies. These fantasies can mean the adoption of Indigenous practices and knowledge, but more, refer to those narratives in the settler colonial imagination in which the Native (understanding that he is becoming extinct) hands over his land, his claim to the land, his very Indian-ness to the settler for safe-keeping. This is a fantasy that is invested in a settler futurity and dependent on the foreclosure of an Indigenous futurity.¶ Settler adoption fantasies are longstanding narratives in the United States, fueled by rare instances of ceremonial “adoptions”, from John Smith’s adoption in 1607 by Powhatan (Pocahontas’ father), to Lewis Henry Morgan’s adoption in 1847 by Seneca member Jimmy Johnson, to the recent adoption of actor Johnny Depp by the family of LaDonna Harris, a Comanche woman and social activist. As sovereign nations, tribes make decisions about who is considered a member, so our interest is not in whether adoptions are appropriate or legitimate. Rather, because the prevalence of the adoption narrative in American literature, film, television, holidays and history books far exceeds the actual occurrences of adoptions, we are interested in how this narrative spins a fantasy that an individual settler can become innocent, indeed heroic and indigenized, against a backdrop of national guilt. The adoption fantasy is the mythical trump card desired by critical settlers who feel remorse about settler colonialism, one that absolves them from the inheritance of settler crimes and that bequeaths a new inheritance of Native-ness and claims to land (which is a reaffirmation of what the settler project has been all along).¶ <cont>¶ In this fantasy, Hawkeye is both adopter and adoptee. The act of adopting indigenous ways makes him ‘deserving’ to be adopted by the Indigenous. Settler fantasies of adoption alleviate the anxiety of settler un-belonging. He adopts the love of land and therefore thinks he belongs to the land. He is a first environmentalist and sentimentalist, nostalgic for vanishing Native ways. In today’s jargon, he could be thought of as an eco-activist, naturalist, and Indian sympathizer. At the same time, his cultural hybridity is what makes him more ‘fit’ to survive - the ultimate social Darwinism - better than both British and Indian; he is the mythical American. Hawkeye, hybrid white and Indian, becomes the reluctant but nonetheless rightful inheritor of the land and warden of its vanishing people.¶ Similarly, the settler intellectual who hybridizes decolonial thought with Western critical traditions (metaphorizing decolonization), emerges superior to both Native intellectuals and continental theorists simultaneously. With his critical hawk-eye, he again sees the critique better than anyone and sees the world from a loftier station 14. It is a fiction, just as Cooper’s Hawkeye, just as the adoption, just as the belonging.¶ In addition to fabricating historical memory, the Tales serve to generate historical amnesia. The books were published between 1823-1841, at the height of the Jacksonian period with the Indian Removal Act of 1830 and subsequent Trail of Tears 1831-1837. During this time, 46,000 Native Americans were removed from their homelands, opening 25 million acres of land for re-settlement. The Tales are not only silent on Indian Removal but narrate the Indian as vanishing in an earlier time frame, and thus Indigenous people are already dead prior to removal.¶ Performing sympathy is critical to Cooper’s project of settler innocence. It is no accident that he is often read as a sympathizer to the Indians (despite the fact that he didn’t know any) in contrast to Jackson’s policies of removal and genocide. Cooper is cast as the ‘innocent’ father of U.S. ideology, in contrast to the ‘bad white men’ of history.¶ Performing suffering is also critical to Cooper’s project of settler innocence. Hawkeye takes on the (imagined) demeanor of the vanishing Native - brooding, vengeful, protecting a dying way of life, and unsuccessful in finding a mate and producing offspring. Thus sympathy and suffering are the tokens used to absorb the Native Other’s difference, coded as pain, the ‘not- I’ into the ‘I’.¶ The settler’s personal suffering feeds his fantasy of mutuality. The 2011 film, The Descendants, is a modern remake of the adoption fantasy (blended with a healthy dose of settler nativism). George Clooney’s character, “King” is a haole hypo-descendant of the last surviving princess of Hawai’i and reluctant inheritor of a massive expanse of land, the last wilderness on the Island of Kauai. In contrast to his obnoxious settler cousins, he earns his privilege as an overworked lawyer rather than relying on his unearned inheritance. Furthermore, Clooney’s character suffers - he is a dysfunctional father, heading a dysfunctional family, watching his wife wither away in a coma, learning that she cheated on him - and so he is somehow Hawaiian at heart. Because pain is the token for oppression, claims to pain then equate to claims of being an innocent non-oppressor. By the film’s end, King goes against the wishes of his profiteering settler cousins and chooses to “keep” the land, reluctantly accepting that his is the steward of the land, a responsibility bequeathed upon him as an accident of birth. This is the denouement of reconciliation between the settler-I and the interiorized native-not-I within the settler. Sympathy and suffering are profoundly satisfying for settler cinema: The Descendants was nominated for 5 Academy Awards and won for Best Adapted Screenplay in 2012.¶ The beauty of this settler fantasy is that it adopts decolonization and aborts it in one gesture. Hawkeye adopts Uncas, who then conveniently dies. King adopts Hawai’i and negates the necessity for ea, Kanaka Maoli sovereignty. Decolonization is stillborn - rendered irrelevant because decolonization is already completed by the indigenized consciousness of the settler. Now ‘we’ are all Indian, all Hawaiian, and decolonization is no longer an issue. ‘Our’ only recourse is to move forward, however regretfully, with ‘our’ settler future.

   #### Decolonizing the academy is an attempt to proclaim innocence and assuage our guilt---proposing specific reforms is necessary to overcome the temptations of this palliative---also proves T version of aff

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   Fanon told us in 1963 that decolonizing the mind is the first step, not the only step toward overthrowing colonial regimes. Yet we wonder whether another settler move to innocence is to focus on decolonizing the mind, or the cultivation of critical consciousness, as if it were the sole activity of decolonization; to allow conscientization to stand in for the more uncomfortable task of relinquishing stolen land. We agree that curricula, literature, and pedagogy can be crafted to aid people in learning to see settler colonialism, to articulate critiques of settler epistemology, and set aside settler histories and values in search of ethics that reject domination and exploitation; this is not unimportant work. However, the front-loading of critical consciousness building can waylay decolonization, even though the experience of teaching and learning to be critical of settler colonialism can be so powerful it can feel like it is indeed making change. Until stolen land is relinquished, critical consciousness does not translate into action that disrupts settler colonialism. So, we respectfully disagree with George Clinton and Funkadelic (1970) and En Vogue (1992) when they assert that if you “free your mind, the rest (your ass) will follow.”¶ Paulo Freire, eminent education philosopher, popular educator, and liberation theologian, wrote his celebrated book, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, in no small part as a response to Fanon’s Wretched of the Earth. Its influence upon critical pedagogy and on the practices of educators committed to social justice cannot be overstated. Therefore, it is important to point out significant differences between Freire and Fanon, especially with regard to de/colonization. Freire situates the work of liberation in the minds of the oppressed, an abstract category of dehumanized worker vis-a-vis a similarly abstract category of oppressor. This is a sharp right turn away from Fanon’s work, which always positioned the work of liberation in the particularities of colonization, in the specific structural and interpersonal categories of Native and settler. Under Freire’s paradigm, it is unclear who the oppressed are, even more ambiguous who the oppressors are, and it is inferred throughout that an innocent third category of enlightened human exists: “those who suffer with [the oppressed] and fight at their side” (Freire, 2000, p. 42). These words, taken from the opening dedication of Pedagogy of the Oppressed, invoke the same settler fantasy of mutuality based on sympathy and suffering. Fanon positions decolonization as chaotic, an unclean break from a colonial condition that is already over determined by the violence of the colonizer and unresolved in its possible futures. By contrast, Freire positions liberation as redemption, a freeing of both oppressor and oppressed through their humanity. Humans become ‘subjects’ who then proceed to work on the ‘objects’ of the world (animals, earth, water), and indeed read the word (critical consciousness) in order to write the world (exploit nature). For Freire, there are no Natives, no Settlers, and indeed no history, and the future is simply a rupture from the timeless present. Settler colonialism is absent from his discussion, implying either that it is an unimportant analytic or that it is an already completed project of the past (a past oppression perhaps). Freire’s theories of liberation resoundingly echo the allegory of Plato’s Cave, a continental philosophy of mental emancipation, whereby the thinking man individualistically emerges from the dark cave of ignorance into the light of critical consciousness. ¶ By contrast, black feminist thought roots freedom in the darkness of the cave, in that well of feeling and wisdom from which all knowledge is recreated. These places of possibility within ourselves are dark because they are ancient and hidden; they have survived and grown strong through darkness. Within these deep places, each one of us holds an incredible reserve of creativity and power, of unexamined and unrecorded emotion and feeling. The woman's place of power within each of us is neither white nor surface; it is dark, it is ancient, and it is deep. (Lorde, 1984, pp. 36-37)¶ Audre Lorde’s words provide a sharp contrast to Plato’s sight-centric image of liberation: “The white fathers told us, I think therefore I am; and the black mothers in each of us - the poet - whispers in our dreams, I feel therefore I can be free” (p. 38). For Lorde, writing is not action upon the world. Rather, poetry is giving a name to the nameless, “first made into language, then into idea, then into more tangible action” (p. 37). Importantly, freedom is a possibility that is not just mentally generated; it is particular and felt.¶ Freire’s philosophies have encouraged educators to use “colonization” as a metaphor for oppression. In such a paradigm, “internal colonization” reduces to “mental colonization”, logically leading to the solution of decolonizing one’s mind and the rest will follow. Such philosophy conveniently sidesteps the most unsettling of questions: The essential thing is to see clearly, to think clearly - that is, dangerously and to answer clearly the innocent first question: what, fundamentally, is colonization? (Cesaire, 2000, p. 32)¶ Because colonialism is comprised of global and historical relations, Cesaire’s question must be considered globally and historically. However, it cannot be reduced to a global answer, nor a historical answer. To do so is to use colonization metaphorically. “What is colonization?” must be answered specifically, with attention to the colonial apparatus that is assembled to order the relationships between particular peoples, lands, the ‘natural world’, and ‘civilization’. Colonialism is marked by its specializations. In North America and other settings, settler sovereignty imposes sexuality, legality, raciality, language, religion and property in specific ways. Decolonization likewise must be thought through in these particularities.¶ To agree on what [decolonization] is not: neither evangelization, nor a philanthropic enterprise, nor a desire to push back the frontiers of ignorance, disease, and tyranny... (Cesaire, 2000, p. 32)¶ We deliberately extend Cesaire’s words above to assert what decolonization is not. It is not converting Indigenous politics to a Western doctrine of liberation; it is not a philanthropic process of ‘helping’ the at-risk and alleviating suffering; it is not a generic term for struggle against oppressive conditions and outcomes. The broad umbrella of social justice may have room underneath for all of these efforts. By contrast, decolonization specifically requires the repatriation of Indigenous land and life. Decolonization is not a metonym for social justice.¶ We don’t intend to discourage those who have dedicated careers and lives to teaching themselves and others to be critically conscious of racism, sexism, homophobia, classism, xenophobia, and settler colonialism. We are asking them/you to consider how the pursuit of critical consciousness, the pursuit of social justice through a critical enlightenment, can also be settler moves to innocence - diversions, distractions, which relieve the settler of feelings of guilt or responsibility, and conceal the need to give up land or power or privilege.¶ Anna Jacobs’ 2009 Master’s thesis explores the possibilities for what she calls white harm reduction models. Harm reduction models attempt to reduce the harm or risk of specific practices. Jacobs identifies white supremacy as a public health issue that is at the root of most other public health issues. The goal of white harm reduction models, Jacobs says, is to reduce the harm that white supremacy has had on white people, and the deep harm it has caused non-white people over generations. Learning from Jacobs’ analysis, we understand the curricular pedagogical project of critical consciousness as settler harm reduction, crucial in the resuscitation of practices and intellectual life outside of settler ontologies. (Settler) harm reduction is intended only as a stopgap. As the environmental crisis escalates and peoples around the globe are exposed to greater concentrations of violence and poverty, the need for settler harm reduction is acute, profoundly so. At the same time we remember that, by definition, settler harm reduction, like conscientization, is not the same as decolonization and does not inherently offer any pathways that lead to decolonization.

   #### Political demands for Red Pedagogy crystalize into a hegemonic strategy that mirrors the worst of the status quo---the guilt-trip of the 1ac masks the privilege that prevents the aff from actually changing the lives of the people whom they invoke to warrant a ballot---our 1nc is a necessary tactical intervention to burst the utopian bubble that is their solvency argument

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   Tactics of Intervention¶ Between Orientalism and nativism, between the melancholic cultural connoisseur and the militant Maoist—this is the scene of post­coloniality as many diasporic intellectuals find it in the West. "Diasporas are emblems of transnationalism because they embody the question of borders," writes Khachig Tölölyan. 24 The "question of borders" should not be a teleological one. It is not so much about the transient eventually giving way to the permanent as it is about an existential condition of which "permanence'' itself is an ongoing fabrication. Accordingly, if, as William Safran writes, "diasporic consciousness is an intellectualization of [the] existential condition" 25 of dispersal from the homeland, then "diasporic consciousness" is perhaps not so much a historical accident as it is an intellectual reality—the reality of being intellectual.¶ Central to the question of borders is the question of propriety and property. Conceivably, one possible practice of borders is to anticipate and prepare for new proprietorship by destroying, replacing, and expanding existing ones. For this notion of borders—as margins waiting to be incorporated as new properties—to work, the accompanying spatial notion of a field is essential. The notion of a "field" is analogous to the notion of "hegemony," in the sense that its formation involves the rise to dominance of a group that is able to diffuse its culture to all levels of society. In Gramsci's sense, revolution is a struggle for hegemony between opposing classes.¶ While the struggle for hegemony remains necessary for many reasons—especially in cases where underprivileged groups seek equality of privilege—I remain skeptical of the validity of hegemony over time, especially if it is a hegemony formed through intellectual power. The question for me is not how intellectuals can obtain hegemony (a question that positions them in an oppositional light against dominant power and neglects their share of that power through literacy, through the culture of words), but how they can¶ 16¶ resist, as Michel Foucault said, "the forms of power that transform [them] into its object and instrument in the sphere of 'knowledge,' 'truth,' 'consciousness,' and 'discourse.'" 26 Putting it another way, how do intellectuals struggle against a hegemony which already includes them and which can no longer be divided into the state and civil society in Gramsci's terms, nor be clearly demarcated into national and transnational spaces?¶ Because "borders" have so clearly meandered into so many intellectual issues that the more stable and conventional relation between borders and the "field" no longer holds, intervention cannot simply be thought of in terms of the creation of new ''fields." 27 Instead, it is necessary to think primarily in terms of borders—of borders, that is, as para­sites that never take over a field in its entirety but erode it slowly and tactically.¶ The work of Michel de Certeau is helpful for a formulation of this para­sitical intervention. De Certeau distinguishes between "strategy" and another practice— "tactic"—in the following terms. A strategy has the ability to "transform the uncertainties of history into readable spaces" (de Certeau, p. 36). The type of knowledge derived from strategy is "one sustained and determined by the power to provide oneself with one's own place" (de Certeau, p. 36). Strategy therefore belongs to "an economy of the proper place" (de Certeau, p. 55) and to those who are committed to the building, growth, and fortification of a "field." A text, for instance, would become in this economy "a cultural weapon, a private hunting preserve," or "a means of social stratification" in the order of the Great Wall of China (de Certeau, p. 171). A tactic, by contrast, is "a calculated action determined by the absence of a proper locus" (de Certeau, p. 37). Betting on time instead of space, a tactic "concerns an operational logic whose models may go as far back as the age­old ruses of fishes and insects that disguise or transform themselves in order to survive, and which has in any case been concealed by the form of rationality currently dominant in Western culture" (de Certeau, p. xi).¶ Why are "tactics" useful at this moment? As discussions about "multiculturalism," "interdisciplinarity," "the third world intellectual," and other companion issues develop in the American academy and society today, and as rhetorical claims to political change and¶ 17¶ difference are being put forth, many deep­rooted, politically reactionary forces return to haunt us. Essentialist notions of culture and history; conservative notions of territorial and linguistic propriety, and the "otherness" ensuing from them; unattested claims of oppression and victimization that are used merely to guilt­trip and to control; sexist and racist reaffirmations of sexual and racial diversities that are made merely in the name of righteousness—all these forces create new "solidarities" whose ideological premises remain unquestioned. These new solidarities are often informed by a strategic attitude which repeats what they seek to overthrow. The weight of old ideologies being reinforced over and over again is immense.¶ We need to remember as intellectuals that the battles we fight are battles of words. Those who argue the oppositional standpoint are not doing anything different from their enemies and are most certainly not directly changing the downtrodden lives of those who seek their survival in metropolitan and nonmetropolitan spaces alike. What academic intellectuals must confront is thus not their "victimization" by society at large (or their victimization­in­solidarity­with­the­oppressed), but the power, wealth, and privilege that ironically accumulate from their "oppositional" viewpoint, and the widening gap between the professed contents of their words and the upward mobility they gain from such words. (When Foucault said intellectuals need to struggle against becoming the object and instrument of power, he spoke precisely to this kind of situation.) The predicament we face in the West, where intellectual freedom shares a history with economic enterprise, is that "if a professor wishes to denounce aspects of big business, … he will be wise to locate in a school whose trustees are big businessmen." 28 Why should we believe in those who continue to speak a language of alterity­as­lack while their salaries and honoraria keep rising? How do we resist the turning­into­propriety of oppositional discourses, when the intention of such discourses has been that of displacing and disowning the proper? How do we prevent what begin as tactics—that which is ''without any base where it could stockpile its winnings" (de Certeau, p. 37)—from turning into a solidly fenced­off field, in the military no less than in the academic sense

   #### They trade the guilt-trip of the 1ac for the moral victory of the ballot---this disavows the link between their advocacy and the privilege it relies on, turning debate into a technology for instrumentalizing the oppressed

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   But while it effectively raises our consciousness in regard to the privileged positions enjoyed by those who are economically successful, the question "Who speaks?" tends to remain useless in its capacity to change existing economic power relations. This is because the posing of the question itself is already a form of privilege, mostly affordable for those who can stand apart and view the world with altruistic concern. The question that this question cannot ask, since it is the condition of its own possibility, is the more fundamental inequality between theory—the most sophisticated speaking instance, one might say—and the oppressed.¶ Like anthropologists, medical doctors, zoological researchers, and their like, theorists need "objects" to advance their careers. The current trend is for theorists in the humanities to discover objects of oppression for the construction of a guilt­tripping discourse along the lines of "Who speaks?" and thus win for themselves a kind of moral and/or rhetorical victory. Strictly speaking, we are not only living in the age of "traveling theories" and "traveling theorists," as the topic of a recent issue of a journal indicates, 2 but also of portable oppressions and portable oppressed objects. Our technology, including the technology that is the academic conference, the visual and aural aids with which we present our "objects," the field trips we take for interviewing and archeological purposes of every kind, is what makes portability, a result of mechanization whose effects far exceed the personal mobility of speaking humans, an inherent part of "voices," even though this portability is often ignored in our theorizing.¶ The problem with the question "Who speaks?", then, is that it is still trying to understand the world in the form of a coherent narrative grammar, with an identifiable (anthropomorphic) subject for every sentence. The emphasis of the question is always on "who." From that it follows that "Who speaks?" is a rhetorical question, with predetermined answers which however cannot change the structure of privilege against which it is aimed. Obviously, it is those who have power who speak—this is the answer this question is meant to provoke. ¶<cont> 154¶ At a time when we have become rightly alert to issues in the "third world," it is precisely the problem of "use" that has to be rethought. Something is "useful," we tend to think, because it serves a collective purpose. While on many occasions I have no objections to this kind of thinking, it is when we deal with the "third world'' that we have to be particularly careful in resorting to paradigms of the collective as such. Why? Such paradigms produce stereotypical views of members of "third world" cultures, who are always seen as representatives driven solely by the cause of vindicating their own cultures. To the extent that such peoples are seen as representatives deprived of their individuality and treated as members of a collective (read "third world") culture, I think that the morally supportive narrativizing of the "third world" by way of utilitarianism, however sophisticatedly utilitarianism is argued, repeats what it tries to criticize, namely the subjection of entire peoples¶ 155¶ to conceptual paradigms of life activities that may have little relevance to such peoples' struggles for survival. [↑](#endnote-ref-1)