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### 1NC FW

#### Most predictable—the agent and verb indicate a debate about hypothetical government action

Jon M Ericson 3, Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action through governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### A general subject isn’t enough—debate requires a specific point of difference

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Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.¶ Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.¶ To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.¶ Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### b. Vote neg

#### 1. Preparation and clash—changing the topic post facto manipulates balance of prep, which structurally favors the aff because they speak last and permute alternatives—strategic fairness is key to engaging a well-prepared opponent

#### Topical fairness requirements are key to effective dialogue—monopolizing strategy and prep makes the discussion one-sided and subverts any meaningful neg role

Galloway 7—Samford Comm prof (Ryan, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007)

Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure.¶ Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table.¶ When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. **Far from** being **a banal request for links** to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon **months of preparation**, research, and critical thinking not be silenced.¶ Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms **operate to exclude** particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). Hugh Duncan furthers this line of reasoning:¶ Opponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other because in doing so they enhance their own chances of thinking better and reaching sound decisions. Opposition is necessary because it sharpens thought in action. We assume that argument, discussion, and talk, among free an informed people who subordinate decisions of any kind, because it is only through such discussion that we reach agreement which binds us to a common cause…If we are to be equal…relationships among equals must find expression in many formal and informal institutions (Duncan, 1993, p. 196-197).¶ **Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintains equality for the sake of the conversation** (Farrell, 1985, p. 114).¶ For example, an affirmative case on the 2007-2008 college topic might defend neither state nor international action in the Middle East, and yet claim to be germane to the topic in some way. The case essentially denies the arguments that state action is oppressive or that actions in the international arena are philosophically or pragmatically suspect. Instead of allowing for the dialogue to be modified by the interchange of the affirmative case and the negative response, the affirmative subverts any meaningful role to the negative team, preventing them from offering effective “counter-word” and undermining the value of a meaningful exchange of speech acts. **Germaneness and other substitutes for topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits** of topical advocacy.

#### 2. Substantive constraints on the debate are key to actualize effective pluralism and agonistic democracy

John Dryzek 6, Professor of Social and Political Theory, The Australian National University, Reconciling Pluralism and Consensus as Political Ideals, American Journal of Political Science,Vol. 50, No. 3, July 2006, Pp. 634–649

A more radical contemporary pluralism is suspicious of liberal and communitarian devices for reconciling difference. Such a critical pluralism is associated with agonists such as Connolly (1991), Honig (1993), and Mouffe (2000), and difference democrats such as Young (2000). As Honig puts it, “Difference is just another word for what used to be called pluralism” (1996, 60). Critical pluralists resemble liberals in that they begin from the variety of ways it is possible to experience the world, but stress that the experiences and perspectives of marginalized and oppressed groups are likely to be very different from dominant groups. They also have a strong suspicion ofliberal theory that looks neutral but in practice supports and serves the powerful.

Difference democrats are hostile to consensus, partly because consensus decisionmaking (of the sort popular in 1970s radical groups) conceals informal oppression under the guise of concern for all by disallowing dissent (Zablocki 1980). But the real target is political theory that deploys consensus, especially deliberative and liberal theory. Young (1996, 125–26) argues that the appeals to unity and the common good that deliberative theorists under sway of the consensus ideal stress as the proper forms of political communication can often be oppressive. For deliberation so oriented all too easily equates the common good with the interests of the more powerful, thus sidelining legitimate concerns of the marginalized. Asking the underprivileged to set aside their particularistic concerns also means marginalizing their favored forms of expression, especially the telling of personal stories (Young 1996, 126).3 Speaking for an agonistic conception of democracy (to which Young also subscribes; 2000, 49–51), Mouffe states:

To negate the ineradicable character of antagonism and aim at a universal rational consensus— that is the real threat to democracy. Indeed, this can lead to violence being unrecognized and hidden behind appeals to “rationality,” as is often the case in liberal thinking. (1996, 248)

Mouffe is a radical pluralist: “By pluralism I mean the end of a substantive idea of the good life” (1996, 246). But neither Mouffe nor Young want to abolish communication in the name of pluralism and difference; much of their work advocates sustained attention to communication. Mouffe also cautions against uncritical celebration of difference, for some differences imply “subordination and should therefore be challenged by a radical democratic politics” (1996, 247). Mouffe raises the question of the terms in which engagement across difference might proceed. Participants should ideally accept that the positions of others are legitimate, though not as a result of being persuaded in argument. Instead, it is a matter of being open to conversion due to adoption of a particular kind of democratic attitude that converts antagonism into agonism, fighting into critical engagement, enemies into adversaries who are treated with respect. Respect here is notjust (liberal) toleration, but positive validation of the position of others. For Young, a communicative democracy would be composed of people showing “equal respect,” under “procedural rules of fair discussion and decisionmaking” (1996, 126). Schlosberg speaks of “agonistic respect” as “a critical pluralist ethos” (1999, 70).

Mouffe and Young both want pluralism to be regulated by a particular kind of attitude, be it respectful, agonistic, or even in Young’s (2000, 16–51) case reasonable.Thus neither proposes unregulated pluralism as an alternative to (deliberative) consensus. This regulation cannot be just procedural, for that would imply “anything goes” in terms of the substance of positions. Recall thatMouffe rejects differences that imply subordination. Agonistic ideals demand judgments about what is worthy of respect and what is not. Connolly (1991, 211) worriesabout dogmatic assertions and denials of identity that fuel existential resentments that would have to be changed to make agonism possible. Young seeks “transformation of private, self-regarding desires into public appeals to justice” (2000, 51). Thus for Mouffe, Connolly, and Young alike, regulative principles for democratic communication are not just attitudinal or procedural; they also refer to the substance of the kinds of claims that are worthy of respect. These authors would not want to legislate substance and are suspicious of the content of any alleged consensus. But in retreating from “anything goes” relativism, they need principles to regulate the substance of what rightfully belongs in democratic debate.

#### Constraints on deliberation are necessary to re-found the political---an untamed agon eviscerates political action and judgment skills

Dana Villa 96—prof of political science, Amherst, Beyond Good and Evil: Arendt, Nietzsche, and the Aestheticization of Political Action, Political Theory, Vol. 20, No. 2 (May, 1992), pp. 274-308

The representative thinking made possible by disinterested judgment is Arendt‘s Kantian version of Nietzsche's perspectival objectivity, the objectivity born of using “more" and “differ-em" eyes to judge/interpret a thing.” There is, however, an obvious and crucial difference between perspectives represented through the free play of imagination and the “perspective seeing" that Nietzsche describes. For Nietzsche, the ability to view the world aesthetically presupposes liberation from any residual sense that the link between signifier and signified is in any way nonarbitrary. Having “more” and “different” eyes simply means the ability to relativize all accepted meanings, to dissolve their apparent solidity in the free play of signifiers.135 In Kant and Arendt, on the other hand, the free play of the imagination, the capacity for representative thought, has the effect of focusing the judging agent's attention on the publicly available aspects of the representation.'‘‘‘’ The representative nature of judgment enables the transcendence of "individual limitations" and “subjective private conditions,” thereby freeing us for the purely public aspect of the phenomenon.

The difference between genealogical "objectivity" and representative judgment, between the kind of aesthetic distance endorsed by Nietzsche and [hat endorsed by Kant and Arcndt, is summed up by the contrast between Nietzsche’s trope of “seeing things from another planet" and the Kantian] Arendtian appeal to “common sense,” the sensus communis.m Nietzschean aestheticism, in the form of perspectivism, has the effect of either placing one beyond any community of interpretation (the genealogical standpoint) or denying that a viable “background consensus" exists, thereby robbing the public realm of its fundamental epistemological precondition. There can be no arena of common discourse, no genuinely public space, whcn the “death of God” leads to the advent of Weber's “waning gods."Us Lyotard expresses a similar thought when he links the discovery of an irreducible plurality of incommensurable language games to the decline of the legitimizing metanarratives of modernity . in such a situation, judgment and interpretation are inevitably aestheticized: we are left, in Nietzsche's phrase, with the "yay and nay of the palate.""°

For Kant, the significance and implications of aesthetic distance are quite opposite. As noted previously, he is struck by the public character of the beautiful, despite the nonobjective quality of aesthetic t’ntpel'ience.“I The impartiality of detached aesthetic judgment, while not pretending to truth, guarantees that the object or ground of aesthetic satisfaction will be communicable. This in turn reveals a quality of taste as judgment, which is obscured by Nietzsche, and our own subjectivist notion of taste. Taste judgments of the disinterested sort are characterized by a peculiar claim: the pure judgment of taste "requires the agreement of everyone, and he who describes anything as beautiful claims that everyone ought to give approval to the object in question and describe it as beautiful?” The communicability of taste judgments leads Kant to posit the existence of a common sense, a common “feeling for the world." Indeed, Kant describes taste itself as “a kind of sensus communism“

The aesthetic distance achieved by representative thought thus points to the “grounding” of judging insight in common sense, a point that Arendt emphasizes. "Common sense,” she writes, “discloses to us the nature of the world insofar as it is a common world; we owe to it the fact that our strictly private and "subjective" five senses and their sensory data can adjust themselves to a nonsubjective and “objective” world which we have in common and share with others.“'“ The significance of Kanl’s theory oftaslejudgmcm for politics is that it shows how a nonfoundationalist theory of judgment can in fact serve to strengthen rather than undermine our sense of a shared world of appearances. Kant's analysis of taste judgment reveals how, in Arendt's words, “judging is one, if not the most, important activity in which this sharing-the-world-with-others comes to pass?"5 It does so by highlighting the public-directed claim implicit in all pure judgments of taste, by showing how the expression of approval or disapproval, satisfaction or dissatisfaction appeals to the common sense of one‘s judging peers. In matters of taste, one “expects agreement from everybody else.”"" Oriented toward agreement, relying on common sense, taste judgment emerges, contra Nietmhe, as the activity through which the public world presences itself as appearance, as the activity through which a community “decides how this world, independently of its utility and all our vital interests in it, is to look and sound, what we will see and what men will hear in

Kant‘s theory of judgment thus opens a space between the false objectivism of Plato (political judgment as a kind of episteme, as determinative judgment) and the subjectivism that accompanies Nietzsche’s endorsement of perspectival valuation. Taste judgments are valid, but their “specific validity“ is to be understood precisely in opposition to the "objective universal validity" that marks cognitive or practical judgments in the Kantian sense. As Arendt says, “its claims to validity can never extend further than the others in whose place the judging person has put himself for his considerations?“ Taste judgments are crucially dependent on perspective, the "it appears to me," on “the simple fact that each person occupies a place of his own from which he looks upon and judges the world.”"° Nevertheless, they constantly return us to a world of appearances “common to all its inhabitants. “Kant’s notion of taste judgment provides the perfect model for political judgment, in Arendt’s opinion, because it preserves appearance and perspective without abolishing the world.

We can sum up the achievement of Kant’s theory of judgment by saying that it removes the spectre of the subjectivism of perspectivism of taste, yet without recourse to objective or cognitive grounds of validation. Lacking an objective principle, taste judgments are necessarily difficult, and where their validity is questioned, it can be redeemed only by persuasive means. As Arendt says in “The Crisis in Culture”: taste judgments (unlike demonstrable facts or truths demonstrated by argument) “share with political opinions that they are persuasive; the judging person — as Kant says quite beautifully -can only ‘woo the consent of everyone else’ in the hope of coming to an agreement with him eventually.”"°

Taste judgments are, in a word, redeemed deliberatively. Kant's conception of aesthetic judgment—departing from the exchange of viewpoints necessary for representative thinking and culminating in the persuasive exchange that accompanies the rendering of each judgment—is thus, for Arendt, political through and through.‘51 It requires an ongoing process of exchange and deliberation, one "without criteria," as Lyotard would say)“

This is yet another reason why Kantian taste judgment is the appropriate model for Arendt’s account of political judgment, the “receptive side” of virtuoso action. It reasserts the intersubjective nature of both appearances and judgment while severing the links between the common or public and the universal. Our capacity for judgment rests on our feeling for the world, and this requires neither a transcendental ground for appearances nor universally valid criteria of argumentative rationality. Practical questions emphatically do not admit of truth.‘” Yet political judgment seen as a kind of taste judgment nevertheless helps to tame the agon by reintroducing the connection between plurality and deliberation, by showing how the activity of judgment can, potentially, reveal to an audience what they have in common in the process of articulating their differences. And what they have in common, contra Aristotle and contemporary oommunitarians, are not purposes per se but the world. Debate, not consensus, constitutes the essence of political life, according to Arcndtf" The conception of taste judgment proposed by Kant reopens the space of deliberation threatened by an overly agonistic aestheticization of action but in such a way that consensus and agreement are not the Isles of action and judgment but, at best. a kind of regulative ideal.

The turn to Kant thus enables Arendt to avoid the antipolitical tendencies encountered in the actor-centered version of agonistic action. The meaning creative capacity of nonsovereign action becomes importantly dependent on the audience, conceived as a group of deliberating agents exercising their capacity for judgment. The judgment of appearances or the meaning of action is seen by Arcndt as predicated on a twofold “death of the author”: the actor does not create meaning as the artist does a work1 nor can the audience redeem the meaning of action through judgment unless the individuals who constitute it are able to forget themselves. This is not to say that Arendt’s conception of political action and judgment extinguishes the self; rather, it is to say that self-coherence is achieved through a process of self-disclosure that is importantly decentered for both actor and judge, for the judging spectator is also engaged in the "sharing of words and deeds” in his capacity as a deliberating agent. As Arendt reminds us, “By his manner of judging, the person discloses to an extent also himself, what kind of person he is, and this disclosure, which is involuntary, gains in validity to the degree that it has liberated itself from merely individual idiosyncrasiesm’

The agon is tamed, then, not by retreating from the aestheticization of action but by following its anti-Platonic impulse through to the end. The "completion" of the theory of action by a Kant-inspired theory of judgment retains the focus on action as something heroic or extraordinary, as beyond

good and evil. It does so, however, by shifting the emphasis from world- and self-creation to the world-illuminating power of “great" words and deeds, to [he beauty of such action. As a public phenomenon, the beautiful can only be confirmed in its being by an audience animated by a care for the world. The difference between Arendt’s aesthcticization of politics and Nietzsche's aestheticizatjon of life is nowhere clearer than in the connection that Arendt draws between greatness and beauty in "The Crisis in Culture":

Generally speaking, culture indicates that the public realm, which is rendered politically secure by men ofaction, offers its space of display to those things whose essence it is to appear and to be beautiful. In other words. culture indicates that an and politics. their conflicts and tensions notwithstanding. are interrelated and even mutually dependent. Seen against the blckground of political experiences and of activities which, if left to themselves, come and go without leaving any trace in the world, beauty is the manifestation ofimpcrishability. The fleeting greatness of word and deed can endure to the extent that beauty is bestowed upon it Mthout the beauty, that is, the radiant glory in which potential immortality is made manifest in the human world, all human life would be futile and no greatness could endure.

Arendtian aestheticism, an aestheticism predicated on a love of the world and which admires great action because it possesses a beauty that illuminates the world, is critically different from Nietzschean aestheticism, the aestheticism of the artist. A persistent theme in Arendt's writing, one parallel to her emphasis on the tension between philosophy and politics, concerns the conflict between art and politics.157 This conflict does not emerge out of the phenomenology of art versus that of political action; as we have seen, Arendt thinks both are importantly similar. Rather, the conflict centers on the mentality of the artist versus that of the political actor. The artist is, according to Arendt, a species of homo faber, who characteristically views the world in terms of means and ends. He is unable to conceive praxis independently of poiesis: the work always retains priority over the activity itself. The result is that performance is denigrated, action misconceived.

Nietzsche, of course, has even less use for homo faber than Arendt, who takes pains to voice her criticism not against making as such but against the universalization ol'a particular attitude. Nevertheless, if we take an Arendtian perspective, it is clear that N ictzsche, the artist-philosopher, must be counted among those who “fall into the common error of regarding the state or govemmenl as a work of art,” as an expression of a form-giving will to power)” The Republic stands as the initiator of the state as “collective masterpiece," as artwork, trope. The fact that Plato launched this metaphor in terms of what Lacoue-Labarthe calls a “mimetology,” while Nietzsche

repudiates again and again all metaphors of correspondence or adequation, does not alter their fundamental agreement: both regard action not as essentially performance but as making.I59 Poiesis has a radically different connounion for Nietzsche, to be sure, but the activity of self-fashioning and self-overcoming does not overturn the Platonic paradigm so much as bring it to closure. Nietzsche may explode the notion of telos in its classical sense, but the model of the work retains its significance. Thus despite the importance of his anti-Platonism to the project of dcconstructing the tradition’s model of action, his contribution to the thinking of plurality and difference in apolitical way is subject to a crucial limitation. Thought essentially in terms of an “aesthetics of existence," in terms of a project of self-fashioning freed from any telos, the positively valorized notion of difference proposed by Nietzsche remains poetic. Like the activity of the artist, it “must be isolated from the public, must be sheltered and concealed from it“ if it is to achieve adequate expression.“J The poetic, ultimately anti theatrical framework assumed by Nietzsche prohibits the Arendtian thought that under certain very specific conditions, it is precisely the public realm which is constituted by plurality and which enables the fullest, most articulated expression of difference.

CONCLUSION

Arendt resists the Habermasian temptation to seek quasi-transcendental standards of agreement in a “polytheistic" disillusioned age However, it is important to realize that her appeal to a Kantian notion of taste and the sensus communis is not tantamount to an endorsement of the Aristotelian view of political community and judgment (her comments linking tastejudgments to phroncsis notwithstanding).'°‘ Arendt’s Kantian, aeslheticizing turn has, unsurprisingly, confused commentators, who note the highly attenuated character of community and the depoliticizcd notion of judgment in Kant.‘M Arendt chooses Kantian formalism over Aristotelian concretencss because, while she wants to focus on the shared world of appearance that is the public realm, she has no desire whatever to frame “what we have in common” in terms of purposes or ends. In this regard, the problem with the Aristotelian notion of koinoru'a, as defined in book 3 of the Politics, is that it creates not a stage fot action but a vehicle for teleological fulfillment."u Arendt’s appeal to the sensus oommunis self-consciously avoids the overly substantive, local character of koinonia or Sittlichlteit. At the same time, it denies the false universalism of moralitat. Arendt‘s theory of judgment points not to the determinancy of phronesis, with its emphasis on context and local practices, but to "the free reflexive discovery of rules in light of indeterminate, transcendent ideas of community”

The critique of Aristotelian/oommunitarian thinking is also applicable to the kind of postmodern relativism that we find in a thinker like Lyotard. Like Arendt, Lyotard's conception of judgment is a curious mixture of Nietzschean, Aristotelian, and Kantian elements)” However, the postmodern "incredulity towards metanarratives” serves not only to deny the possibility of any overarching metadiscourse that might render diverse language games commensurable but to deny the possibility of a public space of discourse, at least insofar as this space claims, implicitly, to synthesize perspectives and distance interests. For Lyotard, discourse is essentially fragmented: “All we can do is gaze in wonderment at the diversity of discursive species, just as we do at the diversity of plant or animal speities."166 It is also incducibly interested: “to speak is to fight, in the general sense of playing, and speech acts fall within the domain of a general agonistic:s."'67 Given these assumptions, it is not surprising that Lyotard feels that Kant has left our ability to judge "hanging,” as it were, and turns to the will to power as an explanation of this faculty.“8 What we find in Lyotard is the false Nietzschean dichotomy between a universal, metaphysically grounded metadiscourse and a fragmented, postmetaphysical discursive realm in which “public” discourse/judgment reflects either local habit or the agonistic ability to create new moves, impose new interpretations, generate new criteria— all in the name of the will to power.“ Arendt's appeal to taste judgment and a shared feeling for the world may be immensely problematic, but it does serve to underline the falseness of this dichotomy.

One may grant that Arendl's aesthcticism avoids the trope of the fiction du polin'que, universalism, and postmodern pluralism. yet still feel that her “solution" is of dubious relevance to our situation. True, there is a distance and alienation built into the Kantian idea of a community of taste that may make the Arendtian response to Enlightenment universalism more palatable to a postmodern sensibility than the oven Aristotelianism of a Maclntyre or a Gadamer. Nevertheless, the “withering away of common sense" in the modern and postmodern ages would appear to relegate Arendt's modification of Nietzschean aestheticism t0 the status of a rearguard action. The fragmentation of contemporary life renders the idea of a “common fooling for the world" more paradoxical, and possibly less viable, than a recovery of ethos or the legislation of a proceduralist rationality.

"Hie simple answer to this objection is mat Arendt completely agrees. Her work stands not only as a comprehensive rethinking of the nature and meaning of political action but as an extended mediation on how the energies

of modernity have worked to dissipate our feeling for the world, to alienate us from the worlti The last part of The Human Condition equates modernity with world alienation: the reduction of Being to process, the subjeclification of the real, and finally, the triumph of a laboring mentality all work to alienate man not from himself but from the world."’° “Worldliness,” presupposed by the sensus communis, is not a distinguishing characteristic of the animal laboranst Similarly, Arendt would entirely agree with the postmodernist who questions the possibility of circumscribing a particular realm of phenomena in a world where boundaries are increasingly blurred. in her analysis of "the rise of the social” in the modern age, Arcndt identifies this blurring as the central movement of modernity."l Her work departs from the strongest possible conviction that our reality is one in which stable boundaries and distinctions have been dissolved and rendered virtually impossible.

The postmodernist will object that Arendtian aestheticism. unlike Nietzsche's, mourns the loss of the world as an articulated, bounded whole. Nietzschean aestheticism is an affirmation of the Dionysian capacity to destroy fixed identities, to dissolve Apollonian slampings into flux. Postmodern theory affirms this aestheticism, exaggerating the immanent tendencies of postmodern reality in the pursuit of an active (i.e., creative) nihilism: it has no time for guilty nostalgia. Arendtian aestheticism, in contrast, stakes its hopes entirely on the rethematization of certain ontological dimensions of human experience (action, the public world, and self), which this blurring obscures, denatures, and makes increasingly difficult to articulate. The fetishistic quality of her distinction making, her Kantian finickincss in delimiting the political: these attest to a deeply rooted desire to preserve the possibility of meaning created by political action and redeemed by political judgment.

#### The impact outweighs—deliberative debate models impart skills vital to respond to existential threats

Christian O. Lundberg 10 Professor of Communications @ University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, “Tradition of Debate in North Carolina” in Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century By Allan D. Louden, p. 311

The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. But the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speech—as indicated earlier, debate builds capacity for critical thinking, analysis of public claims, informed decision making, and better public judgment. If the picture of modem political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid scientific and technological change outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution, at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to rearticulation precisely because as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy such as Ocwey in The Public awl Its Problems place such a high premium on education (Dewey 1988,63, 154). Debate provides an indispensible form of education in the modem articulation of democracy because it builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed about policy decisions that impact them, to sort through and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly information-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them.

The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy. John Larkin (2005, HO) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multimediated information environment (ibid-). Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources:

To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instmction/no instruction and debate topic . . . that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned . . . students in the Instnictional [debate) group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so----These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in (debate).... These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144)

Larkin's study substantiates Thomas Worthcn and Gaylcn Pack's (1992, 3) claim that debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthcn and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials.

There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively, the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice in the classroom as a technology for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities. The unique combination of critical thinking skills, research and information processing skills, oral communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education, and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of meaningful political engagement and new articulations of democratic life.

Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens that can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to produce revisions of democratic life that are necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive. Democracy faces a myriad of challenges, including: domestic and international issues of class, gender, and racial justice; wholesale environmental destruction and the potential for rapid climate change; emerging threats to international stability in the form of terrorism, intervention and new possibilities for great power conflict; and increasing challenges of rapid globalization including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. More than any specific policy or proposal, an informed and active citizenry that deliberates with greater skill and sensitivity provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with the existential challenges to democracy [in an] increasingly complex world.

#### Guidelines for dialogue are intersubjectively possible and desirable---they are necessary to cultivate democratic habits and political judgment---the affirmative’s rejection of normative constraints goes too far

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Beginning with Foucault these were concerned with carrying out an archeology of knowledge with a view to deciphering the potential for restrictions native to, andreproduced by, Western culture since the classical age. Following the same movement, through the concept of différence, Derrida (and at the same time Lacan) pointed out the internal division of the subject between two contrary existential tendencies: the one, centrifugal and directed towards loss and death; the other, centripetal and directed towards conservation and power. Then, in introducing his Leçon at the Collège de France, Barthes proclaimed the explosive slogan: "All language is fascist." By this he meant that syntactical and grammatical conventions constitute a constricting structure from which the writer could escape only by "cheating the language" in order to go beyond orthodox usage. What is essential in the text is no longer the content or manifest sense, but the structure of musical and psychological associations which, like a slip of the tongue, manifest the deepest orientations of the writer — generally referred to as a Freudian or pleasure slip. This literary kamasutra or "science of the pleasures of language" — which Barthes already had developed in Le plaisir du texte — complements on the level of rhetoric the work of Deleuze and Guatari on the psychoanalytic level. Strongly influenced by the Nietzschean idea of "culture," the authors of L’Anti-Oedipe call "writing" that "terrible alphabet" or "cruel system of signs" engraved in the flesh of man who, by that very fact, loses his privileges as the ego scriptor and become a "Desiring machine."1 In this context Jean Baudrillard’s prediction of the subjection of man to the position of a thing gains in force. In Les strategies fatales Baudrillard writes: the subject was beautiful only in itspride andarbitrariness, its limitless willful power, its transcendence as subject of power and of history, or in the drama of its alienation. Without this one is pitiably deficient, the pawn of his own desires or image, incapable of forming a clear representation of the universe and sacrificing himself in an attempt to revive the dead body of history.2 In sum, the insight which would give birth to the revolt of May 1968 destroyed in one stroke the related ideas of conscience, will and autonomy which had constituted the contribution of the Enlightenment; that is, the ability of a subject, besieged by the irrational forces of myth and religion, to give focus to a world in terms of his understanding and will. It is this heritage of the Enlightenment which today is being reaffirmed. The urgency of this return to enlightened reason under the auspices of the Kantian philosophy of the subject provides the principal themes for the last books of Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut. In La pensée 68: essai sur l’anti-humanisme contemporain3 and Heidegger et les modernes,4 the intention is to warn against the dangerously metaphysical process by which the thinkers of the last decade have practiced — often without being aware of it — a systematic anti-humanism. Ironically, under the pretext of eliminating once and for all the metaphysics of reason centered upon the subject, Foucault andDerrida have found themselves caught in the spiral of metaphysical hyperbole. For the a priori identity they suppose between knowledge and power leads them to place the human ideal beyond all kinds of meaning and in so doing to make it inaccessible, in relation to which the individual can only renounce his or her autonomy. In other words, in the end the excess of thought fascinated by the absolute becomes a form of regression. Dispossessed of his attributes as a subject (that is, of knowledge and will) on both the speculative and the practical levels, and thus incapable of acting upon "the world," the modern man is subjected to the transcendentalism of another lay, non theological religion, which leads him to search his salvation no longer in the truth or efficacity of a satisfying answer, but in the effort and tension of an endless questioning. It is as reaction to (in the chemical sense) and against (in the political sense) this metaphysical hyperbole that one should interpret the desire of Ferry and Renaut to search for the conditions of a "non-metaphysical humanism" capable of "conferring coherent philosophical status upon the promise of freedom contained in the requirements (of the term humanism)."5 In a parallel manner Jürgen Habermas wishes to restore to philosophy its true place and function as the "guardian of rationality." Rejecting the erroneous association between reason and power, the author of Morale et communication6 attempts to show that the normative rules of linguistic communication, inasmuch as they provide a universal basis for intersubjective exchanges, constitute the best defense against an abuse of power. Although Barthes deduces a fascist character for language from its normative function, Habermas tries to show that this same function is, on the contrary, presupposed intuitively by every subject who takes part in a process of communication. This permits him to state the ethical principle of dialogue: "only those norms can claim validity which are accepted . . . by all the persons participating in a practical discussion."7 Nonmetaphysical humanism and the ethics of communicative action agree that human activities and relationships must be perceived no longer in terms of an ideal of inaccessible purity, but from the pragmatic point of view where conditions of efficacity and utility are understood on the basis of results in daily life.

#### Debate inevitably involves exclusions---making sure that those exclusions occur along reciprocal lines is necessary to foster democratic habits and critical thinking---this process outweighs the content of the aff

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25¶ Whether such a procedural approach actually helps to yield any substantive normative guidance is an issue of debate. Habermas has sought to justify communicative ethics through appeal to the principles of respect and reciprocity that he claims are inherent in linguistic practices geared toward reaching understanding. Attempting to redress the overwhelmingly negative forms of critique characteristic of both the Frankfurt School and poststructuralist traditions, he argues that the logocentrism of Western thought and the powerful instrumentality of reason are not absolute but rather constitute “a systematic foreshortening and distortion of a potential always already operative in the communicative practice of everyday life.” The potential he refers to is the potential for mutual understanding “inscribed into communication in ordinary language.” 7 Habermas acknowledges the dominance and reach of instrumental reason—his project is largely devoted to a systematic analysis of the historical conditions and social effects of that dominance—yet at the same time he wishes to retrieve an emancipatory model of communicative¶ ¶ 26¶ reason derived from a linguistic understanding of intersubjective relations. As Benhabib argues, this form of communicative action, embodied in the highly controversial and pervasively misunderstood concept of the “ideal speech situation,” entails strong ethical assumptions, namely the principles of universal moral respect and egalitarian reciprocity (SS, 29).¶ Habermas has famously argued that he does not believe any metaphysical grounding of such norms is possible; he insists instead that we view the normative constraints of the ideal speech community as “universal pragmatic presuppositions” of competent moral actors who have reached the postconventional stage of moral reasoning. Habermas’s theory combines a “weak transcendental argument” concerning the four types of validity claims operative in speech acts with an empirical reconstruction of psychosocial development derived from Lawrence Kohlberg. Benhabib, though she, too, appeals to socialization processes, distinguishes her position from Habermas’s “weak transcendental argument” by promoting a “historically self-conscious universalism” that locates the ethical principles of respect and reciprocity as “constituents of the moral point of view from within the normative hermeneutic horizon of modernity” (SS, 30). Benhabib’s work thus constitutes, like Habermas’s, a strong defense of specific potentialities of modernity. She differs from him in two key respects, besides the emphasis already outlined. First, she believes that Habermas’s emphasis on consensus seriously distorts his account of communicative ethics. Like others who have argued against the conflation of understanding and consensus, Benhabib champions instead a discourse model of ethics that is geared toward keeping the conversation going:¶ When we shift the burden of the moral test in communicative ethics from consensus to the idea of an ongoing moral conversation, we begin to ask not what all would or could agree to as a result of practical discourses to be morally permissible or impermissible, but what would be allowed and perhaps even necessary from the standpoint of continuing and sustaining the practice of the moral conversation among us. The emphasis now is less on rational agreement, but more on sustaining those normative practices and moral relationships within which reasoned agreement as a way of life can flourish and continue. (SS, 38)8¶ ¶ 27¶ The second significant difference between Habermas and Benhabib is that Benhabib rejects Habermas’s rigid opposition between justice and the good life, an opposition that effectively relegates identity-based politics to a lower plane of moral practice, and that for Benhabib undercuts our ability to apprehend the radical particularity of the other. While she believes in the importance of self-reflexive interrogations of conventional identities and roles, she strongly opposes any ethics or politics that privileges the unencumbered or detached self over the concrete, embodied, situated self. She argues in particular against those liberal models that imagine that conversations of moral justification should take place between individuals who have bracketed their strongest cultural or social identifications and attachments. Instead she promotes what she calls an “interactive universalism”:¶ Interactive universalism acknowledges the plurality of modes of being human, and differences among humans, without endorsing all these pluralities and differences as morally and politically valid. While agreeing that normative disputes can be settled rationally, and that fairness, reciprocity and some procedure of universalizability are constituents, that is, necessary conditions of the moral standpoint, interactive universalism regards difference as a starting point for reflection and action. In this sense, “universality” is a regulative ideal that does not deny our embodied and embedded identity, but aims at developing moral attitudes and encouraging political transformations that can yield a point of view acceptable to all. Universality is not the ideal consensus of fictitiously defined selves, but the concrete process in politics and morals of the struggle of concrete, embodied selves, striving for autonomy. (SS, 153) ¶ This passage encapsulates the core of Benhabib’s position, which attempts to mediate between universalism and particularism as traditionally understood. On the one hand, universalism’s informing principles of rational argumentation, fairness, and reciprocity adjudicate between different positions in the ethicopolitical realm, enabling crucial distinctions between those notions of the good life that promote interactive universalism and those that threaten its key principles. It insists, in other words, that there is a specifiable moral standpoint from which—to take a few prominent examples—Serbian aggression, neo-Nazism, and gay bashing can be definitively condemned. On the other hand, universalism “regards difference as a starting point.” It understands identity as “embodied and embedded” and promotes encounters with otherness so as to nurture the development of a moral attitude that will “yield a point of view acceptable to all.”¶ Of course it must simultaneously be recognized that the “all” here cannot coherently include those who have, according to universalism’s own principles, forfeited their place as equal participants in the ethicopolitical¶ ¶ 28¶ community. Ironically, then, Benhabib’s redefinition of universalism insists on inevitable exclusion, but not in the sense that many poststructuralist and postmodernist cultural critics do, as the hardwired effect of universalism’s false claims to inclusiveness, and as victimizing those disempowered by race, class, gender, or sexuality. Against naive conceptions of inclusiveness and plurality, which ultimately prove self-undermining in their toleration of communities, individuals, and practices that exclude others arbitrarily, interactive universalism claims that certain exclusions are not only justified, but indeed required by the principles of recognition and respect that underpin democratic institutions and practices.

#### Their strategy of opening up to radical uncertainty goes too far in decentering provisional communal identities necessary for politics in a world of speed---minimal guidelines are necessary to help pluralism flourish

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So, what is the point? Connolly does not describe or define it in this essay. However, judging by the rest of Connolly's work, we might say that the point is akin to the “moment” in Nietzsche's description of the rift in time,57 or Arendt's “present” in her re-telling of Kafka's parable in Between Past and Future.58 The “point” is the conjunctive of a fraught struggle between the forces of fundamentalization and pluralization; it is the joint or center of a “tense balance” between “the claims of regularity, predictability, and commonality” and “those of experimentalism, artistry, and becoming.”59 Speed becomes dangerous, then, when it tilts us against ethico-political interventions on behalf of individual and collective plurality. When the world moves so fast that we cannot resist nostalgia or overcome ressentiment, we are past this “point,” and will henceforth require more intense micro-political efforts to recalibrate our attentiveness to becoming and flux.

Yet there is another and perhaps a more damning way in which Connolly might be missing the point. As quoted above, Connolly finds that those who “recoil from speed” are nostalgic for a slower temporality and find themselves supporting frozen hierarchies in the pursuit of a predictable, slow world. Yet it is also possible to level similar charges against Connolly himself: those who recoil from slow time may align themselves with a tendency in late-modern capitalism that tears asunder the possibilities of democratic negotiations born from attachment to place, vocation, and familiar others.60 This goes well beyond the decline of social capital and the chilling specter of the lone bowler. It is by now well known that rapid vocational mobility leads to lower rates of political and civic participation.61 Yet these declines are themselves part of a growing skepticism towards public institutions as such, a trend that feeds demand for exclusive and positional goods and further entrenches class-based inequalities.62 Moreover, Sheldon Wolin's worry about the normalization of incessant change is that increasing restraints on personal freedom and public life will be accepted by a society habituated to adaptation (“becoming”?). Connolly's recoil from the normalizing pressures of democratic collective identity may perversely support what Wolin calls the “triumph of contemporaneity and of its accomplice, forgetting or collective amnesia.”63 The sobering implication is not only that democratic practices and habits will desiccate, but that their loss will not be recognized or mourned.

Connolly's recoil from collective identity also keeps him from fully appreciating the implications of his calls for “self-experimentation” on “virtual registers” via “fugitive experiences of unconscious performance.”64 Connolly provides two examples of this virtual register: a “violinist who escapes … the slowness of consciousness by getting lost in the imperatives of performance” and a “point guard clearing his mind of clutter as he dribbles down the middle of the court so the ball can be delivered to a shooter at the right instant with exactly the right bounce in a movement too fast and precise to be entrusted to the slow time of consciousness.”64 However, while these rapid maneuvers may take place in “fast time,” they are absolutely dependent on extensive training and practice (i.e. slow time). Maybe Dylan had it right: “the slow one now will later be fast.” Connolly acknowledges this fact but does not seem to recognize how it compromises (or at the very least complicates) his larger argument about speed and democracy.65 Again, recent work on flexible capitalism has shown that “success” in late-modernity (i.e. economic advancement) is negatively correlated with attachment to one's company, locality, or craft.66 Yet this same work has shown that success within these parameters leaves individuals less capable of accepting ambiguity and generously relating to others—the very foundations of Connolly's normative model for agonistic citizenship.67 This in turn feeds the demand for positional and exclusive goods as consumers prefer flexible accommodations and products to the arduous labors of collective negotiation and public action.

Perhaps, then, we are already past the point when social acceleration yielded beneficent consequences for democratic politics. It seems that theorists who care about the prospects of democracy in late-modernity must insist that certain habits are important enough to be cultivated and practiced in slow time. For just as it takes training to become a violinist or point guard, so, too, is training required to become a citizen of a complex, multilayered, and temporally desynchronized polity. Connolly downplays the possibility that slow time practices and habits may in fact serve pluralization; in the process he has overestimated the salutary impact of speed and obscured the difficulties of negotiating these accelerated tempos without a foot (or more) in slow time. While Connolly accuses Wolin and other “self-proclaimed democrats” of “freezing actors into stone,” his work threatens to leave us endlessly spinning and dancing like a toy top: moving fast but going nowhere.

Wolin: Democratic Citizenship as a Fugitive Experience

A society … caught in the frenzy of rapid change has difficulty knowing how to think about the consequences of loss, especially of things widely shared … rapid change not only blunts the collective conscience but dims the collective memory.

—Sheldon Wolin, Democracy Incorporated

Connolly argues that we should embrace speed for the work it does on our cultural/political selves. Sheldon Wolin, on the other hand, has argued that to adopt the accelerated rhythms of culture and economy would be to accept an anti-political ethos inherent to those systems, and turn democratic praxis into largely irrelevant shadow boxing.68 The dispute over speed and democracy, however, conceals another (more fundamental) disagreement between Connolly and Wolin. Unlike Connolly and Shapiro, who posit an ontological and political tendency towards settled identity, which then aggressively protects itself against the threat of its own denied difference, Wolin argues that commonality is “fugitive and impermanent.”69 For Connolly, political identities are always occupied territories, which are justly subject to disruption. For Wolin, it is difference that is stable, and democracy is concerned not with the disturbance but the discovery of “artificial” commonality. Political identities are fleeting phenomena, and similarity is not (only) a violent imposition on becoming but a pre-condition for democratic power and justice.70 Put slightly differently, if Connolly's philosophy seems unconsciously indebted to Freud's pleasure principle, then Wolin's unstated political ontology more closely resembles the death drive.

Democratic power, then, is fugitive, but it is still possible for ephemeral moments of collective action to protest the limits of the institutional order and reveal possibilities for new modes of political practice and being. This action takes place despite intransigent heterogeneity—different constituencies valuing different outcomes at different times through different means. Fugitive democracy (“the carrier of commonality”) is the temporary suspension of this heterogeneity

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in the interests of collective power.71 These exceptional points in time—Wolin identifies the early months of the Free Speech Movement at Berkeley as paradigmatic—disrupt a managed system of elite rule on behalf of widely-shared grievances.72 Whereas Connolly values democratic theory and praxis insofar as they disrupt and pluralize homogenous and hegemonic conceptions of time, culture, and place, Wolin values a “discordant” democracy that “affirms the value of limits.”73 Wolin certainly locates discourses of political identity in desperate need of disturbance—specifically those that emphasize an a-political model of “managed democracy” and a de-mobilized citizenry content with the pursuit of commodious living in a glaringly inegalitarian polity.74 His anxiety about postmodern discourses of disturbance is that they align with a certain tendency within “inverted totalitarianism” that thrives on a perpetually mobile—yet never mobilized—populace. Wolin therefore dismisses the “flashy but empty” discordance of “latter-day Nietzscheans” because it affirms pure becoming rather than a space of appearances in which common problems can find redress through the concerted efforts of ordinary men and women.75

Democratic citizenship, on the other hand, is a “discordant” but limit-affirming experience that compels individuals to identify and address problems they share in common with others. As Wolin puts it, “being a citizen involves doing the best one can to take part in common tasks, the deliberations that define them, and the responsibilities that follow. As a way of existence it lives in the ebb-and-flow of everyday activities, responsibilities, and relationships.”76 Wolin refers to the experience of membership in a democratic assemblage as “incorporation,” which suggests that one becomes “an integral part of some stable grouping and accept(s) it as the principle identity of individuals and the primary object of their loyalty.”77 However, it is crucial to note that Wolin's model of incorporation does not imply the elimination of differences within the body politic. Some differences may be bracketed in the interests of collective power, but Wolin does not imagine that these differences will thereby fail to matter or exist. For him, citizenship practices are the means by which we come into contact with different viewpoints, preferences, and lifestyles. The model here is less that of Rousseau's general will than a will to generality, an aspiration of “commonality amid difference.”77

# Block

### 2NC McIvor

#### Debates about state-policy don’t flatten or exclude difference---they help foster political advocacy and critical habits necessary for navigating inevitable differences in democracy---the affirmative’s emphasis on flux makes negotiating plurality impossible

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In some ways Wolin's description of revolution seems to converge with Connolly's emphasis on speed as a means of creating a pluralistic ethos and ultimately political change. Yet Connolly, as I have argued above, has elided the intense requirements of slow time practice that support the possibility of successful, “rapid” change. Furthermore, Wolin finds that the tempos of frenetic agitation have “not vanished … [but] simply switched location.” The rise of corporate-driven capitalism has appropriated the revolutionary tempo through the “troika effect,” which unites capital, technology and science:

By enlisting technological innovation and scientific discovery and joining them with its own impulses, capital has produced an unprecedented form of power. The combination has quickened the rate of change throughout the world … . Globalized capital … may be said to monopolize agitation … thus corporate capital is the agitator, the exemplar of permanent revolution, of normalized agitation.85

Speedy agitation has been co-opted by corporate capital, which in turn “encourages change, elevates fashion to a norm, and … instructs an agitated populace that virtually every job and habitat are temporary.”86 This emphasis on flux and change disrupts the attachments that normally develop over time, including those related to vocation or community (and, by extension, those which lead to agitation). For Wolin, a hopeful politics today depends on whether or not “agitation … can find its bearings.”86 In order for this to occur the “appropriate tempo” of democratization must be identified. Since Wolin identifies this tempo as the slower one found at the local level of state, county, and municipality, we must wonder if he has not fallen into the nostalgic shackles that Connolly has already fit for him. Far from it. While recognizing the difficulty of frenetic agitation in a hurrying, racing world, Wolin thinks that such agitation can emerge from and alter the slower tempos of small-scale deliberation and debate occurring in local politics. Agitation can “educate … and energize” particularism, leading it to “challenge the center” in changed times. Democratic agitation “takes time” in that it must be nursed by patient deliberation, but it also “takes time” when, energized by such micro-political activities, it alters the status quo in powerful, lasting ways.

Again, Wolin does not look to slow time practices and local sites of action in order to flatten or exclude difference. According to Wolin, a leisurely pace and deliberation are “conditioned by the presence of differences and the attempt to negotiate them.”87 Democratic theory that emphasizes speed and dislocation, on the other hand, mimics the temporal rhythms of contemporary culture and economy at the expense of the tempos of deliberation and reflection that are important in themselves and insofar as they make possible the politics of a quicker pace. Some habits and practices are fundamental to the honoring and negotiating of plurality.

In order to develop these habits, Wolin wants to direct attention away from the state and towards localities with their particularities, peculiarities, and irregularities. On Wolin's reading, national politics is little more than a spectacle, and the citizen's role within that spectacle is often only as “a rooter limited to choosing sides.”88 Localities, on the other hand, remain venues that promise robust participation. As individuals slowly develop the habits related to participation—interpreting and coming to know one's environment and its other inhabitants, its multiple histories and overlapping concerns—their very being changes. “Politicalness” marks our capacity “to develop … into beings who know and value what it means to participate in and be responsible for the care and improvement of our common and collective life.”89 By nurturing this politicalness we begin to feel a tug of loyalty towards a common reality that had not heretofore existed. Wolin, in describing the early stages of the Free Speech Movement, referred to this experience as the “revival of a sense of shared destiny, of some common fate which can bind us into a people we have never been.”90 Of course, these assemblages are subject to the same “thousand natural shocks” to which all flesh is heir. Publics rise and fall; democratic moments remain momentary. Yet those who are honed by these experiences and who are dedicated to their recovery become what Wolin calls a “multiple civic self … one who is required to act the citizen in diverse settings: national, state, city or town, neighborhood, and voluntary association.”91 This is “perhaps the most complex conception of citizenship ever devised” yet “we have no coherent conception of it.”91 The multiple civic self is not modeled along republican or representative lines, which reduce participation to occasional ratification or refusal, and which filter popular power through elite-managed institutions. Nor, however, is it based on the radical democratic conception of citizenship as direct sharing in power. The complexities of what Wolin calls “the megastate” and the sheer size of the United States exceed what an Athens-styled radical democracy could manage. The multiple civic self is one capable of participating not simply in his/her locality but “intellectually and passionately in the controversies surrounding the megastate” in order to “reclaim” public space and insist upon “widened debate.”92 Wolin is not (only) a localist. Rather, he thinks that the skills and habits best acquired by consistent participation in our particular localities lay the groundwork for a form of citizenship attuned to the plural layers of political action and struggle in late-modern America. Moreover, the multiple civic self promotes the dispersal of power between local, state, and national bodies.93 Such diffusion re-establishes a separation of powers that forces slow-time negotiations upon the impatient megastate.94 The slowly developed habits of participation make possible a more robust form of democratic citizenship and, perhaps, fugitive democratic moments. These moments, in turn, can help to slow the world down.

Political theorists and social actors inspired by Wolin's example and worried about the inegalitarian consequences of social acceleration should look to start from his (so far underdeveloped) idea of the multiple civic self. Instead of refurbishing federal institutions or romanticizing the consequences of speed, we ought to attend primarily to what Wolin calls the “recurrent aspiration” of democracy: “to find room in which people can join freely with others to take responsibility for solving their common problems and thereby sharing the modest fate that is the lot of all mortals.”95 By pursuing solutions to mutual problems through concerted action, we as citizens can hone the craft of democratic participation—broadening our notions of self and learning to honor the differences we encounter within a shared space.96

The differences drawn above between Wolin and Connolly—and the choice that they seem to offer, Connolly or Wolin—may seem exaggerated, given the broad convergence between their normative interests and political concerns.97 Perhaps, then, a critical synthesis can be located between Wolin's efforts at nurturing democratic identity and Connolly's recent emphasis on generating a positive political resonance machine capable of promoting the use of inclusive goods while remaining attentive to difference and dissonance. For Connolly, the success of such movements will depend on cultivating the democratic virtues of what he calls “agonistic respect” and “critical responsiveness.” In fact, it is the latter two qualities, first articulated together in Neuropolitics, that form Connolly's recent conception of “bicameral citizenship,” which might be seen as a response or friendly rejoinder to Wolin's idea of the multiple civic self.98 Bicameralism comes from a “decent respect for the persistent diversity of the human condition” and results in a tolerance of ambiguity in our relationships and contestability in our creeds.99 The stubborn opacity of the world and the agonistic nature of political life can both become, on Connolly's reading, the basis for a generous acceptance of disagreement and difference. But the acceptance of such opacity would not necessarily come at the expense of a search for spaces of convergence or commonality—what Wolin calls the “sense of shared destiny.”

The dispositions of agonistic respect and critical responsiveness can clearly resonate with and reinforce the care and concern for the common that Wolin puts at the center of fugitive democracy. Yet these efforts, I would argue, need to be situated within a praxis whereby (seemingly anachronistic) habits of participation and engagement are nurtured in spite of the pressures of an accelerated society. For outside of these practices, what will inspire a commitment to the virtues relevant to democratic flourishing? What will make Connolly's virtues more compelling than resentment about the “illegible” social relations in “liquid” modernity? Connolly's under-theorization of the bonds of democratic identification and commitment seems a symptom of his sanguinity about the connection between speed and pluralism (“the acceleration of speed, though it contains counterpressures, amplifies trends towards diversity among multiple dimensions of being”).100 We ought to remain slightly skeptical, therefore, when Connolly writes, “acceleration prepares us for bicameralism” or asserts “it takes massive energy to turn us against pluralism.”101 We ought to ask whether this sanguine attitude is really justified by our understanding of the world around us. After all, since the fifteenth century, nearly 4,000 human languages have died out, and there have been similar crashes in biodiversity and methods of agricultural production since the rise of the steam engine. It seems that diversity of political, cultural, and ecological life is far from a given; one might say rather that it requires “massive energy” in order to persist.

### 2NC T Version

#### Requiring the affirmative to anchor their analysis of social acceleration around specific institutional policy reforms is key to solve the case---liberal institutions are inevitably making decisions that affect our ability to cope with speed---only analysis of how policymakers should respond makes debate’s political subjectivity relevant and effective

William E. Scheuerman 4, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota, 2004, Liberal Democracy and the Social Acceleration of Time, p. 225-227

Social acceleration places many familiar legal and political concerns in a fresh light. A proper understanding of traditional liberal democratic institutional aspirations, including the separation of powers, deliberative representative legislatures, constitutionalism, and the rule of law, requires us to pay careful attention to their temporal presuppositions. Many widely discussed institutional trends—the rise of the executive, dramatic shifts in the separation of powers, threats to traditional visions of constitutionalism and rule of law, a general speed-up of legislation, the ongoing globalization of law—can be fruitfully reinterpreted, at least in part, as institutional adaptations to social acceleration. Social acceleration also forces us to think creatively about liberal democracy's prospects in the new century. Might we successfully reconfigure liberal democracy for a temporal context distinct from that in which its eighteenth-and early-nineteenth-century defenders first hinted at the possibility of its realization? Can we revive traditional liberal democratic ideals of "government by discussion " the closely related notion of a freewheeling deliberative legislature, the separation of powers, constitutionalism, and the rule of law? A substantial dose of institutional imagination is called for if we are to update liberal democracy to make it mesh with the dictates of speed. Although my own contribution here to a revitalization of liberal democracy has undoubtedly been a modest one, I hope at the very least to encourage others to confront the difficult unanswered questions posed by changes in the temporality of contemporary society for political life. Thus far, it has generally been anthropologists, geographers, and sociologists who have dealt with questions of social temporality. It is now time for political and legal scholars—as well as citizens and policy makers—to situate the problem of social speed at the top of their agenda.

Perhaps it is fitting that my discussion of reflexive law tentatively raised the issue of transnational democracy. For no more basic intellectual and political challenge of social speed faces us than the need to consider the possibility of extending liberal democracy beyond national borders. As I hinted at earlier, the prospect of achieving reflexive law within global economic regulation may ultimately depend on institutionalizing effective transnational forms of liberal democratic state authority. Reflexive law as a possible paradigm for tackling the legal challenges of social acceleration can only take an initial step toward grappling with the broader and more demanding enterprise of achieving transnational liberal democracy. One striking implication of the compression of space generated by high-speed social activity is a long-term trend by which key social and economic activities arc "stretched" and intensified across preexisting political boundaries. For those of us committed to liberal democracy, the "shrinking" of the world via speed probably calls for the advancement of liberal democracy on the transnational arena as well as within the boundaries of existing nation-states. At the same time, social acceleration threatens to undermine even modest attempts to establish transnational liberal democratic institutions (e.g., the rule of law). Speed cries out for transnational governance while simultaneously undermining normatively acceptable forms of it.

Fortunately, a formidable body of scholarly literature shows that many scholars are already busy at work on the difficult normative and institutional questions posed by the possibility of transnational forms of liberal democracy.' Unless the concept of social acceleration plays a pivotal role in that debate, however, its participants are likely to misconstrue many core issues at hand. Only by placing the concept of social acceleration at the center of their analyses can they successfully shift thinking about globalization and liberal democracy onto fruitful terrain. For example, it is surely inadequate simply to extend existing liberal democratic institutions to the transnational level because, as I have argued, these institutions are already plagued by serious faults that derive from social acceleration. It is incumbent on those who defend the idea of a "cosmopolitan democracy," for example, to explain exactly how their oftentimes provocative proposals can help counteract the deeply rooted anti-liberal and antidemocratic developmental trends thematized here. How might the invigoration of international supranational political bodies manage the challenge of social acceleration more effectively than the existing nation-state? What evidence exists that they might provide a better basis for regulating an increasingly high-speed capitalism?

If I am not mistaken, much more than the deepening of (existing) liberal democratic institutions on the global level will be necessary if we are to ward off the more worrisome features of social acceleration. It is probably no less mistaken to see the growing impotence of many elected legislatures as a relatively sudden and even unprecedented development resulting from the ongoing transnationalization of capitalist production and financial markets, unparalleled movements of immigrants and refugees, and cross-border environmental problems. The recent losses of democratic sovereignty lamented by many scholars of globalization are simply the latest chapter in a long-term erosion of democratic legitimacy directly linked to the revolutionary implications of social acceleration long evident within nation-state-based capitalist liberal democracy. The defensive tone of even relatively critical recent contributions to the debate on globalization and democracy is probably misplaced. In his recent essays on globalization, for example, Habermas at times seems primarily concerned with the task of preserving the existing constellation of welfare state liberal democracy in the face of transnational pressures to weaken liberal democracy and dismantle social programs.2 Alas, this preoccupation obscures the seriousness of the ills plaguing existing liberal democratic institutions. We undoubtedly should strive to ward off irresponsible attacks on the welfare state, and the sad liberal democratic status quo is preferable to the technocratic political fantasies of some contemporary defenders of laissez-faire. But we also need to devote more attention to a question whose significance Habermas and many other analysts of the impact of globalization on liberal democracy downplay: how can we refigure liberal democratic institutions so that they have a real chance of successfully confronting the awesome problems posed by social acceleration?

### 2NC Meta-Consesus Key to Pluralism

#### Meta-consensus kt actualize pluralism

John Dryzek 6, Professor of Social and Political Theory, The Australian National University, Reconciling Pluralism and Consensus as Political Ideals, American Journal of Political Science,Vol. 50, No. 3, July 2006, Pp. 634–649

Epistemic meta-consensus for its part could be desirable on the grounds of deliberative economy. That is, to the extent a set of beliefs is accepted as credible and relevant, there is an understanding of what the main issues are, and so no need to debate fundamentals each time a claim is made. A parallel with paradigms in scientific communities can be drawn here. A paradigm by definition features strong epistemic meta-consensus, releasing practitioners from the sheer amount of time and effort it takes to get beyond debating basic assumptions and first principles. Of course, nothing as strong as a paradigm will normally be available (or necessarily desirable) in a political context. Epistemic meta-consensus permits the pluralism at the simple level required for complex issues to be scrutinized from a number of directions in the search for creative solutions that respond to different facets of issues (see our earlier discussion of Popper’s argument for the rationality of simple pluralism in policy making).¶ In effect, epistemic meta-consensus creates a “problem-solving public” in the sense of pragmatist philosophers such as John Dewey (1927). To return to our toxic pollution example, government officials wielding epidemiological studies and local residents reporting particular experiences would not be stuck in ridiculing the methodological basis of each others’ claims, but instead devote energy to joint problem solving. This effort might, for example, involve deploying some version of the “precautionary principle” in environmental policy, which is designed to inform policy making in situations of substantial uncertainty about the content and magnitude of risks. Such an outcome would not be in any sense a mere compromise between the epistemic positions of the two sides that would involve an assessment of risks somewhere between that of the epidemiologists and local residents, but rather a wholly new way of looking at decision in the context of risk.

### Hassan=Neg

#### Dear god this evidence goes neg --- it says that we should use debate to develop information-processing skills and political awareness --- debate should be a site to contest PROVISIONAL TRUTHS anchored in some meta-consensus

Hassan 9 (Robert Hassan, ARC Senior Research Fellow, Media and Communications at University of Melbourne, “Pathologies of Speed” in *Empires of Speed: Time and the Acceleration of Politics and Society*, pub. BRILL, 2009)

Critical thinking, or critical reason, functions dialectically and is able not only to question and add to other forms of knowledge but is also able to interrogate itself and the ontological foundations of its own knowledge production. Critical thinking, working in its optimal environment, would generate its own time and take the necessary time appropriate for dealing with the question or problem that is being confronted. On the other hand, instrumental thinking, or instrumental reason, is essentially non-reflective; it is goal-oriented and much more concerned with producing results and outcomes, be they techno-scientific or politico-economic. Instrumental thinking is concerned, moreover, with achieving results as quickly as possible and with as little fuss as possible, to get straight to the heart of the question or problem and produce a (usually) technological 'solution' for it. During the course of modernity neither critical nor instrumental reason functioned optimally, or were given totally free rein to exploit the potential they contain. Both tended to work in some sort of interaction—and necessarily so. This is because if humans thought and acted on the basis of critical reason alone, then hardly anything would get done. It would be a pure 'thought world'; a world constructed largely in the mind, a world where nothing is certain, where there are no a priori assumptions, and where other ideas and processes need to be taken into account, endlessly. Instrumental reason, on the other hand, as Ronald Barnett (1997:91) puts it: . . . takes the world largely as given and attempts to find means of living ever more productively and efficiently in it . . . instrumentalism works within a horizon of ontological assumptions. The world is objectified: the task is that of securing effects in it and on it. Objects, events, situations, technologies, knowledges and persons are valued so long as they have a use value. The interaction of both these modes of thinking fitted well with the project of modernity. Indeed it was central to modernity. The application of critical thinking was able to project a possible world of freedom and of justice in human affairs, whereas instrumental thinking acted on the concrete reality of the world 'productively and efficiently' through the development and application of scientific and technological forms of knowledge. Each could complement the other: instrumental thinking could jolt critical thinking out of its inertia; and the application of critical reason, in its turn, could act as a check on the baleful effects of instrumentalism—on the 'totally administered world' that Herbert Marcuse saw as the end-point of instrumental reason, or the 'iron cage' of rationality that Max Weber saw as an innate tendency within modern society. It is vital to understand the inherent temporal dispositions of these ways of thinking about the world and how well (or how poorly) they are suited to the current social, economic, technological and temporal order. By foregrounding the time perspective we can see that instrumental thinking with its emphases on productivity and efficiency, of identifiable goals and 'ontological assumptions' regarding the way the world is, meshes easily with the priorities of speed. Critical reason, on the other hand, is antithetical to speed, to rushing around, to coming quickly to conclusions and then acting rapidly (and often thoughtlessly) on them. It is only with the advent of neoliberal globalization and the information technology revolution (and the foregrounding of the temporal perspective with which to analyse these dynamics) that the vital disjuncture between the critical and instrumental dialectic becomes apparent. This postmodernity, with its hegemonic emphasis on speed, efficiency and productivity is creating the context for what Ken Goldberg identifies as 'a recalibration in our definition of knowledge' (2001:3). What this means is that what we consider as valuable and desirable in terms of knowledge has shifted decisively towards instrumental forms, replacing the complex and age-old interaction between the critical and the instrumental that had characterized the building of modernity. JeanFrancois Lyotard noticed this shift—and within this specific speed context—as early as the late 1970s in his book The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (1979). In it he writes that a momentous shift is now underway, one that is set to change the 'state' of knowledge into a lop-sided domination by instrumental forms of knowledge and thinking. According to Lyotard, the universities and the information technology revolution hold a central responsibility in this. He writes that 'that the status of knowledge is altered as societies enter what is known as the postindustrial age and cultures enter what is known as the postmodern age' (p. 3). Lyotard argues that 'technological transformations' in computerization, information storage in data banks, etc., 'can be expected to have a considerable impact on knowledge' (pp. 3-4). He goes on to argue that 'the miniaturization and commercialization of machines is already changing the way in which learning is acquired, classified, made available, and exploited' (p. 4). Anticipating the arrival of the commercialization of the learning institutions, Lyotard notes that the old notion that knowledge and pedagogy are inextricably linked has been replaced by a new view of knowledge as a commodity, and as a consequence, teaching and learning has become an alienated and alienating process: Knowledge is now produced in order to be sold; it is and will be consumed in order to be valorized in a new process of production: in both cases, the goal is exchange. This commercialization of knowledge reaches into the heart of the university and through its power Lyotard predicts a shift in the whole system of organized learning: It is not hard to visualize learning circulating along the same lines as money, instead of for its 'educational' value or political (administrative, diplomatic, military) importance; the pertinent distinction would no longer be between knowledge and ignorance, but rather, as is the case with money, between 'payment knowledge' and 'investment knowledge'—in other words, between units of knowledge exchanged in a daily maintenance framework (the reconstitution of the workforce, 'survival' versus funds of knowledge dedicated to optimizing the performance of a project (p. 6). Computerization is the technological means of speed and neoliberalism its ideological collaborator. Beginning in a systematic way during the 1980s, these dynamics began to transform Western universities, the main institutional and cultural basis for the creation of instrumental and critical forms of knowledge (Delanty, 2001). Under neoliberalism the university was increasingly cast as a 'business enterprise'. It was thrown by market forces into the business of making money (indeed it had to find alternative sources of funding as government subventions were gradually cut back). It was compelled to learn to swim or drown, like any other business, by grasping market 'opportunities'. Today universities are driven to conform to the laws of the market to an extent that is historically without precedent. Acting as businesses they must produce the forms of knowledge that the market (and industry) demands (Marginson & Considine, 2000; Hassan, 2003:69-125). Operating with an eye fixed permanently on the 'bottom line', university departments and their mushrooming layers of non-academic management have discovered certain harsh economic realities. For example, industries (and increasingly students themselves) tend not to see the immediate relevance of, say, the inculcation of a habit critical thinking through a liberal arts degree, or of a three or four year quest for knowledge for its own sake, or the study of medieval poetry, or politics, or pointillism in visual arts, and so on. In the today's instrumentalized climate of higher learning these are seen to offer little in the way of income for the university or employment opportunities for the student. Both institution and student are obliged to focus on the reading of marketplace signals to see what 'skills' industry might need, and then develop as soon as possible (before a competing university gets in first) the optimal mix of appropriate vocational courses to exploit this 'opportunity'. Under such ideological and economic circumstances there was only one possible outcome for the production and dissemination of knowledge. It is an outcome that Barnett (1997:92) succinctly articulates, describing how 'knowledge' transmutes into 'information' in the service of an instrumentalized 'information economy': Critical thought cannot be construed just as a form of individual action or mental state. We live in a knowledge society. This is the case, but more to the point are the changing forms of knowledge. Humanities give way to science; small-scale forms of knowledge production give way to large-scale forms; knowledge for its own sake gives way to applied knowledge; pure inquiry gives way to problem-solving in situ; prepositional knowledge gives way to or at least is supplanted by experiential knowing; and ways of knowing give way to sheer information. The dominance of applied instrumental knowledge—and to think in an abbreviated way—constitutes what Ulrich Beck (2004:131) terms the new 'epistemological referent' of the age of neoliberal globalization. Through ubiquitous and fast information technologies, knowledge is increasingly produced, exchanged and disseminated through a digital nexus which shapes its form and content to align more easily with the needs of the economy, with profit and with efficiency. The obverse side of this process is that critical reasoning and the forms of knowledge that it generates have become devalued and are being consigned to the margins of social relevance. The shift to the hegemony of instrumental knowledge production and the production of ever-increasing volumes of information that we must now contend with (at ever-increasing speeds) means that we now are likely to conceive, comprehend and consider in an abbreviated fashion. For increasing numbers of us there is simply no time to delve deeply into forms of knowledge and modes of thinking that have no direct economic relevance. Where do we find the time to analyze and discuss the ethics of abortion or euthanasia? How to allocate the time to be politically aware, sufficient to make informed decisions about the complex and complicated political developments that make such a difference to our lives? Who will spare us the time to sit down and help us develop knowledge of political economy adequate to make the national and international economic situation at least some way comprehensible? Like Sabelis's (2002) CEO, we 'leave things out' because we have no choice; there is no time. We think about the world in an abbreviated way, leaving gaps in our knowledge and awareness that become wider and darker as social acceleration continues. In the universities subjects such as history, philosophy, economics, literature and anthropology stagnate or die (or commercialize and degrade), whilst the study of accountancy, computer programming, business and tourism studies, marketing and psychology grow and thrive. In this postmodern society, where the market and its 'laws' are preponderant, where open-ended speed is seen as 'natural' and desirable, and where the past and future contract into a constant present, it is no wonder that anxiety abounds. If human cultures and societies have trained themselves to be less critically aware, then the world and our place in it inevitably seems more opaque. Social, economic and political dynamics continue, of course, but the causes of crises, of economic boom and bust, of political and ethnic strife become more and more indecipherable for most of us. And so in life, surprises continually spring on us individually and collectively, and we are left ill equipped to properly comprehend their nature or deal with their effects. As was indicated at the beginning of this section, abbreviated thinking is akin to Kuipers' metaphor of 'constantly treading water at the surface of change'. Deeper historical currents do indeed flow powerfully beneath us but we can barely feel them or appreciate the fact that we are being driven along by them, because we, individually and as a society, lack the grounded and anchored 'truths' that modernity used to furnish (for better or for worse); the narratives of past and future and progress and the feeling of a 'centre' that would constitute our place in the world. This is not to say that modernity with its interaction of critical and instrumental reason uncovered immutable 'truths', but it did produce forms of knowledge that could act at least as provisional truths, as the 'metanarratives' that gave coherence to the life project of the individual and the collective. These truths held and were able to guide as well as anchor so long as there was a consensus regarding their validity. The move to our current postmodern sensibility has pulled the supports out from these structures. Acting as a pathology, social acceleration drives us to thinking in an abbreviated fashion, and causes us to view the wider world in that way. The deeply insidious aspect of this process, however, is that such thinking functions in a vicious cycle. It is like senile dementia: the worse it gets, the less we are aware of it.

### Decision Making KT Ethics

#### decision making is an essential framework for including others into your decision calculus---it’s an ethical process that we can learn in debate to SUPPLEMENT ethical theories we come up with outside of the game

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Ethics can be viewed as rational choice. A decision must have a consistent rationale behind it, or else it is not an ethical decision. Rationality may not be a sufficient criterion for ethical choice, but it is necessary. It is useful as well. It can provide an objective guide for decision making in business situations and everyday life. Although rational choice is popularly identified with rational self-interest, the ethical literature has developed a broader point of view. Neglecting the interests of others is irrational—not because it may eventually damage your own interests—but because it is logically inconsistent. ¶ This essay presents three specific conditions that a decision must satisfy in order to be logically consistent. They might be viewed as three Laws of Ethics, analogous to Newton’s Laws in physics. They help explain our intuitions as to what is right and wrong. More importantly, they are useful for resolving cases in which our intuitions are unclear. ¶ There are several advantages to viewing ethics as rational choice in this broader sense. It provides a conceptual framework that allows you to analyze complex business decisions that involve multiple stakeholders (as nearly all do). It offers a style of argument that can appeal to all parties, since rational choice, by definition, considers all points of view. It provides a vocabulary with which you can articulate an ethical position and defend yourself from pressure to compromise. ¶ Learning to Make Rational Choices ¶ Making rational choices is a skill, and like any skill, it requires practice. Reading this essay is only the beginning. You should work through “Ethical Analysis of Mini-cases” and make sure you follow the arguments. It is impossible to understand the ideas discussed here until you apply them to real ethical dilemmas. Additional exercises will be provided in class and as homework. ¶ Finally, you should practice analyzing cases in other courses, as well as decisions on the job, from an ethical point of view. Psychological research shows that the key to developing expertise in any endeavor is prolonged, continuous, intelligent practice. 1 This goes for ethical decision making in particular. ¶ Even with practice, intellectual analysis alone won’t make your decisions for you. You can’t just turn a crank and get the right answer. As in any field, judgment and experience are indispensable, and good decisions come from the heart as well as the mind. Yet wisdom must be built on a foundation of rigorous analysis and clear thinking.

### Predictability Bad Double Turn

#### Breaking down predictability is self-defeating and impossible---creativity inevitably depends upon constraints, the attempt to wish away the structure of predictability collapses the very structure their aff depends on---it’s better to retain predictability and be creative within it

Armstrong 2K – Paul B. Armstrong, Professor of English and Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences at the State University of New York at Stony Brook, Winter 2000, “The Politics of Play: The Social Implications of Iser's Aesthetic Theory,” New Literary History, Vol. 31, No. 1, p. 211-223

Such a play-space also opposes the notion that the only alternative to the coerciveness of consensus must be to advocate the sublime powers of rule-breaking. 8 Iser shares Lyotard's concern that to privilege harmony and agreement in a world of heterogeneous language games is to limit their play and to inhibit semantic innovation and the creation of new games. Lyotard's endorsement of the "sublime"--the pursuit of the "unpresentable" by rebelling against restrictions, defying norms, and smashing the limits of existing paradigms--is undermined by contradictions, however, which Iser's explication of play recognizes and addresses. The paradox of the unpresentable, as Lyotard acknowledges, is that it can only be manifested through a game of representation. The sublime is, consequently, in Iser's sense, an instance of doubling. If violating norms creates new games, this crossing of boundaries depends on and carries in its wake the conventions and structures it oversteps. The sublime may be uncompromising, asocial, and unwilling to be bound by limits, but its pursuit of what is not contained in any order or system makes it dependent on the forms it opposes. [End Page 220]

The radical presumption of the sublime is not only terroristic in refusing to recognize the claims of other games whose rules it declines to limit itself by. It is also naive and self-destructive in its impossible imagining that it can do without the others it opposes. As a structure of doubling, the sublime pursuit of the unpresentable requires a play-space that includes other, less radical games with which it can interact. Such conditions of exchange would be provided by the nonconsensual reciprocity of Iserian play.

Iser's notion of play offers a way of conceptualizing power which acknowledges the necessity and force of disciplinary constraints without seeing them as unequivocally coercive and determining. The contradictory combination of restriction and openness in how play deploys power is evident in Iser's analysis of "regulatory" and "aleatory" rules. Even the regulatory rules, which set down the conditions participants submit to in order to play a game, "permit a certain range of combinations while also establishing a code of possible play. . . . Since these rules limit the text game without producing it, they are regulatory but not prescriptive. They do no more than set the aleatory in motion, and the aleatory rule differs from the regulatory in that it has no code of its own" (FI 273). Submitting to the discipline of regulatory restrictions is both constraining and enabling because it makes possible certain kinds of interaction that the rules cannot completely predict or prescribe in advance. Hence the existence of aleatory rules that are not codified as part of the game itself but are the variable customs, procedures, and practices for playing it. Expert facility with aleatory rules marks the difference, for example, between someone who just knows the rules of a game and another who really knows how to play it. Aleatory rules are more flexible and open-ended and more susceptible to variation than regulatory rules, but they too are characterized by a contradictory combination of constraint and possibility, limitation and unpredictability, discipline and spontaneity.

### Aff Links to their Offense

#### Voting aff necessitates utilizing every procedure they critique---evaluating that their arguments are better than ours requires an inter-subjective frame for language, some rational standard for what arguments are better, etc---only making these procedures clear up front can allow for fruitful discussion, while the aff insidiously re-creates them POST-HOC which links to all of their offense but can’t solve any of ours

Friedrich 11—Department of Classics, Dalhousie University (Rainer, The Enlightenment Gone Mad (I) The Dismal Discourse of Postmodernism’s Grand Narratives, http://www.bu.edu/arion/the-enlightenment-gone-mad-i-the-dismal-discourse-of-postmodernisms-grand-narratives/)

Yet the sweeping proclamation of the death of all metanarratives is itself a totalizing metanarrative. It connotes all the postmodern death certificates, each of which is a grand récit in its own right. In their ensemble, they amount to postmodernism’s overarching metanarrative totally contesting Western civilization. In current philosophical parlance, this is known by the somewhat unwieldy term, performative self-refutation. Its ancestry reaches back to the notorious Cretan’s proposition that all Cretans are liars. Performative self-refutation occurs when an argument undercuts itself in the very act of its enunciation, by the form and means through which it is performed. In the attempt to abolish it, Lyotard’s postmodernism is itself practicing the discourse of the grand narrative.¶ Yet the grand narrative of the end of the metanarrative is not the only one of Lyotard’s grands récits. Libidinal Economy, the most Sadean of Lyotard’s books, offers the grand narrative of libidinous intensity as an ubiquitous universal force. Here the dismal science and the dismal discourse converge: “every political economy is libidinal.” Its totalizing Sadean mechanism is patent when dealing with the early industrial proletariat’s conditions of extreme misery, once described in all their horror in Friedrich Engels’ classic, The Condition of the Working Class in England. It translates this misery into erotic jouissance: the proletariat is alleged to have wished, willed, and desired the ruin of its health in the hell of mines, foundries, and factories, along with the disintegration of personal identity in anonymous slums, because it experienced all this as the gratification of masochistic desire. It was only when its libidinous intensity grew too strong and thus became unbearable, that the proletariat turned to revolt.22 Libidinal Economy amounts to a bizarre metaphysics of libido, a totalizing metanarrative involving emancipation: the liberation of Desire as the marginalized and suppressed Other.23¶ Yet this is not all. Confronted, after his verdict on grand narratives, with a triumphalist capitalism acting out its grand narrative of market-fundamentalism, Lyotard changed register. Capitalism’s triumph became part of a narrative he dubbed a “postmodern fable” (moralité).24 This tells the story of energy from the beginning of life on earth to the ineluctable disappearance of the solar system, and beyond. Spanning nine billion years of development, of which capitalism’s rise to an unrivaled global system is but a tiny subdivision, it grows into the grand narrative of entropy and negentropy. Negentropy denotes the force counteracting entropy through the organization of energy into ever more complex systems, ultimately enabling mankind, according to Lyotard, to “elude the catastrophe by abandoning its cosmic site, the solar system.” The catastrophe is entropy—“a tragedy about energy. Like Oedipus Rex, it ends badly. Like Oedipus at Colonus, it admits a final remission.”¶ Lyotard does his level best in trying to present his postmodern fable as a non-metanarrative. He insists that it is not a narrative of emancipation, for there is no human subject to be emancipated: “humans are an invention of development. The hero of the fable is not the human species, but energy.” The human species, in his fable, “is taken for a complex material system; consciousness, for an effect of language; and language, for a highly complex material system.” Humankind is presented as the effect of the development of energy: it will, if all goes well, develop into “the negentropic system” that will make possible “the final exodus . . . far from the Earth.” One discerns the usual suspects: postmodern anti-subjectivism asserting a process without a subject; postmodern anti-humanism reducing humanity to an effect of such a process, the outcome of which is not the rescue of an emancipated humankind, but “the rescue of a very differentiated system, a kind of super-brain”; and post-modernity’s linguistic-textualist ontology that turnsall andeverything into the effects of language. The fable’s lack of finality, the absence of a promise of,or the hope for, a “final perfection,”Lyotard claims, are proof that his postmodern fable is not a totalizing metanarrative.25 It ends with a Nietzschean flourish, echoing the amorality of Libidinous Economy: “the fable is unaware of good and evil.”¶ It’s a nice try, and a very elegant one at that, a far cry from the feverish rhetoric of Libidinal Economy. But Lyotard is protesting too much. Calling it a fable—that is, a petit récit—cannot conceal that its content is that of a grand récit, and one of emancipation to boot.26 For all the post-structuralist spin that Lyotard puts on his moralité of entropy and negentropy, the fact remains that it is the human brain—unmaking and remaking itself to strive for ever-increasing complexity—that becomes the motor and the agency of the process. In Lyotard’s grand narrative, the human brain may have originally been the effect of development; but once it has attained the capability of self-consciousness, self-reference, and self-critique, it takes charge of the process as its chief agent. In short, the Lyotardian fable of mankind’s escape from the doom of entropy surpasses in scope all known metanarratives as the grand narrative of human self-emancipation from its ties to a doomed earth. So much for his incredulity towards metanarratives!¶ As for performative self-refutation: at the height of his insouciance, Lyotard offers, as another definition of post-modernity, its ready acceptance of paradox coupled with disdain for coherence. “Post-modern science,” he says, “is theorizing its own evolution as discontinuous, catastrophic, non-rectifiable and paradoxical”—with the consequence, it would seem, that one does not abjure reason and its principles with impunity, and that goofing and screw-ups are the price one pays. Thus postmodern discourses, when critically analyzed, emerge as pitted against themselves and become the opposite of what they claim to be.¶ The mother of all postmodern performative self-refutations, their archetype as it were, is found in deconstruction’s totalizing critique of logocentric reason. Jacques Derrida himself gives it its most pronounced expression:¶ The unsurpassable, unique, and imperial grandeur of the order of reason . . . is that one cannot speak out against it except by being for it, that one can protest it only from within it; and within its domain, Reason leaves us only the recourse to stratagems and strategies. The revolution against reason . . . can be made only within it.27¶¶ In order to dismantle logocentric reason, deconstruction is bound to have recourse to—logocentric reason! It has to reason against reason. Thus Deconstruction remains inescapably trapped in the “unsurpassable, unique, and imperial grandeur” of reason’s order; and it is to Derrida’s credit that he, unlike his fellow post-structuralists, is fully aware of it. To try to escape it, Derrida would have to resort, as he does elsewhere with other terms, to the procedure of putting “under erasure” (sous rature), i.e., of crossing through in the cited passage that which he is forced to use and practice, but aims to deconstruct: Reason. Crossing through, not crossing out: it could not be crossed out because reason, while being deconstructed, is nevertheless operative as the indispensable framework and vehicle of its deconstruction. But to no avail. This elegant sophistic trick of having it both ways, inherited from Heidegger,28 would simply highlight deconstruction’s fatal flaw: that it has to feed on, and is thus parasitically dependent on, what it endeavors to dismantle. Invisible erasures perforce accompany all operations of deconstruction, using the panoply of LOGOS (reason) to dislodge and dismantle logos and truth, and implicitly making truth-claims for deconstructive tenets. Thus, far from being able to demolish the logos, it confirms its ineluctability. Through its parasitic dependency on the very logos that it tries to deconstruct, Deconstruction deconstructs itself by revealing itself as a latent logocentrism.¶The same parasitic dependence on the object of their attempted destruction obtains in the Nietzschean and Heideggerian project of the “destruction of metaphysics” and its modern derivation, enlightenment reason. Here is Derridaon the Nietzschean and Heideggerian anti-metaphysical discourses:¶

[Derrida Quote Begins]

But all these discourses and all their analogues are trapped in a kind of circle. This circle is unique. It describes the form of the relation between the history of metaphysics and the destruction of the history of metaphysics. There is no sense in doing without the concepts of metaphysics in order to shake metaphysics. We have no language—no syntax and no lexicon—which is foreign to this history; we can pronounce not a single destructive proposition which has not already had to slip into the form, the logic, and the implicit postulations of precisely what it seeks to contest.29¶

[Derrida Quote Ends]

Postmodernism’s wholesale critique of enlightenment reason, arising from these roots, faces a similar dilemma. It implicates itself in the most virulent performative self-refutation, as Habermas has demonstrated.30 In fact, the whole development from Nietzschevia decisionism to post-structuralism appears to be one colossal performative self-refutation. The postmodern enterprise of enlightenment-bashing from Nietzsche to Foucault and Derrida is predicated on the enlightenment (“the implicit postulation of precisely what it seeks to contest”). Or rather, the postmodern enterprise is itself enlightenment: what has started in Nietzsche’s critical thinking, and continues in the postmodern discourses, is the attempt to enlighten the enlightenment about itself and its perceived evils. The Nietzschean and postmodern critique of enlightenment reason is essentially the application of enlightenment reason’s own principle, critical reflection, to itself. Kant had done this, aiming at circumscribing the legitimate realm of pure reason; his critique was, in fact, reason’s self-critique, the only possible form of Vernunftkritik. But the totalizing nature of the Nietzschean and postmodern critique of enlightenment reason—critique of reason tout court—aiming, as it does (unlike the Kantian) not at its delimitation, but at its destruction, gives rise to nothing less than reason’s self-cannibalization—just like that of Appetite in Shakespeare’s Troilus and Cressida: “And Appetite, an universal wolf / (so doubly seconded by will and power) / must make perforce an universal prey / and last eat up himself.”31 This can only result in a dreadful irrationalism. It is this, in Stanley Rosen’s striking aphorism, that renders postmodernism “the enlightenment gone mad.”

### 1NR FG Definition

#### Central government

AHD 92 (American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, p. 647)

federal—3. Of or relating to the central government of a federation as distinct from the governments of its member units.