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#### a. Interpretation and violation---the affirmative should defend the desirability of topical government action

#### Most predictable—the agent and verb indicate a debate about hypothetical government action

Jon M Ericson 3, Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action through governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### “Resolved” is legislative

Jeff Parcher 1, former debate coach at Georgetown, Feb 2001 http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html

Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constiutent parts See Syns at \*analyze\* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at \*Solve\* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Firmness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision. (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statement of a decision, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconceivable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desirablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the preliminary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my view. One affirms a resolution. Affirmative and negative are the equivalents of 'yes' or 'no' - which, of course, are answers to a question.

#### “Should” requires defending federal action

Judge Henry Nieto 9, Colorado Court of Appeals, 8-20-2009 People v. Munoz, 240 P.3d 311 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009)

"Should" is "used . . . to express duty, obligation, propriety, or expediency." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2104 (2002). Courts [\*\*15] interpreting the word in various contexts have drawn conflicting conclusions, although the weight of authority appears to favor interpreting "should" in an imperative, obligatory sense. HN7A number of courts, confronted with the question of whether using the word "should" in jury instructions conforms with the Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections governing the reasonable doubt standard, have upheld instructions using the word. In the courts of other states in which a defendant has argued that the word "should" in the reasonable doubt instruction does not sufficiently inform the jury that it is bound to find the defendant not guilty if insufficient proof is submitted at trial, the courts have squarely rejected the argument. They reasoned that the word "conveys a sense of duty and obligation and could not be misunderstood by a jury." See State v. McCloud, 257 Kan. 1, 891 P.2d 324, 335 (Kan. 1995); see also Tyson v. State, 217 Ga. App. 428, 457 S.E.2d 690, 691-92 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (finding argument that "should" is directional but not instructional to be without merit); Commonwealth v. Hammond, 350 Pa. Super. 477, 504 A.2d 940, 941-42 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). Notably, courts interpreting the word "should" in other types of jury instructions [\*\*16] have also found that the word conveys to the jury a sense of duty or obligation and not discretion. In Little v. State, 261 Ark. 859, 554 S.W.2d 312, 324 (Ark. 1977), the Arkansas Supreme Court interpreted the word "should" in an instruction on circumstantial evidence as synonymous with the word "must" and rejected the defendant's argument that the jury may have been misled by the court's use of the word in the instruction. Similarly, the Missouri Supreme Court rejected a defendant's argument that the court erred by not using the word "should" in an instruction on witness credibility which used the word "must" because the two words have the same meaning. State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958). [\*318] In applying a child support statute, the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that a legislature's or commission's use of the word "should" is meant to convey duty or obligation. McNutt v. McNutt, 203 Ariz. 28, 49 P.3d 300, 306 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (finding a statute stating that child support expenditures "should" be allocated for the purpose of parents' federal tax exemption to be mandatory).

#### A general subject isn’t enough—debate requires a specific point of difference in order to promote effective exchange

Steinberg and Freeley 13, \* David, Lecturer in Communication studies and rhetoric. Advisor to Miami Urban Debate League. Director of Debate at U Miami, Former President of CEDA. And \*\* Austin, attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, JD, Suffolk University, *Argumentation and Debate***,** *Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making*, 121-4

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a controversy, a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a feet or value or policy, there is no need or opportunity for debate; the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four,” because there is simply no controversy about this state­ment. Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions of issues, there is no debate. Controversy invites decisive choice between competing positions. Debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants live in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity to gain citizenship? Does illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? How are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification card, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this “debate” is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies are best understood when seated clearly such that all parties to the debate share an understanding about the objec­tive of the debate. This enables focus on substantive and objectively identifiable issues facilitating comparison of competing argumentation leading to effective decisions. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor deci­sions, general feelings of tension without opportunity for resolution, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the U.S. Congress to make substantial progress on the immigration debate. Of course, arguments may be presented without disagreement. For exam­ple, claims are presented and supported within speeches, editorials, and advertise­ments even without opposing or refutational response. Argumentation occurs in a range of settings from informal to formal, and may not call upon an audi­ence or judge to make a forced choice among competing claims. Informal dis­course occurs as conversation or panel discussion without demanding a decision about a dichotomous or yes/no question. However, by definition, debate requires "reasoned judgment on a proposition. The proposition is a statement about which competing advocates will offer alternative (pro or con) argumenta­tion calling upon their audience or adjudicator to decide. The proposition pro­vides focus for the discourse and guides the decision process. Even when a decision will be made through a process of compromise, it is important to iden­tify the beginning positions of competing advocates to begin negotiation and movement toward a center, or consensus position. It is frustrating and usually unproductive to attempt to make a decision when deciders are unclear as to what the decision is about. The proposition may be implicit in some applied debates (“Vote for me!”); however, when a vote or consequential decision is called for (as in the courtroom or in applied parliamentary debate) it is essential that the proposition be explicitly expressed (“the defendant is guilty!”). In aca­demic debate, the proposition provides essential guidance for the preparation of the debaters prior to the debate, the case building and discourse presented during the debate, and the decision to be made by the debate judge after the debate. Someone disturbed by the problem of a growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, “Public schools are doing a terri­ble job! They' are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do some­thing about this” or, worse, “It’s too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as “What can be done to improve public education?”—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies, The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities” and “Resolved; That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. This focus contributes to better and more informed decision making with the potential for better results. In aca­demic debate, it provides better depth of argumentation and enhanced opportu­nity for reaping the educational benefits of participation. In the next section, we will consider the challenge of framing the proposition for debate, and its role in the debate. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about a topic, such as ‘"homeless­ness,” or “abortion,” Or “crime,” or “global warming,” we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish a profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement “Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword” is debatable, yet by itself fails to provide much basis for dear argumen­tation. If we take this statement to mean Iliad the written word is more effec­tive than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose, perhaps promoting positive social change. (Note that “loose” propositions, such as the example above, may be defined by their advocates in such a way as to facilitate a clear contrast of competing sides; through definitions and debate they “become” clearly understood statements even though they may not begin as such. There are formats for debate that often begin with this sort of proposition. However, in any debate, at some point, effective and meaningful discussion relies on identification of a clearly stated or understood proposition.) Back to the example of the written word versus physical force. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, web­site development, advertising, cyber-warfare, disinformation, or what? What does it mean to be “mightier" in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be, “Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Laurania of our support in a certain crisis?” The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as “Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treaty with Laurania.” Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advo­cates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### b. Vote neg

#### 1. Preparation and clash—changing the topic post facto manipulates balance of prep, which structurally favors the aff because they speak last and permute alternatives—strategic fairness is key to engaging a well-prepared opponent

#### Topical fairness requirements are key to meaningful dialogue—monopolizing strategy and prep makes the discussion one-sided and subverts any meaningful neg role

Ryan Galloway 7, Samford Comm prof, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007

Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure.¶ Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table.¶ When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. **Far from** being **a banal request for links** to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon **months of preparation**, research, and critical thinking not be silenced.¶ Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms **operate to exclude** particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). Hugh Duncan furthers this line of reasoning:¶ Opponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other because in doing so they enhance their own chances of thinking better and reaching sound decisions. Opposition is necessary because it sharpens thought in action. We assume that argument, discussion, and talk, among free an informed people who subordinate decisions of any kind, because it is only through such discussion that we reach agreement which binds us to a common cause…If we are to be equal…relationships among equals must find expression in many formal and informal institutions (Duncan, 1993, p. 196-197).¶ **Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintains equality for the sake of the conversation** (Farrell, 1985, p. 114).¶ For example, an affirmative case on the 2007-2008 college topic might defend neither state nor international action in the Middle East, and yet claim to be germane to the topic in some way. The case essentially denies the arguments that state action is oppressive or that actions in the international arena are philosophically or pragmatically suspect. Instead of allowing for the dialogue to be modified by the interchange of the affirmative case and the negative response, the affirmative subverts any meaningful role to the negative team, preventing them from offering effective “counter-word” and undermining the value of a meaningful exchange of speech acts. **Germaneness and other substitutes for topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits** of topical advocacy.

#### 2. substantive regulations that demarcate limits are necessary for dialogue---refusal to tailor their identity claims to normative, public stances shuts down the possibility for discussion and democratic respect

John Dryzek 6, Professor of Social and Political Theory, The Australian National University, Reconciling Pluralism and Consensus as Political Ideals, American Journal of Political Science,Vol. 50, No. 3, July 2006, Pp. 634–649

A more radical contemporary pluralism is suspicious of liberal and communitarian devices for reconciling difference. Such a critical pluralism is associated with agonists such as Connolly (1991), Honig (1993), and Mouffe (2000), and difference democrats such as Young (2000). As Honig puts it, “Difference is just another word for what used to be called pluralism” (1996, 60). Critical pluralists resemble liberals in that they begin from the variety of ways it is possible to experience the world, but stress that the experiences and perspectives of marginalized and oppressed groups are likely to be very different from dominant groups. They also have a strong suspicion ofliberal theory that looks neutral but in practice supports and serves the powerful.

Difference democrats are hostile to consensus, partly because consensus decisionmaking (of the sort popular in 1970s radical groups) conceals informal oppression under the guise of concern for all by disallowing dissent (Zablocki 1980). But the real target is political theory that deploys consensus, especially deliberative and liberal theory. Young (1996, 125–26) argues that the appeals to unity and the common good that deliberative theorists under sway of the consensus ideal stress as the proper forms of political communication can often be oppressive. For deliberation so oriented all too easily equates the common good with the interests of the more powerful, thus sidelining legitimate concerns of the marginalized. Asking the underprivileged to set aside their particularistic concerns also means marginalizing their favored forms of expression, especially the telling of personal stories (Young 1996, 126).3 Speaking for an agonistic conception of democracy (to which Young also subscribes; 2000, 49–51), Mouffe states:

To negate the ineradicable character of antagonism and aim at a universal rational consensus— that is the real threat to democracy. Indeed, this can lead to violence being unrecognized and hidden behind appeals to “rationality,” as is often the case in liberal thinking. (1996, 248)

Mouffe is a radical pluralist: “By pluralism I mean the end of a substantive idea of the good life” (1996, 246). But neither Mouffe nor Young want to abolish communication in the name of pluralism and difference; much of their work advocates sustained attention to communication. Mouffe also cautions against uncritical celebration of difference, for some differences imply “subordination and should therefore be challenged by a radical democratic politics” (1996, 247). Mouffe raises the question of the terms in which engagement across difference might proceed. Participants should ideally accept that the positions of others are legitimate, though not as a result of being persuaded in argument. Instead, it is a matter of being open to conversion due to adoption of a particular kind of democratic attitude that converts antagonism into agonism, fighting into critical engagement, enemies into adversaries who are treated with respect. Respect here is notjust (liberal) toleration, but positive validation of the position of others. For Young, a communicative democracy would be composed of people showing “equal respect,” under “procedural rules of fair discussion and decisionmaking” (1996, 126). Schlosberg speaks of “agonistic respect” as “a critical pluralist ethos” (1999, 70).

Mouffe and Young both want pluralism to be regulated by a particular kind of attitude, be it respectful, agonistic, or even in Young’s (2000, 16–51) case reasonable.Thus neither proposes unregulated pluralism as an alternative to (deliberative) consensus. This regulation cannot be just procedural, for that would imply “anything goes” in terms of the substance of positions. Recall thatMouffe rejects differences that imply subordination. Agonistic ideals demand judgments about what is worthy of respect and what is not. Connolly (1991, 211) worriesabout dogmatic assertions and denials of identity that fuel existential resentments that would have to be changed to make agonism possible. Young seeks “transformation of private, self-regarding desires into public appeals to justice” (2000, 51). Thus for Mouffe, Connolly, and Young alike, regulative principles for democratic communication are not just attitudinal or procedural; they also refer to the substance of the kinds of claims that are worthy of respect. These authors would not want to legislate substance and are suspicious of the content of any alleged consensus. But in retreating from “anything goes” relativism, they need principles to regulate the substance of what rightfully belongs in democratic debate.

#### Tailoring identity claims to common topics for deliberation is possible and desirable---the 1ac’s failure to affirm topical action impedes the culture of democratic debate that’s key to effective decisionmaking in a pluralistic society

Amanda Anderson 6, Andrew W. Mellon Professor of Humanities and English at Brown University, Spring 2006, “Reply to My Critic(s),” Criticism, Vol. 48, No. 2, p. 281-290

MY RECENT BOOK, The Way We Argue Now, has in a sense two theses. In the first place, the book makes the case for the importance of debate and argument to any vital democratic or pluralistic intellectual culture. This is in many ways an unexceptional position, but the premise of the book is that the claims of reasoned argument are often trumped, within the current intellectual terrain, by appeals to cultural identity and what I gather more broadly under the rubric of ethos, which includes cultural identity but also forms of ethical piety and charismatic authority. In promoting argument as a universal practice keyed to a human capacity for communicative reason, my book is a critique of relativism and identity politics, or the notion that forms of cultural authenticity or group identity have a certain unquestioned legitimacy, one that cannot or should not be subjected to the challenges of reason or principle, precisely because reason and what is often called "false universalism" are, according to this pattern of thinking, always involved in forms of exclusion, power, or domination. My book insists, by contrast, that argument is a form of respect, that the ideals of democracy, whether conceived from a nationalist or an internationalist perspective, rely fundamentally upon procedures of argumentation and debate in order to legitimate themselves and to keep their central institutions vital. And the idea that one should be protected from debate, that argument is somehow injurious to persons if it does not honor their desire to have their basic beliefs and claims and solidarities accepted without challenge, is strenuously opposed. As is the notion that any attempt to ask people to agree upon processes of reason-giving argument is somehow necessarily to impose a coercive norm, one that will disable the free expression and performance of identities, feelings, or solidarities. Disagreement is, by the terms of my book, a form of respect, not a form of disrespect. And by disagreement, I don't mean simply to say that we should expect disagreement rather than agreement, which is a frequently voiced-if misconceived-criticism of Habermas. Of course we should expect disagreement. My point is that we should focus on the moment of dissatisfaction in the face of disagreement-the internal dynamic in argument that imagines argument might be the beginning of a process of persuasion and exchange that could end in agreement (or partial agreement). For those who advocate reconciling ourselves to disagreements rather than arguing them out, by contrast, there is a complacent-and in some versions, even celebratory-attitude toward fixed disagreement. Refusing these options, I make the case for dissatisfied disagreement in the final chapter of the book and argue that people should be willing to justify their positions in dialogue with one another, especially if they hope to live together in a post-traditional pluralist society.

One example of the trumping of argument by ethos is the form that was taken by the late stage of the Foucault/Habermas debate, where an appeal to ethos-specifically, an appeal to Foucault's style of ironic or negative critique, often seen as most in evidence in the interviews, where he would playfully refuse labels or evade direct answers-was used to exemplify an alternative to the forms of argument employed by Habermas and like-minded critics. (I should pause to say that I provide this example, and the framing summary of the book that surrounds it, not to take up airtime through expansive self-reference, but because neither of my respondents provided any contextualizing summary of the book's central arguments, though one certainly gets an incremental sense of the book's claims from Bruce Robbins. Because I don't assume that readers of this forum have necessarily read the book, and because I believe that it is the obligation of forum participants to provide sufficient context for their remarks, I will perform this task as economically as I can, with the recognition that it might have carried more weight if provided by a respondent rather than the author.)

The Foucauldian counter-critique importantly emphasizes a relation between style and position, but it obscures (1) the importance or value of the Habermasian critique and (2) the possibility that the other side of the debate might have its own ethos to advocate, one that has precisely to do with an ethos of argument, an ideal of reciprocal debate that involves taking distance on one's pre-given forms of identity or the norms of one's community, both so as to talk across differences and to articulate one's claims in relation to shared and even universal ideals. And this leads to the second thesis of the book, the insistence that an emphasis on ethos and character is interestingly present if not widely recognized in contemporary theory, and one of the ways its vitality and existential pertinence makes itself felt (even despite the occurrence of the kinds of unfair trumping moves I have mentioned). We often fail to notice this, because identity has so uniformly come to mean sociological, ascribed, or group identity-race, gender, class, nationality, ethnicity, sexuality, and so forth. Instances of the move toward character and ethos include the later Foucault (for whom ethos is a central concept), cosmopolitanism (whose aspiration it is to turn universalism into an ethos), and, more controversially, proceduralist ethics and politics (with its emphasis on sincerity and civility). Another version of this attentiveness to ethos and character appears in contemporary pragmatism, with its insistence on casualness of attitude, or insouciance in the face of contingency-recommendations that get elevated into full-fledged exemplary personae in Richard Rorty's notion of the "ironist" or Barbara Herrnstein Smiths portrait of the "postmodern skeptic." These examples-and the larger claim they support-are meant to defend theory as still living, despite the many reports of its demise, and in fact still interestingly and incessantly re-elaborating its relation to practice. This second aspect of the project is at once descriptive, motivated by the notion that characterology within theory is intrinsically interesting, and critical, in its attempt to identify how characterology can itself be used to cover or evade the claims of rational argument, as in appeals to charismatic authority or in what I identify as narrow personifications of theory (pragmatism, in its insistence on insouciance in the face of contingency, is a prime example of this second form). And as a complement to the critical agenda, there is a reconstructive agenda as well, an attempt to recuperate liberalism and proceduralism, in part by advocating the possibility, as I have suggested, of an ethos of argument.

Robbins, in his extraordinarily rich and challenging response, zeroes in immediately on a crucial issue: who is to say exactly when argument is occurring or not, and what do we do when there is disagreement over the fundamentals (the primary one being over what counts as proper reasoning)? Interestingly, Robbins approaches this issue after first observing a certain tension in the book: on the one hand, The Way We Argue Now calls for dialogue, debate, argument; on the other, its project is "potentially something a bit stricter, or pushier: getting us all to agree on what should and should not count as true argument." What this point of entry into the larger issue reveals is a kind of blur that the book, I am now aware, invites. On the one hand, the book anatomizes academic debates, and in doing so is quite "debaterly" This can give the impression that what I mean by argument is a very specific form unique to disciplinary methodologies in higher education. But the book is not generally advocating a narrow practice of formal and philosophical argumentation in the culture at large, however much its author may relish adherence to the principle of non-contradiction in scholarly argument. I take pains to elaborate an ethos of argument that is linked to democratic debate and the forms of dissent that constitutional patriotism allows and even promotes. In this sense, while argument here is necessarily contextualized sociohistorically, the concept is not merely academic. It is a practice seen as integral to specific political forms and institutions in modern democracies, and to the more general activity of critique within modern societies-to the tradition of the public sphere, to speak in broad terms. Additionally, insofar as argument impels one to take distance on embedded customs, norms, and senses of given identity, it is a practice that at once acknowledges identity, the need to understand the perspectives of others, and the shared commitment to commonality and generality, to finding a way to live together under conditions of difference.

More than this: the book also discusses at great length and from several different angles the issue that Robbins inexplicably claims I entirely ignore: the question of disagreement about what counts as argument. In the opening essay, "Debatable Performances," I fault the proponents of communicative ethics for not having a broader understanding of public expression, one that would include the disruptions of spectacle and performance. I return to and underscore this point in my final chapter, where I espouse a democratic politics that can embrace and accommodate a wide variety of expressions and modes. This is certainly a discussion of what counts as dialogue and hence argument in the broad sense in which I mean it, and in fact I fully acknowledge that taking distance from cultural norms and given identities can be advanced not only through critical reflection, but through ironic critique and defamiliarizing performance as well. But I do insist-and this is where I take a position on the fundamental disagreements that have arisen with respect to communicative ethics-that when they have an effect, these other dimensions of experience do not remain unreflective, and insofar as they do become reflective, they are contributing to the very form of reasoned analysis that their champions sometimes imagine they must refuse in order to liberate other modes of being (the affective, the narrative, the performative, the nonrational). If a narrative of human rights violation is persuasive in court, or in the broader cultural public sphere, it is because it draws attention to a violation of humanity that is condemned on principle; if a performance jolts people out of their normative understandings of sexuality and gender, it prompts forms of understanding that can be affirmed and communicated and also can be used to justify political positions and legislative agendas.

#### The impact outweighs—deliberative debate models impart skills vital to respond to existential threats

Christian O. Lundberg 10 Professor of Communications @ University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, “Tradition of Debate in North Carolina” in Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century By Allan D. Louden, p. 311

The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. But the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speech—as indicated earlier, debate builds capacity for critical thinking, analysis of public claims, informed decision making, and better public judgment. If the picture of modem political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid scientific and technological change outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution, at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to rearticulation precisely because as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy such as Ocwey in The Public awl Its Problems place such a high premium on education (Dewey 1988,63, 154). Debate provides an indispensible form of education in the modem articulation of democracy because it builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed about policy decisions that impact them, to sort through and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly information-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them.

The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy. John Larkin (2005, HO) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multimediated information environment (ibid-). Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources:

To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instmction/no instruction and debate topic . . . that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned . . . students in the Instnictional [debate) group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so----These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in (debate).... These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144)

Larkin's study substantiates Thomas Worthcn and Gaylcn Pack's (1992, 3) claim that debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthcn and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials.

There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively, the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice in the classroom as a technology for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities. The unique combination of critical thinking skills, research and information processing skills, oral communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education, and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of meaningful political engagement and new articulations of democratic life.

Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens that can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to produce revisions of democratic life that are necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive. Democracy faces a myriad of challenges, including: domestic and international issues of class, gender, and racial justice; wholesale environmental destruction and the potential for rapid climate change; emerging threats to international stability in the form of terrorism, intervention and new possibilities for great power conflict; and increasing challenges of rapid globalization including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. More than any specific policy or proposal, an informed and active citizenry that deliberates with greater skill and sensitivity provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with the existential challenges to democracy [in an] increasingly complex world.

### OFF

#### The aff’s claim to emancipation collapses the real material difference between our position as debaters and oppressed individuals for whom resistance is not a simple language-game---their deployment of an unproblematic posture of victimization spotlights the aff’s righteousness while robbing the oppressed of protest

Chow 93—Anne Firor Scott Professor of Literature at Trinity College of Arts and Sciences, Duke University (Rey, Writing Diaspora, 11-5)

Until the very end of the novel, Jane is always excluded from every available form of social power. Her survival seems to depend on renouncing what power might come to her as teacher, mistress, cousin, heiress, or missionary's wife. She repeatedly flees from such forms of inclusion in the field of power, as if her status as an exemplary subject, like her authority as narrator, depends entirely on her claim to a kind of truth which can only be made from a position of powerlessness. By creating such an unlovely heroine and subjecting her to one form of harassment after another, Brontë demonstrates the power of words alone. 18¶ This reading of Jane Eyre highlights her not simply as the female underdog who is often identified by feminist and Marxist critics, but as the intellectual who acquires power through a moral rectitude that was to become the flip side of Western imperialism's ruthlessness. Lying at the core of Anglo­American liberalism, this moral rectitude would accompany many territorial and economic conquests overseas with a firm sense of social mission. When Jane Eyre went to the colonies in the nineteenth century, she turned into the Christian missionary. It is this understanding—that Brontë's depiction of a socially marginalized English woman is, in terms of ideological production, fully complicit with England's empire­building ambition rather than opposed to it—that prompted Gayatri Spivak to read Jane Eyre as a text in the service of imperialism. Referring to Brontë's treatment of the "madwoman" Bertha Mason, the white Jamaican Creole character, Spivak charges Jane Eyre for, precisely, its humanism, in which the "native subject" is not created as an animal but as "the object of what might be termed the terrorism of¶ 12¶ the categorical imperative." This kind of creation is imperialism's use/travesty of the Kantian metaphysical demand to "make the heathen into a human so that he can be treated as an end in himself." 19 In the twentieth century, as Europe's former colonies became independent, Jane Eyre became the Maoist. Michel de Certeau describes the affinity between her two major reincarnations, one religious and the other political, this way:¶ The place that was formerly occupied by the Church or Churches vis­à­vis the established powers remains recognizable, over the past two centuries, in the functioning of the opposition known as leftist….¶ [T]here is vis­à­vis the established order, a relationship between the Churches that defended an other world and the parties of the left which, since the nineteenth century, have promoted a different future. In both cases, similar functional characteristics can be discerned….20¶ The Maoist retains many of Jane's awesome features, chief of which are a protestant passion to turn powerlessness into "truth" and an idealist intolerance of those who may think differently from her. Whereas the great Orientalist blames the living "third world" natives for the loss of the ancient non­Western civilization, his loved object, the Maoist applauds the same natives for personifying and fulfilling her ideals. For the Maoist in the 1970s, the mainland Chinese were, in spite of their "backwardness," a puritanical alternative to the West in human form—a dream come true.¶ In the 1980s and 1990s, however, the Maoist is disillusioned to watch the China they sanctified crumble before their eyes. This is the period in which we hear disapproving criticisms of contemporary Chinese people for liking Western pop music and consumer culture, or for being overly interested in sex. In a way that makes her indistinguishable from what at first seems a political enemy, the Orientalist, the Maoist now mourns the loss of her loved object—Socialist China—by pointing angrily at living "third world" natives. For many who have built their careers on the vision of Socialist China, the grief is tremendous. In the "cultural studies" of the American academy in the 1990s, the Maoist is reproducing with prowess. We see this in the way¶ 13¶ terms such as "oppression," "victimization," and "subalternity" are now being used. Contrary to Orientalist disdain for contemporary native cultures of the non­West, the Maoist turns precisely the "disdained'' other into the object of his/her study and, in some cases, identification. In a mixture of admiration and moralism, the Maoist sometimes turns all people from non­Western cultures into a generalized "subaltern" that is then used to flog an equally generalized "West." 21¶ Because the representation of "the other" as such ignores (1) the class and intellectual hierarchies within these other cultures, which are usually as elaborate as those in the West, and (2) the discursive power relations structuring the Maoist's mode of inquiry and valorization, it produces a way of talking in which notions of lack, subalternity, victimization, and so forth are drawn upon indiscriminately, often with the intention of spotlighting the speaker's own sense of alterity and political righteousness. A comfortably wealthy white American intellectual I know claimed that he was a "third world intellectual," citing as one of his credentials his marriage to a Western European woman of part­Jewish heritage; a professor of English complained about being "victimized" by the structured time at an Ivy League institution, meaning that she needed to be on time for classes; a graduate student of upper­class background from one of the world's poorest countries told his American friends that he was of poor peasant stock in order to authenticate his identity as a radical "third world" representative; male and female academics across the U.S. frequently say they were "raped" when they report experiences of professional frustration and conflict. Whether sincere or delusional, such cases of self­dramatization all take the route of self­subalternization, which has increasingly become the assured means to authority and power. What these intellectuals are doing is robbing the terms of oppression of their critical and oppositional import, and thus depriving the oppressed of even the vocabulary of protest and rightful demand. The oppressed, whose voices we seldom hear, are robbed twice—the first time of their economic chances, the second time of their language, which is now no longer distinguishable from those of us who have had our consciousnesses "raised."¶ In their analysis of the relation between violence and representation, Armstrong and Tennenhouse write: "[The] idea of violence ¶ 14¶ as representation is not an easy one for most academics to accept. It implies that whenever we speak for someone else we are inscribing her with our own (implicitly masculine) idea of order." 22 At present, this process of "inscribing" often means not only that we "represent" certain historic others because they are/were ''oppressed"; it often means that there is interest in representation only when what is represented can in some way be seen as lacking. Even though the Maoist is usually contemptuous of Freudian psychoanalysis because it is "bourgeois," her investment in oppression and victimization fully partakes of the Freudian and Lacanian notions of "lack." By attributing "lack," the Maoist justifies the "speaking for someone else" that Armstrong and Tennenhouse call "violence as representation."¶ As in the case of Orientalism, which does not necessarily belong only to those who are white, the Maoist does not have to be racially "white" either. The phrase "white guilt" refers to a type of discourse which continues to position power and lack against each other, while the narrator of that discourse, like Jane Eyre, speaks with power but identifies with powerlessness. This is how even those who come from privilege more often than not speak from/of/as its "lack." What the Maoist demonstrates is a circuit of productivity that draws its capital from others' deprivation while refusing to acknowledge its own presence as endowed. With the material origins of her own discourse always concealed, the Maoist thus speaks as if her charges were a form of immaculate conception.¶ The difficulty facing us, it seems to me, is no longer simply the "first world" Orientalist who mourns the rusting away of his treasures, but also students from privileged backgrounds Western and non­Western, who conform behaviorally in every respect with the elitism of their social origins (e.g., through powerful matrimonial alliances, through pursuit of fame, or through a contemptuous arrogance toward fellow students) but who nonetheless proclaim dedication to "vindicating the subalterns." My point is not that they should be blamed for the accident of their birth, nor that they cannot marry rich, pursue fame, or even be arrogant. Rather, it is that they choose to see in others' powerlessness an idealized image of themselves and refuse to hear in the dissonance between the content and manner of their speech their own complicity with violence. Even though these descendents of the Maoist may be quick to point¶ 15¶ out the exploitativeness of Benjamin Disraeli's "The East is a career," 23 they remain blind to their own exploitativeness as they make "the East" their career. How do we intervene in the productivity of this overdetermined circuit?

### Case

#### Specific demands key

Adolph Reed 9, Professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania and a member of the interim national council of the Labor Party, “The limits of anti-racism”, http://www.leftbusinessobserver.com/Antiracism.html

Antiracism is a favorite concept on the American left these days. Of course, all good sorts want to be against racism, but what does the word mean exactly?¶ The contemporary discourse of “antiracism” is focused much more on taxonomy than politics. It emphasizes the name by which we should call some strains of inequality—whether they should be broadly recognized as evidence of “racism”— over specifying the mechanisms that produce them or even the steps that can be taken to combat them. And, no, neither “overcoming racism” nor “rejecting whiteness” qualifies as such a step any more than does waiting for the “revolution” or urging God’s heavenly intervention. If organizing a rally against racism seems at present to be a more substantive political act than attending a prayer vigil for world peace, that’s only because contemporary antiracist activists understand themselves to be employing the same tactics and pursuing the same ends as their predecessors in the period of high insurgency in the struggle against racial segregation.¶ This view, however, is mistaken. The postwar activism that reached its crescendo in the South as the “civil rights movement” wasn’t a movement against a generic “racism;” it was specifically and explicitly directed toward full citizenship rights for black Americans and against the system of racial segregation that defined a specific regime of explicitly racial subordination in the South. The 1940s March on Washington Movement was also directed against specific targets,like employment discrimination in defense production. Black Power era and post-Black Power era struggles similarly focused on combating specific inequalities and pursuing specific goals like the effective exercise of voting rights and specific programs of redistribution.¶ ¶ Clarity lost¶ Whether or not one considers those goals correct or appropriate, they were clear and strategic in a way that “antiracism” simply is not. Sure, those earlier struggles relied on a discourse of racial justice, but their targets were concrete and strategic. It is only in a period of political demobilization that the historical specificities of those struggles have become smoothed out of sight in a romantic idealism that homogenizes them into timeless abstractions like “the black liberation movement”—an entity that, like Brigadoon, sporadically appears and returns impelled by its own logic.¶ Ironically, as the basis for a politics, antiracism seems to reflect, several generations downstream, the victory of the postwar psychologists in depoliticizing the critique of racial injustice by shifting its focus from the social structures that generate and reproduce racial inequality to an ultimately individual, and ahistorical, domain of “prejudice” or “intolerance.” (No doubt this shift was partly aided by political imperatives associated with the Cold War and domestic anticommunism.) Beryl Satter’s recent book on the racialized political economy of “contract buying” in Chicago in the 1950s and 1960s, Family Properties: Race, Real Estate, and the Exploitation of Black Urban America, is a good illustration of how these processes worked; Robert Self’s book on Oakland since the 1930s, American Babylon, is another. Both make abundantly clear the role of the real estate industry in creating and recreating housing segregation and ghettoization.¶ Tasty bunny¶ All too often, “racism” is the subject of sentences that imply intentional activity or is characterized as an autonomous “force.” In this kind of formulation, “racism,” a conceptual abstraction, is imagined as a material entity. Abstractions can be useful, but they shouldn’t be given independent life.¶ I can appreciate such formulations as transient political rhetoric; hyperbolic claims made in order to draw attention and galvanize opinion against some particular injustice. But as the basis for social interpretation, and particularly interpretation directed toward strategic political action, they are useless. Their principal function is to feel good and tastily righteous in the mouths of those who propound them. People do things that reproduce patterns of racialized inequality, sometimes with self-consciously bigoted motives, sometimes not. Properly speaking, however, “racism” itself doesn’t do anything more than the Easter Bunny does.¶ Yes, racism exists, as a conceptual condensation of practices and ideas that reproduce, or seek to reproduce, hierarchy along lines defined by race. Apostles of antiracism frequently can’t hear this sort of statement, because in their exceedingly simplistic version of the nexus of race and injustice there can be only the Manichean dichotomy of those who admit racism’s existence and those who deny it. There can be only Todd Gitlin (the sociologist and former SDS leader who has become, both fairly and as caricature, the symbol of a “class-first” line) and their own heroic, truth-telling selves, and whoever is not the latter must be the former. Thus the logic of straining to assign guilt by association substitutes for argument.¶ My position is—and I can’t count the number of times I’ve said this bluntly, yet to no avail, in response to those in blissful thrall of the comforting Manicheanism—that of course racism persists, in all the disparate, often unrelated kinds of social relations and “attitudes” that are characteristically lumped together under that rubric, but from the standpoint of trying to figure out how to combat even what most of us would agree is racial inequality and injustice, that acknowledgement and $2.25 will get me a ride on the subway. It doesn’t lend itself to any particular action except more taxonomic argument about what counts as racism.¶ Do what now?¶ And here’s a practical catch-22. In the logic of antiracism, exposure of the racial element of an instance of wrongdoing will lead to recognition of injustice, which in turn will lead to remedial action—though not much attention seems ever given to how this part is supposed to work. I suspect this is because the exposure part, which feels so righteously yet undemandingly good, is the real focus. But this exposure convinces only those who are already disposed to recognize.

#### Reforms are possible and desirable---tangible change outweighs the risk of cooption and is still a better strategy than symbolic victories

Michael Omi 13, and Howard Winant, Resistance is futile?: a response to Feagin and Elias, Ethnic and Racial Studies Volume 36, Issue 6, p. 961-973, 2013 Special Issue: Symposium - Rethinking Racial Formation Theory

In Feagin and Elias's account, white racist rule in the USA appears unalterable and permanent. There is little sense that the ‘white racial frame’ evoked by systemic racism theory changes in significant ways over historical time. They dismiss important rearrangements and reforms as merely ‘a distraction from more ingrained structural oppressions and deep lying inequalities that continue to define US society’ (Feagin and Elias 2012, p. 21). Feagin and Elias use a concept they call ‘surface flexibility’ to argue that white elites frame racial realities in ways that suggest change, but are merely engineered to reinforce the underlying structure of racial oppression. Feagin and Elias say the phrase ‘racial democracy’ is an oxymoron – a word defined in the dictionary as a figure of speech that combines contradictory terms. If they mean the USA is a contradictory and incomplete democracy in respect to race and racism issues, we agree. If they mean that people of colour have no democratic rights or political power in the USA, we disagree. The USA is a racially despotic country in many ways, but in our view it is also in many respects a racial democracy, capable of being influenced towards more or less inclusive and redistributive economic policies, social policies, or for that matter, imperial policies. What is distinctive about our own epoch in the USA (post-Second World War to the present) with respect to race and racism? Over the past decades there has been a steady drumbeat of efforts to contain and neutralize civil rights, to restrict racial democracy, and to maintain or even increase racial inequality. Racial disparities in different institutional sites – employment, health, education – persist and in many cases have increased. Indeed, the post-2008 period has seen a dramatic increase in racial inequality. The subprime home mortgage crisis, for example, was a major racial event. Black and brown people were disproportionately affected by predatory lending practices; many lost their homes as a result; race-based wealth disparities widened tremendously. It would be easy to conclude, as Feagin and Elias do, that white racial dominance has been continuous and unchanging throughout US history. But such a perspective misses the dramatic twists and turns in racial politics that have occurred since the Second World War and the civil rights era. Feagin and Elias claim that we overly inflate the significance of the changes wrought by the civil rights movement, and that we ‘overlook the serious reversals of racial justice and persistence of huge racial inequalities’ (Feagin and Elias 2012, p. 21) that followed in its wake. We do not. In Racial Formation we wrote about ‘racial reaction’ in a chapter of that name, and elsewhere in the book as well. Feagin and Elias devote little attention to our arguments there; perhaps because they are in substantial agreement with us. While we argue that the right wing was able to ‘rearticulate’ race and racism issues to roll back some of the gains of the civil rights movement, we also believe that there are limits to what the right could achieve in the post-civil rights political landscape. So we agree that the present prospects for racial justice are demoralizing at best. But we do not think that is the whole story. US racial conditions have changed over the post-Second World War period, in ways that Feagin and Elias tend to downplay or neglect. Some of the major reforms of the 1960s have proved irreversible; they have set powerful democratic forces in motion. These racial (trans)formations were the results of unprecedented political mobilizations, led by the black movement, but not confined to blacks alone. Consider the desegregation of the armed forces, as well as key civil rights movement victories of the 1960s: the Voting Rights Act, the Immigration and Naturalization Act (Hart- Celler), as well as important court decisions like Loving v. Virginia that declared anti-miscegenation laws unconstitutional. While we have the greatest respect for the late Derrick Bell, we do not believe that his ‘interest convergence hypothesis’ effectively explains all these developments. How does Lyndon Johnson's famous (and possibly apocryphal) lament upon signing the Civil Rights Act on 2 July 1964 – ‘We have lost the South for a generation’ – count as ‘convergence’? The US racial regime has been transformed in significant ways. As Antonio Gramsci argues, hegemony proceeds through the incorporation of opposition (Gramsci 1971, p. 182). The civil rights reforms can be seen as a classic example of this process; here the US racial regime – under movement pressure – was exercising its hegemony. But Gramsci insists that such reforms – which he calls ‘passive revolutions’ – cannot be merely symbolic if they are to be effective: oppositions must win real gains in the process. Once again, we are in the realm of politics, not absolute rule. So yes, we think there were important if partial victories that shifted the racial state and transformed the significance of race in everyday life. And yes, we think that further victories can take place both on the broad terrain of the state and on the more immediate level of social interaction: in daily interaction, in the human psyche and across civil society. Indeed we have argued that in many ways the most important accomplishment of the anti-racist movement of the 1960s in the USA was the politicization of the social. In the USA and indeed around the globe, race-based movements demanded not only the inclusion of racially defined ‘others’ and the democratization of structurally racist societies, but also the recognition and validation by both the state and civil society of racially-defined experience and identity. These demands broadened and deepened democracy itself. They facilitated not only the democratic gains made in the USA by the black movement and its allies, but also the political advances towards equality, social justice and inclusion accomplished by other ‘new social movements’: second-wave feminism, gay liberation, and the environmentalist and anti-war movements among others. By no means do we think that the post-war movement upsurge was an unmitigated success. Far from it: all the new social movements were subject to the same ‘rearticulation’ (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, p. xii) that produced the racial ideology of ‘colourblindness’ and its variants; indeed all these movements confronted their mirror images in the mobilizations that arose from the political right to counter them. Yet even their incorporation and containment, even their confrontations with the various ‘backlash’ phenomena of the past few decades, even the need to develop the highly contradictory ideology of ‘colourblindness’, reveal the transformative character of the ‘politicization of the social’. While it is not possible here to explore so extensive a subject, it is worth noting that it was the long-delayed eruption of racial subjectivity and self-awareness into the mainstream political arena that set off this transformation, shaping both the democratic and anti-democratic social movements that are evident in US politics today.

### Poetry

#### Identity politics should supplement an advocacy of the resolution---otherwise it collapses into self-satisfied symbolism that infinitely defers social change

David Chandler 7, Professor of History, The possibilities of post-territorial political community, Area, Volume 39, Issue 1, pages 116–119

This paper argues that the lack of purchase of traditional territorial constructions of political community does not necessarily indicate the emergence of new post-territorial forms of political belonging. Rather, the claims made for new ‘immanent’ or ‘emerging’ forms of post-territorial political community reflect the highly individuated forms of political activity which have accompanied the break-down of domestic social and political links. This breakdown of territorial forms of belonging has facilitated the development of a variety of unmediated forms of expression of individual claims, tending to privilege the individual over any communal collectivity. This discussion paper concludes by suggesting what the possibilities of a reconstitution of political community might imply. The radical rejection of territorial political communities The immanence of a post-territorial political community is often posed as a radical or critical alternative to the dominant ways of being political today (for example, Appadurai 1996; Kuehls 1996; O'Tuathail 1996; Shapiro and Alker 1996). Territorial state-based politics is held to institutionalize the structuring of grand narratives of ‘the nation’ and to universalize particularist and narrow interests on the basis of the division of those ‘inside’ and those ‘outside’ the territorial boundaries (for example, Ashley 1988; Connolly 1991; Walker 1993; Falk 1995; Campbell 1998; Linklater 1998). Instead of politics being mediated through the divisive institutions of territorial communities, it is argued that the individual can engage directly in the ‘politics of the human’, in ‘global civil society’ or in the struggle against ‘power’ or ‘Empire’ (for example, Deudney 1993; Walker 1994; Baker 2002; Hardt and Negri 2001; Kaldor 2003; Keane 2003; Shaw 2000). Let us consider two different, and in diverse ways, key radical or alternative political sets of actors – radical anti-globalization activists and radical Muslim activism in the form of Al Qaeda. In setting out this brief analysis, three key traits of post-territorial politics will be highlighted: those of non-instrumentality, i.e. the means are self-justifying and no longer attached to instrumental ends: the privileging of activity/emotion over theory/intellect, i.e. there is little emphasis on argument/ideas; and the privileging of difference over communality, i.e. highlighting diverse identities rather than shared interests. It will be suggested that these three traits, essential to post-territorial political activism, privilege the individual over any social collectivity and operate to undermine the possibility of the emergence of post-territorial political community. Radical activism For radical activists – exemplified in the anti-Globalization/Capitalism/War social protests – it would appear that there has been a profound shift away from the politics of parties and collective movements to a much more atomized and individuated form of protest. This was highlighted in the February 2003 anti-Iraq war protest demonstrations which attracted more people than any previous political protests, but which markedly did not produce an anti-war ‘movement’. There was no attempt to win people engaged to a shared position; people expressed disparate and highly personal protests of disengagement, such as the key slogan of ‘Not in My Name’. Being ‘anti-war’ is today an expression of personal ethics rather than of political engagement and does not indicate that the individual concerned is engaged in a campaign of social change or is interested in either understanding or debating the causes of war (capitalism, human nature, etc.). These forms of practical and intellectual engagement with a political community are only relevant if the desire to end war is understood as a practical or instrumental one. Similarly, the anti-Globalization protests and collective comings together in World and European Social Forums are not aimed at producing a collective movement but at sharing the feelings and respecting the identities of various groupings involved (Klein 2002;Kingsnorth 2004). The fact that large numbers of people are engaged in these forms of radical protest is in marked contrast to their political impact. The fact that they appeal to the disengaged is their attractive factor, the inability to challenge this disengagement leads to the lack of political consequences. One of the most individuated expressions of symbolic politics which puts personal ethics above those of a collective engagement is the desire of radical activists to make individual journeys of self-discovery to the conflict areas of the West Bank, Chiapas, Bosnia or Iraq, as humanitarian or aid workers or as ‘human shields’, where they are willing to expose themselves to death or injury as a personal protest against the perceived injustices of the world. Here the ethics lie in the action or personal sacrifice, rather than in any instrumental consequences. This is the politics of symbolism of personal statement, a politics of individual ethics which, through the ability to travel, becomes immediately global in form as well as in content. There is no desire to engage with people from their own country of origin, in fact, this activism is often accompanied by a dismissal of the formal political process, and by implication the views of those trapped in the state-based politics of the ‘self-satisfied West’ (O’Keefe 2002; Chandler 2003). AI Qaeda                                     The desire to take part in martyrdom operations in the cause of the global jihad is representative of the unmediated political action which immediately makes the personal act a global political one. The jihad is a break from the politics of Islamic fundamentalism, in the same way as radical global activism breaks from the traditional politics of the Left and is founded on its historical defeat. The jihad is not concerned with political parties, revolutions or the founding of ideological states (Roy 2004). Al Qaeda's politics are those of the imaginary global space of the ummah making the personal act global in its effects. It is the marginalization and limited means of Al Qaeda that makes its struggle an immediately global one, similar to the marginal and limited struggle of, for example, the Mumbai slum dwellers or the Zapatistas. This marginalization means that their actions lack any instrumentality – i.e. the consequences or responses to their actions are entirely out of their control (Devji 2005). Where intentionality and instrumentality were central to collective political projects aimed at political ends, martyrdom operations in the West are purely ethical acts – this is gesture politics or the politics of symbolism at its most pure. Al Qaeda has no coherent political programme, shared religious faith or formal organizational framework. The act of martyrdom is the only action for which Al Qaeda claims full responsibility, the autonomy of the self in self-destruction makes the most fully individual act also the most immediately global, in its indiscriminate claim on the viewing public of the global sphere. Martyrdom also reflects other new political trends of the politics of global ethics mentioned above. Those involved need no engagement with political or religious learning, nor any engagement with an external audience, nor relationship with any external reality. The act of martyrdom is in-itself evidence of the highest ethical commitment, the act serves as its own proof and justification, its own final end. To what extent can we speak of post-territorial political communities? This disjunction between the human/ethical/global causes of post-territorial political activism and the capacity to ‘make a difference’ is what makes these individuated claims immediately abstract and metaphysical – there is no specific demand or programme or attempt to build a collective project. This is the politics of symbolism. The rise of symbolic activism is highlighted in the increasingly popular framework of ‘raising awareness’– here there is no longer even a formal connection between ethical activity and intended outcomes (Pupavac 2006). Raising awareness about issues has replaced even the pretence of taking responsibility for engaging with the world – the act is ethical in-itself. Probably the most high profile example of awareness raising is the shift from Live Aid, which at least attempted to measure its consequences in fund-raising terms, to Live 8 whose goal was solely that of raising an ‘awareness of poverty’. The struggle for ‘awareness’ makes it clear that the focus of symbolic politics is the individual and their desire to elaborate upon their identity – to make us aware of their ‘awareness’, rather than to engage us in an instrumental project of changing or engaging with the outside world. It would appear that in freeing politics from the constraints of territorial political community there is a danger that political activity is freed from any constraints of social mediation (see further, Chandler 2004a). Without being forced to test and hone our arguments, or even to clearly articulate them, we can rest on the radical ‘incommunicability’ of our personal identities and claims – you are ‘either with us or against us’; engaging with those who disagree is no longer possible or even desirable. It is this lack of desire to engage which most distinguishes the unmediated activism of post-territorial political actors from the old politics of territorial communities, founded on struggles of collective interests (Chandler 2004b).The clearest example is old representational politics – this forced engagement in order to win the votes of people necessary for political parties to assume political power. Individuals with a belief in a collective programme knocked on strangers’ doors and were willing to engage with them, not on the basis of personal feelings but on what they understood were their potential shared interests. Few people would engage in this type of campaigning today; engaging with people who do not share our views, in an attempt to change their minds, is increasingly anathema and most people would rather share their individual vulnerabilities or express their identities in protest than attempt to argue with a peer. This paper is not intended to be a nostalgic paean to the old world of collective subjects and national interests or a call for a revival of territorial state-based politics or even to reject global aspirations: quite the reverse. Today, politics has been ‘freed’ from the constraints of territorial political community – governments without coherent policy programmes do not face the constraints of failure or the constraints of the electorate in any meaningful way; activists, without any collective opposition to relate to, are free to choose their causes and ethical identities; protest, from Al Qaeda, to anti-war demonstrations, to the riots in France, is inchoate and atomized. When attempts are made to formally organize opposition, the ephemeral and incoherent character of protest is immediately apparent. The decline of territorial political community does not appear to have led to new forms of political community (in territorial or post-territorial forms), but rather to the individuation of ‘being’ political. Therefore ‘being political’ today takes the form of individuated ethical activity in the same way as ‘being religious’ takes a highly personal form with the rejection of organized churches. Being religious and being political are both statements of individual differentiation rather than reflections of social practices and ways of life. One can not ‘be’ political (anymore than one can ‘be’ religious) except by elaborating a personal creed or identity – being political or religious today is more likely to distance one from one's community, or at least to reflect that perception of distance. The elaboration of our individual ‘being’, of our identity, signifies the breakdown of community and the organic ties of the traditional social/political sphere.

### ID Politics Bad---Coalitions/Reform

#### Identity politics results in continual policing of difference and makes social justice impossible

Bhambra 10—U Warwick—AND—Victoria Margree—School of Humanities, U Brighton (Identity Politics and the Need for a ‘Tomorrow’, http://www.academia.edu/471824/Identity\_Politics\_and\_the\_Need\_for\_a\_Tomorrow\_)

The idea of a politics underpinned by solidarities based on “sameness” has a long history in the critical tradition. Marx’s ini-tial conceptualisation of the standpoint of the proletariat (albeit, signiﬁcantly different from those of subsequent developments of standpoint epistemology) has been used by feminist theorists as well as those arguing for a post-colonial perspective in terms of the subaltern, and, more recently, for a dalit standpoint (Hart-sock 1984, Guha 1983, Rege 1998, 2000). However, while using identity as the basis of political action has been seen to be power-ful (and effective), it has also increasingly become seen as problematic. The exclusionary politics of movements such as black power, much radical and lesbian feminism, and latterly, move-ments for ethnic purity and/or religious integrity, for example, have yielded a deep concern with the programme of separation and isolationism that such movements are often seen to be based upon. For many critics, more troubling still has been the usually accompanying claim that only women can be feminists, or only black people can work against racism, or only dalits against caste oppression, and so on. ¶ A position which states that only those who have experienced an injustice can understand and thus act effectively upon it seems to rest upon an essentialist theory of identity which assumes that the possibility of knowledge about particular situations is res-tricted to one’s possession of the relevant (seemingly) irreducible traits (being female, black, dalit, and so forth). Arguably, one consequence of these separatist tendencies is that they perpetuate the individualist fallacy

that oppressive social relationships can be reformed by particular subjects without the broader agreement of others who, together, constitute the social relations within which the injustices are embedded. But even where the limitations of a purely exclusionary form of identity politics are recognised, many theorists continue, nevertheless, to argue for a form of “strategic essentialism” (Fuss 1989, Spivak 2003) sug-gesting that where structures of inequality overlap with catego-ries of identity, then a politics based on those identities is both liberatory and necessary (Bramen 2002). In our view, however, the claim for a “strategic essentialism” remains fraught with problems, for at least three reasons. First, it establishes an epistemological division between those who assert a particular identity in advancing political claims and the observer who is sympathetic to those claims but “recognises” the limitations of basing such claims on a putative identity. 1 There is something highly problematic in claiming to support a political movement from the basis of being able to “see” something that the individuals constituting the movement do not see, and in then not engaging with them with regard to this. This sets the observer up in a privileged position vis-à-vis other members of the movement and thus makes solidarity difﬁcult to achieve. 2 Second, the claim for “strategic essentialism” posits solidarity, that is, collective identiﬁcation around a particular standpoint, as a prerequisite for collective action to address perceived injus-tices. This is as against recognising that solidarities can also emerge through the actions taken to correct particular injustices and can include those who recognise the injustice as the reason for action while not directly being disadvantaged themselves. Third, the assertion of “strategic essentialism” generally occurs in the context of claiming justice through an appeal to the widercommunity but with no explanation as to why the wider commu-nity ought to honour this claim for justice, especially when it is often not deemed possible for them to constitute a part of the movement itself. There is a requirement of inclusivity then – in terms of demanding acceptance of the validity of the claims made – at the same time, as an assertion of its impossibility across what are posited as irreducible, essential traits (for a fullerdiscussion see Holmwood 1995). The arguments of this paper start out from a broad agreement that developing a politics from the basis of occupying a particular social position or having a speciﬁc (singular) identity is problem-atic for the reasons identiﬁed above, as well as for covertly legitimating – “absolving and forgiving”, in Said’s (1993: 35) words –the ignorance of those whose understanding and actions are necessary for countering social injustices. It has to be recognized that issues exist between people and are not in people: that is, problems of social injustice occur in the relationships through which subjectivities are produced and thus, all those implicated in those relationships are involved in their address. For example, sexism is not a problem for women to deal with alone, but is a problem situated in the contemporary relationships of social and material inequalities and requires mutual engagement for its address. This is an address which we consider is best served by the solidarities generated as a consequence of the activities around perceived injustices (that is, solidarities generated through the political movements of people working towards equality, justice) as opposed to those activities having to rely on assumed pre-existing solidarities (that is, being female, gay, black, dalit, etc).This is not an argument for movements against speciﬁc injusticesor inequalities to be subsumed within a wider (say, socialist)movement but, rather, an argument for movements to be conceived inclusively as movements where membership is not restricted to those presumed to suffer the injustice or inequality. As such, a question arises as to what would happen if the“identity” in “identity politics” were rethought along the lines of the solidarities that are generated around the address of injus-tices rather than the solidarity that is presumed to ensue frombeing the victim of an injustice. Defending “identity” against a variety of critiques from the academic left, Bramen (2002) assertsthat identity can also be productive in its construction of moraland other communities. Our question, however, would be why such communities – sites of resistance and the discovery of politi-cal agency – need to be constructed around essentialising rheto-ric and restricted (this is the implication) to those who suffer the injustice. Indeed, Bramen herself recognises that “identity poli-tics certainly has its limitations, primarily in terms of prescribing modes of behaviour that pressure individuals to conform to cer-tain standards of authenticity” (2002: 7-8). And this surely is areal problem; that essentialist rhetoric establishes belonging to acommunity, and thus identity, on the basis of presumed shared attributes or experiences that are imagined to be irreducible. As such, not only may the community itself become oppressive to those who do not share those attributes, or who wish to articulate experiences that differ from those expressed by the majority, but the community itself may be weakened in its resistance to other forms of oppression by the distraction of its internal policing against difference.

# Block

## K

### ASDF

#### Decolonizing the academy is an attempt to proclaim innocence and assuage our guilt---proposing specific reforms is necessary to overcome the temptations of this palliative---also proves T version of aff

Tuck 12—Assistant Professor of Educational Foundations at the State University of New York at New Paltz. (Eve, Decolonization is not a metaphor, Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2012, pp. 1-40)

Fanon told us in 1963 that decolonizing the mind is the first step, not the only step toward overthrowing colonial regimes. Yet we wonder whether another settler move to innocence is to focus on decolonizing the mind, or the cultivation of critical consciousness, as if it were the sole activity of decolonization; to allow conscientization to stand in for the more uncomfortable task of relinquishing stolen land. We agree that curricula, literature, and pedagogy can be crafted to aid people in learning to see settler colonialism, to articulate critiques of settler epistemology, and set aside settler histories and values in search of ethics that reject domination and exploitation; this is not unimportant work. However, the front-loading of critical consciousness building can waylay decolonization, even though the experience of teaching and learning to be critical of settler colonialism can be so powerful it can feel like it is indeed making change. Until stolen land is relinquished, critical consciousness does not translate into action that disrupts settler colonialism. So, we respectfully disagree with George Clinton and Funkadelic (1970) and En Vogue (1992) when they assert that if you “free your mind, the rest (your ass) will follow.”¶ Paulo Freire, eminent education philosopher, popular educator, and liberation theologian, wrote his celebrated book, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, in no small part as a response to Fanon’s Wretched of the Earth. Its influence upon critical pedagogy and on the practices of educators committed to social justice cannot be overstated. Therefore, it is important to point out significant differences between Freire and Fanon, especially with regard to de/colonization. Freire situates the work of liberation in the minds of the oppressed, an abstract category of dehumanized worker vis-a-vis a similarly abstract category of oppressor. This is a sharp right turn away from Fanon’s work, which always positioned the work of liberation in the particularities of colonization, in the specific structural and interpersonal categories of Native and settler. Under Freire’s paradigm, it is unclear who the oppressed are, even more ambiguous who the oppressors are, and it is inferred throughout that an innocent third category of enlightened human exists: “those who suffer with [the oppressed] and fight at their side” (Freire, 2000, p. 42). These words, taken from the opening dedication of Pedagogy of the Oppressed, invoke the same settler fantasy of mutuality based on sympathy and suffering. Fanon positions decolonization as chaotic, an unclean break from a colonial condition that is already over determined by the violence of the colonizer and unresolved in its possible futures. By contrast, Freire positions liberation as redemption, a freeing of both oppressor and oppressed through their humanity. Humans become ‘subjects’ who then proceed to work on the ‘objects’ of the world (animals, earth, water), and indeed read the word (critical consciousness) in order to write the world (exploit nature). For Freire, there are no Natives, no Settlers, and indeed no history, and the future is simply a rupture from the timeless present. Settler colonialism is absent from his discussion, implying either that it is an unimportant analytic or that it is an already completed project of the past (a past oppression perhaps). Freire’s theories of liberation resoundingly echo the allegory of Plato’s Cave, a continental philosophy of mental emancipation, whereby the thinking man individualistically emerges from the dark cave of ignorance into the light of critical consciousness. ¶ By contrast, black feminist thought roots freedom in the darkness of the cave, in that well of feeling and wisdom from which all knowledge is recreated. These places of possibility within ourselves are dark because they are ancient and hidden; they have survived and grown strong through darkness. Within these deep places, each one of us holds an incredible reserve of creativity and power, of unexamined and unrecorded emotion and feeling. The woman's place of power within each of us is neither white nor surface; it is dark, it is ancient, and it is deep. (Lorde, 1984, pp. 36-37)¶ Audre Lorde’s words provide a sharp contrast to Plato’s sight-centric image of liberation: “The white fathers told us, I think therefore I am; and the black mothers in each of us - the poet - whispers in our dreams, I feel therefore I can be free” (p. 38). For Lorde, writing is not action upon the world. Rather, poetry is giving a name to the nameless, “first made into language, then into idea, then into more tangible action” (p. 37). Importantly, freedom is a possibility that is not just mentally generated; it is particular and felt.¶ Freire’s philosophies have encouraged educators to use “colonization” as a metaphor for oppression. In such a paradigm, “internal colonization” reduces to “mental colonization”, logically leading to the solution of decolonizing one’s mind and the rest will follow. Such philosophy conveniently sidesteps the most unsettling of questions: The essential thing is to see clearly, to think clearly - that is, dangerously and to answer clearly the innocent first question: what, fundamentally, is colonization? (Cesaire, 2000, p. 32)¶ Because colonialism is comprised of global and historical relations, Cesaire’s question must be considered globally and historically. However, it cannot be reduced to a global answer, nor a historical answer. To do so is to use colonization metaphorically. “What is colonization?” must be answered specifically, with attention to the colonial apparatus that is assembled to order the relationships between particular peoples, lands, the ‘natural world’, and ‘civilization’. Colonialism is marked by its specializations. In North America and other settings, settler sovereignty imposes sexuality, legality, raciality, language, religion and property in specific ways. Decolonization likewise must be thought through in these particularities.¶ To agree on what [decolonization] is not: neither evangelization, nor a philanthropic enterprise, nor a desire to push back the frontiers of ignorance, disease, and tyranny... (Cesaire, 2000, p. 32)¶ We deliberately extend Cesaire’s words above to assert what decolonization is not. It is not converting Indigenous politics to a Western doctrine of liberation; it is not a philanthropic process of ‘helping’ the at-risk and alleviating suffering; it is not a generic term for struggle against oppressive conditions and outcomes. The broad umbrella of social justice may have room underneath for all of these efforts. By contrast, decolonization specifically requires the repatriation of Indigenous land and life. Decolonization is not a metonym for social justice.¶ We don’t intend to discourage those who have dedicated careers and lives to teaching themselves and others to be critically conscious of racism, sexism, homophobia, classism, xenophobia, and settler colonialism. We are asking them/you to consider how the pursuit of critical consciousness, the pursuit of social justice through a critical enlightenment, can also be settler moves to innocence - diversions, distractions, which relieve the settler of feelings of guilt or responsibility, and conceal the need to give up land or power or privilege.¶ Anna Jacobs’ 2009 Master’s thesis explores the possibilities for what she calls white harm reduction models. Harm reduction models attempt to reduce the harm or risk of specific practices. Jacobs identifies white supremacy as a public health issue that is at the root of most other public health issues. The goal of white harm reduction models, Jacobs says, is to reduce the harm that white supremacy has had on white people, and the deep harm it has caused non-white people over generations. Learning from Jacobs’ analysis, we understand the curricular pedagogical project of critical consciousness as settler harm reduction, crucial in the resuscitation of practices and intellectual life outside of settler ontologies. (Settler) harm reduction is intended only as a stopgap. As the environmental crisis escalates and peoples around the globe are exposed to greater concentrations of violence and poverty, the need for settler harm reduction is acute, profoundly so. At the same time we remember that, by definition, settler harm reduction, like conscientization, is not the same as decolonization and does not inherently offer any pathways that lead to decolonization.

## T

### Anderson

#### The 1ac is a vacuous endorsement of pluralism that accomplishes nothing---proposing comprehensive reforms is crucial

Bradford 3—Chiricahua Apache and Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law (William, excerpted from: William Bradford, With a Very Great Blame on Our Hearts, academic.udayton.edu/race/02rights/native14.htm)

[\*17] Nevertheless, even if the non-Indian majority would reject the American Myth in the interest of mending national fences, the path to Indian redress winds through terrain unmapped heretofore. Compensation and apologies, gestures potentially part of an amicable settlement, are not germane to the resolution of Indian claims for injustices that cannot be remedied save by reinvestiture of lands and sovereignty in self-determining Indian tribes. n70 This requires not merely an abstract acknowledgment of the value of pluralism but a comprehensive program of legal reform that dispenses with doctrines and precedents perpetuating the denial of the human rights of Indian tribes and people. n71 As law, more than any other social variable, has reproduced the subordination of Indians in the United States, n72 legal reform occupies a central position in the claim for Indian redress. n73¶ [\*18] In short, proponents of Indian redress must not only displace a flawed version of history: they must articulate a proposal for remediation that transports the American people far beyond the strictures of existing law to enable the peaceful restoration of Indian lands and powers of self-government. n74 Such a transformative mission cannot be accomplished by positing Indians and the non-Indian majority as adversaries, as would reparations; rather, redress of Indian claims and the healing of the American nation -- crucial foci of the drive toward perfection -- necessitate dialogue, reconciliation, and joint authorship of a future history of peace, harmony, and justice. n75

#### Only we access offense---arguments like framework don’t injure people, but policies do---avoiding democratic engagement means the aff can never actually transform the institutions that produce exclusion in the first place---rejecting institutional engagement turns debate into a palliative where they escaped lived realities instead of producing political habits necessary to actualize democratic politics

Amanda Anderson 6, Andrew W. Mellon Professor of Humanities and English at Brown University, Spring 2006, “Reply to My Critic(s),” Criticism, Vol. 48, No. 2, p. 281-290

Probyns piece is a mixture of affective fallacy, argument by authority, and bald ad hominem. There's a pattern here: precisely the tendency to personalize argument and to foreground what Wendy Brown has called "states of injury." Probyn says, for example, that she "felt ostracized by the books content and style." Ostracized? Argument here is seen as directly harming persons, and this is precisely the state of affairs to which I object. Argument is not injurious to persons. Policies are injurious to persons and institutionalized practices can alienate and exclude. But argument itself is not directly harmful; once one says it is, one is very close to a logic of censorship. The most productive thing to do in an open academic culture (and in societies that aspire to freedom and democracy) when you encounter a book or an argument that you disagree with is to produce a response or a book that states your disagreement. But to assert that the book itself directly harms you is tantamount to saying that you do not believe in argument or in the free exchange of ideas, that your claim to injury somehow damns your opponent's ideas.

When Probyn isn't symptomatic, she's just downright sloppy. One could work to build up the substance of points that she throws out the car window as she screeches on to her next destination, but life is short, and those with considered objections to liberalism and proceduralism would not be particularly well served by the exercise. As far as I can tell, Probyn thinks my discussion of universalism is of limited relevance (though far more appealing when put, by others, in more comfortingly equivocating terms), but she's certain my critique of appeals to identity is simply not able to accommodate the importance of identity in social and political life. As I make clear throughout the book, and particularly in my discussion of the headscarf debate in France, identity is likely to be at the center of key arguments about life in plural democracies; my point is not that identity is not relevant, but simply that it should not be used to trump or stifle argument.

In closing, I'd like to speak briefly to the question of proceduralism's relevance to democratic vitality. One important way of extending the proceduralist arguments put forth by Habeimas is to work on how institutions and practices might better promote participation in democratic life. The apathy and nonparticipation plaguing democratic institutions in the United States is a serious problem, and can be separated from the more romantic theoretical investments in a refusal to accept the terms of what counts as argument, or in assertions of inassimilable difference. With respect to the latter, which is often glorified precisely as the moment when politics or democracy is truly occurring, I would say, on the contrary democracy is not happening then-rather, the limits or deficiencies of an actually existing democracy are making themselves felt. Acknowledging struggle, conflict, and exclusion is vital to democracy, but insisting that exclusion is not so much a persistent challenge for modern liberal democracies but rather inherent to the modern liberal-democratic political form as such seems to me precisely to remain stalled in a romantic critique of Enlightenment. It all comes down to a question of whether one wants to work with the ideals of democracy or see them as essentially normative in a negative sense: this has been the legacy of a certain critique of Enlightenment, and it is astonishingly persistent in the left quarters in the academy. One hears it clearly when Robbins makes confident reference to liberalisms tendency to ignore "the founding acts of violence on which a social order is based." One encounters it in the current vogue for the work of Giorgio Agamben and Carl Schmitt. Saying that a state of exception defines modernity or is internal to the law itself may help to sharpen your diagnoses of certain historical conditions, but if absolutized as it is in these accounts, it gives you nothing but a negative diagnostic and a compensatory flight to a realm entirely other-the kind of mystical, Utopian impulse that flees from these conditions rather than confronts and fights them on terms that derive from the settled-if constantly evolving-normative basis of democratic modernity. If one is outraged by the flagrant disregard of democratic procedures in the current U.S. political regime, then one needs to be able to coherently say why democratic procedures matter, what principles underwrite them, and what historical movements and institutions have helped us to secure and support them. Argument as a critical practice and as a key component of democratic institutions and public debate has a vital role to play in such a task.

### Institutional Focus KT Performance

#### Performative ethics are useless in abstraction from institutional determinants

Geoff Boucher 6, lecturer in literary studies at Deakin University, Australia, interdisciplinary PhD from the University of Melbourne, has written on psychoanalysis, contemporary European philosophy, and social theory, The Politics of Performativity: A Critique of Judith Butler, NUMBER 1 • 2006 • 112 – 141, www.parrhesiajournal.org/parrhesia01/parrhesia01\_boucher.pdf

In Excitable Speech (1997), she proposes a model of political transformation through counter-hegemonic cultural practices, one which continues to take gender parody as its paradigmatic instance. Butler’s recent exploration of the ethics of alterity, then, is supposed to complement the politics of performativity by indicating why it is good that individuals exploit the subversive potential identified by this theory. In her recent work, Giving an Account of Oneself (2005), she proposes an ethic of responsibility for the other as the antidote to modern universality and the supposed “ethical violence” of its conception of moral autonomy. Oppressed individuals not only factually do subvert power, they also should subvert power, she suggests, and in doing so their political strategy should be guided by a calculation of the probable consequence of actions aiming to maximise some good. In other words, the politics of performativity is supported in Butler’s most recent work by a form of act consequentialism – but, in keeping with the broad tenets of the ethics of alterity, the good to be maximised is not that of the subject but that of the other.

Against the widespread reception of this book in terms of celebration and congratulation, I propose a symptomatic reading of Butler’s theoretical trajectory in terms of its underlying problematic, which I take to be that of methodological individualism. Although Butler’s ethical turn has been read as a continuation of earlier inquiries, I shall demonstrate that it is best grasped as an effort to rectify serious problems in the theory of performativity – indeed, I shall argue that Butler’s ethics reverses a crucial element of her politics, without, however, arriving at a more satisfactory position. Central to this problem is the perennial focus of Butler’s investigations of identity-formation, on the individual in abstraction from structural determinants. Because she locates the central dynamic of contestation in the vicissitudes of hegemonic norms in the “psychic life of power” within an individual, her theory remains confined to the perspective of the isolated individual either resisting their subjectification or confronting their oppressor. Having located the basis for resistance in individual psychology, Butler conceptualises this resistance in phenomenological terms of personal narratives and subjective melancholy, in abstraction from structural determinants such as material interests or crisis tendencies of the social system. These problems are most clearly exhibited in her repeated redrafting of Althusser’s scene of interpellation, which Butler grasps through the phenomenological lens of the “struggle to the death for recognition”. Progressive rewriting of this scene in the successive versions of her theory gradually erased Althusser’s concern with the institutional formation of subjectivity, and replaced it, via an exclusively cultural focus, with a concern for the interpersonal and intrapsychic dynamics of identity conflict. The final result of this, I argue, is evacuates the materiality of institutions and the reduces the social field to the sum of dyadic interpersonal collisions. To demonstrate these claims, I propose to trace the theoretical trajectory of Butler’s work through close reading of her sometimes dense and difficult texts, as it unfolds in successive drafts of the theory of performativity.

### AT SSD = Whiteness

#### Engaging in switch-side debate around a provisional topic is a praxis of self-reflexive thought that is necessary to help break down racism

Asao Inoue 5, submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY, THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF RACISM AND COMMUNITY-BASED ASSESSMENT PRACTICE, https://research.wsulibs.wsu.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/2376/294/a\_inoue\_012205.pdf?sequence=1

Sophistic antilogic and a slightly altered version of dialectic, as heuristics, can be quite beneficial to the writing classroom. Originally, these methods were meant for education, and for the sophists, a way to invent arguments, not in an Aristotelian sense (i.e. to discover the available means of persuasion), but in an explorative sense. It’s this second sense I hold up as more profitable contemporary classrooms. As a set of heuristics, sophistic pedagogy, particularly antilogic and dialectic method, asks students to play with ideas and language in order to come closest to acceptable truth for a given context, purpose, audience, and their currently understood ethical limits. The practice of antilogic when married to a dialectical forum (as a community of rhetors who vie for understanding) can also provide for ways in which students can see past the god-trick in their own dispositions and the common sense. However, for it to work as a critical pedagogy, the epistemology of racism should be incorporated in order for students to see dispositions as a part of habitus and common sense in discourse as rhetorical and social structures that structure their very ways of seeing and believing. Additionally, it can move away from discussions of relativism that many students will resist, discussions that seem purely opinion-based that antilogic might seem to encourage. Instead dialectic and antilogic can help students position themselves at other locations in a network of ideas and subjectivies, and thus see how consent and SR are structured into our lives, daily activities, and discourse, even when good intentions suggest otherwise. To openly explore opposing positions pushes us to reconsider our own vantage points in the network, and thus they can work to help students better use the epistemology of racism as a framework to see structurally. Antilogic and dialectic also highlight a crucial aspect of the writing class: that it’s not only about grammar, linguistic precision, correctness, or rules to learn, it’s also about learning to be citizens, about the limits and horizons to our knowledge and ways of coming to that knowledge, about revising our initial perspectives and allowing for potential adjustments to them later on, and about finding a critical space in which to make good decisions that work for the present and future. In short, as I’ll discuss in chapter 4, the writing class is about assessing our positions and ideas, as well as those of others, in critical ways that look for structuring structures and address power relationships.

Man-Measure and the Teachability of Arête

A writing pedagogy that uses both antilogic and dialectic as heuristics would also have to incorporate what I’ve only hedged on to this point, Protagoras’ man-measure doctrine and the question of the teachability of virtue (arête). This is the second important issue that contemporary writing students need to be able to address since it historically and contemporaneously attached to notions of citizenship as well as educational access. And again, the sophists offer ample ways to think about virtue, citizenship, and education. In fact, questions in the writing classroom around language and literacy can deepen discussions around the social structuring of knowledge and the purpose and nature of literacy as a citizen-building endeavor that is critical. Important to these kinds of discussions is a full understanding of the man-measure doctrine since it informs social constructionist pedagogy and composition theory. Man-measure is not a doctrine of simple relativism, nor carte blanche to make any claim in which one can offer support, then call it true (for that lone perspective), effective, or persuasive. It is, at its base, a doctrine about community judgment as a collective, or more precisely, it reveals a society’s structured hermeneutical practices (our ways of judging) when we put language to our views, ideas, decisions, positions, and visions of the world.

#### process comes before product—inscribing a set ethical outcome at the outset destroys agency

Race and Pedagogy Project, University of California at Santa Barbara, 2005, Jay, Gregory and Gerald Graff. “A Critique of Critical Pedagogy”, http://bit.ly/11e8uXY

Jay and Graff argue that **critical pedagogy is problematic** because it claims to liberate students but in fact only reinforces the “banking” dynamic by forcing progressive ideologies upon students, enforcing a predetermined outcome based upon an assumed true position on the part of the teacher. Oppositional pedagogy makes the same mistake. Instead, the authors recommend a method of “teaching the conflicts,” where the unilateral teacher’s authority in the classroom is balanced by a “counterauthority,” thus opening the possibility for multiple points of view, all of which are laid open to critique. Suggestions for practical application follow. Freire’s close adherence to the Marxian-Hegelian master-slave dialectic, in which all desire on the part of the oppressed is inevitably formed by the oppressor, suffers from a double bind, giving power only to the “liberatory” teacher, who must impose liberation upon the oppressed, freeing them from false consciousness by persuading them of his (tacitly correct) point of view. In other words, **only students persuaded to the radical point of view of the teacher can be expressing an authentic desire**. “This assumption spares Freire from ever having to consider an unpleasant possibility: that what ‘the people’ authentically prefer might conflict with the pedagogy of the oppressed. The assumption is that, deep down, in our most authentic selves, we are all Christian or existentialist Marxists. According to Freire’s model, the resistance of students to the pedagogy of the oppressed would be taken seriously only as a symptom of their woefully mystified consciousness. The teacher would treat their ideas as the suspect products of their political unconscious, not as arguments that might have their own rationality, persuasiveness, and basis in experience. Needless to say, the possibility never arises that the radical teacher might have his or her mind seriously challenged by the conservative student.” (203) The authors are careful to state that they are both progressives themselves; their **opposition to critical pedagogy rises not from a desire to maintain conservative systems, but rather to avoid the** reinscription of oppression **that** they believe **critical** and oppositional **pedagogies promote by silencing and denying authentic agency to the student who has an alternative point of view**. “The failure to take seriously the objections of the unpersuaded seems to us a serious limitation of critical pedagogy both on ethical and strategic grounds.” (204) The authors further attack critical pedagogy by noting a contextual problem: “Freire’s assumption of a student body that will readily accept a description of themselves as the oppressed is understandable in the original context of Freire’s work with Latin American peasants. But Freire’s model encounters serious problems when it is transplanted to a North American campus, where not all students are obviously members of an oppressed class, and where even many of those who might plausibly fit that designation refuse to accept it.” (204) And later, “In our view, the definition of categories such as the disenfranchised and the dominant, oppressed and oppressor, should be a product of the pedagogical process, not its unquestioned premise.” (207) In contrast, “teaching the conflicts” allows for the autonomy and freedom of the subject through the building of discourse communities which go outside the tacit authority of the teacher, and even outside of the traditional boundaries of the classroom. “To be sure, there is a useful place for the ‘collaborative learning’ strategy of decentering authority by breaking the class into small groups. To decenter authority in a fully useful way, however, and transcend the double bind of radical pedagogy, our classrooms need not just to diffuse authority, but to introduce counterauthorities. And this for us means moving beyond the limitations of the isolated course, a model that unwittingly echoes the myth of the unified subject.” (210) **Students should be** presented with multiple viewpoints in any given classroom **and invited to support or contest all of them**. This does not remove politics from the classroom**, but** in fact **makes it truly possible.** “**Real political** opposition and **change** cannot be accomplished by isolated individuals or random acts of critique. Unlike critique, politics is a social enterprise. It requires that persons form communities based on some degree of trust and faith and. mutual respect – even for those with whom one is ideologically at odds.” (208)

### AT Embodied Knowledge

#### Their argument enforces a false divide between argumentative reasoning and embodied knowledge---seriously make them explain a link to why using narrative to inform a discussion about the government is entirely disembodied

Phyllis Rooney 3, Professor of Philosophy, Oakland University, Feminism and Argumentation: A Response to Govier, web2.uwindsor.ca/faculty/arts/philosophy/ILat25/edited\_rooney.doc‎

Feminist concerns with argument have involved two (not unconnected) issues. The first issue relates to possible gender differences in reasoning and arguing, and raises questions about whether traditional understandings of arguing and argument have favored “masculine” modes, styles, or methods of reasoning and arguing (Orr 1989, Gilbert 1994, Verbiest 1995, Fulkerson 1996). In these discussions the “masculine” mode is typically described as linear, abstract, separating emotion from reason, and antagonistic, whereas the “feminine” mode is narrative, context sensitive, relational, and supportive. However, there are problems with the way in which this issue is advanced as a feminist one, since these kinds of gender difference claims have been quite contentious in feminist theorizing. There is notable debate about whether “essential” differences exist in any significant degree, and, if they do, how they might be theoretically explained and understood. Many argue that purported differences rest on gender stereotyping in perceptions and social regulation—though, if so, they can carry cognitive weight. Others argue that differences may be explained by the kinds of cognitive tasks or situations that evoke different reasoning methods--with gender a factor in how such tasks are distributed. In addition, I would add in this context that it is often not clear what modes or qualities such as “linear,” “abstract,” “contextual,” “relational,” or “supportive” mean when it comes to spelling out their operation in the specifics of argumentation, particularly when they are presented as oppositional modes. Abstracting well or appropriately from a given situation often involves a careful assessment of the contextual particulars and nuances of the situation. Linear reasoning may be quite appropriate in deductive reasoning contexts, while narrative expansion is often very appropriate in eliciting and then reasoning about the relational complexities of moral situations. (For a discussion of these concerns, specifically in connection with debates about gender and moral reasoning, see Rooney 2001.)

### Tallise Debate As Activism Bad

#### Debate as activism gets co-opted by those on the right---the Tea Party rejects existing institutions because they think they are hegemonic, just like the aff

**Talisse 2005** – philosophy professor at Vanderbilt (Robert, Philosophy & Social Criticism, 31.4, “Deliberativist responses to activist challenges”) \*note: gendered language in this article refers to arguments made by two specific individuals in an article by Iris Young

My call for a more detailed articulation of the second activist challenge may be met with the radical claim that I have begged the question. It may be said that my analysis of the activist’s challenge and my request for a more rigorous argument presume what the activist denies, namely, that arguments and reasons operate independently of ideology. Here the activist might begin to think that he made a mistake in agreeing to engage in a discussion with a deliberativist – his position throughout the debate being that one should decline to engage in argument with one’s opponents! He may say that of course activism seems lacking to a deliberativist, for the deliberativist measures the strength of a view according to her own standards. But the activist rejects those standards, claiming that they are appropriate only for seminar rooms and faculty meetings, not for real-world politics. Consequently the activist may say that by agreeing to enter into a discussion with the deliberativist, he had unwittingly abandoned a crucial element of his position. He may conclude that the consistent activist avoids arguing altogether, and communicates only with his comrades. Here the discussion ends.

However, the deliberativist has a further consideration to raise as his discursive partner departs for the next rally or street demonstration. The foregoing debate had presumed that there is but one kind of activist and but one set of policy objectives that activists may endorse. Yet Young’s activist is opposed not only by deliberative democrats, but also by persons who also call themselves ‘activists’ and who are committed to a set of policy objectives quite different from those endorsed by this one activist. Once these opponents are introduced into the mix, the stance of Young’s activist becomes more evidently problematic, even by his own standards.

To explain: although Young’s discussion associates the activist always with politically progressive causes, such as the abolition of the World Trade Organization (109), the expansion of healthcare and welfare programs (113), and certain forms of environmentalism (117), not all activists are progressive in this sense. Activists on the extreme and racist Right claim also to be fighting for justice, fairness, and liberation. They contend that existing processes and institutions are ideologically hegemonic and distorting. Accordingly, they reject the deliberative ideal on the same grounds as Young’s activist. They advocate a program of political action that operates outside of prevailing structures, disrupting their operations and challenging their legitimacy. They claim that such action aims to enlighten, inform, provoke, and excite persons they see as complacent, naïve, excluded, and ignorant. Of course, these activists vehemently oppose the policies endorsed by Young’s activist; they argue that justice requires activism that promotes objectives such as national purity, the disenfranchisement of Jews, racial segregation, and white supremacy. More importantly, they see Young’s activist’s vocabulary of ‘inclusion’, ‘structural inequality’, ‘institutionalized power’, as fully in line with what they claim is a hegemonic ideology that currently dominates and systematically distorts our political discourses.21

The point here is not to imply that Young’s activist is no better than the racist activist. The point rather is that Young’s activist’s arguments are, in fact, adopted by activists of different stripes and put in the service of a wide range of policy objectives, each claiming to be just, liberatory, and properly inclusive.22 In light of this, there is a question the activist must confront. How should he deal with those who share his views about the proper means for bringing about a more just society, but promote a set of ends that he opposes?

It seems that Young’s activist has no way to deal with opposing activist programs except to fight them or, if fighting is strategically unsound or otherwise problematic, to accept a Hobbesian truce. This might not seem an unacceptable response in the case of racists; however, the question can be raised in the case of any less extreme but nonetheless opposed activist program, including different styles of politically progressive activism. Hence the deliberativist raises her earlier suspicions that, in practice, activism entails a politics based upon interestbased power struggles amongst adversarial factions.

## Case

#### Institutional focus key---personal expression as politics calcifies the SQ and cedes the political

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The drumming crisis was barely contained, but not fully averted, and became moot after the forceful eviction of the encampment from Zuccotti. That said, this tale illuminates a key difference between two movements and, perhaps, a deeper cultural style of contemporary social movements. On one level is the contrast in the leadership style and organization of the civil rights movement and Occupy, and the legitimacy of the concept of leadership to those in the movement. The civil right movement, while an immensely complicated phenomenon that was both professionally channeled (Jenkins & Eckert, 1986) and decentralized through networks of progressive churches, civil society organizations, and grassroots activists, developed a tactical repertoire that was distinct from the political valuation of the organizational form and decision-making structure of the movement. By contrast, in this brief article we argue that Occupy participants cast the values and form of the movement itself—how it operates and makes decisions—in terms that are synonymous with its very identity and survival. Occupy is the change that its members seek. There is both promise and peril in this approach. Occupy is finding it difficult to engage in institutional politics—which we argue is key to broad and durable societal transformations. We suggest that as Occupy goes home, and as it prepares to come back, it should renegotiate the tension between self-expression and strategic institutional action, and between movement itself as a goal and movement goals. In short, we argue that mistaking an anti-institutional style of participatory democracy and self-expression for both real democracy and radical capitalist critique undermines political power—and ultimately results in less progress toward participatory democracy as the movement becomes politically less relevant and less able to bring about societal change. Self-Expression as a Mode of Collectivity The drum circle clash was symptomatic of a larger crisis within the movement over who, if anyone, can impose or even suggest modalities of protest. This is not because collective identity or goals are unimportant to Occupy; rather, it is because collective movement identity itself is premised upon creating a space for individual expression. As a consequence, Occupy has found it difficult to develop the decision-making procedures or legitimate leadership structures that enable individuals to align themselves with the strategic choices of the movement without undermining a key tenet of the very collective identity that secures its existence as a movement. While this is an outcome of the rise of constructed personal identity as a key expression of the political self since the 1960s, it is also a broader phenomenon. One of the defining features of modernity is that identity is less a feature of organized social relations (Calhoun, 1994, p. 11) as a reflexive effort by the individual that involves strategic and performative choices. The assertion of the self as an identity is a political project (Castells, 1997). This emergence of identity as a source of political power has had a major impact on trajectories of social movements. Activism and political activity itself is increasingly also a way to construct a desirable self (Polletta & Jasper, 2001) rather than achieve an external goal. The desirable self is the political project as the arbiter of moral value (Lichterman, 1996). As a consequence, the personal is not only political, the legitimacy of movement organizational forms and tactics is entwined with their realization of personal expression. Certainly, movement participants have long adopted organizational forms based on moral values rather than political efficacy (Jasper, 1997, p. 228). However, the case of Occupy highlights the dilemma faced by a movement where the fullest expression of individual identity and a denial of engagement with the structured demands of institutional politics are its very form of politics. The situation has evolved from one in which there was (naturally) a tension between process and goals to one in which individual expression and the mechanics of internal processes have drowned out most other considerations. Therefore, we are witnessing the transition away from movements that had the capacity to handpick their representatives so as to generate maximum sympathy among the broader public, even at the cost of bowing to and reinforcing the very prejudices it was fighting―to ones which seemingly cannot deal with a mundane problem like loud and continuous drumming by its participants in a residential area. Interestingly, one of the key mechanisms through which the Occupy movement has negotiated this tension between individual self-expression and collective identity is through its signature tactic: The “human microphone.” This tactic, which started as a response to a lack of amplified sound in Zuccotti Park, begins with someone yelling “mic check” and the crowd repeating this in unison. After that, speakers address the crowd in short phrases which are again repeated by the whole gathering, phrase by phrase, so that everyone can hear. The “mic check” has evolved from a meeting tactic to Occupy’s signature form of protest, one that activists have used to challenge public figures. In interviews, Occupy organizers argue that this “unison repetition” alters political dynamics by making everyone, even those who disagree with a point, repeat it, almost as if it were their own point, and also by creating a powerful sense of the collective through shared speech (personal interviews, second author). Further, it cuts the power of individual charisma—and hence sets bounds upon the power of self-expression—as it is difficult to be a great orator and monopolize public attention when one has to stop every few words to be repeated by a large crowd. In other words, the psychodynamics of the human microphone reflect a “collective effervescence” (Durkheim, 1912) and cut against the very individualized and performative processes which dominate the movement. This phenomenon is interesting both theoretically and politically, as it reveals a movement creatively grappling with its constitution through self-expression while maintaining a collective space for action. This tension between self-expression and collectivity remains a significant challenge for Occupy as it limits the depth and breadth of the movement’s impact. In particular, we believe that the movement has failed to engage with institutional politics, limiting the durability of the cultural change it has already effected. Symbolic and Institutional Power The Occupy movement has, to-date, focused on claiming, producing, and wielding the symbolic power of the street. Modeled after the movements of the Arab Spring, Occupy self-consciously appropriated the innovative tactic of materially claiming public space. The contested idea of the street provided the performative context, and the pavement and mass media the platforms, for activists to occupy the public sphere. Through this collective, embodied presence of activists, Occupy has claimed symbolic street power and effected cultural change (Gamson, 1992). For example, while more research is needed, survey data suggests that Occupy has succeeded in changing the media and public discourse around its central mobilizing frame: inequality (Gamson, 2012). Although the public is split on its attitudes toward Occupy and its tactics and overall critique of American capitalism, public salience of inequality has increased (Pew, 2011). As importantly, in helping to create this issue salience Occupy has seemingly created the discursive space that enabled institutional, Democratic Party elites to rhetorically embrace its frame of inequality. Occupy has created a “radical flank effect” (Haines, 1984), staking out a radical position that provided ideological cover for Party elites to turn from the rhetoric of deficits and advance more modest proposals that entail a more active state. While it being an election year certainly helped, Obama’s efforts around the extension of the payroll tax and creation of the “millionaire tax,” as well as embrace of tough rhetoric that echoed the movement’s critique of inequality reveals the discursive space opened by the Occupy movement. While elites have embraced the movement’s themes, it appears that the institutional connections to the Democratic Party stop at this cultural influence. While it is young, the Occupy movement can be read through the lens of populism (Goodwin, 2012). Populism is not a coherent and stable ideology but a reaction to institutional power that has historically assumed both conservative and progressive guises (Kazin, 1998). Its coherence lies in its expression as a political style that rejects calcified institutional and bureaucratic politics and grounds its legitimacy in direct appeals to “the people” (Canovan, 1999, p. 4). Populist politics is expressive and direct. It is personal, unmediated by institutions, organizations, elites, and professionals. For Canovan (1999, p. 13), populism is the “redemptive” face of democracy, ritualistically cleansing pragmatic, institutional forms of governance that are “very far removed from spontaneous expression” (p. 13). For many participants in and supporters of Occupy, pragmatic politics is seemingly an anathema (Dean, 2012). Disillusionment with political institutions, from parties and electoral politics to civil society organizations, appears widespread across the populist left, which has long turned from institutional politics in the attempt to create alternative social (Turner, 2006) and political forms (Gitlin, 1993) that are projects of transformative politics. The Occupy movement, the most significant and sustained class-based mobilization in a generation, echoes these earlier projects of transformative world making. From the beginning Occupy was dually oriented toward experimenting with forms of unmediated self-expression and participatory democratic practice as paths to liberating collectivity. And yet, even as the redemptive is the necessary animating spirit of democracy, Canovan (1999) argues that it is through pragmatic politics that the functions of governance are carried out and institutional power wielded. Actual transformative politics has rarely been without an institutional component, even if it does not involve the institutionalization of movements. Civil rights and the women’s, queer, and disability rights movements have all fought successfully to implement institutional and political change ranging from federal laws to workplace polices. This is not to suggest that cultural change is unimportant. It is to suggest that social transformation can only exist through some engagement with institutional politics that makes change durable. It is the turn from pragmatic politics and institutional engagement that distinguished Occupy from the Tea Party, the most recent manifestation of a five decade old populist conservative movement. Similar to other manifestations of conservative mobilization (McGirr, 2001; Teles, 2008) the Tea Party adopted a dual orientation toward both symbolic and institutional power. The most recent example is the Tea Party’s populist mobilization around the 2010 midterm elections, which reshaped the internal workings of the Republican Party and redoubled its institutional ability to block much of the president’s agenda—including what now passes as progressive reform. In conjunction with party elites and conservative media outlets, in 2010 the Tea Party movement drove turnout in the Republican primaries and the midterm elections (Williamson, Skocpol, & Coggin, 2011). After the elections, the Tea Party and its legislative allies created a 62-member caucus in the House and enlisted four members of the Senate to create a voting block that repeatedly eschewed legislative compromise. Even more, Tea Party activists not only drove turnout in the midterm elections, the presence of activists in districts helped hold members to account for the movement’s policy goals (Bailey, Mummolo, & Noel, 2011). In the process, the Tea Party caucus wielded all of the institutional tools at its disposal for the purposes of thwarting the president’s, and often the Republican House leadership’s, agenda. In this, the Tea Party resembles other movements that have taken advantage of political opportunities to open the space for new configurations of institutional politics (Amenta, 2008; McAdam & Tarrow, 2010). The contemporary conservative movement is, in large part, a story of the successful navigation of the twin faces of redemptive and pragmatic politics. Activists who participated in the redemptive mobilization around Barry Goldwater’s candidacy worked to reshape the Republican Party in the years after his defeat (Perlstein, 2001). All of which enabled movement conservatives to seize the political opportunity that Reagan’s candidacy offered. If Goldwater began to unravel the American consensus ideologically, it was Reagan who drew on the movement to wield the levers of institutional power that had effects that ran much deeper than cultural stylings. Reagan dismantled unions, cut taxes on the wealthy, and gutted social service programs. It was Reagan’s electoral victory that forged a radical reimagining of the American state and its obligations to its citizens, and created the institutional forms to hold it in place, from regulatory changes to the reshaping of the judiciary. Conclusion The Occupy movement may now be melting into a sedimentary network (Chadwick, 2007) of activists that will hang together through new media technologies and reconstitute itself around symbolic events in the coming years ― as it did in protest events at the Democratic and Republican National Conventions. This symbolic power will likely prove fleeting given the deinstitutionalized nature of redemptive politics. Deinstitutionalization can certainly be a strength in some contexts, such as the overthrowing of a dictator or the rapid creation and publicizing of a national political movement. But, in the routine workings of pragmatic politics, these organizational qualities are a distinct disadvantage, as secular liberals discovered in their recent defeat in the Egyptian elections. After the initial flare of the movement’s mediated publicity, the political context in the United States has changed to one that requires political organization able to engage and challenge institutional politics to advance an agenda forward. If Occupy is deeply divided about its engagement with pragmatic, institutional politics and fails to build meaningful ties to unions and civil society and advocacy organizations during the president’s second term it will be a wasted opportunity. Occupy’s redemptive energy, for instance, would be well directed towards the organization of a progressive, “Occupy Congress” voting block inside Congress that can hold Democrats to account for its aims. In effect, this strategy would call for using the master’s pragmatic tools to occupy the master’s institutional house. This strategy does not exclude the potential for transforming these institutional tools through a focus on process—neither does it disallow the regenerative politics which broader room for self expression can facilitate. It does, however, call for rethinking the balance between process and durable goals, and between personal and institutional transformation—which in turn can transform the conditions through which individuals ultimately flourish. Nor is this a call for abandoning redemptive politics which can again be mobilized when the institutional levers of power become, as they will inevitably, calcified.

#### Policy focus is key to challenge structures of white supremacy

Themba-Nixon 2k, Executive Director of The Praxis Project, a nonprofit organization helping communities use media and policy advocacy

Makani, July 31, Colorlines, Changing the Rules: What Public Policy Means for Organizing, Vol 3.2)

“This is all about policy," a woman complained to me in a recent conversation. "I'm an organizer." The flourish and passion with which she made the distinction said everything. Policy is for wonks, sell-out politicians, and ivory-tower eggheads. Organizing is what real, grassroots people do. Common as it may be, this distinction doesn't bear out in the real world. Policy is more than law. It is any written agreement (formal or informal) that specifies how an institution, governing body, or community will address shared problems or attain shared goals. It spells out the terms and the consequences of these agreements and is the codification of the body's values-as represented by those present in the policymaking process. Given who's usually present, most policies reflect the political agenda of powerful elites. Yet, policy can be a force for change-especially when we bring our base and community organizing into the process. In essence, policies are the codification of power relationships and resource allocation. Policies are the rules of the world we live in. Changing the world means changing the rules. So, if organizing is about changing the rules and building power, how can organizing be separated from policies? Can we really speak truth to power, fight the right, stop corporate abuses, or win racial justice without contesting the rules and the rulers, the policies and the policymakers? The answer is no-and double no for people of color. Today, racism subtly dominates nearly every aspect of policymaking. From ballot propositions to city funding priorities, policy is increasingly about the control, de-funding, and disfranchisement of communities of color. Take the public conversation about welfare reform, for example. Most of us know it isn't really about putting people to work. The right's message was framed around racial stereotypes of lazy, cheating "welfare queens" whose poverty was "cultural." But the new welfare policy was about moving billions of dollars in individual cash payments and direct services from welfare recipients to other, more powerful, social actors. Many of us were too busy to tune into the welfare policy drama in Washington, only to find it washed up right on our doorsteps. Our members are suffering from workfare policies, new regulations, and cutoffs. Families who were barely getting by under the old rules are being pushed over the edge by the new policies. Policy doesn't get more relevant than this. And so we got involved in policy-as defense. Yet we have to do more than block their punches. We have to start the fight with initiatives of our own. Those who do are finding offense a bit more fun than defense alone. Living wage ordinances, youth development initiatives, even gun control and alcohol and tobacco policies are finding their way onto the public agenda, thanks to focused community organizing that leverages power for community-driven initiatives. - Over 600 local policies have been passed to regulate the tobacco industry. Local coalitions have taken the lead by writing ordinances that address local problems and organizing broad support for them. - Nearly 100 gun control and violence prevention policies have been enacted since 1991. - Milwaukee, Boston, and Oakland are among the cities that have passed living wage ordinances: local laws that guarantee higher than minimum wages for workers, usually set as the minimum needed to keep a family of four above poverty. These are just a few of the examples that demonstrate how organizing for local policy advocacy has made inroads in areas where positive national policy had been stalled by conservatives. Increasingly, the local policy arena is where the action is and where activists are finding success. Of course, corporate interests-which are usually the target of these policies-are gearing up in defense. Tactics include front groups, economic pressure, and the tried and true: cold, hard cash. Despite these barriers, grassroots organizing can be very effective at the smaller scale of local politics. At the local level, we have greater access to elected officials and officials have a greater reliance on their constituents for reelection. For example, getting 400 people to show up at city hall in just about any city in the U.S. is quite impressive. On the other hand, 400 people at the state house or the Congress would have a less significant impact. Add to that the fact that all 400 people at city hall are usually constituents, and the impact is even greater. Recent trends in government underscore the importance of local policy. Congress has enacted a series of measures devolving significant power to state and local government. Welfare, health care, and the regulation of food and drinking water safety are among the areas where states and localities now have greater rule. Devolution has some negative consequences to be sure. History has taught us that, for social services and civil rights in particular, the lack of clear federal standards and mechanisms for accountability lead to uneven enforcement and even discriminatory implementation of policies. Still, there are real opportunities for advancing progressive initiatives in this more localized environment. Greater local control can mean greater community power to shape and implement important social policies that were heretofore out of reach. To do so will require careful attention to the mechanics of local policymaking and a clear blueprint of what we stand for. Much of the work of framing what we stand for takes place in the shaping of demands. By getting into the policy arena in a proactive manner, we can take our demands to the next level. Our demands can become law, with real consequences if the agreement is broken. After all the organizing, press work, and effort, a group should leave a decisionmaker with more than a handshake and his or her word. Of course, this work requires a certain amount of interaction with "the suits," as well as struggles with the bureaucracy, the technical language, and the all-too-common resistance by decisionmakers. Still, if it's worth demanding, it's worth having in writing-whether as law, regulation, or internal policy. From ballot initiatives on rent control to laws requiring worker protections, organizers are leveraging their power into written policies that are making a real difference in their communities. Of course, policy work is just one tool in our box.

### AT: Reform Bad/Bhambra

#### Reform is not always bad---progress has occurred for Native Americans from the Trail of Tears and genocides as the USFG now has several programs to help preserve their culture and connection with Earth – these aren’t enough at ALL but it proves progress is possible

#### Finishing Bhambra

that oppressive social relationships can be reformed by particular subjects without the broader agreement of others who, together, constitute the social relations within which the injustices are embedded. But even where the limitations of a purely exclusionary form of identity politics are recognised, many theorists continue, nevertheless, to argue for a form of “strategic essentialism” (Fuss 1989, Spivak 2003) sug-gesting that where structures of inequality overlap with catego-ries of identity, then a politics based on those identities is both liberatory and necessary (Bramen 2002). In our view, however, the claim for a “strategic essentialism” remains fraught with problems, for at least three reasons. First, it establishes an epistemological division between those who assert a particular identity in advancing political claims and the observer who is sympathetic to those claims but “recognises” the limitations of basing such claims on a putative identity. 1 There is something highly problematic in claiming to support a political movement from the basis of being able to “see” something that the individuals constituting the movement do not see, and in then not engaging with them with regard to this. This sets the observer up in a privileged position vis-à-vis other members of the movement and thus makes solidarity difﬁcult to achieve. 2 Second, the claim for “strategic essentialism” posits solidarity, that is, collective identiﬁcation around a particular standpoint, as a prerequisite for collective action to address perceived injus-tices. This is as against recognising that solidarities can also emerge through the actions taken to correct particular injustices and can include those who recognise the injustice as the reason for action while not directly being disadvantaged themselves. Third, the assertion of “strategic essentialism” generally occurs in the context of claiming justice through an appeal to the widercommunity but with no explanation as to why the wider commu-nity ought to honour this claim for justice, especially when it is often not deemed possible for them to constitute a part of the movement itself. There is a requirement of inclusivity then – in terms of demanding acceptance of the validity of the claims made – at the same time, as an assertion of its impossibility across what are posited as irreducible, essential traits (for a fullerdiscussion see Holmwood 1995). The arguments of this paper start out from a broad agreement that developing a politics from the basis of occupying a particular social position or having a speciﬁc (singular) identity is problem-atic for the reasons identiﬁed above, as well as for covertly legitimating – “absolving and forgiving”, in Said’s (1993: 35) words –the ignorance of those whose understanding and actions are necessary for countering social injustices. It has to be recognized that issues exist between people and are not in people: that is, problems of social injustice occur in the relationships through which subjectivities are produced and thus, all those implicated in those relationships are involved in their address. For example, sexism is not a problem for women to deal with alone, but is a problem situated in the contemporary relationships of social and material inequalities and requires mutual engagement for its address. This is an address which we consider is best served by the solidarities generated as a consequence of the activities around perceived injustices (that is, solidarities generated through the political movements of people working towards equality, justice) as opposed to those activities having to rely on assumed pre-existing solidarities (that is, being female, gay, black, dalit, etc).This is not an argument for movements against speciﬁc injusticesor inequalities to be subsumed within a wider (say, socialist)movement but, rather, an argument for movements to be conceived inclusively as movements where membership is not restricted to those presumed to suffer the injustice or inequality. As such, a question arises as to what would happen if the“identity” in “identity politics” were rethought along the lines of the solidarities that are generated around the address of injus-tices rather than the solidarity that is presumed to ensue frombeing the victim of an injustice. Defending “identity” against a variety of critiques from the academic left, Bramen (2002) assertsthat identity can also be productive in its construction of moraland other communities. Our question, however, would be why such communities – sites of resistance and the discovery of politi-cal agency – need to be constructed around essentialising rheto-ric and restricted (this is the implication) to those who suffer the injustice. Indeed, Bramen herself recognises that “identity poli-tics certainly has its limitations, primarily in terms of prescribing modes of behaviour that pressure individuals to conform to cer-tain standards of authenticity” (2002: 7-8). And this surely is areal problem; that essentialist rhetoric establishes belonging to acommunity, and thus identity, on the basis of presumed shared attributes or experiences that are imagined to be irreducible. As such, not only may the community itself become oppressive to those who do not share those attributes, or who wish to articulate experiences that differ from those expressed by the majority, but the community itself may be weakened in its resistance to other forms of oppression by the distraction of its internal policing against difference.

**Reforms are the best approach---it avoids a mobilization of politics around maintaining identity rather than articulating a future of social justice for society**

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**Political mobilisation** around suffering **engenders solidarities** between those who are suffering and those who afford recognition of (and then action around) that suffering. Those who suffergenerally claim their common humanity with others in asking forpeople to look beyond the speciﬁc circumstances of their suffer-ing, and in doing so, the request is to address those speciﬁc circumstances on the basis of a humanity not bound to the circumstances. **The mistake of some forms of identity politics, then, is to associate identity with suffering**. While a recognition of historical (and contemporary) suffering is an important aspect of the political process of seeking redress for the conditions of suffering, it does not constitute identity singularly. ¶ “Wounded attachments”, we would argue, do not representthe general condition of politicised identities, but rather, are prob-lematic constructions of identities which fail to recognise (oraccept) the processes of change associated with movements. The accumulation of different sorts of challenges around similar issues generally leads to the gradual amelioration of the condi-tions which generated the identity (and the associated move-ment) in the ﬁrst instance. If the emphasis in the movement is on identity then successful reform (**even partial reform**) **reduces the injury and thus diminishes the power of the identity claim based upon that injury**. This is because reform is necessarily uneven in terms of the impact it has. This then poses a problem for those within the movement who would **wish the reforms to go further** and who see in the reforms a weakening of the identity that they believe is a necessary prerequisite for political action. **As they can no longer mobilise the injured identity – and the associated suffering – as common to all** (and thus requiring address becauseof its generalised effect), **there is often, then, a perceived need to privilege that suffering as particular and to institute a politics of guilt with regard to addressing it – truly the politics of ressentiment**. ¶ The problems arise by insisting on the necessity of political action being constituted through pre-existing identities and soli-darities (for example, those of being a woman). If, instead, it was recognised that equality for women is not separable from (or achievable separated from) wider issues of justice and equality within society then **reforms could be seen as steps towards equality.** A movement concerned with issues of social justice (of whichgender justice is an integral aspect) **would allow for provisional reforms to prevailing conditions of injustice without calling into question the basis for the movement** – **for there would always be more to be achieved .** 8 Each achievement would itself necessitate further revision of what equality would look like. And it would also necessitate revision of the particular aims that constitute the “identity” afforded by participating in that movement. In this way, identity becomes more appropriately understood as being, in part at least, about **participating in a series of dialogues about what is desired for the future in terms of understandings of social justice**. ¶ **Focusing on the future, on how we would like things to be tomorrow**, based on an understanding of where we are today**, would allow for partial reforms to be seen as gains and not threats**. **It is only if one believes that political action can only occur in the context of identiﬁcation of past injustices as opposed to future justice that one has a problem with (partial) reforms** in the present. **Political identity which exists only through an enunciation of its injury and does not seek to dissolve itself as an identity can lead to the ossiﬁcation of injured relations**. **The “wounded attachment” occurs when the politicised identity can see no future without the injury also constituting an aspect of that future**. Developing on the work of Brown, we would argue that not only does a “reformed” identity politics need to be based upon desire for the future, but that that desire should actually be a desire for the dissolution (in the future) of the identity claim. The complete success of the femi-nist movement, for instance, would mean that feminists no longerexisted, as the conditions that caused people to become feministhad been addressed. Similarly, with the dalit movement, its success would be measured by the dissolution of the identity of “dalit” as asalient political category. There would be no loss here, only a gain.¶ As we have argued, following Mohanty ([1993] 2000) andNelson (1993), it is participation in the processing of one’s ownand other’s experiences into knowledge about the world, in thecontext of communities that negotiate epistemological premises, which confers a notion of politicised identity. Since it is an under-standing of “tomorrow” (what that would be, and how it is to beachieved) that establishes one as, for example, a feminist, such an identity claim does not exclude others from participation**, and it does not solicit the reiﬁcation of identity around the fact of historical or contemporary suffering**. By removing these obstacles to progress, the “tomorrow” that is the goal, is more readily achievable. **Identity politics**, then, “**needs a tomorrow**” in this sense: that the raison d’être of any politicised identity is the bringing about of a tomorrow in which the social injustices of the present have been overcome. **But identity politics also needs that tomorrow – today – in the sense that politicised identities need to inscribe that tomorrow into their self-deﬁnition in the present, in order to avoid consolidating activity around the maintenance of the identity rather than the overcoming of the conditions that generated it.** **That the tomorrow to be inscribed – today – in the self-deﬁnition of one’s political identity, is one in which that identity will no longer be required, is not a situation to be regretted, since it is rather the promise of success for any movement for justice.**