### 1nc---disad

#### Immigration reform will pass --- it’s Obama’s top priority

Eleanor Clift, 10-25-2013, “Obama, Congress Get Back to the Immigration Fight,” Daily Beast, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/10/25/obama-congress-get-back-to-the-immigration-fight.html

But now with the shutdown behind them and Republicans on the defensive, Obama saw an opening to get back in the game. His message, says Sharry: “‘Hey, I’m flexible,’ which after the shutdown politics was important, and he implied ‘if you don’t do it, I’m coming after you.’” For Obama and the Democrats, immigration reform is a win-win issue. They want an overhaul for the country and their constituents. If they don’t get it, they will hammer Republicans in demographically changing districts in California, Nevada, and Florida, where they could likely pick up seats—not enough to win control of the House, but, paired with what Sharry calls “the shutdown narrative,” Democratic operatives are salivating at the prospect of waging that campaign. Some Republicans understand the stakes, and former vice-presidential candidate and budget maven Paul Ryan is at the center of a newly energized backroom effort to craft legislation that would deal with the thorniest aspect of immigration reform for Republicans: the disposition of 11 million people in the country illegally. Rep. Raul Labrador (R-ID), an early advocate of reform who abandoned the effort some months ago, argues that Obama’s tough bargaining during the shutdown means Republicans can’t trust him on immigration. “When have they ever trusted him?” asks Sharry. “Nobody is asking them to do this for Obama. They should do this for the country and for themselves.... We’re not talking about tax increases or gun violence. This is something the pillars of the Republican coalition are strongly in favor of.” Among those pillars is Chamber of Commerce President Tom Donahue, who on Monday noted the generally good feelings about immigration reform among disparate groups, among them business and labor. He expressed optimism that the House could pass something, go to conference and resolve differences with the Senate, get a bill and have the president sign it “and guess what, government works! Everybody is looking for something positive to take home.” The Wall Street Journal reported Thursday that GOP donors are withholding contributions to lawmakers blocking reform, and that Republicans for Immigration Reform, headed by former Bush Cabinet official, Carlos Gutierrez, is running an Internet ad urging action. Next week, evangelical Christians affiliated with the Evangelical Immigration Table will be in Washington to press Congress to act with charity toward people in the country without documentation, treating them as they would Jesus. The law-enforcement community has also stepped forward repeatedly to embrace an overhaul. House Speaker John Boehner says he wants legislation, but not the “massive” bill that the Senate passed and that Obama supports. The House seems inclined to act—if it acts at all—on a series of smaller bills starting with “Kids Out,” a form of the Dream Act that grants a path to citizenship for young people brought to the U.S. as children; then agriculture-worker and high-tech visas, accompanied by tougher border security. The sticking point is the 11 million people in the country illegally, and finding a compromise between Democrats’ insistence that reform include a path to citizenship, and Republicans’ belief that offering any kind of relief constitutes amnesty and would reward people for breaking the law. The details matter hugely, but what a handful of Republicans, led by Ryan, appear to be crafting is legalization for most of the 11 million but without any mention of citizenship. It wouldn’t create a new or direct or special path for people who came to the U.S. illegally or overstayed their visa. It would allow them to earn legal status through some yet-to-be-determined steps, and once they get it, they go to the end of a very long line that could have people waiting for decades. The Senate bill contains a 13-year wait. However daunting that sounds, the potential for meaningful reform is tantalizingly close with Republicans actively engaged in preparing their proposal, pressure building from the business community and religious leaders, and a short window before the end of the year to redeem the reputation of Congress and the Republican Party after a bruising takedown. The pieces are all there for long-sought immigration reform. We could be a few weeks away from an historic House vote, or headed for a midterm election where Republicans once again are on the wrong side of history and demography.

#### Restrictions on war powers deplete political capital and trade off with the rest of the agenda

Douglas L. Kriner 10, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Boston University, 2010, After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War, p. 68-69

Raising or Lowering Political Costs by Affecting Presidential Political Capital

Shaping both real and anticipated public opinion are two important ways in which Congress can raise or lower the political costs of a military action for the president. However, focusing exclusively on opinion dynamics threatens to obscure the much broader political consequences of domestic reaction—particularly congressional opposition—to presidential foreign policies. At least since Richard Neustadt's seminal work Presidential Power, presidency scholars have warned that costly political battles in one policy arena frequently have significant ramifications for presidential power in other realms. Indeed, two of Neustadt's three "cases of command"—Truman's seizure of the steel mills and firing of General Douglas MacArthur—explicitly discussed the broader political consequences of stiff domestic resistance to presidential assertions of commander-in-chief powers. In both cases, Truman emerged victorious in the case at hand—yet, Neustadt argues, each victory cost Truman dearly in terms of his future power prospects and leeway in other policy areas, many of which were more important to the president than achieving unconditional victory over North Korea."¶ While congressional support leaves the president's reserve of political capital intact, congressional criticism saps energy from other initiatives on the home front by forcing the president to expend energy and effort defending his international agenda. Political capital spent shoring up support for a president's foreign policies is capital that is unavailable for his future policy initiatives. Moreover, any weakening in the president's political clout may have immediate ramifications for his reelection prospects, as well as indirect consequences for congressional races.59 Indeed, Democratic efforts to tie congressional Republican incumbents to President George W. Bush and his war policies paid immediate political dividends in the 2006 midterms, particularly in states, districts, and counties that had suffered the highest casualty rates in the Iraq War.60¶ In addition to boding ill for the president's perceived political capital and reputation, such partisan losses in Congress only further imperil his programmatic agenda, both international and domestic. Scholars have long noted that President Lyndon Johnson's dream of a Great Society also perished in the rice paddies of Vietnam. Lacking both the requisite funds in a war-depleted treasury and the political capital needed to sustain his legislative vision, Johnson gradually let his domestic goals slip away as he hunkered down in an effort first to win and then to end the Vietnam War. In the same way, many of President Bush's highest second-term domestic priorities, such as Social Security and immigration reform, failed perhaps in large part because the administration had to expend so much energy and effort waging a rear-guard action against congressional critics of the war in Iraq.61¶ When making their cost-benefit calculations, presidents surely consider these wider political costs of congressional opposition to their military policies. If congressional opposition in the military arena stands to derail other elements of his agenda, all else being equal, the president will be more likely to judge the benefits of military action insufficient to its costs than if Congress stood behind him in the international arena.

#### Obama’s fresh political capital is vital to reignite momentum for immigration

Reid Epstein 10/17/13, writer at Politico, “Obama’s latest push features a familiar strategy,” http://www.politico.com/story/2013/10/barack-obama-latest-push-features-familiar-strategy-98512.html

President Barack Obama made his plans for his newly won political capital official — he’s going to hammer House Republicans on immigration.¶ And it’s evident from his public and private statements that Obama’s latest immigration push is, in at least one respect, similar to his fiscal showdown strategy: yet again, the goal is to boost public pressure on House Republican leadership to call a vote on a Senate-passed measure.¶ “The majority of Americans think this is the right thing to do,” Obama said Thursday at the White House. “And it’s sitting there waiting for the House to pass it. Now, if the House has ideas on how to improve the Senate bill, let’s hear them. Let’s start the negotiations. But let’s not leave this problem to keep festering for another year, or two years, or three years. This can and should get done by the end of this year.”¶ (WATCH: Assessing the government shutdown's damage)¶ And yet Obama spent the bulk of his 20-minute address taking whack after whack at the same House Republicans he’ll need to pass that agenda, culminating in a jab at the GOP over the results of the 2012 election — and a dare to do better next time.¶ “You don’t like a particular policy or a particular president? Then argue for your position,” Obama said. “Go out there and win an election. Push to change it. But don’t break it. Don’t break what our predecessors spent over two centuries building. That’s not being faithful to what this country’s about.”¶ Before the shutdown, the White House had planned a major immigration push for the first week in October. But with the shutdown and looming debt default dominating the discussion during the last month, immigration reform received little attention on the Hill.¶ (PHOTOS: Immigration reform rally on the National Mall)¶ Immigration reform allies, including Obama’s political arm, Organizing for Action, conducted a series of events for the weekend of Oct. 5, most of which received little attention in Washington due to the the shutdown drama. But activists remained engaged, with Dream Act supporters staging a march up Constitution Avenue, past the Capitol to the Supreme Court Tuesday, to little notice of the Congress inside.¶ Obama first personally signaled his intention to re-emerge in the immigration debate during an interview Tuesday with the Los Angeles Univision affiliate, conducted four hours before his meeting that day with House Democrats.¶ Speaking of the week’s fiscal landmines, Obama said: “Once that’s done, you know, the day after, I’m going to be pushing to say, call a vote on immigration reform.”¶ (Also on POLITICO: GOP blame game: Who lost the government shutdown?)¶ When he met that afternoon in the Oval Office with the House Democratic leadership, Obama said that he planned to be personally engaged in selling the reform package he first introduced in a Las Vegas speech in January.¶ Still, during that meeting, Obama knew so little about immigration reform’s status in the House that he had to ask Rep. Xavier Becerra (D-Calif.) how many members of his own party would back a comprehensive reform bill, according to a senior Democrat who attended.¶ The White House doesn’t have plans yet for Obama to participate in any new immigration reform events or rallies — that sort of advance work has been hamstrung by the 16-day government shutdown.¶ But the president emerged on Thursday to tout a “broad coalition across America” that supports immigration reform. He also invited House Republicans to add their input specifically to the Senate bill — an approach diametrically different than the House GOP’s announced strategy of breaking the reform into several smaller bills.¶ White House press secretary Jay Carney echoed Obama’s remarks Thursday, again using for the same language on immigration the White House used to press Republicans on the budget during the shutdown standoff: the claim that there are enough votes in the House to pass the Senate’s bill now, if only it could come to a vote.¶ “When it comes to immigration reform … we’re confident that if that bill that passed the Senate were put on the floor of the House today, it would win a majority of the House,” Carney said. “And I think that it would win significant Republican votes.”

#### CIR’s critical to economic growth---multiple internals

Klein 13 Ezra is a columnist for The Washington Post. “To Fix the U.S. Economy, Fix Immigration,” 1/29, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-29/to-fix-the-u-s-economy-fix-immigration.html

Washington tends to have a narrow view of what counts as “economic policy.” Anything we do to the tax code is in. So is any stimulus we pass, or any deficit reduction we try. Most of this mistakes the federal budget for the economy.¶ The truth is, the most important piece of economic policy we pass -- or don’t pass -- in 2013 may be something we don’t think of as economic policy at all: immigration reform.¶ Congress certainly doesn’t consider it economic policy, at least not officially. Immigration laws go through the House and Senate judiciary committees. But consider a few facts about immigrants in the American economy: About a tenth of the U.S. population is foreign-born. More than a quarter of U.S. technology and engineering businesses started from 1995 to 2005 had a foreign-born owner. In Silicon Valley, half of all tech startups had a foreign-born founder.¶ Immigrants begin businesses and file patents at a much higher rate than their native-born counterparts, and while there are disputes about the effect immigrants have on the wages of low-income Americans, there’s little dispute about their effect on wages overall: They lift them.¶ The economic case for immigration is best made by way of analogy. Everyone agrees that aging economies with low birth rates are in trouble; this, for example, is a thoroughly conventional view of Japan. It’s even conventional wisdom about the U.S. The retirement of the baby boomers is correctly understood as an economic challenge. The ratio of working Americans to retirees will fall from 5-to-1 today to 3-to-1 in 2050. Fewer workers and more retirees is tough on any economy.¶ Importing Workers¶ There’s nothing controversial about that analysis. But if that’s not controversial, then immigration shouldn’t be, either. Immigration is essentially the importation of new workers. It’s akin to raising the birth rate, only easier, because most of the newcomers are old enough to work. And because living in the U.S. is considered such a blessing that even very skilled, very industrious workers are willing to leave their home countries and come to ours, the U.S. has an unusual amount to gain from immigration. When it comes to the global draft for talent, we almost always get the first-round picks -- at least, if we want them, and if we make it relatively easy for them to come here.¶ From the vantage of naked self-interest, the wonder isn’t that we might fix our broken immigration system in 2013. It’s that we might not.¶ Few economic problems wouldn’t be improved by more immigration. If you’re worried about deficits, more young, healthy workers paying into Social Security and Medicare are an obvious boon. If you’re concerned about the slowdown in new company formation and its attendant effects on economic growth, more immigrant entrepreneurs should cheer you. If you’re worried about the dearth of science and engineering majors in our universities, an influx of foreign-born students is the most obvious solution you’ll find.

#### US economic decline makes global nuclear war likely

O’Hanlon and Lieberthal 12 Michael O’Hanlon, Ph.D., is a senior fellow at The Brookings Institution, specializing in defense and foreign policy issues. Kenneth Lieberthal, Ph.D., is a senior fellow in Foreign Policy and Global Economy and Development at Brookings. “The real national security threat: America's debt,” July 3, LA Times Op-Ed, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jul/03/opinion/la-oe-ohanlon-fiscal-reform-20120703

Lastly, American economic weakness undercuts U.S. leadership abroad. Other countries sense our weakness and wonder about our purported decline. If this perception becomes more widespread, and the case that we are in decline becomes more persuasive, countries will begin to take actions that reflect their skepticism about America's future. Allies and friends will doubt our commitment and may pursue nuclear weapons for their own security, for example; adversaries will sense opportunity and be less restrained in throwing around their weight in their own neighborhoods. The crucial Persian Gulf and Western Pacific regions will likely become less stable. Major war will become more likely.

### 1nc---topicality

#### Restrictions are prohibitions on action

Jean Schiedler-Brown 12, Attorney, Jean Schiedler-Brown & Associates, Appellant Brief of Randall Kinchloe v. States Dept of Health, Washington, The Court of Appeals of the State of Washington, Division 1, http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/Briefs/A01/686429%20Appellant%20Randall%20Kincheloe%27s.pdf

3. The ordinary definition of the term "restrictions" also does not include the reporting and monitoring or supervising terms and conditions that are included in the 2001 Stipulation.

Black's Law Dictionary, 'fifth edition,(1979) defines "restriction" as;

A limitation often imposed in a deed or lease respecting the use to which the property may be put. The term "restrict' is also cross referenced with the term "restrain." Restrain is defined as; To limit, confine, abridge, narrow down, restrict, obstruct, impede, hinder, stay, destroy. To prohibit from action; to put compulsion on; to restrict; to hold or press back. To keep in check; to hold back from acting, proceeding, or advancing, either by physical or moral force, or by interposing obstacle, to repress or suppress, to curb.

In contrast, the terms "supervise" and "supervisor" are defined as; To have general oversight over, to superintend or to inspect. See Supervisor. A surveyor or overseer. . . In a broad sense, one having authority over others, to superintend and direct. The term "supervisor" means an individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibility to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but required the use of independent judgment.

Comparing the above definitions, it is clear that the definition of "restriction" is very different from the definition of "supervision"-very few of the same words are used to explain or define the different terms. In his 2001 stipulation, Mr. Kincheloe essentially agreed to some supervision conditions, but he did not agree to restrict his license.

#### Violation:

#### Ex ante congressional consultation increases presidential authority

Alexander C. Linn 2k, “International Security and the War Powers Resolution,” William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal Volume 8 Issue 3 Article 9, http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1391&context=wmborj

In the famous Steel Seizure Cases °3 in 1952, Justice Jackson's concurrence formulated three analyses of presidential authority. First, when the President acts pursuant to an express or implied congressional authorization, the President's authority is at its maximum.'0 4 Second, when the President acts with an absence of express approval or disapproval from Congress, the President's action must fall within his independent powers. Additionally, there is a "zone of twilight," in which the President and Congress may have overlapping authority or in which authority is uncertain.0 5 In such circumstances, congressional inaction may invite presidential authority. In this area, any actual "test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law."'0 6 Third, when the President acts in contradiction to the will of Congress, he "can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter."¶ Justice Jackson's framework provides a compelling legal lens through which American military force commitments to multilateral operations should be viewed. Typically, an executive decision to commit forces to a U.N. intervention lies in the "zone of twilight" of Justice Jackson's second scenario. Both the textual bifurcation of the war power under the Constitution and the Framers' intent suggest a constitutional overlap in the power to make military decisions. In addition, Congress may be acquiescing to the authority of the President because it lacks the political capital or certainty to challenge a military intervention, especially one that may have support in the world community. Finally, party membership may determine loyalties to the favor or disfavor of an executive usurpation of the war power.'08 When the Executive consults with a core group of congressional leaders before deploying American troops into theaters of risk, the executive action moves asymptotically from Justice Jackson's first scenario, where executive action moves in a constitutionally tenuous "zone of twilight," towards Justice Jackson's second scenario, where the Executive's constitutional authority maximized because it is supported by an express or implied congressional authorization. While this consultation does not authoritatively establish congressional support, or prohibit Congress from later calling for a reduction in American military engagements, it bridges the gap between the Framers' mandate for congressional authority over war and the security mandate for the U.N. delegate to make reliable U.S. commitments for military intervention that fall short of declared wars." 9 In the absence of such consultation, executive authority runs unchecked. As Justice Jackson observed, "[O]nly Congress itself can prevent power from slipping through its fingers.""

#### Vote neg---

#### Neg ground---only prohibitions on particular authorities guarantee links to every core argument like flexibility and deference

#### Precision---only our interpretation defines “restrictions on authority”---that’s key to adequate preparation and policy analysis

### 1nc---disad

#### Rouhani will get a nuclear deal because he’s keeping hardliners in check --- empowering hardliners would scuttle the deal

Fox News, 9-28-2013, “Rouhani begins tougher mission of selling US outreach to hard-liners at home,” http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/09/28/analysis-rouhani-begins-tougher-mission-selling-us-outreach-to-hard-liners-at/

Before leaving for the United Nations, Iran's President Hassan Rouhani said he hoped to open a new era in dialogue with Washington. He returned to Tehran on Saturday with more in hand than even the most optimistic predictions.¶ Now begins the harder task for Rouhani and his inner circle of Western-educated envoys and advisers, who are suddenly partners with the White House in a potentially history-shifting reset in the Middle East that could rival in scope the Arab Spring or Israel's peace pact with Egypt. To build on the stunning diplomatic openings of the past days, Rouhani and his allies now must navigate political channels that make President Barack Obama's showdowns with his domestic critics seem almost genteel by comparison. Possibly standing in the way of Rouhani's overtures is an array of hard-liners, led by the hugely powerful Revolutionary Guard, that hold sway over nearly everything from Iran's nuclear program to a paramilitary network that reaches each neighborhood. What's ahead will measure Rouhani's resolve. It also will test how much the Guard and its backers are willing to accept something other than spite and suspicion toward the U.S. — and what it could all mean for the Guard's regional footholds that include Syria and the anti-Israel militia Hezbollah in Lebanon. At Rouhani's airport arrival in Tehran, backers cheered and held aloft a placard calling him a "lord of peace," while opponents shouted insults and chanted "death to America." One thing is certain, however. The rapid-fire momentum of diplomacy over the past days — fed by Twitter's no-breather pace — cannot be maintained. The linchpin, as always, remains Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the gate keeper for every key decision. He has so far given critical support to Rouhani's overtures with Washington — calling for "heroic flexibility" in diplomacy — while giving the Guard a rare scolding to keep its distance from political developments. As long as Rouhani carries Khamenei's favor, there is unprecedented credibility to his offers to settle the impasse over Iran's nuclear ambitions and possibly forge ahead on other fronts after a more than three-decade diplomatic estrangement with the U.S. But Khamenei also is not interested in tearing apart the country. Strong objections from the Guard and other hard-line factions would certainly get his attention. Even a slight roll back in Khamenei's backing for Rouhani would be magnified on the world stage, raising doubts in the West about whether it's worth investing the diplomatic capital in mending ties with Iran.

#### The prospect that Congress could block military action guarantees failure of Iran diplomacy by emboldening hard-liners --- triggers Israel strikes

Ross 9/9/13 - a counselor at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, was a senior Middle East adviser to President Obama from 2009 to 2011, Director of Policy Planning for the State Department under George H.W. Bush, the Special Middle East coordinator under Clinton (Dennis, “Blocking action on Syria makes an attack on Iran more likely” Washington Post, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/blocking-action-on-syria-makes-an-attack-on-iran-more-likely/2013/09/09/dd655466-1963-11e3-8685-5021e0c41964_story.html>)

Still, for the opponents of authorization, these arguments are portrayed as abstractions. Only threats that are immediate and directly affect us should produce U.S. military strikes. Leaving aside the argument that when the threats become immediate, we will be far more likely to have to use our military in a bigger way and under worse conditions, there is another argument to consider: should opponents block authorization and should the president then feel he cannot employ military strikes against Syria, this will almost certainly guarantee that there will be no diplomatic outcome to our conflict with Iran over its nuclear weapons.¶ I say this for two reasons. First, Iran’s President Rouhani, who continues to send signals that he wants to make a deal on the nuclear program, will inevitably be weakened once it becomes clear that the U.S. cannot use force against Syria. At that point, paradoxically, the hard-liners in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and around the Supreme Leader will be able to claim that there is only an economic cost to pursuing nuclear weapons but no military danger. Their argument will be: Once Iran has nuclear weapons, it will build its leverage in the region; its deterrent will be enhanced; and, most importantly, the rest of the world will see that sanctions have failed, and that it is time to come to terms with Iran.¶ Under those circumstances, the sanctions will wither. What will Rouhani argue? That the risk is too high? That the economic costs could threaten regime stability? Today, those arguments may have some effect on the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei precisely because there is also the threat that all U.S. options are on the table and the president has said he will not permit Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. Should he be blocked from using force against Syria, it will be clear that all options are not on the table and that regardless of what we say, we are prepared to live with an Iran that has nuclear arms.¶ Israel, however, is not prepared to accept such an eventuality, and that is the second reason that not authorizing strikes against Syria will likely result in the use of force against Iran. Indeed, Israel will feel that it has no reason to wait, no reason to give diplomacy a chance and no reason to believe that the United States will take care of the problem. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu sees Iran with nuclear weapons as an existential threat and, in his eyes, he must not allow there to be a second Holocaust against the Jewish people. As long as he believes that President Obama is determined to deal with the Iranian threat, he can justify deferring to us. That will soon end if opponents get their way on Syria.¶ Ironically, if these opponent succeed, they may prevent a conflict that President Obama has been determined to keep limited and has the means to do so. After all, even after Israel acted militarily to enforce its red line and prevent Syria’s transfer of advanced weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon, Assad, Iran and Hezbollah have been careful to avoid responding. They have little interest in provoking Israeli attacks that would weaken Syrian forces and make them vulnerable to the opposition.¶ For all the tough talk about what would happen if the United States struck targets in Syria, the Syrian and Iranian interest in an escalation with the United States is also limited. Can the same be said if Israel feels that it has no choice but to attack the Iranian nuclear infrastructure? Maybe the Iranians will seek to keep that conflict limited; maybe they won’t. Maybe an Israeli strike against the Iranian nuclear program will not inevitably involve the United States, but maybe it will — and maybe it should.

#### Strikes escalate to great power nuclear and biological war

Dennis Ray Morgan 9, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Yongin Campus - South Korea, Futures, Volume 41, Issue 10, December 2009, Pages 683-693

This scenario has gained even more plausibility since a January 2007 Sunday Times report [13] of an Israeli intelligence leak that Israel was considering a strike against Iran, using low-yield bunker busting nukes to destroy Iran’s supposedly secret underground nuclear facilities. In Moore’s scenario, non-nuclear neighboring countries would then respond with conventional rockets and chemical, biological and radiological weapons. Israel then would retaliate with nuclear strikes on several countries, including a pre-emptive strike against Pakistan, who then retaliates with an attack not only on Israel but pre-emptively striking India as well. Israel then initiates the ‘‘Samson option’’ with attacks on other Muslim countries, Russia, and possibly the ‘‘anti-Semitic’’ cities of Europe. At that point, all-out nuclear war ensues as the U.S. retaliates with nuclear attacks on Russia and possibly on China as well.11

#### Iran prolif causes nuclear war

Edelman 11 - Distinguished Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments; he was U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy in 2005-9 (Eric, “The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran,” Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb, proquest)

The reports of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States and the Commission on the Prevention ofWeapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, as well as other analyses, have highlighted the risk that a nuclear-armed Iran could trigger additional nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, even if Israel does not declare its own nuclear arsenal. Notably, Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates- all signatories to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (npt)-have recently announced or initiated nuclear energy programs. Although some of these states have legitimate economic rationales for pursuing nuclear power and although the low-enriched fuel used for power reactors cannot be used in nuclear weapons, these moves have been widely interpreted as hedges against a nuclear-armed Iran. The npt does not bar states from developing the sensitive technology required to produce nuclear fuel on their own, that is, the capability to enrich natural uranium and separate plutonium from spent nuclear fuel.Yet enrichment and reprocessing can also be used to accumulate weapons-grade enriched uranium and plutonium-the very loophole that Iran has apparently exploited in pursuing a nuclear weapons capability.¶ Developing nuclear weapons remains a slow, expensive, and difficult process, even for states with considerable economic resources, and especially if other nations try to constrain aspiring nuclear states' access to critical materials and technology. Without external support, it is unlikely that any of these aspirants could develop a nuclear weapons capability within a decade.¶ There is, however, at least one state that could receive significant outside support: Saudi Arabia. And if it did, proliferation could accelerate throughout the region. Iran and Saudi Arabia have long been geopolitical and ideological rivals. Riyadh would face tremendous pressure to respond in some form to a nuclear-armed Iran, not only to deter Iranian coercion and subversion but also to preserve its sense that Saudi Arabia is the leading nation in the Muslim world. The Saudi government is already pursuing a nuclear power capability, which could be the first step along a slow road to nuclear weapons development. And concerns persist that it might be able to accelerate its progress by exploiting its close ties to Pakistan. During the 1980s, in response to the use of missiles during the Iran-Iraq War and their growing proliferation throughout the region, Saudi Arabia acquired several dozen css-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles from China. The Pakistani government reportedly brokered the deal, and it may have also offered to sell Saudi Arabia nuclear warheads for the css-2s, which are not accurate enough to deliver conventional warheads effectively.¶ There are still rumors that Riyadh and Islamabad have had discussions involving nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, or security guarantees. This "Islamabad option" could develop in one of several different ways. Pakistan could sell operational nuclear weapons and delivery systems to Saudi Arabia, or it could provide the Saudis with the infrastructure, material, and technical support they need to produce nuclear weapons themselves within a matter of years, as opposed to a decade or longer.Not only has Pakistan provided such support in the past, but it is currently building two more heavy-water reactors for plutonium production and a second chemical reprocessing facility to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. In other words, it might accumulate more fissile material than it needs to maintain even a substantially expanded arsenal of its own.¶ Alternatively, Pakistan might offer an extended deterrent guarantee to Saudi Arabia and deploy nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and troops on Saudi territory, a practice that the United States has employed for decades with its allies. This arrangement could be particularly appealing to both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It would allow the Saudis to argue that they are not violating the npt since they would not be acquiring their own nuclear weapons. And an extended deterrent from Pakistan might be preferable to one from the United States because stationing foreign Muslim forces on Saudi territory would not trigger the kind of popular opposition that would accompany the deployment of U.S. troops. Pakistan, for its part, would gain financial benefits and international clout by deploying nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia, as well as strategic depth against its chief rival, India.¶ The Islamabad option raises a host of difficult issues, perhaps the most worrisome being how India would respond. Would it target Pakistan's weapons in Saudi Arabia with its own conventional or nuclear weapons? How would this expanded nuclear competition influence stability during a crisis in either the Middle East or South Asia? Regardless of India's reaction, any decision by the Saudi government to seek out nuclear weapons, by whatever means, would be highly destabilizing. It would increase the incentives of other nations in the Middle East to pursue nuclear weapons of their own. And it could increase their ability to do so by eroding the remaining barriers to nuclear proliferation: each additional state that acquires nuclear weapons weakens the nonproliferation regime, even if its particular method of acquisition only circumvents, rather than violates, the npt.¶ N-PLAYER COMPETITION¶ Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons, the Middle East would count three nuclear-armed states, and perhaps more before long. It is unclear how such an n-player competition would unfold because most analyses of nuclear deterrence are based on the U.S.- Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. It seems likely, however, that the interaction among three or more nuclear-armed powers would be more prone to miscalculation and escalation than a bipolar competition. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union only needed to concern themselves with an attack from the other. Multipolar systems are generally considered to be less stable than bipolar systems because coalitions can shift quickly, upsetting the balance of power and creating incentives for an attack.¶ More important, emerging nuclear powers in the Middle East might not take the costly steps necessary to preserve regional stability and avoid a nuclear exchange. For nuclear-armed states, the bedrock of deterrence is the knowledge that each side has a secure second-strike capability, so that no state can launch an attack with the expectation that it can wipe out its opponents' forces and avoid a devastating retaliation. However, emerging nuclear powers might not invest in expensive but survivable capabilities such as hardened missile silos or submarinebased nuclear forces. Given this likely vulnerability, the close proximity of states in the Middle East, and the very short flight times of ballistic missiles in the region, any new nuclear powers might be compelled to "launch on warning" of an attack or even, during a crisis, to use their nuclear forces preemptively. Their governments might also delegate launch authority to lower-level commanders, heightening the possibility of miscalculation and escalation. Moreover, if early warning systems were not integrated into robust command-and-control systems, the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch would increase further still. And without sophisticated early warning systems, a nuclear attack might be unattributable or attributed incorrectly. That is, assuming that the leadership of a targeted state survived a first strike, it might not be able to accurately determine which nation was responsible. And this uncertainty, when combined with the pressure to respond quickly, would create a significant risk that it would retaliate against the wrong party, potentially triggering a regional nuclear war.

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#### Security threats are political constructions by experts to justify constant militarism

Aziz Rana 12, Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell University Law School; A.B., Harvard College; J.D., Yale Law School; PhD., Harvard University, July 2012, “NATIONAL SECURITY: LEAD ARTICLE: Who Decides on Security?,” 44 Conn. L. Rev. 1417

Despite such democratic concerns, a large part of what makes today's dominant security concept so compelling are two purportedly objective sociological claims about the nature of modern threat. As these claims undergird the current security concept, this conclusion assesses them more directly and, in the process, indicates what they suggest about the prospects for any future reform. The first claim is that global interdependence means that the United States faces near continuous threats from abroad. Just as Pearl Harbor presented a physical attack on the homeland justifying a revised framework, the American position in the world since has been one of permanent insecurity in the face of new, equally objective dangers. Although today these threats no longer come from menacing totalitarian regimes like Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union, they nonetheless create a world of chaos and instability in which American domestic peace is imperiled by decentralized terrorists and aggressive rogue states. n310¶ [\*1486] ¶ Second, and relatedly, the objective complexity of modern threats makes it impossible for ordinary citizens to comprehend fully the causes and likely consequences of existing dangers. Thus, the best response is the further entrenchment of the national security state, with the U.S. military permanently mobilized to gather intelligence and to combat enemies wherever they strike-at home or abroad. Accordingly, modern legal and political institutions that privilege executive authority and insulated decision-making are simply the necessary consequence of these externally generated crises. Regardless of these trade-offs, the security benefits of an empowered presidency-one armed with countless secret and public agencies as well as with a truly global military footprint n311 -greatly outweigh the costs.¶ Yet although these sociological views have become commonplace, the conclusions that Americans should draw about security requirements are not nearly as clear cut as the conventional wisdom assumes. In particular, a closer examination of contemporary arguments about endemic danger suggests that such claims are not objective empirical judgments, but rather are socially complex and politically infused interpretations. Indeed, the openness of existing circumstances to multiple interpretations of threat implies that the presumptive need for secrecy and centralization is not self-evident. And as underscored by high profile failures in expert assessment, claims to security expertise are themselves riddled with ideological presuppositions and subjective biases. All this indicates that the gulf between elite knowledge and lay incomprehension in matters of security may be far less extensive than is ordinarily thought. It also means that the question of who decides-and with it the issue of how democratic or insular our institutions should be-remains open as well.¶ Clearly, technological changes, from airpower to biological and chemical weapons, have shifted the nature of America's position in the [\*1487] world and its potential vulnerability. As has been widely remarked for nearly a century, the oceans alone cannot guarantee our permanent safety. Yet in truth, they never fully ensured domestic tranquility. The nineteenth century was one of near continuous violence, especially with indigenous communities fighting to protect their territory from expansionist settlers. n312 But even if technological shifts make doomsday scenarios more chilling than those faced by Hamilton, Jefferson, or Taney, the mere existence of these scenarios tells us little about their likelihood or how best to address them. Indeed, these latter security judgments are inevitably permeated with subjective political assessments-assessments that carry with them preexisting ideological points of view-such as regarding how much risk constitutional societies should accept or how interventionist states should be in foreign policy.¶ In fact, from its emergence in the 1930s and 1940s, supporters of the modern security concept have-at times unwittingly-reaffirmed the political rather than purely objective nature of interpreting external threats. In particular, commentators have repeatedly noted the link between the idea of insecurity and America's post- World War II position of global primacy, one which today has only expanded following the Cold War. n313 In 1961, none other than Senator James William Fulbright declared, in terms reminiscent of Herring and Frankfurter, that security imperatives meant that "our basic constitutional machinery, admirably suited to the needs of a remote agrarian republic in the 18th century," was no longer "adequate" for the "20th-century nation." n314 For Fulbright, the driving impetus behind the need to jettison antiquated constitutional practices was the importance of sustaining the country's "pre-eminen[ce] in political and military power." n315 Fulbright believed that greater executive action and war- making capacities were essential precisely because the United States found itself "burdened with all the enormous responsibilities that accompany such power." n316 According to Fulbright, the United States had [\*1488] both a right and a duty to suppress those forms of chaos and disorder that existed at the edges of American authority. n317 Thus, rather than being purely objective, the American condition of permanent danger was itself deeply tied to political calculations about the importance of global primacy. What generated the condition of continual crisis was not only technological change, but also the belief that the United States' own national security rested on the successful projection of power into the internal affairs of foreign states.¶ The key point is that regardless of whether one agrees with such an underlying project, the value of this project is ultimately an open political question. This suggests that whether distant crises should be viewed as generating insecurity at home is similarly as much an interpretative judgment as an empirically verifiable conclusion. n318 To appreciate the open nature of security determinations, one need only look at the presentation of terrorism as a principle and overriding danger facing the country. According to National Counterterrorism Center's 2009 Report on Terrorism, in 2009 there were just twenty-five U.S. noncombatant fatalities from terrorism worldwide-nine abroad and sixteen at home. n319 While the fear of a terrorist attack is a legitimate concern, these numbers-which have been consistent in recent years-place the gravity of the threat in perspective. Rather than a condition of endemic danger-requiring ever-increasing secrecy and centralization-such facts are perfectly consistent with a reading that Americans do not face an existential crisis (one presumably comparable to Pearl Harbor) and actually enjoy relative security. Indeed, the disconnect between numbers and resources expended, especially in a time of profound economic insecurity, highlights the political choice of policymakers and citizens to persist in interpreting foreign events through a World War II and early Cold War lens of permanent threat. In fact, the continuous alteration of basic constitutional values to fit national security aims emphasizes just how entrenched Herring's old vision of security as pre-political and foundational has become, regardless of whether other interpretations of the present moment may be equally compelling.¶ It also underscores a telling and often ignored point about the nature of [\*1489] modern security expertise, particularly as reproduced by the United States' massive intelligence infrastructure. To the extent that political assumptions-like the centrality of global primacy or the view that instability abroad necessarily implicates security at home-shape the interpretative approach of executive officials, what passes as objective security expertise is itself intertwined with contested claims about how to view external actors and their motivations. These assumptions mean that while modern conditions may well be complex, the conclusions of the presumed experts may not be systematically less liable to subjective bias than judgments made by ordinary citizens based on publicly available information. It further underlines that the question of who decides cannot be foreclosed in advance by simply asserting deference to elite knowledge.¶ If anything, one can argue that the presumptive gulf between elite awareness and suspect mass opinion has generated its own very dramatic political and legal pathologies. In recent years, the country has witnessed a variety of security crises built on the basic failure of "expertise." n320 At present, part of what obscures this fact is the very culture of secret information sustained by the modern security concept. Today, it is commonplace for government officials to leak security material about terrorism or external threats to newspapers as a method of shaping the public debate. n321 These "open" secrets allow greater public access to elite information and embody a central and routine instrument for incorporating mass voice into state decision-making.

#### It’s try or die---orthodox IR’s atomistic approach to global problems makes extinction inevitable

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3. From securitisation to militarisation 3.1 Complicity

This analysis thus calls for a broader approach to environmental security based on retrieving the manner in which political actors construct discourses of 'scarcity' in response to ecological, energy and economic crises (critical security studies) in the context of the historically-specific socio-political and geopolitical relations of domination by which their power is constituted, and which are often implicated in the acceleration of these very crises (historical sociology and historical materialism).

Instead, both realist and liberal orthodox IR approaches focus on different aspects of interstate behaviour, conflictual and cooperative respectively, but each lacks the capacity to grasp that the unsustainable trajectory of state and inter-state behaviour is only explicable in the context of a wider global system concurrently over-exploiting the biophysical environment in which it is embedded. They are, in other words, unable to address the relationship of the inter-state system itself to the biophysical environment as a key analytical category for understanding the acceleration of global crises. They simultaneously therefore cannot recognise the embeddedness of the economy in society and the concomitant politically-constituted nature of economics.

Hence, they neglect the profound irrationality of collective state behaviour, which systematically erodes this relationship, globalising insecurity on a massive scale - in the very process of seeking security.85 In Cox's words, because positivist IR theory 'does not question the present order [it instead] has the effect of legitimising and reifying it'.86 Orthodox IR sanitises globally-destructive collective inter-state behaviour as a normal function of instrumental reason -thus rationalising what are clearly deeply irrational collective human actions that threaten to permanently erode state power and security by destroying the very conditions of human existence. Indeed, the prevalence of orthodox IR as a body of disciplinary beliefs, norms and prescriptions organically conjoined with actual policy-making in the international system highlights the extent to which both realism and liberalism are ideologically implicated in the acceleration of global systemic crises.

#### Don’t call it an alternative---our response is to interrogate the epistemological failures of the 1ac---this is a prereq to successful policy

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While recommendations to shift our frame of orientation away from conventional state-centrism toward a 'human security' approach are valid, this cannot be achieved without confronting the deeper theoretical assumptions underlying conventional approaches to 'non-traditional' security issues.106 By occluding the structural origin and systemic dynamic of global ecological, energy and economic crises, orthodox approaches are incapable of transforming them. Coupled with their excessive state-centrism, this means they operate largely at the level of 'surface' impacts of global crises in terms of how they will affect quite traditional security issues relative to sustaining state integrity, such as international terrorism, violent conflict and population movements. Global crises end up fuelling the projection of risk onto social networks, groups and countries that cross the geopolitical fault-lines of these 'surface' impacts - which happen to intersect largely with Muslim communities. Hence, regions particularly vulnerable to climate change impacts, containing large repositories of hydrocarbon energy resources, or subject to demographic transformations in the context of rising population pressures, have become the focus of state security planning in the context of counter-terrorism operations abroad.

The intensifying problematisation and externalisation of Muslim-majority regions and populations by Western security agencies - as a discourse - is therefore not only interwoven with growing state perceptions of global crisis acceleration, but driven ultimately by an epistemological failure to interrogate the systemic causes of this acceleration in collective state policies (which themselves occur in the context of particular social, political and economic structures). This expansion of militarisation is thus coeval with the subliminal normative presumption that the social relations of the perpetrators, in this case Western states, must be protected and perpetuated at any cost - precisely because the efficacy of the prevailing geopolitical and economic order is ideologically beyond question.

As much as this analysis highlights a direct link between global systemic crises, social polarisation and state militarisation, it fundamentally undermines the idea of a symbiotic link between natural resources and conflict per se. Neither 'resource shortages' nor 'resource abundance' (in ecological, energy, food and monetary terms) necessitate conflict by themselves.

There are two key operative factors that determine whether either condition could lead to conflict. The first is the extent to which either condition can generate socio-political crises that challenge or undermine the prevailing order. The second is the way in which stakeholder actors choose to actually respond to the latter crises. To understand these factors accurately requires close attention to the political, economic and ideological strictures of resource exploitation, consumption and distribution between different social groups and classes. Overlooking the systematic causes of social crisis leads to a heightened tendency to problematise its symptoms, in the forms of challenges from particular social groups. This can lead to externalisation of those groups, and the legitimisation of violence towards them.

Ultimately, this systems approach to global crises strongly suggests that conventional policy 'reform' is woefully inadequate. Global warming and energy depletion are manifestations of a civilisation which is in overshoot. The current scale and organisation of human activities is breaching the limits of the wider environmental and natural resource systems in which industrial civilisation is embedded. This breach is now increasingly visible in the form of two interlinked crises in global food production and the global financial system. In short, industrial civilisation in its current form is unsustainable. This calls for a process of wholesale civilisational transition to adapt to the inevitable arrival of the post-carbon era through social, political and economic transformation.

Yet conventional theoretical and policy approaches fail to (1) fully engage with the gravity of research in the natural sciences and (2) translate the social science implications of this research in terms of the embeddedness of human social systems in natural systems. Hence, lacking capacity for epistemological self-reflection and inhibiting the transformative responses urgently required, they reify and normalise mass violence against diverse 'Others', newly constructed as traditional security threats enormously amplified by global crises - a process that guarantees the intensification and globalisation of insecurity on the road to ecological, energy and economic catastrophe. Such an outcome, of course, is not inevitable, but extensive new transdisciplinary research in IR and the wider social sciences - drawing on and integrating human and critical security studies, political ecology, historical sociology and historical materialism, while engaging directly with developments in the natural sciences - is urgently required to develop coherent conceptual frameworks which could inform more sober, effective, and joined-up policy-making on these issues.

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The Executive branch should issue an executive order requiring Congressional authorization prior to initiating offensive use of military force, unless to repel attacks against the United States.

#### Counterplan solves cred and the case

Adrian Vermeule 7, Harvard law prof - AND - Eric Posner - U Chicago law, The Credible Executive, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 865

\*We do not endorse gendered language

The Madisonian system of oversight has not totally failed. Some- times legislators overcome the temptation to free ride; sometimes they invest in protecting the separation of powers or legislative preroga- tives. Sometimes judges review exercises of executive discretion, even during emergencies. But often enough, legislators and judges have no real alternative to letting executive officials exercise discretion un- checked. The Madisonian system is a partial failure; compensating mechanisms must be adopted to fill the area of slack, the institutional gap between executive discretion and the oversight capacities of other institutions. Again, the magnitude of this gap is unclear, but plausibly it is quite large; we will assume that it is. It is often assumed that this partial failure of the Madisonian sys- tem unshackles and therefore benefits ill-motivated executives. This is grievously incomplete. The failure of the Madisonian system harms the well-motivated executive as much as it benefits the ill-motivated one. Where Madisonian oversight fails, the well-motivated executive is a victim of his own power. Voters, legislators, and judges will be wary of granting further discretion to an executive whose motivations are un- certain and possibly nefarious. The partial failure of Madisonian over- sight thus threatens a form of inefficiency, a kind of contracting failure that makes potentially everyone, including the voters, worse off. Our central question, then, is what the well-motivated executive can do to solve or at least ameliorate the problem. The solution is for the executive to complement his (well-motivated) first-order policy goals with second-order mechanisms for demonstrating credibility to other actors. We thus do not address the different question of what voters, legislators, judges, and other actors should do about an executive who is ill motivated and known to be so. That project involves shoring up or replacing the Madisonian system to block executive dictatorship. Our project is the converse of this, and involves finding new mechanisms to help the well-motivated executive credibly distinguish himself as such. ¶ IV. EXECUTIVE SIGNALING: LAW AND MECHANISMS ¶ We suggest that the executive’s credibility problem can be solved by second-order mechanisms of executive signaling. In the general case, well-motivated executives send credible signals by taking actions that are more costly for ill-motivated actors than for well- motivated ones, thus distinguishing themselves from their ill- motivated mimics. Among the specific mechanisms we discuss, an important subset involves executive self-binding, whereby executives commit themselves to a course of action that would impose higher costs on ill-motivated actors. Commitments themselves have value as signals of benign motivations. ¶ This departs from the usual approach in legal scholarship. Legal theory has often discussed self-binding by “government” or govern- ment officials. In constitutional theory, it is often suggested that consti- tutions represent an attempt by “the people” to bind “themselves” against their own future decisionmaking pathologies, or relatedly, that constitutional prohibitions represent mechanisms by which govern- ments commit themselves not to expropriate investments or to exploit their populations.72 Whether or not this picture is coherent,73 it is not the question we examine here, although some of the relevant consid- erations are similar.74 We are not concerned with binding the president so that he cannot abuse his powers, but with how he might bind himself or take other actions that enhance his credibility, so that he can generate support from the public and other members of the government. ¶ Furthermore, our question is subconstitutional: it is whether a well-motivated executive, acting within an established set of constitu- tional and statutory rules, can use signaling mechanisms to generate public trust. Accordingly, we proceed by assuming that no constitutional amendments or new statutes will be enacted. Within these con- straints, what can a well-motivated executive do to bootstrap himself to credibility? The problem for the well-motivated executive is to credibly signal his benign motivations. In general, the solution is to engage in actions that are less costly for good types than for bad types. ¶ We begin with some relevant law, then examine a set of possible mechanisms—emphasizing both the conditions under which they might succeed and the conditions under which they might not—and conclude by examining the costs of credibility. ¶ A. A Preliminary Note on Law and Self-Binding ¶ Many of our mechanisms are unproblematic from a legal per- spective, as they involve presidential actions that are clearly lawful. But a few raise legal questions; in particular, those that involve self- binding.75 Can a president bind himself to respect particular first-order policies? With qualifications, the answer is yes, at least to the same extent that a legislature can. Formally, a duly promulgated executive rule or order binds even the executive unless and until it is validly abrogated, thereby establishing a new legal status quo.76 The legal authority to establish a new status quo allows a president to create inertia or political constraints that will affect his own future choices. In a practical sense, presidents, like legislatures, have great de facto power to adopt policies that shape the legal landscape for the future. A president might commit himself to a long-term project of defense pro- curement or infrastructure or foreign policy, narrowing his own future choices and generating new political coalitions that will act to defend the new rules or policies. More schematically, we may speak of formal and informal means of self-binding:

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#### No impact to heg

Maher 11---adjunct prof of pol sci, Brown. PhD expected in 2011 in pol sci, Brown (Richard, The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World, Orbis 55;1)

At the same time, preeminence creates burdens and facilitates imprudent behavior. Indeed, because of America’s unique political ideology, which sees its own domestic values and ideals as universal, and the relative openness of the foreign policymaking process, the United States is particularly susceptible to both the temptations and burdens of preponderance. For decades, perhaps since its very founding, the United States has viewed what is good for itself as good for the world. During its period of preeminence, the United States has both tried to maintain its position at the top and to transform world politics in fundamental ways, combining elements of realpolitik and liberal universalism (democratic government, free trade, basic human rights). At times, these desires have conflicted with each other but they also capture the enduring tensions of America’s role in the world. The absence of constraints and America’s overestimation of its own ability to shape outcomes has served to weaken its overall position. And because foreign policy is not the reserved and exclusive domain of the president---who presumably calculates strategy according to the pursuit of the state’s enduring national interests---the policymaking process is open to special interests and outside influences and, thus, susceptible to the cultivation of misperceptions, miscalculations, and misunderstandings. Five features in particular, each a consequence of how America has used its power in the unipolar era, have worked to diminish America’s long-term material and strategic position. Overextension. During its period of preeminence, the United States has found it difficult to stand aloof from threats (real or imagined) to its security, interests, and values. Most states are concerned with what happens in their immediate neighborhoods. The United States has interests that span virtually the entire globe, from its own Western Hemisphere, to Europe, the Middle East, Persian Gulf, South Asia, and East Asia. As its preeminence enters its third decade, the United States continues to define its interests in increasingly expansive terms. This has been facilitated by the massive forward presence of the American military, even when excluding the tens of thousands of troops stationed in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. military has permanent bases in over 30 countries and maintains a troop presence in dozens more.13 There are two logics that lead a preeminent state to overextend, and these logics of overextension lead to goals and policies that exceed even the considerable capabilities of a superpower. First, by definition, preeminent states face few external constraints. Unlike in bipolar or multipolar systems, there are no other states that can serve to reliably check or counterbalance the power and influence of a single hegemon. This gives preeminent states a staggering freedom of action and provides a tempting opportunity to shape world politics in fundamental ways. Rather than pursuing its own narrow interests, preeminence provides an opportunity to mix ideology, values, and normative beliefs with foreign policy. The United States has been susceptible to this temptation, going to great lengths to slay dragons abroad, and even to remake whole societies in its own (liberal democratic) image.14 The costs and risks of taking such bold action or pursuing transformative foreign policies often seem manageable or even remote. We know from both theory and history that external powers can impose important checks on calculated risk-taking and serve as a moderating influence. The bipolar system of the Cold War forced policymakers in both the United States and the Soviet Union to exercise extreme caution and prudence. One wrong move could have led to a crisis that quickly spiraled out of policymakers’ control. Second, preeminent states have a strong incentive to seek to maintain their preeminence in the international system. Being number one has clear strategic, political, and psychological benefits. Preeminent states may, therefore, overestimate the intensity and immediacy of threats, or to fundamentally redefine what constitutes an acceptable level of threat to live with. To protect itself from emerging or even future threats, preeminent states may be more likely to take unilateral action, particularly compared to when power is distributed more evenly in the international system. Preeminence has not only made it possible for the United States to overestimate its power, but also to overestimate the degree to which other states and societies see American power as legitimate and even as worthy of emulation. There is almost a belief in historical determinism, or the feeling that one was destined to stand atop world politics as a colossus, and this preeminence gives one a special prerogative for one’s role and purpose in world politics. The security doctrine that the George W. Bush administration adopted took an aggressive approach to maintaining American preeminence and eliminating threats to American security, including waging preventive war. The invasion of Iraq, based on claims that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and had ties to al Qaeda, both of which turned out to be false, produced huge costs for the United States---in political, material, and human terms. After seven years of war, tens of thousands of American military personnel remain in Iraq. Estimates of its long-term cost are in the trillions of dollars.15 At the same time, the United States has fought a parallel conflict in Afghanistan. While the Obama administration looks to dramatically reduce the American military presence in Iraq, President Obama has committed tens of thousands of additional U.S. troops to Afghanistan. Distraction. Preeminent states have a tendency to seek to shape world politics in fundamental ways, which can lead to conflicting priorities and unnecessary diversions. As resources, attention, and prestige are devoted to one issue or set of issues, others are necessarily disregarded or given reduced importance. There are always trade-offs and opportunity costs in international politics, even for a state as powerful as the United States. Most states are required to define their priorities in highly specific terms. Because the preeminent state has such a large stake in world politics, it feels the need to be vigilant against any changes that could impact its short-, medium-, or longterm interests. The result is taking on commitments on an expansive number of issues all over the globe. The United States has been very active in its ambition to shape the postCold War world. It has expanded NATO to Russia’s doorstep; waged war in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan; sought to export its own democratic principles and institutions around the world; assembled an international coalition against transnational terrorism; imposed sanctions on North Korea and Iran for their nuclear programs; undertaken ‘‘nation building’’ in Iraq and Afghanistan; announced plans for a missile defense system to be stationed in Poland and the Czech Republic; and, with the United Kingdom, led the response to the recent global financial and economic crisis. By being so involved in so many parts of the world, there often emerges ambiguity over priorities. The United States defines its interests and obligations in global terms, and defending all of them simultaneously is beyond the pale even for a superpower like the United States. Issues that may have received benign neglect during the Cold War, for example, when U.S. attention and resources were almost exclusively devoted to its strategic competition with the Soviet Union, are now viewed as central to U.S. interests. Bearing Disproportionate Costs of Maintaining the Status Quo. As the preeminent power, the United States has the largest stake in maintaining the status quo. The world the United States took the lead in creating---one based on open markets and free trade, democratic norms and institutions, private property rights and the rule of law---has created enormous benefits for the United States. This is true both in terms of reaching unprecedented levels of domestic prosperity and in institutionalizing U.S. preferences, norms, and values globally. But at the same time, this system has proven costly to maintain. Smaller, less powerful states have a strong incentive to free ride, meaning that preeminent states bear a disproportionate share of the costs of maintaining the basic rules and institutions that give world politics order, stability, and predictability. While this might be frustrating to U.S. policymakers, it is perfectly understandable. Other countries know that the United States will continue to provide these goods out of its own self-interest, so there is little incentive for these other states to contribute significant resources to help maintain these public goods.16 The U.S. Navy patrols the oceans keeping vital sea lanes open. During financial crises around the globe---such as in Asia in 1997-1998, Mexico in 1994, or the global financial and economic crisis that began in October 2008--- the U.S. Treasury rather than the IMF takes the lead in setting out and implementing a plan to stabilize global financial markets. The United States has spent massive amounts on defense in part to prevent great power war. The United States, therefore, provides an indisputable collective good---a world, particularly compared to past eras, that is marked by order, stability, and predictability. A number of countries---in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia---continue to rely on the American security guarantee for their own security. Rather than devoting more resources to defense, they are able to finance generous social welfare programs. To maintain these commitments, the United States has accumulated staggering budget deficits and national debt. As the sole superpower, the United States bears an additional though different kind of weight. From the Israeli-Palestinian dispute to the India Pakistan rivalry over Kashmir, the United States is expected to assert leadership to bring these disagreements to a peaceful resolution. The United States puts its reputation on the line, and as years and decades pass without lasting settlements, U.S. prestige and influence is further eroded. The only way to get other states to contribute more to the provision of public goods is if the United States dramatically decreases its share. At the same time, the United States would have to give other states an expanded role and greater responsibility given the proportionate increase in paying for public goods. This is a political decision for the United States---maintain predominant control over the provision of collective goods or reduce its burden but lose influence in how these public goods are used. Creation of Feelings of Enmity and Anti-Americanism. It is not necessary that everyone admire the United States or accept its ideals, values, and goals. Indeed, such dramatic imbalances of power that characterize world politics today almost always produce in others feelings of mistrust, resentment, and outright hostility. At the same time, it is easier for the United States to realize its own goals and values when these are shared by others, and are viewed as legitimate and in the common interest. As a result of both its vast power but also some of the decisions it has made, particularly over the past eight years, feelings of resentment and hostility toward the United States have grown, and perceptions of the legitimacy of its role and place in the world have correspondingly declined. Multiple factors give rise toanti-American sentiment, and anti-Americanism takes different shapes and forms.17 It emerges partly as a response to the vast disparity in power the United States enjoys over other states. Taking satisfaction in themissteps and indiscretions of the imposing Gulliver is a natural reaction. In societies that globalization (which in many parts of the world is interpreted as equivalent to Americanization) has largely passed over, resentment and alienation are felt when comparing one’s own impoverished, ill-governed, unstable society with the wealth, stability, and influence enjoyed by the United States.18 Anti-Americanism also emerges as a consequence of specific American actions and certain values and principles to which the United States ascribes. Opinion polls showed that a dramatic rise in anti-American sentiment followed the perceived unilateral decision to invade Iraq (under pretences that failed to convince much of the rest of the world) and to depose Saddam Hussein and his government and replace itwith a governmentmuchmore friendly to the United States. To many, this appeared as an arrogant and completely unilateral decision by a single state to decide for itselfwhen---and under what conditions---military force could be used. A number of other policy decisions by not just the George W. Bush but also the Clinton and Obama administrations have provoked feelings of anti-American sentiment. However, it seemed that a large portion of theworld had a particular animus for GeorgeW. Bush and a number of policy decisions of his administration, from voiding the U.S. signature on the International Criminal Court (ICC), resisting a global climate change treaty, detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib in Iraq and at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, and what many viewed as a simplistic worldview that declared a ‘‘war’’ on terrorism and the division of theworld between goodand evil.Withpopulations around theworld mobilized and politicized to a degree never before seen---let alone barely contemplated---such feelings of anti-American sentiment makes it more difficult for the United States to convince other governments that the U.S.’ own preferences and priorities are legitimate and worthy of emulation. Decreased Allied Dependence. It is counterintuitive to think that America’s unprecedented power decreases its allies’ dependence on it. During the Cold War, for example, America’s allies were highly dependent on the United States for their own security. The security relationship that the United States had with Western Europe and Japan allowed these societies to rebuild and reach a stunning level of economic prosperity in the decades following World War II. Now that the United States is the sole superpower and the threat posed by the Soviet Union no longer exists, these countries have charted more autonomous courses in foreign and security policy. A reversion to a bipolar or multipolar system could change that, making these allies more dependent on the United States for their security. Russia’s reemergence could unnerve America’s European allies, just as China’s continued ascent could provoke unease in Japan. Either possibility would disrupt the equilibrium in Europe and East Asia that the United States has cultivated over the past several decades. New geopolitical rivalries could serve to create incentives for America’s allies to reduce the disagreements they have with Washington and to reinforce their security relationships with the United States.

#### Hegemony’s no longer key to peace---decline just means allies fill in

Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman ‘13, professor of American foreign relations at San Diego State University, 3/4/13, “Come Home, America,” http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/05/opinion/come-home-america.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit\_th\_20130305&pagewanted=print&\_r=0

EVERYONE talks about getting out of Iraq and Afghanistan. But what about Germany and Japan?

The sequester — $85 billion this year in across-the-board budget cuts, about half of which will come from the Pentagon — gives Americans an opportunity to discuss a question we’ve put off too long: Why we are still fighting World War II?

Since 1947, when President Harry S. Truman set forth a policy to stop further Soviet expansion and “support free peoples” who were “resisting subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures,” America has acted as the world’s policeman.

For more than a century, Britain had “held the line” against aggression in Eurasia, but by World War II it was broke. Only two years after the Allies met at Yalta to hammer out the postwar order, London gave Washington five weeks’ notice: It’s your turn now. The Greek government was battling partisans supplied by Communist Yugoslavia. Turkey was under pressure to allow Soviet troops to patrol its waterways. Stalin was strong-arming governments from Finland to Iran.

Some historians say Truman scared the American people into a broad, open-ended commitment to world security. But Americans were already frightened: in 1947, 73 percent told Gallup that they considered World War III likely.

From the Truman Doctrine emerged a strategy comprising multiple alliances: the Rio Pact of 1947 (Latin America), the NATO Treaty of 1949 (Canada and Northern and Western Europe), the Anzus Treaty of 1951 (Australia and New Zealand) and the Seato Treaty of 1954 (Southeast Asia). Seato ended in 1977, but the other treaties remain in force, as do collective-defense agreements with Japan, South Korea and the Philippines. Meanwhile, we invented the practice of foreign aid, beginning with the Marshall Plan.

It was a profound turn even from 1940, when Franklin D. Roosevelt won a third term pledging not to plunge the United States into war. Isolationism has had a rich tradition, from Washington’s 1796 warning against foreign entanglements to the 1919 debate over the Treaty of Versailles, in which Henry Cabot Lodge argued, “The less we undertake to play the part of umpire and thrust ourselves into European conflicts the better for the United States and for the world.”

World War II, and the relative impotence of the United Nations, convinced successive administrations that America had to fill the breach, and we did so, with great success. The world was far more secure in the second half of the 20th century than in the disastrous first half. The percentage of the globe’s population killed in conflicts between states fell in each decade after the Truman Doctrine. America experienced more wars (Korea, Vietnam, the two Iraq wars, Afghanistan) but the world, as a whole, experienced fewer.

We were not so much an empire — the empire decried by the scholar and veteran Andrew J. Bacevich and celebrated by the conservative historian Niall Ferguson — as an umpire, one that stood for equal access by nation-states to political and economic gains; peaceful arbitration of international conflict; and transparency in trade and business.

But conditions have changed radically since the cold war. When the United States established major bases in West Germany and Japan, they were considered dangerous renegades that needed to be watched. Their reconstructed governments also desired protection, particularly from the Soviet Union and China. NATO’s first secretary general, Hastings Ismay, famously said the alliance existed “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.”

Today, our largest permanent bases are still in Germany and Japan, which are perfectly capable of defending themselves and should be trusted to help their neighbors. It’s time they foot more of the bill or operate their own bases. China’s authoritarian capitalism hasn’t translated into territorial aggression, while Russia no longer commands central and eastern Europe. That the military brass still talk of maintaining the capacity to fight a two-front war — presumably on land in Europe, and at sea in the Pacific — speaks to the irrational endurance of the Truman Doctrine.

Our wars in the Middle East since 2001 doubled down on that costly, outdated doctrine. The domino theory behind the Vietnam War revived under a new formulation: but for the American umpire, the bad guys (Al Qaeda, Iran, North Korea) will win.

Despite his supporters’ expectations, President Obama has followed a Middle East policy nearly identical to his predecessor’s. He took us out of Iraq, only to deepen our commitment to Afghanistan, from which we are just now pulling out. He rejected the most odious counterterrorism techniques of George W. Bush’s administration, but otherwise did not change basic policies. Mr. Obama’s gestures toward multilateralism were not matched by a commensurate commitment from many of our allies.

Cynics assert that the “military-industrial complex” Dwight D. Eisenhower presciently warned against has primarily existed to enrich and empower a grasping, imperialist nation. But America was prosperous long before it was a superpower; by 1890, decades before the two world wars, it was already the world’s largest and richest economy. We do not need a large military to be rich. Quite the opposite: it drains our resources.

Realists contend that if we quit defending access to the world’s natural resources — read, oil — nobody else would. Really? It’s not likely that the Europeans, who depend on energy imports far more than the nation that owns Texas and Alaska would throw up their hands and bury their heads in the sand. It’s patronizing and naïve to think that America is the only truly “necessary” country. Good leaders develop new leaders. The Libyan crisis showed that our allies can do a lot.

The United States can and should pressure Iran and North Korea over their nuclear programs. It must help to reform and strengthen multilateral institutions like the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. It must champion the right of small nations, including Israel, to “freedom from fear.” But there are many ways of achieving these goals, and they don’t all involve more borrowing and spending.

Partisan debates that focus on shaving a percentage point off the Pentagon budget here or there won’t take us where we need to go. Both parties are stuck in a paradigm of costly international activism while emerging powers like China, India, Brazil and Turkey are accumulating wealth and raising productivity and living standards, as we did in the 19th century. The long-term consequences are obvious.

America since 1945 has paid a price in blood, treasure and reputation. Umpires may be necessary, but they are rarely popular and by definition can’t win. Perhaps the other players will step up only if we threaten to leave the field. Sharing the burden of security with our allies is more than a fiscal necessity. It’s the sine qua non of a return to global normalcy.

#### Liberal order is locked in

G. John Ikenberry 11, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University. “A World of Our Making”. Democracy A Journal of Ideas. Issue #21, Summer 2011. http://www.democracyjournal.org/21/a-world-of-our-making-1.php?page=1

The main alternatives to liberal order—both domestic and international—have more or less disappeared. The great liberal international era is not ending. Still, if the liberal order is not in crisis, its governance is. Yet, given the fundamental weakness of the past international orders—brought down by world wars and great economic upheavals—the challenges of reforming and renegotiating liberal world order are, if anything, welcome ones.

There are four reasons to think that some type of updated and reorganized liberal international order will persist. First, the old and traditional mechanism for overturning international order—great-power war—is no longer likely to occur. Already, the contemporary world has experienced the longest period of great-power peace in the long history of the state system. This absence of great-power war is no doubt due to several factors not present in earlier eras, namely nuclear deterrence and the dominance of liberal democracies. Nuclear weapons—and the deterrence they generate—give great powers some confidence that they will not be dominated or invaded by other major states. They make war among major states less rational and there-fore less likely. This removal of great-power war as a tool of overturning international order tends to reinforce the status quo. The United States was lucky to have emerged as a global power in the nuclear age, because rival great powers are put at a disadvantage if they seek to overturn the American-led system. The cost-benefit calculation of rival would-be hegemonic powers is altered in favor of working for change within the system. But, again, the fact that great-power deterrence also sets limits on the projection of American power presumably makes the existing international order more tolerable. It removes a type of behavior in the system—war, invasion, and conquest between great powers—that historically provided the motive for seeking to overturn order. If the violent over-turning of international order is removed, a bias for continuity is introduced into the system.

Second, the character of liberal international order itself—**with or without** American **hegemonic leadership**—reinforces continuity. The complex interdependence that is unleashed in an open and loosely rule-based order generates expanding realms of exchange and investment that result in a growing array of firms, interest groups, and other sorts of political stakeholders who seek to preserve the stability and openness of the system. Beyond this, the liberal order is also relatively easy to join. In the post-Cold War decades, countries in different regions of the world have made democratic transitions and connected themselves to various parts of this system. East European countries and states within the old Soviet empire have joined NATO. East Asian countries, including China, have joined the World Trade Organization (WTO). Through its many multilateral institutions, the liberal international order facilitates integration and offers support for states that are making transitions toward liberal democracy. Many countries have also experienced growth and rising incomes within this order. Comparing international orders is tricky, but the current liberal international order, seen in comparative perspective, does appear to have unique characteristics that encourage integration and discourage opposition and resistance.

Third, the states that are rising today do not constitute a potential united opposition bloc to the existing order. There are so-called rising states in various regions of the world. China, India, Brazil, and South Africa are perhaps most prominent. Russia is also sometimes included in this grouping of rising states. These states are all capitalist and most are democratic. They all gain from trade and integration within the world capitalist system. They all either are members of the WTO or seek membership in it. But they also have very diverse geopolitical and regional interests and agendas. They do not constitute either an economic bloc or a geopolitical one. Their ideologies and histories are distinct. They share an interest in gaining access to the leading institutions that govern the international system. Sometimes this creates competition among them for influence and access. But it also orients their struggles toward the reform and reorganization of governing institutions, not to a united effort to overturn the underlying order.

Fourth, all the great powers have alignments of interests that will continue to bring them together to negotiate and cooperate over the management of the system. All the great powers—old and rising—are status-quo powers. All are beneficiaries of an open world economy and the various services that the liberal international order provides for capitalist trading states. All worry about religious radicalism and failed states. Great powers such as Russia and China do have different geopolitical interests in various key trouble spots, such as Iran and South Asia, and so disagreement and noncooperation over sanctions relating to nonproliferation and other security issues will not disappear. But the opportunities for managing differences with frameworks of great-power cooperation exist and will grow.

#### No will or capability for effective cooperation

Hellmann, 13 (Gunther Hellmann is a senior fellow at the Transatlantic Academy, an initiative of the German Marshall Fund, “The Decline of Multilateralism,” May 2, German Marshall Fund Blog, http://blog.gmfus.org/2013/05/02/the-decline-of-multilateralism/)

WASHINGTON—It is becoming increasingly difficult to argue against retrenchment in Europe and North America. Economic crises and domestic political stagnation absorb energy and consume financial resources. Global military engagements in faraway places cost lives and treasure and often yield limited success. There is growing disillusionment with democracy promotion. Coalitions of sovereign state defenders like the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) make life for the guardians of the liberal world order ever more challenging. The upshot is multilateral fatigue in both Europe and North America.¶ This is a perilous state of affairs because state-transcending global problems are proliferating. “Global Trends 2030,” a study published by the U.S. National Intelligence Council last December, predicts that “the current, largely Western dominance of global structures … will have been transformed by 2030 to be more in line with the changing hierarchy of new economic players.” Yet even if this were to happen, the report argues, it remains unclear to what degree new or reformed institutions “will have tackled growing global challenges.”¶ One might be forgiven for taking this to be an overly optimistic projection. Based on current trends, the outlook is much gloomier, due mainly to the political contagion effects of sovereigntism, the fixation on state sovereignty as an absolute value, and minilateralism. Moisés Naím, who initially coined the term, defined minilateralism as getting together the “smallest possible number of countries needed to have the largest possible impact on solving a particular problem.” The problem is that the smallest possible number may quickly grow very large; Naím’s own book, The End of Power, provides ample evidence that this is so. Consider, for instance, the number and political weight of countries needed to address the problems in the aftermath of a military escalation in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. The minimum number of countries required to effectively regulate global warming does not look any more encouraging. In other words, sovereigntism and minilateralism are symptoms of the crisis of liberal world order — manifestations of The Democratic Disconnect — and not a recipe for curing its ills.¶ In the old days when multilateralism was not yet qualified politically with such adjectives as “assertive” (Madeleine Albright) or “effective” (EU), it served as a descriptor for a fundamental transformation of interstate collaboration in the second half of the 20th century. In an influential article, John Ruggie, a Harvard professor and former high-ranking UN official, showed that the actual practice of multilateralism by the liberal democracies of North America and Europe after World War II was based on a set of generalized principles of conduct. These principles rendered segments of the post-war international order into more reliable cooperative settings, such as the United Nations, or islands of peaceful change, such as the zone of European integration. A readiness to give up sovereignty or, at least to cooperate on the basis of reciprocity, were characteristic elements of multilateralism and what came to be called the “liberal world order.”¶ This liberal order is under strain today because its creators and guardians have themselves strayed from these principles. In the security field, “coalitions of the willing” have undermined multilateralism not only in the UN context, but also in NATO. In economic and financial matters, the politics of European sovereign debt crisis management illustrates both the dangers of executive federalism and the limits of diffuse reciprocity among Europe’s nation states in the world’s most integrated region. “Responsible stakeholders,” the former Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick once said, do more than merely “conduct diplomacy to promote their national interests…They recognize that the international system sustains their peaceful prosperity, so they work to sustain that system.” What was meant as advice to China when Zoellick gave that speech in 2005 can easily be redirected at the liberal democracies of North America and Europe today.¶ There are no easy ways out. Even if the slide toward retrenchment can be stopped, the prospects do not seem bright for the kind of bold new initiatives for global institutional reform that are required. It is debatable whether calls for “democratic internationalism” or a new alignment among “like-minded democracies” can do the trick, but Europe and North America need to realize that their stakes in the liberal order are much higher than those of relative newcomers. Indeed, overcoming crises at home hinges at least in part on sustaining a conducive global environment. Readjusting the balance between minilateralism and multilateralism will help.

### 1nc---un adv

#### AQIM isn’t a threat – can’t project power and won’t lash out at the west

Christina Hellmich 13, reader in IR and ME Studies @ Reading, 1-22-2013, “Mali/Algeria: threat of AQIM to Europe has been overstated,” African Arguments, http://africanarguments.org/2013/01/22/malialgeria-threat-of-aqim-to-europe-has-been-overstated-by-christina-hellmich/

The intervention of French military forces in Mali and the apparent reprisals in the form of the hostage crisis at the In Amenas gas processing plant in Algeria have brought the threat of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) to international attention. The drama of the hostage crisis has shot the hitherto unknown group ‘Signatories in Blood’ and its leader Mokhtar Belmokhtar, variably referred to as an Islamist with ties to bin Ladin and/or a senior al-Qaeda leader, to notoriety overnight and has prompted Western leaders to focus on the possibility of a growing threat of Islamist terrorism on Europe’s southern border. Such tragic events are bound to provoke a strong reaction, yet, upon closer examination, it seems that the idea of a threat to mainland Europe is overstated. Even at a glance, the nature of the attack – hostage-taking for financial gain – is not the kind we have come to associate with al-Qaeda over the years. Rather than reflecting the “signature” suicide attack with mass casualties, the event fits more appropriately into the series of other hostage-takings that have taken place in Algeria in recent years but which have not been on so grand a scale and hence have not gained the same attention as events at In Amenas. It is not only the events which are different: the particular branch of al-Qaeda to which they have been ascribed, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), formerly known as the GSPC (Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat – Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat) stands out for its focus on a local agenda. Although it has allegedly claimed that it supports Osama bin Ladin, the group, which was found to be responsible for car bombings that took place in Algiers in 2007, as well as a number of other local incidents, appears to be more concerned with the goal of overthrowing the Algerian government and the institution of an Islamic state in its place than with bin Ladin’s vision of the reestablishment of the caliphate and global jihad against the West. While it can be argued that the above is not entirely out of touch with al-Qaeda’s stated aims, it is nonetheless a return to the “near enemy” – the forces of occupation and secularisation – that have preoccupied Islamists for almost a century. While the AQIM’s claim to be acting in the name of “al-Qaeda central” feels very much like a convenient piece of flag-waving, current al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri declared in 2006 that America and France were the enemies, indicating a pragmatic approach by which senior al-Qaeda leaders aim to flatter their local affiliates, enabling one side to continue to maintain the impression of its global reach while the other benefits from association with the infamous name. The true extent of any link or co-operative strategy, however, remains open to question. If there is little evidence to suggest genuine cooperation between AQIM and the senior leadership of al-Qaeda, the connection between al-Qaeda and Belmokhtar and his Signatories in Blood is even more tenuous. Sometimes referred to as “Marlboro man” for his cigarette-smuggling exploits, Belmokhtar has a wide-ranging and impressive criminal career which includes drug trafficking, diamond smuggling and the kidnapping of dozens of Westerners, such as diplomats, aid workers and tourists, for ransoms of up to $3 million each. Yet Belmokhtar’s success and growing influence were to be his downfall as far as his membership of AQIM was concerned. While his actions at In Amenas supposedly link Belmokhtar to al-Qaeda in the eyes of the West, he in fact made the news on various jihadist forums for falling out with AQIM for his “fractious behavior”, and either resigned or was formally dismissed from its ranks in late 2012. Such splintering is far from exceptional; indeed, it exemplifies the present state of al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), operating in Yemen, and the recently formed Ansar al-Sharia are a case in point: despite their different names and agendas, the two groups are frequently referred to as one and the same and are conceived of as somehow representing a joint force. This bias amongst commentators towards presenting a united al-Qaeda in various regions of the world is conducive only to resurrecting the popular, yet deeply flawed theory that al-Qaeda operates on a global basis as a cohesive group, with all that this implies for the threat it poses to global security. Today more than ever before, al-Qaeda and its local affiliates are highly fragmented and in disagreement as to their priorities of ideology and strategy. Indeed, the lines of fragmentation only begin here: beyond the increasing internal debate, al-Qaeda and its local affiliates find themselves in direct contest with other, often more established Islamist groups with radically different worldviews and agendas, many of which now enjoy greater popularity because they are not so ready to spill the blood of their fellow Muslims. Whilst the existence of groups such as The Signatories in Blood and the dramatic, violent nature of incidents such as mass hostage-takings and car-bombings heightens fears in the West of a resurgence of the al-Qaeda that caused so much death and destruction on 9/11, the truth is that most of today’s al-Qaeda franchises have a much more limited vision. Thus, when David Cameron announces that Britain must pursue the terrorists with an iron resolve, he unwittingly reinforces a notion of a unified Islamist threat that does not exist in that form in reality. It is a convenient narrative which benefits both the propaganda machine of Islamists and the calls of those in the West who support military action, yet the true picture of those who claim to act in the name of al-Qaeda – both in Africa and elsewhere – is far more nuanced, and much less of a threat to Europe, than we are commonly led to believe.

#### AQIM won’t attack Western interests – no will or capability

Christopher S. Chivvis, senior political scientist @ RAND and Prof @ Johns Hopkins, and Andrew Liepman, senior policy analyst @ RAND and former Dep. Dir. of the National Counterterrorism Center, 2013, “North Africa’s Menace,” RAND, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research\_reports/RR400/RR415/RAND\_RR415.pdf

AQIM would find it harder to recruit suitable operatives. While AQ1M seems to have had no shortage of low-skilled recruits adequate for its typical operations in North Africa, the group would need a different kind of recruit, with more cultural knowledge and sophistication, to operate within Europe without detection. Even here, however. AQ1M could probably find a candidate in the large French North African immigrant population if it really wanted to do so. A more likely explanation for the absence of AQ1M attacks in Europe is that the group does not really place a priority on attacking Europe. Droukdal and his cadre despise Europe for its secularism and colonial past, but they still seem dubious about a Bin Laden-style strategy of attacks against the West. "The pounding that Al Qaeda has taken, including the death of Bin Laden in 2011, may well have discouraged Droukdal and others from mounting an attack on a European target.'2 He may believe (with good reason) that strikes in Europe would do little to build a North African caliphate and much to put himself in the West's crosshairs. In short, while both of AQIM's leaders are notorious for their fiery rhetoric, and while their ties to Al Qaeda's core may have pressured them to shout even louder to try to impress the leadership in Pakistan, the record to date and the real incentives they face suggest that their commitment to Bin Laden and Zawahiri s global terrorist vision may be little more than skin-deep.

#### Status quo power of the purse is SUFFICIENT to ensure both branches deliberate on UN deployments, which solves credibility – additional restrictions on executive authority just link to the flex DA – they’re drastically misreading their Stromseth evidence

Jane E. Stromseth, Law Prof @ Georgetown, October 1995, “Collective Force and Constitutional Responsibility: War Powers in the Post-Cold War Era,” 50 U. Miami L. Rev. 145, ln

If Somalia and Haiti are any guide, we can expect to see several trends at work when the United States participates in U.N.-authorized military operations in the years ahead. First, Congress will scrutinize the objectives of future U.N. operations closely, and will demand a detailed, ongoing account of their goals, costs, and benefits. Even if the President acts unilaterally in deploying U.S. forces, the anticipated congressional scrutiny that is sure to follow will have significant constraining effects. In Haiti, for example, the Clinton Administration deliberately tailored the objectives for U.S. forces narrowly, insisted that a U.S. general be placed in charge of the second phase of the operation, and did a better job than in Somalia of anticipating the challenges involved in making the transition to a U.N.-led operation. In Rwanda, the Administration held back from making any substantial force deployment and opted for a very limited and short-term humanitarian role. More generally, the Administration has taken a cautious stance in the Security Council in voting for and shaping the mandate of future peacekeeping operations. Second, Congress will use its power of the purse more aggressively not only to limit U.S. contributions to peacekeeping in general, but also to limit U.S. involvement in ongoing conflicts, as in Somalia. In the case of Rwanda, for example, Congress made sure that the President's decision to deploy U.S. forces on a limited humanitarian mission would not lead to another Somalia by imposing a funding cut-off and stipulating [\*180] that any change in the U.S. mission from one of strict refugee relief to "peace-enforcing" or "nation-building" not be implemented without the approval of Congress. n159 By virtue of its power of the purse, the Congress ultimately cannot avoid taking a stand when American forces are deployed in U.N. peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations. Third, in situations involving delicate diplomacy and ongoing efforts to resolve a conflict peacefully, as in Haiti, Congress will be reluctant to impose binding prospective limits on the President's military options. This reflects a well-founded concern about undermining the President's ability to engage in coercive diplomacy in a fluid and flexible manner. If the President fails to pursue a coherent and well-articulated policy, however, Congress will step in to fill the policy vacuum, as it did toward the end of the Somalia operation. In the end, the United States Congress, despite its newfound assertiveness, will continue to look to the President to play the leading role in shaping U.S. foreign policy goals for the post-Cold War period. Regardless of who is in the White House, one goal of U.S. foreign policy should be to strengthen the United Nations as a valuable instrument for conflict resolution. Yet because Congress is becoming more willing to challenge the President's foreign policy choices (at least in cases that do not involve threats to core U.S. security interests), the importance of sharing responsibility for decisions to send U.S. forces into hostile situations in U.N.-authorized military operations is increasing. In the years ahead, a continuation of the Cold War "tacit deal" in the U.N. context would deprive the American people of full deliberation by both the executive and legislative branches before American forces are placed in harm's way. A failure to secure and sustain strong domestic support for American involvement in U.N. operations also would leave American policy especially vulnerable to sudden reversal by Congress, which could undermine U.S. credibility among both our allies and our adversaries, and erode the United Nation's ability to respond effectively to the conflict at hand. Building a domestic consensus in favor of American military involvement in U.N. operations often will not be easy. But if Presidents choose to remain on executive-power autopilot, they risk unleashing a congressional counterreaction that could ultimately harm America's ability to maintain a posture of constructive international engagement in the challenging times ahead.

#### Their “now key” card just says that the status quo will boost UN legitimacy – Obama going through the UN on Syria solves

Michale Hirsh, 9-24-2013, “Why the United Nations Is Suddenly Relevant,” Defense One, http://www.defenseone.com/politics/2013/09/why-united-nations-suddenly-relevant/70738/?oref=d-skybox

But now Russia has publicly committed itself to a U.N.-authorized dismantling of Syria's chemical weapons—and if Moscow follows through, that will achieve the double victory of curtailing Assad's activities and co-opting an increasingly roguish Russia back, to some degree, into the international system. The fact is that, as Obama is discovering anew, the Security Council remains the main repository for international legitimacy—which is another way of saying it's the most effective way of getting other nations to ally with the United States. As we are finding out anew, the growing body of U.N. Security Council resolutions is what gives American foreign-policy goals the heft of international law, rather than the stigma of a diktat from Washington.

# 2NC T

#### Restrictions on authority are distinct from conditions

William Conner 78, former federal judge for the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York United States District Court, S. D. New York, CORPORACION VENEZOLANA de FOMENTO v. VINTERO SALES, http://www.leagle.com/decision/19781560452FSupp1108\_11379

Plaintiff next contends that Merban was charged with notice of the restrictions on the authority of plaintiff's officers to execute the guarantees. Properly interpreted, the "conditions" that had been imposed by plaintiff's Board of Directors and by the Venezuelan Cabinet were not "restrictions" or "limitations" upon the authority of plaintiff's agents but rather conditions precedent to the granting of authority. Essentially, then, plaintiff's argument is that Merban should have known that plaintiff's officers were not authorized to act except upon the fulfillment of the specified conditions.

# 2NC CP

#### Self restraint solves better than the aff

Adrian Vermeule 7, Harvard law prof - AND - Eric Posner - U Chicago law, The Credible Executive, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 865

As we noted earlier, legal scholars rarely note the problem of executive credibility, preferring to dwell on the problem of aggrandize- ment by ill-motivated presidents. Ironically, this assumption that presidents seek to maximize power has obscured one of the greatest constraints on aggrandizement, namely, the president’s own interest in maintaining his credibility. Neither a well-motivated nor an ill- motivated president can accomplish his goals if the public does not trust him.34 This concern with reputation may put a far greater check on the president’s actions than do the reactions of the other branches of the government.

#### The counterplan utilizes internal separations of power---the functional result is the same as the aff

Nathan Sales 12, Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason, Self-Restraint and National Security, JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY, 6:227

As we’ve seen, certain officials within military and intelligence agencies – general counsels, legal advisors, and other watchdogs – are responsible for ensuring that national security operations comply with the relevant domestic and international legal requirements. These players intervene to rule out missions they believe would cross a legal line. But sometimes they go beyond that basic function – ensure compliance with the law, full stop – and reject operations that, while lawful, are thought to be undesirable on policy grounds. That is, they impose self-restraints that are stricter than the applicable laws. Why?

One way to answer that question is to consider the individual and institutional incentives that color the behavior of military and intelligence officials. Looking at the government’s national security apparatus through the lens of public choice theory (especially the idea that bureaucrats are rationally self interested actors who seek to maximize their utility152) and basic agency relationships (e.g., the relationships between senior policymakers and the subordinates who act on their behalf153) reveals a complex system in which power is distributed among a number of different nodes. The executive branch “is a ‘they,’ not an ‘it.’”154 The national security community in particular is subdivided into various semi- autonomous entities, each of which promotes its own parochial interests within the system and, in so doing, checks the like ambitions of rival entities;155 the government thus is subject to what Neal Katyal has called the “internal separation of powers.”156 These basic insights into how military and intelligence agencies operate suggest several possible explanations for why self-restraint occurs. As elaborated in this Part, such constraints might result from systematic asymmetries in the expected value calculations of senior policymakers and their lawyers. In addition, as explained in Part IV, self-restraint might occur due to bureaucratic empire building by officials who review operations for compliance with domestic and international law.

A. A Simple Framework

One possible explanation for why the government stays its own hand is expected value asymmetry. This reluctance to push the envelope is a rational and predictable response to powerful bureaucratic incentives. Officials tend to be cautious because the costs they expect to incur as a result of forward-leaning and aggressive action usually are greater than the expected benefits. Similarly, government employment rules and other mechanisms make it easier to internalize onto individual bureaucrats the costs of a failed operation than the benefits of a successful one.157 National security players typically have more to lose from boldness than to gain, and that asymmetry inclines them to avoid risky behavior.158 While all members of the national security community experience some cost-benefit asymmetry, senior policymakers and their lawyers seem especially cautious. Attorneys who review proposed operations for legality therefore look askance at risky missions. They tend to veto proposals that, while legal, could inspire propaganda campaigns by adversaries, expose officials to ruinous investigations, or worse. The result is self-restraint – officials rule out operations that they regard as lawful because of fears they will prove too costly.

#### The PC differential between the plan and the counterplan is tangible

William Howell 5, Harvard University, The Last One Hundred Days, users.polisci.wisc.edu/kmayer/Professional/Last%20100%20Days.pdf

In our estimation, this misconstrues things. By ignoring important policy options outside of the legislative process, scholars have exaggerated the frailty of outgoing presidents and underestimated the inﬂuence they continue to wield. Presidential power does not reduce to bargaining, negotiating, and convincing members of Congress to do things that the president cannot accomplish on his own. Presidents can (and regularly do) act alone, setting public policy without having to rally Congress’s attention, nor even its support (Cooper 2002; Howell 2003; Mayer 2001). With executive orders, proclamations, executive agreements, national security directives, and memoranda, presidents have ample resources to effectuate policy changes that stand little chance of overcoming the collective action problems and multiple veto points that plague the legislative process. And having “lost the attention of the permanent government,” outgoing presidents have every reason to strike out on their own, set new policy, and leave it to the incoming administration to try and steer an alternative course.

#### Congressional backlash to XOs is all bark no bite

Graham G. Dodds 13, Associate Professor, pol sci, Concordia. Take Up Your Pen: Unilateral Presidential Directives in American Politics, 3

Thus, even though the president’s executive order initially elicited so much outrage, and even after more and more controversial details emerged, nothing changed. and it was quickly back to business as usual. It was almost as if controversial unilateral presidential policymaking itself were just business as usual, which is exactly what this book argues ii is.

The Argument of the Book

The above episode is emblematic of a much broader puzzle in U.S. constitutional polities and interbranch relations, as presidents have often used unilateral directives such as executive orders and proclamations to impose controversial policies, and Congress and the courts have at times complained but have seldom offered much in the way of real resistance. This book seeks to explain how we got to this point and why ii matters. The basic argument of the book may be summarized as follows.

#### Counterplan causes congressional follow-on --- solves the whole aff but avoids politics

Duncan 10, Associate Professor of Law at Florida A&M, Winter 2010

(John C., “A Critical Consideration of Executive Orders,” 35 Vt. L. Rev. 333, Lexis)

**Executive orders** can serve the purpose of allowing the President to generate favorable publicity, such as when President Clinton signed an executive order on ethics, n493 and when President George W. Bush signed the first of a series of executive orders to launch his Faith-Based and Community Initiatives. n494 While these orders pay off political debts and thus may seem trivial, they nevertheless **create both infrastructural and regulatory precedents for future administrations**. Hence, they create an avenue for key constituencies of each administration to influence the executive structure as a whole without necessarily permitting that influence to extend to arenas of reserved for Congress. That is, while the President can act more swiftly and precisely to satisfy political commitments, the impact of his action will fall considerably short of analogous congressional action. This in turn serves to satisfy selected constituencies without giving them undue power via the presidency.

Executive orders have even served to create presidential commissions to investigate and research problems, and have been instrumental in solving remedial issues. n495 **Commission reports** that result from such orders can in [\*398] turn put pressure on Congress to enact legislation to respond to those problems. President Franklin Roosevelt pursued this process when he issued a report of the Committee on Economic Security studying financial insecurity due to "unemployment, old age, disability, and health." n496 This report led to the Social Security Act. n497

# 2NC UN adv

#### AQIM won’t attack Western interests – no will or capability

Christopher S. Chivvis, senior political scientist @ RAND and Prof @ Johns Hopkins, and Andrew Liepman, senior policy analyst @ RAND and former Dep. Dir. of the National Counterterrorism Center, 2013, “North Africa’s Menace,” RAND, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research\_reports/RR400/RR415/RAND\_RR415.pdf

AQIM would find it harder to recruit suitable operatives. While AQ1M seems to have had no shortage of low-skilled recruits adequate for its typical operations in North Africa, the group would need a different kind of recruit, with more cultural knowledge and sophistication, to operate within Europe without detection. Even here, however. AQ1M could probably find a candidate in the large French North African immigrant population if it really wanted to do so. A more likely explanation for the absence of AQ1M attacks in Europe is that the group does not really place a priority on attacking Europe. Droukdal and his cadre despise Europe for its secularism and colonial past, but they still seem dubious about a Bin Laden-style strategy of attacks against the West. "The pounding that Al Qaeda has taken, including the death of Bin Laden in 2011, may well have discouraged Droukdal and others from mounting an attack on a European target.'2 He may believe (with good reason) that strikes in Europe would do little to build a North African caliphate and much to put himself in the West's crosshairs. In short, while both of AQIM's leaders are notorious for their fiery rhetoric, and while their ties to Al Qaeda's core may have pressured them to shout even louder to try to impress the leadership in Pakistan, the record to date and the real incentives they face suggest that their commitment to Bin Laden and Zawahiri s global terrorist vision may be little more than skin-deep.

#### Multiple alt-causes to the success of UN CT strategy in North Africa – legitimacy isn’t the key internal link and is high in the status quo, their author

James Cockayne 10, Senior Fellow and Director of the New York Office of the Center on Global Terrror, et al., September 2010, “Implementing the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in North Africa,” Global CT, http://www.globalct.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/North\_Africa\_Report\_Final.pdf

The Role of the United Nations and the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy The Strategy provides a shared and broad-based normative framework that can allow a variety of parties to overcome existing obstacles to effective cooperation, while also developing counterterrorism cooperation in the subregion into a more prevention-oriented system and not simply a mechanism for bolstering the subregion’s security apparatus. For the Strategy to have a sustained impact in North Africa, however, states and other relevant stakeholders in the subregion must “utilize this [historic] tool and translate it into action.”123 Adopted unanimously by the UN General Assembly in September 2006, the Strategy marked the first time that all UN member states agreed on a common strategic framework for addressing the terrorist threat.124 Although it rests largely on a synthesis of preexisting UN counterterrorism-related resolutions, norms, and measures adopted by the Security Council, General Assembly, and other UN bodies, the Strategy pulls them together into a single, coherent, and universally adopted framework.125 As such, it broadened political support for UN counterterrorism efforts by reflecting the consensus of the entire UN membership rather than just the Security Council, which had in previous years come to dominate many actors’ understanding of UN counterterrorism efforts.126 A central reason for that broadening of political support is that the global framework includes not only an emphasis on law enforcement and other security measures in combating terrorism, but also measures to address real and perceived grievances and underlying social, economic, and political conditions that can contribute to the emergence and spread of terrorism. The Strategy’s four-pillar agenda consists of measures to address conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, measures to prevent and combat terrorism, capacity building, and ensuring a human rights– and rule of law–based approach to countering the threat. It thus places counterterrorism in the context of a broad effort to foster states’ own capacity to ensure the security of their populations. This may be of significant utility in helping to structure and coordinate the relations of the subregion with external donors and assistance providers, not least to ensure that a broad spectrum of counterterrorism assistance and capacity-building is provided and not confined to a narrow focus on military and security assistance. The Strategy reinforces the notion that although states have primary responsibility to protect their citizens from terrorism and other security threats, an effective long-term counterterrorism plan requires a multi-stakeholder approach. The Strategy highlights the role that the UN system and regional and subregional bodies, as well as civil society, can play in working with states to implement the framework. Moreover, it recognizes the linkages between terrorism and other illicit activities, such as organized crime, corruption, and illicit trafficking in drugs and small arms and light weapons, and the need for comprehensive approaches to addressing these related security challenges. It proposes an inclusive approach to countering terrorism and its underlying causes at the national level, advocating “joined-up” or “whole-of-government” approaches, treating terrorism not just as a “security” issue, but as intimately intertwined with development challenges. Also, the Strategy provides a common framework for states, the United Nations, regional and subregional bodies, and civil society to coordinate their efforts better, creating a basis of legitimacy for cooperative action against terrorism over the long term. The Strategy is particularly significant at a political level for the countries of North Africa, which have been among the most vocal critics within the Group of 77127 of the Security Council’s enhanced post- 9/11 counterterrorism role. By imposing general counterterrorism obligations on all UN member states, the Group of 77 saw the council as usurping the norm-setting role that has traditionally belonged to the more representative General Assembly. Excluded from the decision-making process and from participation in the monitoring mechanisms created by the council, many states have not felt any real ownership of the counterterrorism commitments imposed by the council and the counterterrorism initiatives launched under its authority. In addition, North African countries and other Group of 77 members argued that the council response to the threat largely ignored terrorism’s so-called root causes, or what the Strategy refers to as “conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism,” which representatives of these countries have claimed to be of paramount importance in tackling terrorism. The Strategy and the shift away from the discourse of a “global war on terror” offer the opportunity to revitalize discussion of terrorism and counterterrorism in North Africa, moving beyond an exclusive focus on the military and other security-related aspects of the response and beginning to understand how international cooperation in and beyond the subregion can address the links among security, development, and the rule of law. As suggested below, the Strategy may provide the framework for deeper intraregional dialogue and cooperation on terrorism in the subregion, offering a frame of reference and cooperation that sidesteps existing subregional tensions. There is a danger that cooperation in Strategy implementation will respond to the dictates of processes in New York rather than the needs on the ground in the subregion. This danger is amplified by the varied nature of terrorist and related transnational threats throughout this subregion; the risk is that cooperation will emerge not as a result of organic cooperation between the states of the subregion in an attempt to deal with common problems, but in response to incentives from New York dealing with “New York problems.” To avoid such a “skewing,” Strategy implementation in the subregion will require contributions from a wide range of stakeholders, starting with member states, but also including the UN system, relevant regional and subregional bodies, and civil society. It also might require a more sustained UN counterterrorism presence on the ground to ensure effective communication with the states and stakeholders of the subregion. The final section of this report discusses at greater length what such sustained implementation may involve.

#### Their terminal impact (Jacobs) is from a far right Christian magazine talking about biblical prophecy – throw this out

Cindy Jacobs, 4-13-2011, “Regional Conflict Could Spark World War III,” Charisma Magazine, http://www.charismamag.com/site-archives/570-news/featured-news/13249-regional-conflict-could-spark-world-war-iii

Many people have been asking me to update them regarding current events on several issues for which we have previously sent out alerts; notably, Egypt, a possible World War III, and Japan. In addition, there have been a number of prophetic words that seem to indicate that there is a very real threat of an earthquake on the west coast of America. Some of you might want to review the prophetic word from the Apostolic Council of Prophets that we sent out for 2011 (ACPE Word of the Lord 2011), wherein we spoke of the potential for a regional escalating into a world war. Considering this, I have felt the need to look at what is happening in the Middle East in the context of the ACPE word and report what could possibly transpire that might start a world war. I say possibly because I believe that God warns his prophets so they can sound an alarm and call for intercessory prayer to avert what Satan might be trying to do.

#### No great power draw in

Schuyler 7(Dave, “Restating the U.S. Policy of Nuclear Deterrence,” Last Mod Nov 13, http://theglitteringeye.com/?p=459)

A recent post on nuclear deterrence on American Future drew several comments on another blog. The blogger at American Future, Marc Schulman, outlines the responses in this post. In summary the responses were that a nuclear response to a nuclear terrorist attack was itself terrorism, a nuclear retaliation would inevitably draw other state actors to escalate the exchange, a nuclear retaliation would be collective punishment, and attacking Muslim holy sites would be counterproductive. I agree with this last point but I want to deal with each of the other points in some detail. \* A nuclear response to a nuclear terrorist attack is terrorism.There’s no generally accepted definition of terrorism so before tackling this point I’ll propose one. Ignoring the issue of state actors vs. non-state actors I think that a terrorist attack is an attack on civilians or civilian assets whose purpose is to provoke terror. It has no other tactical or strategic significance. Any nuclear response by the United States would be against military or governmental facilities, sites involved in military production, or command and control. The objective would be to eliminate the possibility of future attacks or the support for those who would engage in future attacks. That such a response would inevitably result in massive civilian casualties is sad. But such a response would not, by definition, be terrorism \* A nuclear retaliation Iran in response to a terrorist nuclear attack would inevitably draw France, Russia, and China to enter the conflict. To believe this you must believe that France, Russia, and China will act irrationally. There is absolutely no reason to believe that this is the case. All three nations know that their intervention against the U. S. would result in total annihilation. There are other issues as well and let’s examine the two distinct cases: Russia on the one hand and France and China on the other. As a major non-Gulf producer of oil Russia would be in a position to benefit enormously in case of a disruption of Gulf oil production or shipment. That being the case they would publicly deplore a retaliation against Iran but privately rejoice. Both France and China are in an extremely delicate position. A nuclear response by either would result in total annihilation and, equally importantly, wouldn’t keep the oil flowing. Lack of a blue water navy means that both nations are completely at the mercy of the United States’s (or more specifically the U. S. Navy’s) willingness to keep shipments of oil moving out of the Gulf. China is particularly vulnerable since it has only about two weeks’ worth of strategic oil reserves. Neither France nor China has any real ability to project military force other than nuclear force beyond their borders. They’d be upset. But they’re in no position to do anything about it.

# 2NC Warfighting adv

#### Polarity doesn’t determine the likelihood of war

Geller 99---Geller and Singer, 99 – \*Chair of the Department of Political Science @ Wayne State University (Daniel S and Joel David, Nations at war: a scientific study of international conflict, p. 116-117)

Note – Hopf = Visiting Professor of Peace Research, The Mershon Center, Ohio State University PhD in pol sci from Columbia.

Levy = Board of Governors’ Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University and an Affiliate at the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. Past president of the International Studies Association and of the Peace Science Society. Has held tenured positions at the UT Austin, and U Minnesota, and visiting positions at Stanford, Harvard, Yale University, Columbia, Tulane, and NYU. Received the American Political Science Association’s Award for the best dissertation in IR as well as the Distinguished Scholar Award from the Foreign Policy Analysis Section of the International Studies Association. PhD

Hopf (1991) and Levy (1984) examine the frequency, magnitude and severity of wars using polarity (Hopf) and “system size” (Levy) as predictors. Hopf’s database includes warfare in the European subsystems for the restricted temporal period of 1495–1559. The system is classified as multipolar for the years 1495–1520 and as bipolar for the years 1521–1559. Hopf reports that the amount of warfare during those two periods was essentially equivalent. He concludes that polarity has little relationship to patterns of war for the historical period under examination. Levy (1984) explores a possible linear association between the number of great powers (system size) and war for the extended temporal span of 1495 – 1974. His findings coincide with those of Hopf; he reports that the frequency, magnitude and severity of war in the international system is unrelated to the number of major powers in the system.

#### Other countries will fill in if they can’t free-ride anymore

Wilkinson 10---frmr Cato fellow. MA in philosophy, Northern Illinois U. (Hands off the warfare state!, 4 October 2010, http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2010/10/military\_spending)

But not so fast! According to AEI's Arthur Brooks, Heritage's Ed Feulner, and the Weekly Standard's Bill Kristol, any attempt to shrink the big government of garrisons and guns will "make the world a more dangerous place, and ... impoverish our future." Whose side are you on, tea partiers? Messrs Brooks, Feulner, and Kristol assert that military spending "is neither the true source of our fiscal woes, nor an appropriate target for indiscriminate budget-slashing in a still-dangerous world". They aver that "anyone seeking to restore our fiscal health should look at entitlements first, not across-the-board cuts aimed at our men and women in uniform". This is bogus. Sure, Medicare and Social Security cost more, but spending on war and its infrastructure remains a titanic expense. The path from debt, whether for governments or families, is to cut back across the board. If you're in the red and you spend a ridiculous amount of your income on your porcelain egret collection, the fact that you spend even more on rent and student loan payments is obviously no excuse not to cut back on egret miniatures. And, in fact, America's martial profligacy is a "true source of our fiscal woes". According to Joseph Stiglitz and Linda Bilmes: There is no question that the Iraq war added substantially to the federal debt. This was the first time in American history that the government cut taxes as it went to war. The result: a war completely funded by borrowing. U.S. debt soared from $6.4 trillion in March 2003 to $10 trillion in 2008 (before the financial crisis); at least a quarter of that increase is directly attributable to the war. And that doesn't include future health care and disability payments for veterans, which will add another half-trillion dollars to the debt.As a result of two costly wars funded by debt, our fiscal house was in dismal shape even before the financial crisis---and those fiscal woes compounded the downturn. Perhaps because they see the wrong-headedness of their line of defence, Messrs Brooks, Feulner, and Kristol retreat to the claim that in order to make money, America has to spend money: Furthermore, military spending is not a net drain on our economy. It is unrealistic to imagine a return to long-term prosperity if we face instability around the globe because of a hollowed-out U.S. military lacking the size and strength to defend American interests around the world. Global prosperity requires commerce and trade, and this requires peace. But the peace does not keep itself. Again: completely shabby. The real question at issue here is how much military spending is necessary to keep the trade routes open, and how much of that the United States must kick in. By asserting, rather audaciously, that America's level of military spending is not a "net drain" on the economy, they imply the return on the marginal trillion is positive. I doubt it. The return on the three trillion blown on the war on Iraq, for example, is certainly much, much, much less than zero once the cost of removing financial and human capital from productive uses is taken into account. Also, if prosperity requires peace, it's utterly mysterious how starting expensive wars is supposed to help. When thinking about peace as a global public good, it can help to recall that the United States is not the only country that benefits from it. Suppose the United States were to cut its military budget in half to something like the size of the combined budgets of the next five or six countries. This might not suffice if you're itching to invade Yeman, Iran, and who knows what else Mr Kristol's got his eye on. But if the argument is that the purpose of military spending is to secure a calm climate conducive to global trade, it's hard to believe $350 billion per annum will not suffice. But let's say it doesn't, for the sake of argument. Will nations with an equally strong interest in keeping the peace simply faint on their divans whenever a commerce-threatening war breaks out? Of course not. Even the French are perfectly capable of keeping the sea lanes open. The reality is that much of the world is free-riding off the security provided by American military dominance. Were American taxpayers to refuse to bear so much of the burden of keeping the world safe for Danish container ships, other countries would surely step up. Furthermore, considerations of basic distributive fairness suggest they should.

#### Obama’s personality solves their international coalition arguments regardless of intervention

Mead 11 – James Clarke Chace Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities at Bard College and Editor-at-Large of The American Interest magazine, former Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (8/22, Walter Russell, American Interest, “W Gets A Third Term In The Middle East”, http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2011/08/22/w-gets-a-third-term-in-the-middle-east/)

The most irritating argument anyone could make in American politics is that President Obama, precisely because he seems so liberal, so vacillating, so nice, is a more effective neoconservative than President Bush. As is often the case, the argument is so irritating partly because it is so true.¶ President Obama is pushing a democracy agenda in the Middle East that is as aggressive as President Bush’s; he adopts regime change by violence if necessary as a core component of his regional approach and, to put it mildly, he is not afraid to bomb. But where President Bush’s tough guy posture (“Bring ‘Em On!”) alienated opinion abroad and among liberals at home, President Obama’s reluctant warrior stance makes it easier for others to work with him.¶ In some ways, President Obama’s Middle Eastern foreign policy does for President Bush’s democratization policy what President Eisenhower did for President Truman’s containment doctrine. In both cases, a necessary and useful foreign policy had become deeply unpopular; Eisenhower implemented containment but made the country feel better about it — partly by rhetorical shifts, partly by tweaking the execution. Obama is trying to do the same thing with Bush’s transformation agenda.¶ In many ways we are living through George W. Bush’s third term in the Middle East, and neither President Obama’s friends nor his enemies want to admit it. President Obama, in his own way and with his own twists, continues to follow the core Bush policy of nudging and sometimes pushing nasty regimes out of power, aligning the US with the wave of popular discontent in the region even as that popular sentiment continues to dislike, suspect and reject many aspects of American power and society. And that policy continues to achieve ambivalent successes: replacing old and crustily anti-American regimes, rooted deeply in the culture of terror and violence within and beyond their borders, with weaker, more open and — on some issues at least — more accommodating ones.¶ Additionally, the combination of tough military attacks on Al Qaeda and its affiliates wherever they rear their ugly heads and the opening of new political space in the Middle East continues to marginalize the acolytes of Bin Laden. There was a time when Bin Laden hoped to become the voice of Arab protest and resistance; the US had killed his dream long before Team Six got to his house.¶ Obama is better than Bush at building international coalitions and managing the appearance of American policy in a contentious world. In Libya, Obama faced a constraint not dissimilar to Bush’s situation in Iraq. Both presidents got something from the Security Council, but neither got enough. Bush responded by defying the body over the failed “second resolution” on Iraq; Obama simply ignored the gap between what the resolution allowed and what the US needed, stretching a humanitarian mandate to effect regime change.¶ Gratuitous snubs to global sensibilities were one of the Bush administration’s most expensive failings; when the WMD in Iraq did not appear and the occupation turned into a nightmare, an infuriated world (and many Americans) rejoiced at what they saw as a well deserved comeuppance. President Obama’s more conciliatory stance does nothing to win over America’s enemies — but it makes it harder for those enemies to mobilize world opinion on their side. He has also cut the legs off the anti-war movements at home by depriving it of a clear target. Nobody in America much likes all the wars we are fighting in so many obscure places — but the anti-war movement has been reduced to its irrelevant hard core.¶ Obama has plenty of faults of his own, and, like Bush’s, his mistakes can be costly. He has never understood the dynamics of the US-Israel relations or the Israeli-Palestinian issue. He clearly underestimated the conflict in Libya; we shall see whether he and the allies have underestimated the problems of reconstruction. The combination of a surge in Afghanistan with the naming of a date for withdrawal sent mixed signals and probably encouraged the Taliban to fight on.¶ But since the world hates Obama less than it hated Bush, the US and the global press are more forgiving of his errors, and pass lightly over shortcomings and contradictions that, if Bush were still in the White House, would be the mainstay of the nightly news. When was the last time you read something about Obama’s failure to close Guantanamo?¶ The result is that the advance of US power in the Middle East that began under Bush has continued and developed under Obama. Our worst enemies disappear; the Gulf monarchies are more dependent on us than ever; the coalition against Iran deepens and strengthens.

#### The public is strongly anti-war --- Afghanistan & Iraq war-weariness prove --- that means Congress will work against warfighting efforts

Charles Blow 8/30/13, NYT op-ed columnist, “War-Weariness,” http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/31/opinion/blow-war-weariness.html

The problem is that America seems war weary.¶ If the administration is correct, this is a human rights tragedy. Something should be done. But must we always be the ones to do it? Does protecting America’s interest mean policing the world’s horrors?¶ When innocent lives are taken in the most reprehensible of ways, to whom do their souls cry? Whence comes their justice? Is America’s moral leadership in the world carved out by the tip of its sword?¶ These are profound questions that go straight to the heart of how we see ourselves on a rapidly changing planet. Are we the arbiters of the world’s atrocities?¶ It would seem that Americans are conflicted about that role, at least in this case.¶ An NBC News poll released Friday found that while 58 percent of Americans believe that the use of chemical weapons by any country is a “red line” requiring a significant United States response, including military action, only 42 percent believe that we should take such action in Syria and only 21 percent are convinced that such action is in our national interest. Fifty percent of Americans believe that we should take no significant military action.¶ To put that in context, according to data from Gallup, the highest disapproval rate for military action in the last 30 years was 45 percent for military action in Haiti in 1994 and in Kosovo and the Balkans in 1999.¶ Our current conflicts, no doubt, weigh heavily on Americans’ minds.¶ The war in Afghanistan is now in its 12th year, and the Iraq war lasted nearly 9 years. In fact, only 7 of the past 30 years have seen the United States not engaged in military action in some part of the world, according to Gallup.¶ And most of the countries where the United States has been engaged are halfway around the world, where few Americans are likely to have been or even be familiar with.¶ In fact, according to the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, only 50 percent of Americans can correctly locate Syria on a map, and an April report from Pew found that fewer than one in five Americans have followed the news about Syria very closely since May 2011.¶ Convincing Americans that a place they hardly know about poses a security threat may prove difficult. We all remember that the Iraq war was based on faulty intelligence trafficked by the Bush administration and regurgitated by the media. This damaged folks’ faith and left them dubious.

#### Congress doesn’t enhance cred --- narrow majorities make us look unsure --- empirics prove

* the “Congress = Anti-War” ev proves that majorities would be narrow

John Yoo 4, Emanuel S. Heller Professor of Law @ UC-Berkeley Law, visiting scholar @ the American Enterprise Institute, former Fulbright Distinguished Chair in Law @ the University of Trento, served as a deputy assistant attorney general in the Office of Legal Council at the U.S. Department of Justice between 2001 and 2003, received his J.D. from Yale and his undergraduate degree from Harvard, “War, Responsibility, and the Age of Terrorism,” UC-Berkeley Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1015&context=johnyoo

It is also not obvious that congressional deliberation ensures consensus. Legislative authorization might reflect ex ante consensus before military hostilities, but it also might merely represent a bare majority of Congress or an unwillingness to challenge the President’s institutional and political strengths regardless of the merits of the war. It is also no guarantee of an ex post consensus after combat begins. Thus, the Vietnam War, which Ely and others admit satisfied their constitutional requirements for congressional approval, did not meet with a consensus over the long term but instead provoked some of the most divisive politics in American history. It is also difficult to claim that the congressional authorizations to use force in Iraq, of either the 1991 or 2002 varieties, reflected a deep consensus over the merits of war there. Indeed, the 1991 authorization barely survived the Senate and the 2002 one received significant negative votes and has become an increasingly divisive issue in national political and the 2004 presidential election. Congress’s authorization for the use of force in Iraq in 2003 has not served as a guarantee of political consensus. ¶ Conversely, a process without congressional declarations of war does not necessarily result in less deliberation or consensus. Nor does it seem to inexorably lead to poor or unnecessary war goals. Perhaps the most important example, although many might consider it a “war,” is the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union from 1946 through 1991. War was fought throughout the world by the superpowers and their proxies during this period. Yet the only war arguably authorized by Congress – and even this is a debated point – was Vietnam. The United States waged war against Soviet proxies in Korea and Vietnam, the Soviet Union fought in Afghanistan, and the two almost came into direct conflict during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Despite the division over Vietnam, there appeared to be a significant bipartisan consensus on the overall strategy (containment) and goal (defeat of the Soviet Union, protection of Europe and Japan), and Congress consistently devoted significant resources to the creation of a standing military to achieve them. Different conflicts during this period that did not benefit from congressional authorization, such as conflicts in Korea, Grenada, Panama, and Kosovo, did not suffer from a severe lack of consensus, at least at the outset. Korea initially received the support of the nation’s political leadership, and it seems that support declined only once battlefield reverses had occurred. Grenada and Panama did not seem to suffer from any serious political challenge, and while Kosovo met with some political resistance, it does not appear to have been significant.

#### Nobody perceives Congressional participation as a sign of resolve

Matthew Waxman 8/25/13, Professor of Law @ Columbia and Adjunct Senior Fellow for Law and Foreign Policy @ CFR, “The Constitutional Power to Threaten War,” Forthcoming in Yale Law Journal, vol. 123, August 25, 2013, SSRN

The credibility-enhancing effects of legislative constraints on threats are subject to dispute. Some studies question the assumptions underpinning theories of audience costs – specifically the idea that democratic leaders suffer domestic political costs to failing to make good on their threats, and therefore that their threats are especially credible171 – and others question whether the empirical data supports claims that democracies have credibility advantages in making threats.172 Other scholars dispute the likelihood that leaders will really be punished politically for backing down, especially if the threat was not explicit and unambiguous or if they have good policy reasons for doing so.173 Additionally, even if transparency in democratic institutions allows domestic dissent from threats of force to be visible to foreign audiences, it is not clear that adversaries would interpret these mechanisms as political scientists expect in their models of strategic interaction, in light of various common problems of misperception in international relations.174 These disputes are not just between competing theoretical models but also over the links between any of the models and real-world political behavior by states. At this point there remains a dearth of good historical evidence as to how foreign leaders interpret political maneuvers within Congress regarding threatened force.

# 1NR polx

### Timeframe

#### The timeframe for econ decline wars is fast

Turpin 8 (Craig, Executive editor of New Jersey newspapers, 10/14, “Critical Mass: Economic leadership or dictatorship,” http://www.nj.com/cranford/index.ssf/2008/10/critical\_mass\_economic\_leaders.html)

A global economic collapse will also increase the chance of global conflict. As economic systems shut down, so will the distribution systems for resources like petroleum and food. It is certainly within the realm of possibility that nations perceiving themselves in peril will, if they have the military capability, use force, just as Japan and Nazi Germany did in the mid-to-late 1930s. Every nation in the world needs access to food and water. Industrial nations -- the world powers of North America, Europe, and Asia -- need access to energy. When the world economy runs smoothly, reciprocal trade meets these needs. If the world economy collapses, the use of military force becomes a more likely alternative. And given the increasingly rapid rate at which world affairs move; the world could devolve to that point very quickly.

### Multilateralism

#### US economic decline wrecks multilateral cooperation --- accesses every impact

Harris & Burrows 9 Mathew, PhD European History @ Cambridge, counselor of the U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer, member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f\_0016178\_13952.pdf

Perhaps more than lessons, history loves patterns. Despite widespread changes in the world today, there is little to suggest that the future will not resemble the past in several respects. The report asserts that, under most scenarios, the trend toward greater diffusion of authority and power that has been ongoing for a couple of decades is likely to accelerate because of the emergence of new global players, the worsening institutional deficit, potential growth in regional blocs, and enhanced strength of non-state actors and networks. The multiplicity of actors on the international scene could either strengthen the international system, by filling gaps left by aging post-World War II institutions, or could further fragment it and incapacitate international cooperation. The diversity in both type and kind of actor raises the likelihood of fragmentation occurring over the next two decades, particularly given the wide array of transnational challenges facing the international community. Because of their growing geopolitical and economic clout, the rising powers will enjoy a high degree of freedom to customize their political and economic policies rather than fully adoptingWestern norms. They are also likely to cherish their policy freedom to maneuver, allowing others to carry the primary burden for dealing with **terrorism, climate change, proliferation, energy security,** and other system maintenance issues. Existing multilateral institutions, designed for a different geopolitical order, appear too rigid and cumbersome to undertake new missions, accommodate changing memberships, and augment their resources. Nongovernmental organizations and philanthropic foundations, concentrating on specific issues, increasingly will populate the landscape but are unlikely to affect change in the absence of concerted efforts by multilateral institutions or governments. Efforts at greater inclusiveness, to reflect the emergence of the newer powers, may make it harder for international organizations to tackle transnational challenges. Respect for the dissenting views of member nations will continue to shape the agenda of organizations and limit the kinds of solutions that can be attempted. An ongoing financial crisis and prolonged recession would tilt the scales even further in the direction of a fragmented and dysfunctional international system with a **heightened risk of conflict**. The report concluded that the rising BRIC powers (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) seem averse to challenging the international system, as Germany and Japan did in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but this of course could change if their widespread hopes for greater prosperity become frustrated and the current benefits they derive from a globalizing world turn negative.’

#### Effective global multilateralism makes nuclear war impossible – checks escalation from every other impact

Gwynne Dyer, Canadian journalist, columnist, and military analyst, December 30, 2004, “The End of War,” online: http://www.commondreams.org/views04/1230-05.htm

War is deeply embedded in our history and our culture, probably since before we were even fully human, but weaning ourselves away from it should not be a bigger mountain to climb than some of the other changes we have already made in the way we live, given the right incentives. And we have certainly been given the right incentives: The holiday from history that we have enjoyed since the early '90s may be drawing to an end, and another great-power war, fought next time with nuclear weapons, may be lurking in our future.

The "firebreak" against nuclear weapons use that we began building after Hiroshima and Nagasaki has held for well over half a century now. But the proliferation of nuclear weapons to new powers is a major challenge to the stability of the system. So are the coming crises, mostly environmental in origin, which will hit some countries much harder than others, and may drive some to desperation.

Add in the huge impending shifts in the great-power system as China and India grow to rival the United States in GDP over the next 30 or 40 years and it will be hard to keep things from spinning out of control. With good luck and good management, we may be able to ride out the next half-century without the first-magnitude catastrophe of a global nuclear war, but the potential certainly exists for a major die-back of human population.

We cannot command the good luck, but good management is something we can choose to provide. It depends, above all, on preserving and extending the multilateral system that we have been building since the end of World War II. The rising powers must be absorbed into a system that emphasizes co-operation and makes room for them, rather than one that deals in confrontation and raw military power. If they are obliged to play the traditional great-power game of winners and losers, then history will repeat itself and everybody loses.

Our hopes for mitigating the severity of the coming environmental crises also depend on early and concerted global action of a sort that can only happen in a basically co-operative international system.

When the great powers are locked into a military confrontation, there is simply not enough spare attention, let alone enough trust, to make deals on those issues, so the highest priority at the moment is to keep the multilateral approach alive and avoid a drift back into alliance systems and arms races. And there is no point in dreaming that we can leap straight into some never-land of universal brotherhood; we will have to confront these challenges and solve the problem of war within the context of the existing state system.

#### Global economic crisis jacks multilateral institutions

Rothkopf 9 – David Rothkopf, Visiting Scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 3-11, 2009, “Security and the Financial Crisis,” Testimony Before the House Armed Services Committee, CQ Congressional Testimony, lexis

In fact, during the past few months, as the crisis has brought down governments (Iceland) and threatened others (across Eastern Europe), it has also had more pernicious effects that are harder to see. Greatest of these is certainly its impact on the United States, reducing the resources available to this country **as well as seemingly eating away at the political will that would be required if the U.S. were to play the active, broad-ranging internationally stabilizing role** that has marked our foreign policy since the end of the Second World War. Adding to this is the weakening of our core alliances, not in terms of the desire to collaborate, but rather because allies have been preoccupied by challenges at home. Some leading allies, notably the EU, have in recent weeks seen the viability of their core institutions questioned. The weakening of international institutions has been a related consequence of the crisis. Without a degree of financial support and political flexibility for vital organizations like the IMF and the World Bank that seems unlikely at the moment, we may well find ourselves at a true crossroads for the international system. At precisely the instance that the crisis has revealed a need for greater global regulatory oversight and stronger financial institutions to prevent and to respond to crisis, rising nationalism, the political imperative of turning inward, and limited resources threaten existing institutions with irrelevance and needed new ones with being stillborn.

#### Crisis causes a whole-scale reevaluation of international institutions---reforms and new orders will be conflictual and ineffective

Rothkopf 9 – David Rothkopf, Visiting Scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 3-11, 2009, “Security and the Financial Crisis,” Testimony Before the House Armed Services Committee, CQ Congressional Testimony, lexis

--This period of crisis is likely, as noted above, to correspond to a remaking of the international system. Change is likely to be required not only in areas pertaining to the crisis (fixing multilateral banks, creating global regulatory regimes and perhaps authorities) but it is also likely to be required within the UN, within the NPT, within the WTO and in new groups such as that which will be required once a global climate agreement is reached. If these institutions are born of tension, undercapitalized, conflict laden, or developed precipitously in response to the crisis, the international system/order will suffer and it may take years to recover. Also, fault-lines may be institutionalized within these institutions as they have been within others in the past (see complaints re: North-South, East- West issues in the IFIs or the UN).

### Economy Impact---Royal

#### Global economic crisis causes war---strong statistical support

Royal 10 – Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow.¶ First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown.¶ Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4¶ Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write:¶ The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89)¶ Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions.¶ Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. “Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force.¶ In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.¶ This observation is not contradictory to other perspectives that link economic interdependence with a decrease in the likelihood of external conflict, such as those mentioned in the first paragraph of this chapter. Those studies tend to focus on dyadic interdependence instead of global interdependence and do not specifically consider the occurrence of and conditions created by economic crises. As such, the view presented here should be considered ancillary to those views.

### 2NC---Top of Docket

#### It’s the top priority

David Jackson, 10-24-2013, “Obama's day: Immigration again,” USA Today, http://www.usatoday.com/story/theoval/2013/10/24/obama-immigration-health-care-dnc-womens-forum/3176469/

Amid criticism of the health care rollout, President Obama turns attention Thursday to what has become his top legislative priority: Immigration. Obama delivers a mid-morning speech calling on Congress to pass what the White House calls "common sense immigration reform."

#### Top of the docket

Carrie Dunn 10/20/13 NBC Politics, “Did shutdown 'poison the well' for immigration reform?,” http://nbcpolitics.nbcnews.com/\_news/2013/10/20/21026903-did-shutdown-poison-the-well-for-immigration-reform?lite

The ink wasn’t even dry on the bill to end the debt impasse Wednesday night before the president revived the issue of immigration reform as a top domestic priority. ¶ “Let's not leave this problem to keep festering for another year or two years or three years,” President Barack Obama said, even as House Republicans prepared to swallow a debt bill that contained almost no concessions from Democrats. “This can and should get done by the end of this year.”

### 2NC---AT: Farm Bill Thumper

#### Farm bill comes after immigration

Georgia Pabst, 10-18-2013, “Federal government now turns to farm bill,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/federal-government-now-turns-to-farm-bill-b99123269z1-228409571.html

With the end of the government shutdown, farmers and advocates for those who rely on federal food assistance programs are pushing for a new farm bill to win approval from Congress. The day after the government reopened this week, President Barack Obama called a new farm bill his third legislative priority, after a budget deal and immigration reform. "What are we waiting for?" Obama asked. "Let's get it done." The long-delayed farm bill pays for farm programs and food nutrition programs, such as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, generally called food stamps. But like most issues these days, the farm bill has become part of a contentious political battle between Republicans in the House and Democrats in the Senate.

#### **No evidence that Obama will spend capital on the farm bill --- doesn’t affect our DA**

### 2NC --- AT: Budget Thumper

#### **No evidence that Obama will spend capital on the budget --- doesn’t affect our DA**

#### **Budget will pass without Obama push**

Patrick Springer 10-26, Forum News Service- Grand Forks Herald, “N.D. senators optimistic on passage of farm bill,” http://www.grandforksherald.com/event/article/id/276746/

FARGO – North Dakota’s U.S. senators are optimistic Congress will pass a new farm bill because savings it could deliver will help forge a federal budget compromise.¶ Under a bill that passed the Senate, a new farm bill would save $24 billion over 10 years. The revamped farm bill shifts away from direct payments and would instead strengthen crop insurance.¶ The Senate and House have been at loggerheads over a farm bill because the Republican-led House wants to make much deeper cuts to food stamps than the Democrat-led Senate.¶ A conference committee will try to reach agreement, with farm state senators hoping a new farm bill will pass this year.¶ Meanwhile, according to Sen. Heidi Heitkamp, a key date in ongoing efforts to forge a budget compromise falls on Dec. 13, the deadline for the budget leaders in the House and Senate to reach agreement.¶ If a deal is struck by the deadline, falling right before the holidays, it would bolster consumer confidence and help strengthen the economic recovery, said the North Dakota Democrat.¶ Heitkamp is optimistic because she believes Rep. Paul Ryan, R-Wis., the House Budget Committee chairman, has presidential aspirations, and a budget deal would help his prospects.¶ “It would be a huge feather in his cap getting a compromise budget passed,” Heitkamp told The Forum of Fargo-Moorhead’s Editorial Board last week.¶ It was Heitkamp’s first meeting with the Editorial Board since she took office in January after beating former Rep. Rick Berg, R-N.D., in a narrow victory.¶ The budget, farm bill and immigration bill have been among a slate of issues that have dominated Heitkamp’s first months in the Senate.¶ A new immigration bill also would help the budget and economy, she said. A Congressional Budget Office analysis predicted it could reduce the deficit by $158 billion over 10 years. The Senate passed an immigration reform bill, but the House has not.¶ Heitkamp said she is “cautiously optimistic” agreements will be reached on the budget in the wake of the unpopular and costly federal government shutdown and flirtation with a breach of the debt limit.¶ In an earlier session with The Forum’s Editorial Board last week, Sen. John Hoeven, R-N.D., said he is optimistic that a new farm bill and budget agreement will come together.¶ “We think we have some momentum now,” Hoeven said of conference committee negotiations that soon will start to resolve differences between the House and Senate over a new farm bill and food stamp spending.

### 2NC---Will Pass---Most Recent

#### Immigration reform will pass

Byron York, chief political correspondent for Washington Examiner, 10-25-2013, “Next on Obama's agenda,” Trib Live, http://triblive.com/opinion/featuredcommentary/4924091-74/reformers-immigration-bill

But that doesn't keep immigration reformers from trying — and hoping. “There is still a window,” says one House GOP aide involved in crafting a reform proposal. “The leadership has said keep working on it and see what you can do.” Republican immigration proponents have been quietly talking to GOP members throughout even the craziest days of the shutdown and default fights. They report some progress. Yes, the most conservative House Republicans are mostly against them. But those with a libertarian bent are more open to the cause. The aide says reformers have had good meetings “with a few of those guys who were with Ted Cruz at Tortilla Coast,” referring to the House conservatives who met with the Texas senator at a Washington, D.C., restaurant and ended up holding out longest against a deal to end the shutdown. But the problem for reformers is not the fractiousness of House Republicans, although that doesn't help. The problem is that the reformers have never found a way to balance the border security demands of conservatives with the reformers' demand for quick legalization of the 11 million-plus immigrants currently in the United States illegally. The conservatives must have security first, and then legalization (and even then, some won't ever support reform). The reformers won't wait until security is in place before starting legalization. The Senate papered over the problem by throwing billions of dollars at border security in the final rush to pass the Gang of Eight bill. But that didn't make the Gang's solution any more attractive to House conservatives. “I think there would be overwhelming opposition from within the ranks to going to conference with the Gang of Eight bill,” one conservative House member said in an email. But the reformers, led by Obama, are still trying. They have the Senate bill in their pocket. They have nearly unanimous Democrat support plus a significant number of Republicans. They have the support of powerful interest groups. And they have money. At a recent Congressional Hispanic Conference meeting, Democrat Rep. John Yarmuth of Kentucky noted that the forces of comprehensive immigration reform include vastly wealthy businesses willing to spend big to win. And the other side? “There is no money on the other side of the issue,” Yarmuth said. An initiative with that much money and that much clout behind it can never be dismissed.

#### a) Tea Party’s weakened---empowers GOP moderates who’re open to reform

Robert Creamer 10-25, political organizer and Partner, Democracy Partners, 10/25/13, “Four Reasons Why Shutdown Battle Increases Odds of Passing Immigration Reform,” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-creamer/four-reasons-why-shutdown\_b\_4162829.html

Yesterday, President Obama renewed his own push for passage of comprehensive immigration reform with a pathway to citizenship.

Portions of the pundit class continue to believe the immigration reform is barely hanging on life support. In fact, in the post-shutdown political environment, there are four major reasons to believe that the odds of Congressional passage of immigration reform have actually substantially increased:

Reason #1. The extreme Tea Party wing of the Republican Party has been marginalized. That is particularly true when it comes to the efficacy of their political judgment. For those Republicans who want to keep the Republican Party in the majority - or who occupy marginal seats and hope to be reelected -- it's a safe bet that fewer and fewer are taking political advice from the likes of Ted Cruz.

The Republican Party brand has sunk to all-time lows. In a post-shutdown Washington Post-ABC News poll, the percentage of voters holding unfavorable views of the Republican Party jumped to 67 percent. Fifty-two percent of the voters hold the GOP responsible for the shutdown, compared with only 31 percent who hold President Obama responsible.

And, of course, far from achieving their stated goal of defunding ObamaCare, they basically got nothing in exchange for spending massive amounts of the Party's political capital.

Increasingly, many Republicans have come to the view that taking political advice from the Tea Party crowd is like taking investment advice from Bernie Madoff.

And many Republicans are coming to realize that hard-core opponents of immigration reform like Congressmen Steve King and Louie Gohmert are just not attractive to swing voters - especially not to suburban women. The fear of being tainted by the Tea Party has grown among moderate Republicans and those in marginal districts.

All of that has lessened the extremist clout within the GOP House caucus.

And it should also be acknowledged that the "shutdown the government - to hell with the debt ceiling" crowd is not entirely the same as the "round up all the immigrants" gang. Immigration reform has a good deal of support among Evangelical activists that might share Tea Party tendencies on other issues. That's also true among a growing group of economic libertarians.

The business community provides most of the money to fuel the Republican political machine. And the business community - which very much wants comprehensive immigration reform (along with the Labor movement) - is furious with the Tea Party wing and is more ready than ever to challenge them - especially on immigration.

Yesterday's Wall Street Journal reports that:

Some big-money Republican donors, frustrated by their party's handling of the standoff over the debt ceiling and government shutdown, are stepping up their warnings to GOP leaders that they risk long-term damage to the party if they fail to pass immigration legislation.

Some donors say they are withholding political contributions from members of Congress who don't support action on immigration, and many are calling top House leaders. Their hope is that the party can gain ground with Hispanic voters, make needed changes in immigration policy and offset some of the damage that polls show it is taking for the shutdown.

#### b) Boehner---his credibility within his own party survived the shutdown and means he has room to work with Obama on immigration

Robert Creamer 10-25, political organizer and Partner, Democracy Partners, 10/25/13, “Four Reasons Why Shutdown Battle Increases Odds of Passing Immigration Reform,” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-creamer/four-reasons-why-shutdown\_b\_4162829.html

Reason #2. House Speaker John Boehner emerged from the shutdown battle with his support in the caucus in tact.

At the beginning of the shutdown one Boehner aide was quoted as saying that the Speaker had to let his Tea Party wing find out that the stove is hot by touch it. That's exactly what Boehner did. Instead of just telling them the consequences of shutting down the government and threatening default over ObamaCare, he showed them. He let them run down their entire strategy, get nothing in return and suffer enormous political damage for their trouble.

Because Boehner stuck with the Tea Party wing to the bitter end, they joined in the standing ovation the GOP Caucus gave Boehner as he was negotiating the terms of surrender.

Had much of the rank and file caucus believed that Boehner sold them out in negotiations with the White House and Senate, he would have had a much more difficult time allowing the House to vote on a pathway to citizenship than is now the case.

#### c) Republican leadership has an incentive to avoid being perceived as unable to govern

Robert Creamer 10-25, political organizer and Partner, Democracy Partners, 10/25/13, “Four Reasons Why Shutdown Battle Increases Odds of Passing Immigration Reform,” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-creamer/four-reasons-why-shutdown\_b\_4162829.html

Reason #3. Their handling of the shutdown left House Republicans with a desperate need to demonstrate that they have the ability to govern effectively. The polling and focus groups make it very clear that increasing numbers of swing voters think they do not.

If the GOP is tagged with responsibility for blocking common sense immigration reform that is supported by a wide majority of the voters, was passed with a robust bi-partisan majority in the Senate, and is supported by majority of House members, that will add mightily to the negative narrative about the GOP.

A July CBS News poll that asked about immigration found that 78 percent of people surveyed were in favor of providing a path to citizenship for illegal immigrants in the U.S. if they meet certain requirements, including a waiting period, paying fines and back taxes, passing criminal background checks and learning English.

It is hard to see how the Republican leadership can afford one more major, iconic instance is which it allows a small extremist minority to gridlock the government by preventing action to repair an immigration system that is universally believed to be broken.

### 2NC---PC Key

#### Political Capital is key to immigration – overcomes barriers to passage

Richard Andrew, 10-25-2013, “Will the GOP Accept Obama’s Peace Offering?” Ring of Fire, http://www.ringoffireradio.com/2013/10/will-gop-accept-obamas-peace-offering/

President Obama is pushing for immigration reform now while the GOP has been knocked on their heels from the government shutdown. Obama is trying to give them a way out by moving a bill that a majority in both congressional chambers can agree to. The operative word here is compromise. Frank Sharry, executive director of America’s Voice, an immigration advocacy group, told NPR “If they want to take advantage of the get-out-of-jail card Democrats have offered them, this would be the perfect opportunity to do it.” There have been huge rallies around immigration since way before the last presidential election. Groups like America’s Voice are going to step up their rallies regardless of what Congress does. Sharry continues with a determined outcry, “We’re going to throw down until they either say ‘yes’ or they make it clear they’re not going to get to yes and then we’ll pivot to try to un-elect them.” That sounds like a determined group. These advocacy groups believe that, after the shutdown debacle , the GOP is ready to show the country that they can govern. NPR reported that after successfully staring down congressional Republicans in the shutdown-debt ceiling fight, President Obama has pivoted to immigration in a move with almost no downside. I have found the enemy and it is us. If President Obama is trying to push for immigration reform, the Tea Partiers will find a way to turn it against him. Sen. Rubio (R-FL), has already begun to turn the blame towards Obama. Rubio said that “The president has undermined this effort, absolutely, because of the way he has behaved over the last three weeks.” Like Rubio, Rep. Raul Labrador (R-ID), also has immigrant parents. The American Prospect reported him as saying, “After the way the president acted over the last two or three weeks where he would refuse to talk to the Speaker of the House … they’re not going to get immigration reform. That’s done.” The President will have to show some strong leadership skills that can drive a wedge between the Tea Party caucus in both Houses and the more moderate Republicans. What would happen if we have a debate about immigration? That would bring the GOP out of the darkness and into the public light and hold the Tea Party’s feet to the fire. That should be the first thing Congress should do to bring about change on the subject of immigration. The president has already alluded to the second point of attack. In a comment he made on Univision last week, he said, “We had a very strong Democratic and Republican vote in the Senate. The only thing right now that’s holding it back is, again, Speaker Boehner not willing to call the bill on the floor of the House of Representatives.”

### AT: PC Not Real/Hirsh

#### Reject Hirsch---he’s a staff writer with no qualifications---hasn’t conducted any studies

#### PC’s real, observable, and quantifiable---scholarly work proves---and you should reject quibbles like Hirsh

Kimberly L. Casey 8, Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science at William Jewel College, 2008, “Defining Political Capital: A Reconsideration of Bourdieu’s Interconvertibility Theory,” http://lilt.ilstu.edu/critique/spring%202008/casey.pdf

Abstract: This article examines the concept “political capital” (PC) and its context in American politics. Political capital is ill-defined, little understood, yet an important concept for understanding political exchange and relationships in the political arena. I establish a definition based upon Pierre Bourdieu’s interconvertibility theory, which indicates that capital types, such as economic, social, and symbolic forms, interact and can be exchanged for one another. Since the material and non-material components of capital variations are transposable, it can be argued that no capital form is essentially “pure”—every type of capital contains elements of other varieties. Political capital, therefore, is an amalgamation of capital types combined in various ways for specific political markets. It is market demand that shapes capital formation. Capital elements from other capital types inherent in the candidacy market are identified as an example. An index for measuring this variant of political capital is created, demonstrating its conceptual viability. ¶ Introduction: After the 2004 U.S. presidential election, George W. Bush publicized his intent to utilize “political capital” for future projects garnered as a result of his victory. But what exactly is political capital? However much the term is bandied about by politicians or the press, political capital has no established definition in political science literature. Although it remains ill-defined and unmeasured, it is an important concept for understanding political exchange and relationships in the political arena despite the reservations some political scientists have expressed about its applicability because of its complex material and nonmaterial associations. An analysis of sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s interconvertibility theory allows for conceptualization of material and non-material of interactions among capital forms making it possible to define political capital and design an index to measure it based upon previous capital literature.¶ To develop an empirical basis for political capital, this article first examines the associations it connotes in the popular press today. In contrast, a definition of political capital based upon capitalization literature and Bourdieu’s interconvertibility theory is presented. Then, a theory of political capital functions and markets are suggested. Theorizing leads to proposals for objective means of identification and measurement. To illustrate the market association between capital and politics, an index associated with the resources associated with the candidacy market is offered. The paper concludes with directions that studying the concept of political capital may take towards theory-building and framework creation.¶ Defining Political Capital ¶ It is erroneous to refer a “body” of PC literature when seeking a definition. Most writers and concerned actors who invoke the term political capital assume that its meaning is understood. It is inferred to be an entity which political actors possess, build up and spend. 1 However, a definition of “political capital” is typically never stated—the reader or observer is left to determine their own definition based upon the politician’s or journalist’s usage of the term (Suellentrop 2004; Kennicott 2004; “A Year of Setbacks” 2005; and Froomkin 2004). The subjectivity is not reflective of what political capital conceptually means in and to the political arena. Without a sound definition that accurately portrays the elements of political capital as it works within a political marketplaces, such as the electoral arena, and among office holders (executive, legislative, and judicial), bureaucracy, and in society in general, the concept is meaningless. ¶ Defining and utilizing PC as a viable political variable can evolve from the proliferation of capital theories in various fields of study. Political capital can and should be associated with a wide variety of previous “capital” interpretations. The key to explicating political capital is within capital literatures and how they address materialism, non-materialism, and combining the two elements.2¶ The theory of capital is traditionally associated with economics. There is no clear consensus in defining capital as an ideological function applicable beyond material exchange as expounded in economic capital theory, however. Yet nonmaterial forms of capital are well established in scholarly literature. Most of the “capital type” definitions hover around the meaning and terminology of economic capital. Certain theorists believe that all capital forms, regardless of their composition or purpose, connect in some way with economic capital. 3 Pierre Bourdieu’s work is invaluable in understanding capital as conceptually distinguishable from its individual aberrations as a material phenomenon. Bourdieu extends the ideas and metaphor of economic interest (material or physical pursuits) to include non-economic goods and services (symbolic or nonmaterial pursuits). Within this conceptualization, Bourdieu constructs a science of practices that “analyzed all human functions as ‘oriented towards the maximization of material or symbolic profit.’” 4 His theory of capital has limitations, however. He relies on ideal types and lacks the empirical research needed to support much theory. It is impossible to refer to capital-types and not acknowledge Bourdieu’s contributions to multiple capital species (Bourdieu1986; Kane 2001; Putnam 2001; Becker 1993); Fitz-Enz 2000; Davenport 1999; Marr 2005).

### link

#### Link Empirics prove---fighting restrictions on Iraq destroyed the rest of Bush’s domestic agenda

Douglas L. Kriner 10, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Boston University, 2010, After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War, p. 267-277

By contrast, measuring the domestic political costs of congressional opposition, while still difficult, is at least a tractable endeavor. Chapter 2 posited two primary pathways through which congressional opposition could raise the political costs of staying the course militarily for the president. First, high-profile congressional challenges to a use of force can affect real or anticipated public opinion and bring popular pressures to bear on the president to change course. Second, congressional opposition to the president's conduct of military affairs can compel him to spend considerable political capital in the military arena to the detriment of other major items on his programmatic agenda. On both of these dimensions, congressional opposition to the war in Iraq appears to have had the predicted effect.

### AT: Compartmentalization

#### Empirically disproven---vote-trading occurs all the time

Rowley et al 98 (Charles Kershaw Rowley, Professor of Economics at George Mason University, Robert D. Tollison, Professor of Economics at Clemson University, Gordon Tullock, Professor of Law and Economics at George Mason University, “The Political economy of rent-seeking”, Google Books pg. 455)

The U.S. Congress is hindered with respect to vote trading opportunities both by its bicameral structure and by the geographic representation basis of both its chambers. Under such constraints, the rules of the legislative process tend to be important as a determinant of the "efficiency" of pork-barrel politics. In one respect, these rules have always encouraged vote-trading in the U.S. to a greater degree than is the case with most European parliamentary democracies: party discipline is much looser and policy cross-overs by individual congressmen always much more frequent. However, this stimulus to interest group rent-seeking is a consistent feature of the U.S. policy, and not an especial development of the past quarter century. To explain the dynamic of vote-trading in the U.S. over the period in question, it is necessary, therefore, to scrutinize developments in the complex structure of internal decision-making institutions to which Congress delegates substantial authority. Choices registered in these institutions constrain the influence of House or Senate majorities, preventing comparisons between certain collective choice alternatives, while facilitating others. Preeminent among these institutions is the committee/subcommittee system. Committees are endowed with considerable authority to initiate legislation within their defined jurisdictions. In some instances, amendments to their proposals are confined, by convention, to the particular subject matter of such proposals. Bills, as amended, are usually voted up or down, though amendments from the floor are not completely precluded. In the event of disagreement between the House and the Senate, the committees select the conference representatives, whose compromises are protected from amendment.