## Anthro

#### Restricting Presidential war powers is merely a cosmetic alteration that ramps up the species war ongoing against the nonhuman other.

Kochi ‘9

Tarik Kochi. Sussex Law School. 2009. “Species War: Law, Violence and Animals”. Law, Culture and the Humanities. Volume 5. Number 3. Pages 353-369.

In everyday speech, in the words of the media, politicians, protestors, soldiers and dissidents, the language of war is linked to and intimately bound up with the language of law. That a war might be said to be legal or illegal, just or unjust, or that an act might be called “war” rather than terror or crime, displays aspects of reference, connection, and constitution in which the social meaning of the concepts we use to talk about and understand war and law are organised in particular ways. The manner in which specific terms (i.e. war, terror, murder, slaughter, and genocide) are defined and their meanings ordered has powerful and bloody consequences for those who feel the force and brunt of these words in the realm of human action. In this paper I argue that the juridical language of war contains a hidden foundation – species war. That is, at the foundation of the Law of war resides a species war carried out by humans against non-human animals.

At first glance such a claim may sound like it has little to do with law and war. In contemporary public debates the “laws of war” are typically understood as referring to the rules set out by the conventions and customs that define the legality of a state’s right to go to war under international law. However, such a perspective is only a narrow and limited view of what constitutes the Law of war and of the relationship between law and war more generally. Here the “Law” of the “Law of war” needs to be understood as involving something more than the limited sense of positive law. The Law of war denotes a broader category that includes differing historical senses of positive law as well as various ethical conceptions of justice, right and rights. This distinction is clearer in German than it is in English whereby the term Recht denotes a broader ethical and juristic category than that of Gesetz which refers more closely to positive or black letter laws.1

To focus upon the broader category of the Law of war is to put specific (positive law) formulations of the laws of war into a historical, conceptual context. The Law of war contains at its heart arguments about and mechanisms for determining what constitutes legitimate violence. The question of what constitutes legitimate violence lies at the centre of the relationship between war and law, and, the specific historical laws of war are merely different juridical ways of setting-out (positing) a particular answer to this question. In this respect the Law of war (and thus its particular laws of war) involves a practice of normative thinking and rule making concerned with determining answers to such questions as: what types of coercion, violence and killing may be included within the definition of “war,” who may legitimately use coercion, violence and killing, and for what reasons, under what circumstances and to what extent may particular actors use coercion, violence and killing understood as war? When we consider the relationship between war and law in this broader sense then it is not unreasonable to entertain the suggestion that at the foundation of the Law of war resides species war.

#### Civil society marks civil war. The 1ac’s politics becomes nothing more than species war pursued by other means.

Wadiwel 2009 Dinesh, Adj researcher at Hawke Research Institute for Sustainable Societies Social Policy Research Group, “The War Against Animals: Domination, Law and Sovereignty” Griffith Law Review 18.2

In other words, if we take this bleak summary into consideration, it would be fair to say that we are at war with animals. This is a protracted war, a war that arguably grows in intensity, a war that has no foreseeable end. This is a war that operates under the guise of peace, constructed more often than not within the rule of law. This is a war that does not appear to be a war, yet — as the casualties demonstrate — it bears the unmistakable hallmarks of continuing warlike domination. It is a war that absolutely, perhaps irrevocably, ruptures the possibility of companionship.12 In this article, I seek to understand human domination of non-human animal life within the framework of a legalised war. The aim of the article is to use this framework to challenge traditional approaches to the problem of human violence towards animal life and their somatechnic effects, and to propose an alternative economy of relations through arguing for recognition of sovereignty rights. I refer here to ‘somatechnics’ as a way to capture the peculiar intersection of the body within the simultaneously violent and enabling codification of sovereign power. In particular, as will become apparent in the discussion that follows, somatechnics might usefully describe the affective and effective dynamics of war between human and non-human animal life, played out through forms of apparent civility. The First War In many respects, the foundation of modern political theory is marked by a concern in relation to the distinction between the political sphere and the space of war. Thomas Hobbes, for example, provides a vision of a unifying sovereign power that is counterposed to a chaotic state of nature described as a war of ‘all against all’. Sovereignty for Hobbes therefore becomes our salvation from a life that he famously describes as ‘nasty brutish and short’. In a similar vein, Machiavelli considers the civil political sphere as a site for the continuation of war like tactics, of strategy weighing the judicial application of force, and the manipulation of consent. It is for this reason that both The Prince and The Discourses are devoted to evaluating the use of violent as opposed to the use of non-violent means,13 and the value of winning the trust and loyalty of the mass is weighed against the expedience of ruling by fear.14 More recently, we find the relationship between war and politics considered carefully by theorists diverse as Jacques Derrida, who reads the relationship between war, politics and friendship,15 Achille Mbembe, who locates Western sovereignty and ‘bare life’ within a globalised context of colonisation and racialised terror,16 and Aileen Moreton-Robertson, who suggests that race war is the key to understanding the evolution of rights discourse and the reframing of the question of indigenous sovereignty.17 We might argue that the relationship between war and politics is located most prominently by Michel Foucault, encapsulated in his statement that ‘politics is war pursued by other means’. It should be noted that war certainly did not define Foucault’s thinking on politics throughout his career, but was clearly influential during a period of transition in his thinking between the publication of Discipline and Punish, and his later works on sexuality and government, and made available in a 1975–76 series of lectures, published in English under the title Society Must Be Defended.18 Here Foucault’s starting point is Claus Clausewitz’s aphorism ‘war is policy pursued by other means’. Foucault not only inverts Clausewitz — through the understanding of politics as war under a different guise — but offers a challenge to a whole tradition of political theory that would see the civil political space as offering a salvation from the ravages of open hostility between warring parties: War is the motor behind institutions and order. In the smallest of its cogs, peace is waging a secret war. To put it another way, we have to interpret the war that is going on beneath peace; peace itself is a coded war. We are therefore at war with one another; a battlefront runs through the whole of society, continuously and permanently, and it is this battlefront that puts us all on one side or the other. There is no such thing as a neutral subject. We are all inevitably someone’s adversary.19 If civil peacable relations are the means by which war is enfolded within a new set of relations, then law becomes a means by which continuing domination is encoded: the methodology by which it is possible to continue forms of domination that otherwise would be expressed openly in war. Foucault notes that sovereignty is founded upon very real victory in war, and establishes the right to death that accompanies this victory. If a sovereign nation is defeated by another, Foucault observes: The vanquished are at the disposal of the victors. In other words the victors can kill them. If they kill them, the problem obviously goes away: the Sovereignty of the State disappears simply because the individuals who make up that State are dead. But what happens if the victors spare the lives of the vanquished? If they spare their lives … are granted the temporary privilege of life … [they] … agree to work for and obey the others, to surrender their land to the victors, to pay them taxes. It is therefore not the defeat that leads to the brutal establishment of a society based upon domination, slavery, and servitude … It is fear, the renunciation of fear, and the renunciation of the risk of death. The will to prefer life to death; that is what founds sovereignty …’20 Law, from this perspective, becomes a means to enforce forms of domination that emanate from the right of death held by the sovereign, and the avoidance of death by those who submit to the violence of law: ‘the will to prefer life to death; that is what founds sovereignty’. It is for this reason that Foucault avoids any sense that law has a foundation in natural right: War obviously presided over the birth of States: right, peace, and laws were born in the mud of battles … The law is not born of nature, and it was not born near the fountains that the first shepards frequented: the law is born of real battles, victories, massacres, and conquests … the law born in burning towns and ravaged fields.21 The law becomes an expression of a perpetual form of victory, which guarantees a continuing free hand for the victors. Freedom, in this sense, is not connected to equality; on the contrary, it conveys the opposite sense — in Foucault’s words, ‘freedom is the ability to deprive others of their freedom’.22 This in turn enshrines a form of law that guarantees a continual pleasure for the victors — a freedom of unending satisfaction: the freedom enjoyed … was essentially the freedom of egoism, of greed — a taste for battle, conquest and plunder. The freedom of these warriors is not the freedom of tolerance and equality for all; it is the freedom that can be exercised only through domination.23 In other words, law guarantees an unending flow of pleasures, laying in place an economy of greed that can only have been secured through the life and death domination of total defeat that defines the continuing legacy of sovereignty in the West. It is easy to appreciate how this perspective on sovereignty, law and power offers us a radical way to reinterpret the civil political space. Yet it remains unclear how animals might fit into this picture, and it is certainly true that Foucault does not provide any guidance on how non-human life might be rendered within this economy of relations. However, another thinker on sovereignty, Giorgio Agamben, offers some insights on how we might consider this relationship. Agamben, in his now-famous study Homo Sacer, draws attention to the foundational relationship between the Foucauldian concept of biopower and political sovereignty: in Agamben’s words, ‘Western politics is a biopolitics from the very beginning.’24 But it is in a later book, The Open,25 that Agamben offers an account for the relationship of non-human animal life to biopower and political sovereignty. Drawing on Aristotle, Agamben observes that the ‘the human’ is an expression for an animal that has gone beyond its mere animal self. The human is constantly reminded of its close proximity to animal life through the continual bleeding and erasure of borders between the human and the animal.26 For example, Agamben draws attention to Carolus Linneaus who, writing in the 1700s, can only chart marginal differences between the human and the ape and consequently assigns to humans the genus ‘primate’, a category shared with other animals. Agamben further observes that the categorisation sapiens (defined as ‘wise’ or ‘possessing knowledge’) that distinguishes the human from the ‘mere’ ape is a ‘taxonomic anomaly’.27 Agamben also finds resonances in the inseparable connections between humans and animals in the wolf-children that would come to captivate popular sciences, as well as in the ‘missing link’ – both figures that mark the immutable intersection of human and animal.28 Yet what is most important for our discussion here is that this continual reexpression of the fuzzy distinction between human and animal defines biopower, insofar as biopolitics is not merely politics attuned to questions of life and population, but in essence — at least in Agamben’s reading — politics itself becomes concerned with the articulation of the borders between the human and the animal. In Agamben’s words, ‘the decisive political conflict, which governs every other conflict, is that between the animality and the humanity of man. That is to say, in its origin Western politics is also biopolitics.’29 Western politics, in other words, expresses the fact of war between human and animal life. Pulling together the threads that Foucault and Agamben have provided, we might begin to construct a framework within which to comprehend the war against animals. First, we might note that if the civil political space is founded upon the exclusion of the animal, that this same space is a historical reminder of the continuing victory of the first war — that is, the originary conflict between humans and animals. This is the first war from which Western politics may be said to have originated, a conflict that correlates with the distinction between civilisation and nature, bios and zoë; a war that is also foundationally rooted in the mythology of Western sovereignty. Second, the civil political space requires the sublimation of warlike aggression into forms of apparent civil peace-ability, where war is carried out by other means. In other words, the civil political space hides forms of intense domination of animal life through apparatuses that do not, at least on the outside, betray the form of war. We might find evidence for this, for example, in the legalised somatechnic controls that are inherent to pet ownership. In New South Wales, as in other Australian states, a Companion Animals Act 1998 provides regulation on how domestic pets are to be kept, offering a range of legal measures from the compulsory implantation of somatic surveillance technologies, to controls over movement, to the categorisation and segregation of certain classified dogs, to reproductive controls and death for other dogs.30 In this form, the law functions to enable violent forms of subjection and control under the guise of a certain companionship — that is, this legislation enables violent forms of relationality and death quite literally in the name of friendship. Third, we might observe that the l aw aims to establish a covenant of continuing freedom and plunder for the victors of war: an unending flow of pleasures, an economy of greed. This perspective on the relationship of domination, politics and freedom to Western sovereignty might be a way to explain the blatant and horrific excesses of our war with animals: perhaps most viscerally evident in factory farm and industrialised slaughter processes, which have enabled death on a scale that has hitherto been completely unimaginable. How else can we explain this; how else can we explain the complete impotence of ethics, ‘humane’ thinking, and the rights framework before these horrors, without recourse to understanding how victory in war leads to an intoxication of power that guarantees a total and unending defeat of the losers through other means? It is a victory so absolute that it becomes merely everyday, apparently lacking any resistance, without politics. This is violence that, to use Hannah Arendt in another context, is so utterly ‘banal’ that it is only barely perceptible.

#### The affirmative’s manipulation of legal mechanisms determining particular laws of war obscures the foundational species war upon which the law is founded

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In everyday speech, in the words of the media, politicians, protestors, ¶ soldiers and dissidents, the language of war is linked to and intimately ¶ bound up with the language of law. That a war might be said to be legal ¶ or illegal, just or unjust, or that an act might be called “war” rather than ¶ terror or crime, displays aspects of reference, connection, and constitution in which the social meaning of the concepts we use to talk about and ¶ understand war and law are organised in particular ways. The manner in ¶ which specific terms (i.e. war, terror, murder, slaughter, and genocide) ¶ are defined and their meanings ordered has powerful and bloody consequences for those who feel the force and brunt of these words in the realm ¶ of human action. In this paper I argue that the juridical language of war ¶ contains a hidden foundation – species war. That is, at the foundation of the ¶ Law of war resides a species war carried out by humans against non-human ¶ animals.

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**Humanism is the root cause of the drive for war, violence, and systemic militarization and domination of nature**

Johns 98

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MILITARIZATION As with overconsumption we should ask which system of values will constrain militarism more: the human- or the biosphere-centered? By recognizing the valuableness of nature and other species apart front their usefulness to humans, a significant constraint is imposed on human activity with regard to both the conduct of war and more importantly the economic activity that is essential to preparation for war.Indeed, more than war itself, it is the consumption of "resources" to create and maintain the industrial capacity geared to arms production -for whatever purpose--that is so destructive of the biosphere. All human centered value systems necessarily fall prey to the easy rationalization of militarism. If one is concerned only with humans, with the perpetuation and protection of particular social systems against internal or external threats, the constraints placed upon the consumption of nature are weakindeed. Even when limits on resources may temper overconsumption generally, there is a real tendency in this sphere of "national security" to literally let the future take care of itself and commit all to the current struggle. Certainly aesthetic regard for nature falls by the wayside. If the machine needs oil, then drill. The Soviet Union, as an example, has some of the strictest environmental legislation in the These laws also provide a giant loophole for any endeavor related to the security of the state, virtually negating restrictions!' Most countries start with weaker laws to begin with before embracing the exceptions. There are many human-centered value systems, religious and secular, critical of militarization—and all are largely ineffective. The failure comes in part from the wedding of values to structures of power—be they church or state—that depend upon force for their survival. Insofar as these pacifistic values arc taken up by those "outside" these structures they provide some check. But because they are human-centered—the point of opposing militarization is to end human waste and suffering—it is easy to neutralize them by appeal to other human values and other forms of suffering even worse than war or the costs of deterrence. The other great weakness is that much pacifistic thinking does not address adequately the roots of militarism, something I attempt to do below. If one values nature in and for itself, then human goals and needs are placed within the context of a larger community. The value placed on the integrity of that community militates heavily against any human-centered rationalization for exploitation. A biocentrism view quite simply limits the conversion of ecosystems and biomass to human use to any extensive degree. Although such a view may seem utopian, because it poses a threat to the survival of particular social systems or the system of historical social systems, it does not pose a threat to tic survival of the species as some would argue. Quite the opposite, the threat to both us and the planet comes from this system of systems. It is here that biocentrism provides understanding which human-centered approaches cannot, for the latter accept fundamental values which justify the very structures that give rise to the outcomes they criticize. Consider the roots of militarism. Because modern militarism is panicularly virulent, attempts to understand and criticize this blight are often limited to the modern period. Certainly the combination of enlightenment arrogance, science, and technology, embedded in the international political economy resulting from the European expansion, has produced a very dangerous world."' It is, however, necessary to look more deeply into human history to grasp the underlying dynamic of militarism. While it may have reached new proportions, it is not new, but rather an essential feature of something very old: civilization.'It is inseparable from social systems based upon hierarchy (class, gender, and ethnic), control of nature, the denial of self, and the emotions and bonds which constitute the self. It is an essential feature of those societies in which the state exists, the process by which the state attempts to substitute itself for authentic human community is well underway, and conflict between communities has been replaced by the institutionalized conflict of center and periphery and between competing centers." Civilization, and the process of its formation and emergence in the neolithichic, is the story of the human attempt to adapt through various strategies of control—control of nature and of people through technology and social organization. It is this attempt to control nature that separates us from it, that constitutes the core of our alienation from it, and that becomes the foundation for social development that includes patriarchy, class domination, statism, and militarism. While most, but by no means all human centered value systems eschew militarism, civilization is held as a crowning achievement. Some value systems praise the military spirit, while the majority that condemn it usually do so as a necessary evil, i.e.. they simultaneously justify it to one degree or another. The point to be made here is that civilization is based upon and is constituted by relationships of domination that invariably and necessarily produce the conflict and inequality which make militarism inevitable. Certainly some human-centered theory recognizes aspects of the roots of militarism. and it recognizes the terrible price humans have paid, even if ignoring the price nature has paid. Nevertheless, critics maintain a fervent faith in the human mission to manage, in the human ability to disentangle what is inextricably linked. They speak from within the perspective of civilization and cannot see that they must transcend the precarious ground on which they (we) teeter." Critical theory shares much in common with liberal theory in this area. Some Marxist analysis of the genesis of modern Militarism is sound. The notion that many human ills would be solved with due end of class society is also appealing. But the end of class is not the end of the state or of domination, and hence not the end of social systems which produce militarism. (Nor is the end of capitalism the end of class.) The control of nature and the human control of social and cultural evolution are values deeply embedded in most Marxism. Although it has developed useful models for understanding social transformation, the assumptions, perspective, and the content of the transformative vision arc very much within the human-centered tradition that is part of the problem.'" Some feminism gets much closer to the source of the problem in its cri- tique of hierarchy generally and in particular in its understanding of the central role of patriarchy to militarism and to producing humans amenable to domination. At times. however, feminist theory falls into a kind of intraspecific dualism, i.e., human males are the problem (while at the same time claiming credit for the fact that females created agriculture, which became the economic foundation for the emergence of hierarchy), ignoring that systems adapt to and alter the environment, and individuals adapt to (even while they resist) the roles created by the system's division of labor.' Even where this dualism is not at issue, most feminism, like Marxism, remains human-centered. Values such as community, spontaneity, and integration of emotion and intellect militate against the worst features of mainstream human-centered values, but still fail to take account a the re-lationship with nature as fundamental to all hierarchical systems. Or they remain anthropocentric and fail to address the separation front nature which not only makes possible the superexploitation of the biosphere for the maintenance of the military apparatus. but also underlies the social structures which produce militarism. While Marxism, feminism, and other critical social theory have contributed much to understanding the dynamic of our civilization, they tend to miss the point that if nonhuman life is not valued for itself, then life is not valued for itself. Any system of values that does not transcend nature-as-other cannot limit destruction of the biosphere as effectively as one that embraces nonhuman life as intrinsically valuable. Nor can such a value system help to heal the fundamental split in the human psyche which makes possible civilization and militarism. Biocentrism is not alone in grasping that the dynamic of human evolution over the last six or seven thousand years may be at a dead end. Certainly the huge growth in human numbers. the displacement of "simpler" societies by more "complex" ones, ones with greater capacity to exploit nature, capture and use energy, and so on suggests that the underlying dynamic is highly adaptive, at least at first glance. What is increasingly clear. however, is that if this dynamic continues we stand a very good chance of killing ourselves along with a good portion of the rest of the planet. The latter is well under way—it's business as usual. Biocentrism offers a direction for human society based upon a thoroughly fundamental transformation which stresses the centrality of finding our place in nature. Such a transformation is as fundamental as the neolithic or industrial revolutions. A life-centered or planet-centered value system requires that we move toward transcending the split with nature both within our own psyches and in our material relationships: how we consume and alter the biosphere. Far fewer humans, far lower levels of consumption for many. much improved levels for others, the recreation of authentic communitics that reintegrate the human into the natural, and the abandonment of the instrummentalities of control—these are a few of the implications of such an ethic. In contrast, a human-centered approach focuses on wiser if not greater human control. In its more progressive forms we hear words like stewardship rather than ownership; nevertheless, underlying both is the notion that we can replace nature with our intellect. that we can manage our way out of any problems, that We as a species are not only unique (as every species and ecosystem is), but that our uniqueness means we are godlike, better than the others. In short, it is the same arrogance. the same split that has brought us to the current crisis.

#### 10 BILLION Non-human animals in the US alone are slaughtered on the altar of anthropocentrism in factory farms[[1]](#footnote-1) – that’s 2 million by the end of this debate. And the cruel deaths they face are at least a reprieve from a life of disease, torture, forced impregnation, and dismemberment. Globally the number of animals killed for is more than 7 TIMES the ENTIRE human population.[[2]](#footnote-2)

#### Speciesism goes far beyond slaughterhouses. It can only be described as a vast apparatus of genocide and war against the non-human. It is one rendered powerful by its invisibility, the backdrop to any aspect of social or political life. THIS is TRUE structural violence.

#### The Role of Your Ballot Is Liberatory Scholarship as Animal Standpoint Theory

#### Anthropocentrism is THE Foundational Hierarchy that structures all others—Their Humanist Politics Dooms Us To a Future That Endlessly Repeats the Oppression of the Status Quo.

Steven **Best**, Chair of Philosophy at UT-EP, 20**07** [JCAS 5.2]

While a welcome advance over the anthropocentric conceit that only humans shape human actions, the environmental determinism approach typically fails to emphasize the crucial role that *animals* play in human history, as well as how the human *exploitation of animals* is a key cause of hierarchy, social conflict, and environmental breakdown. A core thesis of what I call “animal standpoint theory” is that animals have been *key* driving and *shaping forces of* human thought, psychology, moral *and social life, and history* overall. More specifically, animal standpoint theory argues that *the oppression of human* over human *has deep roots in the oppression of* human over *animal*. In this context, Charles Patterson’s recent book, The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust, articulates the animal standpoint in a powerful form with revolutionary implications. The main argument of Eternal Treblinka is that the human domination of animals, such as it emerged some ten thousand years ago with the rise of agricultural society, was the first hierarchical domination and laid the groundwork for patriarchy, slavery, warfare, genocide, and other systems of violence and power. A key implication of Patterson’s theory is that human liberation is implausible if disconnected from animal liberation, and thus humanism -- a *speciesist* philosophy that constructs a hierarchal relationship privileging superior humans over inferior animals and reduces animals to resources for human use -- collapses under the weight of its logical contradictions. Patterson lays out his complex holistic argument in three parts. In Part I, he demonstrates that animal exploitation and speciesism have direct and profound connections to slavery, colonialism, racism, and anti-Semitism. In Part II, he shows how these connections exist not only in the realm of ideology – as conceptual systems of justifying and underpinning domination and hierarchy – but also in systems of technology, such that the tools and techniques humans devised for the rationalized mass confinement and slaughter of animals were mobilized against human groups for the same ends. Finally, in the fascinating interviews and narratives of Part III, Patterson describes how personal experience with German Nazism prompted Jewish to take antithetical paths: whereas most retreated to an insular identity and dogmatic emphasis on the singularity of Nazi evil and its tragic experience, others recognized the profound similarities between how Nazis treated their human captives and how humanity as a whole treats other animals, an epiphany that led them to adopt vegetarianism, to become advocates for the animals, and develop a far broader and more inclusive ethic informed by universal compassion for all suffering and oppressed beings. The Origins of Hierarchy "As long as men massacre animals, they will kill each other" –Pythagoras It is little understood that the first form of oppression, domination, and hierarchy involves human domination over animals Patterson’s thesis stands in bold contrast to the Marxist theory that the domination over nature is fundamental to the domination over other humans. It differs as well from the social ecology position of Murray Bookchin that domination over humans brings about alienation from the natural world, provokes hierarchical mindsets and institutions, and is the root of the long-standing western goal to “dominate” nature. In the case of Marxists, anarchists, and so many others, theorists typically don’t even mention human domination of animals, let alone assign it causal primacy or significance. In Patterson’s model, however, the human subjugation of animals is the first form of hierarchy and it paves the way for all other systems of domination such as include patriarchy, racism, colonialism, anti-Semitism, and the Holocaust. As he puts it, “the exploitation of animals was the model and inspiration for the atrocities people committed against each other, slavery and the Holocaust being but two of the more dramatic examples.” Hierarchy emerged with the rise of agricultural society some ten thousand years ago. In the shift from nomadic hunting and gathering bands to settled agricultural practices, humans began to establish their dominance over animals through “domestication.” In animal domestication (often a euphemism disguising coercion and cruelty), humans began to exploit animals for purposes such as obtaining food, milk, clothing, plowing, and transportation. As they gained increasing control over the lives and labor power of animals, humans bred them for desired traits and controlled them in various ways, such as castrating males to make them more docile. To conquer, enslave, and claim animals as their own property, humans developed numerous technologies, such as pens, cages, collars, ropes, chains, and branding irons. The domination of animals paved the way for the domination of humans. The sexual subjugation of women, Patterson

suggests, was modeled after the domestication of animals, such that men began to control women’s reproductive capacity, to enforce repressive sexual norms, and to rape them as they forced breeding in their animals. Not coincidentally, Patterson argues, slavery emerged in the same region of the Middle East that spawned agriculture, and, in fact, developed as an extension of animal domestication practices. In areas like Sumer, slaves were managed like livestock, and males were castrated and forced to work along with females. In the fifteenth century, when Europeans began the colonization of Africa and Spain introduced the first international slave markets, the metaphors, models, and technologies used to exploit animal slaves were applied with equal cruelty and force to human slaves. Stealing Africans from their native environment and homeland, breaking up families who scream in anguish, wrapping chains around slaves’ bodies, shipping them in cramped quarters across continents for weeks or months with no regard for their needs or suffering, branding their skin with a hot iron to mark them as property, auctioning them as servants, breeding them for service and labor, exploiting them for profit, beating them in rages of hatred and anger, and killing them in vast numbers – all these horrors and countless others inflicted on black slaves were developed and perfected centuries earlier through animal exploitation. As the domestication of animals developed in agricultural society, humans lost the intimate connections they once had with animals. By the time of Aristotle, certainly, and with the bigoted assistance of medieval theologians such as St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, western humanity had developed an explicitly hierarchical worldview – that came to be known as the “Great Chain of Being” – used to position humans as the end to which all other beings were mere means. Patterson underscores the crucial point that the domination of human over human and its exercise through slavery, warfare, and genocide typically begins with the denigration of victims. But the means and methods of dehumanization are derivative, for speciesism provided the conceptual paradigm that encouraged, sustained, and justified western brutality toward other peoples. “Throughout the history of our ascent to dominance as the master species,” Patterson writes, “our victimization of animals has served as the model and foundation for our victimization of each other. The study of human history reveals the pattern: first, humans exploit and slaughter animals; then, they treat other people like animals and do the same to them.” Whether the conquerors are European imperialists, American colonialists, or German Nazis, western aggressors engaged in wordplay before swordplay, vilifying their victims – Africans, Native Americans, Filipinos, Japanese, Vietnamese, Iraqis, and other unfortunates – with opprobrious terms such as “rats,” “pigs,” “swine,” “monkeys,” “beasts,” and “filthy animals.” Once perceived as brute beasts or sub-humans occupying a lower evolutionary rung than white westerners, subjugated peoples were treated accordingly; once characterized as animals, they could be hunted down like animals. The first exiles from the moral community, animals provided a convenient discard bin for oppressors to dispose the oppressed. The connections are clear: “For a civilization built on the exploitation and slaughter of animals, the `lower’ and more degraded the human victims are, the easier it is to kill them.” Thus, colonialism, as Patterson describes, was a “natural extension of human supremacy over the animal kingdom. For just as humans had subdued animals with their superior intelligence and technologies, so many Europeans believed that the white race had proven its superiority by bringing the “lower races” under its command. There are important parallels between speciesism and sexism and racism in the elevation of white male rationality to the touchstone of moral worth. The arguments European colonialists used to legitimate exploiting Africans – that they were less than human and inferior to white Europeans in ability to reason – are the very same justifications humans use to trap, hunt, confine, and kill animals. Once western norms of rationality were defined as the essence of humanity and social normality, by first using non-human animals as the measure of alterity, it was a short step to begin viewing odd, different, exotic, and eccentric peoples and types as non- or sub-human. Thus, the same criterion created to exclude animals from humans was also used to ostracize blacks, women, and numerous other groups from “humanity.” The oppression of blacks, women, and animals alike was grounded in an argument that biological inferiority predestined them for servitude. In the major strain of western thought, alleged rational beings (i.e., elite, white, western males) pronounce that the Other (i.e., women, people of color, animals) is deficient in rationality in ways crucial to their nature and status, and therefore are deemed and treated as inferior, subhuman, or nonhuman. Whereas the racist mindset creates a hierarchy of superior/inferior on the basis of skin color, and the sexist mentality splits men and women into greater and lower classes of beings, the speciesist outlook demeans and objectifies animals by dichotomizing the biological continuum into the antipodes of humans and animals. As racism stems from a hateful white supremacism, and sexism is the product of a bigoted male supremacism, so speciesism stems from and informs a violent human supremacism -- namely, the arrogant belief that humans have a natural or God-given right to use animals for any purpose they devise or, more generously, within the moral boundaries of welfarism and stewardship, which however was Judaic moral baggage official Chistianithy left behind. Too many people with pretences to ethics, compassion, decency, justice, love, and other stellar values of humanity at its finest resist the profound analogies between animal and human slavery and animal and human holocausts, in order to devalue or trivialize animal suffering and avoid the responsibility of the weighty moral issues confronting them. The **moral myopia** of humanism is blatantly evident when people who have been victimized by violence and oppression decry the fact that they “were treated like animals” – as if it is acceptable to brutalize animal, but not humans. If there is a salient disanalogy or discontinuity between the tyrannical pogroms launched against animals and humans, it lies not in the fallacious assumption that animals do not suffer physical and mental pain similar to humans, but rather that animals suffer more than humans, both quantitatively (the intensity of their torture, such as they endure in fur farms, factory farms, and experimental laboratories) and qualitatively (the number of those who suffer and die). And while few oppressed human groups lack moral backing, sometimes on an international scale, one finds not mass solidarity with animals but rather mass consumption of them. As another Nobel Prize writer in Literature, South African novelist writer J. M. Coetzee, forcefully stated: “Let me say it openly: we are surrounded by an enterprise of degradation, cruelty, and killing which rivals anything the Third Reich was capable of, indeed dwarfs it, in that ours is an enterprise without end, self-regenerating, bringing rabbits, rats, poultry, livestock ceaselessly into the world for the purpose of killing them.”37 Every year, throughout the world, over 45 billion farmed animals currently are killed for food consumption.38 This staggering number is nearly **eight times the present human population**. In the US alone, over 10 billion animals are killed each year for food consumption – 27 million each day, nearly 19,000 per minute. Of the 10 billion land animals killed each year in the US, over 9 billion are chickens; every day in the US, 23 million chickens are killed for human consumption, 269 per second. In addition to the billions of land animals consumed, humans also kill and consume 85 billion marine animals (17 billion in the US).39 Billions more animals die in the name of science, entertainment, sport, or fashion (i.e., the leather, fur, and wool industries), or on highways as victims of cars and trucks. Moreover, ever more animal species vanish from the earth as we enter the sixth great extinction crisis in the planet’s history, this one caused by human not natural events, the last one occurring 65 million years ago with the demise of the dinosaurs and 90% of all species on the planet. It is thus appropriate to recall the saying by English clergyman and writer, William Ralph Inge, to the effect that: "We have enslaved the rest of the animal creation, and have treated our distant cousins in fur and feathers so badly that beyond doubt, if they were able to formulate a religion, they would depict the Devil in human form." Commonalities of Oppression “Compassion, in which all ethics must take root, can only attain its full breadth and depth if it embraces all living creatures and does not limit itself to humankind.” Albert Schweitzer “The animals of the world exist for their own reasons. They were not made for humans any more than black people were made for white, or women created for men.” Alice Walker The construction of industrial stockyards, the total objectification of nonhuman animals, and the mechanized murder of innocent beings should have sounded a loud warning to humanity that such a process might one day be applied to them, as it was in Nazi Germany. If humans had not exploited animals, moreover, they might not have exploited humans, or, at the very least, they would not have had handy conceptual models and technologies for enforcing domination over others. “A better understanding of these connections,” Patterson states, “should help make our planet a more humane and livable place for all of us – people and animals alike, A new awareness is essential for the survival of our endangered planet.”40 The most important objective of the book, indeed, is to promote a new ethics and mode of perception. Eternal Treblinka affects a radical shift in the way we understand oppression, domination, power, and hierarchy. It is both an effect of these changes, and, hopefully, a catalyst to deepen political resistance to corporate domination and hierarchy in all forms. Given its broad framing that highlights the crucial importance of human domination over animals for slavery, racism, colonialism, and anti-Semitism, Eternal Treblinka could and should revolutionize fields such as Holocaust studies, colonial and postcolonial studies, and African American studies. But this can happen only if, to be blunt, humanists, “radicals,” and “progressives” in academia and society in general remove their speciesist blinders in order to grasp the enormity of animal suffering, its monumental moral wrong in needless and unjustifiable exploitation of animals, and the larger structural matrix in which human-over-human domination and human-over-animal domination emerge from the same prejudiced, power-oriented, and pathological violent mindset. Political resistance in western nations, above all, will advance a quantum leap when enough people recognize that the movements for human liberation, animal liberation, and earth liberation are so deeply interconnected that no one objective is possible without the realization of the others. A truly revolutionary social theory and movement seeks to emancipate members of one species from oppression, but rather all species and the earth itself from the grip of human domination and colonization. A future “revolutionary movement” worthy of the name will grasp the ancient roots of hierarchy, such as took shape with the emergence of agricultural societies, and incorporate a new ethics of nature that overcomes instrumentalism and hierarchies of all forms.41 Humanism is a form of prejudice, bias, bigotry, and destructive supremacism; it is a stale, antiquated, immature, and dysfunction dogma; it is a form of fundamentalism, derived from the Church of “Reason” and, in comparison with the vast living web of life still humming and interacting, however tattered and damaged, it is, writ large, a tribal morality – in which killing a member of your own “tribe” is wrong but any barbarity unleashed on another tribe is acceptable if not laudable. Ultimately, humanism is pseudo-universalism, a Kantian quackery, a hypocritical pretense to ethics, a dysfunctional human identity and cosmological map helping to drive us ever-deeper into an evolutionary cul-de-sac.

#### The alternative is an identification with species-being—disrupting the ethical exceptionalism of humanism.

**Hudson 2008** Laura, Grad student in Cultural Studies at UC-Davis “The Political Animal: Species-Being and Bare Life” *Mediations* Spring 23.2: http://www.mediationsjournal.org/articles/the-political-animal

In his discussion of religion, Marx argues that the recognition of religion as the alienated self-consciousness of human beings allows humans to “know” themselves: “I therefore know my own self, the self-consciousness that belongs to its very nature, confirmed not in religion but rather in annihilated and superseded religion.”35 Marx argues that Hegel’s negation of the negation, which is to lead in a positive progression toward the Absolute, is actually the negation of pseudo-essence, not true essence: “A peculiar role, therefore, is played by the act of superseding in which denial and preservation — denial and affirmation — are bound together.”36 Religion is the misrecognized, abstract, and alienated form of human self-consciousness. In recognizing this, and in superseding it, a better understanding of human self-consciousness and potentiality is revealed. Rather than waiting for reward in the next life, we must change our lives in the material world. Religion is a human construct, not a force from outside. Humanism appears as the annulment of religion, but it, too, remains an abstraction until brought into relation with the natural world. Extrapolating from Marx here, we might say that the concept of “the human” occupies the same space in our conceptual framework as religion does: The supersession of the concept of the human as an essence based in a political identity, or even an anti-naturalism, requires that we recognize that the concept is the result of the alienation of human beings from their sensual, living selves: the concept of “the human” is not the thing-in-itself. Nature as presented in Hegel was only the alienated form of the Absolute and, as such, remained an abstraction of thought. Marx argues that we must come to recognize the sensual reality of nature and the supersession of the abstract thought-entity. As elements of nature ourselves, we must move beyond the abstract forms through which we recognize ourselves and come to terms with the fact that we are natural, sensual beings, animals who may be captivated, who may also be processed, objectified, reified things as well as transcendent beings. In bare life, perhaps, we find the first moment of this supersession: Under modern capitalist sovereignty, we are all equally abandoned by the law we have created to free us from nature. We are all equally reduced to mere specimens of human biology, mute and uncomprehending of the world in which we are thrown. Species-being, or “humanity as a species,” may require this recognition to move beyond the pseudo-essence of the religion of humanism. Recognizing that what we call “the human” is an abstraction that fails to fully describe what we are, we may come to find a new way of understanding humanity that recuperates the natural without domination. The bare life that results from expulsion from the law removes even the illusion of freedom. Regardless of one’s location in production, the threat of losing even the fiction of citizenship and freedom affects everyone. This may create new means of organizing resistance across the particular divisions of society. Furthermore, the concept of bare life allows us to gesture toward a more detailed, concrete idea of what species-being may look like. Agamben hints that in the recognition of this fact, that in our essence we are all animals, that we are all living dead, might reside the possibility of a kind of redemption. Rather than the mystical horizon of a future community, the passage to species-being may be experienced as a deprivation, a loss of identity. Species-being is not merely a positive result of the development of history; it is equally the absence of many of the features of “humanity” through which we have learned to make sense of our world. It is an absence of the kind of individuality and atomism that structure our world under capitalism and underlie liberal democracy, and which continue to inform the tenets of deep ecology. The development of species-being requires the collapse of the distinction between human and animal in order to change the shape of our relationships with the natural world. A true species-being depends on a sort of reconciliation between our “human” and “animal” selves, a breakdown of the distinction between the two both within ourselves and in nature in general. Bare life would then represent not only expulsion from the law but the possibility of its overcoming. Positioned in the zone of indistinction, no longer a subject of the law but still subjected to it through absence, what we equivocally call “the human” in general becomes virtually indistinguishable from the animal or nature. But through this expulsion and absence, we may see not only the law but the system of capitalism that shapes it from a position no longer blinded or captivated by its spell. The structure of the law is revealed as always suspect in the false division between natural and political life, which are never truly separable. Though clearly the situation is not yet as dire as Agamben’s invocation of the Holocaust suggests, we are all, as citizens, under the threat of the state of exception. With the decline of the nation as a form of social organization, the whittling away of civil liberties and, with them, the state’s promise of “the good life” (or “the good death”) even in the most developed nations, with the weakening of labor as the bearer of resistance to exploitation, how are we to envision the future of politics and society?

## Case

#### Their traditional state-centered security paradigm fails in the context of terrorism

Oliver Kessler, Sociology at University of Bielefeld, 2008

[“From Insecurity to Uncertainty: Risk and the Paradox of Security Politics” Alternatives 33 (2008), 211-232]

Contemporary dynamics in the fight against terrorism seem to result from a clash of different logics of probability. As Ulrich Beck has shown, terrorism has altered the meaning of space and time for the analysis of risk. Spatially, terrorist networks escape the logic of the nation-state and "diplomacy." Networks are neither private nor public in the sovereign sense; they represent neither a domestic nor an international "actor." Temporally, attacks always have a cata- strophic element. They are simply faster than military "threats" in the traditional sense because they happen without a contextual warning. In other words, uncertainties associated with terrorism escape the logic of risk as terrorism alters the very contours of world politics: It represents a qualitative change that redefines the very game and reality that states face.^s However, by focusing pri- marily on "sponsor states" and an "axis of evil," the current fight against terrorism attempts to reduce the interplay of those various logics to the imperative of deterrence. It is the attempt to ignore categorical shifts and its associated uncertainties and replace it by "traditional security policy." In this sense, the readdressing of ter- rorism to states that harbor terrorists is then an attempt to invoke the traditional vocabulary of deterrence and the logic of the secu- rity dilemma. So when we look at terrorism as an issue of "systemic" impor- tance, the fight represents an expansion of "uncertainty to risk" reasoning to a phenomenon that, from its qualities, belongs to the realm of epistemic probability theory. Neither the assumprion of well-defined problem set rings and repeatable events nor the fixation of the political vocabulary or the mutual formation of expec- tations based on "known" adversaries applies. When read from the context of probability theory, the current endeavors are subject to a conflict between intersubjective epistemology and individualist ontology that manifests itself as a conflict between universal validity of statements and the particularity of contexts. While the universality argument points to the laws associated with the balance of power, of deterrence and pursuit of national interests, the contextual dimen- sion points to (self-) reflexivity and contingency of one's own position. What might be true here might not be true there. Accepting uncer- tainty would make it imperative to understand the other's position and engage in a dialogue. However, in a sense, the current fight uses a universal method to fight a contextual problem. The article proposed a framework of risk, uncertainty, and proba- bility and argued that we experience an overall transformation from "insecurity" to "uncertainty." The insecurity paradigm treats the notion of security as theo- retically superior to that of uncertainty and risk. The primary task of security policy is then the avoidance of risk. Starting from well- denned categories and games, this approach is constitutive for de- terrence and détente as two modes dealing with contingency within preset games. Positions based on the uncertainty paradigm that sees a categorical differentiation between risk and uncertainty leave the confines of the security dilemma behind. Security becomes an empty concept and politically unachievable. In this context, uncer- tainty describes an unstructured realm, where standard criteria of rationality do not apply. Pointing to a possible- and multiple-worlds' semantic, this approach is interested in how actors actively structure or construct the world they live in. From this perspective, the cur- rent problem is not insecurity deriving from the security dilemma, but uncertainty deriving from the changing categories of our polit- ical vocabulary signifying unpredictable futures and inconsistent policies. At the same time, however, the current fight against terrorism is structured in such a way as to reduce the various kinds of uncertain- ties and contingencies to the logic of deterrence. Hence deterrence has not lost any of its actuality; however, by applying this logic in a context that challenges its constitutive boundaries, it seems as if the option of détente has been lost. In other words, what we see is that the logic of the security dilemma, and its particular semantics of threat, risk, and security, is used for the framing of terrorism as a threat. As a consequence, we can identify three dynamics "driving" today's security policy that result exactly from the conflict between the intersubjective constitution of threats and the individual ontology of the deterrence strategy as today's main strategy. First, as Aradau and van Muster have convincingly argued, it translates into a dramatic increase of surveillance technologies: In the fight against terrorism, surveillance functions as an early warning system that allows identification of potential terrorists and therewith, and at the same time, is thought to "deter" future attacks. The intro- duction of private data, video cameras, and biométrie data is pre- sented as a legitimate means to detect and deter future terrorist attacks. These measures are introduced on the basis of the precau- tionary principle that—in our view—is so attractive exactly because it tries to reduce various kinds of uncertainty to a logic of insecurity. Second, what is commonly known as the revolution in military affairs, introduces the same individualist ontology on the level of military policy: It translates the catastrophic features of terrorism into a logic of deterrence by actively reshaping the spatial and tem- poral conditions of military conduct. The strategy is to introduce technologies that can be remotely controlled without employment of soldiers. The task is to be ready to "strike back," instantly and at any time from any place in the world. However, and thirdly, these measures are based on an unnecessary necessity. Presenting terrorism as an objective threat that "exists" independent of practices might produce a distance between oneself and "the other." However, it misses out the importance of context and other means of "risk management" that would require a self- reflective analysis of how "us and them" are constructed in the first place.

#### Their calculation of risk uniquely fails in the terrorism context.

Oliver **Kessler**, Sociology at University of Bielefeld, **2008**

[“From Insecurity to Uncertainty: Risk and the Paradox of Security Politics” Alternatives 33 (2008), 211-232]

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#### Second, THERE IS ALWAYS A RISK OF TERRORISM—We can NEVER eliminate the possibility that angry people will use violence, possibly with WMD—The “logic of risk” will always rate their impact as ABSOLUTE

**AND, Their terrorism advantage uniquely links to banal extinction—Expanding the political imaginary OUTWEIGHS advocacy for specific policy**

**Randals, 2k9.** (non-highlighted but underlined sections are from the 1NC)

[Samuel, Department of Geography at the University College London with Marieke **de Goede,** Department of European Studies at the University of Amsterdam and “Precaution, preemption: arts and technologies of the actionable future.” *Environment and Planning*. 27: . pp. 859-878]

Politics We have argued that preemption in contemporary security practice, and precaution in contemporary environmental practice display important affinities and historical entanglements, through the ways in which they imagine apocalypse and deploy arts and technologies that render this imagination banal. We now turn to examine more explicitly the political implications of the importance of precautionary principles and the resulting quests for knowledge. We argue that three broad political outcomes can be considered. First, terrorist and climate change policies may be performative, bringing into being the very realities they seek to avoid. Second, the imagination of apocalypse may depoliticize debates, smuggling other policies in under their rubric; and, third, they may delegitimate positions in the debates. If ***apocalypse is also about the imagination of a paradise (Enzensberger, 1978; Kumar, 1995), an emergent new order\*7***, then ***the irony of contemporary  debates is that they fail to engage in significant political imagination. Thus, we suggest that  the banality of apocalypse\*8 i***n these debates  fosters a disenchantment that is itself depoliticizing. Masco writes: ``What does it mean when the `state of emergency' has so explicitly become the rule when in order to prevent an apocalypse the governmental apparatus has prepared so meticulously to achieve it?'' (2006, page 12, emphasis in original). First, then, it is important to emphasize that governments not only are anticipating the worst, but also, in trying to prevent that nightmare, act in ways that increase the possibility of its occurrence. This phantasmagoria is thus imagined and made real. Thus, with regard to the politics of security preemption, Massumi (2007, ½16) recounts its logic as follows: ``It is not safe for the enemy to make the first move. You have to move first, to make them move ... .You test and prod, you move as randomly and unpredictably and ubiquitously as they do... .You move like the enemy, in order to make the enemy move.'' That such reasoning is not purely theory was demonstrated by the events surrounding the arrest of six New Jersey men accused of plotting to kill soldiers at Fort Dix in 2007. Reports of the arrest uncovered that the `disrupted plot' was actively encouraged by a police informer, posing as an Egyptian radical. It was the informer who offered to broker a planned weapons purchase, and who, according to New York Times journalist Kocieniewski (2007), ``seemed to be pushing the idea of buying the deadliest items, startling at least one of the suspects.'' In another example of the performativity of security preemption, it is now widely acknowledged that the preemptive strike on Iraq fostered alliances between al Qaeda and Iraqi violent groups that did not exist before the war. Indeed, terrorism expert Richardson (2006, page 166) calls the discursive conflation of the threats of Saddam Hussein and bin Laden a ``self-fulfilling prophecy''. Within climate change, there are two potentially performative aspects. The first relates to the climate stabilization policy framework designed to reduce `dangerous anthropogenic interference' with the climate (such as the EU's 28 target). Although what is dangerous is clearly a political decision, it seems decidedly odd to embark on a policy to get the world to just below the `danger point'. If there is any nonlinear or non-modelled factor, then the catastrophic images that are to be avoided could be brought about. Thus, precautionary action following this policy logic may, ironically, bring about severe climatic consequences, rather than prevent them. More speculatively, a second performative element relates to the ways in which geoengineering solutions to climate change become justified as precautionary measures in case emissions reductions do not result in a stabilized climate: a `Plan B' as The Independent newspaper called it (Connor and Green, 2009). In placing mirrors in space, or altering ocean chemistry, or otherwise engaging in uncertain large-scale projects, the likelihood of precautionary action on climate change resulting in extensive climate change is likely to be high—indeed, that is the very idea (to counteract climate catastrophe). Whilst these remain largely speculative activities at present, they nonetheless represent alarmingly direct militarized technologies that have prompted some serious attention especially in the US (Fleming, 2007). Secondly, contemporary climate change policies act to depoliticize the debate, because they focus narrowly on prescribed modes of thought of climate as an externality. As Swyngedouw (2007, page 23) puts it, the imagination of a Nature that is under threat of apocalypse ``eradicates or evacuates the `political' from debates over what to do with natures''. What get lost here, according to Swyngedouw (2007, page 23), are the prior political questions that ask ``what kind of natures we wish to inhabit, what kind of natures we wish to preserve, to make, or, if need be, to wipe off the surface of the planet''. The larger point, moreover, is that the current debates on climate change may also obscure a wide variety of already existing, or yet to be imagined, strategies to engage with climatic changes (Hulme, 2009). Depoliticizing the debate on climate change  and desensitizing the populace from a critical awareness may aid the smuggling through of a number of  policies under its rubric, including political-economic policies masquerading as climate policies and the possible introduction of enforced personal carbon trading cards. In the Netherlands, plans to tax drivers by actual kilometers driven from 2012 require detailed information of individual car movements to be made available to authorities, and thus set aside privacy concerns for the sake of the environment. Such developments map onto debates about the registration of travel data and other personal transactions data in the fight against terrorism (Amoore and de Goede, 2008).  Other implications within terrorism include enforced immigration controls, the subjection of citizens to full monitoring, and the potential to hold `terrorists' without charges  for extended periods of time, which are all examples of the political machinations derived from  apocalyptic fear (Ericson, 2007). The problem is that the discursive power of climate change and terrorism  could obscure the political debates that should take place on these subjects  by the precautionary  action that must immediately be taken to ensure `our' global future. If we accept Luke's (2005) observation that few people would choose to not `save the planet', much mischief might be done if we do not take Forsyth's (2004, page 212) comment seriously that not all  `` `ecological values' are necessarily progressive''. Thirdly, apocalyptic climate change announcements will become increasingly untenable if the expected climate catastrophe does not rapidly materialize (Hulme, 2006). The vitality of apocalypse may be maintained with a variety of extreme weather events that can at least in a journalist's imagination, even if meteorologists are more cautious, be causally attributed to climate change. This parallels issues in terrorist debates where al Qaeda becomes the `organization' assumed to be at the heart of every terror subplot and fear. What this does, however, is ***delegitimate debate, by making these connections unquestionable  (to question these publicly  would leave one accused of diverting attention  from the `real issue’\*\*\**** or of simply being a sceptic). It is not just that debate is depoliticized, but that there appear no legitimate grounds to even question the overpowering assumptions delivering up these apocalyptic scenarios that must be managed globally through all-seeing means. ***The terms of the debate can become constrained***,\*\* albeit that resistance can occur such as the nine `factual errors' identified by the British courts of law in relation to Al Gore's movie An Inconvenient Truth.(9) Conclusion In this paper we do not wish to answer questions about whether climate change and terrorism are `really' the biggest threats today. Rather, we have asked how these threats are made real, how they are imagined, and what combination of uncanny and fantasy is prescribed to make them targets of contemporary global governing. In analyzing climate change and terrorism debates in this way, through focusing on the connected discourses associated with precaution and preemption, and the  knowledge systems legitimated in their service, we suggest that at the heart of these systems are politics that  depoliticize debate, that delegitimate certain kinds of questions, and that  have the potential to bring about the worst realities they seek to avoid. Deconstructing the notions of precaution and preemption is not simply about critiquing contemporary policies on climate change and terrorism, but, rather, about opening up new spaces to critical political imaginaries and debates.  It is imperative to go beyond debates that have apocalyptic but banal futures, to engage in the frequently absent politics of how to live in the world. We argue that these larger political questions do need to be raised—with regard to security preemption, but also with regard to precautionary environmental politics. In fact, it may be argued that a poverty of political imagination pervades the precautionary principle. This poverty of imagination turns  apocalypse into banality, but fails to foster the enchantment that, according to Bennett, may be  required for ethical engagement with the world. As Bennett (2001, page 91) argues with respect to environmental discourse, ``a strange equivalence gets set up between environmentalist conviction and narrativistic despair: the more alarmed an author is about ecodecline, the more thoroughly nature is depicted as a disenchanted set of defeated and exhausted objects. How could such sickly objects inspire the kind of careful attentiveness that ecological living requires?''  In order for tragedy and  disaster to translate into meaningful political action, Bennett (pages 159 ^ 160) argues , an enchanted attachment to life has to be cultivated that is all too often  evacuated from media sensationalism.

#### Their representation of india/pakistan as the most likely site for nuclear war underlies dominant proliferation metaphors which fuel global nuclear apartheid

Gusterson 99 [Hugh Massachusetts Institute of Technology Nuclear Weapons and the Other in the Western Imagination. Cultural Anthropology 14(1):111-143. 1999] [ct]

Western alarmism about the dangers of nuclear weapons in Third World hands was particularly evident when India and Pakistan set off their salvos of nuclear tests in May 1998. Many analysts had already identified South Asia as the most likely site in the world for a nuclear war. After India's tests, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (Democrat, New York) said, "If Pakistan tests the bomb, we are on the edge of nuclear warfare" (1998). Three days later, following Pakistan's tests, Moynihan elicited agreement from Senator John McCain (Republican, Arizona) when he said that the world was "closer to nuclear war than we have been any time since the Cuban Missile Crisis" (Abrams 1998). Speaking to Reuters wire service, David Albright, president of the liberal Institute for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., opined, "I don't think they [India and Pakistan] are up to the task of preventing a conventional conflict from accidentally slipping into a nuclear exchange." 2 The Washington Post agreed: "Today, in the aftermath of a series of test explosions set off by the bitter rivals, there is no place on earth with greater potential for triggering a nuclear war" (Moore and Khan 1998:1). Eight years earlier there was a similar burst of alarmism over the prospect of an Iraqi nuclear weapon. In November 1990, when American opinion was still badly divided over the prospect of a war with Iraq, opinion polls suggested that more Americans were willing to go to war with Iraq to prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons than to liberate Kuwait or to assure U.S. access to oil (Albright and Hibbs 1991; Gordon 1990). In the national debate leading up to the Gulf War, most American opinion makers agreed that Iraq should not be allowed to acquire nuclear weapons. Even those who accused the Bush administration of exaggerating the immediate danger in its search for a rationale for the U.S. military buildup in the Persian Gulf agreed that a line would eventually have to be drawn. For example, a Christian Science Monitor editorial criticized the Bush administration's "scare-of-the-week campaign" but concluded apropos Iraq's nuclear program that "it may be . . . that ultimately force will be required to end it" (1990:20). Many were not prepared to exercise even such shortterm restraint. For example, in August 1990, former Reagan administration arms control official Richard Perle advised immediate bombing of Iraq in a Wall Street Journal op-ed piece (1990); columnist William Safire was by November advocating preventive war in The New York Times (1990b); another New York Times columnist, A. M. Rosenthal, who has written that "unutterably many will die one day if we allow Saddam to hide and keep his weapons of mass murder" (1998:A27), was recommending an American ultimatum to Iraq to dismantle its nuclear program or have it bombed (1990); and Senator John McCain had called for a military attack on Iraq's nuclear facilities even before the invasion of Kuwait (Kranish 1990). Whether they favored immediate military action or diplomatic efforts first, commentators across the political spectrum agreed that an Iraqi nuclear weapon would be intolerable; the only question was how to prevent it. Nuclear Orientalism According to the literature on risk in anthropology, shared fears often reveal as much about the identities and solidarities of the fearful as about the actual dangers that are feared (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; Lindenbaum 1974). The immoderate reactions in the West to the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan, and to Iraq's nuclear weapons program earlier, are examples of an entrenched discourse on nuclear proliferation that has played an important role in structuring the Third World, and our relation to it, in the Western imagination. This discourse, dividing the world into nations that can be trusted with nuclear weapons and those that cannot, dates back, at least, to the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1970.

#### Their representation of pakistan instability underlies dominant racialized proliferation metaphors which fuel indian nuclearization

Biswas 01 [Shampa Whitman College, Walla Walla, WA "Nuclear Apartheid" as Political Position: Race as a Postcolonial Resource? Alternatives 26 (20( 11), 485-522 JSTOR] [ct]

The Pakistani threat is more complicated. In many ways, Pakistani military policy has been reactive to India's. 'This has been clear with respect to Pakistan's position on international nonproliferation treaties such as the NPT and the CTBT—Pakistan refusing to sign such treaties unless India does the same—and was also demonstrated with Pakistan's decision to conduct six nuclear explosions omits own following India's tests.15 Pakistan's nuclear capability has also always been known to have been smaller than India's; furthermore, the clear conventional weapons advantage that India had over Pakistan is now rendered moot with the equilibrating complications that nuclear weapons bring to the security dynamic.1" However, it could be argued that despite the absence of any clear, identifiable "objective" source of danger, the "Pakistani threat" is rendered more intelligible through the ideological constructions of an anti-Muslim party.17 Since the very emergence of postcolonial India occurred through its separation from Pakistan, there is a sense in which the very terms of independence generated the structural conditions of permanent Indian "in¬security" vis-a-vis Pakistan, an insecurity only amplified by nucleariza¬tion. But, furthermore, nuclear foreign policy aimed at "Islamic Pakistan" helps produce, in a country otherwise ridden by contradictions, 8 "Hindu India"—a coherent, intelligible entity; simultaneously, the BJP becomes lodged quite securely as the voice of this body. It is interesting in that light, as Mohammed Ayoob points out, that several other "domestic" issues that had occupied a more prominent place in the BJP political agenda were relegated to the margins, while the nu-clearization issue became significant.' 9 If the representation of danger is integral to the process through which foreign policy secures a state's identity, one might see the salience of the "external threats" argument in the ability of nuclear policy to performatively constitute the Indian nation-state in a way that such "domestic" issues are unable to do.2° Below, I will have more to say on the racialized construction of Pakistan as the "external enemy" in BIP rhetoric.

1. Belsandia, An Animal Research Group, http://www.belsandia.com/factory-farming.html [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Best ‘7 Evidence [↑](#footnote-ref-2)