# 1ac

#### This argument also includes personal narratives which we have chosen to take out for obvious reasons. Just ask about them if you need to\*

#### The sex that is not one is papered over by the collective forgetting of sexual difference – men and women are forced into subjugating themselves to the phallocentric order as part of their everyday existence

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(Penelope, A Politics of Impossible difference)

Irigaray goes on to explain that these rights signify in her mind not a right to equality but a right to sexual difference. This presupposes that po­litical programs for social change must be concerned with ingrained signi­fying and symbolic structures for sexed identity and the problem of their transformation. To understand her work, it is important to understand this presupposition. Like Beauvoir, **Irigaray asks how women and femininity have been rep­resented throughout western history**. Where Beauvoir focuses more on economic and literary history**, Irigaray focuses on the history of philos­ophy**. Both feminists argue that **women have been the other throughout western history**. W**omen have been considered the exception or supple­ment, not the norm, in discussions of the human**. Also, women have been associated with the privation of masculine qualities and capacities such as reason and discipline. **Women have been the other insofar as they 'have been represented as "not-men**." In this sense, Irigaray suggests **women have served as negative mirrors sustaining masculine identity**. **Cultural and historical understandings of masculine identity have contrasted it to traditional representations of femininity, with femininity understood as an atrophy or lack of masculine qualities. The rationality of man has been opposed to the emotionality of woman. Irigaray's conclusion is that this long history inflects the terms in which women are able to take up positions in the public sphere. They exchange their role as not-men for that of like-men**. **We need an increased sensitivity to the conceptual terms in which women's participation in the public sphere is implicitly understood:** In concrete terms, that means that women must of course continue to struggle for equal wages and social rights, against discrimination in em­ployment and education, and so forth. But that is not enough: women merely "equal" to men would be "like them," therefore not women. **Once more, the difference between the sexes would be in that way cancelled out, ignored, papered over.** So it is essential for women amongst themselves to invent new modes of organization, new forms of struggle, new challenges. (Irigaray 1985c, 165-66) Are women's politics satisfactory **when the language and ideals of tra­ditionally male spheres** **are adopted**? "When [**women**'s] movements aim simply for a change in the distribution of power, leaving intact the power structure itself, then they **are resubjecting themselves, deliberately or not, to a phallocratic order**, **This latter gesture must of course be denounced, and with determination, since it may constitute a more subtly concealed exploitation of women**" (Irigaray 1985c, 81). Irigaray concludes that this "explains certain difficulties encountered by the liberation movements. If women allow themselves to be caught in the trap of power, in the game of authority, if they allow themselves to be contaminated by the 'paranoid' operations of masculine politics, they have nothing more to say or do *as women"* (166).

The logic of phallocentrism structures the debate community- women are forced into the androcentric economy of sameness in order to earn a place in the collegiate debate and the failure to conform drives the exclusion of women from the activity. The reproduction of the masculine subject position spillsover into your life after debate and supports it’s entrenchment across society

Griffin and Raider, 89

(J. Cinder and Holly Jane, “Women in High School Debate”<http://groups.wfu.edu/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/GriffinandRaider1989PunishmentPar.htm)>

'I don't usually vote for girl debaters because debate really is a boy's activity. I am surprised by your ability to handle these issues.'1 This is virtually a verbatim quote received by one of the authors on a ballot during her senior year in high school. A woman wrote the ballot. In recent years there has been some effort to isolate the factors that limit the participation of women in collegiate debate.2 These studies are superfluous if the factors regarding participation of females at the high school level are not understood. Unfortunately, no such formal research attempt has been made to explain the reasons underlying the thoughts that contribute to the opening quote. The issue of participation of other minority groups in debate is a topic beyond the scope of our discussion. The virtual non-existence of minorities is a deeply disturbing issue and deserves further investigation. Understanding gender and minority selection of debate as an activity in high school level is useful in explaining those selection factors at the collegiate level. One finds few college debaters who were not exposed to the activity in high school. Furthermore, it is unlikely that a female who has not experienced some competition and success in the activity while in high school will remain, very much less begin, debating in college. Additionally, given its competitive nature, quest for excellence, and skewed gender composition, debate offers a micro-model of the business and academic worlds. There are implications for female representation and treatment in these societal roles as debaters tend to become leaders in both the business and academic worlds. As the perceptions of women ingrained through debate experience are translated into society at large through leadership positions, the implications for under-representation of women in debate takes on greater significance. This article addresses several of the reasons behind female participation rates at the high school level and offers a few solutions to the problem. All things being equal, one would assume roughly equal numbers of male and female participants in high school debate. Debate, unlike athletics, does not require physical skills which might restrict the participation of women. Additionally, debate is academically oriented and women tend to select extracurricular activities , that are more academic in nature than men.3 Based on these assumptions, one would expect proportional representation of the genders in the activity. Why then, are there four times more men in debate than women?4 Several explanations exist that begin to account for the low rate of female participation in debate. Fewer females enter the activity at the outset. Although organizational and procedural tactics used in high school debate may account for low initial rates of participation, a variety of social and structural phenomena, not necessarily caused by the debate community also account for these rates. Ultimately, the disproportionate attrition rate of female debaters results in the male dominated composition of the activity. There are more disincentives for women to participate in debate than for men. While entry rates for women and man may in some cases be roughly equal, the total number of women who participate for four years is significantly lower than the corresponding number of men. This rate of attrition is due to factors that can be explained largely by an examination of the debate community itself. Socially inculcated values contribute to low rates of female entry in high school debate. Gender bias and its relation to debate has been studied by Manchester and Freidly. They conclude, "[m]ales are adhering to sex-role stereotypes and sex-role expectations when they participate in debate because it is perceived as a masculine' activity. Female debate participants experience more gender-related barriers because they are not adhering to sex-role stereotypes and sex-role expectations.5 In short, 'nice girls' do not compete against or with men, are not assertive, and are not expected to engage in policy discourse, particularly relating to military issues. Rather, "nice girls" should be cheerleaders, join foreign language clubs, or perhaps participate in student government. It should be noted that many of these attitudes are indoctrinated at birth and cannot be directly attributed to the debate community. However, there are many activity specific elements that discourage female participation in high school debate. Structural barriers endemic to the forensics community dissuade female ninth graders from entering the activity.6 Recruitment procedures and initial exposure may unintentionally create a first impression of the activity as dominated by men. By and large, it is a male debater or a male debate coach that will discuss the activity with new students for the first time. Additionally, most debate coaches are men. This reinforces a socially proven norm to prospective debaters, that debate is an activity controlled by men. This male exposure contributes to a second barrier to participation. Parents are more likely to let a son go on an overnight than they are a daughter, particularly when the coach is male and the squad is mostly male. This may be a concern even when the coach is a trusted member of the community. While entry barriers are formidable, female attrition rates effect the number of women in the activity most significantly.7 Rates of attrition are largely related to the level of success. Given the time and money commitment involved in debate, if one is not winning one quits debating. The problem is isolating the factors that contribute to the early failure of women debaters. Even if equal numbers of males and females enter at the novice level, the female perception of debate as a whole is not based on the gender proportions of her immediate peer group. Rather, she looks to the composition of debaters across divisions. This may be easily understood if one considers the traditional structures of novice debate. Often it is the varsity debate team, composed mostly of males, who coach and judge novice. Novices also learn how to debate by watching debates. Thus, the role models will be those individuals already involved in the activity and entrenched in its values. The importance of female role models and mentors should not be underestimated. There is a proven correlation between the number of female participants and the number of female coaches and judges.8 The presence of female mentors and role models may not only help attract women to the activity, but will significantly temper the attrition rate of female debaters. Novice, female debaters have few role models and, consequently, are more likely to drop out than their male counterparts; resulting in an unending cycle of female attrition in high school debate. Pragmatically, there are certain cost benefit criteria that coaches on the high school level, given the constraints of a budget, must consider. Coaches with teams dominated by males may be reluctant to recruit females due to traveling and housing considerations. Thus, even if a female decides to join the team, her travel opportunities may be more limited than those of the males on the team. Once a female has "proven" herself, the willingness to expend team resources on her increases, assuming she overcomes the initial obstacles.

#### Argument choice in debates are also reflective of the phallocentric economy of the same- the denial of personal experience and connections to individuals are indicative of the androcentric logic that denies the feminine

Eisenberg in 2012  
Particular types of argument choices may affect the way participants experience a debate round. For example, debaters may experience some pushback to some of the arguments they wish to speak about in debate, especially if they are trying to integrating personal experiences into their argument. For example, Akila explains that debaters tend to treat each other as if it is a race to the bottom, where the ballot is the only thing that matters. Judy notes that this norm of the community to place emphasis on competitive success allows people to justify arguments that are reprehensible or “not okay.” Akila highlights several examples of teams who will justify racism, sexism and imperialism as appropriate side effects of advocacies that claim to save the lives of many people from potential nuclear war scenarios constructed through a lens of political realism. Ivana notes that externalized logic, large body counts and phallic weapons are privileged over personal experience or “your own body.” Akila feels that debaters don’t place an emphasis on trying to relate to one another, and feels that debate isn’t an alternative space where students are encouraged to relate more ethically towards one another. Like Judy, Akila agrees that the atmosphere promotes an emphasis on competitive success that makes debate feel like “warfare,” a common masculine metaphor. Akila shares: On a personal level, I spent time writing this poem to try to convey to you what being a woman of color and an immigrant is like under this year’s topic which is immigration, but because of the way that we are taught to socialize in a sort of militarized space that is debate, that gets lost until it becomes some sort of arsenal or some sort of weapon. My narrative is just a reason we should win because it foregrounds experiences of immigrants…that’s not a good way of understanding why people put themselves in debates. People put themselves in debates because debate needs to be less insular; it needs to be less detached from the reality of what we talk about. While some women experienced this as a barrier, others did not perceive specific arguments as inherently gendered or as a roadblock to their participation or success in debate. Even though Catherine adopts this particular perspective, she has become more aware of language choices in argumentation, and explains that she frequently hears rhetoric that equates certain argument choices with weakness, such as comparing arguments with rape or making comments such as “that’s gay” or other. These comparisons serve to reaffirm hegemonic masculinity, and Catherine feels that this type of rhetoric is a distinct barrier to inclusion in debate. In order to combat some of these barriers, women utilize argument choice itself as a tactic. Ivana, for example, frequently deploys feminist arguments in debate rounds. She notes that even though some men in the community find it acceptable to speak more candidly about women’s bodies and sexual experiences, it is perpetually taboo to speak about women’s bodies in debate rounds. Ivana deployed arguments related to women’s menstruation as one way to engage this dichotomy she is confronted with. Thomas (2007) explains how the menstruation taboo in modern Western society is “restricting Western women from full citizenship” (p. 76). Ivana’s decision to speak out in this public forum about women’s menstruation might be thought of as a tactic to confront this taboo while reclaiming a sense of citizenship in the debate community or even in the round itself. By requiring both the judge to listen and the other team to engage her discussion of menstruation, she can call for a questioning of this simultaneous objectification and silencing of women while establishing a space for her to feel engaged and empowered by her argument. Other women chose to approach these tensions by using personal experience as evidence, sharing their own stories in debate rounds. Davis (2007) argues that “women’s subjective accounts of their experiences and how they affect their everyday practices need to be linked to a critical interrogation of the cultural discourses, institutional arrangements, and geopolitical contexts in which these accounts are invariably embedded” (p. 133) This is precisely what these women are doing, weaving their own narratives in with theoretical texts and political events situated while acknowledging the particular institutional space the activity is located in. Lucille doesn’t feel that she uses tactics in debate rounds very often to overcome these barriers, however she notes that there are instances where enough was enough and she spoke about her subjectivity as a woman. Several women noted that being able to speak about being a female or femininity in general while also remaining strategic and successful was an empowering tactic. Akila calls these types of tactics “little disruptions,” or subversive instances in debate that challenge their competitors and judges to a moment of reflexivity.

**The role of the ballot is to love to the debate community - we choose to inhabit the silence of policy debate to invigorate a politics of sexual difference whose ontological openness disrupts the phallocentrism of debate and war powers**

#### Deutscher, professor in French philosophy and gender at Northwestern, 2K2

(Penelope, A Politics of Impossible difference pg. 29-30)

**When Irigaray concludes that the history of western culture has ex­cluded sexual difference, notice how the ontological status of sexual dif­ference is left entirely open**. A writer could establish this diagnosis be­lieving that there is no such thing as sexual difference. Another could draw the same diagnosis convinced that there is. Irigaray hoped to move the basis for critique away from claims about what there is or is not. She rejected the idea of asking "What is a woman?" (1985c, 122). She did not want her analyses of Freud and others reduced to such speculative and generalizing questions. **One could achieve a good deal just by analyzing repetition in. the patterns of representation of women in the history of western culture, One -began to generate a sense of what that history has not wanted woman to be. It has not wanted women and femininity to be more than opposite, complement, or same as the male. The term "sexual difference" in her work is an open term, a pair of empty bracket**s. But **the construction of these brackets nonetheless emphasizes that an active ex­clusion has taken place**. As an Irigarayan concept, "**sexual difference" rep­resents something the history of western ideas has not wanted women and femininity to be: something more than opposite, complement, or same.** "Sexual difference" in Irigaray's work refers to an excluded possibility, some **kind of femininity (open in content) that has never become cultur­ally coherent or possible.** Irigaray has continued to rely on this concept throughout her career. **When she refers to the feminine,** **she does not refer to a buried or repressed truth**. **Nor does she envisage** (by giving content to**) a utopian new possibility of femininity.** **Sexual difference is not empir­ically known., except by its exclusion**. **Nor is it some unknowable outside of language and culture to which we could attribute identity or entity**. It is "neither on the near side, the empirical realm that is opaque to all lan­guage, nor on the far side, the self-sufficient infinite (1985c, 77). Instead, **it is a hypothetical possibility on the border of histories of rep­resentation of femininity**. **Not within them**, because it has been excluded**. Not entirely exterior to them**, because insofar as it has been excluded it has been indicated as a possibility. **For this reason the concepts of femi­ninity and sexual difference generated by Irigaray have a paradoxical in‑ side / outside, possible/impossible status**. Hypothetically, the **"recogni­tion of a 'specific' female sexuality would challenge the monopoly on value held by the masculine sex alone"** (s985c, 3). **One can establish this point without asserting that there is a specific female sexuality or femi­ninety**, irrespective of one's position on the latter, **one can analyze and crit­icize theoretical contexts for their inability to tolerate such a possibility**. Irigaray thought a good deal was revealed by Freud's repeated. exclusion of such a possibility, for example. **This exclusion must be considered the very emblem of phallocentrism**.

**Status quo policy debate is a microcosm of the treatment of the feminine in the public sphere- not that difference and identity are not utilized in multiple ways to exclude the body of certain individuals- but there is an undeniable silencing of the feminine perspective that occurs in America today- As one example, the** **exclusion of females from serious consideration for leadership positions like the presidency, is part of the systematic marginalization of the feminine from the Political**

Political Parity 2k12 (Political Parity is a platform for a wide field of leaders, researchers, and funders who are dedicated to increasing the number of women serving in the highest levels of government, “Reaching Executive Office: The Presidency and the Office of the Governor,” http://www.politicalparity.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/inventory-executive.pdf)

The presidency—the highest “glass ceiling” in American politics—has yet to be shattered by a woman. In contrast, another major elective executive office—the office of the governor— has been within women’s reach. Still, only six of the nation’s fifty governors in 2012 are women. Almost half of states have never had a woman governor. What challenges do women face in seeking the presidency and the governor’s office? Gender and the Presidency Voters associate leadership with masculinity. And arguably, no elective office is more masculine than the presidency. The president, as commander-in-chief, is expected to embody masculinity and exhibit toughness. Voters associate both masculine tasks and masculine traits with the office of the presidency. Because people have expectations about what constitutes leadership and about the expected behaviors and traits of women and men, it can be difficult for women to persuade voters that they are good leaders. The presidential selection process itself is arguably a “gendered space,” imbued with references to “toughness,” according to Georgia Duerst-Lahti. The prominence of war and terrorism in particular—can make a female candidate seem even less appropriate for the job because of voters’ gender stereotypes about issue competency. Potential female presidential candidates are also less likely to have a background of military service, which is also associated with the presidency. The United States lags behind many other countries in its failure to elect a female president. Today 22 countries are led by a female president or prime minister. In a provocative argument, Eileen McDonagh argues that countries with female monarchs are more accustomed to women’s leadership. In the United States case, the absence of a hereditary monarchy may have had the unintended consequence of dampening public support for women leaders. McDonagh also argues that the United States lags behind other nations in social welfare provision, a more “female” task that would make for a political tradition more hospitable to a female president.

**To speak is never neutral and discourse in the public sphere is marked by the collective forgetting of the original starting point of social relations which is the subjugation of the feminine**

Irigaray 2k4

(Luce, femme fatale An ethics of sexual difference pg. 10-11)

**In order to distance oneself, must one be able to** take? To **speak**? Which in a certain way comes to the same thing. **Perhaps in order to take, one needs a fixed container or place**? A soul? Or a spirit? Mourning nothing is the most difficult. Mourning the self in the other is almost impossible. **I search myself, as if I had been assimilated into maleness.**  **I ought to reconstitute myself on the basis of a disassimilation….** **Rise again from the traces of a culture, of works already produced by the other.** **Searching through what is in them – for what is not there.** What allowed them to be, for what is not there. **Their conditions of possibility, for what is not there**. Woman ought to be to find herself, among other things, through the images of herself already deposited in history and the conditions of production of the work of man, and not on the basis of his work, his genealogy.

**If** traditionally, and as a mother, woman represents place for man, **such a limit means that she becomes a thing**, with some possibility of change from one historical period to another. **She finds herself delineated as a thing**. Moreover, **the maternal-feminine also serves as an envelope, a container, the starting point from which man limits his things**. The relationship between envelope and things constitutes one of the aporias, or the aporia, of Aristotelianism and of the philosophical systems derived from it. In our terminologies, which derive from this economy of thought but are impregnated with a psychologism unaware of its sources, it is said, for example, that the woman-mother is castrating. **Which means that, since her status as envelope and as thing(s) has not been interpreted, she remains inseparable from the work or act of an, notably insofar as he defines her and creates his identity with her as his starting point or, correlatively, with this determination of her being**. If after this, she is still alive, she continuously undoes his work- distinguishing herself from both the envelope and the thing, ceaselessly creating there some interval, play, something in motion and un-limited which disturbs his perspective, his world, and his/its limits. But, **because he fails to leave her a subjective life, and to be on occasion her place and her thing in an intersubjective dynamic, man remains within a master-slave dialectic.** **The slave,** ultimately, **of a God on whom he bestows the characteristics of an absolute master**. Secretly or obscurely, **a slave to the power of the maternal-feminie which he diminishes or destroys.**

#### The social condition of debate and presidential war powers is informed by the explicit and implicit failure to think the question of sexual difference. Our exposure of the suppression of the potential feminine subjectivity cannot be ossified around squo essentialist notions of gender but must be understood as a bracket whose emptiness must be thought

#### Deutscher, professor in French philosophy and gender at Northwestern, 2K2

(Penelope, A Politics of Impossible difference)

In chapter 2, we saw the suggestion, based on Irigaray's linguistic analysis, that **men and women are sick or suffering from an absence of sexual difference**, and her suggestion that "[for some time now, sexual difference has not played a part in the *creation of culture,* except in a divi­sion of roles and functions that does not allow both sexes to be subjects. Thus we are confronted with a certain *subjective pathology* from both sides of sexual difference" (1993c, 172). Irigaray's diagnosis of **contemporary culture** is that it **has excluded the possibility of adequate sexual differ­ence**. **The very thinking of its impossibility is a kind of thinking of sexual dif­ference**. **We are asked to imagine a pair of empty brackets, 'sexual differ­ence," whose emptiness is necessary to phallocentric culture and the source of its ailment**. **Irigaray deems the empty brackets to be filled with meanings yet to come. She proposes that just thinking of sexual difference as a set of empty brackets is a therapeutic improvement on a culture that places a premium on discourses of equality, sameness, negation, and complementarily.** **Thinking about the emptiness of these brackets is already the beginnings of a thinking of sexual difference. Sexual difference is, at least, thought of as absent.** I think **the inevitable instability of this project adds to its force and in­terest**. Irigaray (1996b) also emphasizes its constructive outlook: "**We do have to smash our chains and prisons, but we need to construct our iden­tity**, and our divine identity, **and seek out traces and scraps of it,** **wherever they may be**. **The project of thinking impossibility would**, in principle, **generate more cultural possibilities for a thinking of sexual dif­ference**. But wherever we lose sight of the impossibility of the project, its specific character has been exchanged for a simpler version of the politics of difference according to which there is difference, men and women are different, and this is a fact that should be recognized. Introducing An *Ethics of Sexual Difference* Irigaraypresents us with sexual difference as a possibility, but not as a question of ontology of the sort "Is there sexual difference really?" Her philosophical framework is constructed by taking both these positions, each of which can be argued with equal vigor: that there is no sexual difference; that there might be sexual difference. Historical attempts to think sexual difference, such as a Rousseauist thinking of women as the natural opposite and complement of man, are anything but. There never has been a thinking of sexual differ­ence that did not subordinate it to a masculine benchmark. Furthermore, there never has been sexual difference because its cultural conditions have never existed. As we know, irigaray elsewhere lists these conditions as a revolution in law, language, media, philosophy, the economy, religion, and so on. Thus, "there is no sexual difference." But **Irigaray does claim that the thinking of sexual difference has been repeatedly avoided, or ignored, or foreclosed, or reduced into a thinking of the same.** One constant of irigaray's work is the view that **western cul­ture has been engaged in the constant process of actively not thinking sexual difference**. On that basis, **while there is not and has not been sexual difference, there is the trace of a possible sexual difference in that active and repeated cultural action of "not that**." The need to think sexual differ­ence in terms of the simultaneous "there is not" and "there might be" pre­cludes **Irigaray** from posing a simple question, "Is there sexual differ­ence?" Rather than introducing it in such terms, she **presents sexual difference as a foreclosed conceptual possibility that has not yet been rec­ognized as culturally significant.**For whom is this foreclosure a problem? According to the diagnostic as­pect of irigaray's work, **we are all suffering from sexual difference, from its failure to come, from our failure to pose it**. The steps of her argumenta­tion are as follows: T.. "There is" must be relinquished in favor of a structure of reflection on a simultaneous and inseparable "There is not" and "There might, *be" to* enable an adequate reflection on sexual difference. z. Sexual difference must be reformulated not as a fact but as a cultural impossibility. 3. This impossibility is significant, whereas many impossibilities may not be. **Sexual difference is a problem with the highest stakes. Indeed "the stakes are so high that everything is subject to denial, incomprehension, blindness, rejection**" (1gg3a 134). **Sexual difference is everybody's problem in all of culture and all cul­tures**. **Cultures and texts may be analyzed as expressing the symptoms of their malaise of an absence of sexual difference. Irigaray considers the absence of sexual difference to be a crucial un­derlying issue of culture and thought to which we do not attend.** The ram­ifications of this claim are first seen in Irigaray's methodological approach in Speculum (1985b). The claim that sexual difference might have this double status leads to a particular reading of Freud and Plato. Irigaray in­terprets their texts as biographies of an excluded sexual difference lurking in their conceptual schemas. Sexual difference lurks as the major issue of these authors, and yet the issue to which they will not attend. On Iri­garay's reading, Freud's concerns of identification, desire, castration, li­bido, object substitution, and repression are symptoms of his failure to deal with the major issue, sexual difference. With some ingenuity, Irigaray also interprets Plato's concern with ideal immaterial forms, symmetry, the scan, light, the good, a knowledge transcending the domain of physical de­sire and procreation, the love of truth, the devaluation of mimesis, the image, the copy, matter, and procreation as symptoms of a neglect of is­sues of sexual difference.' Plato's texts are reinterpreted as the tracing of a conflict about the major issue to which he will not attend. Irigaray is not arguing that sexual difference is a philosophical issue for Plato. Instead we should consider his failure to think of sexual difference as a key philo­sophical issue. This failure is his problem, and his texts constantly mani­fest symptoms of this failure. **This kind of interpretation enables Irigaray's claims concerning the status of historical philosophical texts. These texts are conflictual. They are engaged in a constant, disavowed failure to think sexual difference**. Does any text from the history of philosophy escape this conflict? Few, if any: **Irigaray attributes its symptoms to Plato**, to Aristotle and Plotinus, to Spinoza and Descartes, to Kant and Hegel, to **Nietzsche**, to **Heidegger**, Sartre, Lavinas, and Merleau-Ponty. Tina Chanter (1995) offers a good summary of this Irigarayan account of the overinvested absence of sexual difference from the history of philosophy: **Irigaray reads the history of Western philosophy as a history in which the question of sexual difference has been obliterated. What this means is not only that philosophers--from Plato to the present day—have failed to pose the question of sexual difference, but that the question itself has been buried, suppressed or banished from the arena of legitimate philosophical consideration.** Irigaray's insistent emphasis on the question of sexual differ­ence is not simply a matter of drawing attention to an area that happens as a matter of empirical fact to have been neglected. **The question of sexual difference has been excluded from philosophical orbit as a matter of prin­ciple**. irigaray's concern is to investigate the dynamics of this systematic rel­egation of sexual difference to the sidelines of philosophical discourse, and to ask why and how sexual difference has been. written out of the history of philosophy. (14o) To be sure, s**exual difference seems to be an overt philosophical issue for some of these philosophers. But its unsatisfactory treatment** by figures such as **Nietzsche leaves Irigaray concluding that such texts are still fail­ures to think sexual difference, little better than the simple omission of the question**.2 Whether omitted or mistreated, **the very absence of sexual dif­ference from the texts of the history of philosophy is deemed by Irigaray a presence in the text, a present, interpretable absence**. Where and when, she asks, is sexual difference absent? In relation to what themes, in which locations? With such questions Irigaray establishes a fragile foundation on which to build up a philosophy of sexual difference, pulling it up by its own bootstraps. In *Speculum,* Irigaray reconstitutes the failure to attend to sexual differ­ence. in Plato's concept of ideal forms. In more recent work, Irigaray lo­cates in the following contemporary cultural phenomena a similar failure: the many forms of destruction in the world, nihilism, the proliferation of status quo values, consumerism, cancer, the end of philosophy, religious despair, regression to religiosity, scientistic or technical imperialism "that fails to consider the living subject" (1993a, 5). These are not posited as fail­ures in the face of a sexual difference considered as a cultural fact. **They are interpreted as expressions of the cultural failure to posit the possibility of sexual difference, let alone to allow sexual difference to develop as a cultural reality**. Irigaray (1993a) diagnoses "everything" as "resist[ing] the discovery and affirmation of such an advent or event" (6).

# 2AC

### Framework

**Voting affirmative brings your subject position into the fold of sexual difference and inaugurates a new relationship to the debate community**

#### Deutscher, professor in French philosophy and gender at Northwestern, 2K2

(Penelope, A Politics of Impossible difference pg. 39-41)

Having negotiated in her approach to the history of ideas a concept of sexual difference as absent, **Irigaray** draws on the same approach in her linguistic analysis. She **analyzes language in terms of its lack of an appro­priate relationship to the feminine and to the other more generally**. **She uses language as evidence not just of how the feminine is seen but also of how it is not seen**.. For example, both male and female respondents usu­ally refer to woman not as subject but as object and almost never refer to women in the plural. **Rather than just telling what forms of communica­tion occur, Irigaray attempts an analysis that demonstrates that communi­cation is not occurring.** *This is* seen in the different tendencies in male and female linguistic relations to the world, each other, and others. **What is missing from language is as important as what is present in it. Language** does not just serve as the medium of expression or manifest a subject's relationship to identity or sexuality. It also **expresses the absence of alternative relationships to identity and sexuality and can be analyzed in terms of its paucity in this regard**. Finally, just as in her more philosophical work Irigaray tries to invent an impossible concept of femininity and sexual difference, so **in her linguistic work she proposes the introduction of reforms that might contribute to a culture of sexual difference**. *I Love to* You discusses **the possible substitu­tion of verb formations such as "I speak to you," "I ask of you," "I love to you**," and "I give to you" for "I ask you," "I give you," and "I love you."11 **Such formations could mark a constructive engagement with the possi­bility of restructured relations between selves and others**. According to a utopian linguistic modification., "**the `to' is the sign of non-immediacy, of mediation between us.... The `to' is the site of non-reduction of the person to the object.... The `to' is also a barrier against alienating the other's freedom in my subjectivity, my world, my language"** (1996a, toy-10). **Trying to change words or verb structure by fiat is more than difficult**. Such proposed reforms are among the most ambiguous aspects of “her" work. So are proposals that those who engage in religious worship should. do so in relation to a broad range of feminine figures including Anne, Ruth, Naomi, and Flspeth, and proposals for legal reforms that include the introduction of a new legal status of virginity. **None of the proposed reforms need be taken at face value.** For example, they can be interpreted as a negative reminder of just how much cultural change would be neces­sary for a society to evolve into a culture of sexual difference in the Iri­garayan sense: reform at the level of religion, language, media, the economy, law, and so on. **Thus the point of the reforms would be not that they sound plausible but that they do not.** **The implausibility of the changes can be interpreted as a reminder to us of the sexual indifference of our culture, an indifference to which we are usually oblivious.** The pro­posed reforms can act as the rhetorical reminder that we live in a culture in which they are impossible. Alternatively, Irigaray's repeated demands for linguistic, social, legal, religious, and economic reform may be in­tended to change the reader's attitude toward a culture of sexual differ­ence. **Irigaray cannot expect that any one of the proposed reforms could have the intended effect. But through repetition of the proposals**, **she may heighten the degree to which the reader accepts her view that culture is impoverished to the extent that it does not' better allow the possibility of sexual difference**.

**Your desire for predictability are an extension of the androcentric economies desire to know the body- attempting to render the body of debate knowable and expectable is the drive for sameness that marks the forgetting of sexual difference**

(Nicole, Professor political theory at Fordham university, “Women on the Global Market: Irigaray and the Democratic State” *Diacritics* 28.1 (1998))

Best known for her subtle interrogation of philosophy and psychoanalysis, Luce Irigaray clearly also conducts a dialogue with the political, proposing that **women's erasure from culture and society invalidates all economies, sexual or political**. **Because woman has disappeared both figuratively and literally from society** [see Sen, "More Than 100 Million Women Are Missing"], **Irigaray conceives the contemporary ethical project as a recall to difference rather than equality**, to difference between women and men--**that is, sexual difference**. She characterizes relations between men and women as market relations in which women are commodities, objects, but never subjects of exchange, objects to men but not to themselves: women do not belong to themselves but exist "to keep relationships among men running smoothly" [*TS* 192]. **Women under these conditions require imaginative ways to reconfigure the self, to subvert the melancholy and regression of masculinist economies and envisage a future in which women would not be ashamed of the feminine**, would experience it as a positivity worth emulating. Irigaray contends that after the **gains of egalitarian politics are carefully examined, the inclusion of women in the political arena has failed to take into account women's distinct and different position from men,** and from each other, **as well as perpetuating the fiction of the "neutral" citizen**, **the ahistorical individual citizen of the nation-state**. **It is that fiction Irigaray dispels in her critique of liberal democratic politics and its creation**, "citizens who are *neuter* in regard to familial singularity, its laws, and *necessary sexual difference*" [*SG* 112] in order to benefit the State and its laws. **The subject is male; the citizen is neuter.** Who is the female citizen in contemporary society? What is the ethical elaboration of the contractual relations between women and men, and between sexed individuals and the community? How do women imagine a distinct set of rights and responsibilities based on self-definition and autonomy, given the particular strictures of contemporary politics--that is, the market-driven, antidemocratic nature of the current economic national and global forces? Irigaray suggests that **"the return of women to collective work, to public places, to social relations, demands linguistic mutations" and profound transformations, an embodied imagination with force and agency in civil life** [*TD* 65]. Irigaray warns that **if civil and political participation is construed in overly narrow terms, if focus is on economic or judicial "circuits" alone, we overlook the symbolic organization of power--women risk losing "everything without even being acknowledged**" [*TD* 56**]. Instead an interval of recognition can expand the political** to include the concerns and activities of real women, **lest silence imply consent to sexual neutrality**, or more likely**, to women's obliteration under men's interests and concerns.** Women's insistence on self-definition and wage labor, on love and justly remunerated work, [End Page 120] testifies to the obduracy of women's difference, one that is not likely to disappear. The patriarchal family is still the legal norm, even when certain exceptions are made, while enduring questions regarding women's health and children's physical welfare as priorities beyond market considerations are consigned to legislative obfuscation, still a political afterthought. Instead, in the US the liberal state removes the slender welfare net specific to women and children, Aid to Families with Dependent Children, and fails to provide medical coverage to those who are among the most vulnerable of its citizens. Women without access to the legal protection of sex-neutral citizenship, poor working women without language (the money for an effective "mouthpiece" to represent their distress in a court of law), are further disempowered by liberal politics' insistence on sexual neutrality--that is, on repression or amnesia regarding the lived experiences of women. **Sexual difference is key to any project of self-definition by women**. Irigaray insists on the sexual nature of this self-definition, not solely for its obvious procreative necessity, but because the natural world is a source of renewal and fecundity which requires attentive interrogation and respect [*SG* 15]. **This rebirth seems alien to the structure of male politics**, **which instead seem to provoke disasters** (Bhopal, Chernobyl, or the current runaway jungle fires of Indonesia, courtesy of commercial logging, spreading thick pollution to neighboring countries) **and untimely death**. **[1](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/diacritics/v028/28.1fermon.html" \l "FOOT1)** **We talk about social justice and forget its origins in nature and not merely as an engagement between men in abstraction**. Irigaray believes that **recognition and respect of difference between the sexes is prior to productive and generative relations between women, between men, and between men and women.** **Sexual difference is universal** and allows us to participate in "an immediate natural given, and it is a real and irreducible component of the universal" [*ILTY* 47**]. It is this prior recognition of two, rather than the One that has dominated world politics and thought, which must be acknowledged, along with the possibility of a political economy of abundance, not only that of man-made scarcity then attributed to nature.** This melancholic (male) script pays romantic tribute to motherhood in the abstract without due recognition of the relations between real mothers and children, thus failing to properly acknowledge and protect mother or child. Our ability to address the specifics of race, ethnicity, and religious and other differences with respect hinges on our ability to acknowledge and respect the feminine, to see it as a source of invention and possibilities. To do so would of course affect relations between the sexes, "men and women perhaps . . . communicat[ing] for the first time if two different genders are affirmed," it would allow a new configuration rather than continuing the present regime: "the globalization and universalization of culture . . . ungovernable and beyond our control" [*SG* 120; *ILTY* 129]. Irigaray's critique of liberal society deals with the structure of power and the means by which this structure can yield surprising and subversive outcomes. Like Rousseau, Hegel, Marx, and Nietszche, Irigaray's meticulous readings of society and culture, of work and love, of language, law, and the just political order, of violence allow an interrogation of identity and its permutations, suggest surprising possibilities. Irigaray's politics defy easy categorization, because although they address concrete problems, identify opponents, point to action appropriate to particular struggles, she presents no [End Page 121] solution or utopian structure, refuses alignments with conventional understandings of woman and femininity. Irigaray remains committed to communitarian ideals, spiritual knowledges and practices, and respect of the natural world. Her inquiry situates the "right to identity" and to "citizenship" as the dual precondition of "true democracy" [*ILTY* 53]. Irigaray demonstrates that what divides, as a negativity, is also that which can bring us close: "I defend the impossible" [*ILTY* 9]. Luce Irigaray makes an important intervention regarding central aspects of liberal contract theory that have proved hostile to women and the feminine and that still depict a universal reality, denying or sublating all others. **If women become subjects rather than only objects of exchange it will most likely not be because they have first become accepted as men, or as sexually neutral citizens**. **Women's identity is not a given, and the development of sexuate rights specific to women and men** (or rather the discussions, politics, and organization to create such rights) **could generate conditions receptive to autonomy, self-definition, and self-love for women. Citizens would be able to engage in meaningful discussions about the economic and legal initiatives of the liberal state vis-à-vis women and men in the wider global financial structures beyond the North Atlantic nation-state,** as well as within its boundaries. **Irigaray's political critique thus allows for ways to understand and alleviate violence done to all women as a result of global fiscalization and fluid borders**, and to address the specific attempts to overcome female poverty through microcredit or similar "philanthropic" schemes of the banking and business sectors. Self-definition and self-love by women are critical to establishing an economy which honors and supports the practices of women, as well as the spiritual and material requirements of a fully embodied existence.

Limits are impossible

De Cock, 2k1

[Christian, Profess of Organizational Behavior, Change Management, and Creative Problem Solving, *Of Phillip K. Dick, Reflexivity and Shifting Realities: Organizing (Writing) in our Post-Industrial Society*, 2001]

‘As Marx might have said more generally, “all that is built or all that is ‘natural’ melts into image” in the contemporary global economies of signs and space (Lash & Urry, 1994, p.326).’ The opinion seems to be broadly shared among both academics and practitioners that traditional conceptions of **effective organising and decision-making are no longer viable** because we live in a time of irredeemable turbulence and ambiguity (Gergen, 1995). The emerging digital or ‘new’ economy seems to be a technologically driven vision of new forms of organizing, relying heavily on notions of flexibility as a response this turbulence. Corporate dinosaurs must be replaced with smart networks that add value. Words such as ‘cyberspace’3 and ‘cyborganisation’ drip easily from tongues (e.g. Parker & Cooper, 1998) and ‘the organisation’ becomes more difficult to conceptualise as it ‘dissipates into cyberspace’ and ‘permeates its own boundaries’ (Hardy and Clegg 1997: S6). **Organisations are losing important elements of permanence as two central features of the modern organisation**, **namely the assumption of self-contained units and its structural solidity**, **are undermined** (March, 1995). Even the concept of place becomes increasingly phantasmagoric as **locales get thoroughly penetrated by social influences quite distant from them** (Giddens, 1990). In this new organisational world ‘reality’ seems to have become only a contract, **the fabrication of a consensus** that **can be modified or can break down at any time** (Kallinikos, 1997) and the witnessing point - the natural datum or physical reference point – seems to be in danger of being scrapped (Brown, 1997). This notion that reality is dissolving from the inside cannot but be related with feelings of disorientation and anxiety. Casey (1995, p.70-71), for example, provides a vivid description of the position of ‘the self’ within these new organisational realities. **This is a world where everyone has lost a sense of everyday competence and is dependent upon experts**, **where people become dependent on corporate bureaucracy and mass culture to know what to do**. The solidity (or absence of it) of reality has of course been debated at great length in the fields of philosophy and social theory, but it remains an interesting fact that organisational scholars have become preoccupied with this issue in recent years. Hassard and Holliday (1998), for example, talk about the theoretical imperative to explore the linkages between fact/fiction and illusion/reality. It is as if some fundamental metaphysical questions have finally descended into the metaphorical organisational street. Over the past decade or so, many academics who label themselves critical management theorists and/or postmodernists (for once, let’s not name any names) have taken issue with traditional modes of organising (and ways of theorising about this organising) by highlighting many irrationalities and hidden power issues. These academics have taken on board the idea that **language has a role in the constitution of reality** and their work is marked **by** a **questioning** of the nature of reality, of **our conception of knowledge**, **cognition**, **perception and observation** (e.g. Chia, 1996a; Cooper & Law, 1995, Czarniawska, 1997). Notwithstanding the importance of their contributions, these authors face the problem that in order to condemn a mode of organising or theorising they **need to** occupy an elevated position, a sort of God’s eye view of the world; a position which they persuasively challenge when they deconstruct the claims of orthodox/modern organisational analyses (Parker, 2000; Weiskopf & Willmott, 1997). Chia, for example, writes about the radically untidy, illadjusted character of the fields of actual experience - ‘**It is only by**... **giving ourselves over to the powers of ‘chaos’**, **ambiguity**, **and confusion that new and deeper insights and understanding can be attained** (Chia, 1996b, p.423)’ - using arguments which could not be more tidy, analytical and precise. **This of course raises the issue of reflexivity**: if reality can never be stabilised and the research/theorising process ‘is always necessarily precarious, incomplete and fragmented’ (Chia, 1996a, p.54), then Chia’s writing clearly sits rather uncomfortably with his ontological and epistemological beliefs. In this he is, of course, not alone (see, e.g., Gephart et al., 1995; Cooper & Law, 1995). This schizophrenia is evidence of rather peculiar discursive rules where certain ontological and epistemological statements are allowed and even encouraged, but the reciprocate communicational practices are disallowed. Even the people who are most adventurous in their ideas or statements (such as Chia) are still caught within rather confined communicational practices. To use Vickers’ (1995) terminology: there is a disjunction between the ways in which organisation theorists are ready to see and value the organisational world (their appreciative setting) and the ways in which they are ready to respond to it (their instrumental system). When we write about reflexivity, paradox and postmodernism in organisational analysis, it is expected that we do this unambiguously4. And yet, the notion that ‘if not consistency, then chaos’ is not admitted even by all logicians, and is rejected by many at the frontiers of natural science research – ‘a contradiction causes only some hell to break loose’ (McCloskey, 1994, p.166).

Fairness is the myth of the neutral economy that creates structural inequality

Egnor, 2k11

[Bill, contributor and assistant to the publisher at Firedoglake, *Occupy Wall St: It is All About Fairness, and That is the Strength of It*,” Nov. 28th, 2011]

America has a lot of national myths. In this we are not so different from any nation in the history of nations. Still the myths are not always true, but they are what we think should be true, what we want to be true, about out nation. One of these is **the idea of a level playing field**. I know and you know that it **very rarely is truly level**. The existence of clichés like “It is not what you know but who you know” shows that **there has always been groups of people subverting the level field**, **but it is still something we grow up internalizing, that all things should generally be fair and if they are then the best rise or the hardest working or even the luckiest will rise to the top**. **It is such a basic concept that elected Republicans have been using it for years to argue for tax breaks for the ultra-wealthy**. They say it is not fair that they pay so much more in absolute dollars (even though they are paying far, far less in taxes as a percent of their total income) than other people. Or that we have to abolish the estate tax because it is unfair to family farmers or small businesses. But there is a realization that has been pushed by the Occupy Movement, namely that when it is basically 300 million on one side and 4 million or so on the other most of the 300 million are going to agree on the problem. The 99% really do have more in common on this issue than the 1%. If my cousin can see these realities, feel the inequity and want to do some of the same things that I do, then **there is a dawning realization in this nation that the promise of even a fig leaf of fairness has been betrayed and needs to be fixed**. **This is the meme that I think we need to embrace**. **The premise of this nation is that we are all equal**, **but we have managed to get ourselves into a situation where some are more equal than others due to their wealth**. **While I think most people are okay with the idea that there are always going to be some really wealthy people**, **they are not okay with the idea of people being so wealthy that they can control the rest of us with their money and move government to benefit them solely at the expense of the rest of us**.

**This framework is another link—it’s patriarchal censorship that silences external worldviews—this independently warrants a negative ballot to fight against gendered censorship**

**Mojab 02 (**Shahrzad, director of the Women and Gender Studies Institute and an Associate Professor in the Department of Adult Education and Psychology at University of Toronto, Canada; “Information, Censorship, and Gender Relations in Global Capitalism” Information for Social Change 1)

It is important to know more about the ties that bind censorship to gender. Even when one barrier is removed, others emerge to ensure the reproduction of the status quo**.** For instance, after decades of struggle, beginning in late nineteenth century, legal barriers to women's access to parliament and political office were removed in the West and, later, in many non-Western states. This was achieved, not simply through access to information, but rather due to women's determination to create knowledge and consciousness, and engage in mobilizing and organizing (sit-ins, demonstrations, picketing, leafleting, singing, etc.) in schools, homes, streets, churches, and university campuses. However, states and state-centred politics continue to be male-centred**.** Even when women have a proportionate participation in the parliament, there is no guarantee that they would all advocate feminist alternatives to an androcentric agenda; and this is the case for the simple reason that women can be as patriarchal in their politics as some men are.A more adequate approach to the understanding of censorship is, I believe, to see it not as an irrational practice, as a mischievous attitude, or a technical problem of obstructing channels of communication. Censorship is an integral part of the exercise of gender power, class power, and the powers of the nation, ethnicity, religion and governance. Not only does it deny women access to information, but also limits their participation in the creation of knowledge, and denies them the power to utilize knowledge.If in pre-modern times the church was the major player in creating knowledge, today the market produces, disseminates, and utilizes much of the knowledge, which has achieved the status of a commodity. Knowledge is "intellectual property." Even the knowledge created in public and semi-public institutions such as universities is increasingly geared to the agenda of the market, and serves the promotion of market interests. Moreover, Western states primarily entertain the market as the lifeline of economy, culture and society. They increasingly aim at giving all the power to the market. In dictatorial regimes, however, the state still plays a prominent role in censoring the creation and dissemination of knowledge. From Peru to Turkey, to Iran and to China, states suppress activists, journalists, libraries, bookstores, print and broadcast media, satellite dishes and the Internet**.** They often do so by committing violence against the citizens and the communication systems they use.Although we may find much gender-based subtlety in the techniques of limiting women's access to information, I believe that the subtlest censorship is denying feminist knowledge a visible role in the exercise of power. The state, Western and non-Western, rules through privileging androcentric knowledge as the basis for governance.The conduct of national censuses, for instance, continues to be based on androcentric worldviews in spite of devastating feminist critique. To give another example, women are now recruited into Western armies in combat functions, but states continue to ignore feminist and pacifist knowledge that challenges the very phenomenon of war and violence (Cynthia Enloe, 2000). Women themselves can be and, often, are part of the problem. In the absence of feminist consciousness, they generally act as participants in the reproduction of patriarchal gender relations. In Islamic societies, when men engage in the "honour" killing of their wives, daughters or sisters, sometimes mothers participate in or tolerate the horrendous crime (Mojab, 2002). The democratisation of gender relations is a conscious intervention in a power structure that is closely interlocked with the powers of the state, class, race, ethnicity, religion and tradition. For both women and men, challenging patriarchy means defying one's own values, worldviews, emotions, and traditions. At the same time, it involves risk taking including, in some situations, loss of life. Women's full access to androcentric knowledge will not disturb the status quo. I argue that, in the absence of feminist consciousness, women may even act as ministers of propaganda and censorship. They will not be in a position to exercise the democratic right to revolt against oppressive rule. In the West, feminist knowledge cannot be suppressed through book-burning, jailing, torture, and assassination. Censorship is conducted, much more effectively, by stigmatizing and marginalising feminist knowledge as "special interest," while androcentrism is promoted as the norm, the canon, and "human nature." That is why, I contend, that if we fill all the media institutions with female managers and staff, if we give all educational institutions to women, or hand over all high-rank military positions to women, the androcentric world order with its violence, war, poverty, and degenerating environment will continue to function. Globalization, as it is understood in mainstream media and in state discourses, is nothing new; it emerged with the rise of capitalism; the main engine of globalization is the capitalist market, and it is promoted and planned by capitalist states through various organs such as the G8, World Bank, European Union, World Trade Organization, International Monetary Fund, etc. The impact of this globalization on women has been largely negative, especially in the developing world. Millions of girls aged 5 to 15 are recruited into the global prostitution market. Millions more leave their families and countries to raise some income as maids. However, other forms of globalization or, rather, internationalization have been in the making. For instance, feminism has evolved as an international movement in spite of the opposition of conservatives in many parts of the world. It has been able to put women's demands on the agenda of states and international organs such as the United Nations. Media are also important actors in globalisation. Women have had more presence in the media both as producers and as targets or sources of entertainment and information programming. There is considerable progress, for instance, in the production of women and feminist press in many developing countries. The Internet and desktop publishing present new opportunities for more media activism. Egypt has a women's television channel. Focusing on the question of censorship, the crucial issue is freedom of speech not only for women but also more significantly, for feminists and feminist knowledge. Feminist knowledge and consciousness is the primary target of censorship. Do the globalizing media allow women of the developing countries to learn about the achievements of Western women in fighting patriarchy? Do women of the West learn from the struggles of women in India, Jamaica or Saudi Arabia? Do the global media allow women everywhere to know about the Beijing Conference and its aftermath? Do they disseminate adequate and accurate information about the World March of Women? My answers are rather in the negative. The cyberspace is much like the realspace that creates it. The fact that many individual women or groups can set up their websites does not change power relations in the realspace. The negative stereotyping of women, for instance, cannot change without the dissemination of feminist consciousness among both men and women. Even if stereotyping is eliminated, gender inequality will persist. "Gender-based censorship" cannot be overcome as long as gender relations remain unequal and oppressive. It can, however, be reduced or made less effective. While the concept "gender-based censorship" is useful, it should be broadened to include "censorship of feminist knowledge." The following are just a few ideas about what we may do:A) Creating theoretical and empirical knowledge about gender-based censorship, and especially the censorship of feminist knowledge and feminist movements. B) Disseminating this knowledge and awareness among citizens. Using this knowledge for the purpose of dismantling patriarchal power. Knowledge makes a difference when it is put into practice. C) Making this knowledge available to policy makers and integrating it into policy making in the institutions of the market, the state, and non-state and non-market forces. These goals will not be achieved in the absence of feminist and women's movements. If censorship is not a mistake, but rather it is an organ for exercising gender and class power, resistance to it, too, should be a part of the struggle for a democratic regime.

### Case Extension

Gregory and Alimahomed 01 (Josh and Kasim, Department of Speech and Communication at California State University, Fullerton, “Narrative Voice and the Urban Debater: An investigation into empowerment,” 2/23/2001)

The narrative debater, working from a rhetoric of possibility works from a different ideology or school of thought, though the narrative debater would recognize these same realist conceptions, the narrative debater also tries to guide the audience to see additional perspectives and to create more solutions than the realist platform—the narrative debater as asks the audience to try to work outside and around the realist framework as well. By helping people examine possibilities, which they previously did not imagine or think they could achieve, rhetors can free them to pursue more satisfying responses to both personal and public needs. Hence a rhetoric of possibility can illuminate diverse kinds of communication (Kirkwood, 1992, p.44).¶ As of the writing of this paper, the signing of a debate ballot has gained perlocutionary force—the action of voting has some concrete impact in the community (debate and otherwise). Debaters have began to claim that the ballot can either operate in the traditional debate sense (working from any of a multitude of debate “paradigms:” stock issues, cost-benefit analysis, hypothesis-testing, etc.), or the ballot becomes an endorsement of an ideology, with the action of signing becoming a statement to a larger community. The narrative can operate at either level: it can be weighed in a debate round on the probability and pathos appeal of the narration, or it can be endorsed by a judge for its ideological power. However, the narrative can be impacted at even higher levels. A performance that touches debaters and critics alike should be endorsed for the mere fact that more individuals should hear it. The intellectual landscape would support any effort or trust to exchange and create ideas. The narrative could be a stronghold that keeps the death that debaters often claim as inevitable closer to home.

#### Our argument is not reducible to different sexes good but must be understand as a starting point for universal challenges to oppression in every manifestation

#### Schwab, professor of French at Hofstra, 2K7

(Gail, “Reading Irigaray (and Her Readers) in the Twenty-First Century” in *Returning to Irigaray* edited by Elaine P. Miller and Maria C. Cmitile pg. 36-38)

At this moment, there seem to be no simple and straightforward answers to these questions; however, I will now attempt to address a series of issues that can perhaps be taken together to form the begin­nings of a response. It might be useful to begin by returning to an article entitled "Sexual Difference as Model: An Ethics for the Global Future," published in the special issue of diacritics,S4 where I argued that **Irigaray**, who had always been very much outside mainstream political and academic feminism herself, **saw very clearly that the monologic voice of white Western feminists of equality did not speak for all women globally**. **The postmodernist fragmentation of identi­ties, due to recognition of the importance of differences of race, class, ethnicity, nationality, age, sexual orientation, body configuration, health status, and so on, logically led her to seek a principle that would be universally operative—that of sexual difference**. In the ar­ticle, I tried to analyze the dense philosophical arguments in support of the universality of sexual difference that Irigaray develops specifi­cally in I Love to You and to demonstrate that **sexual difference is not about heterosexuality, or about sexual object choice at all**. It would be beyond the scope of this article to reproduce that analysis here; it would, however, be useful to remind us briefly how **sexual difference can be thought as universal, and universally practical for social change**. Pheng Cheah puts it succintly during the course of the interview with Judith Butler and Drucilla Cornell: She seems to be saying, "**we may not all be mothers and fathers, but all of us have been children once**. And until the cloning of humans is successful, in order for us to be born, in order for us to be, **there must be two sexes or at least the genetic material from two sexes**." At any rate, **this is the trace of the other in us, the constitutive trace of sexual alterity. The argument is not phrased in terms of sexual preferences at all ...'** **Although the universal principle of sexual difference is not about sexual orientation, either hetero- or homo-, it does become**, for Irigaray, **a philosophically useful tool for thinking about the ethics of relation­ships between women and men, an ethics that**—I think few would disagree here—**is in serious need of development on a planetary scale.** Quite apart from the so often disastrous emotional and/or erotic **rela­tions between men and women**, their professional, civil, and famil­ial—what Irigaray calls genealogical—relationships **are difficult to say the least, and violently conflictual at worst**. **This is not to suggest that woman-to-woman and/or man-to-man relations do not exhibit many of the same sorts of problems, but rather pragmatically to recognize that if we are to make a difference we must start somewhere.** I believe that it is Irigaray's position that **if relations between men and women were to be cultivated**, "civilized" as Whitford says**, brought out of their supposed "naturalness" into civil society, then relations among women and relations among men would necessarily change as well**.

### Agamben

**Agamben relies on a singular conception of being as being without reference to the corporeal which makes embracing sexual difference impossible**

**Bertlino and Cavarero 2K8**

(Elisabetta and Adriana, Birkbeck University of London and professor of political philosophy at university of verona “Beyond Ontology and Sexual Difference: An Interview with the Italian Feminist Philosopher Adriana Cavarero” *differences: a journal of feminist cultural studies 19.1)*

**eb**: You have just used the term *sacrality* to describe the way in which ontology is considered; you propose instead to use words “with bad intentions.” This reminds me of Giorgio **Agamben’s theory of desacralization/ profanation**, which **consists of returning something to its simple use to avoid its genetic inscription or sanctification** and, at the same time, of his emphasis on the simple (*haplos*) human being.13 **Although Agamben has ignored feminist issues**, it seems that there is a link between Agamben’s perspective and yours. **ac**: Your questions are always complex and make multiple points. I shall answer them one by one. There is some affinity with Agamben because we have had a common education: the Italian *formae mentis* and a familiarity with classical texts. In relation to desacralization, I do not use it in a way that is as serious and technical as the way Agamben uses it: he has also written books on the theme of the sacred, taking a rather technical approach. I do not use the term *sacrality* with this intention, but rather, with the intention of saying that there are some words (I am speaking with reference to philosophical language) in the metaphysical tradition, such as *essence*, *substance*, or *ontology* (and you noted it immediately), that become key words that loosen the rest of the discourse, words that are usually invented by philosophers. It is enough to think of the *Dasein* of Heidegger or the *différance* of Derrida. A certain approach, let’s call it traditionalist, states that it is necessary to respect those words, use them with their genetic meaning in the sense in which they are inscribed in the history of philosophy and have generated the history of philosophy itself. This is not my position nor is it Agamben’s, happily. There is another position that appears to be slightly more critical but that, in my opinion, is not. I referred to it in my previous answer. That is, for example, this big scandal that the word *ontology* provokes within poststructuralist and postmodern perspectives. Some important poststructuralist and postmodern authors have criticized the classical conception of essence or ontology. Such positions seem to be critical and characterized by radical critique. But to my mind, they leave those words untouched and untouchable, sacred.14 For example, if Aristotle talks about substance (which I do not believe to be true) and something in the tradition of Aristotle becomes substance, then substance becomes a symbol of Aristotelian metaphysical doctrine and the history of metaphysics. It is then said that one should not speak of substance, that it is not correct because it is metaphysical. And yet, merely affirming that touching or repeating the substance means falling into the metaphysical trap does not do anything to substance itself. I prefer instead to deconstruct, to strip those words of their philosophical aura and resignify them, therefore treating them in an ironic way. I enjoy doing this. **A substantial difference** between my work and that of Agamben **is that he treats being as being in general**. **In this sense, his being is a variation within metaphysic**s, **while I insist on the human being as seen in his/her corporeal singularity.** Moreover, when I speak of relation or relationality, I **always** mean **a material, physical relationality that is in the here and now**. Consequently, I would not liken **Agamben’s position** to my own. It seems to me that his position has most in common with that of Jean-Luc Nancy. Even when Nancy **speaks of the singular, which is most interesting, it is a singular in general**. **We could say that one’s corporeal singularity** and all the lessons that I have learned from Hannah Arendt and sexual difference theory **have not influenced these** two **thinkers at all**. Using an Arendtian notion, I prefer to say that **they continue to think the superfluity of human beings in their corporeal existence.**

### “Ideology” K

Narratives solvency

Gregory and Alimahomed 01 (Josh and Kasim, Department of Speech and Communication at California State University, Fullerton, “Narrative Voice and the Urban Debater: An investigation into empowerment,” 2/23/2001)

The narrative as a discursive act is probably one of the most “human” actions that a person can engage in. Individuals organize their lives in personal stories, even to the extent that most theorists claim that the guiding force of personal development and psychological maintenance are intrapersonal self-narratives. To examine the force of the narrative to the personal, one must look at the narrative in relation to identity: Human identities are considered to be evolving constructions; they emerge out of continual social interactions in the course of life. Self-narratives are developed stories that must be told in specific historical terms, using a particular language, reference to a particular stock of working historical conventions and a particular pattern of dominant beliefs and values. The most fundamental narrative forms are universal, but the way these forms are styled and filled with content will¶ ¶ depend upon particular historical conventions of time and place (Scheibe, 1986, p.¶ ¶ 131).¶ ¶ Personal narratives might differ, and special recurring narratives may dictate further action of the individual (such as in a self-fulfilling prophecy). However, there are¶ ¶ fundamental aspects of the narrative that run across all human beings, and it is in the¶ ¶ ability to contrast a personal narrative with the narratives of others that creates a unity of¶ ¶ the self with the other. If a human cannot find universal aspects that run across all¶ ¶ narratives (including their own), than that human feels disjointed by society:¶ ¶ The self is a kind of aesthetic construct, recollected in and with the life of¶ ¶ experience in narrative fashion. One's personal story or personal identity is a¶ ¶ recollected self in which the more complete the story that is formed, the more¶ ¶ integrated the self will be…A self without a story contracts into the thinness of¶ ¶ the personal pronoun (Polkinghorne, 1988, p. 106).¶ ¶ To feel a loss of self through the inability to compare the private narrative with societal¶ ¶ narratives is a personal travesty, but in a multicultural world where individuals come¶ ¶ from such diverse and varied settings, the inability to compare the self with the other¶ ¶ leaves the unique self with a desire to let his/her voice be known. It is at this intersection¶ ¶ that the narrative takes on the power to emancipate the silenced individual.¶ ¶ The emancipatory function of the personal narrative lays not so much in the¶ ¶ individuals ability to incorporate societal narratives into his/her life, but more so in¶ ¶ making their personal narrative known to the greater society. By expressing the voice of¶ ¶ the unique individual, other disjointed individuals can attempt to find similarities and¶ ¶ hopefully, solidarity. The self as constructed narrative brings with it a dynamism, a¶ ¶ fluidity toward social relations:¶ ¶ [We] achieve our personal identities and self-concept through the use of¶ ¶ the narrative configuration, and make our existence into a whole by understanding¶ ¶ it as an expression of a single unfolding and developing story. We are in the¶ ¶ middle of our stories and cannot be sure how they will end; we are constantly¶ ¶ having to revise the plot as new events are added to our lives (Polkinghorne,¶ ¶ 1988, p.150).¶ ¶ Since personal identity is at stake in narrative dialogue, the interlocutors may choose to¶ ¶ interject their unique narrative experiences—at best, a marginalized voice may gain¶ ¶ discursive legitimacy, and at worst an interlocutor may be eschewed by others. For the¶ ¶ exceptionally marginalized voice, the discursive space opened by the narrative is a wise¶ ¶ move. Delgado (1992) posits that the narrative gives unique voice to the oppressed:¶ ¶ No matter how limited one's resources or range of options, no matter how¶ ¶ unequal one's bargaining position, at least one's thoughts are free. Small wonder¶ ¶ that the recent legal-storytelling movement has had such appeal to people of¶ ¶ color, women, gays and lesbians. Stories inject a new narrative into our society.¶ ¶ They demand attention; if aptly told, they win acceptance or, at a minimum,¶ ¶ respect. This is why women demand to tell their account of forced sex, why¶ ¶ cancer victims insist that their smoking was a redressable harm despite the¶ ¶ tobacco companies' pathetic warnings, and why patient advocates demand a¶ ¶ fundamental restructuring of the doctor-patient relationship (p. 822).¶ ¶ Since the narrative gives voice to the disenfranchised, peripheral, and marginal, it would¶ ¶ be logical that these identities would evince action to accommodate for their rhetoric. ¶ ¶ Polkinghorne (1988) gives the final implication for the narrative:¶ ¶ On this basis, humans make decisions about what they want and what they¶ ¶ need to do to satisfy these wants. We retrieve stories about our own and the¶ ¶ community's past, and these provide models of how actions and consequences are¶ ¶ linked. Using these retrieved models, we plan our strategies and actions and¶ ¶ interpret the intentions of other actors. Narrative is the discourse structure in¶ ¶ which human action receives its form and through which it is meaningful¶ ¶ (Polkinghorne, 1988, p.135).¶ ¶ In academic debate, with its urban outreach programs, policy debate has never seen such¶ ¶ a diversity of personality. Within resolutions there is enough freedom to accommodate a¶ ¶ marginal voice—and in finding similarities between the urban debater and the oppressed¶ ¶ narrative of a resolutional actor, the debater finds him/herself transformed. The¶ ¶ marginalized voice is given an ear the form of the narrative, and according to the¶ ¶ aforementioned quotation, human action in society gains meaning through narratives.¶ ¶ ¶ NARRATIVE IN SOCIETY ¶ ¶ ¶

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Our narratives mean we solve debate and societal values

Gregory and Alimahomed 01 (Josh and Kasim, Department of Speech and Communication at California State University, Fullerton, “Narrative Voice and the Urban Debater: An investigation into empowerment,” 2/23/2001)

The first step in orienting to the narratives of everyday life in this way is to listen to what people say. Not necessarily to retell it in exactly those terms, but to enquire into¶ ¶ how it would be possible for them to say that. What kinds of assumptions in what types¶ ¶ of possible world could produce those accounts? (Clegg, 1993, p.31). This inquiry offers the ability to gain an insight into other’s existence and epistemological understandings. The ability to conceptualize or empathize with one’s stories creates a convergence between two different perspectives. This convergence is directly related to the unifying power of the narrative as well as providing a legitimate means for the disenfranchised voice to be heard. Mumby (1993) illustrates how the duality of narrative structures create a social understanding as well as set up an epistemological device of meaning in which social awareness is created: Narrative is a socially symbolic act in the double sense that (a) it takes on meaning only in social context and (b) it plays a role in the construction of that social context as a cite of meaning in which social actors are implicated. However, there is no simple isomorphism between narrative (or any other¶ ¶ symbolic form) and the social realm. In different ways, each of the chapters¶ ¶ belies the notion that the narrative functions monolithically to crate a stable,¶ ¶ structured, social order. Indeed, one of the prevailing themes across the chapters¶ ¶ is the extent to which social order is tenuous, precarious, and open to negotiation¶ ¶ in various ways. In this sense, society is characterized by an ongoing “struggle¶ ¶ over meaning” (p. 5).¶ ¶ The implication of these two factors on intercollegiate debate point to how the narrative not only relies on the social context for meaning, but aids in the construction of that context. Debate is a unique forum to meet Mumby’s socially symbolic act. Debate offers a unique social context in that the majority of audience members are intellectually versed on the social context of a particular narrative (due to debate research). The public advocacy emphasis of academic debate also allows for a “cite of meaning” and the adversarial positions in a debate round allow a team to implicate a judge or another team by virtue of their position. It is in these mock situations that debaters are implicated as social actors, and thus are moved to action by virtue of close engagement with another’s story. In factors of debate the concepts of theory and practice are inexorably intertwined. When these two competing ideologies can be combined creates a holistic insight into the human psyche. Insight gained from this holistic understanding is created by stories (or narratives)¶ ¶ that define human experience. The ability to construct a compelling story can have a dramatic impact on the social epistemology, which creates a co-constructed knowledge framework. Scholars have posited that:¶ ¶ Stories are among the most universal means of representing human events. ¶ ¶ In addition to suggesting an interpretation for a social happening, a well-crafted¶ ¶ narrative can motivate the belief and action of outsiders toward the actors and¶ ¶ events caught up in its plot. A key question about stories, as with other situations-¶ ¶ defining symbolic forms like metaphors, theories, and ideologies is whether they¶ ¶ introduce new and constructive insights into social life (Bennett & Edelman,¶ ¶ 1985, p. 156).¶ ¶ This form of meaning production and the persuasive potential of identification established by the narrative can be a powerful force upon the debate community or even society. The process of which an individuals interacts with a narrative and then how a community reacts to the narrative is better explained by White (1987) who states: Narrative is revealed to be particularly effective system of discursive meaning production by which individuals can be taught to live a distinctively “imaginary relation to the real conditions of existence,” that is to say, an unreal but meaningful relation to the social formations in which they are indentured to live out their lives and realize their destinies and social subjects. To conceive of a narrative discourse in this way permits us to account for its universality as a cultural fact and for the interest that dominant social groups have not only in controlling what will pass for the authoritative myth of a given cultural formation but also in assuring the belief that social reality itself can be both lived and realistically comprehended as a story (p. 187)¶ ¶ The entrance of this new form of information processing seems uncertain. Thus, the¶ ¶ final analysis looks to the debate community in particular and provides some¶ ¶ investigation as to how the persuasiveness of the narrative could interact with the¶ ¶ conventions and norms of the debate community.

#### You do not have your hands on the levers of power and cannot change governing bodies, what you can change however is our community. The detached stance of the policy maker in debate divorces us from true advocacy and forces us into the role of spectators and is one of the most debilitating failures of contemporary education. Throwing around the words genocide and talking as if you have resolved global warming is precisely that.

DSRB 2008

(Shanara,"THE HARSH REALITIES OF “ACTING BLACK”: HOW AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLICY DEBATERS NEGOTIATE REPRESENTATION THROUGH RACIAL PERFORMANCE AND STYLE," pg. 118-120)

Mitchell observes that the stance of the policymaker in debate comes with a “sense of detachment associated with the spectator posture.” In other words, its participants are able to engage in debates where they are able to distance themselves from the events that are the subjects of debates. Debaters can throw around terms like torture, terrorism, genocide and nuclear war without blinking. Debate simulations can only serve to distance the debaters from real world participation in the political contexts they debate about. As William Shanahan remarks: …the topic established a relationship through interpellation that inhered irrespective of what the particular political affinities of the debaters were. The relationship was both political and ethical, and needed to be debated as such. When we blithely call for United States Federal Government policymaking, we are not immune to the colonialist legacy that establishes our place on this continent. We cannot wish away the horrific atrocities perpetrated everyday in our name simply by refusing to acknowledge these implications” (emphasis in original). The “objective” stance of the policymaker is an impersonal or imperialist persona. The policymaker relies upon “acceptable” forms of evidence, engaging in logical discussion, producing rational thoughts. As Shanahan, and the Louisville debaters’ note, such a stance is integrally linked to the normative, historical and contemporary practices of power that produce and maintain varying networks of oppression. In other words, the discursive practices of policy-oriented debate are developed within, through and from systems of power and privilege. Thus, these practices are critically implicated in the maintenance of hegemony. So, rather than seeing themselves as government or state actors, Jones and Green choose to perform themselves in debate, violating the more “objective” stance of the “policymaker” and require their opponents to do the same. Jones and Green argue that debaters should ground their agency in what they are able to do as “individuals.” Note the following statement from Green in the 2NC against Emory’s Allen and Greenstein (ranked in the “sweet sixteen”): “And then, another main difference is that our advocacy is grounded in our agency as individuals. Their agency is grounded in what the US federal government, what the state should do.”117 Citing Mitchell, Green argues further: We talk about, dead prez, talks about how the system ain’t gone change, unless we make it change. We’re talkin’ about what we as individuals should do. That’s why Gordon Mitchell talked about how when we lose our argumentative agency. When we give our agency to someone else, we begin speaking of what the United States Federal Government should do, rather than what we do, that cause us to be spectators. Its one of the most debilitating failures of contemporary education. As part of their commitment to the development of agency, each of the Louisville debaters engages in recognition of their privilege, in an attempt to make their social locations visible and relevant to their rhetorical stance.