# 1NC - Irigaray

#### \*This argument also contains narratives not posted\*

#### The sex that is not one is papered over by the collective forgetting of sexual difference – men and women are forced into subjugating themselves to the phallocentric order as part of their everyday existence

**Deutscher 2 -** professor in French philosophy and gender at Northwestern

(Penelope, A Politics of Impossible difference)

Irigaray goes on to explain that these rights signify in her mind not a right to equality but a right to sexual difference. This presupposes that po­litical programs for social change must be concerned with ingrained signi­fying and symbolic structures for sexed identity and the problem of their transformation. To understand her work, it is important to understand this presupposition. Like Beauvoir, **Irigaray asks how women and femininity have been rep­resented throughout western history**. Where Beauvoir focuses more on economic and literary history**, Irigaray focuses on the history of philos­ophy**. Both feminists argue that **women have been the other throughout western history**. W**omen have been considered the exception or supple­ment, not the norm,** in discussions of the human. Also, women have been associated with the privation of masculine qualities and capacities such as reason and discipline. **Women have been the other insofar as they 'have been represented as "not-men**." In this sense, Irigaray suggests **women have served as negative mirrors sustaining masculine identity**. **Cultural and historical understandings of masculine identity have contrasted it to traditional representations of femininity, with femininity understood as an atrophy or lack of masculine qualities. The rationality of man has been opposed to the emotionality of woman. Irigaray's conclusion is that this long history inflects the terms in which women are able to take up positions in the public sphere. They exchange their role as not-men for that of like-men**. **We need an increased sensitivity to the conceptual terms in which women's participation in the public sphere is implicitly understood:** In concrete terms, that means that women must of course continue to struggle for equal wages and social rights, against discrimination in em­ployment and education, and so forth. But that is not enough: women merely "equal" to men would be "like them," therefore not women. **Once more, the difference between the sexes would be in that way cancelled out, ignored, papered over.** So it is essential for women amongst themselves to invent new modes of organization, new forms of struggle, new challenges. (Irigaray 1985c, 165-66) Are women's politics satisfactory **when the language and ideals of tra­ditionally male spheres** **are adopted**? "When [**women**'s] movements aim simply for a change in the distribution of power, leaving intact the power structure itself, then they **are resubjecting themselves, deliberately or not, to a phallocratic order**, **This latter gesture must** of course **be denounced, and with determination, since it may constitute a more subtly concealed exploitation of women**" (Irigaray 1985c, 81). Irigaray concludes that this "explains certain difficulties encountered by the liberation movements. If women allow themselves to be caught in the trap of power, in the game of authority, if they allow themselves to be contaminated by the 'paranoid' operations of masculine politics, they have nothing more to say or do *as women"* (166).

#### The logic of phallocentrism structures the debate community- women are forced into the androcentric economy of sameness in order to earn a place in the collegiate debate and the failure to conform drives the exclusion of women from the activity. The reproduction of the masculine subject position spillsover into your life after debate and supports it’s entrenchment across society

Griffin and Raider, 89

(J. Cinder and Holly Jane, “Women in High School Debate”<http://groups.wfu.edu/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/GriffinandRaider1989PunishmentPar.htm)>

'I don't usually vote for girl debaters because debate really is a boy's activity. I am surprised by your ability to handle these issues.'1 This is virtually a verbatim quote received by one of the authors on a ballot during her senior year in high school. A woman wrote the ballot. In recent years there has been some effort to isolate the factors that limit the participation of women in collegiate debate.2 These studies are superfluous if the factors regarding participation of females at the high school level are not understood. Unfortunately, no such formal research attempt has been made to explain the reasons underlying the thoughts that contribute to the opening quote. The issue of participation of other minority groups in debate is a topic beyond the scope of our discussion. The virtual non-existence of minorities is a deeply disturbing issue and deserves further investigation. Understanding gender and minority selection of debate as an activity in high school level is useful in explaining those selection factors at the collegiate level. One finds few college debaters who were not exposed to the activity in high school. Furthermore, it is unlikely that a female who has not experienced some competition and success in the activity while in high school will remain, very much less begin, debating in college. Additionally, given its competitive nature, quest for excellence, and skewed gender composition, debate offers a micro-model of the business and academic worlds. There are implications for female representation and treatment in these societal roles as debaters tend to become leaders in both the business and academic worlds. As the perceptions of women ingrained through debate experience are translated into society at large through leadership positions, the implications for under-representation of women in debate takes on greater significance. This article addresses several of the reasons behind female participation rates at the high school level and offers a few solutions to the problem. All things being equal, one would assume roughly equal numbers of male and female participants in high school debate. Debate, unlike athletics, does not require physical skills which might restrict the participation of women. Additionally, debate is academically oriented and women tend to select extracurricular activities , that are more academic in nature than men.3 Based on these assumptions, one would expect proportional representation of the genders in the activity. Why then, are there four times more men in debate than women?4 Several explanations exist that begin to account for the low rate of female participation in debate. Fewer females enter the activity at the outset. Although organizational and procedural tactics used in high school debate may account for low initial rates of participation, a variety of social and structural phenomena, not necessarily caused by the debate community also account for these rates. Ultimately, the disproportionate attrition rate of female debaters results in the male dominated composition of the activity. There are more disincentives for women to participate in debate than for men. While entry rates for women and man may in some cases be roughly equal, the total number of women who participate for four years is significantly lower than the corresponding number of men. This rate of attrition is due to factors that can be explained largely by an examination of the debate community itself. Socially inculcated values contribute to low rates of female entry in high school debate. Gender bias and its relation to debate has been studied by Manchester and Freidly. They conclude, "[m]ales are adhering to sex-role stereotypes and sex-role expectations when they participate in debate because it is perceived as a masculine' activity. Female debate participants experience more gender-related barriers because they are not adhering to sex-role stereotypes and sex-role expectations.5 In short, 'nice girls' do not compete against or with men, are not assertive, and are not expected to engage in policy discourse, particularly relating to military issues. Rather, "nice girls" should be cheerleaders, join foreign language clubs, or perhaps participate in student government. It should be noted that many of these attitudes are indoctrinated at birth and cannot be directly attributed to the debate community. However, there are many activity specific elements that discourage female participation in high school debate. Structural barriers endemic to the forensics community dissuade female ninth graders from entering the activity.6 Recruitment procedures and initial exposure may unintentionally create a first impression of the activity as dominated by men. By and large, it is a male debater or a male debate coach that will discuss the activity with new students for the first time. Additionally, most debate coaches are men. This reinforces a socially proven norm to prospective debaters, that debate is an activity controlled by men. This male exposure contributes to a second barrier to participation. Parents are more likely to let a son go on an overnight than they are a daughter, particularly when the coach is male and the squad is mostly male. This may be a concern even when the coach is a trusted member of the community. While entry barriers are formidable, female attrition rates effect the number of women in the activity most significantly.7 Rates of attrition are largely related to the level of success. Given the time and money commitment involved in debate, if one is not winning one quits debating. The problem is isolating the factors that contribute to the early failure of women debaters. Even if equal numbers of males and females enter at the novice level, the female perception of debate as a whole is not based on the gender proportions of her immediate peer group. Rather, she looks to the composition of debaters across divisions. This may be easily understood if one considers the traditional structures of novice debate. Often it is the varsity debate team, composed mostly of males, who coach and judge novice. Novices also learn how to debate by watching debates. Thus, the role models will be those individuals already involved in the activity and entrenched in its values. The importance of female role models and mentors should not be underestimated. There is a proven correlation between the number of female participants and the number of female coaches and judges.8 The presence of female mentors and role models may not only help attract women to the activity, but will significantly temper the attrition rate of female debaters. Novice, female debaters have few role models and, consequently, are more likely to drop out than their male counterparts; resulting in an unending cycle of female attrition in high school debate. Pragmatically, there are certain cost benefit criteria that coaches on the high school level, given the constraints of a budget, must consider. Coaches with teams dominated by males may be reluctant to recruit females due to traveling and housing considerations. Thus, even if a female decides to join the team, her travel opportunities may be more limited than those of the males on the team. Once a female has "proven" herself, the willingness to expend team resources on her increases, assuming she overcomes the initial obstacles.

#### Argument choice in debates are also reflective of the phallocentric economy of the same- the denial of personal experience and connections to individuals are indicative of the androcentric logic that denies the feminine

Eisenberg in 2012  
Particular types of argument choices may affect the way participants experience a debate round. For example, debaters may experience some pushback to some of the arguments they wish to speak about in debate, especially if they are trying to integrating personal experiences into their argument. For example, Akila explains that debaters tend to treat each other as if it is a race to the bottom, where the ballot is the only thing that matters. Judy notes that this norm of the community to place emphasis on competitive success allows people to justify arguments that are reprehensible or “not okay.” Akila highlights several examples of teams who will justify racism, sexism and imperialism as appropriate side effects of advocacies that claim to save the lives of many people from potential nuclear war scenarios constructed through a lens of political realism. Ivana notes that externalized logic, large body counts and phallic weapons are privileged over personal experience or “your own body.” Akila feels that debaters don’t place an emphasis on trying to relate to one another, and feels that debate isn’t an alternative space where students are encouraged to relate more ethically towards one another. Like Judy, Akila agrees that the atmosphere promotes an emphasis on competitive success that makes debate feel like “warfare,” a common masculine metaphor. Akila shares: On a personal level, I spent time writing this poem to try to convey to you what being a woman of color and an immigrant is like under this year’s topic which is immigration, but because of the way that we are taught to socialize in a sort of militarized space that is debate, that gets lost until it becomes some sort of arsenal or some sort of weapon. My narrative is just a reason we should win because it foregrounds experiences of immigrants…that’s not a good way of understanding why people put themselves in debates. People put themselves in debates because debate needs to be less insular; it needs to be less detached from the reality of what we talk about. While some women experienced this as a barrier, others did not perceive specific arguments as inherently gendered or as a roadblock to their participation or success in debate. Even though Catherine adopts this particular perspective, she has become more aware of language choices in argumentation, and explains that she frequently hears rhetoric that equates certain argument choices with weakness, such as comparing arguments with rape or making comments such as “that’s gay” or other. These comparisons serve to reaffirm hegemonic masculinity, and Catherine feels that this type of rhetoric is a distinct barrier to inclusion in debate. In order to combat some of these barriers, women utilize argument choice itself as a tactic. Ivana, for example, frequently deploys feminist arguments in debate rounds. She notes that even though some men in the community find it acceptable to speak more candidly about women’s bodies and sexual experiences, it is perpetually taboo to speak about women’s bodies in debate rounds. Ivana deployed arguments related to women’s menstruation as one way to engage this dichotomy she is confronted with. Thomas (2007) explains how the menstruation taboo in modern Western society is “restricting Western women from full citizenship” (p. 76). Ivana’s decision to speak out in this public forum about women’s menstruation might be thought of as a tactic to confront this taboo while reclaiming a sense of citizenship in the debate community or even in the round itself. By requiring both the judge to listen and the other team to engage her discussion of menstruation, she can call for a questioning of this simultaneous objectification and silencing of women while establishing a space for her to feel engaged and empowered by her argument. Other women chose to approach these tensions by using personal experience as evidence, sharing their own stories in debate rounds. Davis (2007) argues that “women’s subjective accounts of their experiences and how they affect their everyday practices need to be linked to a critical interrogation of the cultural discourses, institutional arrangements, and geopolitical contexts in which these accounts are invariably embedded” (p. 133) This is precisely what these women are doing, weaving their own narratives in with theoretical texts and political events situated while acknowledging the particular institutional space the activity is located in. Lucille doesn’t feel that she uses tactics in debate rounds very often to overcome these barriers, however she notes that there are instances where enough was enough and she spoke about her subjectivity as a woman. Several women noted that being able to speak about being a female or femininity in general while also remaining strategic and successful was an empowering tactic. Akila calls these types of tactics “little disruptions,” or subversive instances in debate that challenge their competitors and judges to a moment of reflexivity.

**Collegiate policy debate is a microcosm of the treatment of the feminine in the public sphere- not that difference and identity are not utilized in multiple ways to exclude the body of certain individuals- but there is an undeniable silencing of the feminine perspective that occurs in America today- As one example, the** **exclusion of females from serious consideration for leadership positions like the presidency, is part of the systematic marginalization of the feminine from the Political**

Political Parity 2k12 (Political Parity is a platform for a wide field of leaders, researchers, and funders who are dedicated to increasing the number of women serving in the highest levels of government, “Reaching Executive Office: The Presidency and the Office of the Governor,” http://www.politicalparity.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/inventory-executive.pdf)

The presidency—the highest “glass ceiling” in American politics—has yet to be shattered by a woman. In contrast, another major elective executive office—the office of the governor— has been within women’s reach. Still, only six of the nation’s fifty governors in 2012 are women. Almost half of states have never had a woman governor. What challenges do women face in seeking the presidency and the governor’s office? Gender and the Presidency Voters associate leadership with masculinity. And arguably, no elective office is more masculine than the presidency. The president, as commander-in-chief, is expected to embody masculinity and exhibit toughness. Voters associate both masculine tasks and masculine traits with the office of the presidency. Because people have expectations about what constitutes leadership and about the expected behaviors and traits of women and men, it can be difficult for women to persuade voters that they are good leaders. The presidential selection process itself is arguably a “gendered space,” imbued with references to “toughness,” according to Georgia Duerst-Lahti. The prominence of war and terrorism in particular—can make a female candidate seem even less appropriate for the job because of voters’ gender stereotypes about issue competency. Potential female presidential candidates are also less likely to have a background of military service, which is also associated with the presidency. The United States lags behind many other countries in its failure to elect a female president. Today 22 countries are led by a female president or prime minister. In a provocative argument, Eileen McDonagh argues that countries with female monarchs are more accustomed to women’s leadership. In the United States case, the absence of a hereditary monarchy may have had the unintended consequence of dampening public support for women leaders. McDonagh also argues that the United States lags behind other nations in social welfare provision, a more “female” task that would make for a political tradition more hospitable to a female president.

**To speak is never neutral and discourse in the public sphere is marked by the collective forgetting of the original starting point of social relations which is the subjugation of the feminine**

Irigaray 2k4

(Luce, femme fatale An ethics of sexual difference pg. 10-11)

**In order to distance oneself, must one be able to** take? To **speak**? Which in a certain way comes to the same thing. **Perhaps in order to take, one needs a fixed container or place**? A soul? Or a spirit? Mourning nothing is the most difficult. Mourning the self in the other is almost impossible. **I search myself, as if I had been assimilated into maleness.**  **I ought to reconstitute myself on the basis of a disassimilation….** **Rise again from the traces of a culture, of works already produced by the other.** **Searching through what is in them – for what is not there.** What allowed them to be, for what is not there. **Their conditions of possibility, for what is not there**. Woman ought to be to find herself, among other things, through the images of herself already deposited in history and the conditions of production of the work of man, and not on the basis of his work, his genealogy.

**If** traditionally, and as a mother, woman represents place for man, **such a limit means that she becomes a thing**, with some possibility of change from one historical period to another. **She finds herself delineated as a thing**. Moreover, **the maternal-feminine also serves as an envelope, a container, the starting point from which man limits his things**. The relationship between envelope and things constitutes one of the aporias, or the aporia, of Aristotelianism and of the philosophical systems derived from it. In our terminologies, which derive from this economy of thought but are impregnated with a psychologism unaware of its sources, it is said, for example, that the woman-mother is castrating. **Which means that, since her status as envelope and as thing(s) has not been interpreted, she remains inseparable from the work or act of an, notably insofar as he defines her and creates his identity with her as his starting point or, correlatively, with this determination of her being**. If after this, she is still alive, she continuously undoes his work- distinguishing herself from both the envelope and the thing, ceaselessly creating there some interval, play, something in motion and un-limited which disturbs his perspective, his world, and his/its limits. But, **because he fails to leave her a subjective life, and to be on occasion her place and her thing in an intersubjective dynamic, man remains within a master-slave dialectic.** **The slave,** ultimately, **of a God on whom he bestows the characteristics of an absolute master**. Secretly or obscurely, **a slave to the power of the maternal-feminie which he diminishes or destroys.**

**Vote neg to inhabit the silence of the 1ac to invigorate a politics of sexual difference whose ontological openness disrupts the phallocentrism of debate and presidential war powers**

#### Deutscher, professor in French philosophy and gender at Northwestern, 2K2

(Penelope, A Politics of Impossible difference pg. 29-30)

**When Irigaray concludes that the history of western culture has ex­cluded sexual difference, notice how the ontological status of sexual dif­ference is left entirely open**. A writer could establish this diagnosis be­lieving that there is no such thing as sexual difference. Another could draw the same diagnosis convinced that there is. Irigaray hoped to move the basis for critique away from claims about what there is or is not. She rejected the idea of asking "What is a woman?" (1985c, 122). She did not want her analyses of Freud and others reduced to such speculative and generalizing questions. **One could achieve a good deal just by analyzing repetition in. the patterns of representation of women in the history of western culture, One -began to generate a sense of what that history has not wanted woman to be. It has not wanted women and femininity to be more than opposite, complement, or same as the male. The term "sexual difference" in her work is an open term, a pair of empty bracket**s. But **the construction of these brackets nonetheless emphasizes that an active ex­clusion has taken place**. As an Irigarayan concept, "**sexual difference" rep­resents something the history of western ideas has not wanted women and femininity to be: something more than opposite, complement, or same.** "Sexual difference" in Irigaray's work refers to an excluded possibility, some **kind of femininity (open in content) that has never become cultur­ally coherent or possible.** Irigaray has continued to rely on this concept throughout her career. **When she refers to the feminine,** **she does not refer to a buried or repressed truth**. **Nor does she envisage** (by giving content to**) a utopian new possibility of femininity.** **Sexual difference is not empir­ically known., except by its exclusion**. **Nor is it some unknowable outside of language and culture to which we could attribute identity or entity**. It is "neither on the near side, the empirical realm that is opaque to all lan­guage, nor on the far side, the self-sufficient infinite (1985c, 77). Instead, **it is a hypothetical possibility on the border of histories of rep­resentation of femininity**. **Not within them**, because it has been excluded**. Not entirely exterior to them**, because insofar as it has been excluded it has been indicated as a possibility. **For this reason the concepts of femi­ninity and sexual difference generated by Irigaray have a paradoxical in‑ side / outside, possible/impossible status**. Hypothetically, the **"recogni­tion of a 'specific' female sexuality would challenge the monopoly on value held by the masculine sex alone"** (s985c, 3). **One can establish this point without asserting that there is a specific female sexuality or femi­ninety**, irrespective of one's position on the latter, **one can analyze and crit­icize theoretical contexts for their inability to tolerate such a possibility**. Irigaray thought a good deal was revealed by Freud's repeated. exclusion of such a possibility, for example. **This exclusion must be considered the very emblem of phallocentrism**.

#### The social condition of debate and presidential war powers is informed by the explicit and implicit failure to think the question of sexual difference. Our exposure of the suppression of the potential feminine subjectivity cannot be ossified around squo essentialist notions of gender but must be understood as a bracket whose emptiness must be thought

#### Deutscher, professor in French philosophy and gender at Northwestern, 2K2

(Penelope, A Politics of Impossible difference)

In chapter 2, we saw the suggestion, based on Irigaray's linguistic analysis, that **men and women are sick or suffering from an absence of sexual difference**, and her suggestion that "[for some time now, sexual difference has not played a part in the *creation of culture,* except in a divi­sion of roles and functions that does not allow both sexes to be subjects. Thus we are confronted with a certain *subjective pathology* from both sides of sexual difference" (1993c, 172). Irigaray's diagnosis of **contemporary culture** is that it **has excluded the possibility of adequate sexual differ­ence**. **The very thinking of its impossibility is a kind of thinking of sexual dif­ference**. **We are asked to imagine a pair of empty brackets, 'sexual differ­ence," whose emptiness is necessary to phallocentric culture and the source of its ailment**. **Irigaray deems the empty brackets to be filled with meanings yet to come. She proposes that just thinking of sexual difference as a set of empty brackets is a therapeutic improvement on a culture that places a premium on discourses of** equality**, sameness, negation, and complementarily.** **Thinking about the emptiness of these brackets is already the beginnings of a thinking of sexual difference. Sexual difference is, at least, thought of as absent.** I think **the inevitable instability of this project adds to its force and in­terest**. Irigaray (1996b) also emphasizes its constructive outlook: "**We do have to smash our chains and prisons, but we need to construct our iden­tity**, and our divine identity, **and seek out traces and scraps of it,** **wherever they may be**. **The project of thinking impossibility would**, in principle, **generate more cultural possibilities for a thinking of sexual dif­ference**. But wherever we lose sight of the impossibility of the project, its specific character has been exchanged for a simpler version of the politics of difference according to which there is difference, men and women are different, and this is a fact that should be recognized. Introducing An *Ethics of Sexual Difference* Irigaraypresents us with sexual difference as a possibility, but not as a question of ontology of the sort "Is there sexual difference really?" Her philosophical framework is constructed by taking both these positions, each of which can be argued with equal vigor: that there is no sexual difference; that there might be sexual difference. Historical attempts to think sexual difference, such as a Rousseauist thinking of women as the natural opposite and complement of man, are anything but. There never has been a thinking of sexual differ­ence that did not subordinate it to a masculine benchmark. Furthermore, there never has been sexual difference because its cultural conditions have never existed. As we know, irigaray elsewhere lists these conditions as a revolution in law, language, media, philosophy, the economy, religion, and so on. Thus, "there is no sexual difference." But **Irigaray does claim that the thinking of sexual difference has been repeatedly avoided, or ignored, or foreclosed, or reduced into a thinking of the same.** One constant of irigaray's work is the view that **western cul­ture has been engaged in the constant process of actively not thinking sexual difference**. On that basis, **while there is not and has not been sexual difference, there is the trace of a possible sexual difference in that active and repeated cultural action of "not that**." The need to think sexual differ­ence in terms of the simultaneous "there is not" and "there might be" pre­cludes **Irigaray** from posing a simple question, "Is there sexual differ­ence?" Rather than introducing it in such terms, she **presents sexual difference as a foreclosed conceptual possibility that has not yet been rec­ognized as culturally significant.**For whom is this foreclosure a problem? According to the diagnostic as­pect of irigaray's work, **we are all suffering from sexual difference, from its failure to come, from our failure to pose it**. The steps of her argumenta­tion are as follows: T.. "There is" must be relinquished in favor of a structure of reflection on a simultaneous and inseparable "There is not" and "There might, *be" to* enable an adequate reflection on sexual difference. z. Sexual difference must be reformulated not as a fact but as a cultural impossibility. 3. This impossibility is significant, whereas many impossibilities may not be. **Sexual difference is a problem with the highest stakes. Indeed "the stakes are so high that everything is subject to denial, incomprehension, blindness, rejection**" (1gg3a 134). **Sexual difference is everybody's problem in all of culture and all cul­tures**. **Cultures and texts may be analyzed as expressing the symptoms of their malaise of an absence of sexual difference. Irigaray considers the absence of sexual difference to be a crucial un­derlying issue of culture and thought to which we do not attend.** The ram­ifications of this claim are first seen in Irigaray's methodological approach in Speculum (1985b). The claim that sexual difference might have this double status leads to a particular reading of Freud and Plato. Irigaray in­terprets their texts as biographies of an excluded sexual difference lurking in their conceptual schemas. Sexual difference lurks as the major issue of these authors, and yet the issue to which they will not attend. On Iri­garay's reading, Freud's concerns of identification, desire, castration, li­bido, object substitution, and repression are symptoms of his failure to deal with the major issue, sexual difference. With some ingenuity, Irigaray also interprets Plato's concern with ideal immaterial forms, symmetry, the scan, light, the good, a knowledge transcending the domain of physical de­sire and procreation, the love of truth, the devaluation of mimesis, the image, the copy, matter, and procreation as symptoms of a neglect of is­sues of sexual difference.' Plato's texts are reinterpreted as the tracing of a conflict about the major issue to which he will not attend. Irigaray is not arguing that sexual difference is a philosophical issue for Plato. Instead we should consider his failure to think of sexual difference as a key philo­sophical issue. This failure is his problem, and his texts constantly mani­fest symptoms of this failure. **This kind of interpretation enables Irigaray's claims concerning the status of historical philosophical texts. These texts are conflictual. They are engaged in a constant, disavowed failure to think sexual difference**. Does any text from the history of philosophy escape this conflict? Few, if any: **Irigaray attributes its symptoms to Plato**, to Aristotle and Plotinus, to Spinoza and Descartes, to Kant and Hegel, to **Nietzsche**, to **Heidegger**, Sartre, Lavinas, and Merleau-Ponty. Tina Chanter (1995) offers a good summary of this Irigarayan account of the overinvested absence of sexual difference from the history of philosophy: **Irigaray reads the history of Western philosophy as a history in which the question of sexual difference has been obliterated. What this means is not only that philosophers--from Plato to the present day—have failed to pose the question of sexual difference, but that the question itself has been buried, suppressed or banished from the arena of legitimate philosophical consideration.** Irigaray's insistent emphasis on the question of sexual differ­ence is not simply a matter of drawing attention to an area that happens as a matter of empirical fact to have been neglected. **The question of sexual difference has been excluded from philosophical orbit as a matter of prin­ciple**. irigaray's concern is to investigate the dynamics of this systematic rel­egation of sexual difference to the sidelines of philosophical discourse, and to ask why and how sexual difference has been. written out of the history of philosophy. (14o) To be sure, s**exual difference seems to be an overt philosophical issue for some of these philosophers. But its unsatisfactory treatment** by figures such as **Nietzsche leaves Irigaray concluding that such texts are still fail­ures to think sexual difference, little better than the simple omission of the question**.2 Whether omitted or mistreated, **the very absence of sexual dif­ference from the texts of the history of philosophy is deemed by Irigaray a presence in the text, a present, interpretable absence**. Where and when, she asks, is sexual difference absent? In relation to what themes, in which locations? With such questions Irigaray establishes a fragile foundation on which to build up a philosophy of sexual difference, pulling it up by its own bootstraps. In *Speculum,* Irigaray reconstitutes the failure to attend to sexual differ­ence. in Plato's concept of ideal forms. In more recent work, Irigaray lo­cates in the following contemporary cultural phenomena a similar failure: the many forms of destruction in the world, nihilism, the proliferation of status quo values, consumerism, cancer, the end of philosophy, religious despair, regression to religiosity, scientistic or technical imperialism "that fails to consider the living subject" (1993a, 5). These are not posited as fail­ures in the face of a sexual difference considered as a cultural fact. **They are interpreted as expressions of the cultural failure to posit the possibility of sexual difference, let alone to allow sexual difference to develop as a cultural reality**. Irigaray (1993a) diagnoses "everything" as "resist[ing] the discovery and affirmation of such an advent or event" (6).

# Block

#### First is the sequencing da – Even if they win that they can produce change within the state, sequencing is k/. Focusing on the state first and foremost causes any change that arises to disenfranchise movements that would make radical changes like our kritik impossible. Public engagement MUST precede the plan.

Nagin, 5

[Tomiko Brown, Visiting Associate Professor, University of Virginia School of Law, “ELITES, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, AND THE LAW: THE CASE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION,” Columbia Law Review, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1436]

Those seeking to have an impact on the political and legal orders should not root a mass movement in the courts;instead, affirmative litigation about constitutional rights should be anchored upon and preceded by a mass movement.Efforts to achieve fundamental change should begin with the target constituency and be waged initially outside of the confines of institutionalized politics.Law should be understood as a tactic in an ongoing political struggle, where the struggle is the main event and favorable legal outcomes are its byproducts. There is a crucially important temporal component to this view. Legal claims can be tactically useful in a political strategy for achieving change - but only after social movements lay the groundwork for legal change. Social movements must first create political pressure that frames issues in a favorable manner, creates cultural norm shifts, and affects public opinion; these norm shifts then increase the likelihood that courts will reach outcomes favored by lawyers. [437](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=b1b76c3bff33e7c7527182cc42568c87&docnum=11&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAl&_md5=b4841fe459fa752b47486b13d84385b6&focBudTerms=milliken%20w/150%20hispanic%20or%20latino&focBudSel=all#n437) Again, my claims find support in the history of the mid-twentieth-century civil rights movement. This narrative posits an intimate relationship between the sociopolitical dynamics within black client communities and the success (or failure) of civil rights lawyers' litigation campaigns for rights. The postwar civil rights movement confirms that the moral suasion of participatory democratic groups of nonlawyers, and typically nonelites, was integral to law's movement from a Jim Crow regime to a [\*1523] constitutional order in which formal equality was the norm. During the past three decades, historians who have analyzed social change have discovered that small groups of inexpert individuals can be the leading edge of a social movement, especially when they work in coalition with those who traditionally wield influence in society. [438](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=b1b76c3bff33e7c7527182cc42568c87&docnum=11&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAl&_md5=b4841fe459fa752b47486b13d84385b6&focBudTerms=milliken%20w/150%20hispanic%20or%20latino&focBudSel=all#n438)Through their commitment to a social cause, ordinary people with no insider knowledge of the technical aspects of the broad issue on which they are mobilizing can create circumstances in which those with actual power (political, economic, and, ultimately, legal power) are persuaded to act in their favor.

#### Their “hollow hope” in government institutions means the public never gets engaged within any sort of agency, even ones that affect them on a daily basis. Why care about fixing a problem when there’s someone else who can do it for you. They sacrifice agency by seeing governing institutions as a transcendent God of the political and by seeing mega spheres as the only place decisions are made.

**Kappeler 95** (Susanne, The Will to Violence: The politics of personal behavior, Pg. 10-11)

Yet **our insight that** indeed **we are not responsible for the decisions of a** Serbian general or a Croatian **president tends to mislead us into thinking that** therefore **we have no responsibility** at all, not even **for forming our own judgment, and** thus into **underrating the responsibility we** do **have within our** own **sphere of action**. In particular, it seems to **absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events**, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls 'organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally, and also individually organized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major power mongers, For **we** tend to **think that we cannot 'do' anything**, say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation **because we are not where the major decisions are made**. Which is why **many** of those **not yet** entirely **disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics**, in the style of **'what would I do if I were the** general, the prime minister, the **president**, the foreign minister or the minister of defense?' Since **we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only** worthwhile and truly **effective ones**, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, **any question of what I would do if I were** indeed **myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having** what is perceived as **'virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile**. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN - finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like 'I want to stop this war', 'I want military intervention', 'I want to stop this backlash', or 'I want a moral revolution. 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in co-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our non-comprehension': our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, **preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer**. And we 'are' the war in our 'unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the 'fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don't'- our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the 'others.' **We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape 'our feelings, our relationships, our values' according: to the structures and the values of war and violence**.

#### 1st Impact: disempowerment.

Gordon, 87

[Robert. Prof Law @ Stanford Univ. “Unfreezing Legal Reality: Critical Approaches to Law” Florida State University Law Review, Vol 15 No 3. 1987, lexis]

Now a central tenet of CLS work has been that the ordinary discourses of law -- debates over legislation, legal arguments, administrative and court decisions, lawyers' discussions with clients, legal commentary and scholarship, etc. -- all contribute to cementing this feeling, at once despairing and complacent, that things must be the way they are and that major changes could only make them worse. Legal discourse accomplishes this in many ways. First by endlessly repeating the claim that law and the other policy sciences have perfected a set of rational techniques and institutions that have come about as close as we are ever likely to get to solving the problem of domination in civil society. Put another way, legal discourse paints an idealized fantasy of order according to which legal rules and procedures have so structured relations among people that such relations may primarily be understood as instituted by their consent, their free and rational choices. Such coercion as apparently remains may be explained as the result of necessity -- either natural necessities (such as scarcity or the limited human capacity for altruism) or social necessities. For example, in a number of the prevailing discourses, the ordinary hierarchies of workplace domination and subordination are explained: (1) by reference to the contractual agreement of the parties and to their relative preferences for responsibility versus leisure, or risk taking versus security; (2) by the natural distribution of differential talents and skills (Larry Bird earns more as a basketball player because he is better); and (3) by the demands of efficiency in production, which are said to require extensive hierarchy for the purposes of supervision and monitoring, centralization of investment decisions, and so forth. There are always some residues of clearly unhappy [\*199] conditions -- undeserved deprivation, exploitation, suffering -- that cannot be explained in any of these ways. The discourses of law are perhaps most resourceful in dealing with these residues, treating them as, on the whole, readily reformable within the prevailing political options for adjusting the structures of ordinary practices -- one need merely fine tune the scheme of regulation, or deregulation, to correct them. But the prevailing discourse has its cynical and worldly side, and its tragic moments, to offset the general mood of complacency. In this mood it resignedly acknowledges that beyond the necessary minimum and the reformable residues of coercion and misery there is an irreducible, intractable remainder -- due to inherent limits on our capacity for achieving social knowledge, or for changing society through deliberate intervention, or for taking collective action against evil without suffering the greater evil of despotic power. These discourses of legal and technical rationality, of rights, consent, necessity, efficiency, and tragic limitation, are of course discourses of power -- not only for the obvious reasons that law's commands are backed by force and its operations can inflict enormous pain, but because to have access to these discourses, to be able to use them or pay others to use them on your behalf, is a large part of what it means to possess power. Further, they are discourses that -- although often partially constructed, or extracted as concessions, through the pressure of relatively less powerful groups struggling from below -- in habitual practice tend to express the interests and the perspectives of the powerful people who use them. The discourses have some of the power they do because some of their claims sound very plausible, though many do not. The claim, for example, that workers in health-destroying factories voluntarily "choose," in any practical sense of the term, the risks of the workplace in return for a wage premium, is probably not believed by anyone save those few expensively trained out of the capacity to recognize what is going on around them. In addition, both the plausible and implausible claims are backed up in the cases of law and of economics and the policy sciences by a quite formidable-seeming technocratic apparatus of rational justification -- suggesting that the miscellany of social practices we happen to have been born into in this historical moment is much more than a contingent miscellany. It has an order, even if sometimes an invisible one; it makes sense. The array of legal norms, institutions, procedures, and doctrines in force, can be rationally derived from the principles of regard for individual autonomy, utilitarian [\*200] efficiency or wealth creation, the functional needs of social order or economic prosperity, or the moral consensus and historical traditions of the community. There are several general points CLS people have wanted to assert against these discourses of power. First, the discourses have helped to structure our ordinary perceptions of reality so as to systematically exclude or repress alternative visions of social life, both as it is and as it might be. One of the aims of CLS methods is to try to dredge up and give content to these suppressed alternative visions. Second, the discourses fail even on their own terms to sustain the case for their relentlessly apologetic conclusions. Carefully understood, they could all just as well be invoked to support a politics of social transformation instead. n3 Generally speaking, the CLS claims under this heading are that the rationalizing criteria appealed to (of autonomy, functional utility, efficiency, history, etc.) are far too indeterminate to justify any conclusions about the inevitability or desirability of particular current practices; such claims, when unpacked, again and again turn out to rest on some illegitimate rhetorical move or dubious intermediate premise or empirical assumption. Further, the categories, abstractions, conventional rhetorics, reasoning modes and empirical statements of our ordinary discourses in any case so often misdescribe social experience as not to present any defensible pictures of the practices that they attempt to justify. Not to say of course that there could be such a thing as a single correct way of truthfully rendering social life as people live it, or that CLS writers could claim to have discovered it. But the commonplace legal discourses often produce such seriously distorted representations of social life that their categories regularly filter out complexity, variety, irrationality, unpredictability, disorder, cruelty, coercion, violence, suffering, solidarity and self-sacrifice. n4 [\*201] Summing up: The purpose of CLS as an intellectual enterprise is to try to thaw out, or at least to hammer some tiny dents on, the frozen mind sets induced by habitual exposure to legal practices -- by trying to show how normal legal discourses contribute to freezing, and to demonstrate how problematic these discourses are.

#### 2nd impact is advocacy. You do not have your hands on the levers of power and cannot change governing bodies, what you can change however is our community. The detached stance of the policy maker in debate divorces us from true advocacy and forces us into the role of spectators and is one of the most debilitating failures of contemporary education. Throwing around the words genocide and talking as if you have resolved global warming is precisely that.

DSRB 2008

(Shanara,"THE HARSH REALITIES OF “ACTING BLACK”: HOW AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLICY DEBATERS NEGOTIATE REPRESENTATION THROUGH RACIAL PERFORMANCE AND STYLE," pg. 118-120)

Mitchell observes that the stance of the policymaker in debate comes with a “sense of detachment associated with the spectator posture.” In other words, its participants are able to engage in debates where they are able to distance themselves from the events that are the subjects of debates. Debaters can throw around terms like torture, terrorism, genocide and nuclear war without blinking. Debate simulations can only serve to distance the debaters from real world participation in the political contexts they debate about. As William Shanahan remarks: …the topic established a relationship through interpellation that inhered irrespective of what the particular political affinities of the debaters were. The relationship was both political and ethical, and needed to be debated as such. When we blithely call for United States Federal Government policymaking, we are not immune to the colonialist legacy that establishes our place on this continent. We cannot wish away the horrific atrocities perpetrated everyday in our name simply by refusing to acknowledge these implications” (emphasis in original). The “objective” stance of the policymaker is an impersonal or imperialist persona. The policymaker relies upon “acceptable” forms of evidence, engaging in logical discussion, producing rational thoughts. As Shanahan, and the Louisville debaters’ note, such a stance is integrally linked to the normative, historical and contemporary practices of power that produce and maintain varying networks of oppression. In other words, the discursive practices of policy-oriented debate are developed within, through and from systems of power and privilege. Thus, these practices are critically implicated in the maintenance of hegemony. So, rather than seeing themselves as government or state actors, Jones and Green choose to perform themselves in debate, violating the more “objective” stance of the “policymaker” and require their opponents to do the same. Jones and Green argue that debaters should ground their agency in what they are able to do as “individuals.” Note the following statement from Green in the 2NC against Emory’s Allen and Greenstein (ranked in the “sweet sixteen”): “And then, another main difference is that our advocacy is grounded in our agency as individuals. Their agency is grounded in what the US federal government, what the state should do.”117 Citing Mitchell, Green argues further: We talk about, dead prez, talks about how the system ain’t gone change, unless we make it change. We’re talkin’ about what we as individuals should do. That’s why Gordon Mitchell talked about how when we lose our argumentative agency. When we give our agency to someone else, we begin speaking of what the United States Federal Government should do, rather than what we do, that cause us to be spectators. Its one of the most debilitating failures of contemporary education. As part of their commitment to the development of agency, each of the Louisville debaters engages in recognition of their privilege, in an attempt to make their social locations visible and relevant to their rhetorical stance.

#### Thirdly, it leads to the worst forms of liberal violence and racism.

Dossa ‘99

[Shiraz, Department of Political Science, St. Francis Xavier University, Antigonish, Nova Scotia, “Liberal Legalism: Law, Culture and Identity,” The European Legacy, Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 73-87,1]

No discipline in the rationalized arsenal of modernity is as rational, impartial, objective as the province of law and jurisprudence, in the eyes of its liberal enthusiasts. Law is the exemplary countenance of the conscious and calculated rationality of modern life, **it is the** emblematic face of liberal civilization. Law and legal rules symbolize the spirit of science, the march of human progress. As Max Weber, the reluctant liberal theorist of the ethic of rationalization, asserted: judicial formalism enables the legal system to operate like a technically rational machine. Thus it guarantees to individuals and groups within the system a relative of maximum of freedom, and greatly increases for them the possibility of predicting the legal consequences of their action. In this reading, law encapsulates the western capacity to bring order to nature and human beings, to turn the ebb and flow of life into a "rational machine" under the tutelage of "judicial formalism".19 Subjugation of the Other races in the colonial empires was motivated by power and rapacity, but it was justified and indeed rationalized, by an appeal to the civilizing influence of religion and law: western Christianity and liberal law. To the imperialist mind, "the civilizing mission of law" was fundamental, though Christianity had a part to play in this program.20 Liberal colonialists visualized law, civilization and progress as deeply connected and basic, they saw western law as neutral, universally relevant and desirable. The first claim was right in the liberal context, the second thoroughly false. In the liberal version, the mythic and irrational, emblems of thoughtlessness and fear, had ruled all life-forms in the past and still ruled the lives of the vast majority of humanity in the third world; in thrall to the majesty of the natural and the transcendent, primitive life flourished in the environment of traditionalism and lawlessness, hallmarks of the epoch of ignorance. By contrast, liberal ideology and modernity were abrasively unmythic, rational and controlled. Liberal order was informed by knowledge, science, a sense of historical progress, a continuously improving future. But this canonical, secular, bracing self-image, is tendentious and substantively illusory: it blithely scants the bloody genealogy and the extant historical record of liberal modernity, liberal politics, and particularly liberal law and its impact on the "lower races" (Hobson). In his Mythology of Modern Law, Fitzpatrick has shown that the enabling claims of liberalism, specifically of liberal law, are not only untenable but implicated in canvassing a racist justification of its colonial past and in eliding the racist basis of the structure of liberal jurisprudence.21 Liberal law is mythic in its presumption of its neutral, objective status. Specifically, the liberal legal story of its immaculate, analytically pure origin obscures and veils not just law's own ruthless, violent, even savage and disorderly trajectory, but also its constitutive association with imperialism and racism.22 In lieu of the transcendent, divine God of the "lower races", modern secular law postulated the gods of History, Science, Freedom. Liberal law was to be the instrument for realizing the promise of progress that the profane gods had decreed. Fitzpatrick's invasive surgical analysis lays bare the underlying logic of law's self-articulation in opposition to the values of cultural-racial Others, and its strategic, continuous reassertion of liberalism's superiority and the civilizational indispensability of liberal legalism. Liberal law's self-presentation presupposes a corrosive, debilitating, anarchic state of nature inhabited by the racial Others and lying in wait at the borders of the enlightened modern West. This mythological, savage Other, creature of raw, natural, unregulated fecundity and sexuality, justified the liberal conquest and control of the racially Other regions.23 Law's violence and resonant savagery on behalf of the West in its imperial razing of cultures and lands of the others, has been and still is, justified in terms of the necessary, beneficial spread of liberal civilization. Fitzpatrick's analysis parallels the impassioned deconstruction of this discourse of domination initiated by Edward Said's Orientalism, itself made possible by the pioneering analyses of writers like Aime Cesaire and Frantz Fanon. Fitzpatrick's argument is nevertheless instructive: his focus on law and its machinations unravels the one concrete province of imperial ideology that is centrally modern and critical in literally transforming and refashioning the human nature of racial Others. For liberal law carries on its back the payload of "progressive", pragmatic, instrumental modernity, its ideals of order and rule of law, its articulation of human rights and freedom, its ethic of procedural justice, its hostility to the sacred, to transcendence or spiritual complexity, its recasting of politics as the handmaiden of the nomos, its valorization of scientism and rationalization in all spheres of modern life. Liberal law is not synonymous with modernity tout court, but it is the exemplary voice of its rational spirit, **the custodian of its civilizational ambitions.** For the colonized Others, no non-liberal alternative is available: a non-western route to economic progress is inconceivable in liberal-legal discourse. For even the truly tenacious in the third world will never cease to be, in one sense or another, the outriders of modernity: their human condition condemns them to **playing perpetual catch-up**, eternally subservient to Western economic and technological superiority in a epoch of self-surpassing modernity.24 If the racially Other nations suffer exclusion globally, the racially other minorities inside the liberal loop enjoy the ambiguous benefits of inclusion. As legal immigrants or refugees, they are entitled to the full array of rights and privileges, as citizens (in Canada, France, U.K., U.S—Germany is the exception) they acquire civic and political rights as a matter of law. Formally, they are equal and equally deserving. In theory liberal law is inclusive, but concretely it is routinely **partial and** invidious. Inclusion is conditional: it depends on how robustly the new citizens wear and deploy their cultural difference. Two historical facts account for this phenomenon: liberal law's role in western imperialism and the Western claim of civilizational superiority that pervades the culture that sustains liberal legalism. Liberal law, as the other of the racially Other within its legal jurisdiction, differentiates and locates this other in the enemy camp of the culturally raw, irreducibly foreign, making him an unreliable ally or citizen. Law's suspicion of the others socialized in "lawless" cultures is instinctive and undeniable. Liberal law's constitutive bias is in a sense incidental: the real problem is racism or the racist basis of liberal ideology and culture.25 The internal racial other is not the juridical equal in the mind of liberal law but the juridically and humanly inferior Other, the perpetual foreigner.

Gregory and Alimahomed 01 (Josh and Kasim, Department of Speech and Communication at California State University, Fullerton, “Narrative Voice and the Urban Debater: An investigation into empowerment,” 2/23/2001)

The narrative debater, working from a rhetoric of possibility works from a different ideology or school of thought, though the narrative debater would recognize these same realist conceptions, the narrative debater also tries to guide the audience to see additional perspectives and to create more solutions than the realist platform—the narrative debater as asks the audience to try to work outside and around the realist framework as well. By helping people examine possibilities, which they previously did not imagine or think they could achieve, rhetors can free them to pursue more satisfying responses to both personal and public needs. Hence a rhetoric of possibility can illuminate diverse kinds of communication (Kirkwood, 1992, p.44).¶ As of the writing of this paper, the signing of a debate ballot has gained perlocutionary force—the action of voting has some concrete impact in the community (debate and otherwise). Debaters have began to claim that the ballot can either operate in the traditional debate sense (working from any of a multitude of debate “paradigms:” stock issues, cost-benefit analysis, hypothesis-testing, etc.), or the ballot becomes an endorsement of an ideology, with the action of signing becoming a statement to a larger community. The narrative can operate at either level: it can be weighed in a debate round on the probability and pathos appeal of the narration, or it can be endorsed by a judge for its ideological power. However, the narrative can be impacted at even higher levels. A performance that touches debaters and critics alike should be endorsed for the mere fact that more individuals should hear it. The intellectual landscape would support any effort or trust to exchange and create ideas. The narrative could be a stronghold that keeps the death that debaters often claim as inevitable closer to home.

**Voting affirmative brings your subject position into the fold of sexual difference and inaugurates a new relationship to the debate community**

#### Deutscher, professor in French philosophy and gender at Northwestern, 2K2

(Penelope, A Politics of Impossible difference pg. 39-41)

Having negotiated in her approach to the history of ideas a concept of sexual difference as absent, **Irigaray** draws on the same approach in her linguistic analysis. She **analyzes language in terms of its lack of an appro­priate relationship to the feminine and to the other more generally**. **She uses language as evidence not just of how the feminine is seen but also of how it is not seen**.. For example, both male and female respondents usu­ally refer to woman not as subject but as object and almost never refer to women in the plural. **Rather than just telling what forms of communica­tion occur, Irigaray attempts an analysis that demonstrates that communi­cation is not occurring.** *This is* seen in the different tendencies in male and female linguistic relations to the world, each other, and others. **What is missing from language is as important as what is present in it. Language** does not just serve as the medium of expression or manifest a subject's relationship to identity or sexuality. It also **expresses the absence of alternative relationships to identity and sexuality and can be analyzed in terms of its paucity in this regard**. Finally, just as in her more philosophical work Irigaray tries to invent an impossible concept of femininity and sexual difference, so **in her linguistic work she proposes the introduction of reforms that might contribute to a culture of sexual difference**. *I Love to* You discusses **the possible substitu­tion of verb formations such as "I speak to you," "I ask of you," "I love to you**," and "I give to you" for "I ask you," "I give you," and "I love you."11 **Such formations could mark a constructive engagement with the possi­bility of restructured relations between selves and others**. According to a utopian linguistic modification., "**the `to' is the sign of non-immediacy, of mediation between us.... The `to' is the site of non-reduction of the person to the object.... The `to' is also a barrier against alienating the other's freedom in my subjectivity, my world, my language"** (1996a, toy-10). **Trying to change words or verb structure by fiat is more than difficult**. Such proposed reforms are among the most ambiguous aspects of “her" work. So are proposals that those who engage in religious worship should. do so in relation to a broad range of feminine figures including Anne, Ruth, Naomi, and Flspeth, and proposals for legal reforms that include the introduction of a new legal status of virginity. **None of the proposed reforms need be taken at face value.** For example, they can be interpreted as a negative reminder of just how much cultural change would be neces­sary for a society to evolve into a culture of sexual difference in the Iri­garayan sense: reform at the level of religion, language, media, the economy, law, and so on. **Thus the point of the reforms would be not that they sound plausible but that they do not.** **The implausibility of the changes can be interpreted as a reminder to us of the sexual indifference of our culture, an indifference to which we are usually oblivious.** The pro­posed reforms can act as the rhetorical reminder that we live in a culture in which they are impossible. Alternatively, Irigaray's repeated demands for linguistic, social, legal, religious, and economic reform may be in­tended to change the reader's attitude toward a culture of sexual differ­ence. **Irigaray cannot expect that any one of the proposed reforms could have the intended effect. But through repetition of the proposals**, **she may heighten the degree to which the reader accepts her view that culture is impoverished to the extent that it does not' better allow the possibility of sexual difference**.

Noma 2k7 (Emiko, “Woman cannot cry anymore: global voices transforming violent conflict,” Critical Half, http://www.womenforwomen.org/news-women-for-women/assets/files/critical-half/CH\_december07\_final%20file.pdf)

Women’s narratives are tremendously valuable tools for identifying the needs of women during and after periods of violent conflict and, indeed, for transforming conflict itself, but narratives have rarely been harnessed for the pursuit of peace. The narrative genre and the voices it amplifies serve as alternatives to filtered media portrayals and expose the gender-specific ways violence affects women. At the Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice (IPJ) at the University of San Diego, the Women PeaceMakers Program documents the stories of women who are not only victims of conflict but are also build- ing peace amid the ruins of their war-torn societies.1 As detailed explorations of women’s lives before, during, and after conflict, the narratives produced at the IPJ provide context not often found in legal documents used in courts or truth commissions or in the brief vignettes of brutality documented in many reports produced by human rights organizations. The women who participate in the Women Peace- Makers Program are from conflict-affected regions around the world—in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin Amer- ica. But despite their diverse locales and backgrounds, they demonstrate that a culture of peace is generated through the strength of women’s voices. The stories of these women—written in narrative form by Peace Writers over the course of two months—create com- munity across distances, cultures, and experiences. This article weaves together relevant literature with individual stories of the IPJ Women PeaceMakers to explore how the narrative form can contribute to the understanding of conflict and its transformation into peace.2

In an age of sound-bites and 24-hour news cover- age, public discourse on issues affecting our communities and world is often “disembodied, abstract, [and] emotionally detached,” according to sociologist William

Gamson.3 “[Media] can be a facilitator of conflict, if only by editing away facts that do not fit the demands of air time or print space.”4 Headlines purport to provide all necessary information. Nuance is glossed over. Black- and-white perspectives of current events are nurtured. As such, “words are emptied of their concreteness and become a hollow, alienated, and alienating verbosity,” as the educator Paulo Freire referred to disaffected and detached pedagogy.5 To remedy this plague of disembod- ied language, Arundhati Roy, prose writer and antiwar activist, encourages us “to tell stories that are different from the ones we’re being brainwashed to believe.”6 The narratives of women, who are often marginalized or silenced, can serve as these alternative voices, painting a fuller picture than simplified rhetoric.

Gregory and Alimahomed 01 (Josh and Kasim, Department of Speech and Communication at California State University, Fullerton, “Narrative Voice and the Urban Debater: An investigation into empowerment,” 2/23/2001)

The first step in orienting to the narratives of everyday life in this way is to listen to what people say. Not necessarily to retell it in exactly those terms, but to enquire into¶ ¶ how it would be possible for them to say that. What kinds of assumptions in what types¶ ¶ of possible world could produce those accounts? (Clegg, 1993, p.31). This inquiry offers the ability to gain an insight into other’s existence and epistemological understandings. The ability to conceptualize or empathize with one’s stories creates a convergence between two different perspectives. This convergence is directly related to the unifying power of the narrative as well as providing a legitimate means for the disenfranchised voice to be heard. Mumby (1993) illustrates how the duality of narrative structures create a social understanding as well as set up an epistemological device of meaning in which social awareness is created: Narrative is a socially symbolic act in the double sense that (a) it takes on meaning only in social context and (b) it plays a role in the construction of that social context as a cite of meaning in which social actors are implicated. However, there is no simple isomorphism between narrative (or any other¶ ¶ symbolic form) and the social realm. In different ways, each of the chapters¶ ¶ belies the notion that the narrative functions monolithically to crate a stable,¶ ¶ structured, social order. Indeed, one of the prevailing themes across the chapters¶ ¶ is the extent to which social order is tenuous, precarious, and open to negotiation¶ ¶ in various ways. In this sense, society is characterized by an ongoing “struggle¶ ¶ over meaning” (p. 5).¶ ¶ The implication of these two factors on intercollegiate debate point to how the narrative not only relies on the social context for meaning, but aids in the construction of that context. Debate is a unique forum to meet Mumby’s socially symbolic act. Debate offers a unique social context in that the majority of audience members are intellectually versed on the social context of a particular narrative (due to debate research). The public advocacy emphasis of academic debate also allows for a “cite of meaning” and the adversarial positions in a debate round allow a team to implicate a judge or another team by virtue of their position. It is in these mock situations that debaters are implicated as social actors, and thus are moved to action by virtue of close engagement with another’s story. In factors of debate the concepts of theory and practice are inexorably intertwined. When these two competing ideologies can be combined creates a holistic insight into the human psyche. Insight gained from this holistic understanding is created by stories (or narratives)¶ ¶ that define human experience. The ability to construct a compelling story can have a dramatic impact on the social epistemology, which creates a co-constructed knowledge framework. Scholars have posited that:¶ ¶ Stories are among the most universal means of representing human events. ¶ ¶ In addition to suggesting an interpretation for a social happening, a well-crafted¶ ¶ narrative can motivate the belief and action of outsiders toward the actors and¶ ¶ events caught up in its plot. A key question about stories, as with other situations-¶ ¶ defining symbolic forms like metaphors, theories, and ideologies is whether they¶ ¶ introduce new and constructive insights into social life (Bennett & Edelman,¶ ¶ 1985, p. 156).¶ ¶ This form of meaning production and the persuasive potential of identification established by the narrative can be a powerful force upon the debate community or even society. The process of which an individuals interacts with a narrative and then how a community reacts to the narrative is better explained by White (1987) who states: Narrative is revealed to be particularly effective system of discursive meaning production by which individuals can be taught to live a distinctively “imaginary relation to the real conditions of existence,” that is to say, an unreal but meaningful relation to the social formations in which they are indentured to live out their lives and realize their destinies and social subjects. To conceive of a narrative discourse in this way permits us to account for its universality as a cultural fact and for the interest that dominant social groups have not only in controlling what will pass for the authoritative myth of a given cultural formation but also in assuring the belief that social reality itself can be both lived and realistically comprehended as a story (p. 187)¶ ¶ The entrance of this new form of information processing seems uncertain. Thus, the¶ ¶ final analysis looks to the debate community in particular and provides some¶ ¶ investigation as to how the persuasiveness of the narrative could interact with the¶ ¶ conventions and norms of the debate community.

The forgetting of sexual difference invites the worst genocide in history. We must recognize our historical place and move beyond the phallocratic roles that structure our society. This is crucial to overcoming the murderous divides among populations

Irigaray 91 - French feminist, philosopher linguist cultural theorist

(Luce, “Equality or Different?” in the Irigaray Reader edited by Margaret Whitford pg. 32-33)

Demanding equality, as women, seems to me to be an erroneous expression of a real issue. Demanding to be equal presupposes a term of comparison. Equal to what? What do women want to be equal to? Men? A wage? A public position? Equal to what? Why not to themselves? Even a vaguely rigorous analysis of claims to equality shows that they are justified at the level of a superficial critique of culture, and / utopian as a means to women's liberation. **The exploitation of women is based upon sexual difference, and can only be resolved through sexual difference.** **Certain tendencies of the day**, certain contemporary feminists, **are noisily demanding the neutralization of sex** *[sexe].* **That neutralization**, if it were possible, **would correspond to the end of the human race.** The human race is divided into *two genres* which ensure its production and reproduction**. Trying to suppress sexual differ­ence is to invite a genocide more radical than any destruction that has ever existed in History**. **What is important**, on the other hand, **is defining the values of belonging to a sex-specific genre***.* **What is indispensable is elaborating a' culture of the sexual which does not yet exist, whilst respecting both genres***.* **Because of the historical time gaps between the gynocratic, matriarchal, patriarchal and phallocratic eras, we are in a sexual position which is bound up with generation and not with genre as sex. This means that, within the family, women must be mothers and men must be fathers, but that we have no positive and ethical values that allow two sexes of the same generation to form a creative, and not simply procreative, human couple**. **One of the major obstacles to the creation and recognition of such values is the more or less covert hold patriarchal and phallocratic roles have had on the whole of our civilization for centuries**. **It is social justice, pure and simple, to balance out the power of one sex over the other by giving, or restoring, cultural values to female sexuality**. What is at stake is clearer today than it was when *The Second Sex* was written. Unless it goes through this stage, feminism may work towards the destruction of women, and, more generally, of all values. Egalitarianism, in fact, sometimes expends a lot of energy on re­jecting certain positive values and chasing after nothing. Hence the periodic crises, discouragement and regressions in women's liberation movements, and their fleeting inscription in History. Equality between men and women cannot be achieved unless we *think of genre as sexuate [sexue]* and write the rights and duties of each sex, insofar as they are *different,* into social rights and duties. **Peoples constantly split into secondary but murderous rivalries without realizing that their primary and irreducible division is one between two genres**. From that point of view, we are still living in the childhood of culture**. It is urgent for women's struggles, for small, popular groups of women, to realize the importance of issues that are specific to them**. These are bound up with respect for life and culture, with the constant passage of the natural into the cultural, of the spiritual into the natural. **Their responsibility and their oppor­tunity correspond to a stage' in the evolution of the world, and not to some more or less lucid and negative competition within a world undergoing a mutation, in which life is in danger for a variety of reasons.**