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## Drone Dissonance

#### The drone performs the militaristic targeting logic par excellance – it renders the globe as a neat grid of targets to be understood and destroyed in a view from nowhere.

Shaw, Graaham, and Majed 12. Shaw, Ian Graham, and Akhter, Majed. "The Unbearable Humanness of Drone Warfare in FATA, Pakistan." Antipode 44.4 (September 2012).

Representation, a social practice and strategy through which meanings are constituted and communicated, is unavoidable when dealing with militarism and military activities. Armed Forces, and defence institutions, take great care in producing and promoting specific portrayals of themselves and their activities in order to legitimize and justify their activities in places, spaces, environments and landscapes (Woodward 2005:729).¶ In this section, we argue that the ramping up of drone deployments is justified by a distinctive targeting logic. As Paul Virrilo (1989) has long argued, there is never war without representation, which is to say, the deadly materiality of war is always coiled within a discursive system (see also Shaw 2010). In this sense, the drone performs a well-rehearsed imaginative geography (Bialasiewicz et al 2007; Gregory 2004) that is underwritten by targeted kills across neat isometric grids and algorithmic calculations (Amoore 2009), far removed from the brutal Real (Jones and Clarke 2006), and in a peculiar relation with the visceral imagery of previous wars (Tuathail 2003). The official “definition” of a targeted kill is not agreed upon under international law. Yet as a recent UN report on targeted killing reveals, it can be thought of as follows:¶ A targeted killing is the intentional, premeditated and deliberate use of lethal force, by States or their agents acting under colour of law, or by an organized armed group in armed conflict, against a specific individual who is not in the physical custody of the perpetrator. In recent years, a few States have adopted policies, either openly or implicitly, of using targeted killings, including in the territories of other States. Such policies have been justified both as a legitimate response to “terrorist” threats and as a necessary response to the challenges of “asymmetric warfare”. In the legitimate struggle against terrorism, too many criminal acts have been re-characterized so as to justify addressing them within the framework of the law of armed conflict. New technologies, and especially unarmed combat aerial vehicles or “drones”, have been added into this mix, by making it easier to kill targets, with fewer risks to the targeting State (Alston 2010:3).¶ The means and methods of killing vary, and include sniper fire, shooting at close range, missiles from helicopters, gunships, drones, the use of car bombs, and poison (Alston 2010:4)¶ The drone is heralded by the US military as the apex of a targeting logic—accurate, efficient, and deadly. This logic traces a distinct genesis. In 1938 Martin Heidegger wrote of the “age of the world picture”, in a classic essay on the split between subject and object. For him, today's world is conceived, grasped, and conquered as a picture—and what it means “to be” is for the first time defined as the objectiveness of representing. In this modern age of humanism, a subjective “worldview” arises for the first time—humans appear as Cartesian subjects and the world as a calculated picture, engineered by science and technology. Ray Chow (2006) extends this metaphysical analysis to contend that the world has further been produced as a “target”. In the wake of the atomic event of Hiroshima, the entire globe is rendered as a grid of targets to be destroyed as soon as it can be made visible. Indeed, to see is to destroy.¶ Vision is thus crucial to an ocularcentric Western society (Rose 2001), and always already entangled within military culture. The ability to gaze from “nowhere” and yet represent “everywhere” is what Haraway (1988) labels the “god-trick”. She argues that the eyes have been perfected by the logics of military, capitalist, and colonial supremacy; one that is fundamentally located within a nexus of disembodiment:¶ … the vantage point of the cyclopian, self-satiated eye of the master subject. The Western eye has fundamentally been a wandering eye. Vision is apparently without limit, the ‘ordinary primate’ can now see underwater, at night, through walls, into biological cells, onto distant galaxies: an “unregulated gluttony” that prides itself on its “objectivity” (1988:586).¶ This disembodied visual logic is perfected in the doctrine of airpower, the dominant theme of US national defense post World War II. Kaplan (2006a) names this a “cosmic view” that both unifies and separates “targets” from above. The sky is the space in which technology masters the world. It is clean, disembodied, and a place where nobody dies (that just happens on the ground). Do we not see here a colonial logic of “us” in the sky, versus “them” on the ground (Amoore 2009; Gregory 2010)? The drone is capable of performing (Bialasiewicz et al 2007) this logic, through a digital worldview of targets that dismisses ambiguity and reinforces the same old god-trick of a view of somewhere from nowhere (Kaplan 2006b). This is not to say that the sky is a space of pure deterritorialization (Deleuze and Guattari 1987). Since the mid-twentieth century the atmosphere has become increasingly nationalized, particularly after the Cold War (Kaplan 2006b; Williams 2010). The “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA) was a set of tactics put forward by the US military for securing the future of warfare (Kaplan 2009). They include information communications, space technology, satellites, drones, nano-robotics, all pivoting around the idea of “network-centric warfare”. As McDonald (2007) argues, this is precisely the reason that “outer space” needs to be investigated by critical geography, given that social life tied to the celestial, and space-based subjectivities are increasingly normalized.¶ Orbital logics thus spill into the everyday, as does the pervasive influence of targeting in US culture. From the use of GIS sciences that spatialize, calculate, and fix Cartesian wanderings—without a necessary appeal to the uniqueness of place or its crumpled ontologies—to the vicarious gazing and gaming of a far-away war (Shaw 2010; Wark 2007), targeting is now woven into the fabric of mundane life. GIS and GPS programs are no longer alien technologies used by armies and government agencies, but shared everyday practices. As such, the drone is not an aberration—but the apex of an expanding targeting zeitgeist. In this age, “to be” is to be locked within the cool certainty of a crosshair.

#### The executive holds sole control of the power over drones – this shrouds the psychologically detached killing process in anti-democratic norms and secrecy.

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What is particularly worrisome is the lack of judicial checks and balances within the drone program, and the overwhelming power that is being consolidated in the executive branch of government. Other aspects of the “war on terror” have procedural safeguards; for example, if the government wishes to set a wiretap, it must request a warrant under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. And while the Constitution allows unilateral executive action in “exigent circumstances”, these actions must always be followed by ex post judicial review. On the issue of drones, the courts are entirely left out of the process. As journalist David Cole writes, it seems that the government “wants the power to kill Americans unilaterally—and in secret”. [14]¶ As far as we know, three Americans have been killed to date by American-operated drones. This includes Anwar al-Awlaki, a high-level recruiter for al-Qaida and propagandist who was raised in America and killed in Yemen, and Awlaki’s 16-year-old American son, Abdulrahman al-Awlaki, who was killed by a drone in Yemen two weeks later. [15] The U.S. administration has said that Anwar al-Awlaki and individuals like him are dangerous enough to warrant being killed instead of captured and given due process. There have been only unofficial responses given by the U.S. government regarding Abdulrahman’s death, including an anonymous official who told the media that his death was a mistake. The discourse that drones keep us safe does not hold up to the fact that our government has unilaterally killed an innocent American teenager, and refuses to give information about his death. Since the government is intent on creating its own rules with the drone program– and not communicating these rules to the public – it removes any trust we might have in its judgment. [16]¶ Slavoj Zizek’s work can also provide insight into the safety discourse. In his book, Violence, he discusses three modes of violence: subjective, objective, and symbolic. [17] He argues that subjective, or overt, violence is the most visible of the three, and often sheds light on objective, or systemic, violence. If we were to apply this theory to the covert drone program, we can see how the violence enacted by drones takes on different forms for different audiences. The violence inflicted by drones is subjective for those on the receiving end, but symbolic to those who view it from a distance (through the news, for example). For the individuals inflicting the violence (the drone operators), it is less direct because it is “hidden” by the monitors and screens through which the violence is enacted. A study conducted by the U.S. Air Force found that almost half of all drone operators experienced high levels of stress in the workplace, but this stress was tied to working “long and erratic work hours”. [18] The drone operators did not show increased amounts of stress from watching hours of up-close video footage of killing and destruction inflicted by drones. Instead, the operators felt “a sense of accomplishment in protecting troops on the ground”. [19]¶ We can further expand on this idea by historicizing drones in the context of trends in warfare. Noel Sharkey explains in his chapter “Killing Made Easy: From Joysticks to Politics” that the evolution of the military has led to greater physical space between combatants, along with technology that “enable[s] killing from ever-increasing distances”. [20] While increasing the distance between combatants caters to our innate desire to keep ourselves safe, the extreme distance in drone warfare also produces alienation and desensitization; it encourages drone operators to become comfortable with brutality and killing. Sharkey’s research along with the research done on drone operators suggests that what we are seeing is the transition of subjective violence to objective violence; in other words, the violence caused by drones is becoming normalized and if it continues it shall soon be rendered ‘invisible’. The safety elements in the pro-drone discourse are also tied to Karl Marx’s theories about individuals as subjects and objects.[21] Marx states that the division between subjects and objects is created and perpetuated in a capitalist economy, in which violence is inflicted on individuals as objects. This is evident in the CIA’s “signature strikes”, in which drones are used to kill people whose names are not known, but who are in the vicinity of other “militants” and either demonstrate suspicious behavior, or have characteristics that warrant their immediate death. [22] By treating individuals as objects, instead of as subjects of equal worth, drones not only aim to kill individuals, but also to promote the objectification of human beings. As Marx said, “The performance of work is at the same time its objectification”. [23] Once a group of people is objectified, they no longer require safety or protection. The subjective and objective aspects of drone warfare intend to make others appear “less than”. Therefore the discourse of safety has the function of treating some Americans (those not targeted by drones) as subjects, while reducing those within the drone’s purview to mere objects.

#### The drone logic is the ultimate destruction of our ontology – the reduction of life into mapped pieces of data intrinsically eradicates difference and obliterates the essence of existence.

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Drone systems necessarily objectify, and most likely dehumanize, people targeted by them. The ongoing informatization of warfare leads to increased mediation of combat experiences (Robins and Levidow, 1995; Haggerty, 2006; Monahan and Wall, 2007) and this is definitely the case for many UAV ‘pilots’ who ‘sit at 1990s-style computer banks filled with screens, inside dimly lit trailers’ (Drew, 2009) and ‘kill enemy fighters with a few computer keystrokes. Then, after their shifts are over, they get to drive home and sleep in their own beds’ (Lindlaw, 2008). Taken together, the techno-scientific mediation of modern-day weapons systems and the symbolic mediation of television and computer screens allow drone pilots and the general public to view war ‘from a distance’ while making way for organized state violence to be seen as virtuous (Der Derian, 2001)—that is, clean, precise, and noble. In this context of computerized ‘postmodern warfare’ (Gray, 1997), it seems reasonable to assert, as Kevin Robins and Les Levidow (1995: 120) did in the aftermath of the Gulf War of 1991:¶ Killing is done ‘at a distance’, through technological mediation, without the shock of direct confrontation. The victims become psychologically invisible. The soldier appears to achieve a moral dissociation; the targeted ‘things’ on the screen do not seem to implicate him in a moral relationship.¶ The technological mediation vital to what we call ‘the drone stare’ is most often framed by advocates of UAV systems as an unproblematic ability to see the truth of a particular situation (see Rattansi, 2010) or to achieve a totalizing view of the ‘object’ under cosmic control. In the words of Robins and Levidow (1995: 121): ‘Enemy threats—real or imag- inary, human or machine—became precise grid locations, abstracted from their human context.’ To the extent that this description is accurate, it would appear to hold true for the use of drones in combat as well as non-combat settings.¶ Journalist Noah Shachtman (2005), who observed drone operators monitoring the US–Mexico border, betrays through his description the dehumanizing tendency of drone- mediated perceptions: ‘Everyone looks like germs, like ants, from the Hunter’s 15,000- foot point of view. Especially when the ant hill breaks apart, and everybody scatters in a dozen different directions.’ But this particular articulation makes no distinction between ‘illegal immigrants’, political refugees, or Mexican-American citizens. In this sense, the drone system radically homogenizes these identities into a single cluster of racialized information that is used for remote-controlled processes of control and harm. Bodies below become things to track, monitor, apprehend, and kill, while the pilot and other allies on the network remain differentiated and proximate, at least culturally if not physically.¶ In the case of the use of military drones for ‘precision’ killing, the practical action of firing a Hellfire missile is translated and transformed by the informational system into a computerized checklist of ‘things to do’. As one journalist writes concerning US Air Force drones, ‘Now, pilots say, it takes up to 17 steps—including entering data into a pull-down window—to fire a missile’ (Drew, 2009). In this respect, as Kevin Haggerty (2006) has pointed out, the speed and mobility of informatized warfare is perforce slowed by attendant complex systems of control, which is a generalizable finding that presents an important caution against overdetermined conclusions about inevitable increases in the velocity of war technologies. But this step-by-step process of entering ‘data’ into a computer system nonetheless propagates a dehumanizing abstraction when living human beings are rendered into mere spatial or tactical coordinates. As Avital Ronell (1992: 75) puts it: ‘the cyborg soldier, located in command and control systems, exercises on the fields of denial’. Killing transpires not only at a distance but through the routine, banal computerized procedure of typing and clicking. UAV systems, according to one military drone operator, are ‘pretty simple’ to operate but,¶ the challenge is taking all the information available and fusing it into something that’s usable and then practicing and exercising the constraint or the lethal power to either preserve life or to prosecute an attack. And that is where the challenge really is, honing that warrior spirit— knowing when to say when.¶ (Rattansi, 2010)¶ But as we have discussed, this ‘knowing when to say when’ is not a ‘decision’ that is made in a vacuum but is rather a sovereign act shaped by social and political norms, which are encoded in both the institutional practices and technological systems of drone warfare.¶ The state killing enacted by UAV systems exists in a discursive and symbolic context where a steadfast belief in precision technology helps justify the techno-scientific vio- lence of the West (Shaw, 2005). Central to common representations of virtuous warfare, and especially aerial warfare, is the idea that the USA is technologically superior to other countries in its war capabilities, particularly because of its reliance on ‘smart bombs’ and ‘precision-guided missiles’ that distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate targets (Der Derian, 2001). This, in turn, brings about an expectation that militaries should go to great lengths to use their violence in discriminatory ways that target combatants while avoiding civilians (Beier, 2003). Militaries in technologically advanced countries such as the US embrace this rhetoric to assert that they have the capacity to conduct war in more legal and moral ways than less technologically advanced countries (Beier, 2003).

#### This systematic killing has divorced ethics from policymaking – this magnifies militaristic technicism on the global scale and makes extinction desirable.

Fasching 93 (Darrell J., Professor of Religious Studies at University of South Florida, The Ethical Challenge of Auschwitz and Hiroshima, Pp. 232-233) Bankey

These technological barbarians, says Neuhaus, "are composed of the most sophisticated and educated elites of our society, .. . those who in principle refuse to recognize a normative ethic or the reality of public virtue."51 In a technological civilization public issues tend to be reduced to political issues and political issues to technical issues. Instead of public policy we get Disneyland, a world held to­gether by technical and bureaucratic procedures that so skillfully pan­der to our hidden desires and private fantasies that, in our distrac­tion, we scarcely notice the disappearance of either our common political life or our common public life. In a world where all important decisions are deferred to those with the proper technical expertise, neither political nor public decisions are possible. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the conduct of nuclear policy. For, as Richard Falk has pointed out, the history of nuclear policy from the Manhat­tan Project until the present has been cloaked in a technicality and secrecy that is antidemocratic and undermines the democratic proce­dures of society.This antidemocratic political strategy is given legit­imacy by an appeal to being in a permanent state of (cold) war. 52 The rhetoric of war legitimizes the necessity for realism. And realism re­quires secrecy "in the national interest," lest our enemies(who are viewed as the embodiment of evil) acquire our technical knowledge. Hence it is not realistic to expect to conduct nuclear policy through normal democratic processes. Realism under conditions of war requires that we exempt our policies from both the political and ethical-questioning so essential to democratic process to do what we must do to survive. As Robert Lifton's work indicates, these are the ideal con­ditions for the emergence of demonic doubling that renders MAD­ness logical, convincing us that preparation for total annihilation is the only thing that makes the future possible (i.e., "slaying to make alive"). The only way to be in charge of our destiny, we are told, is to place our unquestioning trust in the very technology that is threaten­ing to annihilate us, even as the only way to protect democracy re­quires that we subvert it. The modern secular world of technopolis has been an experi­ment in substituting technical knowledge for public narrative and technical bureaucratic procedures for public ritual. Auschwitz and Hiroshima represent the triumph of the technical and the bureaucra­tic, of the demonic and inhuman over human self-transcendence and compassion for the stranger. In the last chapter I argued that the appropriate response to the demonic is an ethic of human rights sustained by a global ecology of those holy communities whose narra­tive traditions focus on welcoming the stranger. The antidoteto bu­reaucratic compartmentalization is an ethic that requires us to assume responsibility for our multiple selves (i.e., our double) even as it requires us to recognize the primacy of human dignity and human rights, especially those of the stranger, as an absolute limit to which all sacred orders must be subordinated.

#### Drones allow for US intervention to continue without criticism from the public – disconnecting ourselves from the war makes the extension of US militarism acceptable and possible.

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The work of the US military is to kill, its pretext – defense of the homeland. It has succeeded in training soldiers, mostly young men, to kill without remorse, that is until they leave the military with flare-ups of psychological trauma or PTSD.¶ But neither the military nor the White House has convinced a war weary American public to accept men returning home from war in caskets or deeply wounded physically and psychologically. Americans’ increasing distaste for war presents serious problems for a state committed to on-going, unending war which includes feeding military industries, a mainstay of the American economy. What to do?¶ Drones to the rescue! With drones, unmanned aerial vehicles, Americans need not worry about their own soldiers being killed. Those who drop the bombs do so from any one of a number of military bases somewhere in the United States. Research and common sense show that the further away soldiers are from those they kill, the less likely they are to feel guilt or remorse. Drones, it seems, solve the PTSD problem.¶ Since so many Americans now turn off the news of war, they will not know of how, as they do not know about combat on the ground, of the many civilians killed in drone attacks – most are women and children. But those victims are not Americans, specifically, they are not American men. So who cares? As John Brennan, Obama’s counterterrorism chief, in the cold sociopathy of an increasingly US militarized stated, “Sometimes you have to take lives to save lives,” and I would add, as long as most of the lives you take are of brown people and are not American men. War is, after all, gendered and racist violence.¶ The day after Brennan announced that the USA is conducting CIA drone warfare, on May 1 President Obama spoke to Americans in what most pundits agreed was a campaign speech from Bagram Air Force Base in Afghanistan where he and President Karzai had just signed a Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement. So you might wonder what is all the fuss about drones anyway. Aren’t Americans on our way out of Afghanistan? Looking closely at the details of the agreement that Obama did not mention in his television broadcast, we find that it actually “commits Afghanistan to provide U.S. personnel access to and use of Afghan facilities through 2014 and beyond. … for the possibility of U.S. forces in Afghanistan after 2014, for the purposes of training Afghan Forces and targeting the remnants of al-Qaeda” (White House, Office of the Press Secretary. May 1, 2012.)¶ There is every reason to believe that not only the US war in Afghanistan, but the US policy of ongoing, unending war is, under Obama’s leadership, morphing into a drone war. For years the USA has been launching drone strikes in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia even though the US Congress has not declared war on those states. Since 2002 the CIA has conducted up to 321 drone strikes in Pakistan, killing up to 3,100 people. In December, 2009 US drones dropped cluster bombs on a village in Yemen and killed 40 people, 21 children and 14 women, 5 of whom were pregnant were killed.¶ Killing women and children and killing brown people intersects misogyny and racism upon which the military is built. A few weeks ago, a case opened in British courts of a CIA drone strike in Pakistan in March 2011 which killed up to 53 people in an open air meeting of the local jirga (parliament) in that region. US intelligence that directs drone strikes is focusing not on specific people anymore. Rather as journalist Jeremy Schahill exposes, they study the “pattern of life” of groups of people who gather in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia That is exactly how the CIA defended its drone strike: ‘The fact is that a large group of heavily armed men, some of whom were clearly connected to al Qaeda and all of whom acted in a manner consistent with AQ [Al Qaeda] -linked militants, were killed,’ even though Al Qaeda’s not known to hold its meetings in public, open air places.’

#### Drones represent the culmination of shifting from a state of warfare to a doctrine of hunt. Through this predator and prey mentality, the United States asserts its right as hunter to transcend all sovereign borders to wage war on the combat zone which has been reduced to the mobile minute body of the terrorist – not only in this strategy doomed to fail, but it also turns the entire world into a battlefield.

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George W. Bush had warned us early on: the United States has launched itself into a new kind of war, a ‘war that requires us to be on an international manhunt’.1 It would be wrong to believe that Barack Obama’s ‘justice has been done’, echoing Bush nearly ten years later, will close what was merely a parenthesis. In the interim, what had sounded merely like the picturesque slogan of a Texan cowboy was converted into a state doctrine with its experts, plans and weapons. A new doctrine of state violence emerged, finding its unity in the concept of the militarized manhunt. ‘How do we organize the Department of Defence for manhunts? We are obviously not well organized at the present time’, said Donald Rumsfeld in 2002.2 The United States military machine was no doubt not ready, in the early 2000s, to carry out efficiently, and on a global scale, missions that would otherwise be allotted to the police at home. But the difficulty came in a variety of forms in other registers, including the justification of these hybrid operations, the enfants terribles of the police and the army, of war and of the hunt, which are, as much on the level of the theory of war as of international law, like monsters. In a report by the Joint Special Operations University published in 2009, George A. Crawford proposed to make ‘manhunting a foundation of U.S. national strategy’.3 He thus took over a whole series of military studies done before which had sought to establish a conceptual framework for this new strategic doctrine. The doctrine of the manhunt breaks with conventional warfare, which rests on the concepts of fronts, linear battles and face-to-face opposition. In 1916, General Pershing launched a large military offensive on Mexican territory to seize the revolutionary Pancho Villa. The massive deployment of force drew a blank. For the American strategists who cite this historic precedent as a counter-example, it is a question of reversing the polarity: faced with the ‘asymmetrical extremes’ posed by small mobile groups of ‘non-state actors’, one must employ small flexible units in a logic of targeted attacks. Contrary to Clausewitz’s classic definition, such cynegetic war 4 is not, in its fundamental structure, a duel. The structure does not involve two fighters facing off, but something else: a hunter who advances and a prey who flees or who hides. The rules of the game are not the same: In the competition between two enemy combatants, the goal is to win the battle by defeating the adversary – both combatants must confront to win. However, a manhunt scenario differs in that each player’s strategy is different. The fugitive always wants to avoid capture, while the pursuer always wants to engage and capture the target – the pursuer must confront to win, whereas the fugitive must evade to win.5 The first task no longer involves immobilizing the enemy but instead requires identifying and locating him. This is done by means of slow detection work. The art of modern tracking proceeds by means of a cartography of the prey’s social networks that the ‘hunter-analysts’ piece together in order to succeed in tracing [her] back, through his friends or relatives, to [her] hideout. The prey who wants to escape his pursuers tries to become undetectable or inaccessible. But inaccessibility is not only a function of physical geography – such as an inextricable bush or deep crevice. The theorists of manhunting remind us that the ‘political and legal restrictions, especially in the form of jurisdictional boundaries’, are an eminent part of the ‘set of constraints that shape the rules of the game’. From this point of view, it is clear that ‘sovereign borders are among the greatest allies’ that a fugitive can have.6 The hunter’s power has no regard for borders. It allows itself the right of universal trespassing, in defiance of territorial integrity of sovereign states. It is an invasive power which, unlike the imperial manoeuvres of the past, is based less on a notion of right of conquest than of a right of pursuit. In the past, English common law allowed, in the countryside, ‘the hunting of ravenous beasts of prey, as badgers and foxes, in another man’s land; because destroying such creatures is said to be profitable to the Public’.7 It is this kind of right that the United States would like to give itself today with regard to human prey, and on a global scale. To do this fully, however, it would be necessary, in contradiction to contemporary law, to resuscitate the archaic category of common enemies of humanity.8 Absolute emnity In cynegetic war, armed violence seeks to pursue the prey wherever it might be. The place of hostilities is no longer defined by the locatable space of an effective combat zone, but by the simple presence of the hunted individual who carries with [her] everywhere a kind of little halo denoting a personal hostility zone. In this way of thinking, the very notion of armed conflict occurring in a distinct geographical space tends to vanish. Here, on the one hand, the combat zone tends to be reduced to the body of the enemy, which must then, according to the principle of distinction, be the only space that is targeted; but, on the other hand, it is believed that this mobile micro-space can be targeted wherever it happens to be. The paradox is that the principle of targeting is accompanied by a limitless virtual extension of the conflict zone: the world becomes the battlefield. Thus the classical distinction is erased between armed conflict zones, in which the use of weapons of war is allowed, and other zones in which they are not allowed. This, besides the question of respect of territorial sovereignty, is the problem posed by the current American air attacks. As Mary Ellen O’Connelle states: there was no armed conflict on the territory of Pakistan because there was no intense armed fighting between organized armed groups. International law does not recognize the right to kill with battlefield weapons outside an actual armed conflict. The so-called ‘global war on terror’ is not an armed conflict.9 This ‘war’ is more like a vast campaign of extrajudicial executions: a strategy of targeted assassinations, of lethal manhunts, which make up the ‘rogue’ and unilateral counterpart to the manhunts carried out under the aegis of international criminal justice. The difference is that in a law-enforcement regime, the use of lethal force is strictly limited to situations of legitimate defence: there is no question of killing the suspects on sight. Thus, when Barack Obama declared that ‘justice has been done’, regarding the killing of an unarmed man, there is a worrying abuse of language – unless one thinks that a summary execution is compatible with the standards of a revised concept of ‘justice’. If the practice of targeted assassination stretches back into the ancient history of state violence, what is new is the fact that it is no longer confined to clandestine activity, but instead is made legitimate by the states that carry it out. This strategy involves the reinterpretation of the principles of international law, even if it means emptying them of their meaning, in order to authorize arbitrary executions soberly called ‘targeted killings’. As Philip Alston showed in a recent report,10 Western states – with the USA and Israel at the forefront – mobilize a legal arsenal in order to give themselves the right to murder enemies that are reduced, rhetorically, to the status of criminals, yet deprived of the elementary forms of justice. In the new doctrine of militarized manhunting, the goal is ‘to detect, deter, disrupt, detain, or destroy networks before they can harm innocents’.11 It is a matter of preventative security campaigns founded on a logic of elimination of dangerous individuals. The underlying rationality of this type of practice is that of the measure of safety. Unlike a sentence given, the measure of safety, which is ‘not designed to punish but only to protect society from danger’,12 is not determined by the seriousness of an act committed, but by the estimated danger of an individual. We find this mode of thought, today, in the notion of ‘pre-emptive manhunting’,13 where it is not a question of responding to attacks with countermeasures, but of preventing a threat by means of the anticipated elimination of the potential agents. The fragility of this kind of reasoning, which is highlighted elsewhere,14 takes on a particularly dramatic dimension here since it has to do with founding the irrevocable – death – on the probable. ‘Threat’ and ‘dangerousness’ are the words used today to cover over the Schmittian concept of absolute enmity. The logic of political assassination subscribes to a fetishized vision of the power in which the eradication of undesirable individuals would suppress the reasons for their genesis. This way of thinking, common to the murderous state and the statesman’s assassin, neglects however the fact that, even if it is severed, the head can grow back again so long as the conditions which created it remain.15 This logic of elimination furthermore systematically neglects its own effects in return, which can always, in accordance with the law of unintended consequences, end up magnifying the threat that it had intended to eradicate. A premonitory slip perhaps: the programme of assassinations launched by the Americans in Vietnam was called ‘Phoenix’. Cynegetic war bears an ideal of non-confrontation with death, and of domination without real combat. While a duel involves a reciprocal relation of exposure to death – each participant bearing his chest to the enemy – in the hunt, on the contrary, the master barely ever confronts his prey directly. He uses intermediaries, beaters or the pack. Everything is done so that his life is never in danger, to assure him maximum protection. The use of predator drones and of Hellfire missiles, operated at a distance from American soil, illustrates this principle of absolute preservation of the life of the hunter by the mediation of hunting auxiliaries. In this outline, at a pinch, combat becomes superfluous. War becomes pure power of murder. The drone is the emblem of contemporary cynegetic war.16 It is the mechanical, flying and robotic heir of the dog of war. It creates to perfection the ideal of asymmetry: to be able to kill without being able to be killed; to be able to see without being seen. To become absolutely invulnerable while the other is placed in a state of absolute vulnerability. ‘Predator’, ‘Global Hawk’, ‘Reaper’ – birds of prey and angels of death, drones bear their names well. Only death can kill without ever dying itself. Facing such an enemy, there is no way out. As a T-shirt glorifying American drones stated: ‘You can run, but you’ll only die tired.’ The drone is the technical solution found for what Edward N. Luttwak calls the contradictions of the post-heroic age, where Western states are ordered to make war without losing soldiers on their side. Freed of the constraints linked with the mobilization of human combatants, the leader of an army of drones could then finally acquire ‘the right to lead them into war as he would take them on a hunt, and into battles as on a pleasure trip’,17 to borrow an expression from Kant; that is, so that the risk of allowing some of their own to be killed would no longer need to be accounted for in the decision. In a phantom and remote-control war, the people, who do not risk their lives, would have no say in all of this. The drone appears in this sense also like a remedy to the internal political contestations of imperial wars. The strategists who advocated the general use of these weapons after the failures in Vietnam clearly had this goal in mind. The unmanned fighter is a terrible weapon, but it is the weapon of the coward. The danger, perceived by the army itself, consists, for the one who uses it, in becoming ‘unmanned’ in every sense of the term. It is the reason for which the officers of the Air Force, with their haloed image of knights of modern times, resisted the generalization of drones, which of course threatened their use, but also and most of all their virile prestige. Asymmetrical weapons create a radical crisis in the warrior ethos of the dominant player. The residual ideological need to heroicize the use of means that are, however, quite unheroic creates a burlesque effect which, in a macabre way, appears to be the main characteristic of all cynegetic war stories. This cynegetic burlesque is born of the contrast between the baseness of the means deployed and the height of the style in which they are decorated.18 When an assailant can kill without ever risking his or her own life, heroism, as well as martyrdom, becomes the exclusive privilege of the enemy. The contradiction is that the material advantage comes at the price of a moral disadvantage. When the balance of courage leans entirely to the side of the enemy camp, the problem becomes strategic. Specialists of counter-insurrectional war are alarmed today at the perverse effects of an excessive use of drones for American interests. Drones excel at pulverizing bodies at a distance, but they are perfectly incapable of winning ‘hearts and minds’ on the ground. This is, however, the classic objective that is claimed in any strategy of counter-guerrilla warfare. The fact that certain professors of moral philosophy recycled as military consultants should today learnedly claim that drones are weapons that are ethical in themselves 19 undoubtedly says a lot about what the word ‘ethics’ refers to today. The public version of the argument was recently given in a British report explaining that the ‘use of unmanned aircraft prevents the potential loss of aircrew lives and is thus in itself morally justified.’20 This is a thesis that a magazine, towards the end of the 1990s, summarized much more efficiently with a rather advertisement-like subheading, between two photographs of drones with purified lines on a sky blue background: ‘Nobody dies – except the enemy.’21 But this is a double standard that subscribes to not doubting the universalization posed on the foundation of moral law. At the opposite extreme to this simplistic theory of ‘weapons that are ethical in themselves’, Hegel wrote regarding virtue and the world: ‘the weapons are nothing else but the nature of the combatants themselves, a nature which only makes its appearance for both of them reciprocally.’22 In war, and anything else, the effective mode of existence of universality is no doubt only found in reciprocity. But it is precisely that which should push the apostles of militarized ethics to trade their good conscience for a certain anxiety. For, if it is true, as Nietzsche also wrote, that this form of compromise that human societies call justice cannot exist without a certain balance of forces and a certain reciprocity of the power of aggression, it may be that the pretensions for just cynegetic war cannot become effective without terrible retaliation. This is in any case the path opened, unwittingly, by those today who seek to legitimate the drone attacks by a certain ‘right to anticipatory self-defence against non-state actors’.23 Michael Walzer, in a surprisingly – yet ironically – prophetic text, aiming in other times to establish such a right in interstate relations, used the following image: if we imagine an unstable society, like the ‘wild west’ of American fiction, the analogy can be restated: a state under threat is like an individual hunted by an enemy who has announced his intention of killing or injuring him. Surely such a person may surprise his hunter, if he is able to do so.24 It could be that the populations over whom the threat of American ‘Predators’ looms, in Pakistan or elsewhere, might quite rightly, albeit inversely, reach the same conclusion for themselves.

#### This model of preemption normalizes instant killing as the main method for warfare. This causes nuclear escalation and ultra-violent responses to the US.

Goh 6 [Irving, Fellow @ Harvard University, Fast Capitalism, 2.1 2006, http://fastcapitalism.com/]

The articulation of wait cannot be more urgent today. It must be pronouncedly reiterated, in disagreement with the deadly preemptive, before the latter becomes a "necessary" global security condition of living in the world today. The deadly preemptive without chance for a counterhypothetic prophylaxis being offered must be resisted against its gaining momentum to procure a global consensual, legal status. And even if it is already in the process of being legalized or normalized as a contemporary fact or "necessity" of life in this twenty-first century of insecurity, it still has to be disagreed with. According to Rancière, consensus is arrived at from a striated observation of the real. The real today is a situation in which terror is surprising major cities and cities thought to be defensible against if not impenetrable to such surprises in ever greater media visibility and spectacle. To prevent more of these terrifying surprises (mediatising themselves) elsewhere, or such that second surprises will not tear apart the same city, the determination has been to short-circuit the possible dissemination of such terror at whatever cost. And this is where the preemptive has come in, the only possible measure to erase the slightest shadow of the next surprise. It cannot take chances. There is no chance for the counter-hypothesis. The real "is the absorption of all reality and all truth in the category of the only thing possible" (Rancière 1999:132). This is the real through which the consensus on the preemptive is or will be reached. The consensus is that "which asserts, in all circumstances, that it is only doing the only thing possible to do" (ibid.). The aggregation of the striated observation of the real, the "only thing possible to do," and consensus, is the final collapse of thinking of another trajectory of the future of the real, the erasure of the exposition of what is unthinkable or impossible that will falsify the future of "the only thing possible to do." The singular fatal preemptive cannot become a consensus of the "only thing possible to do." It cannot be thought as a necessity of security, a "perceptible given of common life" (Rancière 2004:7). Furthermore, consensus tends to fail to solve the problem it seeks to address. According to Rancière, in the political scene of the late 1990s, "'Consensus' was presented as the pacification of conflicts that arose from ideologies of social struggle, and yet it brought about anything but peace" (2004:4). Instead, there has been but the "re-emergence and success of racist and xenophobic movements" (ibid.). One can hardly imagine that a different outcome will indeed arise with the consensus of the deadly preemptive today. While policies are being put in place to rid a territory of hatred or hate-mongers, as in the United Kingdom today, the normalization of the preemptive, which brings along with it its unspoken profiling contours, would only serve to undermine if not contradict the former, since the profiling contour of the preemptive has been known elsewhere to have "produced tremendous resentment and hostility" [3] (Kershaw, New York Times. 25 July 2005). And as the American State war-machine leads the world in the global "war on terror," conducting war in countries like Iraq to preempt the spread of terror, not only is the right to be alive of innocent civilians in Iraq denied by military collateral damage there, but any homeland in America or elsewhere has not the sense that it has procured a better security. Instead, there remains the constant fear of further terror carried out under the pretext of retaliation against the preemptive like the one in Iraq. This worry has been exactly the same sentiment echoed recently in response to the Bush Administration's engineering of its next preemptive military measure, the Prompt Global Strike (PGS): "[PGS] may push potential hostile nations to be prepared to launch nuclear-armed missiles with even less notice than before in order to avoid them being destroyed in any preemptive U.S. first strike. Therefore, […] far from making the American people and homeland safer, the development of such weapons could put them at even greater risk from thermonuclear attack" (Sieff, United Press International. 09 February 2006). More than exorcizing the past trauma, the preemptive only perpetuates more trauma as more lives are lost and the right to be alive severely striated by the force of law. The global legal consensus on the singular deadly preemptive is therefore nothing short of terrifying either. One is reminded of Minority Report here, in which "rule by terror" is also the name given to the "precrime" methods of preemptively "arresting innocent men—nocturnal police raids, that sort of thing" (Dick 1997:348). And in turn, does that not remind one of all those rendition operations of the CIA, in which terror suspects, some of them arrested preemptively, and some of them already proven innocent in yet another case of mistaken identity or intelligence let-down of the preemptive, are rendered to prisons outside the United States where they can get no legal help and where they may more likely than not be tortured, in clear violation of international law? These preemptive renditions are now beginning to be slowly unveiled to have some sort of consensus from some European nations like the United Kingdom and Germany, and nations that have had supported these prisons such as Poland, Romania, Morocco, and Thailand. There is something not very democratic about the preemptive, to say the least. And the more consensus it gathers around it, the more undemocratic its practice will become. This is at least Rancière's argument of the consensus. For Rancière, consensus is nothing short of the erasure of politics or democracy. The aura of democratic practice that surrounds the politics of consensus is but a false illusion. Politics or democracy should be that primary irreducible gesture of disagreement with any injustice that is at work against an individual or a collective, especially the injustice that detaches the individual or a certain collective from an immanent fact of common freedom by denying them the right to partake of that common. But consensus does not open a space for such a gesture. Instead, according to Rancière, consensus is only "the dissolution of all political differences and juridical distinctions," the "erasing [of] the contestatory, conflictual nature of the very givens of common life" (Rancière 2004:8/7). It would only be in the spirit of democracy to disagree with the consensus, the consensus of the preemptive in all its forms.

## Advocacy

Maggie and I argue that the War Powers Authority of the President of the United States to conduct military drone strikes should be substantially restricted.

## Solvency

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#### Our discursive criticism of U.S. drones policy is critical to shaping and developing new understandings about drones - knowledge about drones does not emanate out from the drone, but is rather a frame of understanding the technology and our relations to it.

Kristin Dorage 13 [School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, Master’s degree, focus area of research is structural violence and developing praxis for conflict resolution] “Understanding the Pro-Drone Discourse” April 13, http://www.unrestmag.com/understanding-the-pro-drone-discourse/

“Foucault argues that since we can only have a knowledge of things if they have a meaning, it is discourse – not the things-in-themselves – which produces knowledge.” - Stuart Hall, Foucault: Power, Knowledge and Discourse. [1] Michel Foucault’s ideas as conveyed here by Stuart Hall indicate that discourse produces our knowledge of objects. If we accept this premise as true, it would be wise for students of conflict analysis and resolution to pay close attention to the development of new objects in conflict settings. Unmanned aerial vehicles (also known as UAVs or drones) are a prime example of such objects. Over the past ten years, lethal drones have changed the nature of warfare by allowing the United States’ “war on terror” to become increasingly clandestine and asymmetrical. Since the U.S. government has not provided basic information about its covert drone program – such as where drones are used, how targets are selected, and how many people have been killed – the discourses both championing and opposing drones are often backed by flimsy evidence. Yet these discourses are powerful nonetheless. How we talk about drones affects our understanding of them. Discourses that promote drone warfare are particularly dangerous because they encourage killing in spite of their lack of substance. Given that the subject of drone warfare is new, anti-drone advocates still have an opportunity to shape the public’s perception of drones. To begin, we must examine the pro-drone discourse with a critical lens and draw attention to its dangerous implications. Former White House Counter-Terrorism Advisor and recently appointed Director of the CIA, John Brennan, gave a speech last year to discuss the administration’s use of lethal drones. In his speech, which constituted the first formal acknowledgement of the drone program by the White House, Brennan stated:¶ As we have seen, deploying large armies abroad won’t always be our best offense. Countries typically don’t want foreign soldiers in their cities and towns. In fact, large, intrusive military deployments risk playing into al-Qaida’s strategy of trying to draw us into long, costly wars that drain us financially, inflame anti-American resentment and inspire the next generation of terrorists. In comparison, there is the precision of targeted strikes. [2]¶ Knowing that the American public is tired of war after the extended invasions in Iraq and Afghanistan, Brennan tries to persuade the audience that using lethal drones is not war. Brennan also sets up a false binary between targeted drone strikes and putting troops on the ground in an attempt to make drones the only option for combating terrorism. Pro-drone discourses are often set in false binaries, which prevent creative thinking about other ways to address terrorism. Brennan equates “large military deployments” with long, expensive wars that play into the enemy’s plan and lead to more terrorists attacks. His phrasing implies that drone strikes would have the opposite effect – that using targeted strikes would not produce anti-American sentiment, nor would their usage play into al-Qaida’s strategy. Brennan appears to acknowledge the desire of other countries to keep their citizens safe, recognizing that they do not want foreign troops in their cities and towns. However, in April last year (one month prior to Brennan’s speech), the Pakistani Parliament voted to end all endorsement of the CIA’s drone operations. [3] Surveys conducted by the Pew Research Center in 20 countries around the world show that the majority of them disapprove of the U.S. using drones to target extremists overseas. This stands in stark contrast to the majority of Americans (56%) who support targeted drone strikes. [4] The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (BIJ), an independent organization which has been conducting an in-depth investigation into the covert drone war, reports there have been nine drone strikes and between 36-71 casualties in Pakistan this year alone. [5]¶ Brennan’s speech demonstrates three elements that I believe are grounding points for the pro-drone discourse. They include: keeping U.S. troops and citizens’ safe, conducting precise and efficient warfare, and maintaining fiscal responsibility on the part of the military.¶ Pro-drone advocates claim that drones ensure U.S. troops’ safety while allowing them to pursue the goal of combat. Stephen A. Cheney, CEO of the American Security Project, states, “any time you can use a drone instead of using a Marine, I think it’s a good thing”. [6] His statement seems logical enough: if we are at war, we want our troops to be safe; if we send drones into battle instead of American soldiers, then more American lives will be saved. However, there is an unstated distinction here between short-term and long-term safety. While lethal drones ensure that U.S. troops are not put directly in harm’s way, the destruction caused by drones is unlikely to be ignored. We can most certainly expect that a targeted operation of this nature will instigate a severe backlash against the U.S. at some point in the future.¶ A study conducted by a former member of President Obama’s counterterrorism group, Michael Boyle, states that the use of drones is “encouraging a new arms race that will empower current and future rivals and lay the foundations for an international system that is increasingly violent”. [7] In Yemen, a series of interviews with witnesses of drone attacks suggest that drones have contributed to a rise in anti-American sentiment and may encourage recruitment to al-Qaida. A former counter-terrorism official at the U.S. State Department concurs: “Drone policy at its current tempo does put the U.S. at the very top of the bad-guys list”. [8]¶ According to John Brennan, drone strikes “conform to the principle of proportionality”. [9] In other words, the gains made by the military exceed the damage done by drones. He emphasizes that targeted strikes are directed towards individuals that pose a significant threat. That includes leaders of al-Qaida and other associated groups, individuals planning on carrying out attacks on “U.S. persons and interests”, and individuals that provide support for these attacks. [10] Brennan says the purpose of targeting these individuals “is to disrupt his plans and his plots before they come to fruition”. [11] The language he employs attempts to reassure his audience. By reciting the principles of war the narrative conveys to us that drone strikes are directed only towards those that are about to cause imminent harm. Yet, how do we know if this is true? And what gives us reason to think that this is an effective strategy? Given that the government has not released information about the process of choosing targets, it is impossible to know. In addition, the long-term strategy or timeline for drone strikes is never mentioned. At what point do we say that all terrorist threats are gone and we can stop using lethal drones? Historically speaking, eliminating the upper echelons of an organization has not always resulted in the group’s termination. The CIA killed thousands of Vietcong leaders during the Vietnam War and the organization survived it. The spread of al-Qaeda operatives to Mali, even the attacks on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, Libya, could be seen as evidence that the U.S.’ counterterrorism policy is not working. [12] Discourses suggesting that drones keep us safe are situated in a short-term perspective. Policies that align with this discourse have not considered what retributive violence might happen as a result of the drone program and are very dangerous indeed.¶ There is another aspect of the safety discourse that is deceiving. The U.S. Justice Department’s 16-page white paper, which was leaked earlier this year by NBC, attempts to make a case for the legality of the U.S. government’s targeted killings. In this paper it states that even U.S. citizens can by killed by drones without charges, a hearing, a trial, or any evidence, as long as an “informed, high-level official of the U.S. government” determines the person is an imminent threat. [13] The paper does not say whether the official needs to be completely sure or just have a sneaking suspicion that the target is an imminent threat. In fact, the paper’s definition of imminence is so broad that it negates the word entirely. According to this document all that is required for the government to conduct a targeted strike on a U.S. citizen is the say-so from a senior official and a window of opportunity.¶ What is particularly worrisome is the lack of judicial checks and balances within the drone program, and the overwhelming power that is being consolidated in the executive branch of government. Other aspects of the “war on terror” have procedural safeguards; for example, if the government wishes to set a wiretap, it must request a warrant under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. And while the Constitution allows unilateral executive action in “exigent circumstances”, these actions must always be followed by ex post judicial review. On the issue of drones, the courts are entirely left out of the process. As journalist David Cole writes, it seems that the government “wants the power to kill Americans unilaterally—and in secret”. [14]¶ As far as we know, three Americans have been killed to date by American-operated drones. This includes Anwar al-Awlaki, a high-level recruiter for al-Qaida and propagandist who was raised in America and killed in Yemen, and Awlaki’s 16-year-old American son, Abdulrahman al-Awlaki, who was killed by a drone in Yemen two weeks later. [15] The U.S. administration has said that Anwar al-Awlaki and individuals like him are dangerous enough to warrant being killed instead of captured and given due process. There have been only unofficial responses given by the U.S. government regarding Abdulrahman’s death, including an anonymous official who told the media that his death was a mistake. The discourse that drones keep us safe does not hold up to the fact that our government has unilaterally killed an innocent American teenager, and refuses to give information about his death. Since the government is intent on creating its own rules with the drone program– and not communicating these rules to the public – it removes any trust we might have in its judgment. [16]¶ Slavoj Zizek’s work can also provide insight into the safety discourse. In his book, Violence, he discusses three modes of violence: subjective, objective, and symbolic. [17] He argues that subjective, or overt, violence is the most visible of the three, and often sheds light on objective, or systemic, violence. If we were to apply this theory to the covert drone program, we can see how the violence enacted by drones takes on different forms for different audiences. The violence inflicted by drones is subjective for those on the receiving end, but symbolic to those who view it from a distance (through the news, for example). For the individuals inflicting the violence (the drone operators), it is less direct because it is “hidden” by the monitors and screens through which the violence is enacted. A study conducted by the U.S. Air Force found that almost half of all drone operators experienced high levels of stress in the workplace, but this stress was tied to working “long and erratic work hours”. [18] The drone operators did not show increased amounts of stress from watching hours of up-close video footage of killing and destruction inflicted by drones. Instead, the operators felt “a sense of accomplishment in protecting troops on the ground”. [19]¶ We can further expand on this idea by historicizing drones in the context of trends in warfare. Noel Sharkey explains in his chapter “Killing Made Easy: From Joysticks to Politics” that the evolution of the military has led to greater physical space between combatants, along with technology that “enable[s] killing from ever-increasing distances”. [20] While increasing the distance between combatants caters to our innate desire to keep ourselves safe, the extreme distance in drone warfare also produces alienation and desensitization; it encourages drone operators to become comfortable with brutality and killing. Sharkey’s research along with the research done on drone operators suggests that what we are seeing is the transition of subjective violence to objective violence; in other words, the violence caused by drones is becoming normalized and if it continues it shall soon be rendered ‘invisible’.¶ The safety elements in the pro-drone discourse are also tied to Karl Marx’s theories about individuals as subjects and objects.[21] Marx states that the division between subjects and objects is created and perpetuated in a capitalist economy, in which violence is inflicted on individuals as objects. This is evident in the CIA’s “signature strikes”, in which drones are used to kill people whose names are not known, but who are in the vicinity of other “militants” and either demonstrate suspicious behavior, or have characteristics that warrant their immediate death. [22] By treating individuals as objects, instead of as subjects of equal worth, drones not only aim to kill individuals, but also to promote the objectification of human beings. As Marx said, “The performance of work is at the same time its objectification”. [23] Once a group of people is objectified, they no longer require safety or protection. The subjective and objective aspects of drone warfare intend to make others appear “less than”. Therefore the discourse of safety has the function of treating some Americans (those not targeted by drones) as subjects, while reducing those within the drone’s purview to mere objects.¶ Bradley J. Strawser, a former Air Force officer and an assistant professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, conducted a study of the drone program and concluded that “using [drones] to go after terrorists not only was ethically permissible but also might be ethically obligatory, because of their advantages in identifying targets and striking with precision”. [24] The idea presented here is common in many pro-drone discourses – that drones represent the most ethical form of warfare because they are precise. The discourse acts as if drones can pluck out the ‘bad guy’ from the masses, and eliminate him or her with no consequences. This idea is suspect for several reasons. First, even when drones are on target, the blast that emanates from Hellfire missiles generally has a radius of 15 to 20 meters. [25] That distance does not include the shrapnel projected after the blast. A report on drones issued by Stanford and New York University further explains why it is difficult for UAVs to be precise:¶ One factor that reduces targeting precision is ‘latency,’ the delay between movement on the ground and the arrival of the video image via satellite to the drone pilot. As the New York Times reported in July 2012, “Last year senior operatives with Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula told a Yemeni reporter that if they hear an American drone overhead, they move around as much as possible.” [26]¶ This quote is particularly insightful because it shows the ways in which drone targets still can outsmart such “precise” technology. In addition, it gives a sense of what it must be like for innocent civilians living in the drone’s purview. Pro-drone discourses rarely expound on the lives of those on the other side.¶ To return again to John Brennan’s speech from last year, we can see other examples of the precision narrative at play. Brennan explained that “compared against other options, a pilot operating the aircraft remotely, with the benefit of technology and with the safety of distance, might actually have a clearer picture of the target and its surroundings, including the presence of innocent civilians”. [27] The way in which Brennan orders the elements in this story has the effect of painting an image of a pilot who, with the help of drones, is a protector of the innocent. Brennan goes on to say “it’s this surgical precision – the ability with laser-like focus to eliminate the cancerous tumor called an al-Qaida terrorist, while limiting damage to the tissue around it”. [28] Instead of portraying a terrorist for what he or she actually is – a human being that has the ability to make choices – the comparison to a tumor dehumanizes the person and depicts him or her as a thing that kills. The act of conducting drone warfare, on the other hand, is compared to surgery – a highly respected and exacting profession. The chances for error in surgery are perceived as being slim, which is what the narrative would like us to think about drone warfare. It is these themes of precision and accuracy that construct a narrative which makes drone warfare seem like a flawless procedure instead of an act of violence based on nebulous protocol.¶ The challenge here for both the pro-drone and anti-drone arguments is that there is no way to know for sure how accurate drones are because the data available is incomplete. Evidence collected from non-governmental organizations suggest the number of civilian casualties is likely higher than the administration admits, but it is difficult to determine whose number is correct. In Michael Boyle’s study he explains that the White House classifies all military-age men that are killed or injured in a strike as militants unless proved otherwise. Boyle states, “the result of the ‘guilt by association’ approach has been a gradual loosening of the standards by which the U.S. selects targets for drone strikes.” [29] The Pakistani government recently stated that 400 Pakistani civilians had been killed as a result of drone attacks. [30]¶ The final theme in the pro-drone discourse is that drones are more cost effective than deploying troops on the ground. Soldiers cost the Pentagon $4 million over their lifetime, whereas a drone is about 10% of that cost and can be discarded once it becomes dysfunctional. As defense budgets shrink, the economic rationale to automate military functions will inevitably grow. [31] Thus, there is incentive for the U.S. to use drones more frequently and for corporations to manufacture smaller, cheaper, and more deadly drones. The global race to develop these machines has started and already produced lethal drones the size of bugs. [32]¶ The affordability argument sparks a sinister question, which is: What happens when war becomes cheap? While many drone advocates claim that the U.S. would never engage in war or conduct targeted killings without serious consideration, it is feasible to think that the cheapening of war will lead to more war overall. As it currently stands, the process of deploying lethal drones is far easier than capturing suspected terrorists. It is not far-fetched to think that the administration has been using drones for more than a just a “last resort” given the large numbers of individuals killed by targeted strikes (currently predicted to be about 4,000 individuals). When the U.S. used to conscript soldiers, convincing the American public to go to war required much justification and careful consideration. [33] Today, the White House sends drones without seeking approval or feeling the need to justify its actions to anyone.¶ The pro-drone discourse often presents lethal drones as the quick, effective, cost-efficient and safe alternative to long and costly warfare. It is evident that while these discursive themes are compelling at first, they are a façade. Anti-drone activists must work to change the nature of the public discourse. They must emphasize that drones are not accurate and do not make us safe. They must maintain that having a more affordable form of warfare is alarmingly dangerous. Unless we can effectively make the claim that drones reduce disincentives for killing, we can expect our world to become increasingly insecure in the future.

#### We are a counter hegemonic project that goes against the seemingly inevitable logic of pre-emption. This dissensus is key.

**Goh 6** [Irving, Fellow @ Harvard University, Fast Capitalism, 2.1 2006, http://fastcapitalism.com/]

The fact remains that the victim of the London police preemptive shooting had no link to terror—had no intent of terror. (neither had the victim of the Miami shooting.) **There is nothing right about that preemptive act. It has been a wrong calculation, a wrong decision, executed in a method of resolute excess.** This is not the first time intelligence fails the preemptive. It has failed in the case of the Iraq war of 2003, since no "weapons of mass destruction" have been found, while the hypothesis of stores of such weapons has been but evidence in absentia that "justified" the projectile of war against Iraq to preempt Iraq from disseminating the said weapons. But the remaining evidence, the only real verifiable evidence, is that there is an intelligence problem with the preemptive in overdrive. So there is in fact a double wrong to the entire sequence of the preemptive. The misidentification of an innocent being as a terror-suspect and denying that being the right to be alive, the intelligence let-down, is the second wrong. The first wrong is what has been discussed earlier—the tearing of the immanent collective of living beings into those that are likely to fall under the force of the preemptive act and those who do not. And as said earlier too, this partition is rather discernible. Basically, the different, the non-natives of the territory tend to belong to those whose right to be alive is now abdicated to the decision of the preemptive force of law. They have no part in articulating that right by themselves anymore. They have no part in voicing out their disagreement with the irreducible profiling force of the preemptive that separates them from others who will hardly be thought to be a suspect. Their voices are simply not heard. They cannot claim to a common collective of living beings insisting on the right to be alive simply by the fact of existence. That they are under the scope of the preemptive separates them from that common. And they are also denied the equality of thinking that any act of violence against civilians of terror is undesirable. For the preemptive to regard these peoples to be as against terror now or in the future is an impossibility. That is unthinkable to the preemptive and its profiling horizon. This is the wrong that one must recognize first and foremost. **The space of wrong, in which those are wronged, must be given exposition. One must re-mark wrong, after the marking out of those who do not have equal right to be alive by the politics of preemptive. As Ranciére (1999) says, The concept of wrong is […] not linked to any theater of 'victimization.' It belongs to the original structure of politics. Wrong is simply the mode of subjectification in which the assertion of equality takes it political shape.** […] Wrong institutes a singular universal, a polemical universal, by tying the presentation of equality, as the part of those who have no part, to the conflict between parts of society. (P. 39) In relation to the imminent preemptive, "the part of those who have no part" has to be articulated. The "part of those who have no part" is that assemblage of peoples—which is, contrary to the delimited perspective of the preemptive, certainly not limited to the migrant, the illegal immigrant, the asylum seeker, the ethnic peoples— who have no part in being presumed innocent or being without suspicion of intent of terror as demarcated by that politics; the peoples who disagree with the deadly force of the preemptive without agreeing with the ideologies and methods of terror; and the peoples who without crime and without intent of crime desire just a right to disappear and just run, from the force of law. It is a people to come, to use Deleuze and Guattari's term, who will say wait to the speed of the preemptive, who will disagree with the law of the preemptive, as long as the law refuses to allow the sending of the prophylaxis or the time of a counter-hypothesis. The beginning of the paper suggested that if one is to disagree with the preemptive, one needs to get outside of it. **This assemblage of "the part of those who have no part" is precisely the people to come who are outside the consensus (the police chiefs, the State, the military complex) that seeks to normalize the preemptive. They are therefore the outside whose exposé must not be denied or deferred anymore. With them reserves the potentiality of what Ranciére calls "dissensus" that will break the politics of consensus, the politics of consensus on the preemptive. The voice of this assemblage might not be heard at present, blocked by the deafening speed of the preemptive, yet this assemblage nonetheless has to have a persistence in inscribing itself as an exposition that disagrees with the politics of the preemptive**. And it will do so only to (re)claim that common fact of right to be alive without submitting to the decision of the preemptive, to (re)claim the common equality to be presumed innocent and be without profiling by the preemptive, and the common equality of sharing the common desire to resist the ideologies and methods of terror. The persistence of this assemblage inscribing itself is its force of disagreement. (Disagreement or mésentente for Ranciére is about the persistence of the exposition of wrong.) This disagreement is the prophylaxis the assemblage brings to the preemptive, displacing it, counter-checking it, counter-arguing it. The persistence this assemblage gives is also what Ranciére calls the "processing" of a wrong. It "passes through the constitution of specific subjects that take the wrong upon themselves, give it shape, invent new forms and names for it to conduct its processing in a specific montage of proofs" (Ranciére 1999:40). With regard to the preemptive, these proofs will be those that prove that a prophylaxis or counter-hypothesis may change the course the "suspect" takes and therefore maintaining every single possibility of the right to be alive, proofs that disarticulate the interpretation and judgment of the preemptive and therefore securing for the mistaken identity the right to be alive, and proofs that the profiling contours of the preemptive is wrong to deny them the equality of being presumed innocence and without suspicion of terror-intent. This persistence can be seen as an effective prophylaxis or counter-hypothesis because it is also an interval, an "opening up [of] the world where argument can be received and have an impact" (Ranciére 1999:56, my emphasis). **This persistence is like the counter-hypothetic "minority report" in Philip K. Dick's text. And just as a "minority report" must be given an exposure to counter the deadly preemptive, so must this persistence.**  If there is anything disappointing about the dénouement of the text of Minority Report, it is perhaps its reactionary turn at the end. There is the chance for Anderton to live out the possibility, the counter-hypothesis of him not being a murderer-to-be. It is the chance presented to him when Anderton's prospective victim according to the "precrime" vision of the future, Kaplan, invites Anderton onto an impromptu stage to expose the flaw of "precrime," to expose the fact that "precrime" makes wrong judgment like the possible misidentifying of Andertonas a potential killer. That could have constituted the emergence of disagreement with the preemptive, as Anderton and Kaplan, "the killer and his victim," "standing side by side," exposes the wrong of "precrime." And the right to be alive, for both Anderton and Kaplan, would have been preserved. But the status quo of the preemptive "precrime" is reinstated instead. In a flash of "blind terror," (Dick 1997: 352) Anderton decides to fulfill the prophecy of "precrime" and fatally shoots Kaplan (One cannot help reading it as a foreshadowing of the "blind terror" of the London shooting in complete view of tube commuters). The exposure of the flaw of "precrime" is thereby short-circuited and the institution of the preemptive is maintained. "Precrime" is secured from any criticism, from any prophylaxis. But the right to be alive is compromised, not Anderton's at least, but Kaplan's. Aside from the politics between the police and the military of which Kaplan belongs, one finds it difficult to justify the exchange of Kaplan's right to be alive for the perpetuation of the preemptive "precrime" system. Anderton , by that time, had already acknowledged and experienced the flaw of "precrime," the flaw that "there've been other innocent people(1997: 333)" under the "precrime" directive. He was going to forcefully resist or disagree with the "precrime" system, for his right to be alive. He had said, "If the system can survive only by imprisoning innocent people, then it deserves to be destroyed. My personal safety is important because I'm a human being" (1997:342). But in the end, Anderton's thought of life is abdicated to a thought of the system. The moment Anderton decides to murder Kaplan is the moment when he "was thinking about the system" so that the "basic validity of the Precrime system" will not be shaken (1997:342, 350). **At the end, all is normal with the preemptive "precrime" system. It returns to the terrifying normalcy of the preemptive condition. Life must not imitate fiction in this case.** Once again, **critical thought must resist any consensual normalization of the preemptive condition. But to be sure again, there is no disputing the good intentions and the possible good what a preemptive can deliver.** One cannot ignore the fact that its point of departure is to be prophylactic. The question, perhaps, is about the question of the relative speeds of the preemptive itself. It would be a question of negotiating between its belatedness—so as to let arrive a possible counter-hypothesis, and its acceleration. To put it in another way, it would be a question of opening up a space of disagreement between its two speeds. Every policy seeks to be both a just act or an act of justice, and an act that serves a certain functionality. **The problem with policies is that States assume an uninterrupted or noncontestable continuum between functionality and justice.** But according to Ranciére, **this continuum is but a "false continuity"** (1999:21). For Ranciére, there is always a wrong that interrupts this continuum: "Between the useful and the just lies the incommensurability of wrong" (ibid.). The articulation of this wrong, which posits a disagreement with an act presumed to be both functional and just, or which proves the "false continuity" between functionality and justice of an act, cannot disappear, cannot be made to disappear. This articulation must surface. So there must be the persistence of exposition of disagreement with the preemptive as it is today, so as to (re)open thought to the unconditional right to be alive that the deadly preemptive is putting into danger, and to open the entire question of the preemptive to intensive critique and inquiry so as to prevent all thoughts of the preemptive to collapse into an uncritical consensus on its deadly speed. The force of persistence of disagreement would also put into question the undemocratic profiling and partitioning practices of the preemptive. Its exposition will only "presuppose the refutation of a situation's given assumptions" (assumptions like the deadly speed of the preemptive as the only necessity of contemporary security condition; the assumption that the ethnic different, the nonnative, the migrant, tends to incline towards a propensity of future terror) and "the introduction of previously uncounted objects and subjects" (like that of the assemblage of wrong) (Ranciére 2004:7). As Ranciére says, disagreement is "the invention of a question that no one was asking themselves until then" (1999:33). The time of invention of a question in disagreement with the preemptive is none other than but now.

#### This micropolitical space is material politics – US neo-imperialism sustains itself by controlling the boundaries of knowledge. Only exposing the epistemic violence of imperialism can offer ways of knowing that counteract the violence and elitism of US empire.

McLaren and Kincheloe 5 (Peter Professor of Education, Graduate School of Education and Information Studies @ UCLA and Joe, professor and Canada Research Chair at the Faculty of Education, McGill University in Montreal, Quebec, Canada. The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research, Third Edition, Eds Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln)

In this context, it is important to note that **we understand** a **social theory as a** map or a **guide to the social sphere**. In a research context, **it** does not determine how we see the world but **helps us devise** questions and **strategies for exploring it**. **A critical** social **theory is concerned** in particular **with issues of power and justice and the ways** that the economy; matters of race, class, and gender; **ideologies; discourses**; education; religion **and other** social **institutions**; and cultural dynamics **interact to construct a social system** (Beck-Gernsheim, Butler, & Puigvert, 2003; Flccha, Gomez, & Puigvert, 2003). Thus, in this context we seek to provide a view of an evolving criticality or a reconceptualized critical theory. **Critical theory is never static**; it is always evolving, changing in light of both new theoretical insights and new problems and social circumstances. The list of concepts elucidating our articulation of critical theory indicates a criticality informed by a variety of discourses emerging after the work of the Frankfurt School Indeed, some of the theoretical discourses, while referring to themselves as critical, directly call into question some of the work of Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse. Thus, diverse theoretical traditions have informed our understanding of criticality and have demanded understanding of diverse forms of oppression including class, race, gender, sexual, cultural, religious, colonial, and ability-related concerns. The evolving notion of criticality we present is informed by, while critiquing, the post-discourses—for example, postmodernism, poststructuralism, and postcolonialism. In this context, critical theorists become detectives of new theoretical insights, perpetually searching for new and interconnected ways of understanding power and oppression and the ways they shape everyday life and human experience. In this context, criticality and the research it supports are always evolving, always encountering new ways to irritate dominant forms of power, to provide more evocative and compelling insights. Operating in this way, an evolving criticality is always vulnerable to exclusion from the domain of approved modes of research. The forms of social change it supports always position it in some places as an outsider, an awkward detective always interested in uncovering social structures, discourses, ideologies, and epistemologies that prop up both the status quo and a variety of forms of privilege. **In the epistemological domain**, white, male, class elitist, heterosexist**, imperial, and colonial privilege often operates by asserting the power to claim objectivity and neutrality.** Indeed**, the owners of such privilege often own the "franchise" on reason and rationality. Proponents of an evolving criticality possess a variety of tools to expose such oppressive power politics.** Such proponents assert that critical theory is well-served by drawing upon numerous liberatory discourses and including diverse groups of marginalized peoples and their allies in the nonhierarchical aggregation of critical analysts {Bello, 2003; Clark, 2002; Humphries, 1997). **In the present era, emerging forms of neocolonialism and neo-imperialism in the United States move critical theorists to examine the wavs American power operates** under the cover of establishing democracies all over the world. Advocates of an evolving criticality argue—as we do in more detail later in this chapter—that such neocolonial power must be exposed so it can be opposed in the United States and around the world. The American Empires justification in the name of freedom for undermining democratically elected governments from Iran (Kincheloe, 2004), Chile, Nicaragua, and Venezuela to Liberia (when its real purpose is to acquire geopolitical advantage for future military assaults, economic leverage in international markets, and access to natural resources) must be exposed by critical-ists for what it is—a rank imperialist sham (McLaren, 2003a, 2003b; McLaren & Jaramillo, 2002; McLaren & Martin, 2003). Critical researchers need to view their work in the context of living and working in a nation-state with the most powerful military-industrial complex in history that is shamefully using the terrorist attacks of September 11 to advance a ruthless imperialist agenda fueled by capitalist accumulation by means of the rule of force (McLaren & Farahmandpur,2003). Chomsky (2003), for instance, has accused the U.S. government of the "supreme crime" of preventive war (in the case of its invasion of Iraq, the use of military force to destroy an invented or imagined threat) of the type that was condemned at Kuremburg. Others, like historian Arthur Schlesinger (cited in Chomsky, 2003), have likened the invasion of Iraq to Japan's "day of infamy'' that is, to the policy that imperial Japan employed at the time of Pearl Harbor. David G. Smith (2003) argues **that such imperial dynamics are supported by particular epistemological forms. The United States is an epistemological empire based on a notion of truth that undermines the knowledges produced by those outside the good graces and benevolent authority of the empire.** Thus, in the 21 st century, **critical theorists must develop sophisticated ways to address not only the brute material relations of class rule linked to the mode and relations of capitalist production and imperialist conquest (whether through direct military intervention or indirectly through the creation of client states) but also the epistemological violence that helps discipline the world Smith refers to this violence as a form of "information warfare" that spreads deliberate falsehoods** about countries such as Iraq and Iran. **U.S. corporate and governmental agents become more sophisticated in the use of such episto-weaponry with every day that passes.** Obviously, **an evolving criticality** does not promiscuously choose theoretical discourses to add to the bricolage of critical theories. It **is highly suspicious**—as we detail later—**of theories that fail to understand the malevolent workings of power, that fail to critique the blinders of Eurocentrism, that cultivate an elitism of insiders and outsiders, and that fail to discern a global system of inequity supported by diverse forms of ideology and violence. It is uninterested in any theory**—no matter how fashionable—**that does not directly address the needs of victims of oppression and the suffering they must endure.** The following is an elastic, ever-evolving set of concepts included in our evolving notion of criticality. With theoretical innovations and shifting Zeitgeists, they evolve. The points that are deemed most important in one time period pale in relation to different points in a new era. <P306-307>

#### Academic spaces should be used to reframe knowledge-practices rather than producing "new and final solutions.”

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Chapel Hill] Blurring Boundaries: Recognizing Knowledge-Practices in the Study of Social Movements. 2008 Institute for Ethnographic Research. Anthropological Quarterly 81.1 (2008) 17-58

In sum, when movements are understood as knowledge-practitioners, and not simply as campaigners, or subjects to be understood by social movement researchers, their importance is rearticulated, challenging our habits of practice and modes of engagement as researchers. Even beyond the specific cases we have described above, we can understand many movement-related activities as knowledge-practices, which not only critically engage and redraw the map of what comprises the political, but also produce practices and subjects according to different logics**.** As such, knowledge-practices are part of the investigative and creative work necessary for (re)making politics, both from the micro-political inscribed on our bodies and lived in the everyday, to broader institutional and systemic change. It is in this sense that movements can be understood in and of themselves as spaces for the production of situated knowledges of the political. Despite these multiple and rich expressions of knowledge-practice, many social movements' visibility in public and academic debates is still confined to media-grabbing mobilizations, concrete and measurable victories, or moments when bodily repression is suffered and sustained. The methodological and theoretical shift in social movement studies that we propose makes visible different goals and effects of knowledge production**.** Instead of detached, academic knowledge about movements that operate "out there," we argue for the value of seeing the continuous generation, circulation and networked nature of heterogeneous knowledges, which in themselves work to make different futures possible—futures that do not exist in a narrow or campaign-specific space that closes once a certain demand has been met or a mobilization realized. In fact, rather than engage solely or primarily with the macro-political, knowledge-practices seem to work as much on the level of the micro-political, a level of experimentation, memory, analysis and intentional and ongoing critique, rather than the production [End Page 51] of new and final solutions (Deleuze and Guattari 1987; see also D'Iganazio 2004). We, too, offer not a new and final solution, but what we hope is an opening for greater recognition, valorization and engagement with the conceptual praxis of movements themselves.

#### Challenging the epistemological legitimacy of the imperial project is essential. Empire is maintained by a seemingly “neutral” political science that shores up liberal assumptions and controls what is or isn’t a legitimate political thought.

Wedeen 7 (Lisa, Professor of Political Science Lisa Wedeen specializes in comparative politics, the Middle East, political theory, feminist theory, and qualitative methods, Scientific Knowledge, Liberalism and Empire: American Political Science in the Modern Middle East Social Science Research Council, June 14-15, 2007, http://www.ssrc.org/workspace/images/crm/new\_publication\_3/%7B8a197abf-ed60-de11-bd80-001cc477ec70%7D.pdf)

The late Edward **Said** (1978**) famously underscored the connections between empire and distinct forms of knowledge**, and in the spirit of his book Orientalism, this essay also specifies the normative conditions, in this case in political science, that have helped make possible distinct visions of the Arab and Muslim Middle East. I want to argue **that these visions are not simply embellishments of an imperial domination independently existing; they are an integral part of the project itself**.4 Such a claim is not meant to suggest that all political scientists participate in reproducing possibilities for empire, or that they do so single-handedly and deliberately. Thus this essay also takes issue with approaches that attribute political power to scholarly discourses without attending to the ways in which scholarship operates within broader discursive and institutional frameworks. Admittedly, **it is by no means self-evident how political science’s complicities with U.S. empire would jibe with the two aspects of political science I argue above are currently defining the discipline—the convergence**, or perhaps more historically accurate, the continuing coalescence in new forms, **of science and liberalism**. This essay is devoted to fleshing out those links while considering how scholarly convictions, combined with the realities of U.S. foreign policy, have structured the terms in which the Middle East is understood and studied today. Part one explores the discipline’s seemingly contradictory commitments to value-neutrality and liberal values. Part two foregrounds the constitutive relationship among science, liberalism, and empire in the making of modern Middle Eastern politics as an area of academic inquiry. One caveat worth noting from the outset: the words “empire” and “imperialism” are politically charged nouns these days. By empire I simply mean, following the Oxford English Dictionary, a state with extensive political and military dominion. In the age of nation-states, imperial states generally exercise this dominion over populations that are perceived (by conqueror and conquered) as different from (in the sense of ineligible for incorporation into) the dominant state exercising control. From the inception of the American Political Science Association in 1903 until the present, there have been repeated attempts within the association to “transform the study of politics into an independent science” (Ross 1991: 288; see also Heaney and Hansen 2006). Despite important variations among positivists and significant disagreements between positivists and nonpositivists (including what “positivism” means), efforts **to make political science a science have generally entailed separating facts from values, identifying law-like principles governing political action, and subjecting these rules to empirical tests.** In this context, objectivity enjoys an “aura of self-evidence”—practical agreement about what counts as a fact and the modes through which knowledge about facts are produced (Shapin and Schaffer 1985: 13-14). Committed to objectivity and value-free scholarship, dominant political science’s applications of positivist principles find expression in causal explanations that rely on a nomothetical understanding of what causation entails. Formulated by Hume and formalized by the prominent positivist, Carl Hempel, the task of science, in this view, is to discover a “covering law” that, in the context of observable initial conditions, can be said to produce the observed event (Hempel 1965; on positivism see Hacking 1983; Cederman 1997; Johnson 2006). Yet contrary to scientific commitments to objectivity and value-free scholarship**, much research in “mainstream” political science has also historically presupposed the value of liberal politics** (Ross 1991; Ricci 1984; Gunnell 1993). Like positivism, liberalism has embodied divergent ideas and been identified variously in different geographical and historical locations. Despite these variations**, the liberal tradition in political science can nevertheless be characterized by four interrelated assumptions** about the connection between human subjectivity and good government (Ricci 1984, 72-73). First**, human beings are born as rights-bearing individuals**. A good government is one that protects an individual’s inalienable rights. Second, **human beings are capable of thinking clearly and rationally.** Good institutions are ones that cultivate human proclivities to reason. Third, **individuals naturally come together and form groups** in order to promote their interests and check those of rival factions. Good institutions are ones that encourage pluralistic interests while dampening potentially incendiary conflicts. Fourth**, individuals are capable of creating governments that operate democratically**, namely, that are responsive to the will of the people.5 Good democratic governments are those that provide procedural mechanisms, such as elections, that enable people to exercise their will as individuals. Of course, liberalism’s values, like those of any ideology, have never been borne out fully in practice. But whereas Marxism and other variants of socialism could be criticized for finding political expression in totalizing systems**, liberalism’s tenets have been treated as separate from people’s experiences in liberal polities. Political scientists have helped make this separation secure by sequestering normative political theory from empirical studies, and by appealing to the authority of scientific discovery** to justify commitments to piecemeal reforms. I am not arguing for better science, however. Nor am I claiming that positivist social science is bad. Rather, I want to bracket the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the enterprise and consider **how the insistence on separating fact from value**, in particular, **has contributed to three persistent disciplinary moves. First, the division has excluded viewing science as a value in and of itself,** indeed as a metaphysic. Political scientists do not tend to ask how scientific knowledge operates to cultivate passionate belief or why science is inherently the most valuable form of knowledge. **Second, the split between fact and value has prevented thinking through how epistemological assumptions** and nationalpolitical commitments **coalesce** to defend the stability of a liberal politics—how **liberalism is itself ideological or “hegemonic**,” and how political science helps to make it so. Or to put it differently, **epistemologies have a politics, and knowledge production in political science tends to shore up certain liberal assumptions and aspirations even while overt prescription and “bias” are seen to be outside the objectivist goals of science**. **Third, the split between fact and value allows methodology**, in particular**, to be viewed as value neutral**, as a technique devoid of normative assumptions. **This v**iew **enables** positivist **political science to occupy the position of authorized** (because disinterested**) discoverer**, teacher, and enforcer of what counts as true or justified statements about politics. **The ultimate effect of this** sequestering of fact-finding from rigorous philosophical examination **has been that dominant epistemological communities are maintained by institutional and practical-discursive means** rather than by any exclusive purchase such conceptual frameworks could have on the truth. Disciplinary strategies (such as writing a methodological textbook designed to unify the discipline) and powerbrokering practices (such as dismissing out of hand arguments that are epistemologically reflexive) help establish the rules and devise the evaluative criteria by which statements about the world are considered knowledge or not. At the same time**, these activities supply and enforce norms about what may and may not be asked. They generally discourage scrutiny into the practices that bound and normalize a discipline**, **enabling certain kinds of knowledge to thrive while foreclosing** or de-authorizing **other** **ways of knowing**. In other words, in addition to the tasks of socializing student-citizens and advising government officials, political science, not surprisingly, operates as a discipline, reproducing the norms, prohibitions, conventions, and constraints that generate standards for identifying expertise. In political science, this expertise affirms the possibility and importance of pursuing value-free science, on the one hand, and the vision of a rationalist liberal politics, on the other.

# FW

#### Their narrow interpretation of agency within debate is politically debilitating. The fiction of a unitary state blinds us to how the government actually functions, causing serial policy failure.

Claude, ‘88; [Inis, Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia, States and the Global System, pages 18-20]

This view of the state as an institutional monolith is fostered by the notion of sovereignty, which calls up the image of the monarch, presiding over his kingdom. Sovereignty emphasizes the singularity of the state, its monopoly of authority, its unity of command and its capacity to speak with one voice. Thus, France wills, Iran demands, China intends, New Zealand promises and the Soviet Union insists. One all too easily conjures up the picture of a single-minded and purposeful state that decides exactly what it wants to achieve, adopts coherent policies intelligently adapted to its objectives, knows what it is doing, does what it intends and always has its act together. This view of the state is reinforced by political scientists’ emphasis upon the concept of policy and upon the thesis that governments derive policy from calculations of national interest. We thus take it for granted that states act internationally in accordance with rationally conceived and consciously constructed schemes of action, and we implicitly refuse to consider the possibility that alternatives to policy-directed behaviour may have importance–alternatives such as random, reactive, instinctual, habitual and conformist behaviour. Our rationalistic assumption that states do what they have planned to do tends to inhibit the discovery that states sometimes do what they feel compelled to do, or what they have the opportunity to do, or what they have usually done, or what other states are doing, or whatever the line of least resistance would seem to suggest. Academic preoccupation with the making of policy is accompanied by academic neglect of the execution of policy. We seem to assume that once the state has calculated its interest and contrived a policy to further that interest, the carrying out of policy is the virtually automatic result of the routine functioning of the bureaucratic mechanism of the state. I am inclined to call this the Genesis theory of public administration, taking as my text the passage: ‘And God said, Let there be light: and there was light’. I suspect that, in the realm of government, policy execution rarely follows so promptly and inexorably from policy statement. Alternatively, one may dub it the Pooh-Bah/Ko-Ko theory, honouring those denizens of William S. Gilbert’s Japan who took the position that when the Mikado ordered that something e done it was as good as done and might as well be declared to have been done. In the real world, that which a state decides to do is not as good as done; it may, in fact, never be done. And what states do, they may never have decided to do. Governments are not automatic machines, grinding out decisions and converting decisions into actions. They are agglomerations of human beings, like the rest of us inclined to be fallible, lazy, forgetful, indecisive, resistant to discipline and authority, and likely to fail to get the word or to heed it. As in other large organizations, left and right governmental hands are frequently ignorant of each other’s activities, official spokesmen contradict each other, ministries work at cross purposes, and the creaking machinery of government often gives the impression that no one is really in charge. I hope that no one will attribute my jaundiced view of government merely to the fact that I am an American–one, that is, whose personal experience is limited to a governmental system that is notoriously complex, disjointed, erratic, cumbersome and unpredictable. The United States does not, I suspect, have the least effective government or the most bumbling and incompetent bureaucracy in all the world. Here and there, now and then, governments do, of course perform prodigious feats of organization and administration: an extraordinary war effort, a flight to the moon, a successful hostage-rescue operation. More often, states have to make do with governments that are not notably clear about their purposes or coordinated and disciplined in their operations. This means that, in international relations, states are sometimes less dangerous, and sometimes less reliable, than one might think. Neither their threats nor their promises are to be taken with absolute seriousness. Above all, it means that we students of international politics must be cautious in attributing purposefulness and responsibility to governments. To say the that the United States was informed about an event is not to establish that the president acted in the light of that knowledge; he may never have heard about it. To say that a Soviet pilot shot down an airliner is not to prove that the Kremlin has adopted the policy of destroying all intruders into Soviet airspace; one wants to know how and by whom the decision to fire was made. To observe that the representative of Zimbabwe voted in favour of a particular resolution in the United Nations General Assembly is not necessarily to discover the nature of Zimbabwe’s policy on the affected matter; Zimbabwe may have no policy on that matter, and it may be that no one in the national capital has ever heard of the issue. We can hardly dispense with the convenient notion that Pakistan claims, Cuba promises, and Italy insists, and we cannot well abandon the formal position that governments speak for and act on behalf of their states, but it is essential that we bear constantly in mind the reality that governments are never fully in charge and never achieve the unity, purposefulness and discipline that theory attributes to them–and that they sometimes claim.

#### Their model of debate makes challenging drones impossible - there is not a topical version of the aff that the 1ac is not a disad to.

Krasmann 12. Susanne Krasmann, prof. Dr, Institute for Criminological Research, University of Hamburg, “Targeted Killing and Its Law: On a Mutually Constitutive Relationship,” Leiden Journal of International Law (2012), 25, pg. 678

The legal debate on targeted killing, particularly that referring to the US practice, has increased immensely during the last decade and even more so very recently, obviously due to a ‘compulsion of legality’.87 Once this state practice of resorting to the use of lethal force has been recognized as systematically taking place, it needs to be dealt with in legal terms. Whether this is done in supportive or critical terms, the assertion of targeted killing as a legal practice commences at this point. This is due to the fact that the law, once invoked, launches its own claims. To insist on disclosing ‘the full legal basis for targeted killings’; on criteria, legal procedures, and ‘access to reliable information’ in order to render governmental action controllable; or on legal principles to be applied in order to estimate the necessity and proportionality of a concrete intervention at stake,88 not only involves accepting targeted killing as a legitimate subject of debate in the first place. It requires distinctions to be made between, for example, a legitimate and an illegitimate target. It invokes the production of knowledge and the establishment of pertinent rules. Indeterminate categories are to be determined and thus established as a new reading of positive law. The introduction of international human rights standards into the debate, for example, clearly allows limits to be set in employing the pre-emptive tactic. As Wouter Werner has shown with regard to the Israeli High Court of Justice’s decision on the legality of targeted killing operations,89 this may well lead, for example, to recognizing the enemy as being not ‘outlaws’ but, instead, combatants who are to be granted basic human rights. Subsequently, procedural rules may be established that restrict the practice and provide criteria for assessing the legality of concrete operations.90 At the same time, however, targeted killing is recognized as a legitimate tactic in the fight against terrorism and is being determined and implemented legally.91 When framed within the ‘theatre of war’, targeted killing categorically seems to be justifiable under the legal principles of necessity, proportionality, discrimination, and the avoidance of unnecessary suffering. This is true as long as one presupposes in general terms, as the juridical discourse usually does, both a well-considered pro- ceeding along those principles92 and, accordingly, that targeted killing, by its very nature, is a ‘calculated, precise use of lethal force’.93 Procedural rules, like the ‘pro- portionality test’, that are essentially concerned with determination, namely with specifying criteria of intervention for the concrete case or constellation, certainly provide reliability by systematically inciting and provoking justifications. Their application therefore, we may say, contributes to clarifying a controversial norm- ative interpretation, but it will never predict or determine how deliberation and justification translate into operational action. The application of procedural rules does not only notoriously remain ‘indeterminate’,94 but also produces its own truth effects. The question of proportionality, for example, is intrinsically a relational one. The damage that targeting causes is to be related to the anticipated military ad- vantage and to the expected casualties of non-targeted operations. Even if there are ‘substantial grounds to believe’ that such an operation will ‘encounter significant armed resistance’,95 this is a presumption that, above all, entails a virtual dimension: the alternate option will never be realized. According to a Foucauldian perspective, decisions always articulate within an epistemic regime and thus ‘eventualize’ on the political stage.96 There is, in this sense, no mere decision and no mere meaning; and, conversely, there is no content of a norm, and no norm, independent of its enforcement.97 To relate this observation to our problem at hand means that, rather than the legal principles’ guiding a decision, it is the decision on how to proceed that constitutes the meaning of the legal principle in question. The legal reasoning, in turn, produces a normative reality of its own, as we are now able to imagine, comprehend, and assess a procedure and couch it in legal terms. This is also noticeable in the case of the Osama bin Laden killing. As regards the initial strategy of justification, the question of resistance typically is difficult to establish ex post in legal terms. Such situations are fraught with so many possible instances of ambiguous behaviour and risk, and the identification of actual behav- iour as probably dangerous and suspicious may change the whole outcome of the event.98 But, once the public found itself with little alternative but to assume that the prospect of capturing the subject formed part of the initial order, it also had to assume that the intention was to use lethal force as a last resort. And, once the public accepts the general presumption that the United States is at war with the terrorist organization, legal reasoning about the operation itself follows and constitutes a rationale shaping the perception of similar future actions and the exercise of governmental force in general.99 Part of this rationale is the assumption, as the president immediately pointed out in his speech, that the threat of al Qaeda has not been extinguished with bin Laden. The identification of a threat that emanates from a network may give rise to the question of whether the killing of one particular target, forming part of a Hydra, makes any sense at all.100 Yet, it equally nourishes the idea that the fight against terrorism, precisely because of its elusiveness, is an enduring one, which is exactly the position the United States takes while considering itself in an armed conflict with the terrorist organization. Targeting and destroying parts of a network, then, do not destroy the entire network, but rather verify that it exists and is at work. The target, in this sense, is constituted by being targeted.101 Within the rationale of the security dispositif, there continue to be threats and new targets. Hence, at work is a transformation of laws through practice, rather than their amendment. Giorgio Agamben maintains that a legal norm, because abstract, does not stipulate its application.102 ‘Just as between language and world . . . there is no internal nexus’ between them. The norm, in this sense, exists independent of ‘reality’. This, according to Agamben, allows for the norm in the ‘state of exception’ both to be applied with the effect of ‘ceasing to apply’103 – ‘the rule, suspending itself, gives rise to the exception’104 – and to be suspended without being abolished. Although forming part of and, in fact, being the effect of applying the law, the state of exception, in Agamben’s view, disconnects from the norm. Within a perspective on law as practice, by contrast, there is no such difference between norm and reality. Even to ignore a pertinent norm constitutes an act that has a meaning, namely that the norm is not being enforced. It affects the norm. Targeted killing operations, in this sense, can never be extra-legal.105 On the contrary, provided that illegal practices come up systematically, they eventually will effectuate the transformation of the law. Equally, the exception from the norm not only suspends the norm, transforming it, momentarily or permanently, into a mere symbol without meaning and force, but at the same time also impinges upon the validity of that norm. Moreover, focus on the exception within the present context falls short of capturing a rather gradual transitional process that both resists a binary deciphering of either legal or illegal and is not a matter of suspending a norm. As practices deploying particular forms of knowledge, targeted killing and its law mutually constitute each other, thus re-enforcing a new security dispositif. The appropriate research question therefore is how positive law changes its framework of reference. Targeted killing, once perceived as illegal, now appears to be a legal practice on the grounds of a new understanding of international law’s own elementary concepts. The crux of the ‘compulsion of legality’ is that legality itself is a shifting reference. Seen this way, the United States does not establish targeted killing as a legal practice on the grounds of its internationally ‘possessing’ exceptional power. Rather the reverse; it is able to employ targeted killing as a military tactic, precisely because this is accepted by the legal discourse. As a practice, targeted killing, in turn, reshapes our understanding of basic concepts of international law. Any dissenting voice will now be heard with more difficulty, since targeted killing is a no longer an isolated practice but, within the now establishing security dispositif, appears to be appropriate and rational. To counter the legal discourse, then, would require to interrupt it, rather than to respond to it, and to move on to its political implications that are rather tacitly involved in the talk about threats and security, and in the dispute about targeted killing operations’ legality.

#### A discussion on drone use must begin now if we have any hope of stopping a foreign policy of endless war. Let your voice be heard.

Baharaeen 2013; Michael; February 26, 2013; “Drones and America’s State of Perpetual War,” http://democrats.truman.edu/2013/02/26/drones-and-americas-state-of-perpetual-war/

A perpetual war on terror – with the drone program at its core – detaches us from the serious harm occurring across the world, in our name, by the will of our own elected officials. We can continue to bomb villages in North Waziristan. We can hope that by inflicting harm upon unsuspecting and innocent bystanders of these areas, such as young Azzedine’s family, we are not creating a new generation of terrorists who are fighting us for no other reason than to avenge the death of their loved ones. We can assume that since we, as ordinary civilians, are not feeling the effects of this war, it’s not really a war. We can allow the military-industrial complex that has a stranglehold on our foreign policy to swell, unhindered.¶ Or we can choose to pay attention and make our voices heard.¶ These acts of aggression were abhorred by Democrats under the Bush presidency, but there has been little, if any objection raised by them under Obama. I like the president. I think he has done a lot of good, especially considering the myriad problems he was handed upon entering office. But I have serious disagreements and concerns with this aspect of his foreign policy.¶ I’m more than willing to speak up on this issue. A handful of notable [political and media figures](http://www.examiner.com/list/top-12-liberal-democrats-who-oppose-president-obama-s-drone-kill-list-policy/barbara-lee-u-s-representative-from-california) have also jumped on this train. But these few discussions should only be the start of a larger conversation among all of us, and we can’t wait much longer to have it.

#### Aff is key to check the ultimate form of governmentality – battlefield earth by every sovereign.

Alan W. Dowd, writer on National Defense, Foreign Policy, and International Security, Winter-Spring 2013, “Drone Wars: Risks and Warnings,” Strategic Studies Institute, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Issues/WinterSpring\_2013/1\_Article\_Dowd.pdf

If these geo-political consequences of remote-control war do not get our attention, then the looming geo-strategic consequences should. If we make the argument that UCAV pilots are in the battlespace, then we are effectively saying that the battlespace is the entire earth. If that is the case, the unintended consequences could be dramatic. First, if the battlespace is the entire earth, the enemy would seem to have the right to wage war on those places where UCAV operators are based. That’s a sobering thought, one few policymakers have contemplated. Second, power-projecting nations are following America’s lead and developing their own drones to target their distant enemies by remote. An estimated 75 countries have drone programs underway.45 Many of these nations are less discriminating in employing military force than the United States—and less skillful. Indeed, drones may usher in a new age of accidental wars. If the best drones deployed by the best military crash more than any other aircraft in America’s fleet, imagine the accident rate for mediocre drones deployed by mediocre militaries. And then imagine the international incidents this could trigger between, say, India and Pakistan; North and South Korea; Russia and the Baltics or Poland or Georgia; China and any number of its wary neighbors. China has at least one dozen drones on the drawing board or in production, and has announced plans to dot its coastline with 11 drone bases in the next two years.46 The Pentagon’s recent reports on Chinese military power detail “acquisition and development of longer-range UAVs and UCAVs . . . for long-range reconnaissance and strike”; development of UCAVs to enable “a greater capacity for military preemption”; and interest in “converting retired fighter aircraft into unmanned combat aerial vehicles.”47 At a 2011 air show, Beijing showcased one of its newest drones by playing a video demonstrating a pilotless plane tracking a US aircraft carrier near Taiwan and relaying targeting information.48 Equally worrisome, the proliferation of drones could enable nonpower-projecting nations—and nonnations, for that matter—to join the ranks of power-projecting nations. Drones are a cheap alternative to long-range, long-endurance warplanes. Yet despite their low cost, drones can pack a punch. And owing to their size and range, they can conceal their home address far more effectively than the typical, nonstealthy manned warplane. Recall that the possibility of surprise attack by drones was cited to justify the war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.49 Of course, cutting-edge UCAVs have not fallen into undeterrable hands. But if history is any guide, they will. Such is the nature of proliferation. Even if the spread of UCAV technology does not harm the United States in a direct way, it is unlikely that opposing swarms of semiautonomous, pilotless warplanes roaming about the earth, striking at will, veering off course, crashing here and there, and sometimes simply failing to respond to their remote-control pilots will do much to promote a liberal global order. It would be ironic if the promise of risk-free war presented by drones spawned a new era of danger for the United States and its allies. 48

# Case

#### Their args make US power both universal and unique and transform those who oppose it into racially inferior others – these claims are rooted in an exceptionalist and orientalist model of knowledge production – turning the impact.

Amy Kaplan 2003; “Violent belongings and the question of empire today presidential address to the American studies Association” American Quarterly, vol. 56, no.1, march 2004, muse

This coming-out narrative, associated primarily with neoconservatives, aggressively celebrates the United States as finally revealing its true essence—its manifest destiny—on a global stage. We won the Cold War, so the story goes, and as the only superpower, we will maintain global supremacy primarily by military means, by preemptive strikes against any potential rivals, and by a perpetual war against terror, defined primarily as the Muslim world. We need to remain vigilant against those rogue states and terrorists who resist not our power but the universal human values that we embody. This narrative is about time as well as space. It imagines an empire in perpetuity, one that beats back the question haunting all empires in J. M. Coetzee's Waiting for the Barbarians: "One thought alone preoccupies the submerged mind of Empire: how not to end, how not to die, how to prolong its era." 9 In this hypermasculine narrative there's a paradoxical sense of invincibility and unparalleled power and at the same time utter and incomprehensible vulnerability—a lethal combination, which reminds us that the word vulnerable once also referred to the capacity to harm. Another dominant narrative about empire today, told by liberal interventionists, is that of the "reluctant imperialist." 10 In this version, the United States never sought an empire and may even be constitutionally unsuited to rule one, but it had the burden thrust upon it by the fall of earlier empires and the failures of modern states, which abuse the human rights of their own people and spawn terrorism. The United States is the only power in the world with the capacity and the moral authority to act as military policeman and economic manager to bring order to the world. Benevolence and self-interest merge in this narrative; backed by unparalleled force, the United States can save the people of the world from their own anarchy, their descent into an [End Page 4] uncivilized state. As Robert Kaplan writes—not reluctantly at all—in "Supremacy by Stealth: Ten Rules for Managing the World": "The purpose of power is not power itself; it is a fundamentally liberal purpose of sustaining the key characteristics of an orderly world. Those characteristics include basic political stability, the idea of liberty, pragmatically conceived; respect for property; economic freedom; and representative government, culturally understood. At this moment in time it is American power, and American power only, that can serve as an organizing principle for the worldwide expansion of liberal civil society." 11 This narrative does imagine limits to empire, yet primarily in the selfish refusal of U.S. citizens to sacrifice and shoulder the burden for others, as though sacrifices have not already been imposed on them by the state. The temporal dimension of this narrative entails the aborted effort of other nations and peoples to enter modernity, and its view of the future projects the end of empire only when the world is remade in our image. This is also a narrative about race. The images of an unruly world, of anarchy and chaos, of failed modernity, recycle stereotypes of racial inferiority from earlier colonial discourses about races who are incapable of governing themselves, Kipling's "lesser breeds without the law," or Roosevelt's "loosening ties of civilized society," in his corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. In his much-noted article in the New York Times Magazine entitled "The American Empire," Michael Ignatieff appended the subtitle "The Burden" but insisted that "America's empire is not like empires of times past, built on colonies, conquest and the white man's burden." 12 Denial and exceptionalism are apparently alive and well. In American studies we need to go beyond simply exposing the racism of empire and examine the dynamics by which Arabs and the religion of Islam are becoming racialized through the interplay of templates of U.S. racial codes and colonial Orientalism. These narratives of the origins of the current empire—that is, the neoconservative and the liberal interventionist—have much in common. They take American exceptionalism to new heights: its paradoxical claim to uniqueness and universality at the same time. They share a teleological narrative of inevitability, that America is the apotheosis of history, the embodiment of universal values of human rights, liberalism, and democracy, the "indispensable nation," in Madeleine Albright's words. In this logic, the United States claims the authority to "make sovereign judgments on what is right and what is wrong" for everyone [End Page 5] else and "to exempt itself with an absolutely clear conscience from all the rules that it proclaims and applies to others." 13 Absolutely protective of its own sovereignty, it upholds a doctrine of limited sovereignty for others and thus deems the entire world a potential site of intervention. Universalism thus can be made manifest only through the threat and use of violence. If in these narratives imperial power is deemed the solution to a broken world, then they preempt any counternarratives that claim U.S. imperial actions, past and present, may have something to do with the world's problems. According to this logic, resistance to empire can never be opposition to the imposition of foreign rule; rather, resistance means irrational opposition to modernity and universal human values.

Although these narratives of empire seem ahistorical at best, they are buttressed not only by nostalgia for the British Empire but also by an effort to rewrite the history of U.S. imperialism by appropriating a progressive historiography that has exposed empire as a dynamic engine of American history. As part of the "coming-out" narrative, the message is: "Hey what's the big deal. We've always been interventionist and imperialist since the Barbary Coast and Jefferson's 'empire for liberty.' Let's just be ourselves." A shocking example can be found in the reevaluation of the brutal U.S. war against the Philippines in its struggle for independence a century ago. This is a chapter of history long ignored or at best seen as a shameful aberration, one that American studies scholars here and in the Philippines have worked hard to expose, which gained special resonance during the U.S. war in Vietnam. Yet proponents of empire from different political perspectives are now pointing to the Philippine-American War as a model for the twenty-first century. As Max Boot concludes in Savage Wars of Peace, "The Philippine War stands as a monument to the U.S. armed forces' ability to fight and win a major counterinsurgency campaign—one that was bigger and uglier than any that America is likely to confront in the future." 14 Historians of the United States have much work to do here, not only in disinterring the buried history of imperialism but also in debating its meaning and its lessons for the present, and in showing how U.S. interventions have worked from the perspective of comparative imperialisms, in relation to other historical changes and movements across the globe.

#### Drones are the only war game in town – conventional war is not possible and drones make bloodshed more likely

Mizner 13 [David Mizner, Daily Kos, 5/3/13, http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/05/03/1206731/-Drones-are-the-Most-Humane-Way-to-Kill-So-Why-the-Hysteria#]

The Method of Killing Does, In Fact, Matter¶ In response to critics of the U.S. drone wars in places like Pakistan and Yemen, liberals defenders are apt to say something like: It's better than a ground invasion. Or: would you prefer carpet bombing? If I haven't already made myself clear, listen up: I'D PREFER NO WAR!¶ Sure, if you accept that there must be war, then drones look OK by those sorry standards. But drones are really the only choice. The fact is, the United States isn't going to invade Yemen or unleash massive conventional air power on Somalia. Because drone warfare poses no immediate danger to Americans and no risk of a hostage crisis (there are no pilots to be shot down), because it is -- or perceived to be -- more accurate than other forms of killing, it's really the only option. (That, and, to a lesser degree, special ops.)¶ Which is to say that drones are enabling war.¶ There exists a danger that the political ease with which these systems can be deployed, and their future potential to deliver even more precise effect, might encourage the normalisation of the use of violence in response to crisis and conflict.¶ That grim future, I'd argue, has already arrived. And so would Rosa Brooks, who worked in the Defense Department from 2009 to 2011. The trouble with drones is that they make it a little too tempting to use force. When you have a nifty tool that allows you to deniably knock off potential bad guys with no risk, why wouldn't you use it more and more? Thus, we've seen drone strikes evolve in the last decade, from a tool used in limited circumstances to go after specifically identified high-ranking al Qaeda officials to a tool relied on in an increasing number of countries to go after an eternally lengthening list of putative bad guys, some identified by name, others targeted on the basis of suspicious behavior patterns, with an increasingly tenuous link to grave or imminent threats to the United States.

So when defenders -- or, for that matter, opponents -- argue, as I have, that the kind of weapon used in an attack is irrelevant, that's true only in terms of the morality and legality of the attack. In terms of the overall level of violence and future of warfare, the rise of the drones is relevant indeed. It makes bloodshed more likely.

#### The fact that drones are a better form of killing than conventional war is not justification for maintaining drones – it is all bad

Mizner 13 [David Mizner, Daily Kos, 5/3/13, http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/05/03/1206731/-Drones-are-the-Most-Humane-Way-to-Kill-So-Why-the-Hysteria#]

'More accurate' does not mean 'acceptable'

The notion that drone strikes are "surgical" is spin. Hundreds, if not thousands, of civilians have died in drone strikes. Reporting on drone strikes is notoriously difficult, but last year one credible source reported that as many as 881 civilians had died in Pakistan alone. A study by Stanford Law School and New York University's School of Law found that only 2% of casualties in Pakistan have been high-level targets.¶ But even if drones are more precise than other weapons, its relative accuracy wouldn't legitimize even a single strike, much less thousands. A knife is an accurate weapon, but a knife-stabbing could still be wrong and illegal. To say that a drone strike is more accurate killing tool only works as a defense if it's a fact that the United States must go to great lengths to kill people all over the world in the name of fighting terrorism. As Greenwald says, drone defenders:¶ ...tacitly embrace the unexamined assumption that the US is inevitably going to engage in aggression and kill Muslims, and then pat themselves on the back for cheering for the way that kills the fewest (I support drones because they're better than full-scale invasions; I support sanctions because they're better than air strikes). They are seemingly incapable of conceiving of a third alternative: that the US could or should refrain from killing innocent people in predominantly Muslim countries.¶ Chris Hayes has more:¶ This narrow choice between big violence and smaller violence shows, I think, just how fully we have all implicitly adopted the conceptual framework of the War on Terror, how much George W. Bush’s advisers continue to set the terms of our thinking years after they’d been dispatched from office. Because that argument presupposes that we are at war and must continue to be at war until an ill-defined enemy is vanquished. What, people ask, is the alternative to small war, if not big war? And the answer no one ever seems to even consider is: no war.¶ If the existence of people out in the world who are actively working to kill Americans means we are still at war, then it seems to me we will be at war forever, and will surrender control over whether that is the state we do in fact want to be in. There’s another alternative: we can be a nation that declares its war over, that declares itself at peace and goes about rigorously and energetically using intelligence and diplomacy and well-resourced police work to protect us from future attacks.¶ It's not necessary to oppose the so-called war on terror to oppose the way the U.S. is using drones -- more on that below -- but the plausible, or plausible-seeming, defenses of US "targeted killings" hinge on the premise that the U.S. global war against AQ and "associated forces" is legitimate. Which is why liberal defenders often liken the battle against AQ to World War II -- just the sort of Bushian rhetorical ploy liberals used to mock.¶ Under Bush, most liberals and many Democrats rejected the notion that the United States ought to fight an open-ended global war against AQ, and this view was hardly relegated to the hippie fringe. John Kerry, the 2004 Democratic candidate for president, likened AQ to a criminal enterprise. He reversed himself in the face of criticism, but the criticism came from the right, not from liberals like Harold Koh, now a willing warrior in Bush's global war on terror.

**[x] We control terminal uniqueness: our movement breaks down barriers that the system has constructed; there is nothing inherently evil about resisting drones.**

The trauma-focused politics of the 1nc is a strategy for cosmopolitan sovereign power to disseminate, divide, and control - the aff is a pre-req to their model of grievability.

Brasset 10 - Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics and International Studies (JAMES, JOURNAL OF CRITICAL GLOBALIZATION STUDIES,” ISSUE 2, 2010, “COSMOPOLITAN SENTIMENTS AFTER 9/11? TRAUMA AND THE POLITICS OF VULNERABILITY”)

On this view, 9-11 can be seen as a significant event for cosmopolitan ethics because it brings the issue of vulnerability to the centre of America and Europe. Television images of planes crashing into buildings, people jumping from buildings, the shocked faces of passers-by and the strange looking cloud of smoke that engulfed the city do not, to say the least, tally with our generalised expectations of normal life. The question that arises is: how does cosmopolitanism address the trauma of 9-11? And, perhaps more critically, how does the ethical subject of cosmopolitanism – the reflexive and tolerant individual – articulate such reflexivity and tolerance if they are, to some extent at least, traumatised?4 On one level, it can be argued that cosmopolitan responses to 9-11 are sensitive to trauma, there has been a clear focus on the loss of life; the indiscriminate use of violence highlighted must in some sense focus our minds upon vulnerability. Indeed, recent attempts to incorporate the ‘human security’ paradigm into global governance are some recognition of the all pervasiveness of vulnerability. Likewise, as considered elsewhere cosmopolitan principles of global justice and the much vaunted agency of global civil society in movements such as the Make Poverty History Campaign clearly follow through on Linklater’s invitation to think through how we might understand and address vulnerability to human suffering (Brassett, 2008). On another level, however, there is a danger that cosmopolitanism might efface the politics of the trauma of 9-11 via a simple narrative of global hope: hope that we can learn, hope that we can improve, hope that we can make the world a better place. Of course, such narratives are important at any time, but as a response to trauma they perhaps overshadow the experience and politics of trauma in a manner commensurate with repression. The point being that when faced with existential questions about ‘our own’ vulnerability we respond with models of global utopias to export to ‘others’. On the argument of Judith Butler we perhaps do ‘the others’ and ourselves a disservice by failing to focus on the ethics and politics of mourning. Cosmopolitan democratic responses to 9-11 re-affirm the moral attractiveness of the reflexive individual who – at their best – is not only tolerant and sensitive to suffering, but is also, able “to reason from the point of view of others”, indeed such people are “better equipped to resolve, and resolve fairly, the challenging transboundary issues that create overlapping communities of fate” (Held and McGrew, 2007, p. 41). Such reflexivity, such doubt and sensitivity to the potential suffering of others is, no doubt, an attractive ethical quality. This is especially so in light of the common charge against cosmopolitans that they impose a violent subjectivity upon the non-Eurocentric ‘other’. But, in light of the fact of 9-11 as a traumatic event, is it possible that the violence might also be inner directed? The model of the rational, internally balanced individual – as both capable of understanding their own contingencies and thinking from the point of view of others – is, to say the least, a tall order for everyone to achieve. In short, how can we reason from the point of view of others when we may have the far larger problem of reasoning from the point of view of ourselves? While this may seem a relatively straightforward point to respond to, perhaps requiring a few caveats and provisos, I would suggest that such assumptions serve as a foundation for the unquestionably grander edifice of cosmopolitan global governance. Addressing the ‘global’ in cosmopolitan democracy is itself a matter of unpicking how the ‘model’ is fundamentally tied to a normative conception of ethics and ethical agency. Held writes “The anticipation of autonomy for each and all constitutes a regulative idea – an idea which has guided conflicts over the institutionalization of democracy. It is an idea, moreover which has provided a normative standard which could be turned against existing institutions, as it has been by the working class, feminist, anti-racist and anti-colonial activists, to reveal the extent to which the principles and aspirations of equal liberty and equal political participation remain unfulfilled.” (1995, p. 71). And for cosmopolitans, the prime target of such a regulative idea is global governance; a state-centric political system is gradually replaced by a form of “heterarchy – a divided authority system – in which states seek to share the task of governance with a complex array of institutions, public and private, local, regional, transnational and global representing the emergence of ‘overlapping communities of fate’” (Held and McGrew, 1998, p. 221). Cosmopolitan democracy is therefore ‘global’ because it undermines appeals to fixed, territorial political communities associated with nation states. Instead it identifies numerous and overlapping communities of fate that now exist in a supra-territorial context. And cosmopolitans seek to re-imagine the political basis of democracy by subjecting this complex global context to the normative principle of autonomy. This leads to various avenues including global institutional reforms to promote accountability and inclusion, increased recognition of the potential contribution of global civil society, and a cosmopolitan legal order. Three inter-related critical points can be made. First, cosmopolitan democracy ultimately hinges on a comprehensive conception of values - liberty & equality – which are extended to all people, everywhere. An apparently complex and contingent global scale is thus rendered to a pre-determined normative logic. Second, and drawing from critical IPE, globalisation should itself be understood as a constitutive discourse which engenders certain attitudes and logics. As such, when those attitudes or logics are either unquestionably accepted or, rendered according to a particular normative position of advocacy then it immediately pushes the question: how do these new positions relate to, and converse with, all those people who don’t accept or agree with the discourse as it is constructed in the first place? And finally, quite simply, where is the ‘politics’ in democratic global governance? Global governance appears as an institutional embodiment of a set of shifts in the spatial organisation of modern life. ‘Politics’ in the sense of the open and acknowledged contest and contestability of that ‘life’ appear somewhat peripheral. The crucial challenge is the ‘issues’ of newly emergent global communities. While this clearly contests the ‘old’ frame of IR and political theory, such a contest arguably works to consolidate, rather than question, the founding assumptions of cosmopolitanism. Moreover, seeking to ‘represent’ diverse ‘communities of fate’ within global governance does not address the instabilities, tensions, and political dissonances between and within those communities. Within the complex array of groups and actors within global civil society we are essentially dealing with the issue of diversity and disagreement. Thus, for some, politics in the context of global governance might mean supporting a project of de-globalisation, or, in the case of terrorism, it could actually (and counter intuitively for some) involve supporting the overthrow of America or Western society. Despite the claims to openness and inclusion, there is a sense of irreconcilability about how to be both global and democratic when ‘anti-global’ or ‘localising’ sentiments might best describe the attitudes of many of those included. The relevance of this democratic critique of cosmopolitan democracy can be seen when we try to engage with what might be called the ‘global traumatic stress community’. If a response to trauma is important for cosmopolitan authors, then surely the voices of the traumatised is an important site of potential commonality? Indeed this is an argument that has received more or less optimistic endorsements in the work of Andrew Linklater and Judith Butler. More located arguments have focused on the regenerative capacity of communities in the wake of disasters. Solnit (2009) even argues that the ‘normal’ response of communities in the wake of major disasters is altruism. However, I want to argue that such identifications are problematic at best and – in line with the work of Jenny Edkins – either naïve about or actively contributory towards a totalizing logic of sovereign power . On the one hand, attitudes towards trauma are simply not ‘always’ uniting and can actually lead to divisive and alienating responses. This common sense of the literature on trauma can no doubt be over done, but it does at least suggest rather less agreement on our global togetherness than might be gleaned from Held’s schema. On the other hand, feelings of trauma, when experienced on a mass level are apt for manipulation, can be structured by power and can feed larger antagonisms. In short, vulnerability to trauma fits only ambivalently with the notion of cosmopolitan ‘communities of fate’. While we may feel sympathy for the suffering of the vulnerable, others, including those who celebrated and danced after the September 11th attacks, may not. Likewise, while survivors and their associates may identify with each other, such identification may skew along exclusively state or parochial lines, even before discussions of affirming sovereign authority in the face of insecurity begin. I therefore suggest that there is no ‘natural kind’ at work in trauma (Young, 1995), it neither naturally divides nor unites, but is a subject of governance and, therefore, politics.

This sovereign power culminates in terminal violence.

**Cambell 8** (DAVID, PROF. OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS @ THE UNIVERSITY OF NEWCASTLE, WRITING SECURITY: UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY AND THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY, REVISED EDITION, UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA PRESS, ISBN 0-8166-3144-1, PG. 199-202)

Our political imagination has been impoverished by the practices associated with the paradigm of sovereignty. As discussed in chapter 3, the force of the sovereignty/anarchy distinction works to contain contingency through the instantiation of a sovereign presence which then acts as a regulative ideal. In terms of the political field, this has meant that the idea of "the political" has been subsumed by and made synonymous with "the state." In effect, the state has colonized our understanding of "the political" by obscuring those practices through which it has been "fashioned in the likeness of legislated fear," and foregrounding in their place its claim to be the source of authorized articulations of danger.20 Integral to this has been the assumption that political modalities — such as strength, resolution, boldness, will, and vigi lance—associated with the regime of Masculine/feminine (discussed in the Introduction) are the natural dispositions of politics. But such a colonization and such an assumption are rendered problematic by the retheorization of identity central to this study. More specifically, such a colonization is rendered problematic by a different understanding of security that emerges from the retheorization of identity. Security and subjectivity are intrinsically linked, even in conventional understandings. Traditional discourses of international relations maintain that alliance is one where security is a goal to be achieved by a number of instrumentalities deployed by the state (defense and foreign policy, for example). But the linkage between the two can be understood in a different light, for just as Foreign Policy works to constitute the identity in whose name it operates, security functions to instantiate the subjectivity it purports to serve. Indeed, security (of which foreign policy/Foreign Policy is a part) is first and foremost a performative discourse constitutive of political order: after all, "securing something requires its differentiation, classification and definition. It has, in short, to be identified."21 An invitation to this line of thought can be found in the later work of Michel Foucault, in which he explicitly addresses the issue of security and the state through the rubric of "governmental rationality."22 The incitement to Foucault's thinking was his observation that from the middle of the sixteenth century to the end of the eighteenth century, political treatises that previously had been written as advice to the prince were now being presented as works on the "art of government." The concern of these treatises was not confined to the requirements of a specific sovereign, but with the more general problematic of government: a problematic that included the government of souls and lives, of children, of oneself, and finally, of the state by the sovereign. This problematic of governance emerges at the intersection of central and centralizing power relationships (those located in principles of universality, law, citizenship, sovereignty), and individual and individualizing power relationships (such as the pastoral relationships of the Christian church and the welfare state).23 Accordingly, the state for Foucault is an ensemble of practices that are at one and the same time individualizing and totalizing: I don't think that we should consider the "modern state" as an entity which was developed above individuals, ignoring what they are and even their very existence, but on the contrary as a very sophisticated structure, in which individuals can be integrated, under one condition: that this individuality would be shaped in a new form, and submitted to a set of very specific patterns. In a way we can see the state as a modern matrix of individualization.24 Foucault posited some direct and important connections between the individualizing and totalizing power relationships in the conclusion to The History of Sexuality, Volume I. There he argues that starting in the seventeenth century, power over life evolved in two complementary ways: through disciplines that produced docile bodies, and through regulations and interventions directed at the social body. The former centered on the body as a machine and sought to maximize its potential in economic processes, while the latter was concerned with the social body's capacity to give life and propagate. Together, these relations of power meant that "there was an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugation of bodies and the control of populations, marking the beginning of an era of 'bio-power/ "25 This era of bio-power saw the art of government develop an overtly constitutive orientation through the deployment of technologies concerned with the ethical boundaries of identity as much (if not more than) the territorial borders of the state. Foucault supported this argument by reference to the "theory of police." Developed in the seventeenth century, the "theory of police" signified not an institution or mechanism internal to the state, but a governmental technology that helped specify the domain of the state.26 In particular, Foucault noted that Delamare's Compendium —an eighteenth-century French administrative work detailing the kingdom's police regulations — outlined twelve domains of concern for the police: religion, morals, health, supplies, roads, town buildings, public safety, the liberal arts, trade, factories, the supply of labor, and the poor. The logic behind this ambit claim of concern, which was repeated in all treatises on the police, was that the police should be concerned with "everything pertaining to men's happiness," all social relations carried on between men, and all "living."27 As another treatise of the period declared: "The police's true object is man."28 The theory of police, as an instance of the rationality behind the art of government, had therefore the constitution, production, and maintenance of identity as its major effect. Likewise, the conduct of war is linked to identity. As Foucault argues, "Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of slaughter in the name of life necessity." In other words, countries go to war, not for the purpose of defending their rulers, but for the purpose of defending "the nation," ensuring the state's security, or upholding the interests and values of the people. Moreover, in an era that has seen the development of a global system for the fighting of a nuclear war (the infrastructure of which remains intact despite the "end of the cold war"), the paradox of risking individual death for the sake of collective life has been pushed to its logical extreme. Indeed, "the atomic situation is now at the end of this process: the power to expose a whole population to death is the underside of the power to guarantee an individual's continued existence."29 The common effect of the theory of police and the waging of war in constituting the identity in whose name they operate highlights the way in which foreign policy/Foreign Policy establishes the general preconditions for a "coherent policy of order," particularly as it gives rise to a geography of evil.30 Indeed, the preoccupation of the texts of Foreign Policy with the prospects for order, and the concern of a range of cultural spokespersons in America with the dangers to order, manifest how this problematic is articulated in a variety of sites distinctive of the United States. Most important, though, it is at the intersection of the "microphysics" and "macrophysics" of power in the problematic of order that we can locate the concept of security. Security in this formulation is neither just an essential precondition of power nor its goal; security is a specific principle of political method and practice directed explicitly to "the ensemble of the population."31

# Cap

#### Transcendent critiques of capitalism are worthless – a fine-tuned analysis is necessary to understand localized instances of capitalism.

Gilbert et al. 2008 (Jeremy Gilbert, Éric Alliez, Claire Colebrook, Peter Hallward, Nicholas Thoburn - all have PhDs and whatever; "Deleuzian Politics? A Roundtable Discussion"; New Formations)

Claire: It comes before that though. The emphasis on deterritorialisation is normative to an extent because they see deterritorialisation as immanent not just to capitalism but to life itself. This means that capitalism isn’t just an accident that befell us, such that if we had been smarter or better it wouldn’t have happened. There is a tendency towards both territorialisation and deterritorialisation in life itself, which is always a positively marked term for Deleuze and Guattari. That means I think the emphasis on deterritorialisation is strictly normative. According to their model, biological life only proceeds by differentiating itself and making connections that, as it were, do away with identity; but in order to create new identities. This process is going to create certain political formations. So then, from this perspective, the problem with capitalism is that it’s not ‘capitalist’ enough, it is not deterritorialising enough, and that’s why that quotation about how it comes against its own limit is so important. That’s where we find the possibility for analysis. For example, this framework would enable us to consider the political ambivalence of the situation wherein a capitalist organisation moves into an Aboriginal community in outback Australia. The people are completely destitute, and then there is this massive influx of benefit and material goods. But at the same time we see the complete evacuation of anything indigenous that would resist the system. At those points then you don’t need a stupid, reactive, anti-capitalism, which would say ‘it’s capitalism and therefore it’s bad’. You don’t need a distinction between good and evil. You need a very fine-tuned analysis of the relation between deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation and the ways in which, under conditions of accumulation, it all gets turned back into an axiom of profit, or capital.

#### History proves social movements fail without a roadmap – the alts act of criticizing is not revolutionary but rather useless for mobilizing people against capitalism.

Andrew Kliman Prof of Economics @ Pace University September 5, 2004 “Alternatives to Capitalism: What Happens After the Revolution?”

I. Concretizing the Vision of a New Human Society We live at a moment in which it is harder than ever to articulate a liberatory alternative to capitalism. As we all know, the collapse of state-capitalist regimes that called themselves “Communist,” as well as the widespread failures of social democracy to remake society, have given rise to a widespread acceptance of Margaret Thatcher’s TINA – the belief that “there is no alternative.” Yet the difficulty in articulating a liberatory alternative is not mostly the product of these events. It is an inheritance from the past. To what extent has such an alternative ever been articulated? There has been a lot of progress – in theory and especially in practice – on the problem of forms of organization – but new organizational forms by themselves are not yet an alternative. A great many leftists, even revolutionaries, did of course regard nationalized property and the State Plan, under the control of the “vanguard” Party, as socialism, or at least as the basis for a transition to socialism. But even before events refuted this notion, it represented, at best, an evasion of the problem. It was largely a matter of leftists with authoritarian personalities subordinating themselves and others to institutions and power with a blind faith that substituted for thought. How such institutions and such power would result in human liberation was never made clear. Vague references to “transition” were used to wave the problem away. Yet as Marxist-Humanism has stressed for more than a decade, the anti-Stalinist left is also partly responsible for the crisis in thought. It, too, failed to articulate a liberatory alternative, offering in place of private- and state-capitalism little more than what Hegel (Science of Logic, Miller trans., pp. 841-42) called “the empty negative … a presumed absolute”: The impatience that insists merely on getting beyond the determinate … and finding itself immediately in the absolute, has before it as cognition nothing but the empty negative, the abstract infinite; in other words, a presumed absolute, that is presumed because it is not posited, not grasped; grasped it can only be through the mediation of cognition … . The question that confronts us nowadays is whether we can do better. Is it possible to make the vision of a new human society more concrete and determinate than it now is, through the mediation of cognition? According to a long-standing view in the movement, it is not possible. The character of the new society can only be concretized by practice alone, in the course of trying to remake society. Yet if this is true, we are faced with a vicious circle from which there seems to be no escape, because acceptance of TINA is creating barriers in practice. In the perceived absence of an alternative, practical struggles have proven to be self-limiting at best. They stop short of even trying to remake society totally – and for good reason. As Bertell Ollman has noted (Introduction to Market Socialism: The Debate among Socialists, Routledge, 1998, p. 1), “People who believe [that there is no alternative] will put up with almost any degree of suffering. Why bother to struggle for a change that cannot be? … people [need to] have a good reason for choosing one path into the future rather than another.” Thus the reason of the masses is posing a new challenge to the movement from theory. When masses of people require reasons before they act, a new human society surely cannot arise through spontaneous action alone. And exposing the ills of existing society does not provide sufficient reason for action when what is at issue is the very possibility of an alternative. If the movement from theory is to respond adequately to the challenge arising from below, it is necessary to abandon the presupposition – and it seems to me to be no more than a presupposition – that the vision of the new society cannot be concretized through the mediation of cognition. We need to take seriously Raya Dunayevskaya’s (Power of Negativity [PON], p. 184) claim in her Hegel Society of America paper that “There is no trap in thought. Though it is finite, it breaks through the barriers of the given, reaches out, if not to infinity, surely beyond the historic moment” (RD, PON, p. 184). This, too, is a presupposition that can be “proved” or “disproved” only in the light of the results it yields. In the meantime, the challenges from below require us to proceed on its basis.

# 1AR

#### The fact that drones are a better form of killing than conventional war is not justification for maintaining drones – it is all bad

Mizner 13 [David Mizner, Daily Kos, 5/3/13, http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/05/03/1206731/-Drones-are-the-Most-Humane-Way-to-Kill-So-Why-the-Hysteria#]

'More accurate' does not mean 'acceptable' The notion that drone strikes are "surgical" is spin. Hundreds, if not thousands, of civilians have died in drone strikes. Reporting on drone strikes is notoriously difficult, but last year one credible source reported that as many as 881 civilians had died in Pakistan alone. A study by Stanford Law School and New York University's School of Law found that only 2% of casualties in Pakistan have been high-level targets.¶ But even if drones are more precise than other weapons, its relative accuracy wouldn't legitimize even a single strike, much less thousands. A knife is an accurate weapon, but a knife-stabbing could still be wrong and illegal. To say that a drone strike is more accurate killing tool only works as a defense if it's a fact that the United States must go to great lengths to kill people all over the world in the name of fighting terrorism. As Greenwald says, drone defenders:¶ ...tacitly embrace the unexamined assumption that the US is inevitably going to engage in aggression and kill Muslims, and then pat themselves on the back for cheering for the way that kills the fewest (I support drones because they're better than full-scale invasions; I support sanctions because they're better than air strikes). They are seemingly incapable of conceiving of a third alternative: that the US could or should refrain from killing innocent people in predominantly Muslim countries.¶ Chris Hayes has more:¶ This narrow choice between big violence and smaller violence shows, I think, just how fully we have all implicitly adopted the conceptual framework of the War on Terror, how much George W. Bush’s advisers continue to set the terms of our thinking years after they’d been dispatched from office. Because that argument presupposes that we are at war and must continue to be at war until an ill-defined enemy is vanquished. What, people ask, is the alternative to small war, if not big war? And the answer no one ever seems to even consider is: no war.¶ If the existence of people out in the world who are actively working to kill Americans means we are still at war, then it seems to me we will be at war forever, and will surrender control over whether that is the state we do in fact want to be in. There’s another alternative: we can be a nation that declares its war over, that declares itself at peace and goes about rigorously and energetically using intelligence and diplomacy and well-resourced police work to protect us from future attacks.¶ It's not necessary to oppose the so-called war on terror to oppose the way the U.S. is using drones -- more on that below -- but the plausible, or plausible-seeming, defenses of US "targeted killings" hinge on the premise that the U.S. global war against AQ and "associated forces" is legitimate. Which is why liberal defenders often liken the battle against AQ to World War II -- just the sort of Bushian rhetorical ploy liberals used to mock.¶ Under Bush, most liberals and many Democrats rejected the notion that the United States ought to fight an open-ended global war against AQ, and this view was hardly relegated to the hippie fringe. John Kerry, the 2004 Democratic candidate for president, likened AQ to a criminal enterprise. He reversed himself in the face of criticism, but the criticism came from the right, not from liberals like Harold Koh, now a willing warrior in Bush's global war on terror.

#### No shift – terrain too difficult and states refuse US entrance

Thompson, 13 [Mark Thompson, The New U.S. Way of War: Killing in the Shadows, Time, 4/9/13,

http://nation.time.com/2013/04/09/the-new-u-s-way-of-war-killing-in-the-shadows/]

Does this kind of warfare make more sense than conventional war when confronting non-state actors?¶ What the U.S. confronted after 9/11 was that there are plenty of places where the 101st Airborne can’t go.¶ Countries like Pakistan and Yemen are deeply suspicious of the American military, and their governments wouldn’t allow conventional American troops to be hunting around looking for al Qaeda operatives.¶ It was one of the reasons that Rumsfeld pushed so hard to expand the military’s special-operations capabilities, and as I said, the Pentagon’s authorities under Title 10 to do man-hunting beyond traditional war zones.