## Off

#### a. Interpretation and violation---the affirmative should defend the desirability of topical action related to war powers

#### Most predictable—the agent and verb indicate a debate about hypothetical War Powers action

Jon M Ericson 3, Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action through governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### “Resolved” is legislative

Jeff Parcher 1, former debate coach at Georgetown, Feb 2001 http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html

Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constiutent parts See Syns at \*analyze\* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at \*Solve\* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Firmness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision. (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statement of a decision, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconceivable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desirablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the preliminary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my view. One affirms a resolution. Affirmative and negative are the equivalents of 'yes' or 'no' - which, of course, are answers to a question.

#### [ ] “Should” requires defending federal action

Judge Henry Nieto 9, Colorado Court of Appeals, 8-20-2009 People v. Munoz, 240 P.3d 311 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009)

"Should" is "used . . . to express duty, obligation, propriety, or expediency." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2104 (2002). Courts [\*\*15] interpreting the word in various contexts have drawn conflicting conclusions, although the weight of authority appears to favor interpreting "should" in an imperative, obligatory sense. HN7A number of courts, confronted with the question of whether using the word "should" in jury instructions conforms with the Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections governing the reasonable doubt standard, have upheld instructions using the word. In the courts of other states in which a defendant has argued that the word "should" in the reasonable doubt instruction does not sufficiently inform the jury that it is bound to find the defendant not guilty if insufficient proof is submitted at trial, the courts have squarely rejected the argument. They reasoned that the word "conveys a sense of duty and obligation and could not be misunderstood by a jury." See State v. McCloud, 257 Kan. 1, 891 P.2d 324, 335 (Kan. 1995); see also Tyson v. State, 217 Ga. App. 428, 457 S.E.2d 690, 691-92 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (finding argument that "should" is directional but not instructional to be without merit); Commonwealth v. Hammond, 350 Pa. Super. 477, 504 A.2d 940, 941-42 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). Notably, courts interpreting the word "should" in other types of jury instructions [\*\*16] have also found that the word conveys to the jury a sense of duty or obligation and not discretion. In Little v. State, 261 Ark. 859, 554 S.W.2d 312, 324 (Ark. 1977), the Arkansas Supreme Court interpreted the word "should" in an instruction on circumstantial evidence as synonymous with the word "must" and rejected the defendant's argument that the jury may have been misled by the court's use of the word in the instruction. Similarly, the Missouri Supreme Court rejected a defendant's argument that the court erred by not using the word "should" in an instruction on witness credibility which used the word "must" because the two words have the same meaning. State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958). [\*318] In applying a child support statute, the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that a legislature's or commission's use of the word "should" is meant to convey duty or obligation. McNutt v. McNutt, 203 Ariz. 28, 49 P.3d 300, 306 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (finding a statute stating that child support expenditures "should" be allocated for the purpose of parents' federal tax exemption to be mandatory).

Topicality is a voting issue.

1.) Competition in debate is good—it encourages education, strong community, and increases quality of work

Gillespie and Gordon 6

(William and Elizabeth, Kennesaw State University, “Competition, Role-Playing, and Political Science Education,” Sep 1, http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p\_mla\_apa\_research\_citation/1/5/1/0/0/pages151007/p151007-1.php)

But, for the most part, coaches report that the competitive element enhances learning in several ways. First, many coaches perceive that competition motivates their students to put in the time and do their best work. Some indicate that no other means of motivation is as effective. Engaging in competition allows students to measure their progress. It also provides a goal, raises the stakes of the activity, and provides more rewards. Second, as one coach said, “the activity faithfully recreates many of the dynamics of the adversarial model, and my students report learning a lot.” For the goal of substantive learning about how American law functions, especially in litigation, competition is an essential element. Mock trial allows students to experience some of the processes, constraints, and emotions associated with competition in a courtroom. Third, the stress of competition itself helps students gain flexibility and adaptability. Many coaches mention the ability to “think on one’s feet” as a skill that students acquire in the fluid environment of a mock trial competition. “Competition enhances the learning experience. The students seem to absorb lessons more quickly and thoroughly under fire,” writes one coach. Another writes: “They also learn to adjust and adapt quickly to the different evaluators. That is something they don't get from their regular classes.” Fourth, some coaches explain that competing against other schools allows their students to learn by seeing different approaches to the same case. Representative comments along these lines include: “Students get to see what other teams do and learn from those experiences.” “[Competition] exposes the students to different techniques and approaches that the other teams use.” Fifth, many coaches explain that the competition enhances camaraderie and teamwork among their students. One coach explains that competition “gives a sense of duty to fulfill an obligation to their fellow teammates.” “Students learn teamwork in an interactive and dynamic setting,” reports another.

#### 2.) Critique critique critique. Critique is intoxicating, the resolution is a research prompt for informed political action and concrete demands - this kind of education outweighs.

Bryant 12 - Professor of Philosophy at Collin College (Levi R., Author of a number of articles on Deleuze, Badiou, Zizek, Lacan, and political theory, November 11th, 2012, http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/11/11/underpants-gnomes-a-critique-of-the-academic-left/)

Unfortunately, the academic left falls prey to its own form of abstraction. It’s good at carrying out critiques that denounce various social formations, yet very poor at proposing any sort of realistic constructions of alternatives. This because it thinks abstractly in its own way, ignoring how networks, assemblages, structures, or regimes of attraction would have to be remade to create a workable alternative. Here I’m reminded by the “underpants gnomes” depicted in South Park: The underpants gnomes have a plan for achieving profit that goes like this: Phase 1: Collect Underpants Phase 2: ? Phase 3: Profit! They even have a catchy song to go with their work: Well this is sadly how it often is with the academic left. Our plan seems to be as follows: Phase 1: Ultra-Radical Critique Phase 2: ? Phase 3: Revolution and complete social transformation! Our problem is that we seem perpetually stuck at phase 1 without ever explaining what is to be done at phase 2. Often the critiques articulated at phase 1 are right, but there are nonetheless all sorts of problems with those critiques nonetheless. In order to reach phase 3, we have to produce new collectives. In order for new collectives to be produced, people need to be able to hear and understand the critiques developed at phase 1. Yet this is where everything begins to fall apart. Even though these critiques are often right, we express them in ways that only an academic with a PhD in critical theory and post-structural theory can understand. How exactly is Adorno to produce an effect in the world if only PhD’s in the humanities can understand him? Who are these things for? We seem to always ignore these things and then look down our noses with disdain at the Naomi Kleins and David Graebers of the world. To make matters worse, we publish our work in expensive academic journals that only universities can afford, with presses that don’t have a wide distribution, and give our talks at expensive hotels at academic conferences attended only by other academics. Again, who are these things for? Is it an accident that so many activists look away from these things with contempt, thinking their more about an academic industry and tenure, than producing change in the world? If a tree falls in a forest and no one is there to hear it, it doesn’t make a sound! Seriously dudes and dudettes, what are you doing? But finally, and worst of all, us Marxists and anarchists all too often act like assholes. We denounce others, we condemn them, we berate them for not engaging with the questions we want to engage with, and we vilify them when they don’t embrace every bit of the doxa that we endorse. We are every bit as off-putting and unpleasant as the fundamentalist minister or the priest of the inquisition (have people yet understood that Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus was a critique of the French communist party system and the Stalinist party system, and the horrific passions that arise out of parties and identifications in general?). This type of “revolutionary” is the greatest friend of the reactionary and capitalist because they do more to drive people into the embrace of reigning ideology than to undermine reigning ideology. These are the people that keep Rush Limbaugh in business. Well done! But this isn’t where our most serious shortcomings lie. Our most serious shortcomings are to be found at phase 2. We almost never make concrete proposals for how things ought to be restructured, for what new material infrastructures and semiotic fields need to be produced, and when we do, our critique-intoxicated cynics and skeptics immediately jump in with an analysis of all the ways in which these things contain dirty secrets, ugly motives, and are doomed to fail. How, I wonder, are we to do anything at all when we have no concrete proposals? We live on a planet of 6 billion people. These 6 billion people are dependent on a certain network of production and distribution to meet the needs of their consumption. That network of production and distribution does involve the extraction of resources, the production of food, the maintenance of paths of transit and communication, the disposal of waste, the building of shelters, the distribution of medicines, etc., etc., etc. What are your proposals? How will you meet these problems? How will you navigate the existing mediations or semiotic and material features of infrastructure? Marx and Lenin had proposals. Do you? Have you even explored the cartography of the problem? Today we are so intellectually bankrupt on these points that we even have theorists speaking of events and acts and talking about a return to the old socialist party systems, ignoring the horror they generated, their failures, and not even proposing ways of avoiding the repetition of these horrors in a new system of organization. Who among our critical theorists is thinking seriously about how to build a distribution and production system that is responsive to the needs of global consumption, avoiding the problems of planned economy, ie., who is doing this in a way that gets notice in our circles? Who is addressing the problems of micro-fascism that arise with party systems (there’s a reason that it was the Negri & Hardt contingent, not the Badiou contingent that has been the heart of the occupy movement). At least the ecologists are thinking about these things in these terms because, well, they think ecologically. Sadly we need something more, a melding of the ecologists, the Marxists, and the anarchists. We’re not getting it yet though, as far as I can tell. Indeed, folks seem attracted to yet another critical paradigm, Laruelle. I would love, just for a moment, to hear a radical environmentalist talk about his ideal high school that would be academically sound. How would he provide for the energy needs of that school? How would he meet building codes in an environmentally sound way? How would she provide food for the students? What would be her plan for waste disposal? And most importantly, how would she navigate the school board, the state legislature, the federal government, and all the families of these students? What is your plan? What is your alternative? I think there are alternatives. I saw one that approached an alternative in Rotterdam. If you want to make a truly revolutionary contribution, this is where you should start. Why should anyone even bother listening to you if you aren’t proposing real plans? But we haven’t even gotten to that point. Instead we’re like underpants gnomes, saying “revolution is the answer!” without addressing any of the infrastructural questions of just how revolution is to be produced, what alternatives it would offer, and how we would concretely go about building those alternatives. Masturbation. “Underpants gnome” deserves to be a category in critical theory; a sort of synonym for self-congratulatory masturbation. We need less critique not because critique isn’t important or necessary– it is –but because we know the critiques, we know the problems. We’re intoxicated with critique because it’s easy and safe. We best every opponent with critique. We occupy a position of moral superiority with critique. But do we really do anything with critique? What we need today, more than ever, is composition or carpentry. Everyone knows something is wrong. Everyone knows this system is destructive and stacked against them. Even the Tea Party knows something is wrong with the economic system, despite having the wrong economic theory. None of us, however, are proposing alternatives. Instead we prefer to shout and denounce. Good luck with that.

There is the nitty gritty of political change that needs to be dealt with - the aff's methodology attempts to wish away the realities of political horse-trading.

Deitz 2k

Mary Dietz, Professor of Polisci at Minnesota, 2000 Political Theory and Partisan Politics p. 131-2

If another of the imperatives of the political world is to avoid becoming contemptible, then speaking the truth is a good, but not an unalloyed good. The paradoxes of politics tend to wreak havoc with the principles of communication because, as Merleau-Ponty observes, "politics is a relationship to [people]~~men~~ rather than principles" (Merleau-Ponty 1964, 219).32 Thus in politics an openness toward the opinions of others is sometimes not a condition of mutual respect, but antithetical to it. It may be a peculiarity of the political domain that "when every­one can tell you the truth, you lose their respect," but it is a peculiarity that discourse ethicists ignore to their peril (Machiavelli 1950, 87). One might say, then, that speaking the truth is an indispensable element in politics, but not the point of it. To make communicative action, or the enactment of principles of discourse ethics, or moral conversation, the end or goal of politics is to mistake the nature of working in half-truth and thereby misconstrue "the milieu that is proper to politics" itself.The supervenience of strategic (speech) action on communicative (speech) action in politics that I have been alluding to here is what I also think Timothy Garton Ash meant to convey when, in the after­math of the PEN Congress, he referred to the "qualitatively different responsibility" that the intellectual has for "the validity, intellectual coherence, and truth of what he says and writes," as opposed to the politician, who invariably works in half-truth. The point is not that the intellectual lives in a communicative world of validity, coherence, and truth while the politician does not. (Although Habermas's ideal com­munication situation might stand a better chance of realization in a scholarly conference or a graduate seminar, as opposed to a press conference, an election campaign, or even a neighborhood caucus.) The politician also inhabits a world of validity, coherence, and truth. Yet validity, coherence, and truth take on different colorations work­ing in the context peculiar to politics—where strategic imperatives and the exercise of power, conflicts of interest and drives of ambition, are ineliminable aspects of collective action. Hence, it is one thing to encourage (or even insist upon) the intellectual's responsibility to keep providing us with various practical (or even imaginary) means for judging the health or sickness of the body politic, and quite another to expect the politician—or the citizen—to "live" them.

#### 3.) Our use of the resolution as the channel for discussion is key to controlled and informed dialogue.

Hanghøj ‘8

[Thorkild. Since this PhD project began in 2004, the present author has been affiliated with DREAM (Danish¶ Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials), which is located at the Institute of¶ Literature, Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. Research visits have¶ taken place at the Centre for Learning, Knowledge, and Interactive Technologies (L-KIT), the¶ Institute of Education at the University of Bristol and the institute formerly known as Learning Lab¶ Denmark at the School of Education, University of Aarhus, where he currently works as an assistant¶ professor. “Playful Knowledge: An Explorative Study of Educational Gaming” PhD Dissertation at The Institute of Literature, Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. 2008, http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf**]**

Debate games are often based on pre-designed scenarios that include descriptions of issues to be debated, educational goals, game goals, roles, rules, time frames etc. In this way, debate games differ from textbooks and everyday classroom instruction as debate scenarios allow teachers and students to actively imagine, interact and communicate within a domain-specific game space. However, instead of mystifying debate games as a “magic circle” (Huizinga, 1950), I will try to overcome the epistemological dichotomy between “gaming” and “teaching” that tends to dominate discussions of educational games. In short, educational gaming is a form of teaching. As mentioned, education and games represent two different semiotic domains that both embody the three faces of knowledge: assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Gee, 2003; Barth, 2002; cf. chapter 2). In order to understand the interplay between these different domains and their interrelated knowledge forms, I will draw attention to a central assumption in Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy. According to Bakhtin, all forms of communication and culture are subject to centripetal and centrifugal forces (Bakhtin, 1981). A centripetal force is the drive to impose one version of the truth, while a centrifugal force involves a range of possible truths and interpretations. This means that any form of expression involves a duality of centripetal and centrifugal forces: “Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear” (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). If we take teaching as an example, it is always affected by centripetal and centrifugal forces in the on-going negotiation of “truths” between teachers and students. In the words of Bakhtin: “Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984a: 110). Similarly, the dialogical space of debate games also embodies centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, the election scenario of The Power Game involves centripetal elements that are mainly determined by the rules and outcomes of the game, i.e. the election is based on a limited time frame and a fixed voting procedure. Similarly, the open-ended goals, roles and resources represent centrifugal elements and create virtually endless possibilities for researching, preparing, presenting, debating and evaluating a variety of key political issues. Consequently, the actual process of enacting a game scenario involves a complex negotiation between these centrifugal/centripetal forces that are inextricably linked with the teachers and students’ game activities. In this way, the enactment of The Power Game is a form of teaching that combines different pedagogical practices (i.e. group work, web quests, student presentations) and learning resources (i.e. websites, handouts, spoken language) within the interpretive frame of the election scenario. Obviously, tensions may arise if there is too much divergence between educational goals and game goals. This means that game facilitation requires a balance between focusing too narrowly on the rules or “facts” of a game (centripetal orientation) and a focusing too broadly on the contingent possibilities and interpretations of the game scenario (centrifugal orientation). For Bakhtin, the duality of centripetal/centrifugal forces often manifests itself as a dynamic between “monological” and “dialogical” forms of discourse. Bakhtin illustrates this point with the monological discourse of the Socrates/Plato dialogues in which the teacher never learns anything new from the students, despite Socrates’ ideological claims to the contrary (Bakhtin, 1984a). Thus, discourse becomes monologised when “someone who knows and possesses the truth instructs someone who is ignorant of it and in error”, where “a thought is either affirmed or repudiated” by the authority of the teacher (Bakhtin, 1984a: 81). In contrast to this, dialogical pedagogy fosters inclusive learning environments that are able to expand upon students’ existing knowledge and collaborative construction of “truths” (Dysthe, 1996). At this point, I should clarify that Bakhtin’s term “dialogic” is both a descriptive term (all utterances are per definition dialogic as they address other utterances as parts of a chain of communication) and a normative term as dialogue is an ideal to be worked for against the forces of “monologism” (Lillis, 2003: 197-8). In this project, I am mainly interested in describing the dialogical space of debate games. At the same time, I agree with Wegerif that “one of the goals of education, perhaps the most important goal, should be dialogue as an end in itself” (Wegerif, 2006: 61).

No Offense - voting against the affirmative is not to tell them that what they talked about was unimportant, or even that what they said was wrong. Rather, it is to tell them that were not dialecticaly relevant.

Walton 2004

[Douglas, Full Professor of Philosophy – U Winnipeg, Relevance in Argumentation, p. 169-170]

The kind of relevance defined in the new theory can be called dialectical relevance, meaning that an argument, a question, or other type of speech act is judged to be relevant insofar as it plays a part, or has a function, in a goal-directed conversation that is a dialogue exchange between two participants who are aware of each other’s moves. The ultimate aim of a system of dialectical relevance is to be useful in judging cases for material relevance, primarily cases where an argument is central. To judge whether a given argument is normatively relevant, basically one has to judge whether, as used in the given case, it meets the normative standards of reasonable argument appropriate for that case. To determine what normative standard is appropriate, one has to ask the basic question, What purpose is the argument supposedly being used for? To answer that question, one has to examine the evidence given in the text and context of dialogue in that case and ask what type of dialogue this case is supposed to be part of. Then the more detailed evaluation can go from there, depending on the goal of that type of dialogue. For example, suppose the dialogue is supposed to be a critical discussion. The purpose of a critical discussion is to resolve a conflict of opinions. Thus, the argument in the given case can be judged to be relevant if it used in such a way as to contribute to the resolution of the conflict of opinions supposedly at issue in the critical discussion. The argument is relevant if it contributes to the goal of the critical discussion at whatever stage it was used. It is irrelevant if it does not. Why should argumentation in a natural conversation be assumed to be goal directed? One might object that a lot of the ordinary conversations we have in everyday life do not appear to be goal directed. Two people may meet in the street and have a casual conversation about whether it is a nice day or not. It would seem to be artificial to describe their conversation as goal directed, implying that the two had agreed in advance to undertake this argument about the weather for some specific purpose. If they switch to talking about something else, is that a bad thing? Should it be criticized as “irrelevant”? If not, the problem is that a criticism of irrelevance seems arbitrary or even unfair. The solution to this problem is to clearly recognize that judgments about the dialectical relevance of an argument confer a stamp of approval of admissibility on the argument as rational or as used correctly in a given case with respect to its serving some purpose. To say that an argument is dialectically relevant or irrelevant is not to say that it is faulty or fallacious in every respect or that it has been incorrectly with respect to every goal that the participants are trying to achieve in a given case. There is a parallel here with applying deductive logic to arguments. To say that an argument is deductively valid is not to say that is good argument in every respect or that it is fallacy free. For a deductively valid argument could be based on false premises, or it could be a circular argument, or it could exhibit many kinds of faults. To say that an argument is deductively valid is only to say that the argument is correct or rational in a conditional sense—it is to say that if the premises are true, then the conclusion must (by logical necessity) be true too. Comparably, to say that an argument is dialectically relevant in a given case is not to say that the argument is perfectly rational, in relation to any goals that might be important the participants. It is only to say that it has the potential to be used correctly or rationally in a conditional or instrumental sense. It is to say that the argument has the potential to be used in such a way as to contribute to the type of discussion the participants are supposed to be engaged in. But you can always raise the question of what type of discussion the participants should really be engaged in. You can ask whether the agenda of that discussion ought to be changed if they are to solve the underlying problem they confront. So if two disputants are arguing about the weather, and one of them suddenly starts to argue about baseball or the price of new cars, the switch of topics is not necessarily a bad thing at all. But from the perspective of the two arguers who hope to resolve their difference of opinions about the weather by using rational argumentation, the switch to baseball may be viewed as dialectically irrelevant. This means that it turns the argumentation away from the direction needed for fulfilling its original purpose. At any rate, we can see that dialectical relevance has its place. Although it is not a requirement of all human communication, it is a useful requirement for reasoned argumentation of various kinds that are quite important in human communication.

## Off

#### One must understand the existing social totality before one can act on it—grounding the sites of political contestation or knowledge outside of labor and surplus value merely serve to humanize capital and prevent a transition to a society beyond oppression

**Tumino**(Prof. English @ Pitt) **01¶** [Stephen, “What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever”, Red Critique]

Any effective political theory will have to do at least two things: it will have to offer an integrated understanding of social practices and, based on suchan interrelated knowledge, offera guideline for praxis. My main argument here is that among all contesting social theories now, only Orthodox Marxism has been able to produce an integrated knowledge of the existing social totality and provide lines of praxis that will lead to building a society free from necessity.But first I must clarify what I mean by Orthodox Marxism. Like all other modes and forms of political theory, the very theoretical identity of Orthodox Marxism is itself contested—not just from non-and anti-Marxists who question the very "real" (by which they mean the "practical" as under free-market criteria) existence of any kind of Marxism now but, perhaps more tellingly, from within the Marxist tradition itself. I will, therefore, first say what I regard to be the distinguishing marks of Orthodox Marxism and then outline a short polemical map of contestation over Orthodox Marxism within the Marxist theories now. I will end by arguing for its effectivity in bringing about a new society based not on human rights but on freedom from necessity. I will argue thatto know contemporary society—and to be able to act on such knowledge—one has to first of all know what makes the existing social totality. I will argue that the dominant social totality is based on inequality—not just inequality of power but inequality of economic access (which then determines access to health care, education, housing, diet, transportation, . . . ). Thissystematic inequality cannot be explained by gender, race, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, or nationality. These are all secondary contradictionsand are all determined by the fundamental contradiction of capitalism which is inscribed in the relation of capital and labor. All modes of Marxism now explain social inequalities primarily on the basis of these secondary contradictions and in doing so—and this is my main argument—legitimate capitalism. Why? Because such arguments authorize capitalism without gender, race, discrimination and thus accept economic inequality as an integral part of human societies. They accept a sunny capitalism—a capitalism beyond capitalism. Such a society, based on cultural equality but economic inequality, has always been the not-so-hidden agenda of the bourgeois left—whether it has been called "new left," "postmarxism," or "radical democracy." This is, by the way, the main reason for its popularity in the culture industry—from the academy (Jameson, Harvey, Haraway, Butler,. . . ) to daily politics (Michael Harrington, Ralph Nader, Jesse Jackson,. . . ) to. . . .For all, capitalism is here to stay and the best that can be done is to make its cruelties more tolerable, more humane. This humanization (not eradication) of capitalism is the sole goal of ALL contemporary lefts (marxism, feminism, anti-racism, queeries, . . . ). Such an understanding of social inequality is based on the fundamental understanding that the source of wealth is human knowledge and not human labor. That is, wealth is produced by the human mind and is thus free from the actual objective conditions that shape the historical relations of labor and capital. Only Orthodox Marxism recognizes the historicity of labor and its primacy as the source of all human wealth. In this paper I argue that any emancipatory theory has to be founded on recognition of the priority of Marx's labor theory of value and not repeat the technological determinism of corporate theory ("knowledge work") that masquerades as social theory.

#### Using imperialism as a focus point kills any chance at change —capital is transnational and imperialism is a byproduct - this ends any chance at a perm and makes the impacts worse by affirming institutions of global capital.

Robinson 7 (Professor of sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara, William, 2007, “Beyond the Theory of Imperialism: Global Capitalism and the Transnational State” Societies Without Borders, 2 (2007) 5-26 p. 9-16)

Harvey offers no explicit conception of the state but he acknowledges that state behavior has “depended on how the state has been constituted and by whom.” 17 Yet dual logics of state and capital ignore the real-world policymaking process in which the state extends backward, is grounded in the forces of civil society, and is fused in a myriad of ways with capital itself. It is incumbent to ask in what ways transnational social forces may influence a reconstitution of state institutions. To the extent that civil society – social forces – and capital are transnationalizing our analysis of the state cannot remain frozen at a nation-state level. The essential problematic that should concern us in attempting to explain phenomena associated with the “new imperialism” is the political management – or rule – of global capitalism. The theoretical gauntlet is how to understand the exercise of political domination in relation to the institutions available to dominant groups and sets of changing historical relations among social forces – that is, how are the political and the economic articulated in the current era? This requires a conception of agency and institutions. But instead of offering an ontology of agency and how it operates through historically constituted institutions, much of the “new imperialism” literature reifies these institutions. Institutions are but institutionalized – that is, codified – patterns of interaction among social forces that structure different aspects of their material relations. When we explain global dynamics in terms of institutions that have an existence or agency independent of social forces we are reifying these institutions. Critical state theories and Gramscian IPE 18 have taught us, despite their limitations, that the story starts – and ends – with historically situated social forces as collective agents. To critique a nation-state framework of analysis as I do, is not, as my critics claim19 to dismiss the nation-state but to dereify it. Reifying categories leads to realist analyses of state power and the inter-state system. Realism presumes that the world economy is divided up into distinct national economies that interact with one another. Each national economy is a billiard ball banging back and forth on each other. This billiard image is then applied to explain global political dynamics in terms of nation-states as discrete interacting units (the inter-state system). The state, says Harvey, in reverting to the realist approach, “struggles to assert its interests and achieve its goals in the world at large.” 20 But Harvey does not stop with this reification of the state. He introduces an additional territorial reification, so that territorial relations become immanent to social relations. “The wealth and well-being of particular territories are augmented at the expense of others,” writes Harvey. 21 This is a remarkably reii ed image – “territories” rather than social groups have “wealth” (accumulated values) and enjoy “well being.” Harvey gives space in this way an independent existence as a social/political force in the form of territory in order to advance his thesis of the “new imperialism.” It is not how social forces are organized both in space and through institutions that is the focus. Rather, for Harvey, territory acquires a social existence of its own, an agentic logic. We are told that “territorial entities” engage in practices of production, commerce, and so on. Do “territorial entities” really do these things? Or is it not that in the real world, individuals and social groups engage in production, commerce, and so on? And they do so via institutions through which they organize, systematize, and demarcate their activities as agents. Social groups became aggregated and organized in the modern era through the particular institutional form of the territorial-based nation state. But this particular institutional form does not acquire a life of its own and neither is it immutable. Nation-states continue to exist but their nature and meaning evolve as social relations and structures become transformed; particular, as they transnationalize. Drawing on insights from Lafebvre, Marx, Luxemburg, and others, Harvey earlier introduced the highly fertile notion of spatial (or spatial-temporal) fixes to understand how capital momentarily resolves contradictions (particularly, crises of overaccumulation) in one place by displacing them to other places through geographic expansion and spatial reorganization. Following Marx’ famous observation that the expanded accumulation of capital involves the progressive “annihilation of space through time,” he also coined the term “time-space compression” in reference to globalization as a process involving a new burst of time-space compression in the world capitalist system. 22 But “places” have no existence or meaning in and of themselves. It is people living in particular spaces that do this dis-placing (literally), these spatiotemporal fixes. The “asymmetric exchange relations” that are at the heart of Harvey’s emphasis on the territorial basis of the “new imperialism” must be for Harvey territorial exchange relations. But not only that: they must be nation-state territorial exchanges. But exchange relations are social relations, exchanges among particular social groups. There is nothing in the concept of asymmetric exchanges that by i at gives them a territorial expression; no reason to assume that uneven exchanges are necessarily exchanges that take place between distinct territories, much less specifically between distinct nation states. That they do or do not acquire such an expression is one of historical, empirical, and conjunctural analysis. Certainly spatial relations among social forces have historically been mediated in large part by territory; spatial relations have been territorially-dei ned relations. But this territorialization is in no way immanent to social relations and may well be fading in significance as globalization advances. Any theory of globalization must address the matter of place and space, including changing spatial relations among social forces and how social relations are spatialized. This has not been satisfactorily accomplished, despite a spate of theoretical proposition, ranging from Castell’s “space of flows” replacing the “space of place.” 23 and Giddens “time-space distanciation” as the “lifting” of social relations from territorial place and their stretching around the globe in ways that may eliminate territorial friction. 24 This notion of ongoing and novel reconfigurations of time and social space is central to a number of globalization theories. It in turn points to the larger theoretical issue of the relationship of social structure to space, the notion of space as the material basis for social practices, and the changing relationship under globalization between territoriality/geography, institutions, and social structures. The crucial question here is the ways in which globalization may be transforming the spatial dynamics of accumulation and the institutional arrangements through which it takes place. The subject – literally, that is, the agents/makers of the social world – is not global space but people in those spaces. What is central, therefore, is a spatial reconfiguration of social relations beyond a nation-state/inter-state framework, if not indeed even beyond territory. States are institutionalized social relations and territorial actors to the extent that those social relations are territorialized. Nation-states are social relations that have historically been territorialized but those relations are not by definition territorial. To the extent that the US and other national states promote deterritorializing social and economic processes they are not territorial actors. The US state can hardly be considered as acting territorially when it promotes the global relocation of accumulation processes that were previously concentrated in US territory. Harvey’s approach is at odds to explain such behavior since by his definition the US state must promote its own territorial aggrandizement. Harvey observes that as local banking was supplanted by national banking in the development of capitalism “the free flow of money capital across the national space altered regional dynamics.” 25 In the same vein we can argue that the free flow of capital across global space alters these dynamics on a worldwide scale. Let us return to the question: why would Harvey propose separate logics for the economic and the political – for capital and the state? By separating the political and the economic he is able to claim that indeed globalization has transformed the spatial dynamics of accumulation – hence capital globalizes – but that the institutional arrangements of such global accumulation remain territorial as nation-states. The state has its own independent logic that brings it into an external relation to globalizing capital. Here we arrive at the pitfall of theoreticism. If one starts with the theoretical assumption that the world is made up of independent, territorial-based nation states and that this particular institutional-political form is something immanent to the modern world – Wood makes the assumption explicit, a law of capitalism; for Harvey it seems implicit – then the changing world of the 21st century must be explained by theoretical i at in these terms. Reality must be made to conform to the theoretical conception of an immutable nation-state based, inter-state political and institutional order. But since Harvey acknowledges the reality of globalizing capital he is therefore forced to separate the logic of that globalizing capital from that of territorially-based states; he is forced either to abandon the theoretical construct altogether or to build it upon a dualism of the economic and the political, of capital and the state. Theory needs to illuminate reality, not make reality conform to it. The pitfall of this theoreticism is to develop analyses and propositions to fit theoretical assumptions. Since received theories establish a frame of an inter-state system made up of competing national states, economies and capitals then 21st century reality must be interpreted so that it fits this frame one way or another. Such theoreticism forces theorists of the “new imperialism” into a schizophrenic dualism of economic and political logics. In any event Harvey has trapped himself in a blind alley that underscores the pitfall. Despite his acknowledgement of capital’s transnationalization he concludes that the US state’s political/territorial logic is driven now by an effort to open up space vis-à-vis competitor nation-states for unloading national capital surplus, hence the new US imperialism. This inconsistency in Harvey’s argumentation reflects a general contradiction in the “new imperialism” literature: the dualism of the economic and political, of capital and the state, is negated by the claim that the US state functions to serve (US national) capital.

#### Capitalism results in incalculable atrocities - this structural violence outweighs.

Herod 7 (James, Columbia U graduate and political activist, “Getting Free” Pg. 22-23 JF)

We must never forget that we are at war, however, and that we have been for five hundred years. We are involved in class warfare. This defines our situation historically and sets limits to what we can do. It would be nice to think of peace, for example, but this is out of the question. It is excluded as an option by historical conditions. Peace can be achieved only by destroying capitalism. The casualties from this war, on our side, long ago reached astronomical sums. It is estimated that thirty million people perished during the first century of the capitalist invasion of the Americas, including millions of Africans who were worked to death as slaves. Thousands of peasants died in the great revolts in France and Germany in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. During the enclosures movement in England and the first wave of industrialization, hundreds of thousands of people died needlessly. African slaves died by the millions (an estimated fifteen million) during the Atlantic crossing. Hundreds of poor people were hanged in London in the early nineteenth century to enforce the new property laws. During the Paris uprising of 1871, thirty thousand communards were slaughtered. Twenty million were lost in Joseph Stalin’s gulag, and millions more perished during the 1930s when the Soviet state expropriated the land and forced the collectivization of agriculture an event historically comparable to the enclosures in England (and thus the Bolsheviks destroyed one of the greatest peasant revolutions of all time). Thousands of militants were murdered by the German police during the near revolution in Germany and Austria in 1919. Thousands of workers and peasants were killed during the Spanish Civil War. Adolf Hitler killed ten million people in concentration camps (including six million Jews in the gas chambers**).** An estimated two hundred thousand labor leaders, activists, and citizens have been murdered in Guatemala since the coup engineered by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1954. Thousands were lost in the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. Half a million communists were massacred in Indonesia in 1975. Millions of Vietnamese were killed by French and U.S. capitalists during decades of colonialism and war. And how many were killed during British capital’s subjugation of India, and during capitalist Europe’s colonization of Asia and Africa? A major weapon of capitalists has always been to simply murder those who are threatening their rule. Thousands were killed by the contras and death squads in Nicaragua and El Salvador. Thousands were murdered in Chile by Augusto Pinochet during his counterrevolution, after the assassination of Salvador Allende. Speaking of assassinations, there is a long list: Patrice Lumumba, Rosa Luxemburg, Antonio Gramsci (died in prison), Ricardo Flores Magon (died in prison), Che Guevara, Gustav Landauer, Malcolm X, Martin Luther King Jr., Fred Hampton, George Jackson, the Haymarket anarchists, Amilcar Cabral, Steve Biko, Karl Liebnicht, Nat Turner, and thousands more. Thousands are being murdered every year now in Colombia. Thousands die every year in the workplace in the United States alone. Eighty thousand die needlessly in hospitals annually in the United States due to malpractice and negligence. Fifty thousand die each year in automobile accidents in the United States, deaths directly due to intentional capitalist decisions to scuttle mass transit in favor of an economy based on oil, roads, and cars (and unsafe cars to boot). Thousands have died in mines since capitalism began. Millions of people are dying right now, every year, from famines directly attributable to capitalists and from diseases easily prevented but for capitalists. Nearly all poverty-related deaths are because of capitalists. We cannot begin to estimate the stunted, wasted, and shortened lives caused by capitalists, not to mention the millions who have died fighting their stupid little world wars and equally stupid colonial wars. (This enumeration is very far from complete.) Capitalists (generically speaking) are not merely thieves; they are murderers. Their theft and murder is on a scale never seen before in history a scale so vast it boggles the mind. Capitalists make Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, Genghis Khan, and Attila the Hun look like boy scouts. This is a terrible enemy we face.

#### Our alternative is to return the priority of political contestation to class. The aim of our alternative makes the production of social relations, capitalism and class, the starting point for resistance and criticism.

McLaren & D'Anniable 4 - (Peter, Valerie Scatamburlo, Educational Philosophy and Theory, Vol. 36, No. 2, 2004, © 2004 Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia April 2004, Class Dismissed? Historical materialism and the politics of ‘difference)

The real problem is the internal or dialectical relation that exists between capital and labor within the capitalist production process itself—a social relation in which capitalism is intransigently rooted. This social relation—essential to the production of abstract labor—deals with how already existing value is preserved and new value (surplus value) is created (Allman, 2001). If, for example, the process of actual exploitation and the accumulation of surplus value is to be seen as a state of constant manipulation and as a realization process of concrete labor in actual labor time—within a given cost-production system and a labor market—we cannot underestimate the ways in which ‘difference’ (racial as well as gender difference) is encapsulated in the production/reproduction dialectic of capital. It is this relationship that is mainly responsible for the inequitable and unjust distribution of resources. A deepened understanding of this phenomenon is essential for understanding the emergence of an acutely polarized labor market and the fact that disproportionately high percentages of ‘people of color’ are trapped in the lower rungs of domestic and global labor markets (McLaren & Farahmandpur, 1999). ‘Difference’ in the era of global capitalism is crucial to the workings, movements and proﬁt levels of multinational corporations but those types of complex relations cannot be mapped out by using truncated post-Marxist, culturalist conceptualizations of ‘difference.’ To sever issues of ‘difference’ from class conveniently draws attention away from the crucially important ways in which ‘people of color’ (and, more speciﬁcally, ‘women of color’) provide capital with its superexploited labor pools—a phenomenon that is on the rise all over the world. Most social relations constitutive of racialized differences are considerably shaped by the relations of production and there is undoubtedly a racialized and gendered division of labor whose severity and function vary depending on where one is situated in the capitalist global economy (Meyerson, 2000).6 In stating this, we need to include an important caveat that differentiates our approach from those invoking the well-worn race/class/gender triplet which can sound, to the uninitiated, both radical and vaguely Marxian. It is not. Race, class and gender, while they invariably intersect and interact, are not co-primary. This ‘triplet’ approximates what the ‘philosophers might call a category mistake.’ On the surface the triplet may be convincing—some people are oppressed because of their race, others as a result of their gender, yet others because of their class—but this ‘is grossly misleading’ for it is not that ‘some individuals manifest certain characteristics known as “class” which then results in their oppression; on the contrary, to be a member of a social class just is to be oppressed’ and in this regard class is ‘a wholly social category’ (Eagleton, 1998, p. 289). Furthermore, even though ‘class’ is usually invoked as part of the aforementioned and much vaunted triptych, it is usually gutted of its practical, social dimension or treated solely as a cultural phenomenon—as just another form of ‘difference.’ In these instances, class is transformed from an economic and, indeed, social category to an exclusively cultural or discursive one or one in which class merely signiﬁes a ‘subject position.’ Class is therefore cut off from the political economy of capitalism and class power severed from exploitation and a power structure ‘in which those who control collectively produced resources only do so because of the value generated by those who do not’ (Hennessy & Ingraham, 1997, p. 2). Such theorizing has had the effect of replacing an historical materialist class analysis with a cultural analysis of class. As a result, many post-Marxists have also stripped the idea of class of precisely that element which, for Marx, made it radical—namely its status as a universal form of exploitation whose abolition required (and was also central to) the abolition of all manifestations of oppression (Marx, 1978, p. 60). With regard to this issue, Kovel (2002) is particularly insightful, for he explicitly addresses an issue which continues to vex the Left—namely the priority given to different categories of what he calls ‘dominative splitting’—those categories of ‘gender, class, race, ethnic and national exclusion,’ etc. Kovel argues that we need to ask the question of priority with respect to what? He notes that if we mean priority with respect to time, then the category of gender would have priority since there are traces of gender oppression in all other forms of oppression. If we were to prioritize in terms of existential signiﬁcance, Kovel suggests that we would have to depend upon the immediate historical forces that bear down on distinct groups of people—he offers examples of Jews in 1930s Germany who suffered from brutal forms of anti-Semitism and Palestinians today who experience anti-Arab racism under Israeli domination. The question of what has political priority, however, would depend upon which transformation of relations of oppression are practically more urgent and, while this would certainly depend upon the preceding categories, it would also depend upon the fashion in which all the forces acting in a concrete situation are deployed. As to the question of which split sets into motion all of the others, the priority would have to be given to class since class relations entail the state as an instrument of enforcement and control, and it is the state that shapes and organizes the splits that appear in human ecosystems. Thus class is both logically and historically distinct from other forms of exclusion (hence we should not talk of ‘classism’ to go along with ‘sexism’ and ‘racism,’ and ‘species-ism’). This is, ﬁrst of all, because class is an essentially (hu)man-made category, without root in even a mystiﬁed biology. We cannot imagine a human world without gender distinctions—although we can imagine a world without domination by gender. But a world without class is eminently imaginable—indeed, such was the human world for the great majority of our species’ time on earth, during all of which considerable fuss was made over gender. Historically, the difference arises because ‘class’ signiﬁes one side of a larger ﬁgure that includes a state apparatus whose conquests and regulations create races and shape gender relations. Thus there will be no true resolution of racism so long as class society stands, inasmuch as a racially oppressed society implies the activities of a class-defending state. Nor can gender inequality be enacted away so long as class society, with its state, demands the super-exploitation of women’s labor. (Kovel, 2002, pp. 123–124) Contrary to what many have claimed, Marxist theory does not relegate categories of ‘difference’ to the conceptual mausoleum; rather, it has sought to reanimate these categories by interrogating how they are refracted through material relations of power and privilege and linked to relations of production. Moreover, it has emphasized and insisted that the wider political and economic system in which they are embedded needs to be thoroughly understood in all its complexity. Indeed, Marx made clear how constructions of race and ethnicity ‘are implicated in the circulation process of variable capital.’ To the extent that ‘gender, race, and ethnicity are all understood as social constructions rather than as essentialist categories’ the effect of exploring their insertion into the ‘circulation of variable capital (including positioning within the internal heterogeneity of collective labor and hence, within the division of labor and the class system)’ must be interpreted as a ‘powerful force reconstructing them in distinctly capitalist ways’ (Harvey, 2000, p. 106). Unlike contemporary narratives which tend to focus on one or another form of oppression, the irrefragable power of historical materialism resides in its ability to reveal (1) how forms of oppression based on categories of difference do not possess relative autonomy from class relations but rather constitute the ways in which oppression is lived/experienced within a class-based system; and (2) how all forms of social oppression function within an overarching capitalist system. This framework must be further distinguished from those that invoke the terms ‘classism’ and/or ‘class elitism’ to (ostensibly) foreground the idea that ‘class matters’ (cf. hooks, 2000) since we agree with Gimenez (2001, p. 24) that ‘class is not simply another ideology legitimating oppression.’ Rather, class denotes ‘exploitative relations between people mediated by their relations to the means of production.’ To marginalize such a conceptualization of class is to conﬂate an individual’s objective location in the intersection of structures of inequality with people’s subjective understandings of who they really are based on their ‘experiences.’ Another caveat. In making such a claim, we are not renouncing the concept of experience. On the contrary, we believe it is imperative to retain the category of lived experience as a reference point in light of misguided post-Marxist critiques which imply that all forms of Marxian class analysis are dismissive of subjectivity. We are not, however, advocating the uncritical fetishization of ‘experience’ that tends to assume that experience somehow guarantees the authenticity of knowledge and which often treats experience as self-explanatory, transparent, and solely individual. Rather, we advance a framework that seeks to make connections between seemingly isolated situations and/or particular experiences by exploring how they are constituted in, and circumscribed by, broader historical and social circumstances. Experiential understandings, in and of themselves, are suspect because, dialectically, they constitute a unity of opposites—they are at once unique, speciﬁc, and personal, but also thoroughly partial, social, and the products of historical forces about which individuals may know little or nothing (Gimenez, 2001). In this sense, a rich description of immediate experience in terms of consciousness of a particular form of oppression (racial or otherwise) can be an appropriate and indispensable point of departure. Such an understanding, however, can easily become an isolated ‘difference’ prison unless it transcends the immediate perceived point of oppression, confronts the social system in which it is rooted, and expands into a complex and multifaceted analysis (of forms of social mediation) that is capable of mapping out the general organization of social relations. That, however, requires a broad class-based approach. Having a concept of class helps us to see the network of social relations constituting an overall social organization which both implicates and cuts through racialization/ethnicization and gender … [a] radical political economy [class] perspective emphasizing exploitation, dispossession and survival takes the issues of … diversity [and difference] beyond questions of conscious identity such as culture and ideology, or of a paradigm of homogeneity and heterogeneity … or of ethical imperatives with respect to the ‘other’. (Bannerji, 2000, pp. 7, 19) A radical political economy framework is crucial since various ‘culturalist’ perspectives seem to diminish the role of political economy and class forces in shaping the ediﬁce of ‘the social’—including the shifting constellations and meanings of ‘difference.’ Furthermore, none of the ‘differences’ valorized in culturalist narratives alone, and certainly not ‘race’ by itself can explain the massive transformation of the structure of capitalism in recent years. We agree with Meyerson (2000) that ‘race’ is not an adequate explanatory category on its own and that the use of ‘race’ as a descriptive or analytical category has serious consequences for the way in which social life is presumed to be constituted and organized. The category of ‘race’—the conceptual framework that the oppressed often employ to interpret their experiences of inequality ‘often clouds the concrete reality of class, and blurs the actual structure of power and privilege.’ In this regard, ‘race’ is all too often a ‘barrier to understanding the central role of class in shaping personal and collective outcomes within a capitalist society’ (Marable, 1995, pp. 8, 226). In many ways, the use of ‘race’ has become an analytical trap precisely when it has been employed in antiseptic isolation from the messy terrain of historical and material relations. This, of course, does not imply that we ignore racism and racial oppression; rather, an analytical shift from ‘race’ to a plural conceptualization of ‘racisms’ and their historical articulations is necessary (cf. McLaren & Torres, 1999). However, it is important to note that ‘race’ doesn’t explain racism and forms of racial oppression. Those relations are best understood within the context of class rule, as Bannerji, Kovel, Marable and Meyerson imply—but that compels us to forge a conceptual shift in theorizing, which entails (among other things) moving beyond the ideology of ‘difference’ and ‘race’ as the dominant prisms for understanding exploitation and oppression. We are aware of some potential implications for white Marxist criticalists to unwittingly support racist practices in their criticisms of ‘race-ﬁrst’ positions articulated in the social sciences. In those instances, white criticalists wrongly go on ‘high alert’ in placing theorists of color under special surveillance for downplaying an analysis of capitalism and class. These activities on the part of white criticalists must be condemned, as must be efforts to stress class analysis primarily as a means of creating a white vanguard position in the struggle against capitalism. Our position is one that attempts to link practices of racial oppression to the central, totalizing dynamics of capitalist society in order to resist white supremacist capitalist patriarchy more fully.7

## Case

#### a.) How progressive of you, right on! the 1AC is apt in describing the ethical injustice of colonialism, but leaves out how it is pertinent FOR THEM save for this condesending savior mentality.

Halberstam 13 - Professor of English and Director of The Center for Feminist Research at University of Southern California. (Jack, http://www.minorcompositions.info/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/undercommons-web.pdf, The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and Black Study) -modified

These kinds of examples get to the heart of Moten and Harney’s world of the undercommons – the undercommons is not a realm where we rebel and we create critique; it is not a place where we “take arms against a sea of troubles/and by opposing end them.” The undercommons is a space and time which is always here. Our goal – and the “we” is always the right mode of address here – is not to end the troubles but to end the world that created those particular troubles as the ones that must be opposed. Moten and Harney refuse the logic that stages refusal as inactivity, as the absence of a plan and as a mode of stalling real politics. Moten and Harney tell us to listen to the noise we make and to refuse the offers we receive to shape that noise into “music.” In the essay that many people already know best from this volume, “The University and the Undercommons,” Moten and Harney come closest to explaining their mission. Refusing to be for or against the university and in fact marking the critical academic as the player who holds the “for and against” logic in place, Moten and Harney lead us to the “Undercommons of the Enlightenment” where subversive intellectuals engage both the university and fugitivity: “where the work gets done, where the work gets subverted, where the revolution is still black, still strong.” The subversive intellectual, we learn, is unprofessional, uncollegial, passionate and disloyal. The subversive intellectual is neither trying to extend the university nor change the university, the subversive intellectual is not toiling in misery and from this place of misery articulating a “general antagonism.” In fact, the subversive intellectual enjoys the ride and wants it to be faster and wilder; she does not want a room of his or her own, she wants to be in the world, in the world with others and making the world anew. Moten insists: “Like Deleuze. I believe in the world and want to be in it. I want to be in it all the way to the end of it because I believe in another world in the world and I want to be in that. And I plan to stay a believer, like Curtis Mayfield. But that’s beyond me, and even beyond me and Stefano, and out into the world, the other thing, the other world, the joyful noise of the scattered, scatted eschaton, the undercommon refusal of the academy of misery.” The mission then for the denizens of the undercommons is to recognize that when you seek to make things better, you are not just doing it for the Other, you must also be doing it for yourself. While men may think they are being “sensitive” by turning to feminism, while white people may think they are being right on by opposing racism, no one will really be able to embrace the mission of tearing “this shit down” until they realize that the structures they oppose are not only bad for some of us, they are bad for all of us. Gender hierarchies are bad for men as well as women and they are really bad for the rest of us. Racial hierarchies are not rational and ordered, they are chaotic and nonsensical and must be opposed by precisely all those who benefit in any way from them. Or, as Moten puts it: “The coalition emerges out of your recognition that it’s [messed] up for you, in the same way that we’ve already recognized that it’s fucked up for us. I don’t need your help. I just need you to recognize that this shit is killing you, too, however much more softly, you stupid motherfucker, you know?” coalition unites us in the recognition that we must change things or die. All of us. We must all change the things that are fucked up and change cannot come in the form that we think of as “revolutionary” – not as a masculinist surge or an armed confrontation. Revolution will come in a form we cannot yet imagine. Moten and Harney propose that we prepare now for what will come by entering into study. Study, a mode of thinking with others separate from the thinking that the institution requires of you, prepares us to be embedded in what Harney calls “the with and for” and allows you to spend less time antagonized and antagonizing. Like all world-making and all world-shattering encounters, when you enter this book and learn how to be with and for, in coalition, and on the way to the place we are already making, you will also feel fear, trepidation, concern, and disorientation. The disorientation, Moten and Harney will tell you is not just unfortunate, it is necessary because you will no longer be in one location moving forward to another, instead you will already be part of “the “movement of things” and on the way to this “outlawed social life of nothing.” The movement of things can be felt and touched and exists in language and in fantasy, it is flight, it is motion, it is fugitivity itself. Fugitivity is not only escape, “exit” as Paolo Virno might put it, or “exodus” in the terms offered by Hardt and Negri, fugitivity is being separate from settling. It is a being in motion that has learned that “organizations are obstacles to organising ourselves” (The Invisible Committee in The Coming Insurrection) and that there are spaces and modalities that exist separate from the logical, logistical, the housed and the positioned. Moten and Harney call this mode a “being together in homelessness” which does not idealize homelessness nor merely metaphorize it. Homelessness is the state of dispossession that we seek and that we embrace: “Can this being together in homelessness, this interplay of the refusal of what has been refused, this undercommon appositionality, be a place from which emerges neither self-consciousness nor knowledge of the other but an improvisation that proceeds from somewhere on the other side of an unasked question?” I think this is what Jay-Z and Kanye West (another collaborative unit of study) call “no church in the wild.”

#### b.) Absent this discussion, the affirmative occupies the position of the Maoist - the impact is imperialism and a reproduction of the harms of the 1ac.

Rey Chow, Comparative Literature—Brown University, 1993

Writing Diaspora, p. 15-16

The Orientalist has a special sibling whom I will, in order to highlight her significance as a kind of representational agency, call the Maoist. Arif Dirlik, who has written extensively on the history of political movements in twentieth-century China, sums up the interpretation of Mao Zedong commonly found in Western Marxist analyses in terms of a "Third Worldist fantasy"—"a fantasy of Mao as a Chinese reincarnation of Marx who fulfilled the Marxist promise that had been betrayed in the West."'6 The Maoist was the phoenix which arose from the ashes of the great disillusionment with Western culture in the 1960s and which found hope in the Chinese Communist Revolution.17 In the 1970s, when it became possible for Westerners to visit China as guided and pampered guests of the Beijing establishment, Maoists came back with reports of Chinese society's absolute, positive difference from Western society and of the Cultural Revolution as "the most important and innovative example of Mao's concern with the pursuit of egalitarian, populist, and communitarian ideals in the course of economic modernization" (Harding, p. 939). At that time, even poverty in China was regarded as "spiritually ennobling, since it meant that [the] Chinese were not possessed by the wasteful and acquisitive consumerism of the United States" (Harding, p. 941). Although the excessive admiration of the 1970s has since been replaced by an oftentimes equally excessive denigration of China, the Maoist is very much alive among us, and her significance goes far beyond the China and East Asian fields. Typically, the Maoist is a cultural critic who lives in a capitalist society but who is fed up with capitalism—a cultural critic, in other words, who wants a social order opposed to the one that is supporting her own undertaking. The Maoist is thus a supreme example of the way desire works: What she wants is always located in the other, resulting in an iden-tification with and valorization of that which she is not/does not have. Since what is valorized is often the other's deprivation—"having" poverty or "having" nothing—the Maoist's strategy becomes in the main a rhetorical renunciation of the material power that enables her rhetoric. In terms of intellectual lineage, one of the Maoist's most important ancestors is Charlotte Bronte's Jane Eyre. Like Jane, the Maoist's means to moral power is a specific representational position—the position of powerlessness. In their reading of Jane Eyre, Nancy Armstrong and Leonard Tennenhouse argue that the novel exemplifies the paradigm of violence that expresses its dominance through a representation of the self as powerless:

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Until the very end of the novel, Jane is always excluded from every available form of social power. Her survival seems to depend on renouncing what power might come to her as teacher, mistress, cousin, heiress, or missionary's wife. She repeatedly flees from such forms of inclusion in the field of power, as if her status as an exemplary subject, like her authority as narrator, depends entirely on her claim to a kind of truth which can only be made from a position of powerlessness. By creating such an unlovely heroine and subjecting her to one form of harassment after another, Bronte demonstrates the power of words alone. This reading of Jane Eyre highlights her not simply as the female underdog who is often identified by feminist and Marxist critics, but as the intellectual who acquires power through a moral rectitude that was to become the flip side of Western imperialism's ruthlessness. Lying at the core of Anglo-American liberalism, this moral rectitude would accompany many territorial and economic conquests overseas with a firm sense of social mission. When Jane Eyre went to the colonies in the nineteenth century, she turned into the Christian missionary. It is this understanding—that Bronte's depic-tion of a socially marginalized English woman is, in terms of ideological production, fully complicit with England's empire-building ambition rather than opposed to it—that prompted Gayatri Spivak to read Jane Eyre as a text in the service of imperialism. Referring to Bronte's treatment of the "madwoman" Bertha Mason, the white Jamaican Creole character, Spivak charges Jane Eyre for, precisely, its humanism, in which the "native subject" is not created as an animal but as "the object of what might be termed the terrorism of the categorical imperative." This kind of creation is imperialism's use/travesty of the Kantian metaphysical demand to "make the heathen into a human so that he can be treated as an end in himself."19 In the twentieth century, as Europe's former colonies became independent, Jane Eyre became the Maoist. Michel de Certeau describes the affinity between her two major reincarnations, one religious and the other political, this way: The place that was formerly occupied by the Church or Churches vis-4-vis the established powers remains recognizable, over the past two centuries, in the functioning of the opposition known as leftist. [T]here is vis-A-vis the established order, a relationship between the Churches that defended an other world and the parties of the left which, since the nineteenth century, have promoted a different future. In both cases, similar functional characteristics can be discerned. . . The Maoist retains many of Jane's awesome features, chief of which are a protestant passion to turn powerlessness into "truth" and an idealist intolerance of those who may think differently from her. Whereas the great Orientalist blames the living "third world" natives for the loss of the ancient non-Western civilization, his loved object, the Maoist applauds the same natives for personifying and fulfilling her ideals. For the Maoist in the 1970s, the mainland Chinese were, in spite of their "backwardness," a puritanical alternative to the West in human form—a dream come true.

### 2nc

Deitz ev says that politics is about tradeoff - rejecting colonialism looks good on face, but what does politics look like? On one hand it would seem to reject the inclusion of transational corporations and US 'development', but that = not simple

Driessen 3 – Bachelors in Geology and Field Ecology, Senior policy adviser to the Congress of Racial Equality (Paul K., Eco-Imperialism: Green Power – Black Death, Free Enterprise Press, Bellevue, WA, 2003, 73-74)

Some 60,000 activists, bureaucrats and politicians flew gas-guzzling, greenhouse-gas-spewing jets into Johannesburg, South Africa, in August 2002 for a $50-million Earth Summit. Many settled into comfy five-star hotels, intending to make the summit a high water mark for sustainable development, global warming and the precautionary principle. Over the next two weeks, many of them denounced everything from electricity and flush toilets, to fossil fuels, biotechnology, capitalism and, of course, the United States. The World Wildlife Fund issued a jeremiad, wailing that mankind will need at least 1.2 more Planet Earths by 2050 to maintain our present standard of living, if people don’t change their evil ways. However, despite their titanic efforts, the summit didn’t turn out quite the way they expected. The United States, Australia and Canada refused to go along with the orchestrated agenda and, instead, promoted free markets, free trade and economic development as the solution to global poverty and environmental degradation. Secretary of State Collin Powell spoke eloquently in support of these themes and the three nations’ increasing alliance with the developing countries against the forces of pessimism and alarmism. USAID Director Andrew Natsios spoke out against NGO and EU demands that starving people be denied genetically modified corn. Writing in London’s Telegraph, Leon Louw, director of South Africa’s Free Market Foundation, accused the NGOs and EU of “insidious eco-imperialism.” These “neo-Luddites,” he argued, “place elitist environmental whims and nebulous conceptions about ‘resource depletion’ above the needs of the world’s destitute billions. They seek to impose first-world concepts of environmentalism and human development … on developing countries. They do not want poor countries to follow the path that made the prosperity of their own countries possible.”235 “Anti-development and anti-trade” policies, said Louw, at their core are “anti-human.” The charges resonated. Developing nations openly rebelled against the “sustainable development” agenda. Hundreds of poor African protesters marched in Johannesburg against what they called the politics and policies of “Sustained Poverty.” Their growing anger and resentment toward “green despotism” was obvious. Barun Mitra of India presented a special “BS Award” to the international NGOs for “sustaining poverty.” It was a plaque heaped high with two piles of animal excrement – symbolizing both the quality of the environmental radicals’ arguments and the “biomass” fuel that many NGOs seem to want poverty-stricken Third World families to use for generations to come. Free Africa Foundation president George Ayittey condemned the corruption endemic in many of the governments attending the Johannesburg summit. “What exists in many African countries,” he says, “is a ‘vampire’ or ‘pirate’ state – a government hijacked by a phalanx of gangsters, thugs and crooks who use the instruments of the state to enrich themselves, their cronies,” their tribesmen, and various bureaucrats and educated elites. The poor get almost nothing – and little of the aid promised at the first sustainability conference in Rio de Janeiro has ever materialized. No wonder Africa’s villagers and honest politicians have become so disenchanted with attempts to impose First World treaties and policies on the Third World, he suggested.236 In the end, many of the greens’ key agenda items were tabled, voted down or relegated to indeterminate timetables, and they were left to cry in their white wine. The Energy and Climate Caucus coalition denounced the Earth summit as a “total failure,” Friends of the Earth called it “notably feeble,” and Oxfam International summed it up as “nine days of bluster.”237 74 It is certainly dangerous to make any kind of prediction about the demise of an $8-billion-a-year global environmental gorilla. However, it is possible that Johannesburg will turn out to have been a watershed event in the history of eco extremism. At previous summits dating back to 1992 in Rio de Janeiro, discussions had focused on Malthusian limits to growth, planetary apocalypse and global governance. In Johannesburg, the focus was on poverty – and on how poverty can be eliminated, and people’s health and environmental quality improved, through private property rights, market economies, global trade, technology, innovation, democratic processes, sustained economic growth, and the right of individuals, communities and nations to make their own decisions and chart their own destinies. At previous summits, the dominant theme was the struggle between rich and poor … between haves and have-nots … between a greedy United States and an impoverished Third World. In Johannesburg, the struggle was largely between those whose vision is one of hope, progress and faith in mankind’s amazing intellectual capacity – against those whose vision is one of fear, worsening environmental degradation and man as the supreme danger to all he surveys. Whether this change in priorities and agendas becomes permanent is largely up to those who support Third World rights of self-determination. The task will not be easy, but it can be done. To maintain the momentum, they must: • Challenge BP, Shell and other companies, politicians, bureaucrats, journalists and investor groups to rediscover their moral compass and do the right thing – on energy and economic development, corporate social responsibility, sustainable economic development and reasonable precaution. Third World advocates can do so not only by appealing to the more moderate organizations’ better instincts, but also by publicly embarrassing the more radical elements for their human rights abuses. • Insist that the same laws and ethical principles apply to all corporations – for-profit and notforprofit alike. Demand that NGOs, and the foundations and government agencies that fund them, be required to abide by the same principles of honesty, integrity, transparency, disclosure and accountability that they have long demanded for the corporate world. • Confront the persistent socialist ideologies and government infrastructures that still dominate much of Europe, Africa, Asia and the United Nations. • Find new ways to broaden the public discourse in these arenas, where free speech, true press diversity, talk radio, think tanks, internet access and other independent sources of thought are far less prevalent than in the United States and Australia. • Provide greater financial and other support to think tanks, journalists, politicians, companies and other advocates of private property, free markets, trade, technology, innovation, democracy and economic growth. • Recruit and support more people in developing countries who want an opportunity to be heard. Give them forums to confront the radical NGOs and urge market reforms that offer the greatest hope for better futures for families and communities in developing countries. • Concentrate on providing energy, jobs, economic opportunities, and better health and environmental quality for people in developing countries – rather than emphasizing aid programs and serving the radical agendas of high-pressure activist groups. Do these things, and Johannesburg could mark, not just a pothole, but the end of the road for eco-imperialism – and new hope for millions of the world’s poor.

#### **Al-Awlaki, the person whose son and grandson were killed by a drone votes negative --- organizations are key to challenge the government and court deference is the reason killings are permitted**

Al-Awlaki 13, Nasar, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/18/opinion/the-drone-that-killed-my-grandson.html?_r=0>

SANA, Yemen — I LEARNED that my 16-year-old grandson, Abdulrahman — a United States citizen — had been killed by an American drone strike from news reports the morning after he died. The missile killed him, his teenage cousin and at least five other civilians on Oct. 14, 2011, while the boys were eating dinner at an open-air restaurant in southern Yemen. I visited the site later, once I was able to bear the pain of seeing where he sat in his final moments. Local residents told me his body was blown to pieces. They showed me the grave where they buried his remains. I stood over it, asking why my grandchild was dead. Nearly two years later, I still have no answers. The United States government has refused to explain why Abdulrahman was killed. It was not until May of this year that the Obama administration, in a supposed effort to be more transparent, publicly acknowledged what the world already knew — that it was responsible for his death. The attorney general, Eric H. Holder Jr., said only that Abdulrahman was not “specifically targeted,” raising more questions than he answered. My grandson was killed by his own government. The Obama administration must answer for its actions and be held accountable. On Friday, I will [petition a federal court](http://www.ccrjustice.org/targetedkillings) in Washington to require the government to do just that. Abdulrahman was born in Denver. He lived in America until he was 7, then came to live with me in Yemen. He was a typical teenager — he watched “The Simpsons,” listened to Snoop Dogg, read “Harry Potter” and had a Facebook page with many friends. He had a mop of curly hair, glasses like me and a wide, goofy smile. In 2010, the Obama administration put Abdulrahman’s father, my son Anwar, on C.I.A. and Pentagon “kill lists” of suspected terrorists targeted for death. A drone took his life on Sept. 30, 2011. The government repeatedly made accusations of terrorism against Anwar — who was also an American citizen — but never charged him with a crime. No court ever reviewed the government’s claims nor was any evidence of criminal wrongdoing ever presented to a court. He did not deserve to be deprived of his constitutional rights as an American citizen and killed. Early one morning in September 2011, Abdulrahman set out from our home in Sana by himself. He went to look for his father, whom he hadn’t seen for years. He left a note for his mother explaining that he missed his father and wanted to find him, and asking her to forgive him for leaving without permission. A couple of days after Abdulrahman left, we were relieved to receive word that he was safe and with cousins in southern Yemen, where our family is from. Days later, his father was targeted and killed by American drones in a northern province, hundreds of miles away. After Anwar died, Abdulrahman called us and said he was going to return home. That was the last time I heard his voice. He was killed just two weeks after his father. A country that believes it does not even need to answer for killing its own is not the America I once knew. From 1966 to 1977, I fulfilled a childhood dream and studied in the United States as a Fulbright scholar, earning my doctorate and then working as a researcher and assistant professor at universities in New Mexico, Nebraska and Minnesota. I have fond memories of those years. When I first came to the United States as a student, my host family took me camping by the ocean and on road trips to places like Yosemite, Disneyland and New York — and it was wonderful. After returning to Yemen, I used my American education and skills to help my country, serving as Yemen’s minister of agriculture and fisheries and establishing one of the country’s leading institutions of higher learning, Ibb University. Abdulrahman used to tell me he wanted to follow in my footsteps and go back to America to study. I can’t bear to think of those conversations now. After Anwar was put on the government’s list, but before he was killed, the American Civil Liberties Union and the Center for Constitutional Rights represented me in a [lawsuit](http://www.aclu.org/national-security/al-aulaqi-v-obama) challenging the government’s claim that it could kill anyone it deemed an enemy of the state.

### 1nr

#### They misdiagnose imperialism—history proves that it is the result of global capital—traditional responses to imperialism fail.

Foster 5 (Editor of the Monthly Review and professor of sociology at the University of Oregon in Eugene, John Bellamy, September 2005, “Naked Imperialism”, Monthly Review,

http://www.monthlyreview.org/0905jbf.htm)

Numerous critics on the U.S. left have responded by declaring, in effect, “Let’s throw the bastards out.” The U.S. government under the Bush administration, so the argument goes, has been taken over by a neoconservative cabal that has imposed a new policy of militarism and imperialism. For example, University of California at Los Angeles sociologist Michael Mann argues at the end of his Incoherent Empire (2003) that “a neoconservative chicken-hawk coup...seized the White House and the Department of Defense” with George W. Bush’s rise to the presidency. For Mann the end solution is simply to “throw the militarists out of office.” The argument advanced here points to a different conclusion. U.S. militarism and imperialism have deep roots in U.S. history and the political-economic logic of capitalism. As even supporters of U.S. imperialism are now willing to admit, the United States has been an empire from its inception. “The United States,” Boot writes in “American Imperialism?,” “has been an empire since at least 1803, when Thomas Jefferson purchased the Louisiana Territory. Throughout the 19th century, what Jefferson called the ‘empire of liberty’ expanded across the continent.” Later the United States conquered and colonized lands overseas in the Spanish-American War of 1898 and the brutal Philippine-American War that immediately followed—justified as an attempt to exercise the “white man’s burden.” After the Second World War the United States and other major imperialist states relinquished their formal political empires, but retained informal economic empires backed up by the threat and not infrequently the reality of military intervention. The Cold War obscured this neocolonial reality but never entirely hid it. The growth of empire is neither peculiar to the United States nor a mere outgrowth of the policies of particular states. It is the systematic result of the entire history and logic of capitalism. Since its birth in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries capitalism has been a globally expansive system—one that is hierarchically divided between metropole and satellite, center and periphery. The objective of the imperialist system of today as in the past is to open up peripheral economies to investment from the core capitalist countries, thus ensuring both a continual supply of raw materials at low prices, and a net outflow of economic surplus from periphery to center of the world system. In addition, the third world is viewed as a source of cheap labor, constituting a global reserve army of labor. Economies of the periphery are structured to meet the external needs of the United States and the other core capitalist countries rather than their own internal needs. This has resulted (with a few notable exceptions) in conditions of unending dependency and debt peonage in the poorer regions of the world.

#### Storytelling as a political strategy prevents necessary conceptual analysis of history – storytelling creates a false consciousness which prevents any change from the status quo

Zavarzadeh, 2003

(Mas'ud, “The Pedagogy of Totality,” Journal of Advanced Composition Theory 23.1, http://redcritique.org/FallWinter2003/thepedagogyoftotality.htm)

Michael Berube's essay in *The Chronicle of Higher Education* (October 5, 2001, B-5) is exemplary of the lessons in empathy to avoid the analytical. It is rhetorically a masterful lesson in the erasure of all traces of thinking about the "event" in part because it preemptively announces itself as an intervention in ignorance ("Ignorance Is a Luxury We Cannot Afford"). After describing how he had shelved "the course assignments" in his classes to devote "most of the rest of the week…to a discussion of [students's] reactions to the attack", he narrates a range of readings of the "event" and concludes that the "most troubling" analyses of the "event" were from the political left, some of which were coming uncomfortably close to justifying the indiscriminate slaughter of innocents. Many students immediately connected the attack to various American operations in the Middle East, and I wanted them to be very careful about how they made those connections. Of course, I said, of course the attacks must be placed in the broader context of the history of U.S. foreign policy in Asia and the Middle East. But any analysis that did not start from a position of solidarity with, and compassion for, the victims, their families, and the extraordinary rescue workers in New York and Washington was an analysis not worth time and attention (B-5). What Berube's teaching seeks is moral clarity, which has become the conservative touchstone in reading the "event" (William J. Bennett, Why We Fight: Moral Clarity and the War on Terrorism) not analytical critique. Berube moves quickly to block by "clarification" any attempt at such a critique by saturating the session with details (what he calls "background information"): "Very well, some students replied, but what does it mean to 'place the attacks in the broader context of U.S. foreign policy'? Here, not surprisingly, what my students wanted and needed most was basic background information" (B-5). What follows, in the name of curing ignorance, are stories about U.S. foreign policy but no conceptual analysis: Was it true, they asked, that the CIA once financed and trained bin Laden? Well, yes, I said, but at the time, in the 1980s, we financed just about anyone who showed up and offered to drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan. No, we didn't have the same kind of relationship to bin Laden that we had to Noriega or Pinochet or the Shah or Somoza or any of the other dictators we'd propped up in the course of waging the cold war. The "story" in contemporary pedagogy (which has opportunistically concluded that knowledge is a story and all concepts are tropes) performs an essential ideological task: it offers a non-explanatory explanation and thus constructs an "enlightened false consciousness" in the classroom (Peter Sloterdijk, *Critique of Cynical Reason*, 5-6). Teaching by stories produces knowingness not knowledge and consequently cultivates a savvy cynicism about ideas, analysis, and explanation. It rejects causal explanations (in fact it dismisses the very idea of "cause-effect") and puts in its place vaguely plotted details that hint at moving but have no analytical yield: the pleasures of stories replace the cognitive. This is important because no account of the "event" can forget the CIA. However, most accounts of the "event", evoke the CIA to obscure its role by telling CIA stories of high intrigue in exotic lands and thus divert attention from the other CIA whose role is crucial in understanding the "event". The CIA which is openly discussed and critiqued to obtain radical credentials for the story-teller is, as Berube's tale demonstrates, a political agency of the US Government. The other CIA—the one that is covered up by these narrative details—is only officially a political agency of the State. In practice, it is the gendarme of American capitalism: it is an economic not a political outfit.