### Off

The aff reduces class analysis to a "one of many" in difference politics - this rhetorical strategy ignores the structural productions of the very forces they criticize.

-Plurality

-Social Production of Difference

-Relations of Production b4 Discourse

McLaren & D'Anniable 4 - (Peter, Valerie Scatamburlo, Educational Philosophy and Theory, Vol. 36, No. 2, 2004, © 2004 Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia April 2004, Class Dismissed? Historical materialism and the politics of ‘difference)

Eager to take a wide detour around political economy, post-Marxists tend to assume that the principal political points of departure in the current ‘postmodern’ world must necessarily be ‘cultural.’ As such, most, but not all post-Marxists have gravitated towards a politics of ‘difference’ which is largely premised on uncovering relations of power that reside in the arrangement and deployment of subjectivity in cultural and ideological practices (cf. Jordan & Weedon, 1995). Advocates of 'difference’ politics therefore posit their ideas as bold steps forward in advancing the interests of those historically marginalized by ‘dominant’ social and cultural narratives. There is no doubt that post-Marxism has advanced our knowledge of the hidden trajectories of power within the processes of representation and that it remains useful in adumbrating the formation of subjectivity and its expressive dimensions as well as complementing our understandings of the relationships between ‘difference,’ language, and cultural conﬁgurations. However, post-Marxists have been woefully remiss in addressing the constitution of class formations and the machinations of capitalist social organization. In some instances, capitalism and class relations have been thoroughly ‘otherized;’ in others, class is summoned only as part of the triumvirate of ‘race, class, and gender’ in which class is reduced to merely another form of ‘difference.’ Enamored with the ‘cultural’ and seemingly blind to the ‘economic,’ the rhetorical excesses of post-Marxists have also prevented them from considering the stark reality of contemporary class conditions under global capitalism. As we hope to show, the radical displacement of class analysis in contemporary theoretical narratives and the concomitant decentering of capitalism, the anointing of ‘difference’ as a primary explanatory construct, and the ‘culturalization’ of politics, have had detrimental effects on ‘left’ theory and practice. Reconceptualizing ‘Difference’ The manner in which ‘difference’ has been taken up within ‘post-al’ frameworks has tended to stress its cultural dimensions while marginalizing and, in some cases, completely ignoring the economic and material dimensions of difference. This posturing has been quite evident in many ‘post-al’ theories of ‘race’ and in the realm of ‘ludic’1 cultural studies that have valorized an account of difference—particularly ‘racial difference’—in almost exclusively ‘superstructuralist’ terms (Sahay, 1998). But this treatment of ‘difference’ and claims about ‘the “relative autonomy” of “race”’ have been ‘enabled by a reduction and distortion of Marxian class analysis’ which ‘involves equating class analysis with some version of economic determinism.’ The key move in this distorting gesture depends on the ‘view that the economic is the base, the cultural/political/ideological the superstructure.’ It is then ‘relatively easy to show that the (presumably non-political) economic base does not cause the political/cultural/ideological superstructure, that the latter is/are not epiphenomenal but relatively autonomous or autonomous causal categories’ (Meyerson, 2000, p. 2). In such formulations the ‘cultural’ is treated as a separate and autonomous sphere, severed from its embeddedness within sociopolitical and economic arrangements. As a result, many of these ‘culturalist’ narratives have produced autonomist and reiﬁed conceptualizations of difference which ‘far from enabling those subjects most marginalized by racial difference’ have, in effect, reduced ‘difference to a question of knowledge/power relations’ that can presumably be ‘dealt with (negotiated) on a discursive level without a fundamental change in the relations of production’ (Sahay, 1998). At this juncture, it is necessary to point out that arguing that ‘culture’ is generally conditioned/shaped by material forces does not reinscribe the simplistic and presumably ‘deterministic**’** base/superstructure metaphor **which** has plagued some strands of Marxist theory. Rather, we invoke Marx’s own writings from both the Grundrisse and Capital in which he contends that there is a consolidating logic in the relations of production that permeates society in the complex variety of its ‘empirical’ reality. This emphasizes Marx’s understanding of capitalism and capital as a ‘social’ relation—one which stresses the interpenetration of these categories, the realities which they reﬂect, and one which therefore offers a uniﬁed and dialectical analysis of history, ideology, culture, politics, economics and society (see also Marx, 1972, 1976, 1977).2 Foregrounding the limitations of ‘difference’ and ‘representational’ politics does not suggest a disavowal of the importance of cultural and/or discursive arena(s) as sites of contestation and struggle. We readily acknowledge the signiﬁcance of contemporary theorizations that have sought to valorize precisely those forms of ‘difference’ that have historically been denigrated. This has undoubtedly been an important development since they have enabled subordinated groups to reconstruct their own histories and give voice to their individual and collective identities. However, they have also tended to redeﬁne politics as a signifying activity generally conﬁned to the realm of ‘representation’ while displacing a politics grounded in the mobilization of forces against the material sources of political and economic marginalization. In their rush to avoid the ‘capital’ sin of ‘economism,’ many post-Marxists (who often ignore their own class privilege) have fallen prey to an ahistorical form of culturalism which holds, among other things, that cultural struggles external to class organizing provide the cutting edge of emancipatory politics.3 In many respects, this posturing, has yielded an ‘intellectual pseudopolitics’ that has served to empower ‘the theorist while explicitly disempowering’ real citizens (Turner, 1994, p. 410). We do not discount concerns over representation; rather our point is that progressive educators and theorists should not be straightjacketed by struggles that fail to move beyond the politics of difference and representation in the cultural realm. While space limitations prevent us from elaborating this point, we contend that culturalist arguments are deeply problematic both in terms of their penchant for de-emphasizing the totalizing (yes totalizing!) power and function of capital and for their attempts to employ culture as a construct that would diminish the centrality of class. In a proper historical materialist account, ‘culture’ is not the ‘other’ of class but, rather, constitutes part of a more comprehensive theorization of class rule in different contexts.4 ‘Post-al’ theorizations of ‘difference’ circumvent and undermine any systematic knowledge of the material dimensions of difference and tend to segregate questions of ‘difference’ from class formation and capitalist social relations. We therefore believe that it is necessary to (re)conceptualize ‘difference’ by drawing upon Marx’s materialist and historical formulations. ‘Difference’ needs to be understood as the product of social contradictions and in relation to political and economic organization. We need to acknowledge that ‘otherness’ and/or difference is not something that passively happens, but, rather, is actively produced. In other words, since systems of differences almost always involve relations of domination and oppression, we must concern ourselves with the economies of relations of difference that exist in speciﬁc contexts. Drawing upon the Marxist concept of mediation enables us to unsettle our categorical approaches to both class and difference, for it was Marx himself who warned against creating false dichotomies in the situation of our politics—that it was absurd to ‘choose between consciousness and the world, subjectivity and social organization, personal or collective will and historical or structural determination.’ In a similar vein, it is equally absurd to see ‘difference as a historical form of consciousness unconnected to class formation, development of capital and class politics’ (Bannerji, 1995, p. 30). Bannerji points to the need to historicize ‘difference’ in relation to the history and social organization of capital and class (inclusive of imperialist and colonialist legacies). Apprehending the meaning and function of difference in this manner necessarily highlights the importance of exploring (1) the institutional and structural aspects of difference; (2) the meanings that get attached to categories of difference; and (3) how differences are produced out of, and lived within speciﬁc historical formations.5 Moreover, it presents a challenge to those theorizations that work to consolidate ‘identitarian’ understandings of difference based exclusively on questions of cultural or racial hegemony. In such approaches, the answer to oppression often amounts to creating greater cultural space for the formerly excluded to have their voices heard (represented). In this regard, much of what is called the ‘politics of difference’ is little more than a demand for inclusion into the club of representation —a posture which reinscribes a neo-liberal pluralist stance rooted in the ideology of free-market capitalism. In short, the political sphere is modeled on the marketplace and freedom amounts to the liberty of all vendors to display their ‘different’ cultural goods. What advocates of this approach fail to address is that the forces of diversity and difference are allowed to ﬂourish provided that they remain within the prevailing forms of capitalist social arrangements. The neopluralism of difference politics (including those based on ‘race’) cannot adequately pose a substantive challenge to the productive system of capitalism that is able to accommodate a vast pluralism of ideas and cultural practices, and cannot capture the ways in which various manifestations of oppression are intimately connected to the central dynamics of capitalist exploitation. An historical materialist approach understands that categories of ‘difference’ are social/political constructs that are often encoded in dominant ideological formations and that they often play a role in ‘moral’ and ‘legal’ state-mediated forms of ruling. It also acknowledges the ‘material’ force of ideologies—particularly racist ideologies—that assign separate cultural and/or biological essences to different segments of the population which, in turn, serve to reinforce and rationalize existing relations of power. But more than this, an historical materialist understanding foregrounds the manner in which ‘difference’ is central to the exploitative production/ reproduction dialectic of capital, its labor organization and processes, and in the way labor is valued and renumerated.

#### 8Capitalism results in incalculable atrocities - this structural violence outweighs.

Herod 7 (James, Columbia U graduate and political activist, “Getting Free” Pg. 22-23 JF)

We must never forget that we are at war, however, and that we have been for five hundred years. We are involved in class warfare. This defines our situation historically and sets limits to what we can do. It would be nice to think of peace, for example, but this is out of the question. It is excluded as an option by historical conditions. Peace can be achieved only by destroying capitalism. The casualties from this war, on our side, long ago reached astronomical sums. It is estimated that thirty million people perished during the first century of the capitalist invasion of the Americas, including millions of Africans who were worked to death as slaves. Thousands of peasants died in the great revolts in France and Germany in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. During the enclosures movement in England and the first wave of industrialization, hundreds of thousands of people died needlessly. African slaves died by the millions (an estimated fifteen million) during the Atlantic crossing. Hundreds of poor people were hanged in London in the early nineteenth century to enforce the new property laws. During the Paris uprising of 1871, thirty thousand communards were slaughtered. Twenty million were lost in Joseph Stalin’s gulag, and millions more perished during the 1930s when the Soviet state expropriated the land and forced the collectivization of agriculture an event historically comparable to the enclosures in England (and thus the Bolsheviks destroyed one of the greatest peasant revolutions of all time). Thousands of militants were murdered by the German police during the near revolution in Germany and Austria in 1919. Thousands of workers and peasants were killed during the Spanish Civil War. Adolf Hitler killed ten million people in concentration camps (including six million Jews in the gas chambers**).** An estimated two hundred thousand labor leaders, activists, and citizens have been murdered in Guatemala since the coup engineered by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1954. Thousands were lost in the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. Half a million communists were massacred in Indonesia in 1975. Millions of Vietnamese were killed by French and U.S. capitalists during decades of colonialism and war. And how many were killed during British capital’s subjugation of India, and during capitalist Europe’s colonization of Asia and Africa? A major weapon of capitalists has always been to simply murder those who are threatening their rule. Thousands were killed by the contras and death squads in Nicaragua and El Salvador. Thousands were murdered in Chile by Augusto Pinochet during his counterrevolution, after the assassination of Salvador Allende. Speaking of assassinations, there is a long list: Patrice Lumumba, Rosa Luxemburg, Antonio Gramsci (died in prison), Ricardo Flores Magon (died in prison), Che Guevara, Gustav Landauer, Malcolm X, Martin Luther King Jr., Fred Hampton, George Jackson, the Haymarket anarchists, Amilcar Cabral, Steve Biko, Karl Liebnicht, Nat Turner, and thousands more. Thousands are being murdered every year now in Colombia. Thousands die every year in the workplace in the United States alone. Eighty thousand die needlessly in hospitals annually in the United States due to malpractice and negligence. Fifty thousand die each year in automobile accidents in the United States, deaths directly due to intentional capitalist decisions to scuttle mass transit in favor of an economy based on oil, roads, and cars (and unsafe cars to boot). Thousands have died in mines since capitalism began. Millions of people are dying right now, every year, from famines directly attributable to capitalists and from diseases easily prevented but for capitalists. Nearly all poverty-related deaths are because of capitalists. We cannot begin to estimate the stunted, wasted, and shortened lives caused by capitalists, not to mention the millions who have died fighting their stupid little world wars and equally stupid colonial wars. (This enumeration is very far from complete.) Capitalists (generically speaking) are not merely thieves; they are murderers. Their theft and murder is on a scale never seen before in history a scale so vast it boggles the mind. Capitalists make Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, Genghis Khan, and Attila the Hun look like boy scouts. This is a terrible enemy we face.

#### One must understand the existing social totality before one can act on it—grounding the sites of political contestation or knowledge outside of labor and surplus value merely serve to humanize capital and prevent a transition to a society beyond oppression

**Tumino**(Prof. English @ Pitt) **01**

[Stephen, “What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever”, Red Critique]

Any effective political theory will have to do at least two things: it will have to offer an integrated understanding of social practices and, based on suchan interrelated knowledge, offera guideline for praxis. My main argument here is that among all contesting social theories now, only Orthodox Marxism has been able to produce an integrated knowledge of the existing social totality and provide lines of praxis that will lead to building a society free from necessity.But first I must clarify what I mean by Orthodox Marxism. Like all other modes and forms of political theory, the very theoretical identity of Orthodox Marxism is itself contested—not just from non-and anti-Marxists who question the very "real" (by which they mean the "practical" as under free-market criteria) existence of any kind of Marxism now but, perhaps more tellingly, from within the Marxist tradition itself. I will, therefore, first say what I regard to be the distinguishing marks of Orthodox Marxism and then outline a short polemical map of contestation over Orthodox Marxism within the Marxist theories now. I will end by arguing for its effectivity in bringing about a new society based not on human rights but on freedom from necessity. I will argue thatto know contemporary society—and to be able to act on such knowledge—one has to first of all know what makes the existing social totality. I will argue that the dominant social totality is based on inequality—not just inequality of power but inequality of economic access (which then determines access to health care, education, housing, diet, transportation, . . . ). Thissystematic inequality cannot be explained by gender, race, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, or nationality. These are all secondary contradictionsand are all determined by the fundamental contradiction of capitalism which is inscribed in the relation of capital and labor. All modes of Marxism now explain social inequalities primarily on the basis of these secondary contradictions and in doing so—and this is my main argument—legitimate capitalism. Why? Because such arguments authorize capitalism without gender, race, discrimination and thus accept economic inequality as an integral part of human societies. They accept a sunny capitalism—a capitalism beyond capitalism. Such a society, based on cultural equality but economic inequality, has always been the not-so-hidden agenda of the bourgeois left—whether it has been called "new left," "postmarxism," or "radical democracy." This is, by the way, the main reason for its popularity in the culture industry—from the academy (Jameson, Harvey, Haraway, Butler,. . . ) to daily politics (Michael Harrington, Ralph Nader, Jesse Jackson,. . . ) to. . . .For all, capitalism is here to stay and the best that can be done is to make its cruelties more tolerable, more humane. This humanization (not eradication) of capitalism is the sole goal of ALL contemporary lefts (marxism, feminism, anti-racism, queeries, . . . ). Such an understanding of social inequality is based on the fundamental understanding that the source of wealth is human knowledge and not human labor. That is, wealth is produced by the human mind and is thus free from the actual objective conditions that shape the historical relations of labor and capital. Only Orthodox Marxism recognizes the historicity of labor and its primacy as the source of all human wealth. In this paper I argue that any emancipatory theory has to be founded on recognition of the priority of Marx's labor theory of value and not repeat the technological determinism of corporate theory ("knowledge work") that masquerades as social theory.

### Off

#### The 1AC’s pedagogy over-focuses on the damages of colonialism and the oppressed status of the indigenous – this shuts off any resistant value that their project may have – voting negative to reject their damage-narratives endorses a pedagogy of desire that is more liberatory

**Tuck 9** – State University of New York

(Eve, “Suspending Damage: A Letter to Communities”, Harvard Educational Review Vol. 79 No. 3 Fall 2009, dml)

Some scholars have built their careers around producing damage narratives of tribalized and detribalized peoples

AND

particularly women who are poor and of color. (p. 11)

#### Research centered at the subjugation of the oppressed increases colonization. Identity is reduced to a people’s who identity is centered in lacking wholeness

Tuck and Yang ’14 – A. Prof of Educational Foundations @ State U. of New York at New Paltz and A. Prof in Ethnic Studies @ U.C. San Diego ( Eve and K. Wayne, “ R-Words: Refusing Research”, Humanizing Research, p.226-231//JC )

Similarly, at the center of the analysis in this chapter is a concern with the fixation social science research has exhibited in eliciting pain stories from com­munities that are not White, not wealthy, and not straight. Academe’s demon­strated fascination with telling and retelling narratives of pain is troubling, both for its voyeurism and for its consumptive implacability. Imagining “itself to be a voice, and in some disciplinary iterations, the voice of the colonised” (Simpson, 2007, p. 67, emphasis in the original) is not just a rare historical occurrence in anthropology and related fields. We observe that much of the work of the academy is to reproduce stories of oppression in its own voice. At first, this may read as an intolerant condemnation of the academy, one that refuses to forgive past blunders and see how things have changed in recent decades. However, it is our view that while many individual scholars have cho­sen to pursue other lines of inquiry than the pain narratives typical of their disciplines, novice researchers emerge from doctoral programs eager to launch pain-based inquiry projects because they believe that such approaches embody what it means to do social science. The collection of pain narratives and the theories of change that champion the value of such narratives are so prevalent in the social sciences that one might surmise that they are indeed what the academy is about. In her examination of the symbolic violence of the academy, bell hooks (1990) portrays the core message from the academy to those on the margins as thus: No need to hear your voice when I can talk about you better than you can speak about yourself. No need to hear your voice. Only tell me about your pain. I want to know your story. And then I will tell it back to you in a new way. Tell it back to you in such a way that it has become mine, my own. Re-writing you I write myself anew. I am still author, authority. I am still colonizer the speaking subject and you are now at the center of my talk. (p. 343) Hooks’s words resonate with our observation of how much of social science research is concerned with providing recognition to the presumed voiceless, a recognition that is enamored with knowing through pain. Further, this passage describes the ways in which the researcher’s voice is constituted by, legitimated by, animated by the voices on the margins. The researcher-self is made anew by telling back the story of the marginalized/subaltern subject. Hooks works to untangle the almost imperceptible differences between forces that silence and forces that seemingly liberate by inviting those on the margins to speak, to tell their stories. Yet the forces that invite those on the margins to speak also say, “Do not speak in a voice of resistance. Only speak from that space in the margin that is a sign of deprivation, a wound, an unfulfilled longing. Only speak your pain” (hooks, 1990, p. 343).

#### We must reject the affirmative as an example of Pain-centered research. The alternative of desire-based research solves the case and avoids the pitfall of pain-centered research

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Craig Gingrich-Philbrook (2005) articulates a related critique of autoethnography, positioning himself as a “narrator who appreciates autoethnography, at least as compared to its positivist alternatives, but one who simultaneously distrusts autoethnography’s pursuit of legitimacy in the form of the patriarch’s blessing and family values” (p. 298). Gingrich-Philbrook locates his concern in what autoethnography/ers are willing to do to secure academic legitimacy (p. 300): “My fears come down to the consequences of how badly autoethno-graphy wants Daddy’s approval” (p. 310). By this Gingrich-Philbrook means that much of autoethnography has fixated on “attempting to justify the presence of the self in writing to the patriarchal council of self-satisfied social scientists” (p. 311). Though Gingrich-Philbrook does not go into detail about how precisely the “presence of the self’ is justified via the performativity of subjugated knowledges (what we are calling pain narratives), he insists that autoethnography is distracted by trying to satisfy Daddy’s penchant for accounts of oppression. In my own autobiographical performance projects, I identify this chiasmatic shift in the possibility that all those performances I did about getting bashed only provided knowledge of subjugation, serving almost as an advertisement for power: “Don’t let this happen to you. Stay in the closet.” In large part motivated by Elizabeth Bell’s writings about performance and pleasure, I decided to write more about the gratifications of same-sex relationships, to depict intimacy and desire, the kinds of subjugated knowledges we don’t get to see on the after school specials and movies of the week that parade queer bruises and broken bones but shy away from the queer kiss. (p. 312) Participatory action research and other research approaches that involve participants in constructing the design and collection of voice (as data) are not immune to the fetish for pain narratives. It is a misconception that by simply building participation into a project—by increasing the number of people who collaborate in collecting data—ethical issues of representation, voice, con-sumption, and voyeurism are resolved. There are countless examples of research in which community or youth participants have made their own stories of loss and pain the objects of their inquiry (see also Tuck & Guishard, forthcoming). Alongside analyses of pain and damage-centered research, Eve (Tuck 2009, 2010) has theorized desire-based research as not the antonym but rather the antidote for damage-focused narratives. Pain narratives are always incomplete. They bemoan the food deserts, but forget to see the food innovations; they lament the concrete jungles and miss the roses and the tobacco from concrete. Desire- centered research does not deny the experience of tragedy, trauma, and pain, but positions the knowing derived from such experiences as wise. This is not about seeing the bright side of hard times, or even believing that everything happens for a reason. Utilizing a desire-based framework is about working inside a more complex and dynamic understanding of what one, or a community, comes to know in (a) lived life. Logics of pain focus on events, sometimes hiding structure, always adhering to a teleological trajectory of pain, brokenness, repair, or irreparability—-from unbroken, to broken, and then to unbroken again. Logics of pain require time to be organized as linear and rigid, in which the pained body (or community or people) is set back or delayed on some kind of path of humanization, and now must catch up (but never can) to the settler/unpained/abled body (or community or people or society or philosophy or knowledge system). In this way, the logics of pain has superseded the now outmoded racism of an explicit racial hierarchy with a much more politically tolerable racism of a developmental hierarchy.2 Under a developmental hierarchy, in which some were undeterred by pain and oppression, and others were waylaid by their victimry and subaltemity, dam¬age-centered research reifies a settler temporality and helps suppress other under¬standings of time. Desire-based frameworks, by contrast, look to the past and the future to situate analyses. Desire is about longing, about a present that is enriched by both the past and the future; it is integral to our humanness. It is not only the painful elements of social and psychic realities, but also the textured acumen and hope. (Tuck, 2010, p. 644) In this way, desire is time-warping. The logics of desire is asynchronous just as it is distemporal, living in the gaps between the ticking machinery of discipli¬nary institutions. To be clear, again, we are not making an argument against the existence of pain, or for the erasure of memory, experience, and wisdom that comes with suffering. Rather, we see the collecting of narratives of pain by social scientists to already be a double erasure, whereby pain is documented in order to be erased, often by eradicating the communities that are supposedly injured and supplanting them with hopeful stories of progress into a better, Whiter, world. Vizenor talks about such “the consumer notion of a ‘hopeful book,”’ and we would add hopeful or feel-good research, as “a denial of tragic wisdom” bent on imagining “a social science paradise of tribal victims” (1993, p. 14). Desire interrupts this metanarrative of damaged communities and White progress.

### Case

a.) How progressive of you, right on! the 1AC is apt in describing the ethical injustice of colonialism, but leaves out how it is pertinent FOR THEM save for this condesending savior mentality.

Halberstam 13 - Professor of English and Director of The Center for Feminist Research at University of Southern California. (Jack, http://www.minorcompositions.info/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/undercommons-web.pdf, The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and Black Study) -modified

These kinds of examples get to the heart of Moten and Harney’s world of the undercommons – the undercommons is not a realm where we rebel and we create critique; it is not a place where we “take arms against a sea of troubles/and by opposing end them.” The undercommons is a space and time which is always here. Our goal – and the “we” is always the right mode of address here – is not to end the troubles but to end the world that created those particular troubles as the ones that must be opposed. Moten and Harney refuse the logic that stages refusal as inactivity, as the absence of a plan and as a mode of stalling real politics. Moten and Harney tell us to listen to the noise we make and to refuse the offers we receive to shape that noise into “music.” In the essay that many people already know best from this volume, “The University and the Undercommons,” Moten and Harney come closest to explaining their mission. Refusing to be for or against the university and in fact marking the critical academic as the player who holds the “for and against” logic in place, Moten and Harney lead us to the “Undercommons of the Enlightenment” where subversive intellectuals engage both the university and fugitivity: “where the work gets done, where the work gets subverted, where the revolution is still black, still strong.” The subversive intellectual, we learn, is unprofessional, uncollegial, passionate and disloyal. The subversive intellectual is neither trying to extend the university nor change the university, the subversive intellectual is not toiling in misery and from this place of misery articulating a “general antagonism.” In fact, the subversive intellectual enjoys the ride and wants it to be faster and wilder; she does not want a room of his or her own, she wants to be in the world, in the world with others and making the world anew. Moten insists: “Like Deleuze. I believe in the world and want to be in it. I want to be in it all the way to the end of it because I believe in another world in the world and I want to be in that. And I plan to stay a believer, like Curtis Mayfield. But that’s beyond me, and even beyond me and Stefano, and out into the world, the other thing, the other world, the joyful noise of the scattered, scatted eschaton, the undercommon refusal of the academy of misery.” The mission then for the denizens of the undercommons is to recognize that when you seek to make things better, you are not just doing it for the Other, you must also be doing it for yourself. While men may think they are being “sensitive” by turning to feminism, while white people may think they are being right on by opposing racism, no one will really be able to embrace the mission of tearing “this shit down” until they realize that the structures they oppose are not only bad for some of us, they are bad for all of us. Gender hierarchies are bad for men as well as women and they are really bad for the rest of us. Racial hierarchies are not rational and ordered, they are chaotic and nonsensical and must be opposed by precisely all those who benefit in any way from them. Or, as Moten puts it: “The coalition emerges out of your recognition that it’s [messed] up for you, in the same way that we’ve already recognized that it’s fucked up for us. I don’t need your help. I just need you to recognize that this shit is killing you, too, however much more softly, you stupid motherfucker, you know?” coalition unites us in the recognition that we must change things or die. All of us. We must all change the things that are fucked up and change cannot come in the form that we think of as “revolutionary” – not as a masculinist surge or an armed confrontation. Revolution will come in a form we cannot yet imagine. Moten and Harney propose that we prepare now for what will come by entering into study. Study, a mode of thinking with others separate from the thinking that the institution requires of you, prepares us to be embedded in what Harney calls “the with and for” and allows you to spend less time antagonized and antagonizing. Like all world-making and all world-shattering encounters, when you enter this book and learn how to be with and for, in coalition, and on the way to the place we are already making, you will also feel fear, trepidation, concern, and disorientation. The disorientation, Moten and Harney will tell you is not just unfortunate, it is necessary because you will no longer be in one location moving forward to another, instead you will already be part of “the “movement of things” and on the way to this “outlawed social life of nothing.” The movement of things can be felt and touched and exists in language and in fantasy, it is flight, it is motion, it is fugitivity itself. Fugitivity is not only escape, “exit” as Paolo Virno might put it, or “exodus” in the terms offered by Hardt and Negri, fugitivity is being separate from settling. It is a being in motion that has learned that “organizations are obstacles to organising ourselves” (The Invisible Committee in The Coming Insurrection) and that there are spaces and modalities that exist separate from the logical, logistical, the housed and the positioned. Moten and Harney call this mode a “being together in homelessness” which does not idealize homelessness nor merely metaphorize it. Homelessness is the state of dispossession that we seek and that we embrace: “Can this being together in homelessness, this interplay of the refusal of what has been refused, this undercommon appositionality, be a place from which emerges neither self-consciousness nor knowledge of the other but an improvisation that proceeds from somewhere on the other side of an unasked question?” I think this is what Jay-Z and Kanye West (another collaborative unit of study) call “no church in the wild.”

b.) Absent this discussion, the affirmative occupies the position of the Maoist - the impact is imperialism and a reproduction of the harms of the 1ac.

Rey Chow, Comparative Literature—Brown University, 1993

Writing Diaspora, p. 15-16

The Orientalist has a special sibling whom I will, in order to highlight her significance as a kind of representational agency, call the Maoist. Arif Dirlik, who has written extensively on the history of political movements in twentieth-century China, sums up the interpretation of Mao Zedong commonly found in Western Marxist analyses in terms of a "Third Worldist fantasy"—"a fantasy of Mao as a Chinese reincarnation of Marx who fulfilled the Marxist promise that had been betrayed in the West."'6 The Maoist was the phoenix which arose from the ashes of the great disillusionment with Western culture in the 1960s and which found hope in the Chinese Communist Revolution.17 In the 1970s, when it became possible for Westerners to visit China as guided and pampered guests of the Beijing establishment, Maoists came back with reports of Chinese society's absolute, positive difference from Western society and of the Cultural Revolution as "the most important and innovative example of Mao's concern with the pursuit of egalitarian, populist, and communitarian ideals in the course of economic modernization" (Harding, p. 939). At that time, even poverty in China was regarded as "spiritually ennobling, since it meant that [the] Chinese were not possessed by the wasteful and acquisitive consumerism of the United States" (Harding, p. 941). Although the excessive admiration of the 1970s has since been replaced by an oftentimes equally excessive denigration of China, the Maoist is very much alive among us, and her significance goes far beyond the China and East Asian fields. Typically, the Maoist is a cultural critic who lives in a capitalist society but who is fed up with capitalism—a cultural critic, in other words, who wants a social order opposed to the one that is supporting her own undertaking. The Maoist is thus a supreme example of the way desire works: What she wants is always located in the other, resulting in an iden-tification with and valorization of that which she is not/does not have. Since what is valorized is often the other's deprivation—"having" poverty or "having" nothing—the Maoist's strategy becomes in the main a rhetorical renunciation of the material power that enables her rhetoric. In terms of intellectual lineage, one of the Maoist's most important ancestors is Charlotte Bronte's Jane Eyre. Like Jane, the Maoist's means to moral power is a specific representational position—the position of powerlessness. In their reading of Jane Eyre, Nancy Armstrong and Leonard Tennenhouse argue that the novel exemplifies the paradigm of violence that expresses its dominance through a representation of the self as powerless: Until the very end of the novel, Jane is always excluded from every available form of social power. Her survival seems to depend on renouncing what power might come to her as teacher, mistress, cousin, heiress, or missionary's wife. She repeatedly flees from such forms of inclusion in the field of power, as if her status as an exemplary subject, like her authority as narrator, depends entirely on her claim to a kind of truth which can only be made from a position of powerlessness. By creating such an unlovely heroine and subjecting her to one form of harassment after another, Bronte demonstrates the power of words alone. This reading of Jane Eyre highlights her not simply as the female underdog who is often identified by feminist and Marxist critics, but as the intellectual who acquires power through a moral rectitude that was to become the flip side of Western imperialism's ruthlessness. Lying at the core of Anglo-American liberalism, this moral rectitude would accompany many territorial and economic conquests overseas with a firm sense of social mission. When Jane Eyre went to the colonies in the nineteenth century, she turned into the Christian missionary. It is this understanding—that Bronte's depic-tion of a socially marginalized English woman is, in terms of ideological production, fully complicit with England's empire-building ambition rather than opposed to it—that prompted Gayatri Spivak to read Jane Eyre as a text in the service of imperialism. Referring to Bronte's treatment of the "madwoman" Bertha Mason, the white Jamaican Creole character, Spivak charges Jane Eyre for, precisely, its humanism, in which the "native subject" is not created as an animal but as "the object of what might be termed the terrorism of the categorical imperative." This kind of creation is imperialism's use/travesty of the Kantian metaphysical demand to "make the heathen into a human so that he can be treated as an end in himself."19 In the twentieth century, as Europe's former colonies became independent, Jane Eyre became the Maoist. Michel de Certeau describes the affinity between her two major reincarnations, one religious and the other political, this way: The place that was formerly occupied by the Church or Churches vis-4-vis the established powers remains recognizable, over the past two centuries, in the functioning of the opposition known as leftist. [T]here is vis-A-vis the established order, a relationship between the Churches that defended an other world and the parties of the left which, since the nineteenth century, have promoted a different future. In both cases, similar functional characteristics can be discerned. . . The Maoist retains many of Jane's awesome features, chief of which are a protestant passion to turn powerlessness into "truth" and an idealist intolerance of those who may think differently from her. Whereas the great Orientalist blames the living "third world" natives for the loss of the ancient non-Western civilization, his loved object, the Maoist applauds the same natives for personifying and fulfilling her ideals. For the Maoist in the 1970s, the mainland Chinese were, in spite of their "backwardness," a puritanical alternative to the West in human form—a dream come true.

Red pedagogy is inherently Western and discounts Indigenous worldviews outside the university

Beauline-Sterling 12—Rebecca, MA student at York University, A review of Red Pedagogy: Native American Social and Political Thought by Sandy Grande, NeoAmericanist Vol. 6, No. 1, Spring/Summer, <http://www.neoamericanist.org/review/red-pedagogy>, Shree

I certainly appreciate much of Grande’s thought, as her writing resonates with some of my own critiques of postmodern and critical theory. I also welcome her historical materialist analysis of past and present social relations. This text indeed marks a significant contribution to critical education theory and Indigenous academic work, yet I cannot help but ask: who is it written for?

Though she positions herself among other Indigenous scholars, Grande’s theory is articulated through a Western epistemic frame. The language and content is accessible only to an academic audience and as such, seems to be written “for” critical theorists rather than Indigenous people or communities. ¶ As an Indigenous woman negotiating my way through academia, I have come to understand what Grande calls the “Native theory of antitheory” wherein “engagement in abstract theory seems indulgent – a luxury and privilege of the academic elite. Further, theory itself is viewed as definitively Eurocentric – inherently contradictory to the aims of [I]ndigenous education” (p. 2). While this “theory of antitheory” persists in our communities – and with good reason – Indigenous ways of knowing and being still form the basis for resistance and emancipatory projects across Turtle Island. Our world-views are rich and complex, full of theories that are merely ignored and devalued in the academy, the space for them “conscripted by academic colonialism” (p. 103). Yet these theories have made their way into universities, albeit ever slowly and not without struggle. Our voices grow stronger beyond the boundaries prescribed for us.¶ Grande calls for an expansion of “the intellectual borders of [I]ndigenous intellectualism” (p. 3). I hope that this does not mean that Indigenous intellectuals – our Elders, knowledge keepers and emerging leaders existing primarily outside of the university – are insufficient in their “intellectualism” and must engage with critical theory as Grande has done in this text. Certainly it is important that Indigenous people create and find spaces within the academy to formulate and share knowledge grounded in their own world-views. Most of us will have no choice but to engage with whitestream theories, though some of us will find ways to work through or around them. Universities are important and difficult places for that reason. In the same way, Grande’s text is an incredible contribution. But academia, critical theory and the university are not the only means by which we can remember, revitalize and share our knowledges for the purposes of decolonization, a promise of “the good life” for generations to come. ¶ We must be careful in how we relate to our own people, how in our own theorizing we ostensibly place value (or not) on the rich knowledge sometimes hidden in our families and communities. How we write reflects how we relate, just as who we write for reflects who we consider as part of that relation.

It privleges the macroframe

Calderón 6—Dolores, J.D., is a PhD Candidate at UCLA’s Graduate School of Education and Information Studies with a specialization in race and ethnic studies, Review: Red Pedagogy: Native American Social and Political Thought by Sandy Grande, InterActions: UCLA Journal of Education and Information Studies Volume 2, Issue 1, <http://escholarship.org/uc/item/3qp8c635>, Shree

Grande challenges both Western Critical theorists and American Indians to question the presuppositions they bring in their scholarship. As she states:¶ To begin, the predominantly white, middle-class advocates of critical theory will need to examine how their language and epistemic frames act as homogenizing agents when interfaced with the conceptual and analytical categories persistent within American Indian educational theory and praxis. They will especially need to examine the degree to which critical pedagogies retain the deep structures of Western thought (p. 3).¶ Grande also challenges American Indian scholars to “challenge their own propensity to privilege local knowledge and personal experience over the macroframes of social and political theory” (p. 3). However, while Grande’s work identifies necessary points of collaboration, it overlooks the distinctiveness of indigenous knowledge systems that are fully equipped with philosophies and approaches to the world. And while Grande points out the limitations of Western theoretical discourses, both her critique of American Indian scholars and her articulation of red pedagogy ultimately utilize Western theoretical constructs and assumptions.

### 2nc

Medina, ‘11

Jose, “Toward a Foucaultian Epistemology of Resistance: Counter-Memory, Epistemic Friction, and Guerrilla Pluralism,” http://www.vanderbilt.edu/AnS/philosophy/\_people/faculty\_files/\_medinafoucaultstudies.pdf

Insurrectionary genealogies exploit the openness of our (indefinitely multiple) pasts. As G.H. Mead suggested in the Philosophy of the Present (1949), the past is as open as the future,56 and they are both equally dependent on the present. As Mead puts it, ‚the novelty of every future demands a novel past.‛ 57 The past is renewed in and through our interpretative practices; it is rendered present in our lives through interpretations that are always the result of re-descriptions and negotiations from the vantage point of the present informed by our current vision of the future.58 For this reason, our past is incessantly novel: we make it and remake it, incessantly, in every present.59 But here an important worry arises: the worry of instrumentalization. We can do harm to past subjects by instrumentalizing their struggles, by co-opting their voices and experiences and using them for our own purposes. If forgetting or ignoring past subjects and their struggles can be unjust, we also commit injustices through the **epistemic spoliation of past lives**. We have obligations with respect to subjects of the past, who had their own interests and values. For example, those who have lived under slavery, the victims of Auschwitz, those tortured and killed by dictatorial regimes, the thousands who die every year in the USA without medi- cal attention or basic necessities, and many others should be remembered not simply because we find it useful or in our interest, but because their lives and deaths deserve critical attention and to be put in relation to our own. Following Mead as well as critical theorists as different as Jürgen Habermas and Walter Benjamin, James Bohman (2009) and Max Pensky (2009) have argued against the instrumentalization of the past and for the need to give moral recognition to past subjects and moral weight to their experiences and perspectives. As Bohman puts it, ‚we do not just deliberate about the past but rather with the past.‛ 60 From a Foucaultian perspective the instrumentalization worry is appeased not by giving moral recognition to subjects of the past as partners in deliberation, but rather, by acknowledging their agency and power/knowledges, whether or not these can be recruited to our deliberation processes in the way we would like.

#### Protests against racist NA policies now

Moya-Smith 10/27/13 (Simon – reporter @ NBC) “'It's always been about the hatred of Indian skin': Native Americans, allies protest Washington Redskins in Denver”

Hundreds of people rallied in Denver on Sunday to protest the name of the Washington Redskins and to send a message to team owner Dan Snyder that the nickname is derogatory to Native Americans.¶ Two Native American organizations, American Indian Movement Colorado and Idle No More Denver, began the demonstration Sunday morning as the team prepared to kick-off against the Denver Broncos.¶ Tessa McLean of the Ojibwe Nation and youth council leader of AIM Colorado, told NBC News that they marched to Sports Authority Field from nearby Auraria Campus and met the players and coaches with placards, drums and a bullhorn as the team pulled into the parking lot.¶ McLean added that Native Americans and their allies spent Saturday afternoon making signs for the demonstration, some reading "Change the Name" with others declaring, "What's in a name? Everything!"¶ "(Redskins) is a term that was created for proof of Indian kill," she said, referencing the early-American sale of Indian scalps.¶ Tink Tinker of the Osage Nation and a professor of American Indian Cultures and Religious Traditions at the University of Denver, told the crowd that the issue demonstrates a history of racism toward Native Americans.¶ "It's always been about the hatred of Indian skin," he said.¶ Basim Mahmood, whose ancestry stems from east India, told NBC News he was there to protest against discrimination.¶ "As a person of Indian origin, I stand in solidarity with them because we are all fighting the same thing — which is racism," he said.¶ Radio ads, paid for by the Oneida Indian Nation in New York, have aired in cities where the Washington Redskins are scheduled to play. Prior to Sunday's match-up between the two teams, Denver's Sports Station KDSP-FM ran the latest ad.¶ Oneida Nation has encouraged Americans to lobby the NFL in support of the name change at www.changethemascot.org, a website that debuted at the beginning of the 2013-14 football season.¶ The issue over the team name has even prompted comments from President Barack Obama who said that were he the owner of the team, he would consider changing the name.¶ "I've got to say, if I were the owner of the team and I knew that there was a name of my team, even if it had a storied history that was offending a sizable group of people, I'd think about changing it," he said.¶ Washington D.C. Mayor Vincent Gray chimed into the debate earlier this year by stating that if the team wishes to relocate within the district's borders from its base in Landover, Maryland, Snyder would need to consider changing the name.¶ On Oct. 9, Snyder released a statement saying that he "respects the opinion of those who disagree" with his position, but reiterated that he remains immovable on the subject, citing an acclaimed team history.¶ "We owe it to our fans and coaches and players, past and present, to preserve that heritage," he wrote.¶ Numerous sports writers and publications including Mother Jones, Slate and the New Republic have recently announced that they have instituted policies against using the team name in their stories.¶ This week, officials of the NFL will meet with the Oneida Indian Nation in New York City to discuss the caustic subject of a name change, the Associated Press reports.¶ Debra Preston of the Omaha Nation, who was at Invesco Field protesting with her 8-year-old granddaughter, Lilliah Walker, told NBC News she was there in honor of Native American children and elders.¶ "We want Indian mascots to be deleted from mother earth," she said. "This is our country, our nation, and we're sick and tired of racist names being used against us."¶ A group of Native Americans have sued the Washington Redskins arguing against the team's trademark rights to the name. Trademarks that are deemed racist are illegal under U.S. federal law.

#### Protests now

Rapid-city Journal 4-28

“Native American Protest Riles Canada”

OTTAWA—A three-week-long hunger strike by a Native American chief in Canada over alleged abuses of land rights and other grievances is stoking wider protests that are also spilling over into the U.S.¶ Theresa Spence, chief of the Attawapiskat First Nation in Northern Ontario, was on the 24th day of a hunger strike Thursday that she says won't end until Prime Minister Stephen Harper agrees to meet with Native American chiefs to address the alleged wrongdoings.¶ Enlarge Image¶ A hunger strike by Chief Spence, center, is becoming a rallying point. Sipa Press¶ Mr. Harper has declined to meet the chief. Canada's minister responsible for aboriginal affairs, John Duncan, has said he would meet with Ms. Spence. But she has refused the offer, calling Mr. Duncan a "program manager," Ms. Spence's spokesman said.¶ Ms. Spence has cited provisions in a recent budget bill that she argues weakens environmental protection on native land, and alleged violations to treaty accords over proposals to lease territory belonging to First Nations, a group of native peoples.¶ The protest has become a rallying point for a broad group of protesters and inspired scattered rallies in some U.S. cities. Some protesters say they will blockade crossings on the U.S.-Canadian border Saturday.¶ "There are a lot of crossings, but there are a lot of Indians to blockade them," said Ron Plain, a spokesman for the blockades, which are being organized by members of the Aamjiwnaang First Nation in southern Ontario.¶ Canadian National Railway Co. CNR.T -1.33% won an injunction Wednesday to end a two-week blockade of a railway line in Sarnia, Ontario, organized by the group.¶ Another group, Idle No More, has promised a series of national protests after setting up rallies across Canada to back Ms. Spence. One of its organizers, Alexandria Wilson, said the group also helped organize recent rallies in Denver, Boston, New York and other U.S. cities.¶ Some Canadians dismiss Ms. Spencer's charges, saying that substantial resources have been plowed into First Nations and that the country has had better relations with its indigenous citizens than the U.S. They say complaints about native people's relative deprivation should be addressed to native leaders who typically manage their resources, such as Ms. Spence.¶ Mark Milke, a director at Fraser Institute, a nonpartisan think tank, said some indigenous leaders haven't addressed economic and internal governance issues. "I don't think Chief Spence is the best spokeswoman for progressive policy, given the problem is a broken system of reserves which often don't have a connection to the wider economy," he said.¶ The Spence spokesman said the chief wasn't available for comment due to her "vulnerable" state. Ms. Spence is holding her protest in a teepee on an island on the Ottawa River, just northwest of Canada's main parliament buildings in the capital.¶ Mr. Duncan will continue to "try to engage" Ms. Spence and other First Nation leaders, a Duncan spokesman said. Under Mr. Harper, annual spending at Canada's aboriginal affairs department has risen by a third to C$7.2 billion (US$7.3 billion) in the past six years, he said. Still, as in the U.S., Canada's indigenous communities lag the wider population in economic well-being and health. The unemployment rate among Canadian aboriginals hit 14.3% in 2010, versus 7.9% rate for other Canadians. First Nations members earned an average of $19,000 a year, against a national average of $33,000, according to the country's 2006 census.¶ But while the protests have attracted support, a number of media commentators and think tanks have criticized the increasingly broad-based movement, calling its aims confused and ridiculing Ms. Spence for allowing herself to eat fish broth in the hunger strike. Her spokesman said the broth was meant "to keep the kidneys going."

#### Lakota protests now against pipelines

Indian Country 10/18/13 “Anishinaabe and Lakota Riders Protest Pipelines, on Horseback” http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/gallery/photo/anishinaabe-and-lakota-riders-protest-pipelines-horseback-151792

Thundering across the plains on horseback, along the routes of two proposed oil pipelines, Earth’s Army has wound up its journey to draw attention to not just TransCanada’s Keystone XL pipeline, but also a lesser-known one being proposed by Enbridge across White Earth territory.¶ On Monday October 14, while many across Turtle Island were flocking to malls in search of Columbus Day sales, a group of riders were on Day 2 of their 150-mile journey from the Pine Ridge Reservation to the Cheyenne River Reservation in South Dakota, tracing the approximate route of the proposed Keystone XL pipeline.¶ Led by Percy White Plume, a descendant of the survivors of the 1890 Wounded Knee massacre, they rode to oppose the so-called man camps built to house the transient laborers who will be brought in to build the pipeline, as well as “to protect our water,” White Plume said.¶ “We can drink bottled water, but our relatives in the horse nation, the buffalo nation and the animals cannot drink bottled water, our water is sacred,” he said.¶ Keystone XL would cross Lakota territory and the Oglala Aquifer, which is the primary source of water for most of the region, noted the organizers. The ride was organized by the Horse Spirit Society of Wounded Knee, sponsored by Honor the Earth, and supported by the Swift Family Foundation, U.S. Climate Action Network and 350.org.¶ “The ride began the same day as the 800,000 gallon plus pipeline spill from a Tesoro six inch line near Tioga, North Dakota was revealed to the press, and amidst a federal shutdown, in which it is not clear that [pipeline safety inspectors] are available,” the organizers said in a statement on the ride’s second day. “The ride also follows a freak … two-foot blizzard which killed over 100,000 cattle in the largely rural ranching state. Amidst the changing weather, and riding through fields still littered with the carcasses of dead cattle, overturned trees and flooded creeks, 25 riders and supporters continue north.”¶ It was the second ride in as many weeks. During the first week of October a smaller, Anishinaabe group headed by LaDuke rode along the proposed route of another would-be pipeline. The construction of the Sandpiper pipeline and the expansion of the Alberta Clipper pipeline have not garnered the attention that the Keystone XL has, though they too would cut through sacred lands and ecologically sensitive areas.¶ The Minnesota Public Utilities Commission is considering the Enbridge Alberta Clipper expansion proposal, which would create a pipeline much larger than Keystone XL. It would run from Hardisty, Alberta across northern Minnesota to Superior, Wisconsin, according to the Minneapolis Star Tribune.¶ The rides are winding up just as Congress begins hearings on the climate change initiatives proposed by President Barack Obama, as Bloomberg newswire pointed out. In addition, Thursday October 17 “marks the fifth anniversary of the Keystone XL pipeline’s non-approval,” the newswire said, with Friday a deadline imposed by Obama for stronger coal-plant-emission rules.¶ “We will oppose the devastation that the proposed Enbridge Sandpiper pipeline would cause in our home community of White Earth,” said LaDuke in a statement from Honor the Earth. “We will be working in coordination with partner organizations and allies to launch a media campaign and public education effort against the Alberta Clipper expansion and the Sandpiper pipelines. We will also join our Lakota relatives to ride in the west.”¶ This they did, and here is the photographic record of the prayer-filled rides. Below, the riders in action.

#### Frames of life

#### Badiou 2001 (Alain, Professor of Philosophy at Université Paris, Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil, 2001. pg. xii-xiv)

An ethics of truths, then, is designed to cultivate: a sense of discernment (do not confuse the true and the false); courage and endurance (do not betray the true); moderation and restraint (resist the idea of total or ‘substantial’ truth). The logic relation of Good and Evil is thus perfectly clear: first the Good (the affirmation of a truth), then the risk of Evil (as perversion of the Good). The polemic thrust of the book’s opening chapter follows as an equally logical conse­quence, for the recent liberal-humanist recourse to ethics —what Badiou calls our ‘ethical ideology’ — presumes the opposite derivation: first the assumption of an a priori evil (totalitarianism, violence, suffering), then the imposition of an essentially defensive ethics, a ‘respect’ for negative liberties and ‘human rights’. ‘Ethics’ here simply means protection from abusive interference. It amounts to an intellectual justification of the status quo. Operating exclusively in the realm of consensus, of the ‘self-evident’, ethics is intrinsi­cally conservative. The prevailing ‘ethical ideology’ has two ‘philosophical’ poles. First, a (vaguely Kantian) universalizing pole which, indifferent to the particularity of any given situation, pro-scribes in advance any possibility of an organized, militant and situated intervention in the name of some collective ‘Good’: ethics here is grounded in the abstract universality of general ‘human’ attributes or rights. And second, a (vaguely Uvinasian) differential pole, attuned to the irre­ducible alterity of the Other: ethics here is expressed in an equally abstract respect for mainly cultural ‘differences’. Neither *this* universality nor *this* alterity, Badiou suggests, can be rigorously founded without tacit reference to theo­logy. Either way, the ethical ideology conceives of ‘man’ as a fundamentally passive, fragile and mortal entity — as a potential victim to be protected (most often, as a ‘margin­alized’, ‘excluded’ or ‘Third World’ victim, to be protected by a dutiful, efficient, and invariably ‘Western’ benefactor! exploiter). By contrast, **an ethic of truths presumes that every individual can be active and ‘immortal’**, is indifferent to established or state-sanctioned differences, operates in the realm of practical division (for or against the event), and situates its affirmation precisely there where the state of the situation can see only the non-known and the non-obvious.

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Third – The perm “solving” impacts is the problem- reform only allows capitalism to promote the belief that it can fix itself.

**Luxemburg 99** Rosa, Polish-Jewish-German Marxist theorist, socialist philosopher, and revolutionary. “Reform or Revolution.” Chapter VI. Conquest of Political Power..

Legislative reform and revolution are not different methods of historic development that can be picked out at the pleasure from the counter of history, just as one chooses hot or cold sausages. Legislative reform and revolution are different factors in the development of class society. They condition and complement each other, and are at the same time reciprocally exclusive, as are the north and south poles, the bourgeoisie and proletariat.¶ Every legal constitution is the product of a revolution. In the history of classes, revolution is the act of political creation, while legislation is the political expression of the life of a society that has already come into being. Work for reform does not contain its own force independent from revolution. During every historic period, work for reforms is carried on only in the direction given to it by the impetus of the last revolution and continues as long as the impulsion from the last revolution continues to make itself felt. Or, to put it more concretely, in each historic period work for reforms is carried on only in the framework of the social form created by the last revolution. Here is the kernel of the problem.¶ It is contrary to history to represent work for reforms as a long-drawn out revolution and revolution as a condensed series of reforms. A social transformation and a legislative reform do not differ according to their duration but according to their content. The secret of historic change through the utilisation of political power resides precisely in the transformation of simple quantitative modification into a new quality, or to speak more concretely, in the passage of an historic period from one given form of society to another.¶ That is why people who pronounce themselves in favour of the method of legislative reform in place and in contradistinction to the conquest of political power and social revolution, do not really choose a more tranquil, calmer and slower road to the same goal, but a different goal. Instead of taking a stand for the establishment of a new society they take a stand for surface modifications of the old society. If we follow the political conceptions of revisionism, we arrive at the same conclusion that is reached when we follow the economic theories of revisionism. Our program becomes not the realisation of socialism, but the reform of capitalism; not the suppression of the wage labour system but the diminution of exploitation, that is, the suppression of the abuses of capitalism instead of suppression of capitalism itself.

Capitalism makes error replication terminally inevitable – turns the aff

Meszaros 6(Istvan, Monthly Review, September, “The Structural Crisis of Politics”)

2. The Nature of Capital’s Structural Crisis In this respect it is necessary to clarify the relevant differences between types or modalities of crisis. It is not a matter of indifference whether a crisis in the social sphere can be considered a periodic/con-junctural crisis, or something much more fundamental than that. For, obviously, the way of dealing with a fundamental crisis cannot be con-ceptualized in terms of the the categories of periodic or conjunctural crises. To anticipate a main point of this lecture, as far as politics is con-cerned the crucial difference between the two sharply contrasting types of crises in question is that the periodic or conjunctural crises unfold and are more or less successfully resolved within a given framework of politics, whereas the fundamental crisis affects that framework itself in its entirety. In other words, in relation to a given socioeconomic and political system we are talking about the vital difference between the more or less frequent crises in politics, as against the crisis of the estab-lished modality of politics itself, with qualitatively different require-ments for its possible solution. It is the latter that we are concerned with today. In general terms, this distinction is not simply a question of the apparent severity of the contrasting types of crises. For a periodic or conjunctural crisis can be dramatically severe—as the “Great World Economic Crisis of 1929–1933” happened to be—yet capable of a solution within the parameters of the given system. Misinterpreting the severity of a given conjunctural crisis as if it was a fundamental systemic crisis, as Stalin and his advisers did in the midst of the “Great World Economic Crisis of 1929–1933,” is bound to lead to mistaken and indeed volun-taristic strategies, like declaring social democracy to be the “main enemy” in the early 1930s, which could only strengthen, as in fact it trag-ically did strengthen, Hitler’s forces. And in the same way, but in the opposite sense, the “non-explosive” character of a prolonged structural crisis, in contrast to the “thunderstorms” (Marx) through which periodic conjunctural crises can discharge and resolve themselves, may also lead to fundamentally misconceived strategies, as a result of the misin-terpretation of the absence of “thunderstorms” as if their absence was the overwhelming evidence for the indefinite stability of “organized capitalism” and of the “integration of the working class.” This kind of misinterpretation, to be sure heavily promoted by the ruling ideological interests under the pretenses of “scientific objectivity,” tends to rein-force the position of those who represent the self-justifying acceptance of the reformist accommodationist approaches in institutionalized—for-merly genuinely oppositional—working–class parties and trade unions (now, however, “Her Majesty’s Official Opposition,” as the saying goes). But even among the deeply committed critics of the capital system, the same misconception regarding the indefinitely crisis-free perspective of the established order can result in the adoption of a self-paralyzing defensive posture, as we witnessed in the socialist movement in the last few decades. It cannot be stressed enough, the crisis of politics in our time is not intelligible without being referred to the broad overall social framework of which politics is an integral part. This means that in order to clarify the nature of the persistent and deepening crisis of politics all over the world today we must focus attention on the crisis of the capital system itself. For the crisis of capital we are experiencing—at least since the very beginning of the 1970s—is an all-embracing structural crisis.18 Let us see, summed up as briefly as possible, the defining characteristics of the structural crisis we are concerned with. The historical novelty of today’s crisis is manifest under four main aspects: ♦ (1) its character is universal, rather than restricted to one particular sphere (e.g., financial, or commercial, or affecting this or that particu-lar branch of production, or applying to this rather than that type of labour, with its specific range of skills and degrees of productivity, etc.); ♦ (2) its scope is truly global (in the most threateningly literal sense of the term), rather than confined to a particular set of countries (as all major crises have been in the past); ♦ (3) its time scale is extended, continuous—if you like: permanent— rather than limited and cyclic, as all former crises of capital happened to be. ♦ (4) its mode of unfolding might be called creeping—in contrast to the more spectacular and dramatic eruptions and collapses of the past— while adding the proviso that even the most vehement or violent con-vulsions cannot be excluded as far as the future is concerned: i.e, when the complex machinery now actively engaged in “crisis-management” and in the more or less temporary “displacement” of the growing con-tradictions runs out of steam.... [Here] it is necessary to make some general points about the criteria of a structural crisis, as well as about the forms in which its solution may be envisaged. To put it in the simplest and most general terms, a structural crisis affects the totality of a social complex, in all its relations with its con-stituent parts or sub-complexes, as well as with other complexes to which it is linked. By contrast, a non-structural crisis affects only some parts of the complex in question, and thus no matter how severe it might be with regard to the affected parts, it cannot endanger the continued survival of the overall structure. Accordingly, the displacement of contradictions is feasible only while the crisis is partial, relative and internally manageable by the system, requiring no more than shifts—even if major ones—within the relatively autonomous system itself. By the same token, a structural crisis calls into question the very existence of the overall complex concerned, postulat-ing its transcendence and replacement by some alternative complex. The same contrast may be expressed in terms of the limits any particular social complex happens to have in its immediacy, at any given time, as compared to those beyond which it cannot conceivably go. Thus, a structural crisis is not concerned with the immediate limits but with the ultimate limits of a global structure....19 Thus, in a fairly obvious sense nothing could be more serious than the structural crisis of capital’s mode of social metabolic reproduction which defines the ultimate limits of the established order. But even though profoundly serious in its all-important general parameters, on the face of it the structural crisis may not appear to be of such a decid-ing importance when compared to the dramatic vicissitudes of a major conjunctural crisis. For the “thunderstorms” through which the con-junctural crises discharge themselves are rather paradoxical in the sense that in their mode of unfolding they not only discharge (and impose) but also resolve themselves, to the degree to which that is feasible under the circumstances. This they can do precisely because of their partial char-acter which does not call into question the ultimate limits of the estab-lished global structure. At the same time, however, and for the same reason, they can only “resolve” the underlying deep-seated structural problems—which necessarily assert themselves again and again in the form of the specific conjunctural crises—in a strictly partial and tempo-rally also most limited way. Until, that is, the next conjunctural crisis appears on society’s horizon. By contrast, in view of the inescapably complex and prolonged nature of the structural crisis, unfolding in historical time in an epochal and not episodic/instantaneous sense, it is the cumulative interrelationship of the whole that decides the issue, even under the false appearance of “normality.” This is because in the structural crisis everything is at stake, involving the all-embracing ultimate limits of the given order of which there cannot possibly be a “symbolic/paradigmatic” particular instance. Without understanding the overall systemic connections and implications of the particular events and developments we lose sight of the really significant changes and of the corresponding levers of poten-tial strategic intervention positively to affect them, in the interest of the necessary systemic transformation. Our social responsibility therefore calls for an uncompromising critical awareness of the emerging cumulative interrelationship, instead of looking for comforting reassurances in the world of illusory normality until the house collapses over our head.

### Link Debate

Their theory of indigenism obfuscates class oppression and pits groups against each other. You should prefer class analysis as a better method to solve oppression

James Herod Getting Free: A sketch of an association of democratic, autonomous neighborhoods and how to create it Fourth Edition, January 2004 http://site.www.umb.edu/faculty/salzman\_g/Strate/GetFre/index.htm

This is actually the same issue as the nationalities question and the identity question, but it might be worthwhile to treat it separately because there is an outstanding Native-American writer, Ward Churchill, who develops and advocates this theory. It is a theory, of native or indigenous peoples, which tends to replace class analysis, and generates a view of the history of the last five hundred years of world history which is quite at odds with an understanding of capitalism. I have never seen a critique of the idea (although surely some marxist journal has published one). It is quite erroneous to identify the enemy as Western Civilization, Europeans, or White People and to attribute the world's problems to these false abstractions. The rise and spread of capitalism was not only massively resisted by peoples all over the world, generating brilliant articulations of this resistance by writers and leaders like Fanon, James, Cabral, Nkrumah, Gandhi, Magon, Mandela, and Cesaire. It was also resisted by Europeans themselves. The European peasants were among the first so-called indigenous or native peoples to be dispossessed and colonized by the emerging capitalist ruling class. They were driven off their lands and forced into wage-slavery. Their villages were destroyed, and their local cultures, as were their unique languages. European resistance to capitalism was vigorous and long lasting. It gave rise to massive movements: the labor movement, the cooperative movement, communism, socialism, anarchism, syndicalism. It resulted in revolutions: the revolutions of 1848, the Paris Commune, the failed revolutions in Central Europe in 1919, the Spanish Civil War, the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, Polish Solidarity, and so forth. There was a worldwide upsurge of anti-capitalist resistance in 1968, and this took place also throughout Europe and the West. Recently there has been another such wave of global opposition to capitalism, but which has appeared also in Seattle, Quebec  City, and Genoa. Thus I believe that Indigenism mis-identifies the enemy, and is therefore incompatible with an Association of Free Peoples (anarchism, communism). Actually, we are just now witnessing a still basically peasant population in Europe, in the Balkans, being hit with an improved, strengthened, new, enclosures movement. Are the peasants in twenty-first century Eastern Europe indigenous peoples who are being attacked by Western Civilization or are they being dispossessed by the neoliberal offensive of late capitalism? Indigenists I think will have to be double-jointed to apply their theory to recent events in Eastern Europe, because peasants there are White, European, a part of Western Civilization, and are Indigenous, if by that term we mean that they have lived there for eons (although most of them moved there from elsewhere in some distant past, as have all so-called Indigenous peoples on earth). So I guess they are attacking themselves, if we follow Indigenism. Thus, rejection of and resistance to capitalism, imperialism, and colonialism has been going on in Europe too, not just in the world outside Europe. It distorts the picture to deny this. Marx himself wrote some of the earliest analyses of colonialism in his essays on India and Ireland. Western Civilization thus includes not only capitalism, but also the critique of capitalism. If we use the term at all it should include both these movements, the evil of capitalism and the good of anti-capitalism. It includes not only White Europeans who fought to impose capitalism on the world, but White Europeans who fought to stop this and to get free from capitalism completely. The terms European and White are false abstractions, in that it is only some Europeans and only some Whites that have colonized the world. Just as it was wrong for some radical feminists to see all men as the enemy, or for some black nationalists to see all whites as the enemy, so also it is wrong for Native Americans to see all non-indigenous people as the enemy, and for Indigenists to blame all Europeans and all Whites for imperialism.       Thus I can no longer accept the notion of indigenous versus nonindigenous people. I much prefer to think in terms of oppressors and the oppressed, exploiters and the exploited, criminals and victims, rulers and the ruled, rather than in terms of western civilization versus the rest of the world, and certainly rather than Whites versus People of Color. Ireland, one of the first countries to be colonized, was a nation of white people.

The identity categories of the affirmative are a tool of capitalism used to erase lines of political commonality among labor and prevent the development of a class consciousness

Rosemary Hennessy, Prof @ SUNY Albany, 2000 Profit and Pleasure: Sexual Identities in Late Capitalism

The signs of an intensified class war are everywhere (even if we only look at the situation in the United States): the privatization of social resources for health, education, and housing; corporate downsizing that means loss of jobs and job security for so many workers; the growing number of unmet human needs as the social compact of the welfare state fast erodes. And yet, in contrast, we also witness an “economic boom” for the corporate sector. At the same time this inequity punctuates daily life for many of us, we are also being told left and right that class is no longer a viable fundamental category for social and cultural analysis. I began to contemplate this “double vision” as one aspect of a broader historical scenario that I would characterize now as the advance of neoliberalism, and in this context the retreat from class analysis in the academy in the eighties and nineties began to seem one of neoliberalism’s most effective ideological weapons. I now think that it is no accident that even as the gap between the rich and the poor widens and the middle class erodes in developed sectors of the world, the knowledges that can address this reality are being swept into the margins as “old-fashioned.” The new relations of production in late capitalism have brought together many people from formerly segregated (national, ethnic, gender) constituencies, and yet the captains of industry are deeply threatened by the prospect of people organizing across lines of difference. The broad-based strategies of free trade are deeply invested in preventing and have systematically worked to undermine or prevent any potential for developing class consciousness. In their place we are invited to embrace ways of thinking that compartmentalize how we see and know the world, knowledges that de-link components of the big picture, that invite us to disparage causal connections, to focus only on the local scenario, the provisional plan, the temporary solution. In order to exist, capitalism requires certain basic social relations that are more than provisional and local; they are its very skeleton. So long as capitalism relies on the extraction of surplus labor to accrue profits, we need analyses that can make these basic social relationships of exploitation visible, analyses that will allow us to see both the social relations that comprise the big picture and the complex and often contradictory ways they are played out in particular, local, historical situations. And we need political projects that continually remind us of this “other” view. Under capitalism, class relations are lived by collective actors— the two key oppositional collective actors being the bourgeois owners and the workers. In actual situations these distinctions are compounded, as alongside this pair there are the reserve army of laborers and the professional managerial class. Moreover, within the working class in overdeveloped areas of the capitalist world, there is also a difference between a primary sector where workers are relatively secure and a secondary sector where workers have less security because they have been poorly paid, lack many benefits, and are more apt to be laid off. These divisions between classes are cross-cut by others organized along culturally and politically constructed lines of difference (Rouse 361). The concrete collectivities through which people act do not always obey this formal outline of class relations, but take the shape of temporary coalitions that are often dominated by segments of a single class. Bourgeois-dominated coalitions form “ruling blocs” that rely on the machinery of the state as well as other institutions such as churches and the corporate controlled mass media (Rouse 361– 62). The class processes and relations through which these ruling blocs operate and accrue capital are not fixed, but change and adjust to accommodate production needs, crises, and pressures from other class coalitions. A brief look at the example of the contemporary United States shows how these class relations have shifted in the past fifty years. After World War II, combined emphasis on consumption and mass production with heavy government investment in the economy allowed the ruling bloc to restructure its relationship to labor, negotiating a social contract with labor unions that provided high wages and economic security in return for a more tightly regulated system of industrial relations. From the 1960s on, these arrangements were pressured by competition from other developed countries and protests from women and people of color. By the 1970s there was a crisis of accumulation that meant a fall in the rate of profits for the bourgeois class. The ruling bourgeois bloc responded with a range of strategies aimed at shoring up its losses— expanding the realms of profitmaking, inventing new systems of accumulation, intensifying corporate financial speculation, reducing the costs of labor by undoing the postwar social compact, placing more emphasis on flexible forms of labor, and intensifying consumerism through the introduction of finer distinctions into consumer culture (Rouse 366). After World War II the new social compact helped form a broad “middle class” of primary-sector workers, and the reserve army of part-time or unemployed workers was relatively small. Access to the various class positions was still distributed unevenly, depending on gender, race, and national origin. In the last two decades, as the bourgeois ruling bloc has pursued an aggressive transnational neoliberal regime, the fraction of the middle class recruited into the ranks of professional managerial bourgeois allies has widened, the once broad primary sector of the middle class has shrunk, while the secondary sector of the working class and the reserve army have grown. The result has been a widened gap between the rich and poor and intensified recruitment of the professional middle class into coalitions with the bourgeois ruling bloc. White men continue to dominate the upper levels, and the majority of immigrants remain in the secondary sector or unemployed. The narrowing gap between men and women in the workforce is mostly the result of white men losing their primary-sector jobs (Rouse 366– 70). As Roger Rouse has very astutely discerned, one of the greatest fears of the ruling groups is that subaltern populations might develop alliances with people in other positions in the class structure. In the face of this threat, the ruling bloc has had to devise a range of strategies to keep alliances from forming among all of those who are being exploited, the losers during these “boom times” for capital, those who have become discontent and frustrated. These strategies span many institutions and social practices. They include a growing emphasis on state repression and violence as well as efforts to shape ideas about how society should be divided— how to assign loyalties along lines of national, ethnic, racial, sexual, and gender difference. The ideological strategies of the ruling bloc have organized people’s attitudes toward work and consumption, pleasure and discipline. Above all, these strategies encourage people to think of class in terms of the visible forms of class status they see— income, occupation, consumption patterns. In other words, people are encouraged to confuse class with lifestyle (Rouse 371– 78). There is no single class actor pursuing these projects, but rather different components of the bourgeois ruling bloc work through different coalitions that often improvise and draw on a wide array of discourses and institutional sites to address a host of concerns.