### (Green highlighting)

### Contention 1: Drone Dissonance

#### Drones create a unique form of bureaucratized killing where violence becomes normalized into governmentality.

Asaro 13 (Peter M., School of Media Studies at The New School, NY, published in Social Semiotics 2013, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, “The Labor of Surveillance and Bureaucratized Killing: New Subjectivities of Military Drone Operators”

There has been a massive increase in the number of drone aircraft used by the US¶ military over the past decade (Singer 2009; Sifton 2012). Along with this, there has¶ been an expansion of the capabilities of drone technologies, and an increase in the¶ sophistication and types of missions and tasks for which drones are used. Since 2001,¶ the number of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in the US military grew from 70 to¶ 7000. They were also armed for the first time with weapons, creating the new aircraft¶ role of ‘‘hunter-killer’’ combining remote surveillance and lethal capabilities. This¶ new role has largely been described as an economical and effective military tool for¶ US operations in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars (DoD 2011), as well as the Libyan¶ civil war, and as a politically expedient tool for the targeted killing of suspected¶ terrorists in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia (Mayer 2009; Sifton 2012). The New¶ America Foundation estimates that as many as 2600 people have been killed by drone There has been a massive increase in the number of drone aircraft used by the US military over the past decade (Singer 2009; Sifton 2012). Along with this, there has¶ been an expansion of the capabilities of drone technologies, and an increase in the¶ sophistication and types of missions and tasks for which drones are used. Since 2001,¶ the number of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in the US military grew from 70 to¶ 7000. They were also armed for the first time with weapons, creating the new aircraft¶ role of ‘‘hunter-killer’’ combining remote surveillance and lethal capabilities. This¶ new role has largely been described as an economical and effective military tool for¶ US operations in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars (DoD 2011), as well as the Libyan¶ civil war, and as a politically expedient tool for the targeted killing of suspected¶ terrorists in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia (Mayer 2009; Sifton 2012). The New¶ America Foundation estimates that as many as 2600 people have been killed by drone domestic uses see Stanley and Crump 2011). There are also many jobs that involve¶ killing (in slaughterhouses, medical research labs, the military, and others; Pachirat¶ 2011). What makes drone operators particularly interesting as subjects is not only that their work combines surveillance and killing, but also that it sits at an intersection of multiple networks of power and technology and visibility and¶ invisibility, and their work is a focal point for debates about the ethics of killing, the effectiveness of military strategies for achieving political goals, the cultural and¶ political significance of lethal robotics, and public concerns over the further¶ automation of surveillance and killing.¶ While the work of killing performed by drone operators bears a certain¶ resemblance to other forms of killing labor, and shares with it certain cultural¶ meanings, social stigmas, and psychological burdens, it is in many ways unique. Its¶ uniqueness becomes most obvious when it is compared to other military jobs that¶ also involve killing. Some of these involve killing at a great distance, such as the work¶ of snipers, artillery gunners, aerial bombardiers, or ballistic missile operators. Among¶ these, only snipers share the long and persistent voyeurism of drone operators, as they peer through their rifle scopes at potential targets. Yet snipers differ in that they are typically a mile or less from their target; terrestrially bound; and in danger of¶ being found out, tracked down, and killed. The sniper also feels the weather, smells¶ the smells, and interacts with the local people in a way that a drone operator does¶ not. The work of drone operators resembles in some ways the work of drawing up¶ lists of aerial bombing targets. Since its invention in World War I, this work has been¶ done in command posts by teams of workers who make their decisions based on¶ maps and photos, intelligence reports of varying accuracy, consultations with lawyers¶ and superior officers, collaborative decision processes, and often under intense time¶ pressures. Yet these bombing planners neither ride along in the plane, nor are they¶ called on to make judgments about events in real time and to change their targeting¶decisions based on live high-resolution video streams of potential targets. In this paper, I will refer to ‘‘bureaucratized killing’’ as the particular form of labor that killing takes in the work of drone operators, and which is constituted by the kind of bureaucratic labor organization developed within the military to do things like generate lists of bombing targets, in combination with the more ‘‘hands- on’’ work of deciding when and where to pull the trigger that more closely resembles the killing work of the sniper. Because this form of killing involves self-conscious processes and efforts at rationalization (at both the individual and organizational levels to make the processes more efficient, more accurate, and more manageable) it is most appropriate to approach this subject as a form of killing that has an elaborate and intentional bureaucratized structure as well as a psychological dimension (Weber 1922). Consequent with the historical emergence of this rational bureaucratization has been an intense computerization and technocratic management of the human labor involved in this complex system of remote surveillance and killing. And thus, there are certain parallels to be drawn between the regimes of scientific expertise applied to understanding and managing workers and the technologies they use in factories and offices, and the kinds of scientific knowledge produced to understand the work of drone operators and the design of the technologies that they use. At this point, I should also clarify what I mean by the term ‘‘subjectivity’’ and why the subjectivity of drone operators is an interesting topic for study. Within the sociological literature there has been a rich discussion of the ways in which social ‘‘subjects’’ are constructed by the social structures in which they find themselves (Weber 1922). More recent theories have identified the formation of subjectivities in the day-to-day activities and habits of individuals (Bourdieu 1977, 1984), and still others have shown how ‘‘subjects’’ have been constructed through systems of knowledge by experts, systems of data collection, and modes of discourse (Thompson 1966; Foucault 1975; Rose 1989, 1996; Taylor 1992; Miller 1993; Scott 1999). In terms of the subjectivities of workers and labor, there is a long historical evolution of systems of expertise that have been deployed to construct and manage the subjectivity of workers, and to respond to the emergent resistance to industrial and post-industrial modes of labor (Miller and Rose 1995; Asaro 2000). From Taylorism to mental hygiene, the quality of working life, business process re- engineering, and the worker-as-entrepreneur, these attempts to actively construct and shape the subjectivities of individual workers in particular ways have had real consequences on large-scale social formations of labor, and the subjective experience of workers, as well as the ways in which we conceive of and discuss their labor. This paper will extend this notion of ‘‘subjectivity’’ to drone operators, in order to better understand how systematic knowledge has been deployed to constitute their subjectivity, as well as how it falls short yet still grasps for greater control over the labor of bureaucratized killing.¶ From the Taylorist vision of observing and decomposing the movements of workers to ethnographies of the workplace, much of the science of labor organization and management seeks to make the practices, skills, and knowledge of workers more visible. Running against, or at least across this trend, are cultural imperatives to render invisible certain distasteful forms of work. From the ‘‘dirty’’ work around sanitation or sex work, to dealing with the materiality of human illness and mortality, to the low prestige and wages assigned to various forms of undesirable work, there are both explicit and implicit means within every society to render some forms of work ‘‘visible’’ and others ‘‘invisible’’ (Star and Strauss 1999). These practices are tied up with cultural ideals and values, and are often a source of political tension among groups of people who are systematically excluded from desirable forms of work, or whose work is systematically hidden, unrecognized, undervalued, or underpaid. Killing work in particular has been traditionally set apart from other forms of work in many societies (Pachirat 2011). Indeed the formation of a separate social class of ‘‘warriors’’ to grapple with the ambivalent nature of socially sanctioned killing can be seen as a cultural expression and enforcement of the difference between killing work and other forms of work. From the execution chamber to the slaughterhouse to the battlefield, there are complicated politics surrounding the visibility and concealment of socially sanctioned forms of killing. As we will see below, even while the work of drone operators has become increasingly important to the military, and to national and international politics, the actual work of drone operators has remained largely hidden from public view and has been increasingly protected from the prying eyes of journalists and social scientists. And even within the military, drone warriors are subject to powerful social pressures not to reveal or discuss their work, or its psychological and emotional stresses.¶ Perhaps unsurprisingly for a technology that is often referred to as ‘‘unmanned,’’ there has been relatively little public discussion about the people who operate these drone aircraft or the character of their work. What little public discussion there has been tends to be highly politically charged􏰀not only because it deals with military service personnel, but because it is also perceived as expressing implicit judgments on the US policies that are being pursued using these technologies. While it may be both practically and theoretically impossible to completely understand what it is like to operate these drones in military missions with lethal consequences, I believe it is worthwhile to examine the social semiotics 􏰀 the signs, social relations, and systems of knowledge that constitute them 􏰀 that have emerged in various attempts to describe this work. That is, as drone technologies have taken on increasing military and political significance, a range of discourses have emerged which attempt, in various ways, to describe the operators of these drones. These discourses range from the subjective, seeking ‘‘what-it-is-like’’ to be a drone operator, to objective techniques seeking scientific understanding of the labor performed by drone operators and the means of improving or optimizing it. From a semiotic perspective, each of these discourses is trying, in its own way, to represent drone operators and their labor, and through these representations to influence how the technology is developed, and how it will be used to achieve military and political goals. This essay aims to provide a fresh perspective on the technological and political debates through a more careful analysis of the ways in which these discourses are framing and constructing the subjectivities of drone operators.

#### Drone logic sanitizes war on an epistemic and ontological level that makes unconstrained violence inevitable.

Pugliese 11 (Joseph Pugliese Research Director of the Department of Media, Music, Communication and Cultural Studies Macquarie University "Prosthetics of Law and the Anomic Violence of Drones." 20 Griffeth L. Rev. 931 2011)

The ensconcing of war operations, and the everyday deployment of lethal drone attacks, within US cities such as Langley, Virginia gestures to a mutation in the conduct of war. The manner in which drone operators can¶ exterminate human targets during their assigned combat sessions, via their ensemble of tele-mediating technologies and military hardware, and then go home to take the kids to soccer or have a drink at their local bar, works to normalise war as something that is effectively part of the civic continuum of everyday life practices. This continuum of practices is facilitated by the euphemisms of war: the screen media that display the atornisation and incineration of bodies by drone missiles are called by the military 'Kill TV'," and the material violence inflicted on human targets becomes merely 'kinetic activity'," as though killing were just another form of gym exercise. The televisual and video game dimensions of these killing operations help facilitate the transition from exterminatory combat operations to civic sites and practices. In the words of an air force colonel of a Predator drone¶ squadron: 'It teaches you how to compartmentalise it [the reality of war].'" The everyday returns to civic locations of 'home' after a series of technologically mediated killings in another country can, in fact, be seen to be inscribed by the forces of technological dis/location that drive the¶ operations of drones: 'The more powerful and violent the technological expropriation, the delocalization,' Derrida notes, 'the more powerful, naturally, the recourse to the at-home, the return towards home.'o The violent deterritoralisation, delocalisation and dissociation experienced in the drone Ground Control Stations provokes the reaction: 'I want to be at home, I want finally to be at home, with my own, close to my friends and family.' Drone operators have remarked on how the trip home from their Ground Control Stations enables them to transition from battle field to civic mode, with the hour's drive back to their home giving them 'that whole amount of time to leave it behind. They get in their bus or car and go into a zone - they say, "For the next hour I'm decompressing, I'm getting re-engaged into what's it's like to be a civilian"."' This return to a safe home is, of course, the privilege and prerogative of the drone-enabled resident-soldier of the Global North. In the target countries of the Global South - Afghanistan or Pakistan - the at-home is open to the anomic violence of drones and, as I discuss below, the ever-present risk of obliteration of home, friends and family.¶ Philip Alston and Hina Shamsi have drawn critical attention to what they term:¶ the 'PlayStation mentality' that surrounds drone killings. Young military personnel raised on a diet of video games now kill real people remotely using joysticks. Far removed from the human consequences of their actions, how will this generation of fighters value the right to life? How will commanders and policymakers keep themselves immune from the deceptively antiseptic nature of drone killings? Will the standards for intelligence-gathering to justify a killing slip? Will the number of acceptable 'collateral' civilian deaths increase?"¶ The bracketing off that is enabled by the parenthetical logic that governs these screen technologies can be appositely situated within Heideggerian terms. 'The fundamental event of the modern age,' writes Martin Heidegger, 'is the conquest of the world as picture.'4 Underscoring this epistemic shift to viewing the world as picture has been the dominance of screen technologies in mediating virtually everything that can be seen in terms of 'world'. The parenthetical bracketing off of the world that I have been examining can effectively be understood as a form of 'enframing' the world. In his discussion of the term, Heidegger posits the process of enframing as a positive aspect of our relation to technology, as in this understanding technology works to reveal the truth of the 'real'. I want to resignify this Heideggerian term in order to mark the manner in which screen technologies operate literally to bracket off the 'real' and to transmute it into object. Conjoining this resignified understanding of enframing to Heidegger's meditation on the 'conquest of the world as picture' effectively brings into focus the levels of epistemic and physical violence enabled by the militarised use of tele-technologies.¶ In his theorisation of the epistemic shift to viewing the world as picture, Heidegger notes that the process of representation is crucial to the construction of the world as picture. What is particularly relevant to my analysis of the parenthetical logic of screen technologies and the lethality of drones is the manner in which Heidegger's analysis of the relation between representation and the world as picture underscores the role of objectifying violence: 'Representing is ... a laying hold and grasping of what it is that is being viewed; in this scopic process, Heidegger emphasizes. 'assault rules'.45 The 'assault' on what is being viewed is legitimated by its transmutation into 'object': 'Representing is making-stand-over-against, an objectifying that goes forward and masters ... That which is ... has the character of an object.'4 6 This process of objectification of the 'real' is undergirded by the play of science and technology: 'Science sets upon the real. It orders it into place to the end that at any given time the real will exhibit itself as an interacting network."' The 'real' in the context of drone technologies is precisely that which 'exhibits' itself through the tele-techno mediations of an 'interacting network' constituted by pilots/sensor operators, satellite links and drones. The enframing of the world as picture through 'entrapping representation' ensures the 'real becomes secured in its objectness'."¶ Everything in this Heideggerian exposition can be clearly transposed to illuminate the operations of drone screen technologies in order to entrap and reduce the surveilled human figure into object that can be effectively and¶ antiseptically liquidated from a distance. The antiseptic vision of war that is produced by the parenthetical logic of the use of drone technologies is enhanced further by the clinical language deployed by the drone operators in the identification of suspect targets. The Predator drone's infrared camera, with its digitally enhanced zoom, enables the sensor operators to detect the heat signature of a human body from significant distances (from an altitude of up to 3 kilometres). The term 'heat signature' works to reduce the targeted human body to an anonymous heat-emitting entity that merely radiates signs of life. This clinical process of reducing human subjects to purely biological categories of radiant life is further elaborated by the US military's use of the term 'pattern of life':¶ The CIA received secret permission to attack a wide range of targets, including suspected militants whose names are not known, as part of a dramatic expansion of its campaign of drone strikes in Pakistan's border region. The expanded authority ... permits the agency to rely on what officials describe as 'pattern of life' analysis, using evidence collected by surveillance cameras or unmanned aircraft. The information was used to target suspected militants, even when their full identities were not known.... Previously the CIA was restricted in most cases to killing only individuals whose names were on an approved list ... some analysts said permitting the CIA to kill people where names were unknown created a serious risk of killing innocent people."

#### The violence of drone logic is ontological – the reduction of life into mapped pieces of data intrinsically eradicates difference and obliterates the essence of existence.

Tyler Wall, Torin Monohan 2011**,** phd justice studies eastern Kentucky university, phd communications studies chapel hill,Surveillance and violence from afar: The politics of drones and liminal security-scapes

Drone systems necessarily objectify, and most likely dehumanize, people targeted by them. The ongoing informatization of warfare leads to increased mediation of combat experiences (Robins and Levidow, 1995; Haggerty, 2006; Monahan and Wall, 2007) and this is definitely the case for many UAV ‘pilots’ who ‘sit at 1990s-style computer banks filled with screens, inside dimly lit trailers’ (Drew, 2009) and ‘kill enemy fighters with a few computer keystrokes. Then, after their shifts are over, they get to drive home and sleep in their own beds’ (Lindlaw, 2008). Taken together, the techno-scientific mediation of modern-day weapons systems and the symbolic mediation of television and computer screens allow drone pilots and the general public to view war ‘from a distance’ while making way for organized state violence to be seen as virtuous (Der Derian, 2001)—that is, clean, precise, and noble. In this context of computerized ‘postmodern warfare’ (Gray, 1997), it seems reasonable to assert, as Kevin Robins and Les Levidow (1995: 120) did in the aftermath of the Gulf War of 1991:¶ Killing is done ‘at a distance’, through technological mediation, without the shock of direct confrontation. The victims become psychologically invisible. The soldier appears to achieve a moral dissociation; the targeted ‘things’ on the screen do not seem to implicate him in a moral relationship.¶ The technological mediation vital to what we call ‘the drone stare’ is most often framed by advocates of UAV systems as an unproblematic ability to see the truth of a particular situation (see Rattansi, 2010) or to achieve a totalizing view of the ‘object’ under cosmic control. In the words of Robins and Levidow (1995: 121): ‘Enemy threats—real or imag- inary, human or machine—became precise grid locations, abstracted from their human context.’ To the extent that this description is accurate, it would appear to hold true for the use of drones in combat as well as non-combat settings.¶ Journalist Noah Shachtman (2005), who observed drone operators monitoring the US–Mexico border, betrays through his description the dehumanizing tendency of drone- mediated perceptions: ‘Everyone looks like germs, like ants, from the Hunter’s 15,000- foot point of view. Especially when the ant hill breaks apart, and everybody scatters in a dozen different directions.’ But this particular articulation makes no distinction between ‘illegal immigrants’, political refugees, or Mexican-American citizens. In this sense, the drone system radically homogenizes these identities into a single cluster of racialized information that is used for remote-controlled processes of control and harm. Bodies below become things to track, monitor, apprehend, and kill, while the pilot and other allies on the network remain differentiated and proximate, at least culturally if not physically.¶ In the case of the use of military drones for ‘precision’ killing, the practical action of firing a Hellfire missile is translated and transformed by the informational system into a computerized checklist of ‘things to do’. As one journalist writes concerning US Air Force drones, ‘Now, pilots say, it takes up to 17 steps—including entering data into a pull-down window—to fire a missile’ (Drew, 2009). In this respect, as Kevin Haggerty (2006) has pointed out, the speed and mobility of informatized warfare is perforce slowed by attendant complex systems of control, which is a generalizable finding that presents an important caution against overdetermined conclusions about inevitable increases in the velocity of war technologies. But this step-by-step process of entering ‘data’ into a computer system nonetheless propagates a dehumanizing abstraction when living human beings are rendered into mere spatial or tactical coordinates. As Avital Ronell (1992: 75) puts it: ‘the cyborg soldier, located in command and control systems, exercises on the fields of denial’. Killing transpires not only at a distance but through the routine, banal computerized procedure of typing and clicking. UAV systems, according to one military drone operator, are ‘pretty simple’ to operate but,¶ the challenge is taking all the information available and fusing it into something that’s usable and then practicing and exercising the constraint or the lethal power to either preserve life or to prosecute an attack. And that is where the challenge really is, honing that warrior spirit— knowing when to say when.¶ (Rattansi, 2010)¶ But as we have discussed, this ‘knowing when to say when’ is not a ‘decision’ that is made in a vacuum but is rather a sovereign act shaped by social and political norms, which are encoded in both the institutional practices and technological systems of drone warfare.¶ The state killing enacted by UAV systems exists in a discursive and symbolic context where a steadfast belief in precision technology helps justify the techno-scientific vio- lence of the West (Shaw, 2005). Central to common representations of virtuous warfare, and especially aerial warfare, is the idea that the USA is technologically superior to other countries in its war capabilities, particularly because of its reliance on ‘smart bombs’ and ‘precision-guided missiles’ that distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate targets (Der Derian, 2001). This, in turn, brings about an expectation that militaries should go to great lengths to use their violence in discriminatory ways that target combatants while avoiding civilians (Beier, 2003). Militaries in technologically advanced countries such as the US embrace this rhetoric to assert that they have the capacity to conduct war in more legal and moral ways than less technologically advanced countries (Beier, 2003).

### Contention 2: preemptive violence

#### Drones are the pinnacle of a strategy of technocratic preemptive violence that locks us into cycles of violence against other countries

Scarry 12; Joe Scarry, June 9; “When ‘Pre-emptive Violence’ is Automated…” http://joescarry.blogspot.com/2012/06/when-pre-emptive-violence-is-automated.html

An ideology that has grown in the past twenty or thirty years is that of "pre-emption" -- namely, "get them before they get us." Let's be clear: the word "pre-emption" really means "pre-emptive violence." It has spurred a whole discourse about the logic of saying "your violence is unacceptable, therefore I will use violence to stop (or prevent) it." Practitioners of "pre-emptive violence" come in all shapes and sizes. One flavor is the "Strauss" school of foreign policy, which is generally recognized to have informed the Bush aggressions in the Middle East. Another flavor is what we in the West refer to as "terrorism," such as that practiced by Al Qaeda. Unless you have been asleep for the past decade, you are aware that, with each passing day, there is more and more recognition that all forms of "pre-emptive violence" are related, and that all are forms of "terrorism." Beyond recognizing the inherent contradictions of "pre-emptive violence," we must confront an urgent problem related to technology: the automation of "pre-emptive violence" -- e.g. via drone technology -- is leading to a spiral (or "loop" or ["recursive process"](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recursion)\*) that we may not be able to get out of. I've written frequently in the past about the moral problems inherent in the violence being carried out every day by the United States using drones. But today, please consider a consequence that goes beyond the moral: as more and more drones are put in the air, with more and more automated logic, and "signature strikes" become more and more prevalent, and the populations subject to those "signature strikes" devote more and more of their time, energy, and commitment to pre-empting such strikes -- almost certainly with advanced technology of some sort or other -- how long will it be before people are no longer "in the loop" and have lost the opportunity to intervene in the spiral of violence?

#### Targeted killing is an ultimate manifestation of sovereign manipulation- it crafts a *racist* relation to life that cedes complete power to the State to let live or make die.

Irving Goh [Fellow @ Harvard University where he worked on a research project on Balibar's philosophy of citizenship. He has also been Research Fellow at the National University of Singapore. His research emphasis is in continental philosophy and its intersections with other disciplines like politics, literature, and architecture] “Disagreeing Preemptive/ Prophylaxis: From Philip K. Dick to Jacques Rancière” Fast Capitalism, 2.1 2006, http://www.uta.edu/huma/agger/fastcapitalism/2\_1/goh.html

At present, the time of the preemptive presents the targeted body without the chance, or the right, to offer a counter-hypothesis, so as to prove the preemptive erroneous. The targeted body of the preemptive is not offered, and cannot offer, a prophylaxis contra the preemptive so as to delay the elimination of the right to be alive. In other words, in the staging of the preemptive, there is no space for disagreement. His or her speech, phone or logos—the desperate cries (phone) of denial of any (future) wrongdoing; or the cries of injustice of a treatment towards another human being, articulated in a linguistic idiom rational and intelligible (logos); and the cries to surrender (including deferring one's own innocence for the sake of one's safety)—no longer matters. It is no longer heard, as in the case of the preemptive shooting in Miami. Even silence is not heard either, as in the case of the London shooting. The rush of a preemptive is a sonic barrage that drowns out any (silent) voice that seeks to defer it. The gap opened by a suspected body between itself and the law that promises the security of the territory is already too great. The law and its need to secure a terrifying peace cannot bear the widening or delaying of that interval by a further demand of a disagreeing counter-hypothesis or auto-prophylaxis. To allow the normalization of the fatal preemptive would be to institute the legitimization of an absolute or extreme biopolitics. According to Foucault, biopolitics is the control and management of individual bodies by the State through technics of knowledge (usually through surveillance) of those same bodies. In a biopolitical situation, the State holds the exceptional power to determine either the right to let live or make die the individual belonging to the State. Should the preemptive become a force of reason of contemporary life, one would terribly risk submitting the freedom of life and therefore an unconditional right to be alive to a biopolitical capture, handing over the right to let die to the State police and military powers. It would be a situation of abdicating the body as a totally exposed frontier of absolute war. For in the constant exposure of the imminent preemptive, the body at any time—when decided upon by military or police powers to be a security threat—becomes the point in which the space and time of conductibility of war collapse in a total manner. The preemptive reduces the body to a total space of absolute war. Virilio has suggested that the absolute destruction of an enemy in war is procured when the enemy can no longer hypothesize an alternate if not counter route or trajectory (of escape or counter- attack) from impending forces (1990: 17). In the sequence of executing the preemptive to its resolute end, the escaping body faces that same threat of zero hypothesis. There is no chance for that body to think (itself) outside the vortical preemptive. Preemptive bullets into the head would take away that chance of hypothesis. A spectral figure begins to haunt the scene now. And that is the figure of the homo sacer, who according to Agamben's analysis, is the one who in ancient times is killed without his or her death being a religious sacrifice, and the one whose killers are non indictable of homicide. This figure is also the sign par excellence of the absolute biopolitical capture of life by the State, in which the decision to let live and make die is absolutely managed and decided by the State, and thereby the right to be alive is no longer the fact of freedom of existence for the homo sacer (Agamben 1998). For the right to be alive to be secured in any real sense from any political capture, for it to be maintained and guaranteed as and for the future of the human, the body cannot be allowed to return to this figure of the homo sacer. But victims of the preemptive irrepressibly recall the figure of the homo sacer. In the current legal proceedings of the London shooting, it has not been the fact that the police officers shot an innocent Brazilian that they will be charged. That charge remains absent. The charge of homicide against the officers remains elliptical. Instead, the plan has been to charge them for altering the police log book to conceal the fact that they had mistakenly identified the victim as a terror suspect. The possible turn of human life into the figure of homo sacer as decided by forces of the police or military under the overarching security measure of the preemptive divides the common space of existence. The space of existence becomes less than common now. The preemptive, as in the decision of a homo sacer, brings along with it a certain profiling of certain peoples, regardless of whether the force of law or the State would like to admit or not to such profiling measures. The law or the State would deny this unspoken profiling, but the evidence of its real imminence is felt by the peoples who would most likely fall under the category that the police or military would identify as a possible terror threat. And there is no denying that this profiling largely takes on an ethnic contour. And the fears of such a contouring are not unspoken. "Anyone with dark skin who was running for a bus or Tube could be thought to be about to detonate a bomb," expressed a concerned Labor peer Lord Ahmed for the U.K. Muslim community after the London shooting ("U.K. Muslims Feel 'Under Suspicion'" BBC News. 25 July 2005). The irreducible profiling in the culture of the preemptive is happening in the United States too. A New York Times article reports of a police-speak of "M.E.W.C's" under its intense surveillance—"Middle Eastern with a camera—perhaps taking pictures of a bridge, a hydropower plant or a reservoir" (Kershaw, New York Times. 25 July 2005). The nonnative ethnic community senses a state of emergency that works against them, that restricts their freedom of living on without fear. Indeed, after the London shooting, the BBC carried a report that said "many young Muslims were reluctant to leave their homes" ("U.K. Muslims Feel 'Under Suspicion'" BBC News. 25 July 2005). Their right to be alive becomes under siege as they "believed they could become victims of mistaken identity by armed police" (ibid.). They simply cannot hypothesize, innocent as they are of the intent of terror, a way to disprove the charge of the deadly preemptive that (mis)identifies or profiles them as possible terror suspects. As a Muslim living in Manchester says, "How do I know I won't just be picked up and labeled as a terrorist?" (ibid.). The possibility of a counter-hypothesis against the preemptive, and the unconditional right to be alive, become for these peoples, the unthinkable. That is what Anderton in Minority Report feels too once the naming of himself as a criminal-to-be and the decision of the preemptive capture of him have been disseminated. Even with a counter-proof that he will not commit a crime, he resigns to the fact that nothing can be done to reverse the precession of the preemptive, nothing to stop "precrime" from believing that he has not "the remotest intention of killing" (Dick 1997:329).

#### Targeted killing uses a dangerous logic of speed and omnipotent violence that normalizes instant killing as the main method for warfare. This causes nuclear blowback.

Goh ’06 [Irving, Fellow @ Harvard University, Fast Capitalism, 2.1 2006, http://fastcapitalism.com/]

**The articulation of wait cannot be more urgent today.** **It must be pronouncedly reiterated, in disagreement with the deadly preemptive, before the latter becomes a "necessary" global security condition of living in the world today.** **The deadly preemptive** without chance for a counterhypothetic prophylaxis being offered **must be resisted against its gaining momentum to procure a global consensual, legal status**. **And even if it is already in the process of being legalized or normalized as a contemporary fact or "necessity" of life in this twenty-first century of insecurity, it still has to be disagreed with**. According to Rancière, **consensus is arrived at from a striated observation of the real. The real today is a situation in which terror is surprising major cities and cities thought to be defensible against if not impenetrable to such surprises** in ever greater media visibility and spectacle. **To prevent more of these terrifying surprises (mediatising themselves) elsewhere, or such that second surprises will not tear apart the same city, the determination has been to short-circuit the possible dissemination of such terror at whatever cost.** **And this is where the preemptive has come in, the only possible measure to erase the slightest shadow of the next surprise.** It cannot take chances. There is no chance for the counter-hypothesis. The real "is the absorption of all reality and all truth in the category of the only thing possible" (Rancière 1999:132). **This is the real through which the consensus on the preemptive is or will be reached.** The consensus is that "which asserts, in all circumstances, that it is only doing the only thing possible to do" (ibid.). The aggregation of the striated observation of the real, the "only thing possible to do," and consensus, is the final collapse of thinking of another trajectory of the future of the real, the erasure of the exposition of what is unthinkable or impossible that will falsify the future of "the only thing possible to do." **The singular fatal preemptive cannot become a consensus of the "only thing possible to do."** It cannot be thought as a necessity of security, a "perceptible given of common life" (Rancière 2004:7). Furthermore, consensus tends to fail to solve the problem it seeks to address. According to Rancière, in the political scene of the late 1990s, "'Consensus' was presented as the pacification of conflicts that arose from ideologies of social struggle, and yet it brought about anything but peace" (2004:4). Instead, **there has been but the "re-emergence and success of racist and xenophobic movements"** (ibid.). **One can hardly imagine that a different outcome will indeed arise with the consensus of the deadly preemptive today.** While policies are being put in place to rid a territory of hatred or hate-mongers, as in the United Kingdom today, **the normalization of the preemptive, which brings along with it** its unspoken profiling contours, would only serve to undermine if not contradict the former, since the profiling contour of the preemptive has been known elsewhere to have "produced **tremendous resentment and hostility"** [3] (Kershaw, New York Times. 25 July 2005). And as the American State war-machine leads the world in the global "war on terror," conducting war in countries like Iraq to preempt the spread of terror, **not only is the right to be alive of innocent civilians in Iraq denied by military collateral damage there, but any homeland in America or elsewhere has not the sense that it has procured a better security.** **Instead, there remains the constant fear of further terror carried out under the pretext of retaliation against the preemptive like the one in Iraq.** **This worry has been exactly the same sentiment echoed recently in response to the** Bush Administration's engineering of its next preemptive military measure, **the Prompt Global Strike (PGS): "[PGS] may push potential hostile nations to be prepared to launch nuclear-armed missiles with even less notice than before in order to avoid them being destroyed in any preemptive U.S. first strike. Therefore, […] far from making the American people and homeland safer, the development of such weapons could put them at even greater risk from thermonuclear attack"** (Sieff, United Press International. 09 February 2006). **More than exorcizing the past trauma, the preemptive only perpetuates more trauma as more lives are lost and the right to be alive severely striated by the force of law.** **The global legal consensus on the singular deadly preemptive is therefore nothing short of terrifying** either. One is reminded of Minority Report here, in which "rule by terror" is also the name given to the "precrime" methods of preemptively "arresting innocent men—nocturnal police raids, that sort of thing" (Dick 1997:348). And in turn, does that not remind one of all those rendition operations of the CIA, in which terror suspects, some of them arrested preemptively, and some of them already proven innocent in yet another case of mistaken identity or intelligence let-down of the preemptive, are rendered to prisons outside the United States where they can get no legal help and where they may more likely than not be tortured, in clear violation of international law? These preemptive renditions are now beginning to be slowly unveiled to have some sort of consensus from some European nations like the United Kingdom and Germany, and nations that have had supported these prisons such as Poland, Romania, Morocco, and Thailand. There is something not very democratic about the preemptive, to say the least. And the more consensus it gathers around it, the more undemocratic its practice will become. This is at least Rancière's argument of the consensus. For Rancière, consensus is nothing short of the erasure of politics or democracy. The aura of democratic practice that surrounds the politics of consensus is but a false illusion. Politics or democracy should be that primary irreducible gesture of disagreement with any injustice that is at work against an individual or a collective, especially the injustice that detaches the individual or a certain collective from an immanent fact of common freedom by denying them the right to partake of that common. But consensus does not open a space for such a gesture. Instead, according to Rancière, consensus is only "the dissolution of all political differences and juridical distinctions," the "erasing [of] the contestatory, conflictual nature of the very givens of common life" (Rancière 2004:8/7). **It would only be in the spirit of democracy to disagree with the consensus, the consensus of the preemptive in all its forms.**

#### This mentality of robotic preemption generates vicious circles of violence that transforms US interventionism into cruise missile diplomacy.

Singer 9 (Peter W., Director of the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence at Brookings, Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy, “Robots at War: The New Battlefield”, Winter 2009, http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2009/01/robots-at-war-singer)

Nations often go to war because of overconfidence. This makes perfect sense; few leaders choose to start a conflict thinking they will lose. Historians have found that technology can play a big role in feeding overconfidence: New weapons and capabilities breed new perceptions, as well as misperceptions, about what might be possible in a war. Today’s new technologies are particularly likely to feed overconfidence. They are perceived to help the offensive side in a war more than the defense, plus, they are improving at an exponential pace. The difference of just a few years of research and development can create vast differences in weapons’ capabilities. But this can generate a sort of “use it or lose it” mentality, as even the best of technological advantages can prove fleeting (and the United States has reasons for concern, as 42 countries are now working on military robotics, from Iran and China to Belarus and Pakistan). Finally, as one roboticist explains, a vicious circle is generated. Scientists and companies often overstate the value of new technologies in order to get governments to buy them, but if leaders believe the hype, they may be more likely to feel ­adventurous. James Der Derian is an expert at Brown University on new modes of war. He believes that the combination of these factors means that robotics will “lower the threshold for violence.” The result is a dangerous mixture: leaders unchecked by a public veto now gone missing, combined with technologies that seem to offer spectacular results with few lives lost. It’s a brew that could prove very seductive to decision makers. “If one can argue that such new technologies will offer less harm to us and them, then it is more likely that we’ll reach for them early, rather than spending weeks and months slogging at diplomacy.”When faced with a dispute or crisis, policymakers have typically regarded the use of force as the “option of last resort.” Unmanned systems might now help that option move up the list, with each upward step making war more likely. That returns us to Korb’s scenario of “more Kosovos, less Iraqs.” While avoiding the mistakes of Iraq certainly sounds like a positive result, the other side of the tradeoff would not be without problems. The 1990s were not the halcyon days some recall. Lowering the bar to allow for more unmanned strikes from afar would lead to an approach resembling the “cruise missile diplomacy” of that period. Such a strategy may leave fewer troops stuck on the ground, but, as shown by the strikes against Al Qaeda camps in Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998, the Kosovo war in 1999, and perhaps now the drone strikes in Pakistan, it produces military action without any true sense of a commitment, ­lash-­outs that yield incomplete victories at best. As one U.S. Army report notes, such operations “feel good for a time, but accomplish little.”They involve the country in a problem, but do not resolve ­it.Even worse, Korb may be wrong, and the dynamic may yield not fewer Iraqs but more of them. It was the lure of an easy preemptive action that helped get the United States into such trouble in Iraq in the first place. As one robotics scientist says of the new technology he is building, “The military thinks that it will allow them to nip things in the bud, deal with the bad guys earlier and easier, rather than having to get into a big-ass war. But the most likely thing that will happen is that we’ll be throwing a bunch of high tech against the usual urban guerillas. . . . It will stem the tide [of U.S. casualties], but it won’t give us some asymmetric advantage.”¶ Thus, robots may entail a dark irony. By appearing to lower the human costs of war, they may seduce us into more ­wars.

### Advocacy

#### Nick and I oppose the war powers authority of the president in the use of military drone strikes for targeted killing.

### Solvency

#### The resolution posits that we must have congress or the courts restrain the president but that fundamentally ignores the political reality- law can never restrain itself, the only effective RESTRICTION on war powers can come from micropolitical resistance.

Douglas Casson 8 [assistant professor at St. Olaf College in¶ Northﬁeld, MN. His research interests have focused on early modern¶ political thought and the tensions between religious commitment and¶ political authority in the course of the emergence of modern liberal¶ democracy] “ Emergency Judgment: Carl Schmitt, John Locke,¶ and the Paradox of Prerogative” Politics & Policy, Volume 36, No. 6: 944-971. Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc¶ http://www.utexas.edu/law/journals/tlr/sources/Issue%2090.1/Kleinerman/Kleinerman.fn006.Casson.EmergencyJudgment.pdf

Schmitt’s challenge compels defenders of liberal democracies to¶ reconsider aspects of the liberal tradition that have often been ignored¶ or disparaged. By taking Schmitt seriously, we can begin to see that¶ Locke’s appeal to prerogative within his defense of liberal government¶ is not simply a vestige of absolutism or an embarrassing inconsistency. Locke includes a discussion of prerogative because he recognizes that¶ the ordinary rule of law must be supplemented by extraordinary¶ prudential judgment. The attempt to eliminate judgment from liberal¶ democratic government is a particularly modern illusion. Koselleck¶ (1988) has documented the way Enlightenment thinkers after Locke¶ sought to deemphasize and obscure the “contingent” aspects of modern¶ life (119-25). They sought to replace the volatility of politics with the¶ predictability of mechanism. Yet the attempt to create a legal,¶ constitutional machine that would be free of the contestation and¶ debate that characterize politics was bound to fail. In fact, banishing the exception has not eliminated the use of executive discretionary powers. It has simply normalized them. As Gross has convincingly argued, the attempt to contain emergency powers in the United States since the Civil War has actually¶ contributed to the expansion of executive power, making permanent¶ otherwise temporary measures (Gross 2003; Gross and Aoláin 2006; see¶ also Tushnet 2005). Instead of recognizing extraordinary governmental¶ actions as a legitimate response to a particular crisis, the U.S. Supreme¶ Court has sought to accommodate these temporary necessities into¶ ordinary legal frameworks. Extraordinary and extralegal actions have been subsequently codiﬁed as legal precedents. They have become¶ the new normalcy. Thus, the problem is not that modern liberal¶ democracies appeal to powers outside of the law but that they incrementally expand the realm of discretionary power within the law. Executive self-assertion is thus hidden behind a curtain of legality. For¶ Schmitt, those who continue to claim that all political actions can be contained within ordinary written law are either naïve or hypocritical.¶ Given the weakness of the constitutional rationalist position, Schmitt¶ can serve as an impetus to revisit alternates within the liberal tradition. If Schmitt nudges contemporary readers toward reconsidering¶ neglected aspects of the liberal tradition, Locke can help us recognize¶ that we need not accept the Schmittian paradigm. For Locke, the¶ admission that emergency discretionary powers are necessary does not¶ exclude the aspiration to safeguard a predictable, legal framework. By¶ incorporating prerogative into the liberal regime, Locke sought to¶ preserve and maintain it in the face of emergencies. While Locke does¶ not supply contemporary readers with many speciﬁc policy proposals,¶ he does offer two general insights into emergency powers. First, he¶ recognizes that all regimes will encounter emergencies that cannot be¶ contained by normal law. Second, he thinks that government should be¶ allowed to respond to emergencies with speed and efﬁciency yet should¶ be restrained from using emergency powers for purposes beyond¶ overcoming the speciﬁc crisis and restoring the preexisting legal regime.¶ Of course, the difﬁculty of restraining the executive in the context of a¶ supposed emergency is a sticking point for liberal democratic regimes.¶ Ackerman’s (2004, 2006) recent suggestions concerning an¶ “emergency constitution” take into account both the importance of¶ responding to extraordinary situations outside of the realm of ordinary¶ law and the danger of executive overreaching. By advocating a¶ supermajoritarian escalator where every temporary expansion of¶ emergency power requires increased democratic support, Ackerman¶ hopes to more effectively restrain presidents from taking advantage¶ of perceived threats to centralize power permanently. Ackerman’s¶ fundamental aspiration—to subordinate the emergency regime both in¶ symbol and in fact to the principles of liberal democracy—is in keeping¶ with Locke’s understanding of prerogative and the sovereign judgment¶ of the people.¶ Yet Locke would also insist that the danger of tyranny that looms¶ over every liberal democracy cannot be eliminated by institutional¶ reform. The task of making judgments concerning the scope of¶ emergencies and the meaning of basic rights ultimately falls to the people. It is a task that requires a vigilant and critical populace. As¶ Zuckerman (2006, 540) points out, “[w]ell-designed institutions can help¶ to open and preserve a space for the public sphere to play this role, even¶ during an emergency, but they cannot replace it.” The stability of a¶ liberal constitutional regime depends on citizens who understand¶ themselves as more than just obedient subjects but as political agents¶ who must make judgments concerning the proper exercise of political¶ power under conditions of uncertainty. The most important and most effective restraint on executive discretionary power is not legal but political. If we ﬁnd ourselves in an especially precarious position today,¶ it is caused by a decline in informed and thoughtful political¶ engagement. In the absence of a vigilant public, legal restrictions on the¶ use of executive power will have little effect. This is a problem that the reform of institutions alone cannot solve. Constitutional government¶ presupposes the active and prudential use of emergency judgment.

#### Prioritize questions of discourse surrounding drones, it shapes the outcome of their use

Dorage 13 [Kristin Dorage; School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, Master’s degree, focus area of research is structural violence and developing praxis for conflict resolution] ¶ “Understanding the Pro-Drone Discourse” ¶ April 13, 2013 http://www.unrestmag.com/understanding-the-pro-drone-discourse/

“Foucault argues that since we can only have a knowledge of things if they have a meaning, it is discourse – not the things-in-themselves – which produces knowledge.” - Stuart Hall, Foucault: Power, Knowledge and Discourse. [1] Michel Foucault’s ideas as conveyed here by Stuart Hall indicate that discourse produces our knowledge of objects. If we accept this premise as true, it would be wise for students of conflict analysis and resolution to pay close attention to the development of new objects in conflict settings. Unmanned aerial vehicles (also known as UAVs or drones) are a prime example of such objects. Over the past ten years, lethal drones have changed the nature of warfare by allowing the United States’ “war on terror” to become increasingly clandestine and asymmetrical. Since the U.S. government has not provided basic information about its covert drone program – such as where drones are used, how targets are selected, and how many people have been killed – the discourses both championing and opposing drones are often backed by flimsy evidence. Yet these discourses are powerful nonetheless. How we talk about drones affects our understanding of them. Discourses that promote drone warfare are particularly dangerous because they encourage killing in spite of their lack of substance. Given that the subject of drone warfare is new, anti-drone advocates still have an opportunity to shape the public’s perception of drones. To begin, we must examine the pro-drone discourse with a critical lens and draw attention to its dangerous implications. Former White House Counter-Terrorism Advisor and recently appointed Director of the CIA, John Brennan, gave a speech last year to discuss the administration’s use of lethal drones. In his speech, which constituted the first formal acknowledgement of the drone program by the White House, Brennan stated:¶ As we have seen, deploying large armies abroad won’t always be our best offense. Countries typically don’t want foreign soldiers in their cities and towns. In fact, large, intrusive military deployments risk playing into al-Qaida’s strategy of trying to draw us into long, costly wars that drain us financially, inflame anti-American resentment and inspire the next generation of terrorists. In comparison, there is the precision of targeted strikes. [2]¶ Knowing that the American public is tired of war after the extended invasions in Iraq and Afghanistan, Brennan tries to persuade the audience that using lethal drones is not war. Brennan also sets up a false binary between targeted drone strikes and putting troops on the ground in an attempt to make drones the only option for combating terrorism. Pro-drone discourses are often set in false binaries, which prevent creative thinking about other ways to address terrorism. Brennan equates “large military deployments” with long, expensive wars that play into the enemy’s plan and lead to more terrorists attacks. His phrasing implies that drone strikes would have the opposite effect – that using targeted strikes would not produce anti-American sentiment, nor would their usage play into al-Qaida’s strategy. Brennan appears to acknowledge the desire of other countries to keep their citizens safe, recognizing that they do not want foreign troops in their cities and towns. However, in April last year (one month prior to Brennan’s speech), the Pakistani Parliament voted to end all endorsement of the CIA’s drone operations. [3] Surveys conducted by the Pew Research Center in 20 countries around the world show that the majority of them disapprove of the U.S. using drones to target extremists overseas. This stands in stark contrast to the majority of Americans (56%) who support targeted drone strikes. [4] The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (BIJ), an independent organization which has been conducting an in-depth investigation into the covert drone war, reports there have been nine drone strikes and between 36-71 casualties in Pakistan this year alone. [5]¶ Brennan’s speech demonstrates three elements that I believe are grounding points for the pro-drone discourse. They include: keeping U.S. troops and citizens’ safe, conducting precise and efficient warfare, and maintaining fiscal responsibility on the part of the military.¶ Pro-drone advocates claim that drones ensure U.S. troops’ safety while allowing them to pursue the goal of combat. Stephen A. Cheney, CEO of the American Security Project, states, “any time you can use a drone instead of using a Marine, I think it’s a good thing”. [6] His statement seems logical enough: if we are at war, we want our troops to be safe; if we send drones into battle instead of American soldiers, then more American lives will be saved. However, there is an unstated distinction here between short-term and long-term safety. While lethal drones ensure that U.S. troops are not put directly in harm’s way, the destruction caused by drones is unlikely to be ignored. We can most certainly expect that a targeted operation of this nature will instigate a severe backlash against the U.S. at some point in the future.¶ A study conducted by a former member of President Obama’s counterterrorism group, Michael Boyle, states that the use of drones is “encouraging a new arms race that will empower current and future rivals and lay the foundations for an international system that is increasingly violent”. [7] In Yemen, a series of interviews with witnesses of drone attacks suggest that drones have contributed to a rise in anti-American sentiment and may encourage recruitment to al-Qaida. A former counter-terrorism official at the U.S. State Department concurs: “Drone policy at its current tempo does put the U.S. at the very top of the bad-guys list”. [8]¶ According to John Brennan, drone strikes “conform to the principle of proportionality”. [9] In other words, the gains made by the military exceed the damage done by drones. He emphasizes that targeted strikes are directed towards individuals that pose a significant threat. That includes leaders of al-Qaida and other associated groups, individuals planning on carrying out attacks on “U.S. persons and interests”, and individuals that provide support for these attacks. [10] Brennan says the purpose of targeting these individuals “is to disrupt his plans and his plots before they come to fruition”. [11] The language he employs attempts to reassure his audience. By reciting the principles of war the narrative conveys to us that drone strikes are directed only towards those that are about to cause imminent harm. Yet, how do we know if this is true? And what gives us reason to think that this is an effective strategy? Given that the government has not released information about the process of choosing targets, it is impossible to know. In addition, the long-term strategy or timeline for drone strikes is never mentioned. At what point do we say that all terrorist threats are gone and we can stop using lethal drones? Historically speaking, eliminating the upper echelons of an organization has not always resulted in the group’s termination. The CIA killed thousands of Vietcong leaders during the Vietnam War and the organization survived it. The spread of al-Qaeda operatives to Mali, even the attacks on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, Libya, could be seen as evidence that the U.S.’ counterterrorism policy is not working. [12] Discourses suggesting that drones keep us safe are situated in a short-term perspective. Policies that align with this discourse have not considered what retributive violence might happen as a result of the drone program and are very dangerous indeed.¶ There is another aspect of the safety discourse that is deceiving. The U.S. Justice Department’s 16-page white paper, which was leaked earlier this year by NBC, attempts to make a case for the legality of the U.S. government’s targeted killings. In this paper it states that even U.S. citizens can by killed by drones without charges, a hearing, a trial, or any evidence, as long as an “informed, high-level official of the U.S. government” determines the person is an imminent threat. [13] The paper does not say whether the official needs to be completely sure or just have a sneaking suspicion that the target is an imminent threat. In fact, the paper’s definition of imminence is so broad that it negates the word entirely. According to this document all that is required for the government to conduct a targeted strike on a U.S. citizen is the say-so from a senior official and a window of opportunity.¶ What is particularly worrisome is the lack of judicial checks and balances within the drone program, and the overwhelming power that is being consolidated in the executive branch of government. Other aspects of the “war on terror” have procedural safeguards; for example, if the government wishes to set a wiretap, it must request a warrant under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. And while the Constitution allows unilateral executive action in “exigent circumstances”, these actions must always be followed by ex post judicial review. On the issue of drones, the courts are entirely left out of the process. As journalist David Cole writes, it seems that the government “wants the power to kill Americans unilaterally—and in secret”. [14]¶ As far as we know, three Americans have been killed to date by American-operated drones. This includes Anwar al-Awlaki, a high-level recruiter for al-Qaida and propagandist who was raised in America and killed in Yemen, and Awlaki’s 16-year-old American son, Abdulrahman al-Awlaki, who was killed by a drone in Yemen two weeks later. [15] The U.S. administration has said that Anwar al-Awlaki and individuals like him are dangerous enough to warrant being killed instead of captured and given due process. There have been only unofficial responses given by the U.S. government regarding Abdulrahman’s death, including an anonymous official who told the media that his death was a mistake. The discourse that drones keep us safe does not hold up to the fact that our government has unilaterally killed an innocent American teenager, and refuses to give information about his death. Since the government is intent on creating its own rules with the drone program– and not communicating these rules to the public – it removes any trust we might have in its judgment. [16]¶ Slavoj Zizek’s work can also provide insight into the safety discourse. In his book, Violence, he discusses three modes of violence: subjective, objective, and symbolic. [17] He argues that subjective, or overt, violence is the most visible of the three, and often sheds light on objective, or systemic, violence. If we were to apply this theory to the covert drone program, we can see how the violence enacted by drones takes on different forms for different audiences. The violence inflicted by drones is subjective for those on the receiving end, but symbolic to those who view it from a distance (through the news, for example). For the individuals inflicting the violence (the drone operators), it is less direct because it is “hidden” by the monitors and screens through which the violence is enacted. A study conducted by the U.S. Air Force found that almost half of all drone operators experienced high levels of stress in the workplace, but this stress was tied to working “long and erratic work hours”. [18] The drone operators did not show increased amounts of stress from watching hours of up-close video footage of killing and destruction inflicted by drones. Instead, the operators felt “a sense of accomplishment in protecting troops on the ground”. [19]¶ We can further expand on this idea by historicizing drones in the context of trends in warfare. Noel Sharkey explains in his chapter “Killing Made Easy: From Joysticks to Politics” that the evolution of the military has led to greater physical space between combatants, along with technology that “enable[s] killing from ever-increasing distances”. [20] While increasing the distance between combatants caters to our innate desire to keep ourselves safe, the extreme distance in drone warfare also produces alienation and desensitization; it encourages drone operators to become comfortable with brutality and killing. Sharkey’s research along with the research done on drone operators suggests that what we are seeing is the transition of subjective violence to objective violence; in other words, the violence caused by drones is becoming normalized and if it continues it shall soon be rendered ‘invisible’.¶ The safety elements in the pro-drone discourse are also tied to Karl Marx’s theories about individuals as subjects and objects.[21] Marx states that the division between subjects and objects is created and perpetuated in a capitalist economy, in which violence is inflicted on individuals as objects. This is evident in the CIA’s “signature strikes”, in which drones are used to kill people whose names are not known, but who are in the vicinity of other “militants” and either demonstrate suspicious behavior, or have characteristics that warrant their immediate death. [22] By treating individuals as objects, instead of as subjects of equal worth, drones not only aim to kill individuals, but also to promote the objectification of human beings. As Marx said, “The performance of work is at the same time its objectification”. [23] Once a group of people is objectified, they no longer require safety or protection. The subjective and objective aspects of drone warfare intend to make others appear “less than”. Therefore the discourse of safety has the function of treating some Americans (those not targeted by drones) as subjects, while reducing those within the drone’s purview to mere objects.¶ Bradley J. Strawser, a former Air Force officer and an assistant professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, conducted a study of the drone program and concluded that “using [drones] to go after terrorists not only was ethically permissible but also might be ethically obligatory, because of their advantages in identifying targets and striking with precision”. [24] The idea presented here is common in many pro-drone discourses – that drones represent the most ethical form of warfare because they are precise. The discourse acts as if drones can pluck out the ‘bad guy’ from the masses, and eliminate him or her with no consequences. This idea is suspect for several reasons. First, even when drones are on target, the blast that emanates from Hellfire missiles generally has a radius of 15 to 20 meters. [25] That distance does not include the shrapnel projected after the blast. A report on drones issued by Stanford and New York University further explains why it is difficult for UAVs to be precise:¶ One factor that reduces targeting precision is ‘latency,’ the delay between movement on the ground and the arrival of the video image via satellite to the drone pilot. As the New York Times reported in July 2012, “Last year senior operatives with Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula told a Yemeni reporter that if they hear an American drone overhead, they move around as much as possible.” [26]¶ This quote is particularly insightful because it shows the ways in which drone targets still can outsmart such “precise” technology. In addition, it gives a sense of what it must be like for innocent civilians living in the drone’s purview. Pro-drone discourses rarely expound on the lives of those on the other side.¶ To return again to John Brennan’s speech from last year, we can see other examples of the precision narrative at play. Brennan explained that “compared against other options, a pilot operating the aircraft remotely, with the benefit of technology and with the safety of distance, might actually have a clearer picture of the target and its surroundings, including the presence of innocent civilians”. [27] The way in which Brennan orders the elements in this story has the effect of painting an image of a pilot who, with the help of drones, is a protector of the innocent. Brennan goes on to say “it’s this surgical precision – the ability with laser-like focus to eliminate the cancerous tumor called an al-Qaida terrorist, while limiting damage to the tissue around it”. [28] Instead of portraying a terrorist for what he or she actually is – a human being that has the ability to make choices – the comparison to a tumor dehumanizes the person and depicts him or her as a thing that kills. The act of conducting drone warfare, on the other hand, is compared to surgery – a highly respected and exacting profession. The chances for error in surgery are perceived as being slim, which is what the narrative would like us to think about drone warfare. It is these themes of precision and accuracy that construct a narrative which makes drone warfare seem like a flawless procedure instead of an act of violence based on nebulous protocol.¶ The challenge here for both the pro-drone and anti-drone arguments is that there is no way to know for sure how accurate drones are because the data available is incomplete. Evidence collected from non-governmental organizations suggest the number of civilian casualties is likely higher than the administration admits, but it is difficult to determine whose number is correct. In Michael Boyle’s study he explains that the White House classifies all military-age men that are killed or injured in a strike as militants unless proved otherwise. Boyle states, “the result of the ‘guilt by association’ approach has been a gradual loosening of the standards by which the U.S. selects targets for drone strikes.” [29] The Pakistani government recently stated that 400 Pakistani civilians had been killed as a result of drone attacks. [30]¶ The final theme in the pro-drone discourse is that drones are more cost effective than deploying troops on the ground. Soldiers cost the Pentagon $4 million over their lifetime, whereas a drone is about 10% of that cost and can be discarded once it becomes dysfunctional. As defense budgets shrink, the economic rationale to automate military functions will inevitably grow. [31] Thus, there is incentive for the U.S. to use drones more frequently and for corporations to manufacture smaller, cheaper, and more deadly drones. The global race to develop these machines has started and already produced lethal drones the size of bugs. [32]¶ The affordability argument sparks a sinister question, which is: What happens when war becomes cheap? While many drone advocates claim that the U.S. would never engage in war or conduct targeted killings without serious consideration, it is feasible to think that the cheapening of war will lead to more war overall. As it currently stands, the process of deploying lethal drones is far easier than capturing suspected terrorists. It is not far-fetched to think that the administration has been using drones for more than a just a “last resort” given the large numbers of individuals killed by targeted strikes (currently predicted to be about 4,000 individuals). When the U.S. used to conscript soldiers, convincing the American public to go to war required much justification and careful consideration. [33] Today, the White House sends drones without seeking approval or feeling the need to justify its actions to anyone.¶ The pro-drone discourse often presents lethal drones as the quick, effective, cost-efficient and safe alternative to long and costly warfare. It is evident that while these discursive themes are compelling at first, they are a façade. Anti-drone activists must work to change the nature of the public discourse. They must emphasize that drones are not accurate and do not make us safe. They must maintain that having a more affordable form of warfare is alarmingly dangerous. Unless we can effectively make the claim that drones reduce disincentives for killing, we can expect our world to become increasingly insecure in the future.

#### Criticisms of drone warfare and the resolution are locked into questions of legality and the law that take for granted the legitimacy of state violence- only breaking free from the constraints of the law can create democratic rejection of drone imperialism

Krasmann 12; Susanne Krasmann, prof. Dr, Institute for Criminological Research, University of Hamburg, “Targeted Killing and Its Law: On a Mutually Constitutive Relationship,” Leiden Journal of International Law (2012), 25, pg. 678

The legal debate on targeted killing, particularly that referring to the US practice, has increased immensely during the last decade and even more so very recently, obviously due to a ‘compulsion of legality’.87 Once this state practice of resorting to the use of lethal force has been recognized as systematically taking place, it needs to be dealt with in legal terms. Whether this is done in supportive or critical terms, the assertion of targeted killing as a legal practice commences at this point. This is due to the fact that the law, once invoked, launches its own claims.¶ To insist on disclosing ‘the full legal basis for targeted killings’; on criteria, legal procedures, and ‘access to reliable information’ in order to render governmental action controllable; or on legal principles to be applied in order to estimate the necessity and proportionality of a concrete intervention at stake,88 not only involves accepting targeted killing as a legitimate subject of debate in the first place. It requires distinctions to be made between, for example, a legitimate and an illegitimate target. It invokes the production of knowledge and the establishment of pertinent rules. Indeterminate categories are to be determined and thus established as a new reading of positive law. The introduction of international human rights standards into the debate, for example, clearly allows limits to be set in employing the pre-emptive tactic. As Wouter Werner has shown with regard to the Israeli High Court of Justice’s decision on the legality of targeted killing operations,89 this may well lead, for example, to recognizing the enemy as being not ‘outlaws’ but, instead, combatants who are to be granted basic human rights. Subsequently, procedural rules may be established that restrict the practice and provide criteria for assessing the legality of concrete operations.90 At the same time, however, targeted killing is recognized as a legitimate tactic in the fight against terrorism and is being determined and implemented legally.91¶ When framed within the ‘theatre of war’, targeted killing categorically seems to be justifiable under the legal principles of necessity, proportionality, discrimination, and the avoidance of unnecessary suffering. This is true as long as one presupposes in general terms, as the juridical discourse usually does, both a well-considered pro-ceeding along those principles92 and, accordingly, that targeted killing, by its very nature, is a ‘calculated, precise use of lethal force’.93 Procedural rules, like the ‘pro- portionality test’, that are essentially concerned with determination, namely with specifying criteria of intervention for the concrete case or constellation, certainly provide reliability by systematically inciting and provoking justifications. Their application therefore, we may say, contributes to clarifying a controversial norm- ative interpretation, but it will never predict or determine how deliberation and justification translate into operational action. The application of procedural rules does not only notoriously remain ‘indeterminate’,94 but also produces its own truth effects. The question of proportionality, for example, is intrinsically a relational one. The damage that targeting causes is to be related to the anticipated military ad- vantage and to the expected casualties of non-targeted operations. Even if there are ‘substantial grounds to believe’ that such an operation will ‘encounter significant armed resistance’,95 this is a presumption that, above all, entails a virtual dimension: the alternate option will never be realized. According to a Foucauldian perspective, decisions always articulate within an epistemic regime and thus ‘eventualize’ on the political stage.96 There is, in this sense, no mere decision and no mere meaning; and, conversely, there is no content of a norm, and no norm, independent of its enforcement.97 To relate this observation to our problem at hand means that, rather than the legal principles’ guiding a decision, it is the decision on how to proceed that constitutes the meaning of the legal principle in question. The legal reasoning, in turn, produces a normative reality of its own, as we are now able to imagine, comprehend, and assess a procedure and couch it in legal terms.¶ This is also noticeable in the case of the Osama bin Laden killing. As regards the initial strategy of justification, the question of resistance typically is difficult to establish ex post in legal terms. Such situations are fraught with so many possible instances of ambiguous behaviour and risk, and the identification of actual behav- iour as probably dangerous and suspicious may change the whole outcome of the event.98 But, once the public found itself with little alternative but to assume that the prospect of capturing the subject formed part of the initial order, it also had to assume that the intention was to use lethal force as a last resort. And, once the public accepts the general presumption that the United States is at war with the terrorist organization, legal reasoning about the operation itself follows and constitutes a rationale shaping the perception of similar future actions and the exercise of governmental force in general.99 Part of this rationale is the assumption, as the president immediately pointed out in his speech, that the threat of al Qaeda has not been extinguished with bin Laden. The identification of a threat that emanates from a network may give rise to the question of whether the killing of one particular target, forming part of a Hydra, makes any sense at all.100 Yet, it equally nourishes the idea that the fight against terrorism, precisely because of its elusiveness, is an enduring one, which is exactly the position the United States takes while considering itself in an armed conflict with the terrorist organization. Targeting and destroying parts of a network, then, do not destroy the entire network, but rather verify that it exists and is at work. The target, in this sense, is constituted by being targeted.101 Within the rationale of the security dispositif, there continue to be threats and new targets. Hence, at work is a transformation of laws through practice, rather than their amendment.¶ Giorgio Agamben maintains that a legal norm, because abstract, does not stipulate its application.102 ‘Just as between language and world . . . there is no internal nexus’ between them. The norm, in this sense, exists independent of ‘reality’. This, according to Agamben, allows for the norm in the ‘state of exception’ both to be applied with the effect of ‘ceasing to apply’103 – ‘the rule, suspending itself, gives rise to the exception’104 – and to be suspended without being abolished. Although forming part of and, in fact, being the effect of applying the law, the state of exception, in Agamben’s view, disconnects from the norm. Within a perspective on law as practice, by contrast, there is no such difference between norm and reality. Even to ignore a pertinent norm constitutes an act that has a meaning, namely that the norm is not being enforced. It affects the norm. Targeted killing operations, in this sense, can never be extra-legal.105 On the contrary, provided that illegal practices come up systematically, they eventually will effectuate the transformation of the law. Equally, the exception from the norm not only suspends the norm, transforming it, momentarily or permanently, into a mere symbol without meaning and force, but at the same time also impinges upon the validity of that norm. Moreover, focus on the exception within the present context falls short of capturing a rather gradual transitional process that both resists a binary deciphering of either legal or illegal and is not a matter of suspending a norm. As practices deploying particular forms of knowledge, targeted killing and its law mutually constitute each other, thus re-enforcing a new security dispositif. The appropriate research question therefore is how positive law changes its framework of reference. Targeted killing, once perceived as illegal, now appears to be a legal practice on the grounds of a new understanding of international law’s own elementary concepts. The crux of the ‘compulsion of legality’ is that legality itself is a shifting reference.¶ Seen this way, the United States does not establish targeted killing as a legal practice on the grounds of its internationally ‘possessing’ exceptional power. Rather the reverse; it is able to employ targeted killing as a military tactic, precisely because this is accepted by the legal discourse. As a practice, targeted killing, in turn, reshapes our understanding of basic concepts of international law. Any dissenting voice will now be heard with more difficulty, since targeted killing is a no longer an isolated practice but, within the now establishing security dispositif, appears to be appropriate and rational. To counter the legal discourse, then, would require to interrupt it, rather than to respond to it, and to move on to its political implications that are rather tacitly involved in the talk about threats and security, and in the dispute about targeted killing operations’ legality.

#### Our criticism starts with obama’s deployment drones but is not the conclusion- drones are just the starting point for broader reaction to the militarized preemptive foreign policy of the US- The 1AC speech act unites our local position to global resistance to drones

Kinane, 2013; [Ed, ““Think Global, Act Local: Grassroots Opposition to Weaponized Drones,” accessed: 9-11-13, SpS]

And I especially must highlight the vigorous, imaginative and gutsy CODEPINK anti-drone campaign radiating out from Washington, DC. However, both Col. Ann Wright and Ally McCracken can speak from direct involvement about these essential efforts to rouse the nation to resist the weaponized drone.¶ But back to upstate New York: since 2009 a few of us – and as time goes on, dozens more of us – have been working to expose the weaponized Reaper drone war crime perpetrated from Hancock air base. Twenty minutes’ drive from my home, Hancock is the home of the 174th Attack Wing of the NY Air National Guard. The issue is global; the work local. ¶ Safely removed from the battlefield, costumed in aviator jumpsuits, air-conditioned and sitting ergonomically at computer screens, jiggling joy sticks linked to earth-orbiting satellites, the 174th Attack Wing technicians “pilot” the unmanned weaponized Reaper over Afghanistan. Further, Hancock is the national center for training technicians to maintain the Reaper. Those technical skills are fungible; such skills can be used not only to service the Afghanistan Reaper, but also the Reaper clandestinely terrorizing other nations – with whom the US has not declared war. In these nations – Iraq, Yemen, Pakistan and others – the CIA, with scant accountability, deploys the Reaper to commit extrajudicial executions. During his re-election campaign last fall, the White House leaked that the President signs off on such killing every Tuesday.¶ Many politicians and talking heads purvey the premise that the Reaper and other weaponized airborne robots are key assets in the “war on terrorism.” These deliberate or unwitting propagandists –some with snug perches in academia –miss a key point: while the Reaper wins a host of extremely asymmetrical battles, it may well be losing the war. The Reaper may be tactically clever, but thanks to the blowback and proliferation it spawns, deploying the Reaper is strategically stupid. ¶ Further – and it’s hard not to emphasize this enough – weaponized drones are themselves terrorist. Those who so readily invoke the boogey man of “terrorism” seldom define terrorism. According to the US State Department definition terrorism is the use of violence or the threat of violence against civilians for political purposes. By that definition the weaponized drone – indeed aerial warfare generally – is itself one of the planet’s major instruments of terrorism.¶ The weaponized drone not only perpetrates terrorism, but thanks to the quite justifiable hatred it incites toward the United States,it may perpetuate terrorism – mostly of the retaliatory and asymmetric kind. The Pentagon and CIA’s wholesale and cowardly terrorism surely has been a boon for “Al Qaeda’s” recruiters. Such state terrorism, lucrative for university research institutes and US weapons systems corporations spread across numerous Congressional districts, keeps the pot boiling, keeps us locked in perpetual war. ¶ Upstate Drone Action is a grassroots, decentralized, informally-organized group made up primarily from people from Syracuse, Buffalo, Rochester, Utica, Binghamton and Albany, New York. But our direct actions at Hancock have involved activists from as far away as Iowa and Virginia, Illinois and Hawaii. Two years ago Kathy Kelly of Voices for Creative Nonviolence, and Col. Ann Wright spoke at a drone rally in St. Lucy’s parish gym in Syracuse, galvanizing our first civil resistance.¶ That April 22, 2011 die-in at the base led to the week-long trial of the “Hancock 38,” in November 2011 – a bench trial before Judge David Gideon in the DeWitt Town court. Former US attorney general Ramsey Clark spent several hours testifying on our behalf. Ramsey told Judge Gideon that the Hancock Reaper committed war crimes and that the Nuremburg principles require citizens to expose and challenge their nation’s war crime.¶ Through direct actions and ensuing endless court appearances, through frequent legal demonstrations and street theatre, and through both mainstream and movement media, Upstate Drone Action has sought to educate the public about Reaper assassinations and extra-judicial killings. We seek to educate about the drone’s harrowing impact on civilians and about drone proliferation and blowback, as well as the surveillance and civil liberties threat the Reaper and other airborne robots pose domestically. We also hope our message reaches Hancock base personnel. Who knows, such exertions just might inspire the next Bradley Manning!¶ Legitimized by international law, including the Nuremburg Principles, and by the First Amendment of the US Constitution, Upstate Drone Action members seek to expose and impede our nation’s Reaper war crimes. In theory the First Amendment protects our freedom of assembly, our freedom of speech, and especially relevant in this case, our right to petition our government for a redress of grievance. At Hancock each time we approach the main gate we attempt to deliver a peoples’ war crimes indictment. When we are rebuffed, typically we block that gate with banners and with our bodies, either standing or, once, lying on the pavement wrapped in bloody shrouds. But our actions don’t require the warrant of legality: we are acting on our respect for life; we are heeding our conscience. ¶ And speaking of conscience, I must mention Brian Terrell. Brian was one of one of the “Hancock 38” and one of the “Creech 14.” He is now serving six months in Yankton federal prison for seeking to deliver a citizens’ drone war crimes indictment to Whiteman Air Force Base, a drone hub in Missouri.¶ Anti-military drone activists like Brian and Upstate Drone Action are committed to nonviolent direct action at the entrance to the offending military base. And as at Benning, we keep coming back. We call such recurring civil resistance “Gandhian Waves.” We periodically endure arrest, trial and even incarceration. Typically in court we “go pro se,” i.e. each of us defends his or herself, declaring to the court why we did what we did in an effort to put the Hancock drone itself on trial.¶ We say our Hancock actions are civil resistance not civil disobedience. Civil disobedience entails (justifiably) breaking the law, whereas our direct actions seek to enforce the law – international law. Despite such law being widely ignored by local, state and federal courts, under Article 6 of the US Constitution, international law is the supreme law of the land.¶ [Let me remind you of how Article 6 reads: This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.]¶ As historians you’ll surely recall how, back in the day, white mobs would periodically lynch blacks. For generations they did so with impunity, such torture and murder being ignored or enabled by all levels of the judiciary. Likewise today the judiciary thus far seems extremely tolerant of, or implicitly enables, if not condones, drone assassination and extra-judicial execution. ¶ You can decide whether or not the killing – virtually exclusively – of people of color in Islamic lands, is a kind of 21st century high-tech lynching…and whether or not such killing is yet another expression and tool of white, Western supremacy…

#### Epistemology is a critical starting point- empire is maintained by liberal knowledge production that makes the violence of the West objective

Wedeen 7 (Lisa, Professor of Political Science Lisa Wedeen specializes in comparative politics, the Middle East, political theory, feminist theory, and qualitative methods, Scientific Knowledge, Liberalism and Empire: American Political Science in the Modern Middle East Social Science Research Council, June 14-15, 2007, http://www.ssrc.org/workspace/images/crm/new\_publication\_3/%7B8a197abf-ed60-de11-bd80-001cc477ec70%7D.pdf)

The late Edward **Said** (1978**) famously underscored the connections between empire and distinct forms of knowledge**, and in the spirit of his book Orientalism, this essay also specifies the normative conditions, in this case in political science, that have helped make possible distinct visions of the Arab and Muslim Middle East. I want to argue **that these visions are not simply embellishments of an imperial domination independently existing; they are an integral part of the project itself**.4 Such a claim is not meant to suggest that all political scientists participate in reproducing possibilities for empire, or that they do so single-handedly and deliberately. Thus this essay also takes issue with approaches that attribute political power to scholarly discourses without attending to the ways in which scholarship operates within broader discursive and institutional frameworks. Admittedly, **it is by no means self-evident how political science’s complicities with U.S. empire would jibe with the two aspects of political science I argue above are currently defining the discipline—the convergence**, or perhaps more historically accurate, the continuing coalescence in new forms, **of science and liberalism**. This essay is devoted to fleshing out those links while considering how scholarly convictions, combined with the realities of U.S. foreign policy, have structured the terms in which the Middle East is understood and studied today. Part one explores the discipline’s seemingly contradictory commitments to value-neutrality and liberal values. Part two foregrounds the constitutive relationship among science, liberalism, and empire in the making of modern Middle Eastern politics as an area of academic inquiry. One caveat worth noting from the outset: the words “empire” and “imperialism” are politically charged nouns these days. By empire I simply mean, following the Oxford English Dictionary, a state with extensive political and military dominion. In the age of nation-states, imperial states generally exercise this dominion over populations that are perceived (by conqueror and conquered) as different from (in the sense of ineligible for incorporation into) the dominant state exercising control. From the inception of the American Political Science Association in 1903 until the present, there have been repeated attempts within the association to “transform the study of politics into an independent science” (Ross 1991: 288; see also Heaney and Hansen 2006). Despite important variations among positivists and significant disagreements between positivists and nonpositivists (including what “positivism” means), efforts **to make political science a science have generally entailed separating facts from values, identifying law-like principles governing political action, and subjecting these rules to empirical tests.** In this context, objectivity enjoys an “aura of self-evidence”—practical agreement about what counts as a fact and the modes through which knowledge about facts are produced (Shapin and Schaffer 1985: 13-14). Committed to objectivity and value-free scholarship, dominant political science’s applications of positivist principles find expression in causal explanations that rely on a nomothetical understanding of what causation entails. Formulated by Hume and formalized by the prominent positivist, Carl Hempel, the task of science, in this view, is to discover a “covering law” that, in the context of observable initial conditions, can be said to produce the observed event (Hempel 1965; on positivism see Hacking 1983; Cederman 1997; Johnson 2006). Yet contrary to scientific commitments to objectivity and value-free scholarship**, much research in “mainstream” political science has also historically presupposed the value of liberal politics** (Ross 1991; Ricci 1984; Gunnell 1993). Like positivism, liberalism has embodied divergent ideas and been identified variously in different geographical and historical locations. Despite these variations**, the liberal tradition in political science can nevertheless be characterized by four interrelated assumptions** about the connection between human subjectivity and good government (Ricci 1984, 72-73). First**, human beings are born as rights-bearing individuals**. A good government is one that protects an individual’s inalienable rights. Second, **human beings are capable of thinking clearly and rationally.** Good institutions are ones that cultivate human proclivities to reason. Third, **individuals naturally come together and form groups** in order to promote their interests and check those of rival factions. Good institutions are ones that encourage pluralistic interests while dampening potentially incendiary conflicts. Fourth**, individuals are capable of creating governments that operate democratically**, namely, that are responsive to the will of the people.5 Good democratic governments are those that provide procedural mechanisms, such as elections, that enable people to exercise their will as individuals. Of course, liberalism’s values, like those of any ideology, have never been borne out fully in practice. But whereas Marxism and other variants of socialism could be criticized for finding political expression in totalizing systems**, liberalism’s tenets have been treated as separate from people’s experiences in liberal polities. Political scientists have helped make this separation secure by sequestering normative political theory from empirical studies, and by appealing to the authority of scientific discovery** to justify commitments to piecemeal reforms. I am not arguing for better science, however. Nor am I claiming that positivist social science is bad. Rather, I want to bracket the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the enterprise and consider **how the insistence on separating fact from value**, in particular, **has contributed to three persistent disciplinary moves. First, the division has excluded viewing science as a value in and of itself,** indeed as a metaphysic. Political scientists do not tend to ask how scientific knowledge operates to cultivate passionate belief or why science is inherently the most valuable form of knowledge. **Second, the split between fact and value has prevented thinking through how epistemological assumptions** and nationalpolitical commitments **coalesce** to defend the stability of a liberal politics—how **liberalism is itself ideological or “hegemonic**,” and how political science helps to make it so. Or to put it differently, **epistemologies have a politics, and knowledge production in political science tends to shore up certain liberal assumptions and aspirations even while overt prescription and “bias” are seen to be outside the objectivist goals of science**. **Third, the split between fact and value allows methodology**, in particular**, to be viewed as value neutral**, as a technique devoid of normative assumptions. **This v**iew **enables** positivist **political science to occupy the position of authorized** (because disinterested**) discoverer**, **teacher, and enforcer of what counts as true or justified statements about politics**. **The ultimate effect of this** sequestering of fact-finding from rigorous philosophical examination **has been that dominant epistemological communities are maintained by institutional and practical-discursive means** rather than by any exclusive purchase such conceptual frameworks could have on the truth. Disciplinary strategies (such as writing a methodological textbook designed to unify the discipline) and powerbrokering practices (such as dismissing out of hand arguments that are epistemologically reflexive) help establish the rules and devise the evaluative criteria by which statements about the world are considered knowledge or not. At the same time**, these activities supply and enforce norms about what may and may not be asked. They generally discourage scrutiny into the practices that bound and normalize a discipline**, **enabling certain kinds of knowledge to thrive while foreclosing** or de-authorizing **other** **ways of knowing**. In other words, in addition to the tasks of socializing student-citizens and advising government officials, political science, not surprisingly, operates as a discipline, reproducing the norms, prohibitions, conventions, and constraints that generate standards for identifying expertise. In political science, this expertise affirms the possibility and importance of pursuing value-free science, on the one hand, and the vision of a rationalist liberal politics, on the other.