## 1AC

#### Same as Rd 1

## 2AC

### Norms

#### Chinese threat real and inevitable—China’s aggressive behavior over the Senkakus risks miscalculation

#### Gertz, national security columnist and senior editor at The Washington Free Beacon, 8-28-13 (Bill Gertz, “Inside the Ring: Air Force on China threat “, The Washington Times, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/aug/28/inside-the-ring-air-force-on-china-threat/?page=all)

China is aggressively seeking military control over disputed islands in the South China Sea and pressuring Japan over its control of the Senkakus in the East China Sea, Gen. Carlisle said during a breakfast July 29. Gen. Carlisle said Chinese territorial claims increase the risk of military confrontation. In addition to the Senkakus, China is asserting its claims over other disputed islands, including the Second Thomas Shoal and other islets in the Spratly islands. China also claims to control most of the South China Sea through its declared Nine Dash Line, impinging on large areas of international waters. China is being “fairly aggressive” and as a result “runs itself the risk of creating the potential for miscalculation,” Gen. Carlisle said. The general said the maritime disputes involving China “are all ripe for challenge.” “And that’s something we think about every day — from [U.S. Pacific Command commander Adm. SamuelJ.LocklearII ]— to every one of the components of what we can do to stabilize those situations.” Additionally, China’s “fairly assertive, aggressive behavior” has increased demands by states such as Japan and the Philippines for a greater U.S. military presence, he said.

#### Proclamations against the US prove the reality of threats—US allies being pushed around now

#### Agence France Presse 9-14-13 (“Stay out of sea disputes, China warns US”, <http://globalnation.inquirer.net/85595/stay-out-of-sea-disputes-china-warns-us>)

BEIJING—Beijing has warned the United States not to support China’s neighbors’ claims to disputed islands in the East and South China Seas, the government said Friday. Sino-Japanese ties have soured dramatically since Tokyo nationalized some of the Senkaku islands, which Beijing claims and calls the Diaoyus, in the East China Sea a year ago. China also claims almost all of the South China Sea including waters close to its neighbors’ coasts, and tensions with the Philippines and Vietnam have intensified in recent years. Washington has security alliances with both Tokyo and Manila, but Wang Guanzhong, a senior officer of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA), this week warned visiting US counterparts that it should handle issues “appropriately” to avoid damaging “mutual strategic trust.”

### Pakistan

**Imagining nuclear annihilation is a project of survival – their alternative creates repression and denial which makes nuclear war more likely**

**Lenz 90, Science and Policy Professor at SUNY, 90 (“Nuclear Age Literature For Youth,” p. 9-10)**

A summary of Frank’s thought in “Psychological Determinants of the Nuclear Arms Race” notes how all people have difficulty grasping the magnitude and immediacy of the threat of nuclear arms and this psychological unreality is a basic obstacle to eliminating that threat. Only events that people have actually experienced can have true emotional impact. Since Americans have escaped the devastation of nuclear weapons on their own soil and “nuclear weapons poised for annihilation in distant countries cannot be seen, heard, smelled, tasted, or touched,” we find it easy to imagine ourselves immune to the threat. Albert Camus had the same phenomenon in mind when he wrote in his essay Neither Victims nor Executioners of the inability of most people really to imagine other people’s death (he might have added “or their own”). Commenting on Camus, David P. Barash and Judith Eve Lipton observed that this distancing from death’s reality is yet another aspect of our insulation from life’s most basic realities. “We make love by telephone, we work not on matter but on machines, and we kill and are killed by proxy. We gain in cleanliness, but lose in understanding.” If we are to heed Camus’s call to refuse to be either the victims of violence like the Jews of the Holocaust, or the perpetrators of it like the Nazi executioners of the death camps, we must revivify the imagination of what violence really entails. It is here, of course, that the literature of nuclear holocaust can play a significant role. Without either firsthand experience or vivid imagining, it is natural, as Frank points out, to deny the existence of death machines and their consequences. In psychiatric usage denial means to exclude from awareness, because “letting [the instruments of destruction] enter consciousness would create too strong a level of anxiety or other painful emotions.” In most life-threatening situations, an organism’s adaptation increases chances of survival, but ironically, adapting ourselves to nuclear fear is counterproductive. We only seal our doom more certainly. The repressed fear, moreover, takes a psychic toll.

### T

#### Counter interp—Judicial restrictions are restrictions on jurisdiction—AFF changes jurisdiction to the Federal District Courts

Schlueter 82 [Spring, Court-martial Jurisdiction: An Expansion of the Least Possible Power, Northwestern School of Law¶ Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology, Former Assistant Professor, Criminal Law Division, The Judge Advocate General's School. LL.M. University of Virginia, 1981; J.D. Baylor University, 1971; B.A. Texas A&M University, 1969.]

Judicial restrictions include implementing a stricter interpretation of definitions

[\*77] C. JUDICIAL RESTRICTION OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION¶ A broad interpretation of personal jurisdiction remained until 1974 when the United States Court of Military Appeals, in three decisions, severely limited the military's ability to exercise jurisdiction over service members with defective enlistments. In the first case, United States v. Catlow, n18 the court ruled that a service member enlisting in lieu of an otherwise inevitable jail sentence had involuntarily entered the armed forces; his continued protestations once on active duty (in the nature of repeated A.W.O.L.'s) prevented formation of a constructive enlistment. And in United States v. Brown, n19 the fraudulent enlistment of a minor was aided by a recruiter who failed to follow Army regulations. n20 That oversight coupled with sluggish reaction by military authorities to discharge him, according to the court, stopped the government to argue that a constructive enlistment had been formed after the accused turned seventeen. These two cases, far-reaching in their own right, were soon eclipsed by United States v. Russo, n21 where the court ruled that court-martial jurisdiction could not be premised upon an enlistment obtained with recruiter misconduct. In ruling such enlistments to be void ab initio the court relied upon common law contract principles and the public policy against enforcing illegal contracts. n22

### J

**The aff’s relationship to death is one of up-front recognition and humility. By banishing the specter of death, they just make the sarcophagus invisible, turning confrontation into obsession**

**Dollimore 98**, Sociology – U Sussex,

(Jonathan, Death, Desire and Loss in Western Culture, pg. 221)

Jean Baudrillard presents the argument for the existence of a denial of death in its most extreme form. For him, this denial is not only deeply symptomatic of contemporary reality, but represents an insidious and pervasive form of ideological control. His account depends heavily upon a familiar critique of the Enlightenment's intellectual, cultural and political legacy. This critique has become influential in recent cultural theory, though Baudrillard's version of it is characteristically uncompromising and sweeping, and more reductive than most. The main claim is that Enlightenment rationality is an instrument not of freedom and democratic empowerment but, on the contrary, of repression and violence. Likewise with the Enlightenment's secular emphasis upon a common humanity; for Baudrillard this resulted in what he calls 'the cancer of the Human' - far from being an inclusive category of emancipation, the idea of a universal humanity made possible the demonizing of difference and the repressive privileging of the normal: the 'Human' is from the outset the institution of its structural double, the 'Inhuman\*. This is all it is: the progress of Humanity and Culture are simply the chain of discriminations with which to brand 'Others' with inhumanity, and therefore with nullity, {p. 125) Baudrillard acknowledges here the influence of Michel Foucault, but goes on to identify something more fundamental and determining than anything identified by Foucault: at the very core of the 'rationality' of our culture, however, is an exclusion that precedes every other, more radical than the exclusion of madmen, children or inferior races, an exclusion preceding all these and serving as their model: the exclusion of the dead and of death, (p. 12.6) So total is this exclusion that, 'today, it is not normal to be dead, and this is new. To be dead is an unthinkable anomaly; nothing else is as offensive as this. Death is a delinquency, and an incurable deviancy' (p. 126). He insists that the attempt to abolish death (especially through capitalist accumulation), to separate it from life, leads only to a culture permeated by death - 'quite simply, ours is a culture of death' (p. 127). Moreover, it is the repression of death which facilitates 'the repressive socialization of life'; all existing agencies of repression and control take root in the disastrous separation of death from life (p. 130). And, as if that were not enough, our very concept of reality has its origin in the same separation or disjunction (pp. 130-33). Modern culture is contrasted with that of the primitive and the savage, in which, allegedly, life and death were not separated; also with that of the Middle Ages, where, allegedly, there was still a collectivist, 'folkloric and joyous' conception of death. This and many other aspects of the argument are questionable, but perhaps the main objection to Baudrillard's case is his view of culture as a macro-conspiracy conducted by an insidious ideological prime-mover whose agency is always invisibly at work (rather like God). Thus (from just one page), the political economy supposedly ^intends\* to eliminate death through accumulation; and 'our whole culture is just one huge effort to dissociate life and death' {p. 147; my emphases). What those like Baudrillard find interesting about death is not the old conception of it as a pre-cultural constant which diminishes the significance of all cultural achievement, but, on the contrary, its function as a culturally relative - which is to say culturally formative - construct. And, if cultural relativism is on the one hand about relinquishing the comfort of the absolute, for those like Baudrillard it is also about the new strategies of intellectual mastery made possible by the very disappearance of the absolute. Such modern accounts of how death is allegedly denied, of how death is the supreme ideological fix, entail a new intensity and complexity of interpretation and decipherment, a kind of hermeneutics of death. To reinterpret death as a deep effect of ideology, even to the extent of regarding it as the most fundamental ideological adhesive of modern political repression and social control, is simultaneously to denounce it as in some sense a deception or an illusion, and to bring it within the domain of knowledge and analysis as never before. Death, for so long regarded as the ultimate reality - that which disempowers the human and obliterates all human achievement, including the achievements of knowledge - now becomes the object of a hugely empowering knowledge. Like omniscient seers, intellectuals like Baudrillard and Bauman relentlessly anatomize and diagnose the modern (or post-modern) human condition in relation to an ideology of death which becomes the key with which to unlock the secret workings of Western culture in all its insidiousness. Baudrillard in particular applies his theory relentlessly, steamrollering across the cultural significance of the quotidian and the contingent. His is an imperialist, omniscient analytic, a perpetual act of reductive generalization, a self-empowering intellectual performance which proceeds without qualification and without any sense that something might be mysterious or inexplicable. As such it constitutes a kind of interpretative, theoretical violence, an extreme but still representative instance of how the relentless anatomizing and diagnosis of death in the modern world has become a struggle for empowerment through masterful -i.e. reductive - critique. Occasionally one wonders if the advocates of the denial-of-death argument are not themselves in denial. They speak about death endlessly yet indirectly, analysing not death so much as our culture's attitude towards it. To that extent it is not the truth of death but the truth of our culture that they seek. But, even as they make death signify in this indirect way, it is still death that is compelling them to speak. And those like Baudrillard and Bauman speak urgently, performing intellectually a desperate mimicry of the omniscience which death denies. One senses that the entire modern enterprise of relativizing death, of understanding it culturally and socially, may be an attempt to disavow it in the very act of analysing and demystifying it. Ironically then, for all its rejection of the Enlightenment's arrogant belief in the power of rationality, this analysis of death remains indebted to a fundamental Enlightenment aspiration to mastery through knowledge. Nothing could be more 'Enlightenment', in the pejorative sense that Baudrillard describes, than his own almost megalomaniac wish to penetrate the truth of death, and the masterful controlling intellectual subject which that attempt presupposes. And this may be true to an extent for all of us more or less involved in the anthropological or quasi-anthropological accounts of death which assume that, by looking at how a culture handles death, we disclose things about a culture which it does not know about itself. So what has been said of sex in the nineteenth century may also be true of death in the twentieth: it has not been repressed so much as resignified in new, complex and productive ways which then legitimate a never-ending analysis of it. It is questionable whether the denial of death has ever really figured in our culture in the way that Baudrillard and Bauman suggest. Of course, the ways of dealing with and speaking about death have changed hugely, and have in some respects involved something like denial. But **in philosophical and literary terms there has never been a denial of death**.2 Moreover, however understood, the pre-modern period can hardly be said to have been characterized by the 'healthy\* attitude that advocates of the denial argument often claim, imply or assume. In fact it could be said that we can begin to understand the vital role of death in Western culture only when we accept death as profoundly, compellingly and irreducibly traumatic.

### PIC

**Engaging nuclear policy-makers is critical to shape policy and prevent dominance of worse analysis**

**Nye 08** (Political Psychology Volume 29, Issue 4, Pages 593-603 Published Online: 8 Jul 2008 Bridging the Gap between Theory and Policy Joseph S. Nye, Jr. 1 1 Harvard University Copyright © 2008 International Society of Political Psychology

Some academics criticize this narrow professional orientation and engage in politics or policy advocacy, but they argue that the role of academics and universities is to use their independence to criticize the power structure, not support it. Whether through political activism or through the development of "post-positivist" critical theory, they believe that theorists should criticize the powerful, **no matter how little relevance their theory appears to have in the eyes of policy makers** or how little it conforms to the central professional standards of the discipline. There is much to be said for the view that universities are unique institutions, but the imagined trade-off between corruption and relevance need not be so acute. An intermediate position on the appropriateness issue is what I call the "balanced portfolio" approach. When I served as dean of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, I tried to maintain a faculty on which some members had government experience while others were purely academic. The latter ensured rigor and the former brought relevance, and the combination meant that the institution filled a different role on the research spectrum than either a Washington think tank or a typical academic department. But the portfolio analogy works best when there are a number of people who have occupied both positions in the division of labor at different times and are able to act as bridges. As the above cited evidence suggests, however, "in and outers" who contribute to both practice and theory are increasingly rare. The key to the success of such a faculty mix is the ability and willingness of members to interact and communicate with each other. This is easier in a professional school than in a purely academic department. But even in the latter case, theorists and practice-oriented scholars can communicate if they are interested in policy problems. The communication gap does not belong solely to international relations or foreign policy. A survey of articles published over the lifetime of the American Political Science Review found that about one in five dealt with policy prescription or criticism in the first half of the century, while only a handful did so after 1967. As journal editor Lee Sigelman observed, "if 'speaking truth to power' and contributing directly to public dialogue about the merits and demerits of various courses of action were still numbered among the functions of the profession, one would not have know it from leafing through its leading journal" (2006, pp. 463–478). Bruce Jentleson has summarized this middle position, "it is not that all intellectuals must do stints in government, or even make policy relevance a priority for their research and scholarship. But the reverse is too true: as a discipline we place too little value on these kinds of hands-on experiences and this kind of scholarship, to our own detriment as scholars and teachers—and as a discipline" (2002, p. 130). If the gap becomes too large, something is lost for both sides. In the past, academics have made useful contributions to policy, either directly or at arms length. A few decades ago, academics like Arnold Wolfers, Carl Friedrich, McGeorge Bundy, Thomas Schelling, and others felt it proper to be engaged with the policy process. Some academic ideas have been quite significant in framing policy. Through a combination of writing and consulting, Schelling, Bernard Brodie, Albert Wohlstetter, William Kaufmann, and others **developed and refined theories of nuclear strategy and arms control that were widely used by practitioners in the Cold War.** (In Bridging the Gap, Alex cites the impact of Brodie, Kauffmann, and Herman Kahn.) More recently, Michael Doyle, Rudolph Rummel, Bruce Russett, and others helped to update Kant's theory of the democratic peace ("liberal democracies tend not to fight each other"), and it has entered into popular political discourse and policy (Siverson, 2000, pp. 59–64). In addition to such large ideas, academics have provided many middle-level theories and generalizations that are based upon specific functional or regional knowledge and have proved useful to policy makers (Lieberthal, 2006, pp. 7–15). **Theories about deterrence, balance of terror, interdependence, and bipolarity have helped shape the vocabulary that policy makers depend upon.** As Alex put it, "scholars also perform a useful, indeed a necessary, task by developing better concepts and conceptual frameworks, which should assist policymakers in orienting themselves to the phenomena and the problems with which they must deal" (George, 1993, p. xxiv). Historical analogies are a frequent form of ideas used by policy makers, often in a crude and misleading way. Academics can help to discipline the use and misuse of such analogies (Neustadt & May, 1986, pp. 34–58). Academics can also help the public and policy makers by framing, mapping, and raising questions even when they do not provide answers. As Ernest J. Wilson III argues, "by mapping I mean the identification and explication of the defining dimensions of a new problem, its constituent elements, and its general contours and boundaries" (Wilson, 2000, p. 122). Framing a question is often as important to policy as providing answers. At the end of the Cold War, two of the most influential "mapping" ideas—Francis Fukuyama's idea that class based ideologically driven history had come to an end, and Samuel Huntington's idea of clashes based on cultures and civilizations—were examples of influential academic ideas. From a normative perspective, this record can be used to bolster the argument that academics, as citizens, have an obligation to help to improve policy ideas when they can. Moreover, such engagement in the policy debates can enhance and enrich academic work, and thus the ability of academics to teach the next generation. As Ambassador David D. Newsom has written, "the growingwithdrawal of university scholars behind curtains of theoryand modeling would not have wider significance if this trend did not **raise questions regarding the preparation of new generations and the future influence of the academic community on public and official perceptions of international issues and events**. Teachers plant seeds that shape the thinking of each new generation; this is probably the academic world's most lasting contribution" (1995–96, p. 52). Alternatively, one can argue that while the gap between theory and policy has grown in recent decades and may have costs for policy, the growing gap has produced better political theory, and that is more important than whether it is relevant. To some extent the gap is an inevitable result of the growth and specialization of knowledge. Few people can keep up with their subfields, much less all of social science. But there are costs as well as benefits. Lepgold and Nincic summarize the trade-offs, "the Ivory Tower exists for a good reason: we expect university-based intellectuals to reflect on the world at some distance, and not simply to do the work of policy commentators or journalists at a slower pace. **But. .** . . it is odd to think that no practical implications should follow from a better understanding of the world. I**f scholars address important, real-world issues, they will more often than not improve their own work and have more to share with those who must act**" (2002, p. 185). Or as Robert Putnam has put it, "simple questions about major real-world events have driven great research. Worrying about the same 'big' issues as our fellow citizens is not a distraction from our best professional work, but often a goad to it" (2003, pp. 313–314). Regardless of one's normative views about the correct relationship of academia to policy, the fields of international relations and foreign policy are not nearly so distant from the influences of the practical world as some scholars like to think. The gap is bridged all too easily in that direction. To paraphrase Keynes, academic theorists, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any practical influence, are usually slaves of unseen larger world events. At times, academic trends and fads have proven to be too influenced by events. Theoretical trends in the field have always been strongly influenced by the outside world. Naturally, if our purpose is to understand the world, current change will drive changes in theory building, but often the swings in academic fashion are excessive and lack balance. That a gap exists between academia and the policy world is both natural and a good thing up to a point, assuming that some efforts are made to bridge it. The academic ethic is to offer elegant theoretical answers to general questions while the policy maker seeks definite answers to particular questions. But in recent years, the gap has been widening and bridging efforts have become more difficult. The growing specialization of knowledge, the increasing scientific methodological orientation of academic disciplines, and development of new institutional transmission belts helps to account for the change. Some aspects of the gap, however, are not new. The world of the academic theorist and the world of the policy practitioner have always involved very different cultures. As an academic going into a policy position at the State Department three decades ago, I was struck by the fact that bureaucracy is a huge machine for turning out reams of paper, but the top policy world is really an oral culture. As I wrote of that experience, "the pace did not permit wide reading or detailed contemplation. I was often bemused by colleagues who sent me thirty or forty-page articles they thought would be helpful. It was all I could do to get through the parts of the intelligence briefings and government papers that my various special assistants underlined for the hour of two of reading possible on a good day" (Nye, 1989, p. 206). As a result, effective policy memos are often one or two pages long, and concise oral briefings are often more influential than memos. As Ezra Vogel reports from his experience as an academic in government in the 1990s, "generally speaking . . . academic books and articles are useless for policymakers. Even if they were not filled with what policymakers consider arcane theories and esoteric details written solely for other academics, these publications are simply too lengthy for policymakers to go through the haystack looking for the needle they might use" (2006, p. 33). A premium on time is a major difference between the two cultures. For the academic, time is a secondary consideration, while accuracy and elegance are primary. As Alex George noted, "Academics aim at increasing general knowledge and wisdom about international relations; practitioners are more interested in the type of knowledge that increases their ability to influence and control the course of events." They want short quick answers while for many academics such short answers are not answers (1993, p. 9). For practitioners, timing is everything. A "B" quality memo written to brief the president for his meeting with a foreign dignitary at 3 pm is a success, while an "A" memo that arrives at 4 pm is a total failure. In the university, the priorities are (properly) reversed. Another difference is the importance of group work as opposed to individual creativity. In the university, plagiarism is a cardinal sin. In government policy work, ideas are a public good and it is often most effective not to attribute credit. Finally, in the academy, the highest value is to ignore politics and speak truth to power, while in the policy world some political trimming and appreciation of "applied truth" may be essential for effectiveness. It is not always easy to straddle these two cultures. I used fiction to dramatize some of the moral dilemmas that arise in The Power Game: A Washington Novel. But the inherent culture gap has grown wider in recent years largely because of trends in academic disciplines and in the institutions of foreign policy. As Stephen Walt explains, the incentive structures and professional ethos of the academic world have changed, and the trickle-down model linking theory and policy has weakened as a transmission belt. In his view, "the prevailing norms of academic life have increasingly discouraged scholars from doing work that would be directly relevant to policy makers" (2005, pp. 26–38). General theories such as structural realism and liberal institutionalism have become more abstract, and some rational choice models, while stimulating to theorists, often reflect what Stanley Hoffmann has called "economics envy" (2006, p. 4). Middle-range generalizations, historical cases, and regional expertise—the types of theory most accessible and most useful to practice—are accorded less prestige in the disciplinary pecking order. Methodology reinforces the trend. As Bruce Jentleson argues, "dominant approaches to methodology give short shrift to policy analysis, to the analytic skills for addressing questions of strategy and for assessing policy options. It is one thing to train Ph.D.s primarily for academic careers; it is another to have this be virtually the only purpose of most major international relations/political science Ph.D. programs. The job market for new Ph.D.s operationalizes this incentive structure" (2002, p. 178). Professors spend most of their energies reproducing little professors. The problem is further compounded by the use of academic jargon and the lack of interest in communicating in plain language to a policy public. As Alex George put it, "not a few policy specialists exposed to the scholarly literature have concluded that most university professors seem to write largely for one another and have little inclination or ability to communicate their knowledge in terms comprehensible to policy makers" (1993, p. 7). Young scholars are rated and promoted by their contributions to refereed academic journals and citations by other scholars in those same journals where there is little premium on writing in clear and accessible English. They get little credit for contributions to policy journals edited for a broader audience. In institutional terms, the transmission belts between academia and government have also changed. Universities are less dominant sources of policy ideas than in the past. In the traditional model, professors produced theories that would trickle down (or out) to the policy world through the articles they wrote and the students they taught. As Walt describes it, "the trickle-down model assumes that new ideas emerge from academic 'ivory towers' (i.e., as abstract theory), gradually filter down into the work of applied analysts (and especially people working in public policy 'think tanks'), and finally reach the perceptions and actions of policy makers. In practice, however, the process by which ideas come to shape policy is far more idiosyncratic and haphazard" (2005, p. 40). Or as Jentleson writes, "whereas thirty or forty years ago academics were the main if not sole cohort of experts on international affairs outside of government and international institutions, today's world is a more competitive marketplace of ideas and expertise" (2002, p. 181). Even when academics supplement the trickle down approach with articles in policy journals, op-eds in newspapers, blogs, consulting for candidates or officials, and appearance in the media, they find many more competitors for attention. Some of these transmission belts serve as translators and additional outlets for academic ideas, but many add a bias provided by their founders and funders. There are more than 1,200 think tanks in the United States alone, and they are very heterogeneous in scope, funding, ideology, and location, but universities generally offer a more neutral viewpoint. The think tanks provide not only ideas but also experts ready to comment or consult at a moments notice (Haass, 2002, pp. 5–8). In addition, journalists, public intellectuals, nongovernmental organizations, trade associations, private contractors, and others are involved in providing policy ideas. As Ernest Wilson points out, while the pluralism of institutional pathways may be good for democracy, **many of the nonuniversity institutions have narrow interests and tailor their policy advice to fit particular agendas (2007, pp. 147–151). The policy process in democracies is diminished by the withdrawal of an academic community which has broader agendas and more rigorous intellectual standards.**

**Anti-nuclear rhetoric is key to convincing leaders to change their opinions – it’s the only way to solve**

**Babst 97**, retired government scientist and Coordinator of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation's Accidental Nuclear War Studies program, Krieger, President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, and Aldridge, former aerospace engineer, now leads the Pacific Life Research Center, ’97 (Dean, David, and Bob, November, “The self-destructiveness of nuclear weapons: a dangerous and costly mental block” Canadian Business and Current Affairs, Vol 29 No 97 p 11-19)

There is **worldwide reluctance to think about the self-destructive consequence of the use of nuclear weapons**. Though understandable, this reluctance **is dangerous and costly. It prevents public discourse and political engagement by citizens of the nuclear-weapons states concerning one of the most important issues of our time. The lack of public attention in nuclear-weapons states to the self-destructiveness of nuclear weapons has allowed humankind to place itself in danger of annihilation**, and to spend some $8 trillion over the course of the nuclear age doing so. **Denial of the dangers or likelihood of nuclear-weapons use has created a dangerous mental block that must be overcome. We owe it to ourselves and to our posterity to break through this mental block and directly confront the dangers of annihiliaton**, including self-annihilation, **inherent in reliance on nuclear arsenals**. We reasoned that **if the citizens in nuclear-weapons states understood that the use of a hundred or so nuclear weapons could turn the world into an unbearable place in which to live, they would take a less complacent view of maintaining nuclear arsenals.** We believed that **an awareness of the self-destructive consequences of the use of nuclear arsenals would lead to a general understanding that nuclear weapons are a source of insecurity rather than security. This understanding**, we reasoned, **would lead to a desire to rid the world of nuclear weapons as soon as possible.** We discovered, however, that **virtually nothing was being published on the subject of the self-destructive consequences of the use of nuclear weapons. The fact that an issue as important as this one was not even being discussed in the mass media alerted us to the existence of widespread public denial regarding this issue**. We also realized that **the issue of nuclear arsenals and their use was not even entering into public debate during elections in the nuclear-weapons states**. As we looked into this situation further, we found many other indications of public denial of the suicidal dangers of nuclear arsenals. We have listed some of these indications below.

### K

#### Framework – the ballot is a question of the passage of the plan

#### Drone discussions break down symbolic representations of global issues—Macro-political discussion key

Green and Bernal 13 [May 29th, Droning Toward the Boundless War, Volume 25, Issue 2, Pages 212-218, Published authors under, Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10402659.2013.785324>]

War reminds us of our disconnection from one another. If we begin with acknowledging our common humanity, war comes when those small differences between us become amplified. We fail to see in the eyes of another that they are our brothers and sisters. We remove ourselves from the intimacy of knowing what war brings. Through the quiet embrace of an illusion, we fail to see the blood spilled by “them” as also our blood. The irony of war is that it provides a kind of curious veil that places our individual and collective anxiety about death “out there” into someone who will die on our behalf and kill so that we may live. What we consider to be vital in our lives is increasingly about ideologies, resources, and dominance. Behind this veil is an admixture of beliefs that our life is better than those who have become the enemy. What many of us seek unconsciously to protect is not so much life in the sense of our physical safety; rather, it has become more about a way of life where war keeps the balance of the scales tipped to our advantage a bit longer.¶ Our human differences were once about the survival of one tribe over another, one kingdom ruling another, and one nation conquering its neighbor. Warfare was for millennia face-to-face, where club and spear and sword were the implements of the mortal wound. Then with the bullet and the bomb, the mine and the missile, death from war became a more distant affair. The impact of taking a life became visible only in its aftermath. As the distance increased so did the lethality of weaponry. One bomb could kill 100,000. Within two decades in the era of the Cold War, humans had created the capacity to kill ourselves many times over. Yet these wars remained nation against nation. The “other” was one that had a flag, a people, and lands that were within generally recognized boundaries. Through the Geneva Convention, there were rules of war. A World Court was also established to prosecute those who violated these international agreements.¶ On September 11, 2001, war changed. With the beginning of the War on Terrorism, the United States entered the new era of the boundless war. No longer was the enemy another nation-state. What evolved as a consequence was a movement into a transitional space where no rules and no laws of war can any longer be found. With the collapse of the World Trade Center twin towers in New York came a descent into a different way of waging war. Initially, many of the elements remained the same. The United States took action against the Taliban government of Afghanistan for harboring training camps for Al Qaeda. In many respects, this “boots on the ground” approach to warfare had the trappings of modern conventional struggles. Troops were deployed with all the latest tactical support to take on an elusive enemy in a far away land. One powerful nation-state sought to reap justice through war from another nation-state deemed responsible for attacking the sovereignty and sanctity and safety of its people. This decade of action was designed to help Americans believe something was being done to quell the threat of terrorist attacks and implicitly to offer an assurance that the horror of 9/11 would somehow never again reach the shores of the nation. The shadowy adversary, if not vanquished, was so depleted, according to the politicians, that their ability to assault our way of life was dramatically diminished.¶ What is less visible is how the boundaries of the War on Terror morphed into something different where the psychological nature of war shifted once more. Much as The Bomb with its horrific dimensions made death in war a devastating fact for some distant enemy, so it is that the drone has become its more technologically precise and sophisticated counterpart. From thousands of miles away, “assets” can be deployed to eliminate “targets” who are deemed to pose an imminent threat to the United States. The face of the enemy is no longer seen. The hands that guide the lethal cargo do so remotely on a computer screen where the deadly action once executed has the appearance akin to a graphically intense video game. With no troops of “our” own placed in harms way, fewer deaths of innocents as “collateral damage,” and more precise elimination of sworn enemies, collective complacency about the practice was implicitly endorsed by 66 million Americans—if not more—at the last presidential election. The thorny legal complexities of this new terrain of war are placed in abeyance, in part because of the anxiety that is alleviated through the drones of war.¶ At an unconscious level, the named but faceless enemy, consistently presented as top operatives of terrorist organizations, becomes the projective repository of the threat to our way of life. They are the objects that evoke our death anxiety. They remind us that our way of life, and thereby the only life we have come to know, is threatened. They have attacked our symbols of military might and economic power. They have killed those who represent these pillars of our way of being. In this respect, the literal becomes the symbolic. The war on “them,” wherever they may be and whatever nation-state they may call their home, reduces in relevance. A drone crosses all these boundaries, as the lethal action of the surgical strike becomes just because the enemy combatant is one who lives in the shadows and therefore can be pursued there.¶ The rationale for the absence of outcry has deep unconscious antecedents in the most primitive ego defenses. The seemingly antiseptic elimination of targets allows for denial to become normative. Violence viewed through a flat screen has become entertainment, even when practiced at our own hands. When neutralizing an Al Qaeda leader looks the same as scoring a kill on Call of Duty, we can easily deny how we are complicit in a violent action of war. As such a threshold of consciousness that allows us to function in denial, relatively free of death anxiety in our day-to-day lives, remains intact. By seeing a puff on a screen rather than the riddled bodies of the defeated enemy, the connection to our own common mortality is displaced and placed at a distance. They enemy on the other side of the screen become the holders of death, quite literally, while symbolically representing the preservation of our way of life through their demise.¶ The role of the boundless war also provides an endless supply of targets for projection. While given the current name of “Islamic extremists,” this label is less important than how they become icons on which our fears about our mortality can be projected. In the illusion of a war that is not like what war once was and an enemy that is not an army like the troops of the past and a location that has no national borders or discrete regions, the ambiguity becomes a further expression of the boundlessness. War waged in this “No Man's Land” is rendered invisible, denied, and sufficiently subtle so as to remain unconscious to those who benefit from its execution.¶ When the New York Times wrote an expose revealing the appearance of corrupt financial activity on the part of those ascending to power in China, they came under attack. Within days of the publication of the stories, the Times reported a breach in the security of its electronic files. Through malicious code that was introduced into their server by an unsuspecting employee, some distant party began to search files, steal passwords, and target specific reporters. Suspected in these attacks was the Chinese government, known for its ambivalence about press freedoms.¶ These incidents are not isolated. During the summer of 2012, a number of U.S. financial institutions reported “delivery of service” attacks, ones where a flood of data overwhelms an organization's servers to the point that routine business transactions are disrupted. The Iranian government, despite repeated denials, was suspected in these actions. Perhaps an extension of what drones represent in terms of warfare, cyberattacks may be a new frontier in the boundless war. No longer is life itself directly attacked; rather, ideologies and ways of life become the new mortal symbolic targets.The anxiety that comes through such an approach to war means that what is perceived as necessities of life in much of the West—electric power, running water, Internet access—each increasingly controlled by virtual means, can be brought down by infiltration of hackers in distant lands. As with drones where international boundaries are no longer a limit on who may be seen as the enemy, the alleged actions of Iran and China suggest that corporate entities and private citizens who represent assaults on a people can be attacked.¶ One consequence of globalization is that the virtual distance between us is radically reduced to be a click or two away on a device that is often in our pocket or purse. It also means that tools of the emerging warfare may well soon be in each of our hands. Surveillance tools and sources to launch a cyberattack are carried in our cell phone.¶ The boundless war finds its justification in our perceived differences. We wage deadly violence through a kind of zero-sum social logic that views resources as finite. The need to destroy the “other” to access these resources comes through the tacit and often unconscious agreement with similar others that says “they” are a threat to “us.” This kind of paranoid stance allows war to be waged to ensure no disruption in the symbol and source of what “our” group values and perceives it needs. The paradox is in how virtual reality concurrently allows us to know the extent of the global inequities. We in the West operate with the reasonable concern that “they” will not long tolerate this kind of imbalance.¶ Nonetheless, we speak primarily to their threat to us and point to lives lost in terrorist attacks as the rationale for the boundless war. Little corresponding attention is given to the degradation of the environment, the forced migrations, the imposition of government structures, and other evidence of dominance that seed discontent in generations of the “other.” What gets enacted is the fear of death rather than any deeper examination of the mutuality of shared human interests. Death anxiety taps into a greater existential question about what to do with our lives and a more general unease about the unavoidable trajectory toward our own death. Differences in a group's way of life can in this instance be understood as more than cultural nuance. As such, the further paradox is that the boundless war gives life meaning and helps satisfy the human impulse to alleviate existential angst and the certainty of our death by killing the other who threatens this denial.¶ On a healthy level, various cultural symbols such as country, race, or a religious tradition can serve as very positive elements in human meaning-making. They create the fiber of a functioning civil society where debate, discussion, participation, coexistence, and learning are the norm. Under circumstances of threat or significant levels of uncertainty, however, there may be a regressive tendency to attach allegiance to these symbols to an extent that destruction, death, and domination is justified and even celebrated.¶ From a psychological perspective, many conditions contribute to the creation of the boundless war. As referenced previously, globalization reduces the distance between us. Under this condition, there is a virtual intimacy in knowing that we can instantaneously be in touch and face-to-face with someone on the other side of the planet. It is this form of connection that gives substance to our experience of a common humanity. Yet, it is also this same means that can remind us of the inequities and injustices abound. Ideally, consciousness of the experience of the other can bring about greater compassion, empathy, understanding, and identification with our fellow human beings. In other instances, the starkness of the differences may first lead to recoiling into the familiar. Reaching out to the world can be replaced by a regressive return to known narratives that reinforce our view or the world. Those small differences become the beginning of the alienation of one from another. As such, a cycle of displacement of anxieties and projection of fears gets enacted and often perpetuated through war.¶ The small deaths that happens when our point of view of way of being is not understood or recognized by the “other” is like a little war. In seeking to affirm our cherished reality and deeply held belief, the necessity to find those who share our worldview creates coalitions of belonging. These connections form the basis of shared identity, common language, and preferred ways of knowing where our boundaries end and the realm of the “other” begins. There was a time when one could claim access to resources such as people, land, or wealth as the measure of supremacy in such disputes. In the age of the virtual, increasingly there is equity in the capacity to find one's people and that critical mass needed to battle forces that were once invisible.¶ What makes this condition so critical in a time of boundless war is that such coalitions are like shifting sands. Most will find themselves with multiple allegiances and many factors to balance in the quest to keep the fear of death at bay. When the discourse around us becomes increasingly divisive and fear is used to bring the like-minded in line with one another, an either–or mentality becomes like a psychological refugee camp in a world where our interdependence because increasingly undeniable. Boundless war is known to be nowhere and everywhere. We are its victims and its propagators. With no longer a bomb shelter that can protect us nor a country whose boundaries are secure enough to stop the world from closing in on us, a kind of schizoid state that gives us the fleeting solace of self-sufficiency shields us from the deeper and starker reality. From this psychological bunker of virtual walls, we allow the boundless war to drone on, as we remain unconscious.¶ Locating the coordinates and governing social logic that structure the context under which we live and inform our lives reveals a system that operates under a number of principles that currently remain supreme. Globalization spreads to all corners of the world and with it the primacy of profit seeking, wealth accumulation, and the struggle for control of depleting resources. This quest, which has many traits of an addictive process, serves to maintain the lifestyle of an unrestrained consumer culture. What becomes valued are those actions that play a role in mass production and monetary gain. What is compromised is a relational, environmental, ethical, or aesthetic orientation to one another that promotes compassion and helps us sustain our deeper shared human connection.¶ In a globalizing world, tremendous levels of expanding inequality exist at a time when there are great amounts of wealth. This reality suggests an inability to meet some basic human needs despite consciousness of our deeper interconnectedness and interdependence.These conditions have created a situation in both the developed and developing world where a growing sector of the population is becoming alienated from meaning. Our role within the global economy comes with certain by-products and social ills that become translated into a compulsion toward aggression. The cost is the kind of cooperative empathy capable of nurturing diverse environments and addressing inequities for which there is a current collusion to deny.¶ Daily participation within this broader macro system creates the necessary triggers that can expand the relationship we have with anxiety. Our need to reduce this anxiety means reducing the social symbols that link us. The trade-off is in the boundless war, the safety valve for our collective emotional rationalizations. Through drones and loss of boundaries of the nation-state to pursue the enemy, we can justify any number of aggressions on to the “other.” In the boundless war, ongoing financial crises, citizen debt, and the break down of social and public investment accompany a perpetual war that is not only borderless but also ongoing. We are always fighting someone “out there” that threatens our safety and our way of life even to the point where we have to give up civil liberties. Our authority figures become unaccountable when there is constant vigilance and a concentration of power in the name of safety to battle an enemy that has no border. Our justifications and tolerance for destruction deepen when the virtuality of technology and the materiality of human life continue to overlap in a way that can obscure the human connection we actually share on this same planet.

The Role of the Ballot is Policy Simulation

Hodson 10 Derek, professor of education – Ontario Institute for Studies @ University of Toronto, “Science Education as a Call to Action,” Canadian Journal of Science, Mathematics and Technology Education, Vol. 10, Issue 3, p. 197-206

\*\*note: SSI = socioscientific issues

The final (fourth) level of sophistication in this issues-based approach is concerned with students findings ways of putting their values and convictions into action, helping them to prepare for and engage in responsible action, and assisting them in **developing the skills**, attitudes, and values **that will enable them to** take control of their lives, **cooperate with others to bring about change**, and work toward a more just and sustainable world in which power, wealth, and resources are more equitably shared. Socially and environmentally responsible behavior will not necessarily follow from knowledge of key concepts and possession of the “right attitudes.” As Curtin (1991) reminded us, it is important to distinguish between caring about and caring for. It is almost always much easier to proclaim that one cares about an issue than to do something about it. Put simply, our values are worth nothing until we live them. Rhetoric and espoused values will not bring about social justice and will not save the planet. We must change our actions. A politicized ethic of care (caring for) entails active involvement in a local manifestation of a particular problem or issue, exploration of the complex sociopolitical contexts in which the problem/issue is located, and attempts to resolve conflicts of interest. FROM STSE RHETORIC TO SOCIOPOLITICAL ACTION Writing from the perspective of environmental education, Jensen (2002) categorized the **knowledge** that is **likely to promote sociopolitical action** and encourage pro-environmental behavior into four dimensions: (a) **scientific and technological knowledge** that informs the issue or problem; (b) knowledge about the underlying social, political, and economic issues, conditions, and structures and how they contribute to creating social and environmental problems; (c) knowledge about how to bring about changes in society through direct or indirect action; and (d) knowledge about the likely outcome or direction of possible actions and the **desirability of those outcomes.** Although formulated as a model for environmental education, it is reasonable to suppose that Jensen's arguments are applicable to all forms of SSI-oriented action. Little needs to be said about dimensions 1 and 2 in Jensen's framework beyond the discussion earlier in the article. With regard to dimension 3, students need knowledge of actions that are likely to have positive impact and knowledge of how to engage in them. **It is essential** that they gain robust knowledge of the social, legal, and **political system(s)** that prevail in the communities in which they live and develop a clear understanding of how **decisions** are **made within** local, regional, and **national government** and within industry, commerce, and the military. Without knowledge of where and with whom power of decision making is located and awareness of the **mechanisms by which decisions are reached**, **intervention is not possible.** Thus, the curriculum I propose requires a concurrent program designed to achieve a measure of political literacy, including knowledge of how to engage in collective action with individuals who have different competencies, backgrounds, and attitudes but share a common interest in a particular SSI. Dimension 3 also includes knowledge of likely sympathizers and potential allies and strategies for encouraging cooperative action and group interventions. What Jensen did not mention but would seem to be a part of dimension 3 knowledge is the nature of science-oriented knowledge that would enable students to appraise the statements, reports, and arguments of scientists, politicians, and journalists and to present their own supporting or opposing arguments in a coherent, robust, and convincing way (s

ee Hodson [2009b] for a lengthy discussion of this aspect of science education). Jensen's fourth category includes awareness of how (and why) others have sought to bring about change and entails formulation of a vision of the kind of world in which we (and our families and communities) wish to live. It is important for students to explore and develop their ideas, dreams, and aspirations for themselves, their neighbors and families and for the wider communities at local, regional, national, and global levels—a clear overlap with futures studies/education. An essential step in cultivating the critical scientific and technological literacy on which **sociopolitical action depends** is the application of a social and political critique capable of challenging the notion of technological determinism. We can control technology and its environmental and social impact. More significantly, we can control the controllers and redirect technology in such a way that adverse environmental impact is substantially reduced (if not entirely eliminated) and issues of freedom, equality, and justice are kept in the forefront of discussion during the **establishment of policy**.

#### A constructivist framework divorces the neg from empirics and does not lead to shifts away from realism

Hyde 1 – Price, Prof in the Institute for German Studies @ University of Birmingham, Adrian 2001 [Europe’s New Security Challenges, 2001. p. 38-39)

The Copenhagen school thus emphasizes the need to understand the “speech acts” that accomplish a process of securitization. Their focus is on the linguistic and conceptual dynamics involved, even though they recognize the importance of the institutional setting within which securitization takes place. The concept of securitization offers some important insights for security studies. However, it is too epistemologically restricted to contribute to a significant retooling of security studies. On the positive side, it draws attention to the way in which security agendas are constructed by politicians and other political actors. It also indicates the utility of discourse analysis as an additional tool of analysis for security studies. However, at best, securitization studies can constitute one aspect of security studies. It cannot provide the foundations for a paradigm shift in the subdiscipline. Its greatest weakness is its epistemological hypochondria, that is, its tendency to reify epistemological problems and push sound observations about knowledge claims to their logical absurdity. Although it is important to understand the discursive moves involved in perceptions of security in, say, the Middle East, it is also necessary to make some assessment of nondiscursive factors like the military balance or access to freshwater supplies. For the Copenhagen school, however, these nondiscursive factors are relegated to second place. They are considered only to the extent that they facilitate or impede the speech act. In this way, the Copenhagen school is in danger of cutting security studies off from serious empirical research and setting it adrift on a sea of floating signifiers.

#### Uncertainty justifies realism – even under a cooperative framework, the malleability of discourse proves that leaders will always calculate action based on capability

Copeland 6, Associate Professor and Director Dept. of Government and Foreign Affairs @ University of Virginia (Dale, “The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review Essay”, Constructivism and International Relations, Alexander Wendt and His Critics)

Notwithstanding Wendt’s important contributions to international relations theory, his critique of structural realism has inherent flaws. Most important, it does not adequately address a critical aspect of the realist worldview: **the problem of uncertainty.** For structural realists, it is states’ uncertainty about the present and especially the future intentions of others that makes the levels and trends in relative power such fundamental causal variables. Contrary to Wendt’s claim that realism must smuggle in states with differently constituted interests to explain why systems sometimes fall into conflict, neorealists argue that uncertainty about the other’s present interests—whether the other is driven by security or nonsecurity motives—**can be enough to lead security-seeking states to fight**. This problem is exacerbated by the incentives that actors have to deceive one another, an issue Wendt does not address. Yet even when states are fairly sure that the other is also a security seeker, they know that it might change its spots later on. States must therefore worry about any decline in their power, lest the other turn aggressive after achieving superiority. Wendt’s building of a systemic constructivist theory—and his bracketing of unit-level processes—thus presents him with an ironic dilemma. It is the very mutability of polities as emphasized by domestic-level constructivists—that states may change because of domestic processes independent of international interaction—that makes prudent leaders so concerned about the future. If diplomacy can have only a limited effect on another’s character or regime type, **then leaders must calculate the other’s potential to attack later should it acquire motives for expansion**. In such an environment of future uncertainty, levels and trends in relative power will thus act as a key constraint on state behavior. The problem of uncertainty complicates Wendt’s efforts to show that anarchy has no particular logic, but only three different ideational instantiations in history—as Hobbesian, Lockean, or Kantian cultures, depending on the level of actor compliance to certain behavioral norms. By differentiating these cultures in terms of the degree of cooperative behavior exhibited by states, Wendt’s analysis reinforces the very dilemma underpinning the realist argument. If the other is acting cooperatively, how is one to know whether this reflects its peaceful character, or is just a façade **masking aggressive desires**? Wendt’s discussion of the different degrees of internalization of the three cultures only exacerbates the problem. What drives behavior at the **lower levels of internalization** is precisely what is not shared between actors—their private incentives to comply for short-term selfish reasons. This suggests that the neorealist and neoliberal paradigms, both of which emphasize the role of uncertainty when internalization is low or nonexistent, remain strong competitors to constructivism in explaining changing levels of cooperation through history. And because Wendt provides little empirical evidence to support his view in relation to these competitors, the debate over which paradigm possesses greater explanatory power is still an open one.

#### The impact is the rise of Hitlerite states – the possibility of deception and different discursive interpretations means constructivist theory could prove fatal

Copeland 6, Associate Professor and Director Dept. of Government and Foreign Affairs @ University of Virginia (Dale, “The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review Essay”, Constructivism and International Relations, Alexander Wendt and His Critics)

Second, Wendt’s view is inconsistent with his recognition that states often do have difficulty learning about the other. The very problem Ego and Alter have in first communicating is that ‘behavior does not speak for itself. It must be interpreted, and ‘many interpretations are possible’ (330). This point is reinforced by Wendt’s epistemological point of departure: that the ideas held by actors are ‘unobservable’ (chap. 2). Because leaders cannot observe directly what the other is thinking, they are resigned to making inferences from its behavior. Yet in security affairs, as Wendt acknowledges, mistakes in inferences—assuming the other is peaceful when in fact it has malevolent intentions—could prove ‘fatal’ (360). Wendt accepts that the problem facing rational states ‘is making sure that they perceive other actors, and other actors’ perception of them, correctly’ (334, emphasis in original). Yet the book provides no mechanism through which Ego and Alter can increase their confidence in the correctness of their estimates of the other’s type. Simply describing how Ego and Alter shape each other’s sense of self and other is not enough.21 Rational choice models, using assumptions consistent with structural realism, do much better here. In games of incomplete information, where states are unsure about the other’s type, actions by security-seeking actors that would be too costly for greedy actors to adopt can help states reduce their uncertainty about present intentions, thus moderating the security dilemma.22 Wendt cannot simply argue that over time states can learn a great deal about other states. It is what is not ‘shared’, at least in the area of intentions, that remains the core stumbling block to cooperation. Third, Wendt’s position that the problem of other minds is not much of a problem ignores a fundamental issue in all social relations, but especially in those between states, namely, the problem of deception. In making estimates of the other’s present type, states have reason to be suspicious of its diplomatic gestures—the other may be trying to deceive them. Wendt’s analysis is rooted in the theory of symbolic interactionism, but he does not discuss one critical aspect of that tradition: the idea of ‘impression management’. Actors in their relations exploit the problem of other minds for their own ends. On the public stage, they present images and play roles that often have little to do with their true beliefs and interests backstage.23 In laying out his dramaturgical view of Ego and Alter co-constituting each other’s interests and identities, Wendt assumes that both Ego and Alter are making genuine efforts to express their true views and to ‘cast’ the other in roles that they believe in. But deceptive actors will stage-manage the situation to create impressions that serve their narrow ends, and other actors, especially in world politics, will understand this.24 Thus a prudent security-seeking Ego will have difficulty distinguishing between two scenarios: whether it and Alter do indeed share a view of each other as peaceful, or whether Alter is just pretending to be peaceful in order to make Ego think that they share a certain conception of the world, when in fact they do not.25 Wendt’s analysis offers no basis for saying when peaceful gestures should be taken at face value, and when they should be discounted as deceptions.26 When we consider the implications of a Hitlerite state deceiving others to achieve a position of military superiority, we understand why great powers in history have tended to adopt postures of prudent mistrust.

#### No impact – threat construction isn’t sufficient to cause wars

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(Stuart J, “Narratives and Symbols in Violent Mobilization: The Palestinian-Israeli Case,” *Security Studies* 18:3, 400 – 434)

Even when hostile narratives, group fears, and opportunity are strongly present, war occurs **only if these factors are harnessed.** Ethnic narratives and fears must combine to create significant ethnic hostility among mass publics. Politicians must also seize the opportunity to manipulate that hostility, evoking hostile narratives and symbols to gain or hold power by riding a wave of chauvinist mobilization. Such mobilization is often spurred by prominent events (for example, episodes of violence) that increase feelings of hostility and make chauvinist appeals seem timely. If the other group also mobilizes and if each side's felt security needs threaten the security of the other side, the result is a security dilemma spiral of rising fear, hostility, and mutual threat that results in violence. **A virtue of** this **symbolist theory is that symbolist logic explains why** ethnic **peace is more common than ethnonationalist war.** Even if hostile narratives, fears, and opportunity exist, severe violence usually can still be avoided if ethnic elites skillfully define group needs in moderate ways and collaborate across group lines to prevent violence: this is consociationalism.17 War is likely only if hostile narratives, fears, and opportunity spur hostile attitudes, chauvinist mobilization, and a security dilemma.

#### Turn - Rejecting strategic predictions of threats makes them inevitable – decision makers will rely on preconceived conceptions of threat rather than the more qualified predictions of analysts

Fitzsimmons, 07 (Michael, Washington DC defense analyst, “The Problem of Uncertainty in Strategic Planning”, Survival, Winter 06-07, online)

But handling even this weaker form of uncertainty is still quite challeng- ing. If not sufficiently bounded, a high degree of variability in planning factors can exact a significant price on planning. The complexity presented by great variability strains the cognitive abilities of even the most sophisticated decision- makers.15 And even a robust decision-making process sensitive to cognitive limitations necessarily sacrifices depth of analysis for breadth as variability and complexity grows. It should follow, then, that in planning under conditions of risk, variability in strategic calculation should be carefully tailored to available analytic and decision processes. Why is this important? What harm can an imbalance between complexity and cognitive or analytic capacity in strategic planning bring? Stated simply, where analysis is silent or inadequate, **the personal beliefs of decision-makers** **fill the void**. As political scientist Richard Betts found in a study of strategic sur- prise, in ‘an environment that lacks clarity, abounds with conflicting data, and allows no time for rigorous assessment of sources and validity, ambiguity allows intuition or wishfulness to drive interpretation ... The greater the ambiguity, the greater the impact of preconceptions.’16 The decision-making environment that Betts describes here is one of political-military crisis, not long-term strategic planning. But a strategist who sees uncertainty as the central fact of his environ- ment brings upon himself some of the pathologies of crisis decision-making. He invites ambiguity, takes conflicting data for granted and **substitutes a priori scepticism about the validity of prediction** for time pressure as a rationale for discounting the importance of analytic rigour. It is important not to exaggerate the extent to which data and ‘rigorous assessment’ can illuminate strategic choices. Ambiguity is a fact of life, and scepticism of analysis is necessary. Accordingly, the intuition and judgement of decision-makers will always be vital to strategy, and attempting to subordinate those factors to some formulaic, deterministic decision-making model would be both undesirable and unrealistic. All the same, there is danger in the opposite extreme as well. Without careful analysis of what is relatively likely and what is relatively unlikely, what will be the possible bases for strategic choices? A decision-maker with no faith in prediction is left with little more than a set of worst-case scenarios and his existing beliefs about the world to confront the choices before him. Those beliefs may be more or less well founded, but if they are not made explicit and subject to analysis and debate regarding their application to particular strategic contexts , they remain only beliefs and premises, rather than rational judgements. Even at their best, such decisions are likely to be poorly understood by the organisations charged with their implementation. At their worst, such decisions may be poorly understood by the decision-makers themselves

#### Avoiding action because of the unpredictability of its outcome has been foundational in the justification for state domination and eradication of plurality.

Paul Saurette, PhD in Political Theory at Johns Hopkins University and Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Ottawa, 3/1/1996, “‘I Mistrust all Systematizers and Avoid Them’: Nietzsche, Arendt and the Crisis of the Will to Order in International Relations Theory,” Millennium Journal of International Studies, Volume 25, Number 1

Arendt's conception of political action seems unorthodox to `modem' ears precisely because it has been systematically marginalised within the tradition of Western political theory. Arendt suggests that the denial of politics as action is a recurrent condition. She notes that [e]xasperation with the threefold frustration of action-the unpredictability of its outcome, the irreversibility of the process and the anonymity of its authors-is almost as old as recorded history. It has always been a great temptation, for men of action no less than for men of thought, to find a substitute for action in the hope that the realm of human affairs may escape the haphazardness and moral irresponsibility inherent in a plurality of agents. This exasperation almost invariably led to attempts to abolish the plurality of the public realm by replacing human interaction with the absolute control of rulership. This conversion, however, fundamentally transforms the understanding of politics by replacing the notion that to be human is to exist within a plurality and act `freely', with the idea that `men can lawfully and politically live together only when some are entitled to command and others forced to obey'**.**

#### No Impact— ANY existence is better than nothing

Kateb 92, Prof of Politics @ Princeton (George, The Inner Ocean, pg. 141)

But neither of these responses will do in the nuclear situation. To affirm existence as such is to go beyond good and evil; it is to will its perpetual prolongation for no particular reason. To affirm existence is not to praise it or love it or find it good. These responses are no more defensible than their contraries—no more defensible than calling exis­tence absurd, or meaningless, or worthless. All such responses are appro­priate only for particulars. Existence does not have systemic attributes amenable to univocal judgments. At least some of us cannot accept the validity of revelation, or play on ourselves the trick of regarding existence as if it were the designed work of a personal God, or presume to call it good, and bless it as if it were the existence we would have created if we had the power, and think that it therefore deserves to exist and is justifia­ble just as it is. No: these argumentative moves are bad moves; they are hopeless stratagems. The hope is to go beyond the need for reasons, to go beyond the need for justifying existence, and in doing so to strengthen, not weaken, one's attachment. Earthly existence must be preserved whatever we are able or unable to say about it. There is no other human and natural existence. The alternative is earthly nothingness. Things are better than nothing; anything is better than nothing.

#### DA’s to the alt—Alt causes genocide

Kalish 4 Michael Kalish, PhD student in philosophy at UC Santa Barbara, 2004 (http://www.history.ucsb.edu/faculty/marcuse/classes/133p/133p04papers/MKalishNietzNazi046.htm)

Nietzsche described the nobles as seeing the majority of mankind as contemptible and ignorant, and themselves as the protectors of all that is good. On the other hand, slave morality was the belief that the majority of human beings are good and it is the nobles who are oppressive and vicious, thus contemptible beings. "The revolt of the slaves in morals begins in the very principle of resentment becoming creative and giving birth to values – a resentment experienced by creatures who, deprived as they are of the proper outlet of action, are forced to find their compensation in an imaginary revenge" (Nietzsche, Genealogy III 10). Thus it is through values that slaves make nobles feel resentment towards themselves, and it is the slaves who prevent mankind from reaching its potential. Slave and noble morality differ from master morality because they do not operate in the interest of self-preservation. Rather, they attempt to help one another. In The Will to Power, Nietzsche described the resulting "mediocrity" as a seducer, which he defined as "liberal" (Nietzsche, Will, 864). The strong have come to see themselves as contemptible, causing them to be weak and indecisive, hence their "mediocrity." This liberal perspective provides the clever slaves with an advantage over the strong, who thus reject their own strengths as ugly and subhuman.Both Hitler and Nietzsche refer to the clever slaves as the Jews. Hitler's Mein Kampf is an attack on the Judeo-Christian ethic, as is The Genealogy of Morals. Nietzsche addressed the Jews as being responsible for the slave revolt and victory over the master race (I 7): In the context of the monstrous and inordinately fateful initiatives which the Jews have exhibited in connection with the most fundamental of all another occasion (Beyond Good and Evil, Aph. 195) – that it was, in fact, with the Jews that the revolt of the slaves begins in the sphere of morals; that revolt which has behind it a history of two millennia, and which at the present day has only moved out of our sight, because it has achieved victory. It is easier to understand the Judeo-Christian ethic, in respect to Nietzsche, as a mirror with which the slaves use to make the masters feel guilty and self-hating. By making the master empathize with the Slave, the master resents the qualities that make him strong, that is, actions that are in the interest of self-preservation. Nietzsche identifies the slave with the Jew because they are responsible for the existence of the Judeo-Christian ethic. In Mein Kampf, Hitler also identifies Jews as the creators of moral slavery (Hitler, 178): The most unbeautiful thing there can be in human life is and remains the yoke of slavery. Or do these schwabing [?] decadents view the present lot of the German people as 'aesthetic'? Certainly we don't have to discuss these matters with the Jews, the most modern inventors of this cultural perfume. Their whole existence is an embodied protest against the aesthetics of the lord's image. Hitler describes Jews as slaves in the same sense as Nietzsche. Hitler points to "slavery" as the ugliest aspect of human life in the past and present, while linking the Jews and their influence (i.e. "cultural perfume") to the deterioration of values, which is manifest in the "schwabing decadents." Hitler describes the product of the cultural perfume as the "whole man" and "half man," which are terms used to describe individuals motivated by self-preservation, as opposed to those whose individual guilt is ridden by morality, seeking to help others. Hitler defined the "degeneration" of man in these terms (Hitler, 30): This uncertainty is only too well founded in our own sense of guilt regarding such tragedies of degeneration; be that as it may, it paralyzes any serious and firm decision and is thus partly responsible for the weak and half-hearted, because hesitant, execution of even the most necessary measures of self-preservation. Hitler's use of the "weak and half-hearted" appears frequently throughout Mein Kampf, often in conjunction with Jews or the influence of the Jewish conspiracy. For example, Hitler accused the Jews of being responsible for both democracy and Marxism, the two forms of government founded to appease the collective over the strong individual. The ineffectiveness of Weimar's democracy and the threat of Bolsheviks following World War I provided the context with which Hitler saw them clash as weak, irreconcilable ideologies designed to profit Jews (Hitler 173f).¶ For Nietzsche and Hitler, the Judeo-Christian ethic caused an individual to split himself into two opposing forces: the interest of the collective (i.e. "half man" or slave morality) and the interest of self-preservation (i.e. "whole man" or master morality). The dominating force makes an individual either confident and strong, or guild-ridden and indecisive. For both Nietzsche and Hitler, the latter prevailed throughout Europe. In The Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche described the state of Europe (I 9):¶ The 'masters' have been done away with; the morality of the vulgar man has triumphed. This triumph may also be called a blood-poisoning (it has mutually fused the races)…Everything is obviously becoming Judaised, or Christianised, or vulgarized…¶ Nietzsche's use of the phrase "blood poisoning" to describe the effect of the Judeo-Christian ethic is similarly stressed by Hitler. In multiple sections of Mein Kampf, including: "Consequence of Jew Egotism," the "Sham Culture of the Jew," "The Jew a Parasite," "Jewish Religious Doctrine," "Development of Jewry," and many others, Hitler accused the Jewish people as belonging to a race that lacked any culture and manipulated others to get the strength to survive (Hitler, 301). And because they are a primitive herd, they are limited in their impulses to surpass the "individual's naked sense of self-preservation" through self-sacrifice (Hitler, 301). With their blood they contaminate the higher races and weaken the culture of the Aryan race: The Jew "poisons the blood of others, but preserves his own," and being aware of his ability to degenerate the high nobility, the Jew "systematically carries on this mode of 'disarming' the intellectual leader class of his racial adversaries. In order to mask his activity and lull his victims, however, he talks more and more of the equality of all men without regard to race and color" (Hitler, 316). Hitler wrote that men did not die from wars, but rather from the lack of resistance created by pure blood; and it was blood mixture that caused the deterioration of culture (Hitler, 296).¶ While the slave moralities clash, Nietzsche prophesed that a new morality would form and harness the human "will to power," and this man will be the Overman, or Superman. Nietzsche described the terribleness that follows the questioning of values and the creation of the superman: "Man is beast and superbeast; the higher human is inhuman and superhuman: these belong together. With every increase of greatness and height in man, there is also an increase in depth and terribleness" (Will to Power, 1027). Nietzsche justified terror with the belief that it would bring a higher state for mankind. But what is the superman other than terribleness? Shirer cited Nietzsche's explanation of how the superman was prophesized to dominate the world (Shirer, 111):¶ The strong men, the masters, regain the pure conscience of a beast of prey; monsters filled with joy, they can return from a fearful succession of murder…when a man is capable of commanding, when he is by nature a 'master,' when he is violent in act and gesture … to judge morality properly, it must be replaced by two concepts borrowed from zoology: the taming of a beast and the breeding of a specific species.¶ Nietzsche's prophecy calls for a master to maintain beasts of prey through breeding and transvaluation, which was essentially Hitler's course of action following his appointment to chancellor. In The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, William Shirer cited an aphorism from The Will to Power that more clearly defined the Superman's qualities: "A daring and ruler race is building itself up…the aim should be to prepare a transvaluation of values for a particular strong kind of man, most highly gifted in intellect and will. This man and the elite around him will become 'lords of the earth'" (Shirer, 101f). Shirer analyzed this quotation with respect to how Nietzsche affected Hitler and the content of Mein Kampf:¶ Such rantings from one of Germany's most original minds must have struck a responsive chord in Hitler's ¶ littered mind. At any rate he appropriated them for his own – not only the thoughts but the philosopher's penchant for grotesque exaggeration, and often his very words. 'Lords of the Earth' is a familiar expression in Mein Kampf. That in the end Hitler considered himself the superman of Nietzsche's prophesy can not be doubted.¶ In Mein Kampf, Hitler also emphasized the importance of questioning values and the necessary terror to transform the blood-poisoned state of Germany into an Aryan utopia. Hitler wrote, "Only when an epoch ceases to be haunted by the shadows of its own consciousness of guilt will it achieve the inner calm and outward strength brutally and ruthlessly to prune off the wild shoots and tear out the weeds" (Hitler, 30). If Hitler's Mein Kampf was partly a derivative of Nietzsche's work, the brutality Hitler referred to is the terribleness which Nietzsche described; it is the necessary destruction to refine the masses.¶ Proposal for resolution of the slave's disease (i.e. Judeo-Christian ethic and blood poisoning) was implied by both Hitler and Nietzsche to be annihilation. Hitler believed in the possibility of the pacifistic-humane idea "when the highest type of man has previously conquered and subjected the world to an extent that makes him the sole ruler of the earth" (Hitler, 288). Consistent with this thought, annihilation of the slave was essential. To fight the weight of diseased and weak human beings, Hitler sought to ruthlessly apply "Nature's stern and rigid laws" (Hitler, 289). His philosophy was "Those who want to live, let them fight, and those who do not want to fight in this world of eternal struggle do not deserve to live" (Hitler, 289).¶ In The Will to Power, a number of aphorisms present solutions to the decadence of Europe and the World. In aphorism 862, Nietzsche proposes a doctrine of breeding and annihilation:¶ A doctrine is needed powerful enough to work as a breeding agent: strengthening the strong, paralyzing and destructive for the world weary. The annihilation of the decaying races. Decay of Europe.-The annihilation of slavish evaluations.-Dominion over the earth as a means of producing a higher type.-The annihilation of the tartuffery called 'morality.' The annihilation of suffrage universel; i.e. the system through which the lowest natures prescribe themselves as laws for the higher.-The annihilation of mediocrity and its acceptance (The one sided, individuals – peoples; to strike for fullness of nature through the pairing of opposites: race mixture to this end). The new courage – no a priori truths…¶ This proposal of annihilation highly compares to Hitler's policies of extermination. Both Hitler and Nietzsche assert that the host of the slavish disease of values and decay is the clever Jew, the need for a spiritual base of independence of thought and action, the revaluation of strong and weak, and the annihilation of the slaves. By juxtaposing Hitler's work and Nietzsche's, the groundwork of Mein Kampf is clearly a literal interpretation of Nietzsche's work.