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### Plan Text

#### Plan: The United States Federal Government ought to substantially increase judicial restrictions on the war powers authority of the President of the United States by designating District Court judges to approve or reject targeted killings involving the use of drone strikes based on a strict scrutiny test.

### Advantage – Pakistan

#### Our Advantage is Pakistan—

#### Current drone policy makes instability in Pakistan inevitable and triggers a coup

Boyle 13 [Michael J., Assistant Professor of Political Science at La Salle University in Philadelphia, “The costs and consequences of drone warfare,” <http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International%20Affairs/2013/89_1/89_1Boyle.pdf>, ALB]\*\*we reject any offensive language used in this evidence  
Pakistan¶ The escalation of drone strikes in Pakistan to its current tempo—one every few ¶ days—directly contradicts the long-term American strategic goal of boosting the ¶ capacity and legitimacy of the government in Islamabad. Drone attacks are more ¶ than just temporary incidents that erase all traces of an enemy. They have lasting ¶ political effects that can weaken existing governments, undermine their legitimacy and add to the ranks of their enemies. These political effects come about ¶ because drones provide a powerful signal to the population of a targeted state that ¶ the perpetrator considers the sovereignty of their government to be negligible.¶ The popular perception that a government is powerless to stop drone attacks on its ¶ territory can be crippling(SIC) to the incumbent regime, and can embolden its domestic ¶ rivals to challenge it through violence. Such continual violations of the territorial integrity of a state also have direct consequences for the legitimacy of its ¶ government. Following a meeting with General David Petraeus, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari described the political costs of drones succinctly, saying that ¶ ‘continuing drone attacks on our country, which result in loss of precious lives ¶ or property, are counterproductive and difficult to explain by a democratically ¶ elected government. It is creating a credibility gap.’ Similarly, the Pakistani High ¶ Commissioner to London Wajid Shamsul Hasan said in August 2012 that¶ what has been the whole outcome of these drone attacks is that you have directly or ¶ indirectly contributed to destabilizing or undermining the democratic government. ¶ Because people really make fun of the democratic government—when you pass a resolution against drone attacks in the parliament and nothing happens. The Americans don’t ¶ listen to you, and they continue to violate your territory.76¶ The appearance of powerlessness in the face of drones is corrosive to the appearance of competence and legitimacy of the Pakistani government. The growing ¶ perception that the Pakistani civilian government is unable to stop drone attacks is ¶ particularly dangerous in a context where 87 percent of all Pakistanis are dissatisfied with the direction of the country and where the military, which has launched ¶ coups before, remains a popular force.¶ The political effects of this signal are powerful and lasting even when the ¶ reality of the relationship between the perpetrator and the targeted state is more ¶ complex. For example, the government of Pakistan has been ambivalent about ¶ drone strikes, condemning them in some cases but applauding their results in ¶ others. Much has been made of the extent to which the Pakistani government ¶ has offered its ‘tacit consent’ for the US drone strikes on its territory. The US ¶ has been willing to provide details on drone strikes after the fact, but has refrained ¶ from providing advance warning of an attack to the Pakistani government for fear ¶ that the information might leak. Pakistan has been operationally compliant with ¶ drone strikes and has not ordered its air force to shoot down drones in Pakistani ¶ airspace. Despite official denials, it has been revealed that the Pakistani government has permitted the US to launch drones from at least one of its own airbases.80¶ Whatever the complexity of its position and the source of its ambivalence over ¶ drone strikes, the political effects of allowing them to escalate to current levels ¶ are increasingly clear. The vast expansion of drone warfare under the Obama ¶ administration has placed enormous pressure on Pakistan for its complicity with the US, multiplied the enemies that its government faces and undermined parts of ¶ the social fabric of the country. By most measures, Pakistan is more divided and ¶ unstable after the Obama administration’s decision to ramp up the tempo and scale ¶ of drone attacks than it was during the Bush administration.

#### Drones strikes aren’t ending—Kerry’s statement was wrong

Mazzetti and Landler 13 [Mark and Mark, NYT, “Despite Administration Promises, Few Changes in Drone War,” <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/03/us/politics/drone-war-rages-on-even-as-administration-talks-about-ending-it.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0>, ALB]

¶ ¶ There were more drone strikes in Pakistan last month than any month since January. Three missile strikes were carried out in Yemen in the last week alone. And after Secretary of State John Kerry told Pakistanis on Thursday that the United States was winding down the drone wars there, officials back in Washington quickly contradicted him.¶ ¶ ¶ More than two months after President Obama signaled a sharp shift in America’s targeted-killing operations, there is little public evidence of change in a strategy that has come to define the administration’s approach to combating terrorism.¶ ¶ Most elements of the drone program remain in place, including a base in the southern desert of Saudi Arabia that the Central Intelligence Agency continues to use to carry out drone strikes in Yemen. In late May, administration officials said that the bulk of drone operations would shift to the Pentagon from the C.I.A.¶ ¶ But the C.I.A. continues to run America’s secret air war in Pakistan, where Mr. Kerry’s comments underscored the administration’s haphazard approach to discussing these issues publicly. During a television interview in Pakistan on Thursday, Mr. Kerry said the United States had a “timeline” to end drone strikes in that country’s western mountains, adding, “We hope it’s going to be very, very soon.”¶ ¶ But the Obama administration is expected to carry out drone strikes in Pakistan well into the future. Hours after Mr. Kerry’s interview, the State Department issued a statement saying there was no definite timetable to end the targeted killing program in Pakistan, and a department spokeswoman, Marie Harf, said, “In no way would we ever deprive ourselves of a tool to fight a threat if it arises.”¶ ¶ Micah Zenko, a fellow with the Council on Foreign Relations, who closely follows American drone operations, said Mr. Kerry seemed to have been out of sync with the rest of the Obama administration in talking about the drone program. “There’s nothing that indicates this administration is going to unilaterally end drone strikes in Pakistan,” Mr. Zenko said, “or Yemen for that matter.”

#### Pakistani instability and a coup goes nuclear

Pitt 9 - a New York Times and internationally bestselling author of two books: "War on Iraq: What Team Bush Doesn't Want You to Know" and "The Greatest Sedition Is Silence." (5/8/09, William, “Unstable Pakistan Threatens the World,” http://www.arabamericannews.com/news/index.php?mod=article&cat=commentary&article=2183)

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But a suicide bomber in Pakistan rammed a car packed with explosives into a jeep filled with troops today, killing five and wounding as many as 21, including several children who were waiting for a ride to school. Residents of the region where the attack took place are fleeing in terror as gunfire rings out around them, and government forces have been unable to quell the violence. Two regional government officials were beheaded by militants in retaliation for the killing of other militants by government forces. As familiar as this sounds, it did not take place where we have come to expect such terrible events. This, unfortunately, is a whole new ballgame. It is part of another conflict that is brewing, one which puts what is happening in Iraq and Afghanistan in deep shade, and which represents a grave and growing threat to us all.Pakistan is now trembling on the edge of violent chaos, and is doing so with nuclear weaponsin its hip pocket,right in the middle ofone ofthe most dangerous neighborhoods in the world.The situation in brief: Pakistan for years has been a nation in turmoil, run by a shaky government supported by a corrupted system, dominated by a blatantly criminal security service, and threatened by a large fundamentalist Islamic population with deep ties to the Taliban in Afghanistan. All this is piled atop an ongoing standoff with neighboring India that has been the center of political gravity in the region for more than half a century. The fact thatPakistan, andIndia, and Russia, and China all possess nuclear weaponsand share the same space means any ongoing or escalating violence over there hasthe real potential to crack open the very gates of Hellitself. Recently, the Taliban made a military push into the northwest Pakistani region around the Swat Valley. According to a recent Reuters report: The (Pakistani) army deployed troops in Swat in October 2007 and used artillery and gunship helicopters to reassert control. But insecurity mounted after a civilian government came to power last year and tried to reach a negotiated settlement. A peace accord fell apart in May 2008. After that, hundreds — including soldiers, militants and civilians — died in battles. Militants unleashed a reign of terror, killing and beheading politicians, singers, soldiers and opponents. They banned female education and destroyed nearly 200 girls' schools.About 1,200 people were killed since late 2007 and 250,000 to 500,000 fled, leaving the militants in virtual control. Pakistan offered on February 16 to introduce Islamic law in the Swat valley and neighboring areas in a bid to take the steam out of the insurgency. The militants announced an indefinite cease-fire after the army said it was halting operations in the region. President Asif Ali Zardari signed a regulation imposing sharia in the area last month. But the Taliban refused to give up their guns and pushed into Buner and another district adjacent to Swat, intent on spreading their rule. The United States, already embroiled in a war against Taliban forces in Afghanistan, must now face the possibility that Pakistan could collapse under the mounting threat of Taliban forces there. Military and diplomatic advisers to President Obama, uncertain how best to proceed, now face one of the great nightmare scenarios of our time. "Recent militant gains in Pakistan," reported The New York Times on Monday, "have so alarmed the White House that the national security adviser, Gen. James L. Jones, described the situation as 'one of the very most serious problems we face.'" "Security was deteriorating rapidly," reported The Washington Post on Monday, "particularly in the mountains along the Afghan border that harbor al-Qaeda and the Taliban, intelligence chiefs reported, and there were signs that those groups were working with indigenous extremists in Pakistan's populous Punjabi heartland. The Pakistani government was mired in political bickering. The army, still fixated on its historical adversary India, remained ill-equipped and unwilling to throw its full weight into the counterinsurgency fight. But despite the threat the intelligence conveyed, Obama has only limited options for dealing with it. Anti-American feeling in Pakistan is high, and a U.S. combat presence is prohibited. The United States is fighting Pakistan-based extremists by proxy, through an army over which it has little control, in alliance with a government in which it has little confidence." It is believedPakistan is currently in possession of between 60 and 100 nuclear weapons. Because Pakistan's stability is threatened by the wide swath of its population that shares ethnic, cultural and religious connections to the fundamentalist Islamic populace of Afghanistan, fears over what could happen to those nuclear weapons if the Pakistani government collapses are very real. "As the insurgency of the Taliban and Al Qaeda spreads in Pakistan," reported the Times last week, "senior American officials say they are increasingly concerned about new vulnerabilities for Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, including the potential for militants to snatch a weapon in transport or to insert sympathizers into laboratories or fuel-production facilities. In public, the administration has only hinted at those concerns, repeating the formulation that the Bush administration used: that it has faith in the Pakistani Army. But that cooperation, according to officials who would not speak for attribution because of the sensitivity surrounding the exchanges between Washington and Islamabad, has been sharply limited when the subject has turned to the vulnerabilities in the Pakistani nuclear infrastructure." "The prospect of turmoil in Pakistan sends shivers up the spinesof those U.S. officials charged with keeping tabs on foreign nuclear weapons," reported Time Magazine last month. "Pakistan is thought to possess about 100 — the U.S. isn't sure of the total, and may not know where all of them are. Still, if Pakistan collapses, the U.S. military is primed to enter the country and secure as many of those weapons as it can, according to U.S. officials. Pakistani officials insist their personnel safeguards are stringent, but a sleeper cell could cause big trouble, U.S. officials say." In other words, a shaky Pakistan spells trouble for everyone, especially if America loses the footrace to secure those weapons in the event of the worst-case scenario. If Pakistani militants ever succeed in toppling the government, several very dangerous events could happen at once. Nuclear-armedIndia couldbe galvanized into military actionof some kind,as couldnuclear-armedChina ornuclear-armedRussia. If the Pakistani government does fall, and all those Pakistani nukes are not immediately accounted for and secured,the specter (or reality) ofloose nukes falling into the hands of terrorist organizations could place the entire world on a collision course with unimaginable disaster.We have all been paying a great deal of attention to Iraq and Afghanistan, and rightly so. The developing situation in Pakistan, however, needs to be placed immediately on the front burner. The Obama administration appears to be gravely serious about addressing the situation. So should we all.

#### Drone strikes uniquely destroy relations—They’re the biggest reason for anti-American sentiment

Boyle 13 [Michael J., Assistant Professor of Political Science at La Salle University in Philadelphia, “The costs and consequences of drone warfare,” <http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International%20Affairs/2013/89_1/89_1Boyle.pdf>, ALB]

Drone strikes have an invidious and subtle effect on the social fabric of the societies ¶ where they occur. Drones do not just affect their targets, but spread fear and suspicion throughout the society in unexpected ways. As Brian Glyn Williams has ¶ noted, in Pakistan drones are often described by local villagers as machays (wasps) ¶ for their stings or bangana (thunder) for their ability to strike without warning.114¶ While drones terrify their intended targets, innocent villagers are equally terrified of being in the wrong place at the wrong time when an attack occurs. Drones ¶ produce among the civilian population a ‘wave of terror’ which has been described ¶ by some mental health professionals as ‘anticipatory anxiety’.David Rohde, ¶ a journalist who was captured and held by the Taliban, has described the fear ¶ produced by drone strikes as the aircraft were heard whirring overhead for hours ¶ at a time and calls them a ‘potent, unnerving symbol of unchecked American ¶ power’.116 This fear leads ordinary civilians to refrain from helping those wounded ¶ in drone strikes in case they are targeted in a ‘double tap’ strike. Drones have ¶ inhibited normal economic and social activity, and even made parents reluctant ¶ to send their children to schools that might be accidentally targeted. The drones ¶ have also turned neighbours on neighbours and fuelled communal mistrust in a ¶ society where overlapping family, tribal and social ties are crucial. The targets of ¶ drone strikes are often pinpointed by paid informants who place small electronic ¶ targeting devices in the homes or vehicles of suspected terrorists.118 Yet there is no ¶ way to tell whether these chips are left with real terrorist operatives or with those ¶ against whom the informant has a personal grudge. Rumours of these chips have ¶ produced high levels of mistrust in the community as ‘neighbors suspect neighbors of spying for the US, Pakistani or Taliban intelligence or using drone strikes ¶ to settle feuds’. While the drones circling overhead spread fear throughout the ¶ population and disrupt normal life, the suspicion produced by these chips and ¶ other means of nominating targets have eroded the trust that underlies much of ¶ religious, economic and political life in these societies.¶ The use of drones also has a series of second-order political effects that must ¶ be weighed against advantages accrued through the killing of terrorist operatives. ¶ Drones can subject governments to high levels of political pressure that make ¶ compliance with US requests more costly. They can multiply the ranks of enemies ¶ in insurgencies and undermine the social fabric that allows many of these societies ¶ to function. Many of these consequences are systematically discounted in analyses ¶ of drones that focus exclusively on how many terrorists are killed relative to civilians. More generally, these costs illustrate a central inconsistency of American ¶ policy: that if the commitment to degrade or destroy terrorists is put into practice with drone strikes, it will damage the perceived competence and legitimacy of ¶ governments that the US is most dependent upon for counterterrorism cooperation. The long-term goal of building strong and legitimate governments that can ¶ police their territory and work as reliable partners with the United States is undermined by a drones-first policy that sidelines these governments or treats them as ¶ subservient accomplices to the brute exercise of American power.

#### US-Pakistan relations are key to resolve Kashmir—Prevents Indo-Pak war

Riedel 8 Bruce, senior fellow in the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, (“Pakistan and Terror: The Eye of the Storm”, The annals of the American academy of political and social science, July, 2008, sage journals)

But this does not rule out an option that would involve a major effort to resolve the Kashmir problem on a more realistic basis. The basis for such an approach would be to complement the ongoing Indo-Pakistani bilateral dialogue. That dia- logue has already produced a series of confidence-building measures between the two countries, reopening transportation links, setting up hotlines between military commands, and holding periodic discussions at the foreign secretary level on all the issues that divide the two. Unfortunately, the dialogue has not seriously addressed the Kashmir issue because of the significant gulf between the two parties and India’s refusal to negotiate while still a target of terrorist attacks planned and organized in Pakistan. The United States has been reluctant to engage more actively in the Kashmir dispute in light of the Indian posture that outside intervention is unwarranted and that Kashmir is a purely bilateral issue. Faced with the likelihood of India’s rejection of outside intervention, American diplomacy has put the Kashmir prob- lem in the “too hard” category and left it to simmer. The results are all too pre- dictable. The Kashmir issue periodically boils over, and the United States and the international community have to step in to try to prevent a full-scale war. This was the case during the Kargil crisis in 1999, after the terrorist attack on the Indian parliament in 2001, and again in 2002 when India mobilized its army for war on the Pakistani border. A unique opportunity for quiet American diplomacy to help advance the Kashmir issue to reach a better, more stable solution may exist in 2009. The U.S.- India nuclear deal agreed to during President Bush’s July 2005 visit to South Asia should create a more stable and enduring basis for U.S.-Indian relations than at any time in history. The deal removes the central obstacle to closer strategic ties between Washington and New Delhi: the nuclear proliferation problem, which has held back the development of their relationship for two decades. In the new era of U.S.-Indian strategic partnership, Washington should be more prepared to press New Delhi to be more flexible on Kashmir. It is clearly in the American interest to try to defuse a lingering conflict that has generated global terrorism and repeatedly threatened to create a full-scale military con- frontation on the subcontinent. It is also in India’s interest to find a solution to a conflict that has gone on for too long. Since Kargil, India has been more open to an American role in Kashmir because it senses Washington is fundamentally in favor of a resolution on the basis of the status quo, which favors India. The United States currently has better relations with both India and Pakistan than at any time in the past several decades. The U.S. rapprochement with India, begun by President Clinton and advanced by President Bush, is now supported by an almost unique bipartisan consensus in the American foreign policy estab- lishment and the Congress. At the same time, U.S.-Pakistani relations are stronger now than at any time since the Reagan years, and the sanctions that poi- soned U.S.-Pakistani ties for decades have been removed by legislation sup- ported by both Republicans and Democrats. It is a unique moment. A Kashmir solution would have to be based around a formula for both making the line of control a permanent and normal international border (perhaps with some minor modifications) and creating a permeable frontier between the two parts of Kashmir so that the Kashmiri people could live more normal lives. A spe- cial condominium might be created to allow the two constituencies to work together on issues that are internal to Kashmir, such as transportation, the envi- ronment, sports, and tourism. It is unlikely that the two states will be able to reach such an agreement on their own given the history of mistrust that pervades both sides of the problem. A quiet American effort to promote a solution, led by the next U.S. president, is probably essential to any effort to move the parties toward an agreement. Resolution of the Kashmiri issue would go a long way to making Pakistan a more normal state and less preoccupied with India. It would also remove a major rationale for the army’s disproportionate role in Pakistani national security affairs, thus helping to restore genuine civilian democratic rule in the country. A resolution of the major outstanding issue between Islamabad and New Delhi would reduce the arms race between the two countries and the risk of nuclear conflict. And it would remove the need for Pakistan to find allies, such as the Taliban, LeT, and al Qaeda, to fight asymmetric warfare against India. Of course, it would not resolve all the tensions between the two neighbors or end the problem of the Taliban in Afghanistan. But more than anything else it would set the stage for a different era in the subcontinent and for more produc- tive interaction between the international community and Pakistan. The alternative is to let Kashmir simmer and avoid trying to find a means to advance the Indo-Pakistani dialogue. In the long run, this approach is virtually certain to lead to another crisis in the subcontinent. Sooner or later, the two countries will again find themselves on the precipice of war. In a worst-case sce- nario, a terrorist incident like the July 2006 metro bombings in Mumbai or the hijacking of IA 814 could spark an Indian military response against targets in Pakistan allegedly involved in the planning and orchestration of terrorism. And that could lead to nuclear war. The next president must adopt a more sophisticated approach to Pakistan and its terror nexus that goes beyond threats and sanctions, beyond commando raids and intelligence cooperation, beyond aid and aircraft sales. It is time to come to grips with what motivates Pakistan’s behavior and make peace.

#### Extinction

Korb 12 Senior Fellow Center for American Progress, (Lawrence- Assistant Secretary of Defense under Reagan, (Lawrence, March/April, “No first use: The way to contain nuclear war in South Asia” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Vol 68 No 2, p 34-42, SagePub)

In the twenty-first century, the Indian subcontinent has surpassed Europe as the most likely region for nuclear war. Over the past three decades, the Cold War giants—the United States and Russia—have reduced their nuclear arsenals by more than 70 percent (Cirincione, 2011). Meanwhile, India and Pakistan have begun the world’s second nuclear arms race. Since their partition in 1947, India and Pakistan have fought three major wars and remained on the brink of conflict for more than six decades. The South Asian neighbors carried out rival nuclear weapons tests in 1998 and are now estimated to possess at least 80 nuclear weapons each (Oswald, 2011). Pakistan has more than doubled the size of its arsenal in the past four years, likely as a means of countering India’s greater conventional strength (Korb and Rothman, 2011). As these countries develop more advanced nuclear capabilities, chances increase that even a relatively small skirmish could escalate into a nuclear conflict. For example, earlier this year, Pakistan announced it had tested a small nuclear warhead designed to be used against invading troops on Pakistani soil (The Economist, 2011). A nuclear war between India and Pakistan would be an absolute catastrophe. A Natural Resources Defense Council study found that even a limited nuclear exchange consisting of as few as 10 warheads could result in about three million casualties (Natural Resources Defense Council, 2002). Moreover, the effects of such a conflict would not be confined to South Asia: According to a recent article in Scientific American, a major regional nuclear conflict could spark a global “nuclear winter,” with worldwide implications for agriculture (Robock and Toon, 2010). Given the terrible effects of a nuclear exchange, much ink has been spilled articulating policies to prevent war, particularly a nuclear war, between India and Pakistan. However, little has been written about how the United States should respond if diplomacy fails—that is, if a nuclear war breaks out between India and Pakistan, how can the United States contain the conflict so it does not come to involve other nations with alliances or interests in the region and significantly larger nuclear arsenals? Foreign interests and the Indian subcontinent On the surface, preventing foreign intervention in a nuclear conflict appears to be a simple task. Asking how to keep countries from jumping into a nuclear war seems like asking how people can be kept from running into burning buildings. It’s not hard; they have plenty of reasons to steer clear. But the web of alliances, rivalries, and power politics on the Indian subcontinent means that foreign intervention in any major conflict between India and Pakistan—even a nuclear one—cannot be discounted. China, in particular, has close ties to Islamabad and views Pakistan as integral to its strategy of containing Indian influence on the subcontinent. Beijing—which has provided military and, allegedly, nuclear aid to Islamabad—would almost certainly provide some sort of support to Pakistan, be it covert or open, in the event of a conflict with India. Such assistance could enflame the smoldering rivalry between Beijing and New Delhi.1 China is not the only nation with strong strategic interests in the region. As the United States attempts to extricate itself from Afghanistan without further destabilizing Central Asia, it will need the support of both India and Pakistan, who have dramatically different visions for the future of Afghanistan. The United States has long had an on-and-off relationship with Pakistan and now needs Islamabad’s support in cracking down on the region’s terrorist organizations. Pakistan, on the other hand, worries that when the NATO mission in Afghanistan ends, the Indians and Afghanis will join forces to encircle it. The United States is also seeking to establish a strategic partnership with India, cemented in part with a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement signed by the Bush administration. Finally, Russia has had a long-term relationship with India and is concerned about increasing Chinese influence on the subcontinent. The outbreak of hostilities between India and Pakistan is more than a remote possibility. The contentious issue of Kashmir presents one road to conflict. This territorial dispute has already prompted the two South Asian powers to go to war twice, and India and Pakistan remain far from resolving their differences on the disputed region. An attack by a terrorist organization with ties to Islamabad presents a second and far more frightening path to conflict. In 2008, the terrorist group Lakshar-e-Taiba carried out a brutal attack on Mumbai, India’s largest city, killing more than 160 people and bringing the city to a standstill for two days. A gunman captured in the attack said he trained in Pakistan for more than a year (Perlez and Sengupta, 2008). Lakshar-e-Taiba is widely believed to have ties to elements of the Pakistani government’s intelligence agency, and it operates and recruits openly in Pakistan (Goldberg and Ambinder, 2011). Further, Lakshar-e-Taiba is hardly the only militant organization with a hatred of India and connections to the Pakistani military or its intelligence service. While India showed tremendous restraint in responding to the Mumbai attacks, there are no guarantees that it would choose to restrain itself after another such incident.

#### Drones are collapsing Yemen now and increasing terrorism – they create resentment

Huffington Post, 8/10 [2013, Yemen Drone Strikes Bring New Round Of Terror To Embattled Country, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/10/yemen-drone-strikes\_n\_3737554.html]

On Friday night, Farea al-Muslimi, a young Yemeni journalist and activist, went for a drive with a friend around the capital city of his home, Sanaa.¶ It was a holiday weekend, the second day of the Muslim holy festival of Eid al-Fitr, and the streets were calm. But what struck al-Muslimi the most as they crossed through the town, was that they hardly encountered any security presence.¶ "We didn't see a single checkpoint," he told HuffPost. "No one buys the idea that there is a security threat here. They simply don't see it -- I don't see it."¶ Over the previous week, the United States and other Western nations ramped up terror alerts about Yemen, a small nation on the tip of the Arabian peninsula that attracts a disproportionate amount of American attention. A recent terrorism alert prompting the closures of nearly two dozen American embassies around the Arab world was "emanating from Yemen," the U.S. said, and earlier in the week American citizens were urged to flee Yemen. The staff of the U.S. embassy there was spirited to Germany on a military cargo plane.¶ However, as the week progressed, signs of terror did not take the form of an attack by al Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula, an increasingly powerful franchise of the feared terrorist organization, but instead, as Haykal Bafana, a Sanaa-based Yemeni lawyer, put it recently, of an "orgy of drones."¶ Over the past 10 days, at least nine American drone strikes have been conducted across the country's remote provinces, most recently on Saturday evening. At least 36 people, all of them immediately deemed "suspected militants" by the Yemeni government, were killed, according to wire service counts. On Thursday alone, there were three drone attacks, an unprecedented rate; Saturday's was the fifth in 72 hours.¶ For those left in Yemen, it has been like living in a universe parallel to the one described in American terror alerts, Bafana said on Saturday. "It's like there are two different Yemens," he said. "The one the U.S. and Yemeni government claims is always under a terrorist threat, and the one we actually live in, with drones. It's like they stepped through the looking glass."¶ For Farea al-Muslimi, that's meant a week of fear and anger. "You can tell how frustrated the people here are," al-Muslimi said, when reached by phone late on Friday.¶ Earlier in the week, he said, when an American P-3 Orion spy plane circled over Sanaa for nearly 10 hours, loudly buzzing as residents tried to celebrate the start of Eid, residents stopped in their tracks to protest. "People were standing in the street and screaming at it," he said.¶ Al-Muslimi became something of an American household name, at least in the relatively small circle of people who monitor America's counter-terrorism policies and drone usage, earlier this year when he live-Tweeted accounts of a drone strike from his family's village, Wessab.¶ He subsequently traveled to Washington, D.C., where he testified before Congress about the experience, telling lawmakers that drone strikes were destroying America's image in Yemen, and driving ordinary citizens into the arms of al Qaeda and other militants. "What violent militants had previously failed to achieve, one drone strike achieved in an instant," he said at the time.¶ In the ensuing months, amid a growing atmosphere of dissent about the use and abuse of drone warfare in Washington, President Barack Obama found himself compelled to speak publicly about the policy. In a speech in May, he acknowledged America's role in drone strikes and pledged to create a legal framework for oversight of the program.¶ But The New York Times and others have since reported that the reality in targeted areas like Yemen shows that drone policy is anything but reformed.¶ In Yemen, there have already been 22 strikes this year, close to the pace in 2012 when Obama ordered a record 42 drone strikes, according to the Long War Journal. And in Pakistan, another frequent target of American drones, there were more strikes in July than in any month since January.¶ The history of U.S. drone wars in Yemen includes a number of tactical successes, of course, including the strike that killed feared al Qaeda propagandist Anwar al-Awlaki, an American citizen. But it's also littered with devastating failures: innocent families and children have been hit by misguided missiles, first-aid responders have found themselves targeted by a practice known as "double-tapping," and even some prominent anti-al Qaeda clerics have been assassinated.¶ The day after Obama was reelected for his second term, for instance, he ordered a strike that killed a tribal leader known for negotiating with al Qaeda militants to reduce their lethality. More recently, officials acknowledged that a strike last summer killed Salem Ahmed bin Ali Jaber, a popular sheik who a few days earlier delivered a sermon on the evils of al Qaeda.¶ Mohammed al-Qadhi, a Sanaa-based Yemeni journalist, said that so far there is no conclusive evidence that the current attacks killed innocents. Others, including Bafana, who tracks the strikes through his own network, said the first strikes last week in Hadhramauat killed at least four civilians, including a child.¶ Either way, al-Qadhi said the latest strikes are producing an uptick in popular discontent and protest -- on Facebook and Twitter, in the targeted villages, and at the now-vacant American embassy in Sanaa.¶ "People feel they don't have a government anymore," al-Qadhi said by phone. "They feel we don't have a government to attack the militants, so the Americans are handling it for us, and they are encroaching onto the sovereignty of Yemen."¶ The killings, he added, "may be good for Americans but in the end it doesn't solve the problem completely, especially if some civilians are killed. It just creates a kind of sympathy with al Qaeda. And I think al Qaeda will not stop attacking. I think they will retaliate, and they will fire back again in retaliation to these attacks."¶ The practitioners of America's counterterrorism strategy also sometimes seem at a loss to explain the U.S. policy's objectives.¶ “It’s too early to tell whether we’ve actually disrupted anything,” a top U.S. official told The Washington Post this week, of the most recent round of strikes. “What the U.S. government is trying to do here is to buy time."¶ To al-Muslimi, the return of drone warfare almost reflects an aimlessness among American policymakers. "Just like troubled teenagers with bad parents might run to the addiction of drugs and alcohol when it has problems, Americans are running to drones when they have terrorism problems," he said. "Alcohol makes you forget your failures, and for the Americans it seems like drones are for when they want to forget their counter-terrorism failures. It's senseless."¶ Meanwhile, he said, this week's action may have made some Americans feel better, but it's only increasing the sense of terror in Yemen.¶ "When there is a normal war, people can hide, or they can stay away from the military -- they can make choices and be careful," al-Muslimi said. "But when drones come, you just don't know when you'll be next. The fear is incredible."

#### Drones increase terrorism – collapses Yemen and causes loose nukes in Pakistan

Bandow Global Research 7-7-13 (Doug, “The Democratic Way of Killing: The President as Judge, Jury, and Executioner,” <http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-democratic-way-of-killing-the-president-as-judge-jury-and-executioner/5341944>, Mike)

America is a geographic location. It is a people. It also is an idea, a community defined by a shared commitment to a free society. Sacrifice the latter and America will be profoundly changed. Yet that has been happening since 9/11. Obama’s targeted assassination is another step down this treacherous road. Extreme assertions of authority, such as the claim that the president may kill whenever he believes necessary, threaten a liberal order. The danger is greatest when the targets are American citizens. However, the president has no authority to kill foreigners without extraordinary cause either. Claims to the contrary raise questions about what America is. In the parody song “Obama That I Used to Know,” one of the singers observes, “Sometimes I think that a peace prize winner shouldn’t have a kill list.” He does, however. And the decision to kill appears to be the president’s alone. The Times ran a long story on the assassinator-in-chief and the regular White House meetings on whom next to kill. Although some 100 officials gather online by video conference, the president alone adjudges guilt and imposes punishment. There is no appeal or review. Rather like a Roman emperor, a thumbs down from the president means death, at least assuming the drone or SEAL team can find the target. The Founders carefully limited the discretion of the president to start conflicts. He could defend against sudden attack, but that would not extend without congressional authority to launching a continuous series of preventive attacks in nations against which America is not at war. And the drone campaigns are war. For instance, at least 2,400 Pakistanis have been killed by drones since 2004. No limits After 9/11 Congress approved the Authorization for Use of Military Force. More general than a typical declaration of war, it nevertheless targeted specific people, most of whom are now dead or in captivity — those who “planned, authorized, committed, or aided” the 9/11 attacks. Today that measure is too distant in circumstance, time, geography, and people to authorize the administration’s multiple drone campaigns. Moreover, secret military campaigns reduce political accountability. The practice moves foreign and defense policy into the shadows. One reason the Founders insisted on a congressional declaration of war was to encourage a full public debate over basic issues of war and peace. Raining missiles on another country from drones is the equivalent of war, yet it occasions little notice. Complained Murtaza Hussain in Salon, “In the past governments have often found their ability to wage wars abroad constrained by the citizenry who have borne the brunt of the social pressures these wars inevitably create.” Today, however, Americans are scarcely aware of the multiple wars being fought in their name. Moreover, undertaking a policy of promiscuous assassination transforms both the battlefield and the enemy. In a traditional conflict the opposing sides are reasonably clear: Anyone in uniform on a battlefield is a legitimate target. But in the “war on terrorism” no one wears a uniform and anyone anywhere can be a combatant, making the entire world, including the American homeland, a battlefield. Indeed, the very ease of drone assassinations undermines any safeguards on their use. Warned Amos Guiora and Laurie Blank in the Guardian, “A ‘flexible understanding of imminence’ ultimately produces an approach that can only be defined as ‘kill all the bad guys.’ If everyone who constitutes ‘a bad guy’ is automatically a legitimate target, then careful analysis of threats, imminence, proportionality, credibility, reliability, and other factors simply goes out the window.” A 2004 United Nations report raised similar concerns: “Empowering governments to identify and kill ‘known terrorists’ places no verifiable obligation upon them to demonstrate in any way that those against whom legal force is used indeed are terrorists, or to demonstrate that every other alternative has been exhausted.” Are there any limits on government, especially executive, power? This president recognizes none. Indeed, the Obama administration’s policy seems to be to kill first and consider other options second. The Bush administration kidnapped and tortured, but at least its mistakes could, and occasionally were, remedied by the victim’s release. That option is not available with targeted assassinations. Admittedly it isn’t easy to grab possible enemies in tribal Pakistan or Yemen, and the administration claims that some adversaries have been identified and then arrested and imprisoned by local authorities. Yet the sheer number of assassinations raises the question whether the United States really has so many deadly enemies. Politics is never far in the background. In the New Yorker Steve Coll pointed to evidence “suggesting that the Obama Administration leans toward killing terrorism suspects because it does not believe it has a politically attractive way to put them on trial.” Indeed, the entire program is surrounded by political spin. Noted Dennis Blair, the administration’s first director of national intelligence, “It is the politically advantageous thing to do — low cost, no U.S. casualties, gives the appearance of toughness. It plays well domestically, and it is unpopular only in other countries. Any damage it does to the national interest only shows up over the long term.” Unfortunately, that damage can be extensive. The first is moral. The United States has a basic ethical obligation to minimize the deaths of noncombatants. Obviously, that is difficult when the combatants live and train among civilians. However, most people recognize that terrorism is outrageous precisely because it targets innocents. To be just, counterterrorism must seek to avoid the same consequence, even if unintentional. In discussing the Obama drone program, the Times cited the possibility of “explicit intelligence posthumously proving” people to be innocent, but as yet, alas, there is no medical procedure to posthumously unkill them. The administration acknowledges the duty to avoid noncombatant casualties and claims that few, if any, civilians have been killed recently. However, such claims deserve to be treated with skepticism. We now know that many nonterrorists — some innocent civilians, others Taliban foot-soldiers — were arrested, detained, tortured, and imprisoned as if they were terrorists. Moreover, in Pakistan the United States has relied on “signature” strikes, which, according to the Times, aimed not at “named, high-value terrorists” but instead “targeted training camps and suspicious compounds in areas controlled by militants.” Internal administration critics, reported the Times, “complained to the White House that the criteria used by the C.I.A. for identifying a terrorist ‘signature’ were too lax. The joke was that when the C.I.A. sees ‘three guys doing jumping jacks,’ the agency thinks it is a terrorist training camp, said one senior official. Men loading fertilizer could be bombmakers — but they might also be farmers, skeptics argued.” Such attacks obviously are no joke for those killed. Washington is following a similar policy in Yemen, where the administration has undertaken “Terrorist Attack Disruption Strikes.” At least they are supposed to be based on more-stringent standards than are “signature” attacks. However, the administration apparently still does not even know the names of those it is killing. Creating terrorists Of course, no one really knows how many of those killed by drone strikes (or other means) are terrorists, enablers, or innocents. Obviously, real terrorists have an incentive to overstate civilian losses, but locals respond to administration claims with incredulity. Moreover, Washington uses definitions to assert a peerless rec-ord. Reported the Times, the administration “in effect counts all military-age males in a strike zone as combatants, according to several administration officials, unless there is explicit intelligence posthumously proving them innocent. Counterterrorism officials insist this approach is one of simple logic: people in an area of known terrorist activity, or found with a top Qaeda operative, are probably up to no good.” So living next to, riding with, or talking to a possible terrorist entails the risk of a death sentence. Third-party casualty figures vary widely, but most contradict the administration. The website Long War Journal, New America Foundation, and the London-based Bureau of Investigative Journalism have estimated that the number of noncombatants killed in Pakistan alone ranges from 138 to 832. Innocent deaths may be inevitable in war, but killing hundreds of noncombatants is morally abhorrent. Moreover, killing innocents will create additional terrorists. Noted the Times, “Drones have replaced Guantanamo as the recruiting tool of choice for militants.” The Pakistani Taliban had little interest in America until Washington began targeting the group’s members. Faisal Shahzad, the U.S. citizen who attempted to set off a bomb in New York City’s Times Square, received assistance from the Pakistan Taliban. Yet the administration has been expanding its kill list. The Times cited Baitullah Mehsud, head of the Pakistan Taliban, “whose group then mainly targeted the Pakistan government.” The administration decided “that he represented a threat, if not to the homeland, to American personnel in Pakistan,” but targeting him may have turned him into a threat to the homeland as well. Much the same has happened in Yemen, where U.S. officials admitted, “There were times when we were intentionally misled, presumably by [former president Ali Abdullah] Saleh, to get rid of people he wanted to get rid of,” one unnamed official told the Washington Post. Washington is now targeting Yemenis who at most pose a threat to Americans in Yemen — who, not coincidentally, are supporting the authoritarian regime against which many Yemenis are fighting. Reported the Post, “A growing number of attacks have been aimed at lower-level figures who are suspected of having links to terrorism operatives but are seen mainly as leaders of factions focused on gaining territory in Yemen’s internal struggle.” There are many bad people in the world, but most have no desire to attack Americans. If the United States targets them, however, they have a compelling reason to reconsider. If they do, Washington then would fire more missiles on them, reinforcing the cycle. That should not surprise U.S. officials: Americans would react badly if a distant country, say China, was killing their neighbors in the name of fighting terrorism — even if those killed really were terrorists. And some day, as the global balance of power shifts, Americans might suffer such attacks on the basis of the precedent set by their government. Washington’s de facto war also destabilizes target nations. Of course, it is possible that countries such as Pakistan and Yemen would be in worse shape with more terrorists absent the steady stream of drone attacks. Yet both those countries have deteriorated as U.S. strikes have increased. Pakistan is a nuclear-armed state that is perennially on the brink. Washington is widely reviled there. Writing from Yemen, author and political activist Ibrahim Mothana warned that because of the drone strikes “a new generation of leaders is spontaneously emerging in furious retaliation to attacks on their territories and tribes. This is why [al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula] is much stronger in Yemen today than it was a few years ago. In 2009, A.Q.A.P. had only a few hundred members and controlled no territory; today it has, along with Ansar al-Sharia, at least 1,000 members and controls substantial territory.” The Obama administration’s desperate attempt to eradicate every last radical operative, whether dangerous or not, could have regrettable consequences. Warned Michael Boyle in the Guardian, Obama has allowed “short-term tactical victories against terrorist networks to overwhelm America’s wider strategic priorities and leave its relations with key governments in a parlous state.” If Pakistan implodes, Washington might find itself chasing loose nukes as well as violent jihadists.

#### AQAP on the rise – attack coming and the commitment is huge

CNN Security 2-16-12 (“Al-Qaeda’s Biggest Threat,” http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/02/16/al-qaedas-biggest-threat/, Mike)

Ibrahim al-Asiri is the sort of terrorist who keeps intelligence officials awake at night. He’s al Qaeda’s chief bomb-maker, and he built explosive devices hidden in printer cartridges that got onto several planes in October 2010. He’s still at large in Yemen. The bomb plots he’s alleged to have masterminded – the 2009 underwear bomb plot and printer bombs dispatched to the United States in 2010 – have very nearly worked. And security experts say al-Asiri and al Qaeda in Yemen may yet penetrate the security screening that is meant to protect aviation. Three international plots In the summer of 2009, two Saudi brothers clasped each other in a last embrace in the desert. The elder brother, Ibrahim al-Asiri, had constructed a bomb like none al Qaeda had produced before: a device designed to be inserted inside the rectum of a suicide bomber containing around 100 grams of PETN, a difficult-to-detect white powdery explosive. The suicide bomber was his younger brother, Abdullah al-Asiri. And their target was Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, the head of Saudi counter-terrorism, whose security services had driven them out of Saudi Arabia two years earlier. Their group - al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) - was determined to show that even well-protected targets outside Yemen were not beyond their reach. In the end, the attack - in August 2009 - failed. Despite gaining entry to bin Nayef’s residence by claiming to be defecting, the device killed only Abdullah al-Asiri and slightly injured the head of Saudi counter-terrorism. But even in failure, his brother and comrades were emboldened. Never had al Qaeda come so close to killing a member of the Saudi royal family. At about the same time, a young Nigerian - Umar Farouk AbdulMutallab - arrived in Yemen. Schooled in the West and from a prominent family, he had become radicalized as a student in London. He was the ideal candidate to carry out AQAP's most ambitious attack yet. According to recently released court documents, al-Asiri was instrumental in developing plans for the Nigerian to bring down a U.S. passenger jet as it approached its destination. According to the documents, al-Asiri worked in tandem with American-Yemeni cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, who persuaded the Nigerian to conduct a martyrdom mission and approved al-Asiri’s plan for getting a bomb past security onto a U.S.-bound airliner. Al-Asiri met with AbdulMutallab several times and personally delivered his ingenious new device: 200 grams of PETN stuffed into the lining of specially tailored underwear. According to the court documents, al-Asiri trained AbdulMutallab, "having the defendant practice the manner in which the bomb would be detonated, that is, by pushing the plunger of a syringe, causing two chemicals to mix, and initiating a fire (which would then detonate the explosive)." AbdulMutallab slipped through airport security to board a Detroit-bound flight on Christmas Day but failed to fully detonate the device as the plane came in for landing. It was a lucky escape. An explosives expert told CNN that one of the likeliest explanations for the failure was the wear and tear on the device during AbdulMutallab's three-week journey through Africa, before flying to the United States. After the failed attack, the FBI found al-Asiri’s fingerprints on the underwear device and matched them to a file kept by the Saudi government, but the bomb-maker continued to elude the grasp of counter-terrorism agencies. The following year, Ibrahim al-Asiri began developing his most ingenious device yet. It involved placing 400 grams of PETN inside a printer cartridge and connecting it to a detonator and timer embedded in the circuitry of a laser printer. The choice of a laser printer was deliberate: PETN is similar in texture to ink-toner powder and would therefore evade detection by single-view X-ray machines at many air cargo departure points. "Whoever designed this is at the clever end of the scale," Sidney Alford, one of the world’s leading explosive experts, told CNN. Al-Awlaki again played a significant role in the plot. He “certainly encouraged, supported, supervised al-Asiri's efforts," a senior U.S. counter-terrorism official told CNN. In late October 2010, two printer bombs designed by al-Asiri were dropped off at FedEx and UPS offices in Sanaa, Yemen. They passed through airport security undetected and were then loaded onto the first leg of their journey toward the United States. Only an intelligence tip to Saudi authorities allowed authorities in Dubai and the UK to eventually intercept the deadly cargo. Al-Asiri had concealed the explosives so well that bomb disposal teams at both locations initially believed the printers were not bombs. It was the most sophisticated al Qaeda device that Western counter-terrorism officials had ever seen, and they said it had the potential to bring down a plane. Al Qaeda later boasted in its online magazine Inspire: "The following phase would be for us to use our connections to mail such packages from countries that are below the radar and to use similar devices on civilian aircrafts in Western countries." A bomb-maker’s journey Though al-Asiri remains a shadowy figure, CNN has pieced together details of his journey to jihad. This account is based in part on a detailed briefing on AQAP that Saudi counter-terrorism officials, including Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, provided late last year to Mustafa Alani, the director of security and defense studies at the Gulf Research Center. Saudi Arabia is generally viewed as having the most extensive intelligence presence in Yemen. Bin Nayef, whose father is crown prince, responded to the assassination attempt against him in 2009 by expanding the Saudi intelligence-gathering operation in Yemen, developing a network of informants, according to Alani. In late October 2010, it was a communication from an informant close to AQAP’s inner circle that tipped Saudi Arabia off to the fact that explosive packages had just been dispatched by the group to the United States, according to Alani. Al-Asiri was born in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on April 18, 1982. His father had served as an officer in the Saudi military, and according to interviews the family later gave the Saudi newspaper Watan, nothing about Ibrahim and his brother Abdullah’s upbringing marked them for jihad. "They were not religious boys at the time. They used to listen to music and had a wide variety of friends; friends not like the ones they had later when they became more religious," his mother told Watan. One of their sisters told the newspaper that the death of their brother Ali in a car accident in 2000 was a turning point in Ibrahim and Abdullah's attitude. "It was after that that they started swapping videotapes and cassettes on the Mujahedeen in Chechnya and Afghanistan, and they became at times distant," the sister said. "Abdullah started to go out a lot with his new friends to camps known as 'preaching camps.’ " Al-Asiri began studying chemistry at King Saud University in Riyadh but dropped out after only two years, according to Alani. Though he would acquire bomb-making expertise later on, those studies would lay a foundation for his future terrorist career. Then came the Iraq war. Like hundreds of other young Saudis, al-Asiri was determined to fight in Iraq against the U.S. occupation. But he never made it there. In 2006, he was arrested by Saudi security forces as he tried to cross the border into Iraq. "He was not considered an important person, so he was released after spending a brief amount of time in prison," Alani told CNN. He was held for nine months. When he was released, al-Asiri, who became known as Abu Salah in militant circles, attempted to create a new militant cell inside Saudi Arabia, linked to al Qaeda, that planned to bomb oil pipelines in the country, according to his later designation as a terrorist by U.S. and U.N. authorities. When police swooped in on their meeting place in northern Riyadh, six of his cell were killed in a shootout, but he and his brother were not there. They were not then viewed by Saudi authorities as key members of the Saudi wing of al Qaeda, according to Alani. In 2007, al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia instructed its operatives to move to Yemen, according to Alani. Al Qaeda’s Yemen operations had been given a new life after several of its leaders had escaped from prison the previous year. Al-Asiri, then on the run, called his father to tell him he was leaving the country but did not reveal where he was heading. Saudi counter-terrorism were eavesdropping on the call. The brothers crossed the border into Yemen. Saudi counter-terrorism officials believe that it was only when he moved to Yemen that al-Asiri developed his bomb-making expertise. Alani says there are indications he was tutored by a Pakistani bomb-maker linked to the group. By the summer of 2009, Ibrahim al-Asiri was one of several Saudis in AQAP’s inner circle. In the weeks leading up to the plot to kill bin Nayef, he and his brother were filmed sitting in a tent with several senior AQAP operatives, including its Yemeni leader, Nasir al-Wuhayshi, a former personal secretary to Osama bin Laden. Some counter-terrorism officials believe that al-Wuhayshi might become the overall head of al Qaeda if Ayman al-Zawahiri is killed. The film was for a propaganda video for the forthcoming attack on bin Nayef. According to Alani, the most influential figure within AQAP has been another Yemeni - Qasim al-Raymi - who Saudi counter-terrorism officials suspect steered the group toward directly attacking the United States. After his brother’s death, al-Asiri was deployed to work with a group separate from the rest of AQAP and tasked with plotting attacks against the United States, according to Alani. U.S. officials believe that al-Awlaki led the unit. An enduring threat A U.S. missile strike in September 2011 killed al-Awlaki. U.S. officials believe his death has temporarily lessened the threat of an attack on the United States. But they also believe that AQAP has emerged as the most dangerous part of the al Qaeda terrorist network. As for al-Asiri, "he is in fact undoubtedly one of, if not the largest threats that we face right now," a senior U.S. counter-terrorism official told CNN. "He's smart, determined and quite secretive about his activities and clearly determined." Saudi counter-terrorism officials believe that political turmoil in Yemen is allowing AQAP to gain strength, according to Alani, because the regime of President Ali Abdullah Saleh has focused its efforts on survival rather than counter-terrorism. Recent months have seen jihadist militants linked to AQAP but operating under the banner Ansar al Shariah periodically take control of towns in southern Yemen. In their public statements, AQAP commanders have claimed to be at the forefront of such efforts - in line with their pledge after the death of bin Laden to follow the guidance of al Qaeda’s new leader, al-Zawahiri, whose strategic maxim for jihadists has long been to create "an Islamic base in the heart of the Arab region." Some eyewitness accounts report a new focus within the group on seizing territory. Abdul Razzaq al-Jamal, a Yemeni journalist who was given unique access to al Qaeda fighters in Abyan province, wrote in the Al Quds al Arabi newspaper last autumn that the group had "used a new strategy recently, which is the strategy of showing themselves and controlling." Counter-terrorism analysts disagree on how significant a role the group has played in the fighting in Yemen. An extensive field study published by West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center in September found that most of AQAP’s fighters - in the low hundreds - were drawn from urban areas, and there was no conclusive evidence that the group had yet won the allegiance of tribes in southern Yemen. By contrast, al-Jamal, the Yemeni journalist, described seeing significantly greater numbers of al Qaeda fighters and witnessing their control of several towns in Abyan province last September. Despite a fluctuating situation on the ground, jihadist militants still control significant territory in southern Yemen, including much of the town of Zinjibar, according to reports. Saudi counter-terrorism officials believe AQAP has taken a back seat in the fighting in Yemen, and has instead taken advantage of the breathing space opened up by jihadist advances to build up its cell structure and a network of safe houses, according to Alani. The group, he says, has learned lessons from Iraq, when seizing territory made al Qaeda an easy target for American airstrikes. "Their objective in Yemen is to secure a safe haven for recruitment, training and for planning attacks," Alani told CNN. He says Saudi counter-terrorism officials believe that AQAP's goal is nothing short of eclipsing al Qaeda "central" in the tribal areas of Pakistan as the dominant node of the terrorist network. "They’ve taken a decision to escalate their global campaign of terrorism," he told CNN. "AQAP believe an attack against the United States is worth a hundred attacks on other places." Intelligence challenges The intelligence tipoff that led to the interception of the explosive printers probably saved lives, but it has also made AQAP even more careful about handling information, making it harder for Saudi counter-terrorism to disrupt future plots, according to Alani. "They tried to find who leaked the information, because the information was so accurate that it must be a human intelligence and not electronic intelligence. Al Qaeda in Yemen became very careful: They hardly use mobile phones, they hardly use any electronic technology." Saudi Arabia’s counter-terrorism agency believes that al-Asiri has passed on his bomb-making expertise to about five members of the group. "They understand that Asiri is going to be killed or captured one day," Alani told CNN. "We're talking about a new generation of very skillful bomb builders and very committed people." U.S. counter-terrorism agencies have reached a similar conclusion. "There are other people who will benefit from his expertise. I think the fear is not just that he'll share his ability within his own circle, but rather more widely, and send it to other al Qaeda-sympathetic individuals or organizations," a senior U.S. counter-terrorism official told CNN.

#### Nuke Terror is the most Likely Scenario For Extinction

-this evidence cites multiple peer-reviewed studies as well as terrorist group statements

-answers defense based on means – there’s lots of unsafe material around the world and a lot of providers

-answers defense based on motives – terrorists have an incentive to spur retaliation because it create chaos

Jaspal– Associate Professor at the School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan 12 (Zafar Nawaz, “Nuclear/Radiological Terrorism: Myth or Reality?”, Journal of Political Studies, Vol. 19, Issue - 1, 2012, 91:111)

The misperception, miscalculation and above all ignorance of the ruling elite about security puzzles are perilous for the national security of a state. Indeed, in an age of transnational terrorism and unprecedented dissemination of dualuse nuclear technology, ignoring nuclear terrorism threat is an imprudent policy choice. The incapability of terrorist organizations to engineer fissile material does noteliminate completely the possibility of nuclear terrorism. At the same time, the absence of an example or precedent of a nuclear/ radiological terrorism does not qualify the assertion that the nuclear/radiological terrorism ought to be remained a myth. Farsighted rationality obligates that one should not miscalculate transnational terrorist groups — whose behavior suggests that they have a death wish — of acquiring nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological material producing capabilities. In addition, one could be sensible about the published information that huge amount of nuclear material is spread around the globe. According to estimate it is enough to build more than 120,000 Hiroshima-sized nuclear bombs (Fissile Material Working Group, 2010, April 1). The alarming fact is that a few storage sites of nuclear/radiological materials are inadequately secured and continue to be accumulated in unstable regions (Sambaiew, 2010, February). Attempts at stealing fissile material had already been discovered (Din & Zhiwei, 2003: 18). Numerous evidences confirm that terrorist groups had aspired to acquire fissile material for their terrorist acts. Late Osama bin Laden, the founder of al Qaeda stated that acquiring nuclear weapons was a“religious duty” (Yusufzai, 1999, January 11). The IAEA also reported that “al-Qaeda was actively seeking an atomic bomb.” Jamal Ahmad al-Fadl, a dissenter of Al Qaeda, in his trial testimony had “revealed his extensive but unsuccessful efforts to acquire enriched uranium for al-Qaeda” (Allison, 2010, January: 11). On November 9, 2001, Osama bin Laden claimed that “we have chemical and nuclear weapons as a deterrent and if America used them against us we reserve the right to use them (Mir, 2001, November 10).” On May 28, 2010, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, a Pakistani nuclear scientist confessed that he met Osama bin Laden. He claimed that “I met Osama bin Laden before 9/11 not to give him nuclear know-how, but to seek funds for establishing a technical college in Kabul (Syed, 2010, May 29).” He was arrested in 2003 and after extensive interrogation by American and Pakistani intelligence agencies he was released (Syed, 2010, May 29). Agreed, Mr. Mahmood did not share nuclear know-how with Al Qaeda, but his meeting with Osama establishes the fact that the terrorist organization was in contact with nuclear scientists. Second, the terrorist group has sympathizers in the nuclear scientific bureaucracies. It also authenticates bin Laden’s Deputy Ayman Zawahiri’s claim which he made in December 2001: “If you have $30 million, go to the black market in the central Asia, contact any disgruntled Soviet scientist and a lot of dozens of smart briefcase bombs are available (Allison, 2010, January: 2).” The covert meetings between nuclear scientists and al Qaeda members could not be interpreted as idle threats and thereby the threat of nuclear/radiological terrorism is real. The 33Defense Secretary Robert Gates admitted in 2008 that “what keeps every senior government leader awake at night is the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear (Mueller, 2011, August 2).” Indeed, the nuclear deterrence strategy cannot deter the transnational terrorist syndicate from nuclear/radiological terrorist attacks. Daniel Whiteneck pointed out: “Evidence suggests, for example, that al Qaeda might not only use WMD simply to demonstrate the magnitude of its capability but that it might actually welcome the escalation of a strong U.S. response, especially if it included catalytic effects on governments and societies in the Muslim world. An adversary that prefers escalation regardless of the consequences cannot be deterred” (Whiteneck, 2005, Summer: 187) Since taking office, President Obama has been reiterating that “nuclear weapons represent the ‘gravest threat’ to United States and international security.” While realizing that the US could not prevent nuclear/radiological terrorist attacks singlehandedly, he launched 47an international campaign to convince the international community about the increasing threat of nuclear/ radiological terrorism. He stated on April 5, 2009: “Black market trade in nuclear secrets and nuclear materials abound. The technology to build a bomb has spread. Terrorists are determined to buy, build or steal one. Our efforts to contain these dangers are centered on a global non-proliferation regime, but as more people and nations break the rules, we could reach the point where the center cannot hold (Remarks by President Barack Obama, 2009, April 5).” He added: “One terrorist with one nuclear weapon could unleash massive destruction. Al Qaeda has said it seeks a bomb and that it would have no problem with using it. And we know that there is unsecured nuclear material across the globe” (Remarks by President Barack Obama, 2009, April 5). In July 2009, at the G-8 Summit, President Obama announced the convening of a Nuclear Security Summit in 2010 to deliberate on the mechanism to “secure nuclear materials, combat nuclear smuggling, and prevent nuclear terrorism” (Luongo, 2009, November 10). President Obama’s nuclear/radiological threat perceptions were also accentuated by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1887 (2009). The UNSC expressed its grave concern regarding ‘the threat of nuclear terrorism.” It also recognized the need for all States “to take effective measures to prevent nuclear material or technical assistance becoming available to terrorists.” The UNSC Resolution called “for universal adherence to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and its 2005 Amendment, and the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.” (UNSC Resolution, 2009) The United States Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) document revealed on April 6, 2010 declared that “terrorism and proliferation are far greater threats to the United States and international stability.” (Security of Defence, 2010, April 6: i). The United States declared that it reserved the right to“hold fully accountable” any state or group “that supports or enables terrorist efforts to obtain or use weapons of mass destruction, whether by facilitating, financing, or providing expertise or safe haven for such efforts (Nuclear Posture Review Report, 2010, April: 12)”. This declaration underscores the possibility that terrorist groups could acquire fissile material from the rogue states**.**

#### And even an unsuccessful nuclear attack results in retaliation, which leads to extinction

Ayson 10 (Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions, InformaWorld)

But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide.

### Solvency

#### Authority of District Courts judges are key—Most effective and speedy process

Rushforth 12 [Elinor June, Fall, Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law, There's An App For That: Implications Of Armed Drone Attacks And Personality Strikes By The United States Against Non-Citizens, 2004-2012, .D. candidate, University of Arizona, James E. Rogers College of Law, Class of 2013]

Regardless of the type of judicial mechanism used to ensure the lawfulness of a targeted killing, the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court should designate district court judges from every region where CIA drone operators are stationed, with several in the District of Columbia. These judges will preside over courts with jurisdiction to "hear applications and grant orders," whose job would be approving or rejecting targeted killing warrants. n202 The hearings will be held expeditiously and records will be kept according to security measures "established by the Chief Justice in consultation with the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence." n203¶ The application for an order approving a targeted killing will be submitted by a designated CIA official, or DOJ official in conjunction with the CIA investigative team, "in writing upon oath or affirmation" after review and [\*654] approval by the supervisor of the drone program at a given outpost. n204 This application will include all necessary and pertinent information needed for the judge's decision. n205 This information shall include who the target is (if known), what action or information led to this targeting, any informant information, imminent threat analysis, known links to terrorists or terrorist organization, and a distinction and proportionality analysis (if available).¶ These warrants could be made before locating a target. Once a suitable application has been assembled, the designated official may submit the application and receive a warrant that would be good for a specific period. If the target is not found within that period, a renewal request may be made by adding an addendum to the above described application with any new and pertinent information. n206 An expedited process would also apply to newly acquired targets by which the CIA official could make an emergency application. Further, an authorization made by the President, through the Attorney General, could bypass this application process in appropriate exigent circumstances. There would also be a semi-annual report to Congress from CIA officials on targeted killing application procedures. An act creating this court would also address sanctions and liabilities, likely monetary fines or professional sanctions, of CIA and DOJ officials who do not comply with the procedures. Although any judicial action that encroaches on the Executive's autonomy in the national security realm will likely face pushback, judicial review is an important check on the Executive's power. To assuage the separation of powers issues that could arise in the creation of this court on targeted killing and drone strike operations, the legislative and judicial branches will have to ensure they are not unconstitutionally restricting the President's authority.

#### Strict Scrutiny is key—Requires evidence based verification and definitional restraint which prevents civilian casualties and reestablish credibility

Guiora 12 [Amos, Professor of Law, SJ Quinney College of Law, University of Utah, author of numerous books dealing with military law and national security including Legitimate Target: A Criteria-Based Approach to Targeted Killing, “Drone Policy: A Proposal Moving Forward,” <http://jurist.org/forum/2013/03/amos-guiora-drone-policy.php>, ALB]

Targeted killing sits at the intersection of law, morality, strategy and policy. I am a proponent of targeted killing because it enables the state to protect its innocent civilian population. However, my support for targeted killing is conditioned on the process being subject to rigorous standards, criteria and guidelines.¶ My advocacy of both targeted killing and criteria-based decision-making rests largely on 20 years of experience with a "seat at the table" of operational counterterrorism. The dangers inherent in the use of state power are enormous. On the opposite side of the equation, however, is the terrible cost of terrorism; after all, terrorists deliberately target innocent civilians.¶ However, broad definitions of imminence combined with new technological capabilities drastically affect the implementation of targeted killing ¶ predicated on legal and moral principles. The recently released US Department of Justice (DOJ) "white paper" regarding the Obama administration's drone policy defines "imminence" so expansively there need not be clear evidence of a specific attack to justify the killing of an individual, including US citizens. This extraordinary broadness creates a targeted killing paradigm akin to interrogation excesses under the Bush administration that followed in the wake of the Bybee Memo.¶ The solution to this search for an actionable guideline is adoption of a strict scrutiny standard which would enable operational engagement of a non-state actor predicated on intelligence information subject to admissibility standards akin to a court of law. Such intelligence would have to be reliable, material and probative.¶ To re-phrase, this strict scrutiny test seeks to strike a balance by enabling the state to act sooner but subjecting that action to significant restrictions. This paradigm would be predicated on narrow definitions of imminence and legitimate targets. Rather than enabling the consequences of the DOJ memo, the strict scrutiny test would ensure implementation of person-specific operational counterterrorism. That is the essence of targeted killing conducted in accordance with the rule of law and morality in armed conflict.¶ This proposal is predicated on the understanding that, while nation states need to engage in operational counterterrorism, mistakes regarding the correct interpretation and analysis of intelligence information can lead to tragic mistakes. Adopting admissibility standards akin to criminal law minimizes operational error.¶ Rather than relying on the executive branch to make decisions in a "closed world" devoid of oversight and review, the intelligence information justifying the proposed action must be submitted to a court that would ascertain the information's admissibility. The discussion before the court would necessarily be conducted ex parte; however, the process of preparing and submitting available intelligence information to a court would significantly contribute to minimizing operational error that otherwise would occur.¶ The logistics of this proposal are far less daunting than might seem — the court before which the executive would submit the evidence is the US Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA Court), established by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Presently, FISA Court judges weigh the reliability of intelligence information in determining whether to grant government ex parte requests for wire-tapping warrants. Under this proposal, judicial approval is necessary prior to undertaking a counterterrorism operation predicated solely on intelligence information. The standard the court would adopt in determining the information's reliability is the same applied in the traditional criminal law paradigm.¶ The court would cross-examine the representative of the executive branch and subsequently rule as to the information's admissibility. While some may suggest that the FISA Court is largely an exercise in "rubber-stamping," the importance of this proposal is in requiring the government to present the available information to an independent judiciary as a precursor to engaging in operational counterterrorism.¶ While this proposal explicitly calls for changing the nature of the relationship between the executive and the judicial branches of the government, it would serve to minimize collateral damage in drone attacks predicated on narrow definitions of legitimate target.¶ This proposal does not limit the state's fundamental right to self-defense. Rather, it creates a process seeking to objectify counterterrorism by seeking to establish standards for determining the reliability of intelligence information that is the backbone of targeted killing decision-making.¶ The practical impact? A drone policy predicated on the rule of law and morality rather than the deeply troubling paradigm established by the Obama administration in the DOJ white paper.

### Assumptions

#### India Pakistan threat is real

Hayes 13 (Jarrod Hayes, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, 2013, <http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=8479209>)

The 1971 case is also attractive because “mainstream” structural international relations ~IR! theories are unable to provide a compelling explanation for U+S+ behavior+ Structural realist balance-of-power predictions are indeterminate+3 It is not clear that the secession of overwhelmingly poor East Pakistan would meaningfully change the regional or global balance of power+ Even assuming that secession did change the balance of power, structural realism does not explain the secretive, milquetoast U+S+ response where a more robust response would be required+ Shifting to balance of threat does not resolve the problem of underdetermination+ 4 Reframing the balancing of bandwagoning impetus from power to threat does not help us understand why India might be construed as a threat, much less why the United States would choose to oppose India rather than acquiesce to India’s actions as a means of gaining influence over Indian foreign policymaking+ Admittedly, India had recently signed a friendship treaty with the Soviets, but this on its own does not mandate a balancing response+ Under neorealism, alliances enjoy no permanence in the anarchic system, so the alliance with Pakistan for its own sake cannot be explanatory. Variants of structural liberalism ~neoliberalism! do not fare better+ Emphasizing economic interdependence and international institutions as moderators of conflict, neoliberalism has little to say on patterns of behavior in the absence of these fac- tors+5 In 1971, India and the United States shared no appreciable institutional ties outside the United Nations and negligible economic interdependence+6 This article takes advantage of structuralist approaches’ failure to explain the 1971 case to present a mechanism-based theory of the democratic peace, integrating the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory with theorizing regarding public democratic identity dynamics+7 The argument is that we cannot understand the underlying mechanisms of the democratic peace without examining the domestic security politics of democracies and the ideational factors that shape them+ Securitization, Identity, and the Democratic Peace The central problem with the study of the democratic peace lies in underdevelopment of the causal mechanisms that generate the phenomenon+ While the majority of large-N statistical studies examining the democratic peace support it,8 the emphasis on large-N studies has produced a significant lacuna when it comes to understanding the mechanisms of the democratic peace and the dynamics of democratic security+9 This is not to say that mechanisms are completely absent from the literature+ Constructivist, psychological, and rationalist approaches have produced plausible mechanism-based explanations+ The constructivist literature focuses on the monadic construction of state-level shared norms and identity or on the influence of democratic identity on the individual decision maker+10 While these are valuable areas of investigation, they neglect the role of domestic political structure in the norms and identity dynamic; the importance of public social and corporate identity; and the role of identity and norms in the dyadic context of interstate relations+ Constructivists argue that leaders construct threats based on their identity-informed interests+ The argument should be extended to the public in democracies because their construction of threat is an important factor in democratic security policy+11 Scholars in the rationalist tradition focus on the behavioral implications of political structures in terms of audience costs credible commitments transparency, enhanced signaling, and the political effects of winning coalition size ~distribution of war benefits!+14 Psychological approaches focus on the role of perception in political leaders—significantly overlapping with individual-centric constructivist approaches—or on operational codes shaped by democratic background+15 The rationalist and psychological explanations share the constructivist focus on leaders+ The mechanism of the democratic peace lies in the cognitions of democratic leaders or the anthropomorphized state+ Rationalist explanations ostensibly point to domestic politics, but in all cases the proposed mechanism is never directly investigated+ Further, the politics of security are exogenized by the assumption that the public universally and consistently accepts the security arguments of political leaders+ Finally, most are monadic explanations of a dyadic phenomenon+16

#### Our 1AC was written the way it was due to qualitative and quantitative research about these threats, we recognize our responsibility for those contributions, we think the responsibility for future generations outweighs

Kateb 92 Professor of Politics at Princeton University (George, “The Inner Ocean” p 111-112)

Schell's work attempts to force on us an acknowledgment that sounds far-fetched and even ludicrous, an acknowledgment hat the possibility of extinction is carried by any use of nuclear weapons, no matter how limited or how seemingly rational or seemingly morally justified. He himself acknowledges that there is a difference between possibility and certainty. But in a matter that is more than a matter, more than one practical matter in a vast series of practical matters, in the "matter" of extinction, we are obliged to treat a possibility-a genuine possibility-as a certainty. Humanity is not to take any step that contains even the slightest risk of extinction. The doctrine of no-use is based on the possibility of extinction. Schell's perspective transforms the subject. He takes us away from the arid stretches of strategy and asks us to feel continuously, if we can, and feel keenly if only for an instant now and then, how utterly distinct the nuclear world is. Nuclear discourse must vividly register that distinctiveness. It is of no moral account that extinction may be only a slight possibility. No one can say how great the possibility is, but no one has yet credibly denied that by some sequence or other a particular use of nuclear weapons may lead to human and natural extinction. If it is not impossible it must be treated as certain: the loss signified by extinction nullifies all calculations of probability as it nullifies all calculations of costs and benefits. Abstractly put, the connections between any use of nuclear weapons and human and natural extinction are several. Most obviously, a sizable exchange of strategic nuclear weapons can, by a chain of events in nature, lead to the earth's uninhabitability, to "nuclear winter," or to Schell's "republic of insects and grass." But the consideration of extinction cannot rest with the possibility of a sizable exchange of strategic weapons. It cannot rest with the imperative that a sizable exchange must not take place. A so-called tactical or "theater" use, or a so-called limited use, is also prohibited absolutely, because of the possibility of immediate escalation into a sizable exchange or because, even if there were not an immediate escalation, the possibility of extinction would reside in the precedent for future use set by any use whatever in a world in which more than one power possesses nuclear weapons. Add other consequences: the contagious effect on nonnuclear powers who may feel compelled by a mixture of fear and vanity to try to acquire their own weapons, thus increasing the possibility of use by increasing the number of nuclear powers; and the unleashed emotions of indignation, retribution, and revenge which, if not acted on immediately in the form of escalation, can be counted on to seek expression later. Other than full strategic uses are not confined, no matter how small the explosive power: each would be a cancerous transformation of the world. All nuclear roads lead to the possibility of extinction. It is true by definition, but let us make it explicit: the doctrine of no-use excludes any first or retaliatory or later use, whether sizable or not. No-use is the imperative derived from the possibility of extinction. By containing the possibility of extinction, any use is tantamount to a declaration of war against humanity. It is not merely a war crime or a single crime against humanity. Such a war is waged by the user of nuclear weapons against every human individual as individual (present and future), not as citizen of this or that country. It is not only a war against the country that is the target. To respond with nuclear weapons, where possible, only increases the chances of extinction and can never, therefore, be allowed. The use of nuclear weapons establishes the right of any person or group, acting officially or not, violently or not, to try to punish those responsible for the use. The aim of the punishment is to deter later uses and thus to try to reduce the possibility of extinction, if, by chance, the particular use in question did not directly lead to extinction. The form of the punishment cannot be specified. Of course the chaos ensuing from a sizable exchange could make punishment irrelevant. The important point, however, is to see that those who use nuclear weapons are qualitatively worse than criminals, and at the least forfeit their offices. John Locke, a principal individualist political theorist, says that in a state of nature every individual retains the right to punish transgressors or assist in the effort to punish them, whether or not one is a direct victim. Transgressors convert an otherwise tolerable condition into a state of nature which is a state of war in which all are threatened. Analogously, the use of nuclear weapons, by containing in an immediate or delayed manner the possibility of extinction, is in Locke's phrase "a trespass against the whole species" and places the users in a state of war with all people. And people, the accumulation of individuals, must be understood as of course always indefeasibly retaining the right of selfpreservation, and hence as morally allowed, perhaps enjoined, to take the appropriate preserving step

#### The AFF is true—Assumptions about the world are validated by the results of our research and analysis—Our form of knowledge does not produce value claims it is the result of validated value claims

Fluck 10, PhD in International Politics from Aberystwyth, ’10 (Matthew, November, “Truth, Values and the Value of Truth in Critical International Relations Theory” Millennium Journal of International Studies, Vol 39 No 2, SagePub)\*\*we reject any gendered or offensive language used in this evidence

Critical Realists arrive at their understanding of truth by inverting the post-positivist attitude; rather than asking what knowledge is like and structuring their account of the world accordingly, they assume that knowledge is possible and ask what the world must be like for that to be the case. 36 This position has its roots in the realist philosophy of science, where it is argued that scientists must assume that the theoretical entities they describe – atoms, gravity, bacteria and so on – are real, that they exist independently of thoughts or discourse. 37 Whereas positivists identify causal laws with recurrent phenomena, realists believe they are real tendencies and mechanisms. They argue that the only plausible explanation for the remarkable success of science is that theories refer to these real entities and mechanisms which exist independently of human experience. 38 ¶ Against this background, the Critical Realist philosopher Roy Bhaskar has argued that truth must have a dual aspect. On the one hand, it must refer to epistemic conditions and activities such as ‘reporting judgements’ and ‘assigning values’. On the other hand, it has an inescapably ontic aspect which involves ‘designating the states of affairs expressed and in virtue of which judgements are assigned the value “true’’’. In many respects the epistemic aspect must dominate; we can only identify truth through certain epistemic procedures and from within certain social contexts. Nevertheless, these procedures are oriented towards independent reality. The status of the conclusions they lead us to is not dependent on epistemic factors alone, but also on independently existing states of affairs. For this reason, Bhaskar argues that truth has a ‘genuinely ontological’ use. 39¶ Post-positivists would, of course, reply that whilst such an understanding of truth might be unproblematic in the natural sciences, in the social sciences the knower is part of the object known. This being the case, there cannot be an ontic aspect to the truths identified. Critical Realists accept that in social science there is interaction between subject and object; social structures involve the actions and ideas of social actors. 40 They add, however, that it does not follow that the structures in question are the creations of social scientists or that they are simply constituted through the ideas shared within society at a given moment. 41 According to Bhaskar, since we are born into a world of structures which precede us, we can ascribe independent existence to social structures on the basis of their pre-existence. We can recognise that they are real on the basis of their causal power – they have a constraining effect on our activity. 42 Critical Realists are happy to agree to an ‘epistemological relativism’ according to which knowledge is a social product created from a pre-existing set of beliefs, 43 but they maintain that the reality of social structures means that our beliefs about them can be more or less accurate – we must distinguish between the way things appear to us and the way they really are. There are procedures which enable us to rationally choose between accounts of reality and thereby arrive at more accurate understandings; epistemological relativism does not preclude judgemental rationalism. 44 It therefore remains possible to pursue the truth about social reality.

#### It’s key to decision-making skills

Hodson 10 Derek, professor of education – Ontario Institute for Studies @ University of Toronto, “Science Education as a Call to Action,” Canadian Journal of Science, Mathematics and Technology Education, Vol. 10, Issue 3, p. 197-206

\*\*note: SSI = socioscientific issues

The final (fourth) level of sophistication in this issues-based approach is concerned with students findings ways of putting their values and convictions into action, helping them to prepare for and engage in responsible action, and assisting them in developing the skills, attitudes, and values that will enable them to take control of their lives, cooperate with others to bring about change, and work toward a more just and sustainable world in which power, wealth, and resources are more equitably shared. Socially and environmentally responsible behavior will not necessarily follow from knowledge of key concepts and possession of the “right attitudes.” As Curtin (1991) reminded us, it is important to distinguish between caring about and caring for. It is almost always much easier to proclaim that one cares about an issue than to do something about it. Put simply, our values are worth nothing until we live them. Rhetoric and espoused values will not bring about social justice and will not save the planet. We must change our actions. A politicized ethic of care (caring for) entails active involvement in a local manifestation of a particular problem or issue, exploration of the complex sociopolitical contexts in which the problem/issue is located, and attempts to resolve conflicts of interest. FROM STSE RHETORIC TO SOCIOPOLITICAL ACTION Writing from the perspective of environmental education, Jensen (2002) categorized the knowledge that is likely to promote sociopolitical action and encourage pro-environmental behavior into four dimensions: (a) scientific and technological knowledge that informs the issue or problem; (b) knowledge about the underlying social, political, and economic issues, conditions, and structures and how they contribute to creating social and environmental problems; (c) knowledge about how to bring about changes in society through direct or indirect action; and (d) knowledge about the likely outcome or direction of possible actions and the desirability of those outcomes. Although formulated as a model for environmental education, it is reasonable to suppose that Jensen's arguments are applicable to all forms of SSI-oriented action. Little needs to be said about dimensions 1 and 2 in Jensen's framework beyond the discussion earlier in the article. With regard to dimension 3, students need knowledge of actions that are likely to have positive impact and knowledge of how to engage in them. It is essential that they gain robust knowledge of the social, legal, and political system(s) that prevail in the communities in which they live and develop a clear understanding of how decisions are made within local, regional, and national government and within industry, commerce, and the military. Without knowledge of where and with whom power of decision making is located and awareness of the mechanisms by which decisions are reached, intervention is not possible. Thus, the curriculum I propose requires a concurrent program designed to achieve a measure of political literacy, including knowledge of how to engage in collective action with individuals who have different competencies, backgrounds, and attitudes but share a common interest in a particular SSI. Dimension 3 also includes knowledge of likely sympathizers and potential allies and strategies for encouraging cooperative action and group interventions. What Jensen did not mention but would seem to be a part of dimension 3 knowledge is the nature of science-oriented knowledge that would enable students to appraise the statements, reports, and arguments of scientists, politicians, and journalists and to present their own supporting or opposing arguments in a coherent, robust, and convincing way (see Hodson [2009b] for a lengthy discussion of this aspect of science education). Jensen's fourth category includes awareness of how (and why) others have sought to bring about change and entails formulation of a vision of the kind of world in which we (and our families and communities) wish to live. It is important for students to explore and develop their ideas, dreams, and aspirations for themselves, their neighbors and families and for the wider communities at local, regional, national, and global levels—a clear overlap with futures studies/education. An essential step in cultivating the critical scientific and technological literacy on which sociopolitical action depends is the application of a social and political critique capable of challenging the notion of technological determinism. We can control technology and its environmental and social impact. More significantly, we can control the controllers and redirect technology in such a way that adverse environmental impact is substantially reduced (if not entirely eliminated) and issues of freedom, equality, and justice are kept in the forefront of discussion during the establishment of policy.

#### Epistemology puts the cart before the horse – pragmatic action must come first

Owen 2 David, Reader in Political Theory at the University of Southampton, Reorienting International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3, http://mil.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/31/3/653

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises. It should be noted that I am not claiming that such a vicious circle has been established in IR by virtue of the philosophical turn, nor am I claiming that IR is alone in its current exposure to this threat; on the contrary, Shapiro’s remarks are directed at (primarily North American) political science. I am simply concerned to point out that the philosophical turn in IR increases its exposure to these dangers and, hence, its vulnerability to the kind of vicious circle that they can, collectively, generate.

#### Drone discussions re-orient symbolic representations of global issues—Macro-political discussion key to overcome institutional bias

Green and Bernal 13 [May 29th, Droning Toward the Boundless War, Volume 25, Issue 2, Pages 212-218, Published authors under, Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10402659.2013.785324>]

War reminds us of our disconnection from one another. If we begin with acknowledging our common humanity, war comes when those small differences between us become amplified. We fail to see in the eyes of another that they are our brothers and sisters. We remove ourselves from the intimacy of knowing what war brings. Through the quiet embrace of an illusion, we fail to see the blood spilled by “them” as also our blood. The irony of war is that it provides a kind of curious veil that places our individual and collective anxiety about death “out there” into someone who will die on our behalf and kill so that we may live. What we consider to be vital in our lives is increasingly about ideologies, resources, and dominance. Behind this veil is an admixture of beliefs that our life is better than those who have become the enemy. What many of us seek unconsciously to protect is not so much life in the sense of our physical safety; rather, it has become more about a way of life where war keeps the balance of the scales tipped to our advantage a bit longer.¶ Our human differences were once about the survival of one tribe over another, one kingdom ruling another, and one nation conquering its neighbor. Warfare was for millennia face-to-face, where club and spear and sword were the implements of the mortal wound. Then with the bullet and the bomb, the mine and the missile, death from war became a more distant affair. The impact of taking a life became visible only in its aftermath. As the distance increased so did the lethality of weaponry. One bomb could kill 100,000. Within two decades in the era of the Cold War, humans had created the capacity to kill ourselves many times over. Yet these wars remained nation against nation. The “other” was one that had a flag, a people, and lands that were within generally recognized boundaries. Through the Geneva Convention, there were rules of war. A World Court was also established to prosecute those who violated these international agreements.¶ On September 11, 2001, war changed. With the beginning of the War on Terrorism, the United States entered the new era of the boundless war. No longer was the enemy another nation-state. What evolved as a consequence was a movement into a transitional space where no rules and no laws of war can any longer be found. With the collapse of the World Trade Center twin towers in New York came a descent into a different way of waging war. Initially, many of the elements remained the same. The United States took action against the Taliban government of Afghanistan for harboring training camps for Al Qaeda. In many respects, this “boots on the ground” approach to warfare had the trappings of modern conventional struggles. Troops were deployed with all the latest tactical support to take on an elusive enemy in a far away land. One powerful nation-state sought to reap justice through war from another nation-state deemed responsible for attacking the sovereignty and sanctity and safety of its people. This decade of action was designed to help Americans believe something was being done to quell the threat of terrorist attacks and implicitly to offer an assurance that the horror of 9/11 would somehow never again reach the shores of the nation. The shadowy adversary, if not vanquished, was so depleted, according to the politicians, that their ability to assault our way of life was dramatically diminished.¶ What is less visible is how the boundaries of the War on Terror morphed into something different where the psychological nature of war shifted once more. Much as The Bomb with its horrific dimensions made death in war a devastating fact for some distant enemy, so it is that the drone has become its more technologically precise and sophisticated counterpart. From thousands of miles away, “assets” can be deployed to eliminate “targets” who are deemed to pose an imminent threat to the United States. The face of the enemy is no longer seen. The hands that guide the lethal cargo do so remotely on a computer screen where the deadly action once executed has the appearance akin to a graphically intense video game. With no troops of “our” own placed in harms way, fewer deaths of innocents as “collateral damage,” and more precise elimination of sworn enemies, collective complacency about the practice was implicitly endorsed by 66 million Americans—if not more—at the last presidential election. The thorny legal complexities of this new terrain of war are placed in abeyance, in part because of the anxiety that is alleviated through the drones of war.¶ At an unconscious level, the named but faceless enemy, consistently presented as top operatives of terrorist organizations, becomes the projective repository of the threat to our way of life. They are the objects that evoke our death anxiety. They remind us that our way of life, and thereby the only life we have come to know, is threatened. They have attacked our symbols of military might and economic power. They have killed those who represent these pillars of our way of being. In this respect, the literal becomes the symbolic. The war on “them,” wherever they may be and whatever nation-state they may call their home, reduces in relevance. A drone crosses all these boundaries, as the lethal action of the surgical strike becomes just because the enemy combatant is one who lives in the shadows and therefore can be pursued there.¶ The rationale for the absence of outcry has deep unconscious antecedents in the most primitive ego defenses. The seemingly antiseptic elimination of targets allows for denial to become normative. Violence viewed through a flat screen has become entertainment, even when practiced at our own hands. When neutralizing an Al Qaeda leader looks the same as scoring a kill on Call of Duty, we can easily deny how we are complicit in a violent action of war. As such a threshold of consciousness that allows us to function in denial, relatively free of death anxiety in our day-to-day lives, remains intact. By seeing a puff on a screen rather than the riddled bodies of the defeated enemy, the connection to our own common mortality is displaced and placed at a distance. They enemy on the other side of the screen become the holders of death, quite literally, while symbolically representing the preservation of our way of life through their demise.¶ The role of the boundless war also provides an endless supply of targets for projection. While given the current name of “Islamic extremists,” this label is less important than how they become icons on which our fears about our mortality can be projected. In the illusion of a war that is not like what war once was and an enemy that is not an army like the troops of the past and a location that has no national borders or discrete regions, the ambiguity becomes a further expression of the boundlessness. War waged in this “No Man's Land” is rendered invisible, denied, and sufficiently subtle so as to remain unconscious to those who benefit from its execution.¶ When the New York Times wrote an expose revealing the appearance of corrupt financial activity on the part of those ascending to power in China, they came under attack. Within days of the publication of the stories, the Times reported a breach in the security of its electronic files. Through malicious code that was introduced into their server by an unsuspecting employee, some distant party began to search files, steal passwords, and target specific reporters. Suspected in these attacks was the Chinese government, known for its ambivalence about press freedoms.¶ These incidents are not isolated. During the summer of 2012, a number of U.S. financial institutions reported “delivery of service” attacks, ones where a flood of data overwhelms an organization's servers to the point that routine business transactions are disrupted. The Iranian government, despite repeated denials, was suspected in these actions. Perhaps an extension of what drones represent in terms of warfare, cyberattacks may be a new frontier in the boundless war. No longer is life itself directly attacked; rather, ideologies and ways of life become the new mortal symbolic targets.The anxiety that comes through such an approach to war means that what is perceived as necessities of life in much of the West—electric power, running water, Internet access—each increasingly controlled by virtual means, can be brought down by infiltration of hackers in distant lands. As with drones where international boundaries are no longer a limit on who may be seen as the enemy, the alleged actions of Iran and China suggest that corporate entities and private citizens who represent assaults on a people can be attacked.¶ One consequence of globalization is that the virtual distance between us is radically reduced to be a click or two away on a device that is often in our pocket or purse. It also means that tools of the emerging warfare may well soon be in each of our hands. Surveillance tools and sources to launch a cyberattack are carried in our cell phone.¶ The boundless war finds its justification in our perceived differences. We wage deadly violence through a kind of zero-sum social logic that views resources as finite. The need to destroy the “other” to access these resources comes through the tacit and often unconscious agreement with similar others that says “they” are a threat to “us.” This kind of paranoid stance allows war to be waged to ensure no disruption in the symbol and source of what “our” group values and perceives it needs. The paradox is in how virtual reality concurrently allows us to know the extent of the global inequities. We in the West operate with the reasonable concern that “they” will not long tolerate this kind of imbalance.¶ Nonetheless, we speak primarily to their threat to us and point to lives lost in terrorist attacks as the rationale for the boundless war. Little corresponding attention is given to the degradation of the environment, the forced migrations, the imposition of government structures, and other evidence of dominance that seed discontent in generations of the “other.” What gets enacted is the fear of death rather than any deeper examination of the mutuality of shared human interests. Death anxiety taps into a greater existential question about what to do with our lives and a more general unease about the unavoidable trajectory toward our own death. Differences in a group's way of life can in this instance be understood as more than cultural nuance. As such, the further paradox is that the boundless war gives life meaning and helps satisfy the human impulse to alleviate existential angst and the certainty of our death by killing the other who threatens this denial.¶ On a healthy level, various cultural symbols such as country, race, or a religious tradition can serve as very positive elements in human meaning-making. They create the fiber of a functioning civil society where debate, discussion, participation, coexistence, and learning are the norm. Under circumstances of threat or significant levels of uncertainty, however, there may be a regressive tendency to attach allegiance to these symbols to an extent that destruction, death, and domination is justified and even celebrated.¶ From a psychological perspective, many conditions contribute to the creation of the boundless war. As referenced previously, globalization reduces the distance between us. Under this condition, there is a virtual intimacy in knowing that we can instantaneously be in touch and face-to-face with someone on the other side of the planet. It is this form of connection that gives substance to our experience of a common humanity. Yet, it is also this same means that can remind us of the inequities and injustices abound. Ideally, consciousness of the experience of the other can bring about greater compassion, empathy, understanding, and identification with our fellow human beings. In other instances, the starkness of the differences may first lead to recoiling into the familiar. Reaching out to the world can be replaced by a regressive return to known narratives that reinforce our view or the world. Those small differences become the beginning of the alienation of one from another. As such, a cycle of displacement of anxieties and projection of fears gets enacted and often perpetuated through war.¶ The small deaths that happens when our point of view of way of being is not understood or recognized by the “other” is like a little war. In seeking to affirm our cherished reality and deeply held belief, the necessity to find those who share our worldview creates coalitions of belonging. These connections form the basis of shared identity, common language, and preferred ways of knowing where our boundaries end and the realm of the “other” begins. There was a time when one could claim access to resources such as people, land, or wealth as the measure of supremacy in such disputes. In the age of the virtual, increasingly there is equity in the capacity to find one's people and that critical mass needed to battle forces that were once invisible.¶ What makes this condition so critical in a time of boundless war is that such coalitions are like shifting sands. Most will find themselves with multiple allegiances and many factors to balance in the quest to keep the fear of death at bay. When the discourse around us becomes increasingly divisive and fear is used to bring the like-minded in line with one another, an either–or mentality becomes like a psychological refugee camp in a world where our interdependence because increasingly undeniable. Boundless war is known to be nowhere and everywhere. We are its victims and its propagators. With no longer a bomb shelter that can protect us nor a country whose boundaries are secure enough to stop the world from closing in on us, a kind of schizoid state that gives us the fleeting solace of self-sufficiency shields us from the deeper and starker reality. From this psychological bunker of virtual walls, we allow the boundless war to drone on, as we remain unconscious.¶ Locating the coordinates and governing social logic that structure the context under which we live and inform our lives reveals a system that operates under a number of principles that currently remain supreme. Globalization spreads to all corners of the world and with it the primacy of profit seeking, wealth accumulation, and the struggle for control of depleting resources. This quest, which has many traits of an addictive process, serves to maintain the lifestyle of an unrestrained consumer culture. What becomes valued are those actions that play a role in mass production and monetary gain. What is compromised is a relational, environmental, ethical, or aesthetic orientation to one another that promotes compassion and helps us sustain our deeper shared human connection.¶ In a globalizing world, tremendous levels of expanding inequality exist at a time when there are great amounts of wealth. This reality suggests an inability to meet some basic human needs despite consciousness of our deeper interconnectedness and interdependence.These conditions have created a situation in both the developed and developing world where a growing sector of the population is becoming alienated from meaning. Our role within the global economy comes with certain by-products and social ills that become translated into a compulsion toward aggression. The cost is the kind of cooperative empathy capable of nurturing diverse environments and addressing inequities for which there is a current collusion to deny.¶ Daily participation within this broader macro system creates the necessary triggers that can expand the relationship we have with anxiety. Our need to reduce this anxiety means reducing the social symbols that link us. The trade-off is in the boundless war, the safety valve for our collective emotional rationalizations. Through drones and loss of boundaries of the nation-state to pursue the enemy, we can justify any number of aggressions on to the “other.” In the boundless war, ongoing financial crises, citizen debt, and the break down of social and public investment accompany a perpetual war that is not only borderless but also ongoing. We are always fighting someone “out there” that threatens our safety and our way of life even to the point where we have to give up civil liberties. Our authority figures become unaccountable when there is constant vigilance and a concentration of power in the name of safety to battle an enemy that has no border. Our justifications and tolerance for destruction deepen when the virtuality of technology and the materiality of human life continue to overlap in a way that can obscure the human connection we actually share on this same planet.

## 2AC

### Pakistan

#### It’s the biggest reason for recruitment

Cox 8/19 [Joseph, journalist for Vice, “Are American Drones Al Qaeda’s Strongest Weapon in Yemen?,” <http://www.vice.com/read/are-us-drones-al-qaedas-strongest-weapon>, ALB]

It is these close-knit ties of people who may not have any kind of connection to al Qaeda that make Yemen a completely different battlefield to Afghanistan or Pakistan. According to Ibrahim Mothana, a Yemeni youth activist, “Drone strikes are causing more and more Yemenis to hate America and join radical militants. They are not driven by ideology but rather by a sense of revenge and despair.” During the latest escalation of violence, Yemeni bloggers have claimed “there is more hostility now in Yemen against the US because of these attacks.” Even Robert Grenier, a former CIA station head, has said that the US policy in Yemen runs the risk of turning the country into a "safe haven" for al Qaeda.¶ Even as academics, experts and Yemenis themselves are saying that drones may be contributing to a rise in al Qaeda's local fanbase, the US government are seeking to place the blame elsewhere. In the recent sentencing of Bradley Manning, prosecutors claimed that his leak of over 700,000 files to WikiLeaks had aided al Qaeda’s recruitment efforts.¶ However, visit any local Yemeni news website and you’ll be greeted with images of the latest bloodied drone strike victims. As a Yemeni, what's more likely to make you resent the US: Whatever you happen to see of Manning's leaks, or the very real threat of a missile killing your family at any moment?

#### Our studies are comparative

Boyle, 13 [“The costs and consequences of drone warfare”, MICHAEL J. BOYLE, International Affairs 89: 1 (2013) 1–29, assistant professor of political science at LaSalle University]

As this discussion illustrates, each of the most common claims for the effectiveness of drones is based on shaky empirical evidence, questionable assumptions and logical fallacies. Several of them conflate arguments about efficiency—that is, the relative ratio of inputs (measured in dollars or risk to US personnel) to outputs (measured in killed terrorists) with arguments about effectiveness. Drones are only ‘effective’ if they contribute to achieving US strategic goals in a region, a fact which is often lost in analyses that point only to body counts as a measure of their worthiness. More generally, arguments in favour of drones tend to present only one side of the ledger, measuring the losses for groups like Al-Qaeda and the Taliban without considering how many new recruits they gain as a result of the escalation of drone strikes. They ignore the fact that drones have replaced Guantánamo Bay as the number one recruiting tool for Al-Qaeda today.72 The gruesome mathematics of assessing drone strikes, especially when measured only in the dead bodies of those associated with terrorist movements, ignores the impact that drones are having on how the US is perceived among the populations of these states. Drone warfare may be considered ‘effective’ only if one operates with an attenuated notion of effectiveness that focuses on short-term tactical successes— that is, dead terrorists who might some day have posed a threat to the United States—while ignoring or underplaying long-term strategic costs.

#### Pragmatic policy is key in this context—Only the AFF solves this mindset

**Varisco 07**

Reading orientalism: said and the unsaid (Google eBook)

Dr. Daniel Martin Varisco is chair of anthropology and director of Middle Eastern and Central Asia studies at Hofstra University. He is fluent in Arabic and has lived in the Middle East (Yemen, Egypt, Qatar) for over 5 years since 1978. He has done fieldwork in Yemen, Egypt, Qatar, U.A.E. and Guatemala.

In sum, the essential argument of Orientalism is that a pervasive and endemic Western discourse of Orientalism has constructed "the Orient," a representation that Said insists not only is perversely false but prevents the authentic rendering of a real Orient, even by Orientals themselves. Academicized Orientalism is thus dismissed, in the words of one critic, as "the magic wand of Western domination of the 0rient."283i The notion of a single conceptual essence of Orient is the linchpin in Said's polemical reduction of all Western interpretation of the real or imagined geographical space to a single and latently homogeneous discourse. Read through Orientalism and only the Orient of Western Orientalism is to be encountered; authentic Orients are not imaginable in the text. The Orient is rhetorically available for Said simply by virtue of not really being anywhere. Opposed to this Orient is the colonialist West, exemplified by France, Britain, and the United States. East versus West, Occident over Orient: this is the debilitating binary that has framed the unending debate over Orientalism. A generation of students across disciplines has grown up with limited challenges to the polemical charge by Said that scholars who study the Middle East and Islam still do so institutionally through an interpretive sieve that divides a superior West from an inferior East. Dominating the debate has been a tiresome point/counterpoint on whether literary critic Edward Said or historian Bernard Lewis knows best. Here is where the dismissal of academic Orientalism has gone wrong. Over and over again the same problem is raised. Does the Orient as several generations of Western travelers, novelists, theologians, politicians, and scholars discoursed it really exist? To not recognize this as a fundamentally rhetorical question because of Edward Said is, nolo contendere, nonsense. No serious scholar can assume a meaningful cultural entity called "Orient" after reading Said's Orientalism; some had said so before Said wrote his polemic. Most of his readers agreed with the thrust of the Orientalism thesis because they shared the same frustration with misrepresentation. There is no rational retrofit between the imagined Orient, resplendent in epic tales and art, and the space it consciously or unwittingly misrepresented. However, there was and is a real Orient, flesh-and-blood people, viable cultural traditions, aesthetic domains, documented history, and an ongoing intellectual engagementwith the past, present, and future. What is missing from Orientalism is any systematic sense of what that real Orient was and how individuals reacted to the imposing forces that sought to label it and theoretically control it. ASLEEP IN ORIENTALISM'S WAKE I have avoided taking stands on such matters as the real, true or authentic Islamic or Arab world. —EDWARD SAID, "ORIENTALISM RECONSIDERED" Orientalism is frequently praised for exposing skeletons in the scholarly closet, but the book itself provides no blueprint for how to proceed.=84 Said's approach is of the cut-and-paste variety—a dash of Foucauldian discourse here and a dram of Gramscian hegemony there—rather than a howto model. In his review of Orientalism, anthropologist Roger Joseph concludes: Said has presented a thesis that on a number of counts is quite compelling. He seems to me, however, to have begged one major question. If discourse, by its very metanature, is destined to misrepresent and to be mediated by all sorts of private agendas, how can we represent cultural systems in ways that will allow us to escape the very dock in which Said has placed the Orientalists? The aim of the book was not to answer that question, but surely the book itself compels us to ask the question of its author.a85 Another cultural anthropologist, Charles Iindholm, criticizes Said's thesis for its "rejection of the possibility of constructing general comparative arguments about Middle Eastern cultures.286 Akbar Ahmed, a native Pakistani trained in British anthropology, goes so far as to chide Said for leading scholars into "an intellectual cul-de- sac."287 For a historian's spin, Peter Gran remarks in a favorable review that Said "does not fully work out the post-colonial metamorphosis."288 As critic Rey Chow observes, "Said's work begs the question as to how otherness—the voices, languages, and cultures of those who have been and continue to be marginalized and silenced— could become a genuine oppositional force and a usable value." Said's revisiting and reconsidering of Orientalism, as well as his literary expansion into a de-geographicalized Culture and Imperialism, never resolved the suspicion that the question still goes begging. There remains an essential problem. Said's periodic vacillation in Orientalism on whether or not the Orient could have a true essence leads him to an infinity of mere representations, presenting a default persuasive act by not representing that reality for himself and the reader. If Said claims that Orientalism created the false essence of an Orient, and critics counterclaim that Said himself proposes a false essence of Orientalism, how do we end the cycle of guilt by essentialization? Is there a way out of this epistemologieal morass? If not a broad way to truth, at least a narrow path toward a clearing? With most of the old intellectual sureties now crumbling, the prospect of ever finding a consensus is numbing, in part because the formidably linguistic roadblocks are—or at least should be—humbling. The history of philosophy, aided by Orientalist and ethnographic renderings of the panhumanities writ and unwrit large, is littered with searches for meaning. Yet, mystical ontologies aside, the barrier that has thus far proved unbreachable is the very necessity of using language, reducing material reality and imaginary potentiality to mere words. As long as concepts are essential for understanding and communication, reality—conterminous concept that it must be—will be embraced through worded essences. Reality must be represented, like it or not, so how is it to be done better? Neither categorical nor canonical Truth" need be of the essence. One of the pragmatic results of much postmodern criticism is the conscious subversion of belief in a singular Truth" in which any given pronouncement could be ascribed the eternal verity once reserved for holy writ. In rational inquiry, all truths are limited by the inescapable force of pragmatic change. Ideas with "whole truth" in them can only be patched together for so long. Intellectual activity proceeds by characterizing verbally what is encountered and by reducing the complex to simpler and more graspable elements. A world without proposed and debated essences would be an unimaginable realm with no imagination, annotation without nuance, activity without art. I suggest that when cogito ergo sum is melded with "to err is human," essentialization of human realities becomes less an unresolvable problem and more a profound challenge. Contra Said's polemical contentions, not all that has been created discursively about an Orient is essentially wrong or without redeeming intellectual value. Edward Lane and Sir Richard Burton can be read for valuable firsthand observations despite their ethnocentric baggage. Wilfrid and Anne Blunt can be appreciated for their moral suasion. TheJ 'accuse of criticism must be tempered constructively with the louche of everyday human give-and-take. In planed biblical English, it is helpful to see that the beam in one's own rhetorical eye usually blocks appreciation of the mote in the other's eye. Speaking truth to power a la Said's oppositional criticism is appealing at first glance, but speaking truths to varieties of ever-shifting powers is surely a more productive process for a pluralistic society. As Richard King has eloquently put it, "Emphasis upon the diversity, fluidity and complexity within as well as between cultures precludes a reification of their differences and allows one to avoid the kind of monadic essentialism that renders cross-cultural engagement an a priori impossibility from the outset."2?0 Contrasted essentialisms, as the debate over Orientalism bears out, do not rule each other out. Claiming that an argument is essentialist does not disprove it; such a ploy serves mainly to taint the ideas opposed and thus tends to rhetorically mitigate opposing views. Thesis countered by antithesis becomes sickeningly cyclical without a willingness to negotiate synthesis. The critical irony is that Said, the author as advocate who at times denies agency to authors as individuals, uniquely writes and frames the entire script of his own text. Texts, in the loose sense of anything conveniently fashioned with words, become the meter for Said's poetic performance. The historical backdrop is hastily arranged, not systematically researched, to authorize the staging of his argument. The past becomes the whiggishly drawn rationale for pursuing a present grievance. As the historian Robert Berkhofer suggests, Said "uses many voices to exemplify the stereotyped view, but he makes no attempt to show how the new self/other relationship ought to be represented. Said's book does not practice what it preaches multiculturally."29i Said's method, Berkhofer continues, is to "quote past persons and paraphrase them to reveal their viewpoints as stereotyped and hegemonic." Napoleon's savants, Renan's racism, and Flaubert's flirtations serve to accentuate the complicity of modern-day social scientists who support Israel. Orientalism is a prime example of a historical study with one voice and one viewpoint. Some critics have argued in rhetorical defense of Said that he should not be held accountable for providing an alternative. The voice of dissent, the critique (of Orientalism or any other hegemonic discourse) does not need to propose an alternative for the critique to be effective and valid," claim Ashcroft and Ahluwalia.29= Saree Makdisi suggests that Said's goal in Orientalism is "to specify the constructedness of reality" rather than to "unmask and dispel" the illusion of Orientalist discourse.=93 Timothy Brennan argues that Said's aim is not to describe the "brute reality" of a real Orient but rather to point out the "relative indifference" of Western intellectuals to that reality.=94 Certainly no author is under an invisible hand of presumption to solve a problem he or she wishes to expose. Yet, it is curious that Said would not want to suggest an alternative, to directly engage the issue of how the "real" Orient could be represented. He reacts forcefully to American literary critics of the "left" who fail to specify the ideas, values, and engagement being urged.=95 If, as Said, insists "politics is something more than liking or disliking some intellectual orthodoxy now holding sway over a department of literature,"=9'6 then why would he not follow through with what this "something more" might be for the discourse he calls Orientalism? As Abdallah Laroui eloquently asks, "Having become concerned with an essentially political problem, the Arab intelligentsia must inevitably reach the stage where it passes from diagnosis of the situation to prescription of remedial action. Why should I escape this rule?"=97 This is a question that escapes Edward Said in Orientalism, although it imbues his life work as an advocate against ethnocentric bias. CLASH TALKING AD NAUSEAM The questioning of whether or not there really is an Orient, a West, or a unified discourse called Orientalism might be relatively harmless philosophical musing, were it not for the contemporary, confrontational political involvement of the United States and major European nations with buyable governments and bombable people in the Middle East. One of the reasons Said's book has been so influential, especially among scholars in the emerging field of post-colonial studies, is that it appeared at the very moment in which the Cold War divide reached a zenith in Middle East politics. In 1979, the fall of the United States-backed and anti-communist Shah allowed for the creation of the first modern Islamic republic in Iran, even as the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan to try to prevent the same thing happening there. Almost three decades later, the escalation of tension and violence sometimes described as "Islamic terrorism" has become a pressing global concern. In the climate of renewed American and British political engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq after September 11, 2001, the essential categories of East and West continue to dominate public debate through the widely touted mantra of a "clash of civilizations.\* The idea of civilizations at war with each other is probably as old as the very idea of civilization. The modern turn of phrase owes its current popularity to the title of a 1993 Foreign Affairs article by political historian Samuel Huntington, although this is quite clearly a conscious borrowing from a 1990 Atlantic Monthly article by Said's nemesis, Bernard Lewis. Huntington, speculating in an influential policy forum, suggests that Arnold Toynbee's outdated list of twenty-one major civilizations had been reduced after the Cold War to six, to which he adds two more. With the exception of his own additions of Latin America and Africa, the primary rivals of the West, according to his list, are currently Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, and Slavic-Orthodox. To say, as Huntington insists, that the main criterion separating these civilizations is religion, given the labels chosen, borders on the tautological.2?8 But logical order here would suggest that the West be seen as Christian, given its dominant religion. In a sense, Huntington echoes the simplistic separation of the West from the Rest, for secular Western civilization is clearly the dominant and superior system in his mind. The rejection of the religious label for his own civilization, secular as it might appear to him, seriously imbalances Huntington's civilizational breakdown. It strains credulity to imagine that religion in itself is an independent variable in the contemporary world of nation-states that make up the transnationalized mix of cultural identities outside the United Sates and Europe. Following earlier commentary of Bernard Lewis, Huntington posits a "fault line" between the West and Islamic civilization ever since the Arabs were turned back in 732 CE at the Battle of Tours.=99 The fault of Islam, however, appears to be less religious than politie-al and ideological. The fundamental clash Huntington describes revolves around the seeming rejection by Islam (and indeed all the rest) of "Western ideas of individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, the separation of church and state/300 In citing this neoconservative laundry list, Huntington is blind to the modern history of Western nations. He assumes that these idealized values have in fact governed policy in Europe and America, as though divine kingship, tyranny, and fascism have not plagued European history. Nor is it credible to claim that such values have all been rejected by non-Western nations. To assert, for example, that the rule of law is not consonant with Islam, or that Islamic teaching is somehow less concerned with human rights than Western governments, implies that the real clash is between Huntington's highly subjective reading of a history he does not know very well and a current reality he does not like. Huntington's thesis was challenged from the start in the very next issue of Foreign Affairs. "But Huntington is wrong," asserts Fouad Ajami.301 Even former U. N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, hardly a proponent of postcolonial criticism, called Huntington's list of civilizations 'strange."3°= Ironically, both Ajami and Kirkpatrick fit Said's vision of bad-faith Orientalism. Being wrong in the eyes of many of his peers did not prevent Huntington from expanding the tentative proposals of a controversial essay into a book, nor from going well outside his field of expertise to write specifically on the resurgence of Islam. Soon after the September 11,2001, tragedy, Edward Said weighed in with a biting expose on Huntington's "clash of ignorance." Said rightly crushes the blatant political message inherent in the clash thesis, explaining why labels such as "Islam\* and "the West" are unedifying: They mislead and confuse the mind, which is trying to make sense of a disorderly reality that won't be pigeonholed or strapped down as easily as all that."3°3 Exactly, but the same must therefore be true about Said's imagined discourse of Orientalism. Pigeonholing all previous scholars who wrote about Islam or Arabs into one negative category is discursively akin to Huntington's pitting of Westerners against Muslims. Said is right to attack this pernicious binary, but again he leaves it intact by not posing a viable alternative. Both Edward Said and Fouad Ajami, who rarely seem to agree on anything, rightly question the terms of Huntington's clash thesis. To relabel the Orient of myth as a Confucian-Islamic military complex is not only ethnocentric but resoundingly ahistorical. No competent historian of either Islam or Confucianism recognizes such a misleading civilizational halfbreed. Saddam Hussein's Iraq and Kim Jong Il's Korea could be equated as totalitarian states assumed to have weapons of mass destruction, but not for any religious collusion. This is the domain of competing political ideologies, not the result of religious affiliation. And, as Richard Bulliet warns, the phrase "clash of civilizations\* so readily stirs up Islamophobia in the United States that it "must be retired from public discourse before the people who like to use it actually begin to believe it."3°4 Unfortunately, many policy-makers and media experts talk and act as if they do believe it. The best way to defeat such simplistic ideology, I suggest, is not to lapse into blame-casting polemics but to encourage sound scholarship of the real Orient that Said so passionately tried to defend.

### Assumptions

#### Past rogue proliferation and loose nukes prove our argument—Try or die flips AFF

DW 13 (“Why Pakistan's nuclear bombs are a threat”, <http://www.dw.de/why-pakistans-nuclear-bombs-are-a-threat/a-16730597>)

North Korea owes a great deal to Pakistan, in particular to its former nuclear chief Abdul Qadeer Khan, who, in 2004, confessed that he sold nuclear secrets to Pyongyang. Experts say that without Khan's help, North Korea would not be able to conduct nuclear tests. Internationally, Khan is a controversial figure but in his country he is revered by millions and is fondly called the "father of the Islamic bomb." Khan was removed from his post as head of the country's nuclear program by former military dictator and President Pervez Musharraf in 2001. Khan spent five years under house arrest after Musharraf had him arrested in 2004 for his alleged role in proliferating nuclear technology to "rogue states" like North Korea and Iran. The restrictions on his movement were relaxed after a court in Islamabad declared him a free man in 2009. The scientist now heads a political party and is preparing to contest upcoming parliamentary elections on May 11. Although the nuclear controversy involving Pakistan and Khan has subsided, the Islamic Republic's nuclear arsenal is a constant source of worry for the international community. Though Pakistan's civilian and military establishments claim that their nuclear weapons are under strict state control, many defense experts fear that they can fall into the hands of terrorists in the event of an Islamist takeover of Islamabad or if things get out of control for the government and the military. Pakistan, which conducted its nuclear tests in 1998, is battling with a protracted Islamist insurgency which threatens to paralyze the state. In the past decade, Islamists not only attacked civilians but targeted military installations and bases as well. Some international experts say that the Taliban and al Qaeda have their eyes on Pakistan's nuclear warheads.

#### Culture of radical Islam and nuclear weapons development prove

#### Fateh, columnist, 6-28-13 (Tarek Fatah, “Why Pakistan Is a Bigger Threat to Israel than Iran”, Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/tarek-fatah/israel-iran\_b\_3506504.html)

Pakistan is not an easy subject. It is a multi-ethnic country with a multi-lingual population dominated by Punjab; a civil war in Balochistan; a disputed border with Afghanistan; hundreds of thousands of troops on war footing at the Kashmir Line of Control against India; a slow slaughter of the country's Shia population and China's strategic interests at the mouth of the Straits of Hormuz. All of this makes the study of Pakistan a daunting task for any outsider. Even Britain and the USA who helped create the country to install a buffer state between the advancing USSR and India after the Second World War, have not been able to read the tea leaves with any degree of accuracy. As I write this essay, Pakistan produces more nuclear bombs than any other nuclear power while developing longer-range missiles. On paper, these nuclear warheads and missiles are India-centric and pointed towards the east. However, Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is not at a static location and the warheads as well as missiles are constantly on the move, and if there is one country that the Pakistan's politicians, both on the right as well as the left, hate more than India, it is Israel. Are Israelis aware of the vulnerabilities in Pakistan's nuclear program that make it possible for non-state jihadi actors to strike at the Jewish State? I doubt it. Pakistan is a society based on the hatred of the "other." Since its creation, the Hindu and the Jew, ("Hanood wa Yahood" in the popular street lexicon of the Urdu language) has been cultivated as the enemy of the country and Islam. In a culture of violence, three million fellow Muslims were killed in genocide in 1971 in Bangladesh. With the liquidation of the Hindu population and the total absence of Jews, the addiction to killing the "other" is now consuming the Pakistanis from within. Just in the three years leading up to the 2011 capture and death of Osama Bin Laden in Abbotabad, Pakistan, there were 225 suicide bombings in the country killing over 3,900 people, and all of them in politically motivated attacks by Sunni Muslim jihadis. All the victims -- from Ahmadi Muslims to Shia Muslims -- are accused of serving the Zionist cause and thus eliminated.

#### Prefer our positivist epistemology—We can objectively analyze and describe truths about the state of the world—Solves the link

Geller 4, Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science at Wayne State University and Consultant with the U.S. Department of State Office of Technology and Assessments and Vasquez, Harvey Picker Chair in International Relations at Colgate University and President of the Peace Science Society (International) and the International Studies Association, ‘4 (Daniel and John, December, “The Construction and Cumulation of Knowledge in International Relations: Introduction” International Studies Review, Vol 6 Issue 4, p 1-6, Blackwell Synergy)

The idea of building knowledge—that humans can observe and think about the world in such a way that they learn things that they did not know before and are able to understand and explain processes—is at the center of all inquiry. This natural tendency has gone hand in hand with those who have questioned whether what we think we know is actually true and who have demanded that we defend the rules by which we believe knowledge is acquired. Despite this epistemological skepticism the quest goes on and on, even though those who want to display their sophistication may put key concepts, like "reality" or "cause" or "truth" in quotes or use intellectual euphemisms, like "utility" or "adequacy." Today, within international relations (IR) inquiry, the debate over knowledge—its possibility, its nature, even its desirability—is informed by much of the postmodern and postpositivist movements within the social sciences and the humanities (see Foucault 1972, 1980; Vasquez 1995; Hellmann 2003). Constructivism has emerged as an alternative intellectual pillar of mainstream international relations theory to take its place alongside its competitors—realism and liberalism—to claim its role as a productive approach to inquiry. Although, like realism and liberalism, constructivism is better seen as a paradigm that encompasses a number of specific theoretical formulations, it nonetheless has a core set of assumptions and theoretical perspectives that shape its approach and provide guidance to its practitioners. Among the most central in terms of its epistemological assumptions is the idea that "reality" is constructed by concepts, ideas, and knowledge and not the other way around, namely, that the observation or study of "reality" gives rise to knowledge. Within constructivism this assumption is then used to push inquiry into new directions (see, for example, Onuf 1989; Wendt 1992; Katzenstein 1996; and earlier, Berger and Luckman 1966). Realism and liberalism, despite their differences, have maintained the more positivist assumption that the empirical world can be analytically separated from the ideas and concepts we use to observe and study it, so that the former can be used to test the adequacy (indeed accuracy) of the latter. With the proper tools and appropriate criteria and methods—in particular the use of science (although traditionalists and quantitative scholars differ sharply on the meaning and limits of the scientific approach)—knowledge is not only possible but can accumulate in ways anticipated and promised by the Enlightenment—a project that postmodernists, of course, reject out of hand (Foucault 1980). For the most part, postmodernist alternatives have been more influenced by philosophy and the humanities, in general, than mainstream social sciences. Nevertheless, to the extent that constructivism has been primarily an epistemic stance, it is not surprising that attempts have been made to reformulate positivist IR theories, like realism, on a constructivist basis (see Wendt 1999).

### T – Authority

#### 1. We Meet—

#### a. Congress ADDED its powers—They’re now the president’s AUTHORITY

Paulsen 9 (Michael Stokes, Distinguished University Chair & Professor of Law, The University of St. Thomas, The War Power, http://www.utexas.edu/law/journals/tlr/sources/Issue%2088.7/Kitrosser/fn009.paulsen.the%20war%20power.pdf)

Thus, whatever the scope of legitimate debate over whether¶ the President may, in certain circumstances, employ military¶ force on his own unilateral constitutional authority, notwithstanding¶ Congress’s enumerated power “to declare War,” that¶ debate is moot with respect to these wars. Congress has added¶ its powers to those of the President. In Youngstown‐ish terms,27¶ the wars of September 11, 2001, including the Iraq war, are¶ “Category I” wars: They are fully constitutionally authorized,¶ on any view of the Constitution’s allocation of war powers.

#### b. AUMF gave Obama authority to use drones

Taeb and Levey 13 (Taeb is Government Relations manager at the Arab American Institute, and Levey is Arab American Institute Legal Fellow on the AUMF., “Time to fix the AUMF”, 06/13/13 01:00 PM ET, <http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/305349-time-to-fix-the-aumf->)

The Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), passed immediately after the September 11, 2001 attacks, was a declaration of war against the people who attacked us. It gives the president immense power, including over the lives and liberties of American citizens, and doesn’t create much accountability. Since we now face a terror threat that is fundamentally different from the one we faced on 9/11, we must assess the AUMF’s continuing application and relevance, and whether it’s still necessary to fight terrorism. The AUMF grants the president extraordinary power. The last president used it to justify torture and illegal warrantless surveillance of Americans. This one uses it to justify lethal drone strikes all over the world, including at least one aimed at a U.S. citizen. The Supreme Court said in 2004 that the law authorized the President to detain an American citizen as an enemy combatant without any criminal charges. Last month, Pentagon lawyers said the AUMF might allow the U.S. to enter Syria, on the grounds that the extremist al-Nusra Front there is an “associated force” of al-Qaeda. That was too much for even Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), who said the authority “is no longer applicable to the conditions that prevailed” when Congress passed the AUMF in 2001. Sen. Angus King (I-Maine) added that the argument had “essentially rewritten the Constitution,” because it is Congress, not the president, that declares war. McCain and King are right. The AUMF was meant as a declaration of war against core al-Qaeda and the Taliban – the groups actually responsible for 9/11. These groups, while they still exist, no longer pose a major threat to our homeland. The terror threat we face is diffuse and disorganized: our enemies can carry out local attacks on our interests abroad (such as at our consulate in Benghazi), and as always, we will face “lone wolf” domestic terrorists inside the United States, from the Boston Marathon bombers to extremists who murder abortion doctors. But we don’t need to deal with these threats using total war powers: over 500 terrorists have been convicted in regular, civilian federal courts since 9/11 (military commissions have convicted seven).

#### 2. Counter interp—War powers authority is authority over national defense

Manget 91(Fred, Assistant General Counsel with the CIA, Presidential Powers and Foreign Intelligence Operations, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 5:2, 131-153, DOI: 10.1080/08850609108435176)

5. National Defense Power¶ The president's war powers authority is actually a national defense power that¶ exists at all times, whether or not there is a war declared by Congress, armed¶ conflict, or any hostilities or fighting at all. In a recent case, the Supreme Court¶ upheld the revocation of the passport of a former CIA employee (Philip Agee)¶ and rejected his contention that certain statements of executive branch policy¶ were entitled to diminished weight because they concerned the powers of the¶ Executive in wartime, stating, "History eloquently attests that grave problems of¶ national security and foreign policy are by no means limited to times of formally¶ declared war."43 Another court has said that the war power is not only confined¶ to actual engagements on fields of battle but embraces every aspect of national¶ defense and comprehends everything required to wage war successfully.44 A¶ third court stated, "It is — and must — be true that the Executive should be¶ accorded wide and normally unassailable discretion with respect to the conduct¶ of the national defense and the prosecution of national objectives through¶ military means."45¶ Thus, the executive branch's constitutional war powers authority does not¶ spring into existence only when Congress declares war, nor is it dependent on¶ there being hostilities. It empowers the president to prepare for war as well as¶ wage it, in the broadest sense. It operates at all times.

### K – Spanos/Fear of Death

#### Political engagement is the only way to breaking the cycle of corrupt executive policies

Unger 12 (David C. Unger, author of The Emergency State: America's Pursuit of Absolute Security at All Costs, Feb 16, 2012, <http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=BfdbgjzJfagC&oi=fnd&pg=PP6&dq=%22presidential+war+powers%22+%22policy+discussion%22&ots=Z3pofxh_Ac&sig=AFVTmzmrrHXovUUvPWi0qb34yAw#v=onepage&q=%22presidential%20war%20powers%22%20%22policy%20discussion%22&f=false>)

The emergency state did not begin with the serial abuses of George W. Bush's presidency—from the Patriot Act to the cooked intelligence on Iraq, from Guantanamo Bay to Abu Ghraib—and getting America back on the course of constitutional democracy requires more than just changing presidents. The record of Bush's two terms shows us just how much harm emergency governance has done to America's ideals, reputation, and security. But our costly detour from America's traditional democratic course began much earlier. The emergency state took on its present contours in the days of Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, and Dwight Eisenhower. The Bush administration's policies did not come out of nowhere; nor did the leading personalities who formulated them and ordered them carried out. Those policies, and those policy makers, came out of the experience, and the logic, of the emergency state. George W. Bush did not invent presidential war making—Harry Truman did. He didn't invent extraordinary rendition—Bill Clinton did. He didn't invent the theory of a unitary, sovereign executive—Richard Nixon did. Nor did Bush invent the practice of selectively invoking, and distorting, classified intelligence data to rally public support for dubious foreign interventions. Dwight Eisenhower did just that to justify the 1954 CIA coup in Guatemala. Lyndon Johnson did it to win congressional passage of the 1964 Tonkin Gulf Resolution. The Bush administration did not do many things that other administrations had not done before. It just did them more radically, more foolishly, and more unsuccessfully than any recent predecessor. It was the Bush administration's failures on the battlefield and in the marketplace, not its trampling of constitutional procedures and liberties, that eventually turned the American people and the Congress against it. Before Congress was outraged, it was complicit. Before the electorate rebelled, it approved. Before we threw those responsible for these constitutional abuses out. we voted them in for a second term. And three years into the Obania administration, emergency state thinking and habits continue to damage our democracy, weaken our economy- and poison our international relationships. As a candidate, Barack Obaina talked eloquently about the importance of presidents acting in accordance with the Constitution and the rule of law. and promised a new relationship with the world. But as president, Obama has addressed only a handful of Bush's most flagrant constitutional abuses while building his core foreign policies around the familiar emergency state model. The assumptions and institutions of America's emergency state have been nurtured by thirteen successive presidential administrations, seven Democratic and six Republican. Its practices and values have been sustained, and continue to be sustained, by glib, overreaching formulas for national security that politicians and foreign policy experts have trained voters to demand from all candidates for national office.

#### Epistemological debate is irrelevant—Concrete action is inevitable—They fail to create useful knowledge

Friedrichs 9 [Jorg, University Lecturer in Politics at the Oxford Department of International Development, “From Positivist Pretense to Pragmatic Practice Varieties of Pragmatic Methodology in IR Scholarship” Pragmatism and International Relations]

As Friedrich Nietzsche ([1887] 1994:1; cf. Wilson 2002) knew, the knower isstrangely unknown to himself. In fact, it is much morehazardous to contemplate theway how we gain knowledge than to gain such knowledge in the ﬁrst place. This is not to deny that intellectuals are a narcissistic Kratochwil lot, with a penchant for omphaloskepsis. The typical result of their navel-gazing, however, is not increased self-awareness. Scholars are more likely to come up with ex-post-facto rationalizations of how they would like to see their activity than with accurate descriptions of how they go about business. As a result, in science there is a paradoxical divide between positivist pretenseand pragmatic practice. Many prominent scholars proceed pragmatically in gen-erating their knowledge, only to vest it all in a positivist cloak when it comes topresenting results. In the wake of Karl Popper (1963), fantasies about ingeniousconjectures and inexorable refutations continue to hold sway despite the muchmore prosaic way most scholars grope around in the formulation of their theo-ries, and the much less rigorous way they assess the value of their hypotheses. In proposing pragmatism as a more realistic alternative to positivist idealiza-tions, I am not concerned with the original intentions of Charles Peirce. Theseare discussed and enhanced by Ryto¨ vuori-Apunen (this forum). Instead, Ipresent various attempts to make pragmatism work as a methodology for IR scholarship. This includes my own preferred methodology, the pragmaticresearch strategy of abduction. As Fritz Kratochwil and I argue elsewhere, abduction should be at the center of our efforts, while deduction and induction areimportant but auxiliary tools (Friedrichs and 2009).Of course, one does not need to be a pragmatist to proceed in a pragmatic way. Precisely because it is derived from practice, pragmatic commonsense is a sold as the hills. For example, James Rosenau (1988:164) declared many yearsago that he coveted ‘‘a long-held conviction that one advances knowledge most effectively by continuously moving back and forth between very abstract and very empirical levels of inquiry, allowing the insights of the former to exert pressurefor the latter even as the ﬁndings of the latter, in turn, exert pressure for the for-mer, thus sustaining an endless cycle in which theory and research feed on eachother.’’ This was shortly before Rosenau’s turn to postmodernism, while he wasstill touting the virtues of behaviorism and standard scientiﬁc requisites, such asindependent and dependent variables and theory testing. But if we take his state-ment at face value, it appears that Rosenau-the-positivist was guided by a sort of pragmatism for all but the name. While such practical commonsense is certainly valuable, in and by itself, it does not qualify as scientiﬁc methodology. Science requires a higher degree of methodological awareness. For this reason, I am not interested here in pragma-tism as unspoken commonsense, or as a pretext for doing empirical researchunencumbered by theoretical and methodological considerations. Nor am I con-cerned with pragmatism as an excuse for staging yet another epistemological debate. Instead, I am interested in pragmatism as an instrument to go about research with an appropriate degree of epistemological and methodologicalawareness. Taking this criterion as my yardstick, the following three varieties of pragmatist methodology in recent IR scholarship are worth mentioning: theory synthesis, analytic eclecticism (AE), and abduction.Theory synthesis is proposed by Andrew Moravcsik (2003), who claims that theories can be combined as long as they are compatible at some unspeciﬁedfundamental level, and that data will help to identify the right combination of theories. He does not explicitly invoke pragmatism but vests his pleading in apositivist cloak by using the language of theory testing. When looking closer,however, it becomes apparent that his theoretical and methodological noncha-lance is far more pragmatic than what his positivist rhetoric suggests. Moravcsiksees himself in good company, dropping the following names: Robert Keohane,Stephen Walt, Jack Snyder, Stephen Van Evera, Bary Buzan, Bruce Russett, John O’Neal, Martha Finnemore, and Kathryn Sikkink. With the partial excep-tion of Finnemore, however, none of these scholars explicitly links his or herscholarship to pragmatism. They employ pragmatic commonsense in theirresearch, but devoutly ignore pragmatism as a philosophical and methodologicalposition. As a result, it is fair to say that theory synthesis is only on a slightly higher level of intellectual awareness than Rosenau’s statement quoted above. Analytic eclecticism, as advertized by Peter Katzenstein and Rudra Sil, links acommonsensical approach to empirical research with a more explicit commit-ment to pragmatism (Sil and Katzenstein 2005; Katzenstein and Sil 2008).The 7 Even the dean of critical rationalism, Karl Popper, is ‘‘guilty’’ of lapses into pragmatism, for example when hestates that scientists, like hungry animals, classify objects according to needs and interests, although with the impor-tant difference that they are guided in their quest for ﬁnding regularities not so much by the stomach but ratherby empirical problems and epistemic interests (Popper 1963:61–62). 646 Pragmatism and International Relations idea is to combine existing research traditions in a pragmatic fashion and thusto enable the formulation and exploration of novel and more complex sets of problems. The constituent elements of different research traditions are trans-lated into mutually compatible vocabularies and then recombined in novel ways.This implies that most scholars must continue the laborious process of formulat-ing parochial research traditions so that a few cosmopolitan colleagues will beenabled to draw upon their work and construct syncretistic collages. 8 In additionto themselves, Katzenstein and Sil cite a number of like-minded scholars such asCharles Tilly, Sidney Tarrow, Paul Pierson, and Robert Jervis. 9 The ascription isprobably correct given the highly analytical and eclectic approach of these schol-ars. Nevertheless, apart from Katzenstein and Sil themselves none of these schol-ars has explicitly avowed himself to AE.My preferred research strategy is abduction, which is epistemologically asself-aware as AE but minimizes the dependence on existing research traditions.The typical situation for abduction is when we, both in everyday life and as socialscientists, become aware of a certain class of phenomena that interests us for somereason, but for which we lack applicable theories. We simply trust, although we donot know for certain, that the observed class of phenomena is not random. Wetherefore start collecting pertinent observations and, at the same time, applyingconcepts from existing ﬁelds of our knowledge. Instead of trying to impose anabstract theoretical template (deduction) or ‘‘simply’’ inferring propositions fromfacts (induction), we start reasoning at an intermediate level (abduction). Abduction follows the predicament that science is, or should be, above all amore conscious and systematic version of the way by which humans have learnedto solve problems and generate knowledge in their everyday lives. As it iscurrently practiced, science is often a poor emulator of what we are able toachieve in practice. This is unfortunate because human practice is the ultimatemiracle. In our own practice, most of us manage to deal with many challenging situations. The way we accomplish this is completely different from**,** and far moreefﬁcient than, the way knowledge is generated according to standard scientiﬁc methods. If it is true that in our own practice we proceed not so much by induction or deduction but rather by abduction, then science would do well tomimic this at least in some respects. 10 Abduction has been invoked by numerous scholars, including Alexander Wendt, John Ruggie, Jeffrey Checkel, Martin Shapiro, Alec Stone Sweet, andMartha Finnemore. While they all use the term abduction, none has ever thor-oughly speciﬁed its meaning. To make up for this omission, I have developedabduction into an explicit methodology and applied it in my own research oninternational police cooperation (Friedrichs 2008). Unfortunately, it is impossi-ble to go into further detail here. Readers interested in abduction as a way toadvance international research and methodology can also be referred to my recent article with Fritz Kratochwil (Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009).On a ﬁnal note, we should be careful not to erect pragmatism as the ultimateepistemological fantasy to caress the vanity of Nietzschean knowers unknown tothemselves, namely that they are ingeniously ‘‘sorting out’’ problematic situa-tions. Scientiﬁc inquiry is not simply an intimate encounter between a researchproblem and a problem solver. It is a social activity taking place in communitiesof practice (Wenger 1998). Pragmatism must be neither reduced to the utility of results regardless of their social presuppositions and meaning, nor to the 8 Pace Rudra Sil (this forum), the whole point about eclecticism is that you rely on existing traditions to blendthem into something new. There is no eclecticism without something to be eclectic about. 9 One may further expand the list by including the international society approach of the English school (Ma-kinda 2000), as well as the early Kenneth Waltz (1959). 10 Precisely for this reason, abduction understood as ‘Inference to the Best Explanation’ plays a crucial role inthe ﬁeld of Artiﬁcial Intelligence. 647 The Forum fabrication of consensus among scientists. Pragmatism as the practice of dis-cursive communities and pragmatism as a device for the generation of useful knowledge are two sides of the same coin

#### The world is structurally improving

Dash 13 Co-Founder and Managing Director at Activate, a new kind of strategy consultancy that advises companies about the opportunities at the intersection of technology and media co-founder and CEO of ThinkUp, which shows you how to be better at using your social networks, publisher, editor and owner of Dashes.com, my personal blog where I've been publishing continuously since 1999, entrepreneur, writer and geek living in New York City (Anil Dash, 4 February 2013, “THE WORLD IS GETTING BETTER. QUICKLY.,” http://dashes.com/anil/2013/02/the-world-is-getting-better-quickly.html)

The world is getting better, faster, than we could ever have imagined. For those of us who are fortunate enough to live in wealthy communities or countries, we have a common set of reference points we use to describe the world's most intractable, upsetting, unimaginable injustices. Often, we only mention these horrible realities in minimizing our own woes: "Well, that's annoying, but it's hardly as bad as children starving in Africa." Or "Yeah, this is important, but it's not like it's the cure for AIDS." Or the omnipresent description of any issue as a "First World Problem". But let's, for once, look at the actual data around developing world problems. Not our condescending, world-away displays of emotion, or our slacktivist tendencies to see a retweet as meaningful action, but the actual numbers and metrics about how progress is happening for the world's poorest people. Though metrics and measurements are always fraught and flawed, Gates' single biggest emphasis was the idea that measurable progress and metrics are necessary for any meaningful improvements to happen in the lives of the world's poor. So how are we doing? THE WORLD HAS CHANGED The results are astounding. Even if we caveat that every measurement is imprecise, that billionaire philanthropists are going to favor data that strengthens their points, and that some of the most significant problems are difficult to attach metrics to, it's inarguable that the past two decades have seen the greatest leap forward in the lives of the global poor in the history of humanity. Some highlights: Children are 1/3 less likely to die before age five than they were in 1990. The global childhood mortality rate for kids under 5 has dropped from 88 in 1000 in 1990 to 57 in 1000 in 2010. The global infant mortality rate for kids dying before age one has plunged from 61 in 1000 to 40 in 1000. Now, any child dying is of course one child too many, but this is astounding progress to have made in just twenty years. In the past 30 years, the percentage of children who receive key immunizations such as the DTP vaccine has quadrupled. The percentage of people in the world living on less than $1.25 per day has been cut in half since 1990, ahead of the schedule of the Millennium Development Goals which hoped to reach this target by 2015. The number of deaths to tuberculosis has been cut 40% in the past twenty years. The consumption of ozone-depleting substances has been cut 85% globally in the last thirty years. The percentage of urban dwellers living in slums globally has been cut from 46.2% to 32.7% in the last twenty years. And there's more progress in hunger and contraception, in sustainability and education, against AIDS and illiteracy. After reading the Gates annual letter and following up by reviewing the UN's ugly-but-data-rich Millennium Development Goals statistics site, I was surprised by how much progress has been made in the years since I've been an adult, and just how little I've heard about the big picture despite the fact that I'd like to keep informed about such things. I'm not a pollyanna — there's a lot of work to be done. But I can personally attest to the profound effect that basic improvements like clean drinking water can have in people's lives. Today, we often use the world's biggest problems as metaphors for impossibility. But the evidence shows that, actually, we're really good at solving even the most intimidating challenges in the world. What we're lacking is the ability to communicate effectively about how we make progress, so that we can galvanize even more investment of resources, time and effort to tackling the problems we have left.

#### Democracy—Imperialism’s key to it

Boot 3 “American Imperialism? No need to run away from Label” Max Boot, Senior fellow of the Council of foreign relations, USA Today, May 6, 2003. http://66.102.1.104/scholar?hl=en&lr=&q=cache:sP5soPyDtzAJ:www.attacberlin.de/fileadmin/Sommerakademie/Boot\_Imperialim\_fine.pdf+author:max+author:boot).

Mind you, this is not meant as a condemnation. The history of American imperialism is hardly one of unadorned good doing; there have been plenty of shameful episodes, such as the mistreatment of the Indians. But, on the whole, U.S. imperialism has been the greatest force for good in the world during the past century. It has defeated the monstrous evils of communism and Nazism and lesser evils such as the Taliban and Serbian ethnic cleansing. Along the way, it has helped spread liberal institutions to countries as diverse as South Korea (news - web sites) and Panama. Yet, while generally successful as imperialists, Americans have been loath to confirm that's what they were doing. That's OK. Given the historical baggage that ''imperialism'' carries, there's no need for the U.S. government to embrace the term. But it should definitely embrace the practice. That doesn't mean looting Iraq of its natural resources; nothing could be more destructive of our goal of building a stable government in Baghdad. It means imposing the rule of law, property rights, free speech and other guarantees, at gunpoint if need be. This will require selecting a new ruler who is committed to pluralism and then backing him or her to the hilt. Iran and other neighboring states won't hesitate to impose their despotic views on Iraq; we shouldn't hesitate to impose our democratic views.

#### Extinction

Diamond 95 (Professor of Sociology and Political Science at Stanford University and a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Diamond was a senior adviser on governance to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. He is an advisory board member for the Roosevelt Institution and a founding Co-Editor of the National Endowment for Democracy's Journal of Democracy, served as an advisor to numerous governmental and international organizations at various points in his life, including the State Department, United Nations, World Bank, and U.S. Agency for International Development, Larry, “Promoting Democracy in the 1990’s”, Carnegie Foundation)

OTHER THREATS This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built

#### It has literally averted every scenario for extinction

Barnett 11 Author of Great Powers: America and the World After Bush ’11 (Thomas, “The New Rules: Leadership Fatigue Puts U.S., and Globalization, at Crossroads,” <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8099/the-new-rules-leadership-fatigue-puts-u-s-and-globalization-at-crossroads>, Mike)

Events in Libya are a further reminder for Americans that we stand at a crossroads in our continuing evolution as the world's sole full-service superpower. Unfortunately, we are increasingly seeking change without cost, and shirking from risk because we are tired of the responsibility. We don't know who we are anymore, and our president is a big part of that problem. Instead of leading us, he explains to us. Barack Obama would have us believe that he is practicing strategic patience. But many experts and ordinary citizens alike have concluded that he is actually beset by strategic incoherence -- in effect, a man overmatched by the job. It is worth first examining the larger picture: We live in a time of arguably the greatest structural change in the global order yet endured, with this historical moment's most amazing feature being its relative and absolute lack of mass violence. That is something to consider when Americans contemplate military intervention in Libya, because if we do take the step to prevent larger-scale killing by engaging in some killing of our own, we will not be adding to some fantastically imagined global death count stemming from the ongoing "megalomania" and "evil" of American "empire." We'll be engaging in the same sort of system-administering activity that has marked our stunningly successful stewardship of global order since World War II. Let me be more blunt: As the guardian of globalization, the U.S. military has been the greatest force for peace the world has ever known. Had America been removed from the global dynamics that governed the 20th century, the mass murder never would have ended. Indeed, it's entirely conceivable there would now be no identifiable human civilization left, once nuclear weapons entered the killing equation. But the world did not keep sliding down that path of perpetual war. Instead, America stepped up and changed everything by ushering in our now-perpetual great-power peace. We introduced the international liberal trade order known as globalization and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. What resulted was the collapse of empires, an explosion of democracy, the persistent spread of human rights, the liberation of women, the doubling of life expectancy, a roughly 10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP and a profound and persistent reduction in battle deaths from state-based conflicts. That is what American "hubris" actually delivered. Please remember that the next time some TV pundit sells you the image of "unbridled" American military power as the cause of global disorder instead of its cure. With self-deprecation bordering on self-loathing, we now imagine a post-American world that is anything but. Just watch who scatters and who steps up as the Facebook revolutions erupt across the Arab world. While we might imagine ourselves the status quo power, we remain the world's most vigorously revisionist force. As for the sheer "evil" that is our military-industrial complex, again, let's examine what the world looked like before that establishment reared its ugly head. The last great period of global structural change was the first half of the 20th century, a period that saw a death toll of about 100 million across two world wars. That comes to an average of 2 million deaths a year in a world of approximately 2 billion souls. Today, with far more comprehensive worldwide reporting, researchers report an average of less than 100,000 battle deaths annually in a world fast approaching 7 billion people. Though admittedly crude, these calculations suggest a 90 percent absolute drop and a 99 percent relative drop in deaths due to war. We are clearly headed for a world order characterized by multipolarity, something the American-birthed system was designed to both encourage and accommodate. But given how things turned out the last time we collectively faced such a fluid structure, we would do well to keep U.S. power, in all of its forms, deeply embedded in the geometry to come.

#### Militarism prevents extinction

Williams 4, PhD in economics from the University of California at Los Angeles, 2004 [Walter, “The Appeasement Disease,” Capitalism Magazine, August 25, 2004, http://www.capmag.com/article.asp?ID=3885]

President Bush's foreign-policy critics at home and abroad share characteristics and visions that have previously led to worldwide chaos and untold loss of lives. These people believe that negotiation, appeasement and caving in to the demands of vicious totalitarian leaders can produce good-faith behavior. Their vision not only has a long record of failure but devastating consequences. During the late 1930s, France and Britain hoped that allowing Adolf Hitler to annex Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia would satisfy his territorial ambitions. This was after a long string of German violations of the terms of the Versailles Treaty ending World War I. Appeasement didn't work. It was seen as weakness, and it simply emboldened Hitler. At the Yalta Conference, near the end of World War II, Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt thought they could appease Josef Stalin by giving away Eastern Europe and making other concessions that ultimately marked the beginning of the nearly half-century Cold War and Soviet/China expansionism. War-weary Westerners hoped that brutal tyrants would act in good faith. Failing to stand up to Stalin resulted in unspeakable atrocities, enslavement and human suffering**.** Quite interestingly, Western leftist appeasers exempted communist leaders from the harsh criticism directed toward Hitler, even though communist crimes made Hitler's slaughter of 21 million appear almost amateurish. According to Professor R.J. Rummel's research in "Death by Government," from 1917 until its collapse, the Soviet Union murdered or caused the death of 61 million people**,** mostly its own citizens. Since 1949, communist China's Mao Zedong regime was responsible for the death of 35 million of its own citizens. History never exactly repeats itself, but the vision of earlier appeasers was part of the West's vision of how to deal with Saddam Hussein. After devastating defeat in the first Gulf War, Iraq agreed to coalition peace terms. After documents were signed, every effort was made by the Iraqis to frustrate implementation of the terms, particularly U.N. weapons inspections. Western appeasers, most notably Europeans, were quite willing to respond to Saddam Hussein's violation of peace terms in a fashion similar to their earlier counterparts' response to Hitler's violation of the peace terms of the Versailles Treaty. Had Britain or France launched a military attack on Germany between 1934 and 1935, when Hitler started his arms buildup in violation of the Versailles Treaty and before he fully developed his military capability, he would have been defeated and at least 50 million lives would have been spared.

#### Fear of death is good, without the existential fear or and end to existence, states will dissolve leading to catastrophic wars

#### Beres, PhD at Princeton, 96 (Louis Rene, “No Fear, No Trembling Israel, Death and the Meaning of Anxiety,” www.freeman.org/m\_online/feb96/beresn.htm)

Fear of death, the ultimate source of anxiety, is essential to human survival. This is true not only for individuals, but also for states. Without such fear, states will exhibit an incapacity to confront nonbeing that can hasten their disappearance. So it is today with the State of Israel. Israel suffers acutely from insufficient existential dread. Refusing to tremble before the growing prospect of collective disintegration - a forseeable prospect connected with both genocide and war - this state is now unable to take the necessary steps toward collective survival. What is more, because death is the one fact of life which is not relative but absolute, Israel's blithe unawareness of its national mortality deprives its still living days of essential absoluteness and growth. For states, just as for individuals, confronting death can give the most positive reality to life itself. In this respect, a cultivated awareness of nonbeing is central to each state's pattern of potentialities as well as to its very existence. When a state chooses to block off such an awareness, a choice currently made by the State of Israel, it loses, possibly forever, the altogether critical benefits of "anxiety." There is, of course, a distinctly ironic resonance to this argument. Anxiety, after all, is generally taken as a negative, as a liability that cripples rather than enhances life. But anxiety is not something we "have." It is something we (states and individuals) "are." It is true, to be sure, that anxiety, at the onset of psychosis, can lead individuals to experience literally the threat of self-dissolution, but this is, by definition, not a problem for states. Anxiety stems from the awareness that existence can actually be destroyed, that one can actually become nothing. An ontological characteristic, it has been commonly called Angst, a word related to anguish (which comes from the Latin angustus, "narrow," which in turn comes from angere, "to choke.") Herein lies the relevant idea of birth trauma as the prototype of all anxiety, as "pain in narrows" through the "choking" straits of birth. Kierkegaard identified anxiety as "the dizziness of freedom," adding: "Anxiety is the reality of freedom as a potentiality before this freedom has materialized." This brings us back to Israel. Both individuals and states may surrender freedom in the hope of ridding themselves of an unbearable anxiety. Regarding states, such surrender can lead to a rampant and delirious collectivism which stamps out all political opposition. It can also lead to a national self-delusion which augments enemy power and hastens catastrophic war. For the Jewish State, a lack of pertinent anxiety, of the positive aspect of Angst, has already led its people to what is likely an irreversible rendezvous with extinction.

#### The alt causes global conflict

Rosen 3 (Stephen Peter Rosen, Beton Michael Kaneb Professor of National Security and Military Affairs at Harvard University, The National Interest. “An Empire, if You Can Keep It.” March 22. http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G1-99377575.html)

Rather than wrestle with such difficult and unpleasant problems, the United States could give up the imperial mission, or pretensions to it, now. This would essentially mean the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the Middle East, Europe and mainland Asia. It may be that all other peoples, without significant exception, will then turn to their own affairs and leave the United States alone. But those who are hostile to us might remain hostile, and be much less afraid of the United States after such a withdrawal. Current friends would feel less secure and, in the most probable post-imperial world, would revert to the logic of self-help in which all states do what they must to protect themselves. This would imply the relatively rapid acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Iran, Iraq and perhaps Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Indonesia and others. Constraints on the acquisition of biological weapons would be even weaker than they are today. Major regional arms races would also be very likely throughout Asia and the Middle East. This would not be a pleasant world for Americans, or anyone else. It is difficult to guess what the costs of such a world would be to the United States. They would probably not put the end of the United States in prospect, but they would not be small. If the logic of American empire is unappealing, it is not at all clear that the alternatives are that much more attractive.