# Quarters vs ASU

## 1NC

### Off-1

#### Interpretation- Restrictions are direct and legally binding

Law.com, no date (“Restrict,” <http://dictionary.law.com/Default.aspx?selected=1835&bold=restrict>)

The noun ―restriction means direct, on-face limitation. restriction¶ n. any limitation on activity, by statute, regulation or contract provision. In multi-unit real estate developments, condominium and cooperative housing projects managed by homeowners' associations or similar organizations, such organizations are usually required by state law to impose restrictions on use. Thus, the restrictions are part of the "covenants, conditions and restrictions" intended to enhance the use of common facilities and property which are recorded and incorporated into the title of each owner.3

#### Violation- the aff doesn’t impose a legally binding restriction- they establish a new court which changes the conditions of authority for the president to detain indefinitely but does not restrict the authority of the president

William Conner 78, former federal judge for the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York United States District Court, S. D. New York, CORPORACION VENEZOLANA de FOMENTO v. VINTERO SALES, http://www.leagle.com/decision/19781560452FSupp1108\_11379

Plaintiff next contends that Merban was charged with notice of the restrictions on the authority of plaintiff's officers to execute the guarantees. Properly interpreted, the "conditions" that had been imposed by plaintiff's Board of Directors and by the Venezuelan Cabinet were not "restrictions" or "limitations" upon the authority of plaintiff's agents but rather conditions precedent to the granting of authority. Essentially, then, plaintiff's argument is that Merban should have known that plaintiff's officers were not authorized to act except upon the fulfillment of the specified conditions.

#### Reasons to vote-

#### 1. Ground- they allow virtually anything that has the effect of making detentions or targeted killings more difficult- we force the aff to take a legally binding action that ONLY affects the given area

#### 2. Effects- allowing indirect restrictions allows the aff to base their restriction off of the result of the plan, not its direct language- makes it impossible to predict the plan’s actual action

#### 3. Topic coherence – the core controversy is what war powers the President has, not how he must use them – key to clash and literature

#### 4. Bidirectional – they allow the aff to endorse the status quo – Congressional oversight and approval become topical because they just shift where the authority is – not what authority exists

#### 5. Limits – hundreds of insignificant conditions or shifts Congress could impose on the courts

### Off-2

#### Text: The Executive Branch of the United States federal government should exhibit executive restraint over

#### The president should mandate more procedural checks on detention

O’Neil 2011 (Robin, JD from University of Houston, THE PRICE OF PURITY: WEAKENING THE¶ EXECUTIVE MODEL OF THE UNITED STATES'¶ COUNTER-TERROR LEGAL SYSTEM, 47 Hous. L. Rev. 1421 2010-2011)

The founding fathers designed the Constitution to permit¶ the power of the executive branch to swell in times of crisis and shrink in times of peace. Through this process, the executive has¶ gradually gained institutional strength over the years. In accord¶ with this historical trend, the development of detention policy¶ during the Bush Administration evidences the tremendous¶ growth of executive power in the wake of the 2001 terrorist¶ attacks.2 18 However, with Congress retroactively legislating¶ overly broad authorizations of unilateral executive action in the¶ context of a war with no clear enemy or duration, the scope of¶ that power is less likely to recede than ever before. In order to¶ substantively improve the United States' counter-terror policy¶ and render it consistent with the country's constitutional design,¶ President Obama should reject the inclination to retain the¶ expanded powers of his office and institute procedural and¶ substantive changes that reverse the course of the American¶ anti-terror legal system toward the pure form of the executive¶ model."'

### Off-3

#### Obamas foreign policy presidential powers are high but he will show strategic restraint if they decline

Joseph S. Nye Jr. is University Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard University and is the former Dean of the Kennedy School. 5-31-13 (“The Cult of Transformational Leadership”, the diplomat)

In contrast to Bush, the crisis that Obama faced was economic rather than security related, but Obama’s temperament was different as well. While Obama had expounded a transformational vision in his campaign, his crisis responses were those of a pragmatist. Temperamentally, he was noted for his coolness in analysis under pressure, a term sometimes summed up by the phrase “no drama Obama.” For example, his reaction to success in the highly risky cross- border raid that killed Bin Laden in 2011 but could have destroyed his presidency “was self-contained to the extreme: ‘we got him,’ was all he said.” Political scientist George Edwards criticizes Obama as a man who presented himself as a “transformational leader who would fundamentally change the policy and politics of America” and then overreached by thinking his ability to communicate and educate the public could change more than he could. But this criticism is more telling in regard to Obama’s domestic program than in regard to his foreign policy.¶ Obama’s rhetoric both in the 2008 campaign and during the first months of his presidency was both inspirational in style and transformational in objective. As several experts describe the campaign, “This image of a new domestic agenda, a new global architecture, and a transformed world was crucial to his ultimate success as a candidate.” Of course, campaign rhetoric always sounds more transformational as challengers criticize the incumbents, but Obama continued the transformational rhetoric with a series of speeches in the first year of his presidency, including his inaugural address; a speech at Prague proclaiming the goal of a nuclear-free world; a speech in Cairo promising a new approach to the Muslim world; and his Nobel Peace Prize speech promising to “bend history in the direction of justice.” In part this series of speeches was tactical. Obama needed to meet his promise to set a new direction in foreign policy while simultaneously managing to juggle the legacy of issues left to him by Bush, any of which, if dropped, could cause a crisis for his presidency. Nonetheless, there is no reason to believe that Obama was being disingenuous about his objectives.¶ Obama had an “activist vision of his role in history,” intending to “refurbish America’s image abroad, especially in the Muslim world; end its involvement in two wars; offer an outstretched hand to Iran; reset relations with Russia as a step toward ridding the world of nuclear weapons; develop significant cooperation with China on both regional and global issues; and make peace in the Middle East.” As Martin S. Indyk, Kenneth G. Lieberthal, and Michael E. O'Hanlon have observed, his record of achievement on these issues in his first term was mixed. “Seemingly intractable circumstances turned him from the would-be architect of a new global order into a leader focused more on repairing relationships and reacting to crises—most notably global economic crisis.”¶

#### Regulating war making ability erodes presidential powers

Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in The Global War on Terrorism: Assessment of Legal, Historical, Policy, and Operational Considerations. Published in The Modern Tribune, Full Text Available at www.themoderntribune.com/full\_text\_us\_torture\_policy\_memo\_gonzalez\_bush.htm#Administration%20Lawyers%20Ascribed%20Broad%20Power%20to%20Bush%20on%20Torture

Written 6 March 2003, De-Classified 10 June 2004

3. Legal doctrines under the Federal Criminal Law that could render specific conduct, otherwise criminal, not unlawful (U) Generally, the following discussion identifies legal doctrines and defenses applicable to the interrogation of unlawful combatants, and the decision process related to them. In practice, their efficacy as to any person or circumstances will be fact-dependent.a. Commander-in-Chief Authority(U) As the Supreme Court has recognized, and as we will explain further below, the President enjoys complete discretion in the exercise of his [or her] Commander-in-Chief authority including in conducting operations against hostile forces. Because both "[t]he executive power and the command of the military and naval forces is vested in the President," the Supreme Court has unanimously stated that it is "the President alone who is constitutionally invested with the entire charge of hostile operations." Hamilton v. Dillin, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 73 (1874) (emphasis added).(U) In light of the President's complete authority over the conduct of war, without a clear statement otherwise, criminal statutes are not read as infringing on the President's ultimate authority in these areas. The Supreme Court has established a canon of statutory construction that statutes are to be constructed in a manner that avoids constitutional difficulties so long as a reasonable alternative construction is available, See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (citing NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 499-501 (1979)) ("[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, [courts] will construe [a] statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.") this canon of construction applies especially where an act of Congress could be read to encroach upon powers constitutionally committed to a coordinate branch of government. See, e.g. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800-1 (1992) (citation omitted) ("Out of respect for the separation of powers and the unique constitutional position of the President, we find that textual silence is not enough to subject the President to the provisions of the [Administrative Procedure Act]. We would require an express statement by Congress before assuming it intended for the President's performance of this statutory duties to be reviewed for abuse of discretion."); Public Citizen V. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 465-67 (19890 (construing Federal Advisory Committee Act not to apply to advice given by American Bar Association to the President on judicial nominations, to avoid potential constitutional question regarding encroachment on Presidential power to appoint judges).(U) In the area of foreign affairs, and war powers in particular, the avoidance canon has special force. See, e.g., Dept of Navy v. Egan 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988) ("unless Congress specifically has provided otherwise, courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs."); in Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cemcean Socy, 478 U.S. 221, 232-33 (1986) (construing federal statutes to avoid curtailment of traditional presidential prerogatives in foreign affairs). It should not be lightly assumed that Congress has acted to interfere with the President's constitutionally superior position as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief in the area of military operations. See Egan, 484 U.S. at 529 (quoting Haig V. Agee, 1453 U.S. 280, 293-94 (1981). See also Agee, 453 U.S. at 291 (deference to Executive Branch is "especially" appropriate "in the area of national security").

#### Perception of Obama as a strong leader is key to climate negotiations – solves GHG

MARK LANDLER, 7-2-13 (Obama Seeks New U.S. Role in Climate Debate, NYT)

When President Obama barged into a meeting of leaders from Brazil, China, India and other countries at a climate conference in Copenhagen in December 2009, he managed to extract a last-minute agreement to set a goal to limit the rise in global temperatures.¶ It was the high-water mark of Mr. Obama’s leadership on climate change — even if the deal was less than the Americans or Europeans wanted — but it has been downhill ever since. Preoccupied with other problems, the president largely disappeared from the global debate.¶ Now he is trying to reclaim the spotlight.¶ Mr. Obama’s climate change speech at Georgetown University last week was aimed not just at a domestic audience, but also at foreigners convinced that a balky Congress had killed America’s commitment to tackling the issue. “Make no mistake,” he said, mopping his brow in the 90-degree heat, “the world still looks to America to lead.”¶ Mr. Obama has done more than talk: he recently reached a deal with President Xi Jinping of China to reduce the use of hydrofluorocarbons, known as HFCs, a particularly potent greenhouse gas. In a meeting long on atmosphere, it was the only achievement that actually cleared the air.¶ “We felt we needed to expand the discussion,” said Caroline Atkinson, deputy national security adviser for international economic affairs. “We’re working all the different international angles: multilaterally, bilaterally and actions on our own.”¶ That last point is crucial because at Georgetown, Mr. Obama reaffirmed the pledge he made in Copenhagen that the United States would reduce its emissions by about 17 percent from 2005 levels by 2020. Without mandated cuts in emissions from American power plants, which Mr. Obama announced he would address using his executive powers, there is little hope that the United States can meet that goal.¶ For a president who has been on the defensive over the National Security Agency’s surveillance operations and his failure to close the military prison at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, the climate change plan offers a chance to reset his image overseas. It carries echoes of what once made him so popular, tempered with the pragmatism of a leader in his second term.¶ Yet skepticism about America’s resolve to lead runs deep after four years in which climate change took a back seat in Washington to the financial crisis, a new health care law, fiscal negotiations and an overhaul of the nation’s immigration laws — really, every other big-ticket item on Mr. Obama’s agenda.¶ Whether the president can erase those doubts is an open question. While the United States drifted, Europe and Australia have plowed ahead with their own ambitious initiatives to reduce emissions. Critics were quick to fault Mr. Obama’s speech for its lack of specifics.¶ “It’s no longer the case where everyone expects key decisions from the United States and are disappointed when they don’t come,” said Stephan Singer, director of global energy policy at the environmental group WWF in Brussels. “Many countries went ahead and did their own stuff, independent of the lack of action in the U.S.”¶ Still, Mr. Singer and other experts said a re-engaged United States would make a difference in global climate efforts, particularly with countries like China and India, the world’s first and third largest emitters of carbon dioxide. Both still point to the laggard No. 2, the United States, as the main reason they should not be obliged to do more.¶ Mr. Obama’s speech kindled hopes for a couple of reasons. The centerpiece of his plan does not require Congressional approval. And he announced that the United States would no longer finance the building of conventional coal-fired plants overseas, which would help curb emissions in developing countries.¶ Mr. Obama also argued that confronting climate change need not threaten economic growth: that investing in windmills, solar panels and other types of clean-energy technology could spur scientific innovation and generate jobs. That mollifies countries like India that often complain that the West lectures them about cutting emissions, even if it constricts their development and deprives them of a better lifestyle.¶ “The U.S. has become very sophisticated in its bilateral dealings with countries,” said Durwood Zaelke, who runs the Institute for Governance and Sustainable Development. “We are targeting things that India needs, like super-efficient air-conditioning.”¶ On a recent visit to New Delhi, Secretary of State John Kerry announced a loan-guarantee program by the United States Agency for International Development intended to generate at least $100 million in private financing to develop clean-energy technologies.¶ “The good news is that if we do this right, it’s not going to hurt our economies,” Mr. Kerry said. “It actually helps them. It won’t deny our children opportunity; it will actually create new ones.”¶ Chandra Bhushan, an Indian environmentalist, wrote in the online magazine Down to Earth that it was “hypocritical” for Mr. Kerry to call for India to cut emissions in its residential sector without discussing how the United States planned to do the same.¶ Still, Mr. Kerry got a warmer reception than his predecessor, Hillary Rodham Clinton, on her first visit to India four years earlier. After touring an energy-efficient building outside New Delhi that was meant to showcase American-Indian cooperation, she was caught off guard when an Indian minister warned the United States not to bully India into legally binding reductions of its carbon emissions.¶ With his long history as a champion of climate change legislation, Mr. Kerry could serve as a not-so-secret weapon for Mr. Obama. At his Senate confirmation hearing, Mr. Kerry said he intended to put climate change at the heart of his agenda at the State Department.¶ Mr. Kerry was at the table last month in Rancho Mirage, Calif., when Mr. Obama made his deal on HFCs with Mr. Xi. The administration is emphasizing these agreements, in part to work around the hurdles of negotiating a global deal to reduce emissions through the United Nations, an effort that has dragged on for years.¶ For all Mr. Obama’s efforts to forge side deals and clean-energy partnerships, his reaffirmation of his goal to reduce emissions 17 percent ties him to the United Nations process. Attention now turns to the next big climate conference, which is expected to be held in France in 2015. The question is what role the United States will play.¶ “There are still fears that the political issues in the U.S. could pull down the outcome in the 2015 meeting,” said Jennifer Morgan, director of climate and energy programs at the World Resources Institute. “But this breath of fresh air from the president could revive things.”

#### Warming is the largest risk of extinction

Deibel 7 (Terry L., professor of IR at National War College, *“Conclusion: American Foreign Affairs Strategy Today Anthropogenic – caused by CO2,”* Foreign Affairs Strategy, 2007)

Finally, there is one major existential threat to American security (as well as prosperity) of a nonviolent nature, which, though far in the future, demands urgent action. It is the threat of global warming to the stability of the climate upon which all earthly life depends. Scientists worldwide have been observing the gathering of this threat for three decades now, and what was once a mere possibility has passed through probability to near certainty. Indeed not one of more than 900 articles on climate change published in refereed scientific journals from 1993 to 2003 doubted that anthropogenic warming is occurring. “In legitimate scientific circles,” writes Elizabeth Kolbert, “it is virtually impossible to find evidence of disagreement over the fundamentals of global warming.” Evidence from a vast international scientific monitoring effort accumulates almost weekly, as this sample of newspaper reports shows: an international panel predicts “brutal droughts, floods and violent storms across the planet over the next century”; climate change could “literally alter ocean currents, wipe away huge portions of Alpine Snowcaps and aid the spread of cholera and malaria”; “glaciers in the Antarctic and in Greenland are melting much faster than expected, and…worldwide, plants are blooming several days earlier than a decade ago”; “rising sea temperatures have been accompanied by a significant global increase in the most destructive hurricanes”; “NASA scientists have concluded from direct temperature measurements that 2005 was the hottest year on record, with 1998 a close second”; “Earth’s warming climate is estimated to contribute to more than 150,000 deaths and 5 million illnesses each year” as disease spreads; “widespread bleaching from Texas to Trinidad…killed broad swaths of corals” due to a 2-degree rise in sea temperatures. “The world is slowly disintegrating,” concluded Inuit hunter Noah Metuq, who lives 30 miles from the Arctic Circle. “They call it climate change…but we just call it breaking up.” From the founding of the first cities some 6,000 years ago until the beginning of the industrial revolution, carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere remained relatively constant at about 280 parts per million (ppm). At present they are accelerating toward 400 ppm, and by 2050 they will reach 500 ppm, about double pre-industrial levels. Unfortunately, atmospheric CO2 lasts about a century, so there is no way immediately to reduce levels, only to slow their increase, we are thus in for significant global warming; the only debate is how much and how serous the effects will be. As the newspaper stories quoted above show, we are already experiencing the effects of 1-2 degree warming in more violent storms, spread of disease, mass die offs of plants and animals, species extinction, and threatened inundation of low-lying countries like the Pacific nation of Kiribati and the Netherlands at a warming of 5 degrees or less the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets could disintegrate, leading to a sea level of rise of 20 feet that would cover North Carolina’s outer banks, swamp the southern third of Florida, and inundate Manhattan up to the middle of Greenwich Village. Another catastrophic effect would be the collapse of the Atlantic thermohaline circulation that keeps the winter weather in Europe far warmer than its latitude would otherwise allow. Economist William Cline once estimated the damage to the United States alone from moderate levels of warming at 1-6 percent of GDP annually; severe warming could cost 13-26 percent of GDP. But the most frightening scenario is runaway greenhouse warming, based on positive feedback from the buildup of water vapor in the atmosphere that is both caused by and causes hotter surface temperatures. Past ice age transitions, associated with only 5-10 degree changes in average global temperatures, took place in just decades, even though no one was then pouring ever-increasing amounts of carbon into the atmosphere. Faced with this specter, the best one can conclude is that “humankind’s continuing enhancement of the natural greenhouse effect is akin to playing Russian roulette with the earth’s climate and humanity’s life support system. At worst, says physics professor Marty Hoffert of New York University, “we’re just going to burn everything up; we’re going to heat the atmosphere to the temperature it was in the Cretaceous when there were crocodiles at the poles, and then everything will collapse.” During the Cold War, astronomer Carl Sagan popularized a theory of nuclear winter to describe how a thermonuclear war between the Untied States and the Soviet Union would not only destroy both countries but possible end life on this planet. Global warming is the post-Cold War era’s equivalent of nuclear winter at least as serious and considerably better supported scientifically. Over the long run it puts dangers from terrorism and traditional military challenges to shame. It is a threat not only to the security and prosperity to the United States, but potentially to the continued existence of life on this planet.

### Off-4

#### Security speech acts define difference as threatening otherness, to secure state identity, which causes a self-fulfilling prophecy based on false regimes of truth.

**Jæger** 20**00** (Øyvind @ Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute. *Peace and Conflict Studies* 7.2 “Securitizing Russia: Discoursive Practice of the Baltic States” shss.nova.edu/pcs/journalsPDF/V7N2.pdf”, MT)

Security is a field of practice into which subject matters can be inserted as well as exempted. Security is a code for going about a particular business in very particular ways. By labeling an issue a security issue, that is, a threat to security, one legitimises the employment of extraordinary measures to counter the threat, because it threatens security. In other words, security is a self-referential practice that carries its own legitimisation and justification. Security issues are allotted priority above everything else because everything else is irrelevant if sovereignty is lost, the state loses independence and ceases to exist. This makes for the point that it is not security as an objective or a state of affairs that is the crux of understanding security, but rather the typical operations and modalities by which security comes into play, Wæver (1995) notes.15 The typical operations are speech-acts and the modality threat-defence sequences. That is, perceiving and conveying threats and calling upon defence hold back the alleged threat. This is also a self-referential practice with the dynamic of a security dilemma: Defensive measures taken with reference to a perceived threat cause increased sense of insecurity and new calls for defence, and so forth. Wæver’s argument is that this logic is at work also in other fields than those busying themselves with military defence of sovereignty. Moreover, viewing security as a speech act not only makes it possible to include different sectors in a study of security, and thus open up the concept. It also clears the way for resolving security concerns by desecuritising issues which through securitisation have raised the concern in the first place. Knowing the logic of securitisation and pinning it down when it is at work carries the possibility of reversing the process by advocating other modalities for dealing with a given issue unluckily cast as a matter of security. What is perceived as a threat and therefore invoking defence, triggering the spiral, might be perceived of otherwise, namely as a matter of political discord to be resolved by means of ordinary political conduct, (i.e. not by rallying in defence of sovereignty). A call for more security will not eliminate threats and dangers. It is a call for more insecurity as it will reproduce threats and perpetuate a security problem. As Wæver (1994:8)16 puts it:"Transcending a security problem, politicizing a problem can therefore not happen through thematization in terms of security, only away from it." That is what de-securitisation is about. David Campbell (1992) has taken the discursive approach to security one step further. He demonstrates that security is pretty much the business of (state) identity. His argument is developed from the claim that foreign policy is a discourse of danger that came to replace Christianity’s evangelism of fear in the wake of the Westphalian peace. But the effects of a "evangelism of fear" and a discourse of danger are similar – namely to produce a certitude of identity by depicting difference as otherness. As the Peace of Westphalia signified the replacement of church by state, faith by reason, religion by science, intuition by experience and tradition by modernity, the religious identity of salvation by othering evil ("think continually about death in order to avoid sin, because sin plus death will land you in hell"17 –so better beware of Jews, heretics, witches and temptations of the flesh) was replaced by a hidden ambiguity of the state. Since modernity’s privileging of reason erased the possibility of grounding social organisation in faith, it had to be propped up by reason and the sovereign state as a anthropomorphic representation of sovereign Man was offered as a resolution. But state identity cannot easily be produced by reason alone. The problem was, however, that once the "death of God" had been proclaimed, the link between the world, "man" and certitude had been broken (Campbell 1992: 53). Thus ambiguity prevailed in the modernist imperative that every presumption grounded in faith be revealed by reason, and on the other hand, that the privileging of modernity, the state, and reason itself is not possible without an element of faith. In Campbell’s (1992: 54) words: In this context of incipient ambiguity brought upon by an insistence that can no longer be grounded, securing identity in the form of the state requires an emphasis on the unfinished and endangered nature of the world. In other words, discourses of "danger" are central to the discourses of the "state" and the discourses of "man". In place of the spiritual certitude that provided the vertical intensity to support the horizontal extenciveness of Christendom, the state requires discourses of "danger" to provide a new theology of truth about who and what "we" are by highlighting who and what "we" are not, and what "we" have to fear. The mode through which the Campbellian discourse of danger is employed in foreign (and security) policy, can then be seen as practices of Wæverian securitisation. Securitisation is the mode of discourse and the discourse is a "discourse of danger" identifying and naming threats, thereby delineating Self from Other and thus making it clear what it is "we" are protecting, (i.e. what is "us", what is our identity and therefore – as representation – what is state identity). This is done by pointing out danger, threats and enemies, internal and external alike, and – by linking the two (Campbell 1992: 239): For the state, identity can be understood as the outcome of exclusionary practices in which resistant elements to a secure identity on the "inside" are linked through a discourse of danger (such as Foreign Policy) with threats identified and located on the "outside". To speak security is then to employ a discourse of danger inter-subjectively depicting that which is different from Self as an existential threat – and therefore as Other to Self. Securitisation is about the identity of that which is securitised on behalf of, a discursive practice to (re)produce the identity of the state. Securitising implies "othering" difference – making difference the Other in a binary opposition constituting Self (Neumann 1996b: 167). Turning to the Baltic Sea Region, one cannot help noting the rather loose fitting between the undeniable – indeed underscored – state focus in the works of both David Campbell and the Copenhagen School on the one hand, and the somewhat wishful speculations of regionality beyond the state – transcending sovereignty – on the other. Coupling the two is not necessarily an analytical problem. It only makes a rather weak case for regionality. But exactly that becomes a theoretical problem in undermining the very theoretical substance, and by implication – empirical viability – of regionality. There are of course indications that the role of states are relativised in late modern (or post- modern) politics. And there is reason to expect current developments in the security problematique of the Baltic states – firmly connected to the dynamic of NATO’s enlargement – to exert an impact on regional co-operation in the Baltic Sea Region, possibly even on regionality. NATO moving east, engaging Russia and carrying elements of the post-modernist security agenda with it in the process, is likely to narrow the gap between the two agendas. Moreover, since the Baltic states are not included in a first round of expansion, they might in this very fact (failure, some would say) find an incentive for shifting focus from international to regional levels. Involving Poland and engaging Russia, the enlargement of NATO will in fact bring the Alliance as such (not only individual NATO countries as the case has been) to bear increasingly on the regional setting as well as on regional activity. That might add significance to the regional level. It does not, however, necessarily imply that the state as actor and state centric approaches will succumb to regionality. Neither does it do away with the state as the prime referent for, and producer of, collective identity, so central to the approaches of both Wæver and Campbell. But it might spur a parallel to sovereignty. A way out of this theoretical impasse would then be not to stress the either or of regionality/sovereignty, but to see the two as organising principles at work side by side, complementing each other in parallelity rather than excluding one another in contrariety. The Discourse of Danger: The Russian war on Chechnya is one event that was widely interpreted in the Baltic as a ominous sign of what Russia has in store for the Baltic states (see Rebas 1996: 27; Nekrasas 1996: 58; Tarand 1996: 24; cf. Haab 1997). The constitutional ban in all three states on any kind of association with post-Soviet political structures is indicative of a threat perception that confuses Soviet and post- Soviet, conflating Russia with the USSR and casting everything Russian as a threat through what Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985) call a discursive "chain of equivalence". In this the value of one side in a binary opposition is reiterated in other denotations of the same binary opposition. Thus, the value "Russia" in a Russia/Europe-opposition is also denoted by "instability", "Asia", "invasion", "chaos", "incitement of ethnic minorities", "unpredictability", "imperialism", "slander campaign", "migration", and so forth. The opposite value of these markers ("stability", "Europe", "defence", "order", and so on) would then denote the Self and thus conjure up an identity. When identity is precarious, this discursive practice intensifies by shifting onto a security mode, treating the oppositions as if they were questions of political existence, sovereignty, and survival. Identity is (re)produced more effectively when the oppositions are employed in a discourse of in-security and danger, that is, made into questions of national security and thus securitised in the Wæverian sense. In the Baltic cases, especially the Lithuanian National Security Concept is knitting a chain of equivalence in a ferocious discourse of danger. Not only does it establish "[t]hat the defence of Lithuania is total and unconditional," and that "[s]hould there be no higher command, self-controlled combat actions of armed units and citizens shall be considered legal." (National Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 7, Sc. 1, 2) It also posits that [t]he power of civic resistance is constituted of the Nation’s Will and self-determination to fight for own freedom, of everyone citizen’s resolution to resist to [an] assailant or invader by all possible ways, despite citizen’s age and [or] profession, of taking part in Lithuania’s defence (National Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 7, Sc. 4). When this is added to the identifying of the objects of national security as "human and citizen rights, fundamental freedoms and personal security; state sovereignty; rights of the nation, prerequisites for a free development; the state independence; the constitutional order; state territory and its integrity, and; cultural heritage," and the subjects as "the state, the armed forces and other institutions thereof; the citizens and their associations, and; non governmental organisations,"(National Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 2, Sc. 1, 2) one approaches a conception of security in which the distinction between state and nation has disappeared in all-encompassing securitisation. Everyone is expected to defend everything with every possible means.

Our alternative is to reject the security fetishism of the 1AC, their flawed methodology and discourse to eschew the logic of security.

**Critical praxis outweighs policy making- voting affirmative guarantees error replication. Only a radical break from dominant paradigms can avoid becoming a self fulfilling prophecy**

Cheeseman & Bruce 1996 (Graeme, Senior Lecturer at the University of New South Wales, and Robert, Associate Professor in social sciences at Curtin university, “Discourses of Danger & Dread Frontiers”, p. 5-8, MT)

This goal is pursued in ways which are still unconventional in the intellectual milieu of international relations in Australia, even though they are gaining influence worldwide as traditional modes of theory and practice are rendered inadequate by global trends that defy comprehension, let alone policy. The inability to give meaning to global changes reflects partly the enclosed, elitist world of professional security analysts and bureaucratic experts, where entry is gained by learning and accepting to speak a particular, exclusionary language. The contributors to this book are familiar with the discourse, but accord no privileged place to its ‘knowledge form as reality’ in debates on defence and security. Indeed, they believe that debate will be furthered only through a long overdue critical re-evaluation of elite perspectives. Pluralistic, democratically-oriented perspectives on Australia’s identity are both required and essential if Australia’s thinking on defence and security is to be invigorated. This is not a conventional policy book; nor should it be, in the sense of offering policy-makers and their academic counterparts sets of neat alternative solutions, in familiar language and format, to problems they pose. **This expectation is in itself a considerable part of the problem** to be analysed. It is, however, a book about policy, one that **questions how problems are framed by policy-makers**. It challenges the proposition that irreducible bodies of real knowledge on defence and security exist independently of their ‘context in the world’, and it demonstrates how security policy is articulated authoritatively by the elite keepers of that knowledge, experts trained to recognize enduring, universal wisdom. All others, from this perspective, must accept such wisdom or remain outside the expert domain, tainted by their inability to comply with the ‘rightness’ of the official line. But it is precisely the official line, or at least its image of the world, that needs to be problematised. If the critic responds directly to the demand for policy alternatives, without addressing this image, he or she is tacitly endorsing it. **Before engaging in the policy debate the critics need to reframe the basic terms of reference**. This book, then, reflects and underlines the importance of Antonio Gramsci and Edward Said’s ‘critical intellectuals’.15 The demand, tacit or otherwise, that the policy-maker’s frame of reference be accepted as the only basis for discussion and analysis ignores a three thousand year old tradition commonly associated with Socrates and purportedly integral to the Western tradition of democratic dialogue. More immediately, it ignores post-seventeenth century democratic traditions which insist that a good society must have within it some way of critically assessing its knowledge and the decisions based upon that knowledge which impact upon citizens of such a society. This is a tradition with a slightly different connotation in contemporary liberal democracies which, during the Cold War, were proclaimed different and superior to the totalitarian enemy precisely because there were institutional checks and balances upon power. In short, one of the major differences between ‘open societies’ and their (closed) counterparts behind the Iron Curtain was that the former encouraged the critical testing of the knowledge and decisions of the powerful and assessing them against liberal democratic principles. The latter tolerated criticism only on rare and limited occasions. For some, this represented the triumph of rational-scientific methods of inquiry and techniques of falsification. For others, especially since positivism and rationalism have lost much of their allure, it meant that for society to become open and liberal, sectors of the population must be independent of the state and free to question its knowledge and power. Though we do not expect this position to be accepted by every reader, contributors to this book believe that critical dialogue is long overdue in Australia and needs to be listened to. For all its liberal democratic trappings, Australia’s security community continues to invoke closed monological narratives on defence and security. This book also questions the distinctions between policy practice and academic theory that inform conventional accounts of Australian security. One of its major concerns, particularly in chapters 1 and 2, is to illustrate how theory is integral to the practice of security analysis and policy prescription. The book also calls on policy-makers, academics and students of defence and security to think critically about what they are reading, writing and saying; to begin to ask, of their work and study, difficult and searching questions raised in other disciplines; to recognise, no matter how uncomfortable it feels, that what is involved in theory and practice is not the ability to identify a replacement for failed models, but a realisation that terms and concepts – state sovereignty, balance of power, security, and so on – are contested and problematic, and that the world is indeterminate, **always becoming what is written about it.** Critical analysis which shows how particular kinds of theoretical presumptions can effectively exclude vital areas of political life from analysis **has direct practical implications for policy-makers**, academics and citizens who face the daunting task of steering Australia through some potentially choppy international waters over the next few years. There is also much of interest in the chapters for those struggling to give meaning to a world where so much that has long been taken for granted now demands imaginative, incisive reappraisal. The contributors, too, have struggled to find meaning, often despairing at the terrible human costs of international violence. This is why readers will find no single, fully formed panacea for the world’s ills in general, or Australia’s security in particular. There are none. Every chapter, however, in its own way, offers something more than is found in orthodox literature, often by exposing ritualistic Cold War defence and security mind-sets that are dressed up as new thinking. Chapters 7 and 9, for example, present alternative ways of engaging in security and defence practice. Others (chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8) seek to alert policy-makers, academics and students to alternative theoretical possibilities which might better serve an Australian community pursuing security and prosperity in an uncertain world. All chapters confront the policy community and its counterparts in the academy with a deep awareness of the intellectual and material constraints imposed by dominant traditions of realism, but they avoid dismissive and exclusionary terms which often in the past characterized exchanges between policy-makers and their critics. This is because, as noted earlier, attention needs to be paid to the words and the thought processes of those being criticized. A close reading of this kind draws attention to underlying assumptions, showing they need to be recognized and questioned. A sense of doubt (in place of confident certainty) is a necessary prelude to a genuine search for alternative policies. First comes an awareness of the need for new perspectives, **then specific policies may follow.** As Jim George argues in the following chapter, we need to look not so much at **contending policies** as they are made for us **but at challenging ‘the discursive process which gives** [favoured **interpretations of “reality”] their meaning and which direct** [Australia’s] **policy**/analytical/**military responses**’. This process is not restricted to the small, official defence and security establishment huddled around the US-Australian War Memorial in Canberra. It also encompasses much of Australia’s academic defence and security community located primarily though not exclusively within the Australian National University and the University College of the University of New South Wales. These discursive processes are examined in detail in subsequent chapters as authors attempt to make sense of a politics of exclusion and closure which exercises disciplinary power over Australia’s security community. They also question the discourse of ‘regional security’, ‘security cooperation’, ‘peacekeeping’ and ‘alliance politics’ that are central to Australia’s official and academic security agenda in the 1990s. This is seen as an important task especially when, as is revealed, the disciplines of International Relations and Strategic Studies are under challenge from critical and theoretical debates ranging across the social sciences and humanities; debates that are nowhere to be found in Australian defence and security studies. The chapters graphically illustrate how Australia’s public policies on defence and security are informed, underpinned and legitimised by a narrowly-based intellectual enterprise which draws strength from contested concepts of realism and liberalism, which in turn seek legitimacy through policy-making processes. Contributors ask whether Australia’s policy-makers and their academic advisors are unaware of broader intellectual debates, or resistant to them, or choose not to understand them, and why?

### Leadership

#### 1. No motivation for nuclear terror

Francis J. Gavin 10, Professor of International Affairs and Director of the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law, Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, University of Texas at Austin, “Same As It Ever Was,” International Security, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Winter 2009/10), pp. 7–37

A recent study contends that al-Qaida’s interest in acquiring and using nuclear weapons may be overstated. Anne Stenersen, a terrorism expert, claims that “looking at statements and activities at various levels within the al-Qaida network, it becomes clear that the network’s interest in using unconventional means is in fact much lower than commonly thought.”55 She further states that “CBRN [chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear] weapons do not play a central part in al-Qaida’s strategy.”56 In the 1990s, members of al-Qaida debated whether to obtain a nuclear device. Those in favor sought the weapons primarily to deter a U.S. attack on al-Qaida’s bases in Afghanistan. This assessment reveals an organization at odds with that laid out by nuclear alarmists of terrorists obsessed with using nuclear weapons against the United States regardless of the consequences. Stenersen asserts, “Although there have been various reports stating that al-Qaida attempted to buy nuclear material in the nineties, and possibly recruited skilled scientists, it appears that al-Qaida central have not dedicated a lot of time or effort to developing a high-end CBRN capability. . . . Al-Qaida central never had a coherent strategy to obtain CBRN: instead, its members were divided on the issue, and there was an awareness that militarily effective weapons were extremely difficult to obtain.” 57 Most terrorist groups “assess nuclear terrorism through the lens of their political goals and may judge that it does not advance their interests.”58 As Frost has written, “The risk of nuclear terrorism, especially true nuclear terrorism employing bombs powered by nuclear fission, is overstated, and that popular wisdom on the topic is significantly flawed.”59

#### 2. No chance of a terrorist attack

Mueller 11—IR prof at Ohio State. PhD in pol sci from UCLA (2 August 2011, John, The Truth about Al Qaeda, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68012/john-mueller/the-truth-about-al-qaeda?page=show)

As a misguided Turkish proverb holds, "If your enemy be an ant, imagine him to be an elephant." The new information unearthed in Osama bin Laden's hideout in Abbottabad, Pakistan, suggests that the United States has been doing so for a full decade. Whatever al Qaeda's threatening rhetoric and occasional nuclear fantasies, its potential as a menace, particularly as an atomic one, has been much inflated. The public has now endured a decade of dire warnings about the imminence of a terrorist atomic attack. In 2004, the former CIA spook Michael Scheuer proclaimed on television's 60 Minutes that it was "probably a near thing," and in 2007, the physicist Richard Garwin assessed the likelihood of a nuclear explosion in an American or a European city by terrorism or other means in the next ten years to be 87 percent. By 2008, Defense Secretary Robert Gates mused that what keeps every senior government leader awake at night is "the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear." Few, it seems, found much solace in the fact that an al Qaeda computer seized in Afghanistan in 2001 indicated that the group's budget for research on weapons of mass destruction (almost all of it focused on primitive chemical weapons work) was some $2,000 to $4,000. In the wake of the killing of Osama bin Laden, officials now have more al Qaeda computers, which reportedly contain a wealth of information about the workings of the organization in the intervening decade. A multi-agency task force has completed its assessment, and according to first reports, it has found that al Qaeda members have primarily been engaged in dodging drone strikes and complaining about how cash-strapped they are. Some reports suggest they've also been looking at quite a bit of pornography. The full story is not out yet, but it seems breathtakingly unlikely that the miserable little group has had the time or inclination, let alone the money, to set up and staff a uranium-seizing operation, as well as a fancy, super-high-tech facility to fabricate a bomb. It is a process that requires trusting corrupted foreign collaborators and other criminals, obtaining and transporting highly guarded material, setting up a machine shop staffed with top scientists and technicians, and rolling the heavy, cumbersome, and untested finished product into position to be detonated by a skilled crew, all the while attracting no attention from outsiders. The documents also reveal that after fleeing Afghanistan, bin Laden maintained what one member of the task force calls an "obsession" with attacking the United States again, even though 9/11 was in many ways a disaster for the group. It led to a worldwide loss of support, a major attack on it and on its Taliban hosts, and a decade of furious and dedicated harassment. And indeed, bin Laden did repeatedly and publicly threaten an attack on the United States. He assured Americans in 2002 that "the youth of Islam are preparing things that will fill your hearts with fear"; and in 2006, he declared that his group had been able "to breach your security measures" and that "operations are under preparation, and you will see them on your own ground once they are finished." Al Qaeda's animated spokesman, Adam Gadahn, proclaimed in 2004 that "the streets of America shall run red with blood" and that "the next wave of attacks may come at any moment." The obsessive desire notwithstanding, such fulminations have clearly lacked substance. Although hundreds of millions of people enter the United States legally every year, and countless others illegally, no true al Qaeda cell has been found in the country since 9/11 and exceedingly few people have been uncovered who even have any sort of "link" to the organization. The closest effort at an al Qaeda operation within the country was a decidedly nonnuclear one by an Afghan-American, Najibullah Zazi, in 2009. Outraged at the U.S.-led war on his home country, Zazi attempted to join the Taliban but was persuaded by al Qaeda operatives in Pakistan to set off some bombs in the United States instead. Under surveillance from the start, he was soon arrested, and, however "radicalized," he has been talking to investigators ever since, turning traitor to his former colleagues. Whatever training Zazi received was inadequate; he repeatedly and desperately sought further instruction from his overseas instructors by phone. At one point, he purchased bomb material with a stolen credit card, guaranteeing that the purchase would attract attention and that security video recordings would be scrutinized. Apparently, his handlers were so strapped that they could not even advance him a bit of cash to purchase some hydrogen peroxide for making a bomb. For al Qaeda, then, the operation was a failure in every way -- except for the ego boost it got by inspiring the usual dire litany about the group's supposedly existential challenge to the United States, to the civilized world, to the modern state system. Indeed, no Muslim extremist has succeeded in detonating even a simple bomb in the United States in the last ten years, and except for the attacks on the London Underground in 2005, neither has any in the United Kingdom. It seems wildly unlikely that al Qaeda is remotely ready to go nuclear. Outside of war zones, the amount of killing carried out by al Qaeda and al Qaeda linkees, maybes, and wannabes throughout the entire world since 9/11 stands at perhaps a few hundred per year. That's a few hundred too many, of course, but it scarcely presents an existential, or elephantine, threat. And the likelihood that an American will be killed by a terrorist of any ilk stands at one in 3.5 million per year, even with 9/11 included.

#### NATO doesn’t have the military to do anything- it’s totally irrelevant

Alexander Melikishvili- research associate with the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies- 1/26/09, YaleGlobal, NATO’s Double Standards Make for a Hollow Alliance, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/nato%E2%80%99s-double-standards-make-hollow-alliance

The lack of adequate military preparedness is the third factor that makes NATO irrelevant. Russia’s actions in Georgia had direct implications for the European security and underscored the importance of contingency planning on the part of NATO. Since 1995, as a matter of official policy doctrine, NATO has not considered Russia a potential source of military threat. Ironically by bullying Georgia, Russia made its perennial fear of Western military encirclement a self-fulfilling prophecy as NATO is taking steps to ensure the security of its most vulnerable members – the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. It’s long been an open secret that airspace above these countries is protected by only four fighter jets. NATO planners belatedly scramble to devise plans to defend these countries from possible Russian military incursion. Unburdened by the toxic legacy of disagreements over the invasion of Iraq, the Obama administration will have an opportunity to reinvigorate Euro-Atlantic ties by launching a comprehensive overhaul of the alliance. Unless NATO undergoes radical internal consolidation, it risks becoming increasingly vulnerable and ultimately extinct. An integral part of this process must be emphasis on increasing force projection capabilities to strengthen NATO’s deterrent potential. Ever respectful of brute force, the Kremlin should know that the costs of tempering with the tripwires along Russia’s European periphery will outweigh any benefits, both imagined and real.

#### No compliance – states ignore punishments

**Thakore 09 (Neil, “The Failure of International Law: Why the Department of Justice Will Not Prosecute at Guantanamo”** [**http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/2084995/the\_failure\_of\_**](http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/2084995/the_failure_of_) **international\_law\_why\_pg4.html?cat=17”)**

Furthermore, while international law, specifically Geneva Conventions provide specific and clear standards as to what is a violation of international law and what is not, the Conventions do not mention what the appropriate punishment should be. According to the Human Rights Watch World Report, the Convention leaves it to the state to "enact laws to investigate and punish those responsible for war crimes," (Human Rights Watch World Report, International Humanitarian Law and War Crimes). The Geneva Convention leaves it to the administration committing the violation to prosecute themselves. Thus, if the country hypothetically chooses not to prosecute the aggressors in the country, or even hinder the prosecution, it can with fairly easily. The reason, once again, is because not one country has sovereignty over another; therefore, not one country has the right to prosecute another. Therefore, when the government feels the need to commit "enhanced interrogation techniques" in order to protect its citizens, such as the Bush Administration, it does without hesitation.

#### Risk of bioterrorism is extremely low – several constraints

Keller 13 (3-7, Rebecca – Analyst at Stratfor, Post-Doctoral Fellow at University of Colorado at Boulder, 2013, "Bioterrorism and the Pandemic Potential," http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/bioterrorism-and-pandemic-potential)

It is important to remember that the risk of biological attack is very low and that, partly because viruses can mutate easily, the potential for natural outbreaks is unpredictable. The key is having the right tools in case of an outbreak, epidemic or pandemic, and these include a plan for containment, open channels of communication, scientific research and knowledge sharing. In most cases involving a potential pathogen, the news can appear far worse than the actual threat. Infectious Disease Propagation Since the beginning of February there have been occurrences of H5N1 (bird flu) in Cambodia, H1N1 (swine flu) in India and a new, or novel, coronavirus (a member of the same virus family as SARS) in the United Kingdom. In the past week, a man from Nepal traveled through several countries and eventually ended up in the United States, where it was discovered he had a drug-resistant form of tuberculosis, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention released a report stating that antibiotic-resistant infections in hospitals are on the rise. In addition, the United States is experiencing a worse-than-normal flu season, bringing more attention to the influenza virus and other infectious diseases. The potential for a disease to spread is measured by its effective reproduction number, or R-value, a numerical score that indicates whether a disease will propagate or die out. When the disease first occurs and no preventive measures are in place, the reproductive potential of the disease is referred to as R0, the basic reproduction rate. The numerical value is the number of cases a single case can cause on average during its infectious period. An R0 above 1 means the disease will likely spread (many influenza viruses have an R0 between 2 and 3, while measles had an R0 value of between 12 and 18), while an R-value of less than 1 indicates a disease will likely die out. Factors contributing to the spread of the disease include the length of time people are contagious, how mobile they are when they are contagious, how the disease spreads (through the air or bodily fluids) and how susceptible the population is. The initial R0, which assumes no inherent immunity, can be decreased through control measures that bring the value either near or below 1, stopping the further spread of the disease. Both the coronavirus family and the influenza virus are RNA viruses, meaning they replicate using only RNA (which can be thought of as a single-stranded version of DNA, the more commonly known double helix containing genetic makeup). The rapid RNA replication used by many viruses is very susceptible to mutations, which are simply errors in the replication process. Some mutations can alter the behavior of a virus, including the severity of infection and how the virus is transmitted. The combination of two different strains of a virus, through a process known as antigenic shift, can result in what is essentially a new virus. Influenza, because it infects multiple species, is the hallmark example of this kind of evolution. Mutations can make the virus unfamiliar to the body's immune system. The lack of established immunity within a population enables a disease to spread more rapidly because the population is less equipped to battle the disease. The trajectory of a mutated virus (or any other infectious disease) can reach three basic levels of magnitude. An outbreak is a small, localized occurrence of a pathogen. An epidemic indicates a more widespread infection that is still regional, while a pandemic indicates that the disease has spread to a global level. Virologists are able to track mutations by deciphering the genetic sequence of new infections. It is this technology that helped scientists to determine last year that a smattering of respiratory infections discovered in the Middle East was actually a novel coronavirus. And it is possible that through a series of mutations a virus like H5N1 could change in such a way to become easily transmitted between humans. Lessons Learned There have been several influenza pandemics throughout history. The 1918 Spanish Flu pandemic is often cited as a worst-case scenario, since it infected between 20 and 40 percent of the world's population, killing roughly 2 percent of those infected. In more recent history, smaller incidents, including an epidemic of the SARS virus in 2003 and what was technically defined as a pandemic of the swine flu (H1N1) in 2009, caused fear of another pandemic like the 1918 occurrence. The spread of these two diseases was contained before reaching catastrophic levels, although the economic impact from fear of the diseases reached beyond the infected areas. Previous pandemics have underscored the importance of preparation, which is essential to effective disease management. The World Health Organization lays out a set of guidelines for pandemic prevention and containment. The general principles of preparedness include stockpiling vaccines, which is done by both the United States and the European Union (although the possibility exists that the vaccines may not be effective against a new virus). In the event of an outbreak, the guidelines call for developed nations to share vaccines with developing nations. Containment strategies beyond vaccines include quarantine of exposed individuals, limited travel and additional screenings at places where the virus could easily spread, such as airports. Further measures include the closing of businesses, schools and borders. Individual measures can also be taken to guard against infection. These involve general hygienic measures -- avoiding mass gatherings, thoroughly washing hands and even wearing masks in specific, high-risk situations. However, airborne viruses such as influenza are still the most difficult to contain because of the method of transmission. Diseases like noroviruses, HIV or cholera are more serious but have to be transmitted by blood, other bodily fluids or fecal matter. The threat of a rapid pandemic is thereby slowed because it is easier to identify potential contaminates and either avoid or sterilize them. Research is another important aspect of overall preparedness. Knowledge gained from studying the viruses and the ready availability of information can be instrumental in tracking diseases. For example, the genomic sequence of the novel coronavirus was made available, helping scientists and doctors in different countries to readily identify the infection in limited cases and implement quarantine procedures as necessary. There have been only 13 documented cases of the novel coronavirus, so much is unknown regarding the disease. Recent cases in the United Kingdom indicate possible human-to-human transmission. Further sharing of information relating to the novel coronavirus can aid in both treatment and containment. Ongoing research into viruses can also help make future vaccines more efficient against possible mutations, though this type of research is not without controversy. A case in point is research on the H5N1 virus. H5N1 first appeared in humans in 1997. Of the more than 600 cases that have appeared since then, more than half have resulted in death. However, the virus is not easily transmitted because it must cross from bird to human. Human-to-human transmission of H5N1 is very rare, with only a few suspected incidents in the known history of the disease. While there is an H5N1 vaccine, it is possible that a new variation of the vaccine would be needed were the virus to mutate into a form that was transmittable between humans. Vaccines can take months or even years to develop, but preliminary research on the virus, before an outbreak, can help speed up development. In December 2011, two separate research labs, one in the United States and one in the Netherlands, sought to publish their research on the H5N1 virus. Over the course of their research, these labs had created mutations in the virus that allowed for airborne transmission between ferrets. These mutations also caused other changes, including a decrease in the virus's lethality and robustness (the ability to survive outside the carrier). Publication of the research was delayed due to concerns that the results could increase the risk of accidental release of the virus by encouraging further research, or that the information could be used by terrorist organizations to conduct a biological attack. Eventually, publication of papers by both labs was allowed. However, the scientific community imposed a voluntary moratorium in order to allow the community and regulatory bodies to determine the best practices moving forward. This voluntary ban was lifted for much of the world on Jan. 24, 2013. On Feb. 21, the National Institutes of Health in the United States issued proposed guidelines for federally funded labs working with H5N1. Once standards are set, decisions will likely be made on a case-by-case basis to allow research to continue. Fear of a pandemic resulting from research on H5N1 continues even after the moratorium was lifted. Opponents of the research cite the possibility that the virus will be accidentally released or intentionally used as a bioweapon, since information in scientific publications would be considered readily available. The Risk-Reward Equation The risk of an accidental release of H5N1 is similar to that of other infectious pathogens currently being studied. Proper safety standards are key, of course, and experts in the field have had a year to determine the best way to proceed, balancing safety and research benefits. Previous work with the virus was conducted at biosafety level three out of four, which requires researchers wearing respirators and disposable gowns to work in pairs in a negative pressure environment. While many of these labs are part of universities, access is controlled either through keyed entry or even palm scanners. There are roughly 40 labs that submitted to the voluntary ban. Those wishing to resume work after the ban was lifted must comply with guidelines requiring strict national oversight and close communication and collaboration with national authorities. The risk of release either through accident or theft cannot be completely eliminated, but given the established parameters the risk is minimal. The use of the pathogen as a biological weapon requires an assessment of whether a non-state actor would have the capabilities to isolate the virulent strain, then weaponize and distribute it. Stratfor has long held the position that while terrorist organizations may have rudimentary capabilities regarding biological weapons, the likelihood of a successful attack is very low. Given that the laboratory version of H5N1 -- or any influenza virus, for that matter -- is a contagious pathogen, there would be two possible modes that a non-state actor would have to instigate an attack. The virus could be refined and then aerosolized and released into a populated area, or an individual could be infected with the virus and sent to freely circulate within a population. There are severe constraints that make success using either of these methods unlikely. The technology needed to refine and aerosolize a pathogen for a biological attack is beyond the capability of most non-state actors. Even if they were able to develop a weapon, other factors such as wind patterns and humidity can render an attack ineffective. Using a human carrier is a less expensive method, but it requires that the biological agent be a contagion. Additionally, in order to infect the large number of people necessary to start an outbreak, the infected carrier must be mobile while contagious, something that is doubtful with a serious disease like small pox. The carrier also cannot be visibly ill because that would limit the necessary human contact. As far as continued research is concerned, there is a risk-reward equation to consider. The threat of a terrorist attack using biological weapons is very low. And while it is impossible to predict viral outbreaks, it is important to be able to recognize a new strain of virus that could result in an epidemic or even a pandemic, enabling countries to respond more effectively. All of this hinges on the level of preparedness of developed nations and their ability to rapidly exchange information, conduct research and promote individual awareness of the threat.\

**Single instances don’t affect credibility**

Christopher **Fettweis**, professor of political science at Tulane, Credibility and the War on Terror, Winter **2008**, Political Science Quarterly, Ingenta.

**There is** actually **scant evidence that other states ever learn the right lessons**. **ColdWar history contains little reason to believe that the credibility of the superpowers had very much effect on their ability to influence others**. Over the last decade, **a series of major scholarly studies have cast further doubt upon the fundamental assumption of interdependence across foreign policy actions.** **Employing methods borrowed from social psychology** rather than the economics-based models commonly employed by deterrence theorists, Jonathan **Mercer argued that threats are far more independent than is commonly believed and**, therefore, **that reputations are not likely to be formed on the basis of individual actions**. **While policymakers** may **feel** that **their** **decisions send messages about** their basic **dispositions to others, most of the evidence from social psychology suggests otherwise**. **Groups** tend to **interpret the actions of their rivals as situational, dependent upon the constraints of place and time**. Therefore, **they are not likely to form lasting impressions** of irresolution **from single,** independent **events**. Mercer argued that **the interdependence assumption had been accepted on faith, and rarely put to a coherent test; when it was,** it **almost inevitably failed**.

### Judicial Activism

#### Here’s evidence – their internal link article is about Hedges vs. Obama – that case is specifically about capture policy – they don’t legally affect the definition of “support” or “forces”

Davidson 8-18-13 (Lawrence, “In the Matter of Hedges v. Obama,” <http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/08/16/in-the-matter-of-hedges-v-obama/>, Mike)

Back in January of 2012 former war correspondent Christ Hedges and others, including Noam Chomsky and Daniel Ellsberg, filed a lawsuit in federal court challenging the constitutionality of the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and specifically the Act’s Section 1021(b)(2), which allows for indefinite detention by the U.S. military of people “who are part of or substantially support Al Qaeda, the Taliban or associated forces engaged in hostilities against the United States.” This detention denies those held of the ability to “contest the allegations against them because they have no right to be notified of the specific charges against them.” In this suit filed by Hedges et al., the issue in question was the vagueness of the terms “substantially support” and “associated forces.” For instance, could this vagueness lead to apprehension and detention of journalists who publish interviews with members of Al Qaeda or the Taliban? Could it lead to the same treatment against political activists protesting U.S. policies against these or “associated” groups? The case, now designated Hedges v. Obama, was initially heard in New York District Court by Judge Katherine Forrest. The plaintiffs claimed that the NDAA violated the 1st (free speech), 5th (due process as well as the stipulation that people must be able to understand what actions break the law) and 14th (equal protection) Amendments to the Constitution. To address the question Judge Forrest asked the government lawyers if they could assure the court that the activities of the plaintiffs would not result in indefinite detention under the act. If they could give such assurances it would, as far as the judge was concerned, eliminate the plaintiff’s “standing” to challenge the law. The government lawyers refused to give those assurances, and as a result, the judge concluded, “The definitions of ‘substantially supported’ and ‘associated forces’ were so vague that a reporter or activist could not be sure they would not be covered under the provision.” This, in turn, would result in what the plaintiffs considered a “chilling effect on free speech and freedom of the press.” Therefore, in September 2012, the Judge granted a permanent injunction against the practice of indefinite detention as put forth in NDAA.

#### No impact of oil shock on the economy

**Khadduri, 11** (Walid, MEES Consultant, former Middle East Economic Survey Editor-in-Chief, August 23, 2011, “Walid Khadduri: The impact of rising oil prices on the economies of importing nations,” Al Arabiya News, http://english.alarabiya.net/views/2011/08/23/163590.html, Hensel)

What is the impact of oil price shocks on the economies of importing nations? At first glance, there appears to be large-scale and extremely adverse repercussions for rising oil prices. However, a study published this month by researchers in the IMF Working Paper group suggests a different picture altogether (it is worth mentioning that the IMF has not endorsed its findings.) The study (Tobias N. Rasmussen & Agustin Roitman, "Oil Shocks in a Global Perspective: Are They Really That Bad?", IMF Working Paper, August 2011) mentions that “Using a comprehensive global dataset […] we find that the impact of higher oil prices on oil-importing economies is generally small: a 25 percent increase in oil prices typically causes GDP to fall by about half of one percent or less.” The study elaborates on this by stating that this impact differs from one country to another, depending on the size of oil-imports, as “oil price shocks are not always costly for oil-importing countries: although higher oil prices increase the import bill, there are partly offsetting increases in external receipts [represented in new and additional expenditures borne by both oil-exporting and oil-importing countries]”. In other words, the more oil prices increase, benefiting exporting countries, the more these new revenues are recycled, for example through the growth in demand for new services, labor, and commodity imports. The researchers argue that the series of oil price rallies (in 1983, 1996, 2005, and 2009) have played an important role in recessions in the United States. However, Rasmussen and Roitman state at the same time that significant changes in the U.S. economy in the previous period (the appearance of combined elements, such as improvements in monetary policy, the institution of a labor market more flexible than before and a relatively smaller usage of oil in the U.S. economy) has greatly mitigated the negative effects of oil prices on the U.S. economy. A 10 percent rise in oil prices before 1984, for instance, used to lower the U.S. GDP by about 0.7 percent over two to three years, while this figure started shrinking to no more than 0.25 percent after 1984, owing to these accumulated economic changes. This means that while oil price shocks continue to adversely impact the U.S. economy, the latter has managed, as a result of the changes that transpired following the first shock in the seventies, to overcome these shocks, and subsequently, the impact of oil price shocks has become extremely limited compared to previous periods.

#### 93 crises prove no war

Miller ‘00 (Morris, Economist, Adjunct Professor in the Faculty of Administration – University of Ottawa, Former Executive Director and Senior Economist – World Bank, “Poverty as a Cause of Wars?”, Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, Winter, p. 273)

The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis that  
exacerbates poverty and growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. According to a study undertaken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis in twenty-two countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War they concluded that:19 Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ... The severity of economic crisis – as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth - bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes ... (or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence ... In the cases of dictatorships and semidemocracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another).

### Solvency

#### NSC’s relaxed procedural and evidentiary rules undermine commitment to the rule of law – turns the aff

Cole 08, Professor of Law at Georgetown

(David, A CRITIQUE OF “NATIONAL SECURITY COURTS, www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/Critique\_of\_the\_National\_Security\_Courts.pdf)

Most importantly, there is the intrinsic and inescapable problem of definition. Whereas the argument for specialized courts for tax and patent law is that expert judges are particularly necessary given the complex subject-matter, proposals for specialized courts for terrorism trials are based on the asserted need for relaxed procedural and evidentiary rules and are justified on the ground that terrorists do not deserve full constitutional protections. This creates two fundamental constitutional problems. First, justifying departures from constitutional protections on the basis that the trials are for terrorists undermines the presumption of innocence for these individuals. Second, if a conviction were obtained in a national security court using procedural and evidentiary rules that imposed a lesser burden on the government, then the defendant would be subjected to trial before a national security court based upon less of a showing than would be required in a traditional criminal proceeding. The result would be to apply less due process to the question of guilt or innocence, which, by definition, would increase the risk of error. And, if the government must make a preliminary showing that meets traditional rules of procedure and evidence in order to trigger the jurisdiction of a national security court, such a showing would also enable it to proceed via the traditional criminal process.

## 2NC

**A) Error Replication – Hegemony’s goal is to make the nation secure but this recreates the conditions that caused \_\_\_\_ to be perceived as a threat in the first place and triggers a cycle where all actions strive to create security but simply escalate – that’s Jaeger**

**And, the gap of insecurity can never be crossed – their discourse results in destructive international relationships**

**Lifton 3** (Robert J. Lifton, *Superpower Syndrome: America’s Apocalyptic Confrontation with the World*, New York: Nation Books, pg 128-130; MCLOON)

Ironically, superpower syndrome projects the problem of American vulnerability onto the world stage. **A super­power is perceived as possessing more than natural power. (In this sense it comes closer to resembling the comic-strip hero Superman than the Nietzschean Superman)**For a nation, its leaders, or even its ordinary citizens **to enter into the superpower syndrome is to lay claim to omnipo­tence, to power that is unlimited, which is ultimately power over death. At the heart of the superpower syndrome then is the need to eliminate a vulnerability that, as the antithesis of omnipo­tence, contains the basic contradiction of the syndrome. For vulnerability can never be eliminated, either by a nation or an individual. In seeking its elimination, the superpower finds itself on a psychological treadmill. The idea of vul­nerability is intolerable, the fact of it irrefutable. One solu­tion is to maintain an illusion of invulnerability. But the superpower then runs the danger of taking increasingly draconian actions to sustain that illusion. For to do oth­erwise would be to surrender the cherished status of superpower. Other nations have experiences in the world that render them and their citizens all too aware of the essen­tial vulnerability of life on earth.** They also may be influ­enced by religious and cultural traditions (far weaker in the United States) that emphasize vulnerability as an aspect of human mortality. No such reality can be accepted by those clinging to a sense of omnipotence. **At issue is the experience of death anxiety, which is the strongest manifestation of vulnerability.** Such a deep-seated sense of vulnerability can sometimes be acknowl­edged by the ordinary citizens of a superpower, or even at times by its leaders, who may admit, for instance, that there is no guaranteed defense against terrorist acts. But those **leaders** nonetheless **remain committed to elimi­nating** precisely that **vulnerability**—committed, that is, to the illusory goal of invulnerability. **When that goal is** repeatedly **undermined**—whether by large-scale terrorist acts like 9/11, or as at present by militant resistance to American hegemony in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East—**both the superpower and the world it acts upon may become dangerously destabilized.**

**We will never be able to entirely eradicate ‘evil’ from the world – however, their condemnation of terrorism blocks structural analysis of why terrorism exists and locks is into infinite violence.**

**Zulaika** 20**03** (Joesba, Director of the Center for Basque Studies at University of Nevada, Reno. “Reflections and Reports: The Self-Fulfilling Prophecies of Counterterrorism,” Radical History Review 85 (2003) 191-199, Muse, MT)

This is primarily a discourse that substitutes the spectacle of a constant "waiting [End Page 192] for terror" for actual historical temporality. Begoña Aretxaga describes it in the following way: "In contrast to historical time, the structure of this timeless war is characterized by the temporality of waiting, waiting for the next attack. Waiting for the spread of a virus, waiting for the killing of terrorists, waiting . . . as a prolonged moment of suspension and anxiety, of terror transformed into spectacle, of terror that is also a thrill, of terror that focuses and binds into a new sense of patriotic affect." 6 If the Beckettian theater of waiting is so intensely ominous ("it is not if, but when"), if the political manipulations of collective fantasies about nuclearism and savagery can prove so effective, it is hard not to assume that terrorism foretold must become prophecy fulfilled at some point. The army of public officials, experts, journalists, and academics who orchestrate the doom of terrorist futurology are thus vindicated. The events of September 11 are not immune to the possibility that counterterrorism is complicit in creating the very thing it abominates. We mentioned earlier that Sheik Omar, condemned to a New York prison for the rest of his life as the mastermind of the 1993 attack on the WTC, was directly a product of the CIA that recruited him for Reagan's anti-Soviet crusade in Afghanistan and gave him visas to come to the United States. The same pattern fits Osama bin Laden and the Taliban. The United States initially trained and armed them. When the Taliban became a pariah regime, the United States' main ally in the Arab world, Saudi Arabia, gave them primary support. But the blame game leads us at once into what Slavoj Zizek has labeled "the temptation of a double blackmail." 21 Namely, either the unconditional condemnation of Third World evil that appears to endorse the ideological position of American innocence, or drawing attention to the deeper sociopolitical causes of Arab extremism, which ends up blaming the victim. Each of the two positions prove one-sided and false. Pointing to the limits of moral reasoning, Zizek resorts to the dialectical category of totality to argue that "from the moral standpoint, the victims are innocent, the act was an abominable crime; however, this very innocence is not innocent—to adopt such an 'innocent' position in today's global capitalist universe is in itself a false abstraction." 22 This does not entail a compromised notion of shared guilt by terrorists and victims; "the point is, rather, that the two sides are not really opposed, that they belong to the same field. In short, the position to adopt is to accept the necessity of the fight against terrorism, BUT to redefine and expand its terms so that it will include also (some) American and other Western powers' acts." 23 As widely reported at the time, the Reagan administration, led by Alexander Haig, would self-servingly "confuse terrorism with communism." 24 As the cold war was coming to an end, terrorism became the easy substitute for communism in Reagan's black-and-white world. Still, when Haig would voice his belief that Moscow controlled the worldwide terrorist network, the State Department's bureau of intelligence chief Ronald Spiers would react by thinking that "he was kidding." 25 By the 1990s, the Soviet Union no longer constituted the terrorist enemy and only days after the Oklahoma City bombing, Russian president Yeltsin hosted President Clinton in Moscow who equated the recent massacres in Chechnya with Oklahoma City as domestic conflicts. We should be concerned as to what this new Good-versus-Evil war on terror substitutes for. Its consequences in legitimizing the repression of minorities in India, Russia, Turkey, and other countries are all too obvious. [End Page 197] But the ultimate catastrophe is that such a categorically ill-defined, perpetually deferred, simpleminded Good-versus-Evil war echoes and re-creates the very absolutist mentality and exceptionalist tactics of the insurgent terrorists. By formally adopting the terrorists' own game—one that by definition lacks rules of engagement, definite endings, clear alignments between enemies and friends, or formal arrangements of any sort, military, political, legal, or ethical—the inevitable danger lies in **reproducing it endlessly**. One only has to look at the Palestinian-Israeli or the Basque-Spanish conflicts to see how self-defeating the alleged "victories" against terrorism can be in the absence of addressing the causes of the violence. "A war against terrorism, then, mirrors the state of exception characteristic of insurgent violence, and in so doing it reproduces it ad infinitum. The question remains: What politics might be involved in this state of alert as normal state? Would this possible scenario of competing (and mutually constituting) terror signify the end of politics as we know it?" 27 It is either politics or once again the self-fulfilling prophecy of fundamentalist crusaders who will **never be able to entirely eradicate evil from the world.** Our choice cannot be between Bush and bin Laden, nor is our struggle one of "us" versus "them." Such a split leads us into the ethical catastrophe of not feeling full solidarity with the victims of either side—since the value of each life is absolute, "the only appropriate stance is the unconditional solidarity with ALL victims." 28 We must question our own involvement with the phantasmatic reality of terrorism discourse, for "now even the USA and its citizens can be regulated by terrorist discourse. . . . Now the North American territory has become the most global and central place in the new history that terrorist ideology inaugurates." 29 Resisting the temptation of innocence regarding the barbarian other implies an awareness of a point Hegel made and that applies to the contemporary and increasingly globalized world more than ever: evil, he claims, resides also in the innocent gaze itself, perceiving as it does evil all around itself. Derrida equally holds this position. In reference to the events of September 11, he said: "My unconditional compassion, addressed to the victims of September 11, does not prevent me from saying it loudly: with regard to this crime, I do not believe that anyone is politically guiltless." 30 In brief, we are all included in the picture, and these tragic events must make us problematize our own innocence while questioning our own political and libidinal investment in the global terrorism discourse.

**3. Security politics create blowback terrorism, multiple factors prove.**

**Eland** 20**08** (Ivan. Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute. Ph.D. in Public Policy from George Washington University and Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute. “Reverend Wright Is Not Totally Wrong.” May 5. <http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=2182>, MT)

But what about Wright’s implication that **U.S. foreign policy causes blowback terrorism** against the United States? Again, the facts are on his side. Poll after poll **in** the **Arab**/Islamic **world** indicates that **U.S**. political and economic freedoms, technology, and even **culture** **are** **popular in these countries, but U.S. interventionist foreign policy** toward the Middle East **is not**. **Bin Laden** has repeatedly **said** that **he attacks** the United States **because of its occupation** of Muslim lands and its support for corrupt Middle Eastern governments. Finally, **empirical studies have linked U.S. foreign occupation and military interventions with blowback terrorism against the U.S. targets**. The upshot of Rev. Wright’s remarks is that if the United States militarily intervened less overseas, the chickens would not be roosting as much in the U.S. henhouse. It is too bad that Rev. Wright’s largely correct analysis of U.S. foreign policy is being thrown out with his other wacky and bigoted ravings.

**Apocalyptic framing of climate change denies the power of small-scale politics that could actually change consumption patterns that are the root cause of warming.**

**Swyngedouw 10**-Professor of Geography @ the University of Manchester in the School of Environment and Development, PhD entitled “The production of new spaces of production” @ Hopkins University [Erik, Theory, Culture & Society, “Apocalypse Forever? Post-Political Populism and the Spectre of Climate Change,” 5/24/2010, Sage Journals, DKP]

The Desire for the Apocalypse and the Fetishization of CO2 It is easier to imagine the end of the world than to imagine the end of capitalism. (Jameson, 2003: 73) We shall start from the attractions of the apocalyptic imaginaries that infuse the climate change debate and through which much of the public concern with the climate change argument is sustained. The distinct millennialist discourse around the climate has co-produced a widespread consensus that the earth and many of its component parts are in an ecological bind that may short-circuit human and non-human life in the not too distant future if urgent and immediate action to retroﬁt nature to a more benign equilibrium is postponed for much longer. Irrespective of the particular views of Nature held by different individuals and social groups, consensus has emerged over the seriousness of the environmental condition and the precariousness of our socio-ecological balance (Swyngedouw, forthcoming). BP has rebranded itself as ‘Beyond Petroleum’ to certify its environmental credentials, Shell plays a more eco-sensitive tune, eco-activists of various political or ideological stripes and colours engage in direct action in the name of saving the planet, New Age post-materialists join the chorus that laments the irreversible decline of ecological amenities, eminent scientists enter the public domain to warn of pending ecological catastrophe, politicians try to outmanoeuvre each other in brandishing the ecological banner, and a wide range of policy initiatives and practices, performed under the motif of ‘sustainability’, are discussed, conceived and implemented at all geographical scales. Al Gore’s evangelical ﬁlm An Inconvenient Truth won him the Nobel Peace price, surely one of the most telling illustrations of how eco logical matters are elevated to the terrain of a global humanitarian cause (see also Giddens, 2009). While there is certainly no agreement on what exactly Nature is and how to relate to it, there is a virtually unchallenged consensus over the need to be more ‘environmentally’ sustainable if disaster is to be avoided; a climatic sustainability that centres around stabilizing the CO2 content in the atmosphere (Boykoff et al., forthcoming). This consensual framing is itself sustained by a particular scientiﬁc discourse. 1 The complex translation and articulation between what Bruno Latour (2004) would call matters of fact versus matters of concern has been thoroughly short-circuited. The changing atmospheric composition, marked by increasing levels of CO2 and other greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, is largely caused by anthropogenic activity, primarily (although not exclusively) as a result of the burning of fossilized or captured CO2 (in the form of oil, gas, coal, wood) and the disappearance of CO2 sinks and their associated capture processes (through deforestation for example). These undisputed matters of fact are, without proper political intermediation, translated into matters of concern. The latter, of course, are eminently political in nature. Yet, in the climate change debate, the political nature of matters of concern is disavowed to the extent that the facts in themselves are elevated, through a short-circuiting procedure, on to the terrain of the political, where climate change is framed as a global humanitarian cause. The matters of concern are thereby relegated to a terrain beyond dispute, to one that does not permit dissensus or disagreement. Scientiﬁc expertise becomes the foundation and guarantee for properly constituted politics/ policies. In this consensual setting, environmental problems are generally staged as universally threatening to the survival of humankind, announcing the premature termination of civilization as we know it and sustained by what Mike Davis (1999) aptly called ‘ecologies of fear’. The discursive matrix through which the contemporary meaning of the environmental condition is woven is one quilted systematically by the continuous invocation of fear and danger, the spectre of ecological annihilation or at least seriously distressed socio-ecological conditions for many people in the near future. ‘Fear’ is indeed the crucial node through which much of the current environmental narrative is woven, and continues to feed the concern with ‘sustainability’. This cultivation of ‘ecologies of fear’, in turn, is sustained in part by a particular set of phantasmagorical imaginaries (Katz, 1995). The apocalyptic imaginary of a world without water, or at least with endemic water shortages, ravaged by hurricanes whose intensity is ampliﬁed by climate change; pictures of scorched land as global warming shifts the geopluvial regime and the spatial variability of droughts and ﬂoods; icebergs that disintegrate around the poles as ice melts into the sea, causing the sea level to rise; alarming reductions in biodiversity as species disappear or are threatened by extinction; post-apocalyptic images of waste lands reminiscent of the silent ecologies of the region around Chernobyl; the threat of peak-oil that, without proper management and technologically innovative foresight, would return society to a Stone Age existence; the devastation of wildﬁres, tsunamis, diseases like SARS, avian ﬂu, Ebola or HIV, all these imaginaries of a Nature out of synch, destabilized, threatening and out of control are paralleled by equally disturbing images of a society that continues piling up waste, pumping CO2 into the atmosphere, deforesting the earth, etc. This is a process that Neil Smith appropriately refers to as ‘nature-washing’ (2008: 245). In sum, our ecological predicament is sutured by millennial fears, sustained by an apocalyptic rhetoric and representational tactics, and by a series of performative gestures signalling an overwhelming, mind-boggling danger, one that threatens to undermine the very coordinates of our everyday lives and routines, and may shake up the foundations of all we took and take for granted. Table 1 exempliﬁes some of the imaginaries that are continuously invoked. Of course, apocalyptic imaginaries have been around for a long time as an integral part of Western thought, ﬁrst of Christianity and later emerging as the underbelly of fast-forwarding technological modernization and its associated doomsday thinkers. However, present-day millennialism preaches an apocalypse without the promise of redemption. Saint John’s biblical apocalypse, for example, found its redemption in God’s inﬁnite love. The proliferation of modern apocalyptic imaginaries also held up the promise of redemption: the horsemen of the apocalypse, whether riding under the name of the proletariat, technology or capitalism, could be tamed with appropriate political and social revolutions. As Martin Jay argued, while traditional apocalyptic versions still held out the hope for redemption, for a ‘second coming’, for the promise of a ‘new dawn’, environmental apocalyptic imaginaries are ‘leaving behind any hope of rebirth or renewal . . . in favour of an unquenchable fascination with being on the verge of an end that never comes’ (1994: 33). The emergence of newforms of millennialism around the environmental nexus is of a particular kind that promises neither redemption nor realization. As Klaus Scherpe (1987) insists, this is not simply apocalypse now, but apocalypse forever. It is a vision that does not suggest, preﬁgure or expect the necessity of an event that will alter history. Derrida (referring to the nuclear threat in the 1980s) sums this up most succinctly: . . . here, precisely, is announced – as promise or as threat – an apocalypse without apocalypse, an apocalypse without vision, without truth, without revelation . . . without message and without destination, without sender and without decidable addressee . . . an apocalypse beyond good and evil. (1992: 66) The environmentally apocalyptic future, forever postponed, neither promises redemption nor does it possess a name; it is pure negativity. The attractions of such an apocalyptic imaginary are related to a series of characteristics. In contrast to standard left arguments about the apocalyptic dynamics of unbridled capitalism (Mike Davis is a great exemplar of this; see Davis, 1999, 2002), I would argue that sustaining and nurturing apocalyptic imaginaries is an integral and vital part of the new cultural politics of capitalism (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2007) for which the management of fear is a central leitmotif (Badiou, 2007). At the symbolic level, apocalyptic imaginaries are extraordinarily powerful in disavowing or displacing social conﬂict and antagonisms. As such, apocalyptic imaginations are decidedly populist and foreclose a proper political framing. Or, in other words, the presentation of climate change as a global humanitarian cause produces a thoroughly depoliticized imaginary, one that does not revolve around choosing one trajectory rather than another, one that is not articulated with speciﬁc political programs or socio-ecological project or revolutions. It is this sort of mobilization without political issue that led Alain Badiou to state that ‘ecology is the new opium for the masses’, whereby the nurturing of the promise of a more benign retroﬁtted climate exhausts the horizon of our aspirations and imaginations (Badiou, 2008; Žižek, 2008). We have to make sure that radical techno-managerial and socio-cultural transformations, organized within the horizons of a capitalist order that is beyond dispute, are initiated that retroﬁt the climate (Swyngedouw, forthcoming). In other words, we have to change radically, but within the contours of the existing state of the situation – ‘the partition of the sensible’ in Rancière’s (1998) words, so that nothing really has to change.

**Indefinite detention and forward deployed military forces are justified through the lens of biopolitical ‘exception’. Choosing certain actions as ‘defensive’ tactics perpetuate securitization**

**Morrissey 11**, Department of Geography, National University of Ireland, Galway, 2011 (John Morrissey, ‘Liberal lawfare and biopolitics: US juridical warfare in the war on terror’, Geopolitics , 16(2 ): 280 – 305)

Two basic forms of ‘lawfare’ are employed by the United States in its enactment of the war on terror; both of which have a biopolitical focus. The first strategy has been well documented. 1 It involves the indefinite detention and sometimes extraordinary rendition of enemy combatants, legally sanctioned and politically justified by the ‘exceptional’ circumstances of late modern war and terrorist violence. Geography plays a central role in strategy number one: the legal statuses of detainees, whose lives and bodies are cast out and denied basic juridical rights, are bounded, identified and allowed for in extra - territorial spaces throughout the world, from Guantanamo Bay to Bagram Air Force Base. Such exceptional biopolitical spaces are essentially ‘defensive’ and operate at the local scale. On the contrary, the second seldom - discussed legal strategy conditions and protects the US military in ‘offensive’ mode, operates at the national and transnational scale, and involves the careful legal designation and protection of US military personnel in forward deployed areas. 2 This paper is centrally concerned with strategy number two – a strategy that can be defined as ‘forward juridical warfare’ and involves the US military’s mobilization of the law in the waging of war along the ‘new frontiers’ of its war on terror. The paper seeks to expound the legal and biopolitical constitution and operation of the current US military’s forward presence overseas, and begins by drawing on recent work on biopolitics that has sought in various ways to critique the proliferation of practices of liberal lawfare and securitization in our contemporary world.

### 2NC Framework

3. The framework—the judge is an individual determining the most epistemologically effective worldview—

Political reality only comes into being after we describe the world. Thus we have to deal with how the Affirmative represents the world before we can move on to any other question

Blieker 2000 (Roland, Professor of IR at University of Queensland, “Contending Images of World Politics”, p. 227-228, MT)

While the conceptual contours of the postmodern will always remain elusive, the substantial issues that this image of world politics has brought to the forefront have clear and important implications. Critical engagements with modernity have emerged from a dissatisfaction with what Lyotard famously described as a long modern tendency to ground and legitimize knowledge in reference to a grand narrative, that is, a universalizing framework which seeks to emancipate the individual by **mastering the conditions** of life (Lyotard, 1979, pp. 7-9). Even when such a master narrative seems unquestionably desirable, it inevitably **legitimizes and objectivizes** certain interpretations and political agendas, thereby excluding everything that does not fit into its corresponding view of life. Authors who are said to represent a postmodern image of the world politics grapple with the implications that emerge from the prevalence of master narratives in world politics. They challenge the way in which scientific discourses that have emerged from the Cartesian separation of the object and subject mask the constituted dimensions of life. They engage prevalent thinking patterns so that we can see the world from more that one perspective, and that marginalized voices can be brought into the realm of dialogue. This search for epistemological tolerance and inclusion is as much political as it is philosophical. And its practical applicability is – needless to say – virtually unlimited. It is in this sense that, for instance, all feminisms can be thought of as a postmodern’ (Sylvester, 1994, p. 16). The purpose of this essay is not to summarize the great variety of postmodern approaches to the world politics. Several authors have already done so (see for instance, Brown, 1994; Devetak, 1996). The main effort of this essay thus revolves around demonstrating how something termed postmodernism may work. From such a perspective the ‘how’ is as important as the ‘is’. In fact, the ‘how’ becomes the ‘is’ insofar as the nature of something is identified primarily as the process through which it works. The prime task of such an approach consists not of looking at modernity or postmodernity as metaphors of contemporary world politics, but of understanding – and acting upon – the more fundamental recognition that all forms of thought are metaphorical in nature. They cannot be anything else, for language itself is a series of metaphors through which we make sense of the world that surrounds us. And since we need language not only to communicate, but also to form our opinions of social phenomena, we inevitably think, live and politicize through a series of metaphors – that is, through forms of conceptualizing that contain **inevitable gaps** between a representation of an event and the event itself. Various implications follow from an approach that acknowledges the metaphorical nature of our understanding of world politics. At the beginning is perhaps the simple recognition that representation is an essential aspect of the political process. Political reality, F.R. Ankersmit stresses, ‘is’ not first given to us and subsequently represented; **political reality only comes into being after and due to representations’** (1996, pg. 47). What this means for an analysis of world politics is that **before being able to move to any other question, one has to deal with how the representation has structured the object it seeks to represent**.

5. Their framework arguments make violence inevitable by isolating the K by being outside the acceptable realm of political discourse.

DuRand 2003 (Dr. Cliff DuRand is Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at Morgan State University in Baltimore, Maryland.  This paper was presented February 14, 2003 in a public lecture series sponsored by Biblioteca Publica in San Miguel de Allende, Mexico. <http://www.ocf.berkeley.edu/~marto/aip/future.htm>, MT)

The main point I want to make about that era is that the climate of fear was deliberately induced by our political elite in order to mobilize a frightened population into supporting its anti-communist crusade. Republicans and Democrats, conservatives and liberals alike sought to purge Leftists from the political life of the nation so there could be no dissenting voices from a Cold War to  protect capitalism and ensure U.S. hegemony in the world. Never mind that a nuclear arms race made us less secure, that in the name of anti-communism our government sought to crush every progressive movement that emerged anywhere in the world, and that the scope of political discourse at home was limited to a narrow range. A fearful population was willing to accept all this and  more. Fear induced an unquestioning, childlike trust in a political elite that promised to protect us from harm. As the 17th century philosopher Thomas Hobbes well understood, those with sufficient fear for their lives, liberties and property will be willing to turn all that over to an all powerful Leviathan in hopes of finding security. The politics of fear has governed our national life ever since. With the end of the Cold War up until 911, there was a hiatus.  Without a communist bogeyman to scare us with anymore, the national security state was faced with a legitimization crisis. How could it justify its interventions  against Third World countries? How could it justify continued high levels of military expenditures? How could it sustain the powers of an imperial presidency? Without  an enemy, without a threat to fear, how could the political elite mobilize public support? Through the 1990s you could see it grasping for a new enemy for us to fear. A  war on drugs was offered as cover for interventions in the Andean countries and in Panama, even though the problem of drugs had its roots here at home. We were  told to fear crime (at a time when crime rates were actually decreasing) so we would support draconian police and sentencing practices that have given us the  highest prison population in the industrial world. But the most ludicrous of all was the propaganda campaign launched by the Pentagon to try to convince us that we  were threatened by a possible asteroid that could crash into the earth, destroying all life. To protect against that, we needed to develop space laser weapons that  could destroy an oncoming asteroid first. Thus did the military-industrial complex seek to frighten us into supporting the development of star wars weaponry.  But  none of that could quite do what the political elite needed. Finally, in 2001 on September 11 a spectacular mass terrorist crime gave them a new threat for us to fear.  Quickly interpreting it as an act of war rather than a crime, the most reactionary sector of the elite declared war on an undefined enemy - a war without end. They  offered us something new to fear so we would need the protection they claimed to offer. And they have played the politics of fear masterfully. With frequent alerts,  high visibility security measures, constant reminders of vulnerabilities, an atmosphere of fear has been maintained even in the absence of further real attacks. In his  January 29 State of the Union address, George W. Bush fed our fear with these words: "Imagine those 19 hijackers with other weapons and other plans, this time  armed by Saddam Hussein. It would take one vial, one canister, one crate slipped into this country to bring a day of horror like none we have ever known." The  operative word here is 'imagine.' By fueling a fevered imagination, he promotes a "servile fearfulness", to use Shakespeare's phrase.   This has enabled this reactionary sector of the elite to not only win acceptance of unprecedented regressive policies domestically, with passive acceptance by the rest of the elite, but now push through a war against a country that didn't even have anything to do with terrorism.  Again, we can see how fear can be a potent political force in the hands of skilled political leaders.

6. And, you are not a policy-maker—pretending you are causes absolving of individual responsibility—ensures the aff’s impacts are inevitable and link turns their cede the political arguments.

Kappeler 1995 (Susanne, Associate Professor at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Al Akhawayn University, “The Will to Violence”, p. 10-11, MT)

We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of `collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equival ent of a universal acquittal.' On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective `assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility leading to the well-known illusion of our apparent `powerlessness’ and its accompanying phe nomenon, our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens even more so those of other nations have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina or Somalia since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us into thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgement, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls `organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually or ganized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major powermongers: For we tend to think that we cannot `do' anything, say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of `What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as `virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like `I want to stop this war', `I want military intervention', `I want to stop this backlash', or `I want a moral revolution." 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our `non-comprehension’: our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we `are' the war in our `unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the `fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don't' our readiness, in other words, to build ident ities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the `others'. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape `our feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence. “destining” of revealing insofar as it “pushes” us in a certain direction. Heidegger does not regard destining as determination (he says it is not a “fate which compels”), but rather as the implicit project within the field of modern practices to subject all aspects of reality to the principles of order and efficiency, and to pursue reality down to the finest detail. Thus, insofar as modern technology aims to order and render calculable, the objectification of reality tends to take the form of an increasing classification, differentiation, and fragmentation of reality. The possibilities for how things appear are increasingly reduced to those that enhance calculative activities.  Heidegger perceives the real danger in the modern age to be that human beings will continue to regard technology as a mere instrument and fail to inquire into its essence. He fears that all revealing will become calculative and all relations technical, that the unthought horizon of revealing, namely the “concealed” background practices that make technological thinking possible, will be forgotten. He remarks:  The coming to presence of technology threatens revealing, threatens it with the possibility that all revealing will be consumed in ordering and that everything will present itself only in the unconcealedness of standing-reserve. *(QT,* 33) [10](http://www.questiaschool.com/read/108740194)  Therefore, it is not technology, or science, but rather the essence of technology as a way of revealing that constitutes the danger; for the essence of technology is existential*,* not technological. [11](http://www.questiaschool.com/read/108740194) It is a matter of how human beings are fundamentally oriented toward their world vis a vis their practices, skills, habits, customs, and so forth. Humanism contributes to this danger insofar as it fosters the illusion that technology is the result of a collective human choice and therefore subject to human control. [12](http://www.questiaschool.com/read/108740194)

### A2: Perm

3. Cloaking DA - The reasons for pursuing a policy are central to understanding it, we must reject liberal reforms that mask the security apparatus by shifting the frame of debate because they effectively kill critique and sustain security logic.

Burke 2007 (Anthony, Senior Lecturer @ School of Politics & IR @ Univ. of New South Wales, 2007, *Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence*, p. 1-4, MT)

Working between international relations, philosophy, and political and cultural theory, and with those whose daily suffering is most shocking and unbearable in mind, this book thus brings sustained critical attention to the promises and practices of security, ethics and violence as they manifest themselves in the statecraft, foreign policy, diplomacy, terrorism, war-making, geopolitics and strategy of the last few decades. This book does so to sound a warning: that not only are global patterns of insecurity, violence and conflict getting ever more destructive and out of hand, but that the dominant conceptual and policy frameworks we use to understand and respond to them are deeply inadequate and dangerous. Given this danger, the book insists upon a ‘critical’ approach: one that refuses to accept the representations of the world most available to us and apparently most credible, but instead questions the very categories we have used to understand and shape our modernity and its relation to power, violence and existence. Hence none of these things – ethics, violence, security or war – are taken for granted, as if we know what they are and how they fit together. Rather this is a book that asks about the kind of violence that war is, that we think and allow it to be; that asks about the kind of ethics that relates to security and violence, that by turns condemns, demands or exonerates killing; that asks about the violence that we think enables, defends or threatens security; and that asks about the security that conjures violence from its soul, which pushes kindness or cruelty or murder through its veins like a life-giving fluid. It asks if violence is really as rational, ethical and controllable as we believe; if a security that hinges upon violence is tenable or meaningful, and if it can be refigured; and it asks if ethics can offer us a path beyond violence or is in danger of becoming reduced to it. While a concern with ethics, as both a source of hope and danger, is a central theme of the book, it is not based on an approach that brings ‘ethics’, as a fully formed and systematic body of principles, to something that lies outside it: ‘security’, ‘war’ or ‘international relations’. Rather it interrogates the very practical and conceptual structure of these processes, along with ethical 4 reasoning itself, in order to understand the ethical outcomes of various approaches to security and violence even when they claim to be governed by the demands of ethics. Nor are ethics, security and violence the limit of this book’s concerns. It puts significant related ideas under scrutiny: sovereignty, freedom, identity and power. These frameworks are interrogated at the level both of their theoretical conceptualisation and their practice: in their influence and implementation in specific policy contexts and conflicts in East and Central Asia, the Middle East and the 'war on terror', where their meaning and impact take on greater clarity. This approach is based on a conviction that the meaning of powerful political concepts cannot be abstract or easily universalised: they all have histories, often complex and conflictual; their forms and meanings change over time; and they are developed, refined and deployed in concrete struggles over power, wealth and societal form. While this should not preclude normative debate over how political or ethical concepts should be defined and used, and thus be beneficial or destructive to humanity, it embodies a caution that the meaning of concepts can never be stabilised or unproblematic in practice. Their normative potential must always be considered in relation to their utilisation in systems of political, social and economic power and their consequent worldly effects. Hence this book embodies a caution by Michel Foucault, who warned us about the 'politics of truth . . the battle about the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays', and it is inspired by his call to 'detach the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time'. It is clear that traditionally coercive and violent approaches to security and strategy are both still culturally dominant, and politically and ethically suspect. However, the reasons for pursuing a critical analysis relate not only to the most destructive or controversial approaches, such as the war in Iraq, but also to their available (and generally preferable) alternatives. There is a necessity to question not merely extremist versions such as the Bush doctrine, Indonesian militarism or Israeli expansionism, but also their mainstream critiques - whether they take the form of liberal policy approaches in international relations (IR), just war theory, US realism, optimistic accounts of globalisation, rhetorics of sensitivity to cultural difference, or centrist Israeli security discourses based on territorial compromise with the Palestinians. The surface appearance of lively (and often significant) debate masks a deeper agreement about major concepts, forms of political identity and the imperative to secure them. Debates about when and how it may be effective and legitimate to use military force in tandem with other policy options, for example, mask a more fundamental discursive consensus about the meaning of security, the effectiveness of strategic power, the nature of progress, the value of freedom or the promises of national and cultural identity.  As a result, political and intellectual debate about insecurity, violent conflict and global injustice can become hostage to a claustrophic structure of political and ethical possibility that systematically wards off critique.

### LINKS

**Their discourse of the economy as an issue of national security is representative of the marriage of the economy and security by which the state applies it to both social life and the international order.**

**Neocleous** 20**06** (Mark, Professor in the Department of Politics and History at Brunel University “From Social to National Security: On the Fabrication of Economic Order” Security Dialogue 2006; 37; pdf, p. 376-380, MT)

Robert Pollard (1985: 13) has suggested that ‘the concept of “economic security” – the idea that American interests would be best served by an open and integrated economic system, as opposed to a large peacetime military establishment – was firmly established during the wartime period’. In fact, the concept of ‘economic security’ became a concept of *international* politics in this period, becoming liberalism’s strategic weapon of choice and *the* main policy instrument from 1945 (Latham, 1997: 143; Pollard, 1985: 3), but the concept itself had longer history, as we have seen. *Economic* security, in this sense, provides the important link between social and national security. As a weapon of choice, it would be used as diplomatic leverage in arguments for international aid. As one State Department memo of February 1944 put it, ‘the development of sound international economic relations is closely related to the problem of security’ (cited in Pollard, 1985: 13). But, it would also continue to be used to think about the political administration of *internal* order. Hence Roosevelt’s comment in December 1943 that ‘we must plan for, and help to bring about, an expanded economy which will result in more security . . . so that the conditions of 1932 and the beginning of 1933 won’t come back again’ (Roosevelt, 1950b: 574). On security grounds, inside and outside were constantly folding into one another, the domestic and the foreign never quite properly distinguishable. The reason why lay in the kind of economic order that was being secured. Take, as a starting point, the European Recovery Program (ERP, or Marshall Plan). This has generally been understood as a huge economic panacea, ‘saving’ Europe from economic disaster. However, Alan Milward has sug- gested that this conventional reading of the Marshall Plan and US aid tends to accept the picture of postwar Europe on the verge of collapse and with serious social and economic discontent, such that it needed to be rescued by US aid. In fact, excluding Germany, no country was actually on the verge of collapse. There were no bank crashes and very few bankruptcies, and the evidence of a slowdown in industrial production is unconvincing. There is also little evidence of grave distress or a general deterioration in the standard of living. By late 1946, production had roughly equalled prewar levels in all countries except Germany. And yet Marshall Aid came about. Milward argues that the Marshall Plan was designed not to increase the rate of recovery in European countries or to prevent European economies from deteriorating, but to sustain ambitious, new, expansionary economic and social policies in Western European countries (which were already in full bloom conditions). In other words, the Marshall Plan was predominantly designed for political objectives (Milward, 1984; Kolko & Kolko, 1972; Leffler, 1992). This is why the Marshall Plan was so inextricably linked to the Truman Doctrine’s strategy of new global commitment, at the heart of which was the possibility of intervention in the affairs of other countries in order to rebut a perceived worldwide trend away from the ‘system of free enterprise’. The point here is not just that the Marshall Plan was ‘political’. It is fairly clear that the Marshall Plan was multidimensional, and to distinguish reasons that are ‘economic’ from reasons that are ‘political’ misses the extent to which the economic, political and military were entwined. The point is that it was very much a project driven by the ideology of ‘security’. The referent object of ‘security’ in this context is ‘economic order’, viz., capitalist order. The government and the emerging national security bureaucracy saw the major threat as economic – or, at least, the potential of a counter-hegemonic power exploiting economic disorder – as far more important and likely than military confrontation. As Latham (1997: 175) notes, at first glance the idea of military security within a broad context of economic containment appears to be one more dimension of strength within the liberal order. But, in another respect, the project of economic security might itself be viewed as the very force that made military security appear to be necessary. In this sense, the priority given to *economic* security was the driving force behind the US commitment to underwrite military security for Western Europe. More to the point, however, is that the Marshall Plan and Truman Doctrine implied not just a programme for ‘economic security’, but an attempt at *reordering global capital*. And *this* project was also undertaken in the guise of national security. NSC-68, the most significant national security document to emerge in this period, stated that the ‘overall policy at the present time may be described as one designed to foster a world environment in which the American system can survive and flourish’ (National Security Council, 1950: 401). In this sense, we can also read the Bretton Woods institutions, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of 1947, as part and parcel of the security project (Mastanduno, 1998; Pollard, 1985). The key institutions of ‘international order’ in this period invoked a particular vision of order, with a view to reshaping global capital as a means of bringing social order and thus security – political, social and economic – from the communist threat. ‘Communist’, that is, as opposed to ‘Soviet’. Communism, of course, pre-dates and exceeds the Soviet Union. But, the nature of the military threat ascribed to the latter is related to the character of the former as a more gen- eral threat to the system of private property. The implication drawn from this by David Campbell (1992: 159) is that ‘the well-developed antipathy towards communism within the United States stems from the way in which the danger to the private ownership of property it embodies is a code for distinguishing the “civilized” from the “barbaric”’. This, Campbell suggests, is the basis for the interpretive framework that constituted the Soviet Union as a danger independent of its actual military capacity. Thus, the rise of the national security state was not dependent on any supposed military threat posed by the Soviet Union; even the US national security managers correctly identified this at the time as both limited and weak. Indeed, in many ways the Soviet Union was a side issue. NSC-68, the most significant national security document to emerge in this period, stated that the policy of creating a world environment in which the American system can survive and flourish embraces two subsidiary polices: ‘One is a policy which we would probably pursue even if there were no Soviet threat. It is a policy of attempting to develop a healthy international community. The other is the policy of “containing” the Soviet system’. Thus, the document later adds, ‘even if there were no Soviet Union we would face the problem of the free society . . . of reconciling order, security, the need for participation, with the requirements of freedom’ (National Security Council, 1950: 401, 412). The policies would have been followed, then, *even if there were no Soviet threat*. The issue was communism as a threat to private property, and thus to the vision of an ‘economic order’ of the ‘civilized West’; that is, communism as an alternative socio-economic order, not the Soviets as a military threat. And the real danger of this communism was that it might reside *within* the civilized West rather than ‘over there’ in the East. Just as communism was/is a problem of the ‘inside’ as well as the outside, so the security solution had to straddle the domestic and the foreign. The mediating link between inside and outside, the concept through which the attempt to reshape capital could oscillate between the domestic and foreign, the national and international, was ‘economic security’. Just as the doctrine of containment looked to economic aid to produce the necessary resistance to communism in Europe and elsewhere, policies such as the Marshall Plan mirrored the doctrine of containment, with the Truman government seeking to overcome Congressional recalcitrance to the ERP by promoting it as a security measure (Gaddis, 1982; Latham, 1997; Pollard, 1985; Ambrose, 1985). The major National Security Council documents from 1948 through to 1950 all highlight this dimension of the security project. NSC-20/1 (National Security Council, 1948: 102), for example, noted approv- ingly of the role of the ERP in limiting Soviet influence and thereby securing the USA in its objectives, while NSC-68 (National Security Council, 1950: 408) noted that ‘foreign economic policy is . . . an instrument which can power- fully influence the world environment in ways favourable to the security and welfare of this country’, again citing the ERP as a principle feature of the policy. Similarly, the ‘Military Aid Program’ (MAP) to help rearm Western Europe in the light of an emerging NATO was administered by the State Department rather than the Defense Department because MAP’s main pur- pose was to continue the Marshall Plan’s policy of buttressing economic stability and thus political order in Western Europe. The Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 explicitly stated this: ‘Congress recognizes that eco- nomic recovery is essential to international peace and security and must be given clear priority’ (cited in Pollard, 1985: 227–228). And, in conjoining security and economy in such ways, the USA was able to gain ideological support for both the politico-strategic and economic dimensions of liberal order- building. The conceptual consistency between the strategy of economic security and liberal order-building meant that ‘economic security’ could be justified on liberal grounds, emphasizing economic (and thus ‘human’) needs over military ones. The fabrication of the new order of global capital could thus look decidedly liberal and humanitarian, an appearance which helped co-opt the liberal Left into the process and, of course, played on indi- viduals’ desire for personal and ‘social’ security by using notions such as ‘personal freedom’ and ‘social equality’ (Latham, 1997: 144–146). All of this is to suggest that although the late 1940s saw the emergence of what has become known as the ‘national security state’, this emergence was heavily driven by the notion of ‘economic security’. In other words, the emerging global power moved very quickly to reassert the connection between economic and national security: the commitment to the former was simultaneously a commitment to the latter, and vice versa. As the doctrine of national security was being born, the major player on the international stage would aim to use perhaps its most important power of all – its economic strength – in order to fabricate a certain vision of economic order, both inter- nally and internationally. Marx and Engels (1848) once highlighted the historical role of the bourgeoisie in shaping the world according to its own interests, pointing out that the need for a constantly expanding market for its products forces the bourgeoisie across the whole surface of the globe and compels all nations to adopt the bourgeois mode of economic order. From the mid-20th century onwards, this project would increasingly be conducted under the guise of security, through which the USA has seen fit to reorder – either overtly or covertly – the affairs of myriad nation-states, even those with democratically elected governments, and to thereby restructure inter- national order more generally. Far from merely ‘reacting’ or ‘responding’ to events, under the guise of national security, the USA has sought to reshape international society, administering global order according to a security doctrine behind which lies a commitment to capital accumulation.

The protection of oil through securitized techniques will serve as the greatest geopolitical struggle of the 21st century ultimately culminating in the destruction of humanity and the biosphere.

Heinberg 2003 (Richard, Professor New College, recipient of M.K. Hubbert Award for Energy Excellence Education & Senior Fellow at Post-Carbon Institute, “The Party’s Over: Oil, War, and the Fate of Industrial Societies”, 2003, p. 230, MT)

Today the average US citizen uses five times as much energy as the world average. Even citizens of nations that export oil — such as Venezuela and Iran — use only a small fraction of the energy US citizens use per capita. The Carter Doctrine, declared in 1980, made it plain that US military might would be applied to the project of dominating the world’s oil wealth: henceforth, any hostile effort to impede the flow of Persian Gulf oil would be regarded as an “assault on the vital interests of the United States” and would be “repelled by any means necessary, including military force.”23 In the past 60 years, the US military and intelligence services have grown to become bureaucracies of unrivaled scope, power, and durability. While the US has not declared war on any nation since 1945, it has nevertheless bombed or invaded a total of 19 countries and stationed troops, or engaged in direct or indirect military action, in dozens of others.24 During the Cold War, the US military apparatus grew exponentially, ostensibly in response to the threat posed by an archrival: the Soviet Union. But after the end of the Cold War the American military and intelligence establishments did not shrink in scale to any appreciable degree. Rather, their implicit agenda — the protection of global resource interests — emerged as the semi-explicit justification for their continued existence. With resource hegemony came challenges from nations or sub-national groups opposing that hegemony. But the immensity of US military might ensured that such challenges would be overwhelmingly asymmetrical. US strategists labeled such challenges “terrorism” — a term with a definition malleable enough to be applicable to any threat from any potential enemy, foreign or domestic, while never referring to any violent action on the part of the US, its agents, or its allies. This policy puts the US on a collision course with the rest of the world. If all-out competition is pursued with the available weapons of awesome power, the result could be the destruction not just of industrial civilization, but of humanity and most of the biosphere.

**Threat depiction of the environment halts mobilization efforts and ignites backlash – that turns and outweighs the case – any solvency they may claim only exists in a bottle – large comparative analysis takes out their answers**

Trennel, 06 [Paul – Ph.D University of Wales, “The (Im)possibility of Environmental Security”] PDF

The entire rationale behind the move to link the environment to security is a belief that by so doing it is possible to utilise the capacity of security to engineer a greater degree of social mobilization in the quest to meet environmental challenges. As Deudney points out “the aim of these new links is not primarily descriptive, but polemical. It is not a concern about fact but a rhetorical device designed to stimulate action” (1990: 465). In other words, the notion of ‘environmental security’ represents a “motivational strategy” (1991: 195). Therefore, the attempt to conjoin the environment and security can be understood with reference to the Copenhagen School’s conception of security as a performative speech act (Waever, 1995; Buzan ***et al.***, 1998). Under this model when an issue is cast in security terms, or ‘securitized’, social relations are reordered along security lines and a response which transcends normal politics is initiated. The status of attempts to link the environment and security as rhetorical moves undertaken with the desire to alter reality means that the conception of security as a speech act represents the best framework for analysing the environment-security literaturen. It will, therefore, be employed throughout this thesis. From this perspective this I contend that there is a fundamental, and erroneous, assumption underlying ongoing attempts to conceive of the environment as a security issue. I argue that this project is guilty of assuming that the mere linguistic conjunction of ‘environment’ and ‘security’ will produce the mobilization effect which forms the fundamental purpose of the environment-security linkage. This is not necessarily the case. Not every issue referred to in security terms generates an extraordinary response, and thus far the connection of the environment to security has roundly failed to generate large-scale environmental mobilization. A deeper analysis of the dynamics of securitization reveals that ‘security’ only attains the performative capacity to mobilize through a complex political process. I argue, following Thierry Balzaqc (2005) that successful securitization is intersubjective, meaning that in order for mobilization to occur an audience must accept a securitizing actor’s claims and the necessity for an extraordinary response to a problem. As such, securitizing moves must be backed with external evidence of an imminent existential threat to affirm the urgent need for action. Whether or not the environment provides this external dimension is a point of contention. It is my claim that the spatially and temporally distant nature of environmental threats leads to a lack of evidence of environmental destruction in the everyday experience of the target audience of securitizing moves[[1]](#footnote-1). This may prevent the environment from being seen as a pressing existential threat which merits immediate and extraordinary corrective action. I attempt to validate this claim by comparing environmental hazards to other examples of distant suffering such as famine and genocide in order to highlight how suffering which is not immediately proximate and observable to individuals frequently fails to motivate remedial action. The environment too could fall foul of the tendency to ignore suffering which is not accompanied by a proximate physical stimulus and therefore fail to generate mobilization. If it can be shown that the environment is unlikely to sustain large-scale mobilization on security grounds due to the very nature of the threat it poses, then the incentive for linking the environment to security is removed. This would serve to break the academic deadlock over whether and how to connect the environment and security and provide the basis for the project to overcome environmental vulnerability to move beyond security.

Disease is a securitized construct used to fill the lack of threats in the post-Cold War era.

Periera 2008 (Ricardo - PhD candidate in International Politics and Conflict Resolution at the Centre for Social Studies, University of Coimbra, Portugal, “Processes of Securitization of Infectious Diseases and Western Hegemonic Power: A Historical-Political Analysis” PDF, MT)

The end of the Cold War and the global expansion of the neo-liberal model brought about changes more in terms of nature of threat than subject of threat. States as sovereign units are not bound to cause so much preoccupation from a security viewpoint as “non-traditional threats” do: environmental imbalances, religious fanaticism and terrorism, ethnic wars, refugees and other ‘irregular’ migrations, urban insecurities, reductions in energy resources, etc. Often these “new threats” were regarded as risks Western societies had to take for the sake of their own middle-class lifestyle, which one would describe as Western “ontological security.” They are described by Anthony Giddens as “dark side” of globalization, drawing from what Ulrich Beck has called “risk society.” One such risk turned out as actual hazard in September 11, 2001 was global terrorism. With regard to epidemics, risks and effective hazards have pronouncedly been associated with the deterioration of many populations’ living standards in developing countries, particularly in Africa. Phenomena such as “new wars,” i.e. post-Cold War civil wars, and “failed states,” that is, states “unable or unwilling” to offer the residents basic public goods such as food, access to health or public security, have strongly potentiated that negative trend. These phenomena appear as both cause and effect of the threats mentioned above. The human security paradigm emerged in the early 1990s as a political and instrumental response to the problems that “new wars” and “failed states” have posed throughout the post-Cold War era. It embodies the early 1980s ambition of several authors in Security Studies (Homer-Dixon, Ullman, etc.) of enlarging the concept of security in which threat builds less in function of states and more of populations and their well-being. Informing the nascent European defense and foreign security policies and the Middle Powers Initiative, human security has been embedded since the early 1990s in the United Nation’s conflict prevention, peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction missions. It was so defined by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP): “human security can be said to have two main aspects. It means, first, safety from such chronic diseases as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or in communities.” According to this definition, the concept of human security presents itself as an eminently emancipating, pacifist and human rights-centered doctrine. It is in that vein that I believe that it is widely promoted by the activist community, as, for instance, the panel “Human Security and HIV,” coordinated by Alex de Waal, at the 2008 International AIDS Conference in Mexico City confirmed. Yet, Mark Duffield warns us on human security’s two interconnected problems. One problem with the human security paradigm is its ambivalence, since, as one suggested above, it incorporates two rather conflicting agendas, i.e. human rights and security. Duffield argues that “in a single concept the idea of human security […] contains the optimism of sustainable development while, at the same time, it draws attention to the conditions that menace international stability.” Writing about HIV/AIDS, human rights and security, Laurie Garret expresses such tension in these terms: “As vital as the human rights agenda is in the HIV pandemic, however, it ought not to be permitted to befuddle attention to security.” The second problem meets the ethical issue emerging from the induction of a state of exception for a non-military issue. Following 1930s scholarship by Carl Schmitt on the establishment of a state of exception, securitization may jeopardize civil liberties, democratic order and therefore the emancipating horizon of human security. It is relevant to clarify that pathogenic agents only appear as menacing human beings when they, first, infiltrate human ecology and afterwards penetrate and develop themselves within the human body. Thus, those agents as such do not pose any threat. What is actually convertible to a threat status are peoples, societies and, in the last analysis, states. If one perceives detection, prevention, care and eventual cure of populations as the major measures against disease, one defines as security objective the contention, if not the abolition, of the multiplication of the number of people carrying the agent. It also accounts for the social impact that such multiplication feeds and probably provokes. The securitized people are depicted as those “at risk,” “vulnerable,” if not making up “dangerous classes.” In Southern and Eastern Africa they are, among the general population, “orphans and vulnerable children.” In China, India, Russia, and the West, they are drug injectors, migrants, homosexuals and the general mass of “marginalized ones.” Conversely, the securitizing agents tend to be most influent groups in society, where power, according to Williams, is more “‘sedimented’ (rhetorically and discursively, culturally, and institutionally) and structured in ways that make securitizations somewhat predictable and thus subject to probabilistic analysis.”

**The affirmative’s faith in the legal system is misplaced. The prevailing discourse of the law that they engage in is not neutral and objective but rather a discourse of power that serves to prevent marginalized voices from grasping hold of the levers of power. The law itself is indeterminate and the rationalizing criteria the affirmative uses to make their legal argument is an excuse to freeze existing social relations and systems of oppression.**

Robert W**. Gordon**, Professor of Law at Stanford University, **1987** [“Unfreezing Legal Reality: Critical Approaches To Law,” *Florida State University Law Review* (15 Fla. St. U.L. Rev. 195), Summer, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Lexis-Nexis]

Now a central tenet of CLS work has been that the ordinary discourses of law -- debates over legislation, legal arguments, administrative and court decisions, lawyers' discussions with clients, legal commentary and scholarship, etc. -- all contribute to cementing this feeling, at once despairing and complacent, that things must be the way they are and that major changes could only make them worse. Legal discourse accomplishes this in many ways. First by endlessly repeating the claim that law and the other policy sciences have perfected a set of rational techniques and institutions that have come about as close as we are ever likely to get to solving the problem of domination in civil society. Put another way, legal discourse paints an idealized fantasy of order according to which legal rules and procedures have so structured relations among people that such relations may primarily be understood as instituted by their consent, their free and rational choices. Such coercion as apparently remains mdefay be explained as the result of necessity -- either natural necessities (such as scarcity or the limited human capacity for altruism) or social necessities. For example, in a number of the prevailing discourses, the ordinary hierarchies of workplace domination and subordination are explained: (1) by reference to the contractual agreement of the parties and to their relative preferences for responsibility versus leisure, or risk taking versus security; (2) by the natural distribution of differential talents and skills (Larry Bird earns more as a basketball player because he is better); and (3) by the demands of efficiency in production, which are said to require extensive hierarchy for the purposes of supervision and monitoring, centralization of investment decisions, and so forth. There are always some residues of clearly unhappy [\*199] conditions -- undeserved deprivation, exploitation, suffering -- that cannot be explained in any of these ways. The discourses of law are perhaps most resourceful in dealing with these residues, treating them as, on the whole, readily reformable within the prevailing political options for adjusting the structures of ordinary practices -- one need merely fine tune the scheme of regulation, or deregulation, to correct them. But the prevailing discourse has its cynical and worldly side, and its tragic moments, to offset the general mood of complacency. In this mood it resignedly acknowledges that beyond the necessary minimum and the reformable residues of coercion and misery there is an irreducible, intractable remainder -- due to inherent limits on our capacity for achieving social knowledge, or for changing society through deliberate intervention, or for taking collective action against evil without suffering the greater evil of despotic power.

**NATO utilizes a grammar of security and is premised off of maintaining deterrence.**

**Fierke** 20**02** (Karin M., Professor of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews. “Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases” edited by Michael and Keith. Copywrited in 1997, this edition was published in 2002. p. 230-234, MT)

Language games of family structure the public texts of both alliances during the Cold War in slightly different ways. Both rely on a grammar of security, but the structuring rules of each family are different. This does not mean that any one writer is forced to use exactly the same words, but that they draw on a shared language comprising clusters of concepts belonging to a grammar of families and security. The following story illustrates the structure of relationships underlying this versatile grammar at the beginning of the I980s. A main point is that these do not represent the interpretations of individuals but, rather, a public language that reappears again and again and, subsequently, constitutes the identities of NATO and the Warsaw Pact as well as knowledge of what they do. The relationship between the NATO discourse of security and the construction of NATO as a family is evident from the texts of this organization in the early 1980s. The nuclear family of the West is built on a commitment between a stronger partner and a weaker one. The title of one article in the NATO Review, “The Atlantic Family—Managing Its Problems,” names the metaphor directly.10 This family includes partners whose stable relationship is characterized by commitment, faithfulness, duties, responsibilities, common burdens, and obligations. The stronger partner has gotten into the habit of making most of the decisions, however, partly because of his more global responsibilities, in contrast to the primarily domestic responsibilities of the other. This relationship, which “is now an old one,”11 has become no less intense over the years. The partners are bound by what bound them forty years ago, and they would not feel safe if they could not rely on each other. As one partner described it, “their safety and ours are one.”12; “we were with you and are with you now, our hopes are your hopes, your destiny is our destiny.”13 The stable and secure relationship of NATO’S nuclear family is based on a foundation of values and friendship, as well as inequality, given that the two differ in capabilities. The stronger one offers protection and ensures the security of the weaker, who cannot feel secure on her own, in the face of the Soviet Union, who wants to isolate the two, making the feminine partner docile, productive, and supportive. The main objective of the Soviet Union is to split or decouple the partners. The neighboring enemy to the East also refers to its unit as a family, although based on different values. They occupy a home, but it seems to be a very masculine family, fraternal and attached to a fatherland, where everyone is said to be equal. It is a particular kind of individual that is protected by the fraternal family, the laborer, and the socialist system in which he labors. Like NATO, the Soviet Union is concerned with preventing a shattering of the unity of this family by an interference in its domestic space. Poland, in the early I980s, is a key concern precisely because it is the place where this interference is said to be most evident, and a space most vital to the maintenance of international security. Actors in both households are concerned that their unity is being shattered; both are protecting a set of values. This difference in values is said to be the cause of conflict between them. In the West, security was inseparable from the need to secure the space of Western Europe, the securing of a feminine object by a masculine subject, the United States. The relationship was consensual, based on a shared history and culture, and less imposed by the Americans than desired by the Europeans—although the balance between these two was precarious—but the relationship, nonetheless, involved the securing of a larger continental space by an external power. While the Warsaw Pact also presents itself as a family, the Soviet Union actually focuses its gaze, like the United States, on Western Europe and its relationship with the United States. The Soviet Union transforms the hierarchical commitment and need expressed by NATO into the imposed obedience of Western Europe to the diktat of the United States. For the Soviet Union, the Western alliance is a form of imprisonment, done by people overseas, not present, not part of the European continent. While Western Europe was the feminine object that held each superpower’s attention, Eastern Europe lacked any identity whatsoever, largely invisible, nondescript, historically abandoned, visible only as a domestic space in which the West should not interfere. The two family spheres in East and West, as well as the security dilemma constituted between them, were mutually reinforcing, a family feud in which the Other was not to be trusted because of the lack of correspondence between words and deeds. In the early 1980s, both East and West are consumed by the need to keep their families together, in light of a renewed threat from the Other and the activities of a “younger generation,” which begins to question the fundamental values on which each family is based. The naming of oppositional movements as a younger generation is particularly evident in NATO documents, in which the Western peace movement is characterized, among other things, as “immature, naive, and irresponsible.”14 The connotation of this particular label is that these movements are made up of rebellious kids reminiscent of the 1960s.15 Participants in the peace movements have not been necessarily young, however, as various opinion polls have demonstrated.16 This labeling effort on the part of NATO communicates a particular image of these movements and what they are about, that is, overturning a set of values by which peace has been maintained in Europe since World War II. While Eastern European dissidents are cast in less familial terms by state officials, the conflict has been discussed by many as the difference between the World War II generation and those who grew up in the relative wealth and security of the postwar period.17 While the two families are concerned with providing security for their domestic spaces, the younger generation in each house is attempting to emancipate itself from the destructive practices of its respective family. In this sense the critical movements take these language games of security very seriously: while the families claim to provide security, the oppositional movements expose or rename this security as a source of insecurity. Their actions relate to this same grammar of families or intimate relationships, but they make a different move in the game, based on a renaming of the relationship. Emancipation, and the cluster of concepts belonging to it, is a game that can belong to a grammar of families,18 but it is not within the realm of possibility in alliance games based on the permanence of a particular family structure. The structuring role of these concepts is evident in the texts of Solidarity and the Western European peace movement. The central value of the Eastern house is protecting workers in the process of building socialism. Yet as the protector becomes a source of threat to workers, KOR (Worker’s Defence Committee), and later Solidarity in Poland, attempt to expose abuse by the party and state of those rights that the latter has promised to protect, both in its own constitution and in signing the international Helsinki accords. The younger generation is revolting against the oppressive control of the family over all spheres of life and wants to open up a dialogue with the government so that society can take its fate into its own hands, speak with its own voice, and develop its own self-governing and independent institutions. In the West, while the alliance partners claim to be protecting the Western family, the acquisition of more and more sophisticated weapons as well as heightened tensions between the two families are making many feel insecure. While the family names the neighbor as the source of threat, the peace movement names the deployment of a new generation of weapons, as well as nuclear weapons and deterrence in general, as the primary threat. Like Solidarity, the Western peace movement is busy exposing a distinction between the words and the deeds of the older generation. Social movements in both houses are calling for emancipation from a particular form of politics, a politics that has become a source of insecurity. At the international level, talk between the two households, in its present form, serves only to fix the antagonistic relationship between them. The main function of this antagonism, and the negotiations by which it is preserved, is in their view to discipline the younger generation and the alliance partners. That which the alliance names a relationship of security and protection, the Western European peace movement renames a relationship of dependence and submission. They call on Europeans within each alliance to reclaim responsibility for their own lives by taking a more independent role, disengaging from the military side of the relationship, and liberating themselves from the ideology of the Cold War. Common security between East and West requires loosening the hold of the two families and opening up spaces for more voices to speak. The foundations of each bloc enclose two different kinds of families—neighbors who cannot get along because of a difference in values. In both houses the younger generation is making different moves within these family games, pointing out the distinction between the claim to provide security and protection and what is in fact being done. The analysis can be broadened by looking at the relationship between these family games and a structural change over a longer period of time. The structural grammar was recovered from a larger range of documents, involving the same actors, covering the period from 1975 to 1991? when the Soviet Union collapsed. This involved pulling out predicates related to a range of attributes, from ceilings to walls to foundations, as well as a range of possible moves, both active and passive (for instance, maintaining, building, eroding, undermining, restoring, and so on), and attempting to delineate patterns of action attached to specific actors. What follows is a rough sketch of moves in language games by which the structures of the Cold War were dismantled. Following this I will return to the further transformation of both security grammars in the post-Cold War world. DISMANTLING THE COLD WAR STRUCTURES In the mid–1970s, at the height of detente, following the signing of the Helsinki Final Act by the states participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), both superpowers engage in acts of structural maintenance. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization provides a framework that rests on the foundations of deterrence capability and transatlantic ties; NATO is a political structure furnished with military means, a structure whose central task is one of maintaining deterrence, defense capabilities, and the political cohesion that provides the cement of the foundation. Likewise, the socialist family of the Eastern bloc also provides a framework that rests on the foundations of socialist production, Marxism-Leninism, and the unity of the socialist countries. The socialist alliance is the cornerstone of relations between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. As in NATO, maintenance is a central task of the Warsaw Pact, in this case the object of which is socialism, peace, and equilibrium. Detente also provides a framework that needs to be maintained.

## 1NR

### Judicial Activism

#### Prefer our evidence – our studies are the most accurate and comprehensive

**Khadduri, 11** (Walid, MEES Consultant, former Middle East Economic Survey Editor-in-Chief, August 23, 2011, “Walid Khadduri: The impact of rising oil prices on the economies of importing nations,” Al Arabiya News, http://english.alarabiya.net/views/2011/08/23/163590.html, Hensel)

The significance of this study lies in its investigation of the impact of rising oil prices worldwide, especially in developing countries, in contrast with the limited focus on the United States or the Western industrialized countries in other similar available literature. Thus, the researchers draft a comprehensive global portrait of the intertwined relationship between crude oil prices on the one hand, and economic production and international trade on the other. They thus conclude that “the results show that these correlations have, across the world, usually been positive. High oil prices have generally coincided with good times for the world economy, especially in recent years.”

#### No causal relationship – ignores other variables

Niall **Ferguson** (Laurence A. Tisch Professor of History at Harvard University and a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University) **2006** Foreign Affairs, September/October, Vol. 85, Issue 5

**Nor can economic crises explain** the **bloodshed. What may be** the most familiar causal chain **in modern historiography** links **the Great** Depression to the **rise of fascism and the** outbreak of **World** War **II. But** that simple story leaves too much out**.** Nazi **Germany started the war** in Europe only **after its economy had recovered.** Not all **the** countries affected **by the Great Depression** were taken over by fascist regimes, nor did all such regimes start wars of aggression. In fact, no general relationship between economics and conflict is discernible for the century as a whole. Some wars came after periods of growth, others were the causes rather than the consequences of economic catastrophe**, and some** severe economic crises were not followed by wars**.**

### Leadership

#### Terrorists view nukes as counterproductive

Moodie 2**—**headed the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute and served as assistant director for multilateral affairs at the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency**.** president of the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute (Brad Roberts and Michael Moodie, Biological Weapons: Toward a Threat Reduction Strategy, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/DefHor/DH15/DH15.htm)  
The argument about terrorist motivation is also important. Terrorists generally have not killed as many as they have been capable of killing. This restraint seems to derive from an understanding of mass casualty attacks as both unnecessary and counterproductive. They are unnecessary because terrorists, by and large, have succeeded by conventional means. Also, they are counterproductive because they might alienate key constituencies, whether among the public, state sponsors, or the terrorist leadership group. In Brian Jenkins' famous words, terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead. Others have argued that the lack of mass casualty terrorism and effective exploitation of BW has been more a matter of accident and good fortune than capability or intent. Adherents of this view, including former Secretary of Defense William Cohen, argue that "it's not a matter of if but when." The attacks of September 11 would seem to settle the debate about whether terrorists have both the motivation and sophistication to exploit weapons of mass destruction for their full lethal effect. After all, those were terrorist attacks of unprecedented sophistication that seemed clearly aimed at achieving mass casualties--had the World Trade Center towers collapsed as the 1993 bombers had intended, perhaps as many as 150,000 would have died. Moreover, Osama bin Laden's constituency would appear to be not the "Arab street" or some other political entity but his god. And terrorists answerable only to their deity have proven historically to be among the most lethal. But this debate cannot be considered settled. Bin Laden and his followers could have killed many more on September 11 if killing as many as possible had been their primary objective. They now face the core dilemma of asymmetric warfare: how to escalate without creating new interests for the stronger power and thus the incentive to exploit its power potential more fully. Asymmetric adversaries want their stronger enemies fearful, not fully engaged--militarily or otherwise. They seek to win by preventing the stronger partner from exploiting its full potential. To kill millions in America with biological or other weapons would only commit the United States--and much of the rest of the international community--to the annihilation of the perpetrators.

#### Any supposed historical interest in nuclear weapons is bullshit – they will stick to conventional attacks

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The al Qaeda factor The degree to which al Qaeda, the only terrorist group that seems to want to target the United States, has pursued or even has much interest in a nuclear weapon may have been exaggerated. The 9/11 Commission stated that "al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make nuclear weapons for at least ten years," but the only substantial evidence it supplies comes from an episode that is supposed to have taken place about 1993 in Sudan, when al Qaeda members may have sought to purchase some uranium that turned out to be bogus. Information about this supposed venture apparently comes entirely from Jamal al Fadl, who defected from al Qaeda in 1996 after being caught stealing $110,000 from the organization. Others, including the man who allegedly purchased the uranium, assert that although there were various other scams taking place at the time that may have served as grist for Fadl, the uranium episode never happened. As a key indication of al Qaeda's desire to obtain atomic weapons, many have focused on a set of conversations in Afghanistan in August 2001 that two Pakistani nuclear scientists reportedly had with Osama bin Laden and three other al Qaeda officials. Pakistani intelligence officers characterize the discussions as "academic" in nature. It seems that the discussion was wide-ranging and rudimentary and that the scientists provided no material or specific plans. Moreover, the scientists probably were incapable of providing truly helpful information because their expertise was not in bomb design but in the processing of fissile material, which is almost certainly beyond the capacities of a nonstate group. Kalid Sheikh Mohammed, the apparent planner of the 9/11 attacks, reportedly says that al Qaeda's bomb efforts never went beyond searching the Internet. After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, technical experts from the CIA and the Department of Energy examined documents and other information that were uncovered by intelligence agencies and the media in Afghanistan. They uncovered no credible information that al Qaeda had obtained fissile material or acquired a nuclear weapon. Moreover, they found no evidence of any radioactive material suitable for weapons. They did uncover, however, a "nuclear-related" document discussing "openly available concepts about the nuclear fuel cycle and some weapons-related issues." Just a day or two before al Qaeda was to flee from Afghanistan in 2001, bin Laden supposedly told a Pakistani journalist, "If the United States uses chemical or nuclear weapons against us, we might respond with chemical and nuclear weapons. We possess these weapons as a deterrent." Given the military pressure that they were then under and taking into account the evidence of the primitive or more probably nonexistent nature of al Qaedas nuclear program, the reported assertions, although unsettling, appear at best to be a desperate bluff. Bin Laden has made statements about nuclear weapons a few other times. Some of these pronouncements can be seen to be threatening, but they are rather coy and indirect, indicating perhaps something of an interest, but not acknowledging a capability. And as terrorism specialist Louise Richardson observes, "Statements claiming a right to possess nuclear weapons have been misinterpreted as expressing a determination to use them. This in turn has fed the exaggeration of the threat we face." Norwegian researcher Anne Stenersen concluded after an exhaustive study of available materials that, although "it is likely that al Qaeda central has considered the option of using non-conventional weapons," there is "little evidence that such ideas ever developed

into actual plans, or that they were given any kind of priority at the expense of more traditional types of terrorist attacks." She also notes that information on an al Qaeda computer left behind in Afghanistan in 2001 indicates that only $2,000 to $4,000 was earmarked for weapons of mass destruction research and that the money was mainly for very crude work on chemical weapons. Today, the key portions of al Qaeda central may well total only a few hundred people, apparently assisting the Taliban's distinctly separate, far larger, and very troublesome insurgency in Afghanistan. Beyond this tiny band, there are thousands of sympathizers and would-be jihadists spread around the globe. They mainly connect in Internet chat rooms, engage in radicalizing conversations, and variously dare each other to actually do something. Any "threat," particularly to the West, appears, then, principally to derive from self-selected people, often isolated from each other, who fantasize about performing dire deeds. From time to time some of these people, or ones closer to al Qaeda central, actually manage to do some harm. And occasionally, they may even be able to pull off something large, such as 9/11. But in most cases, their capacities and schemes, or alleged schemes, seem to be far less dangerous than initial press reports vividly, even hysterically, suggest. Most important for present purposes, however, is that any notion that al Qaeda has the capacity to acquire nuclear weapons, even if it wanted to, looks farfetched in the extreme. It is also noteworthy that, although there have been plenty of terrorist attacks in the world since 2001, all have relied on conventional destructive methods. For the most part, terrorists seem to be heeding the advice found in a memo on an al Qaeda laptop seized in Pakistan in 2004: "Make use of that which is available … rather than waste valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach." In fact, history consistently demonstrates that terrorists prefer weapons that they know and understand, not new, exotic ones.

#### They have no new recruits and are internally divided

Byman 11—Prof in the Security Studies Program at the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown. Research Director at the Saban Center for M.E. Policy at Brookings (24 May 2011, Daniel, Al Qaeda’s Terrible Spring, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67864/daniel-byman/al-qaedas-terrible-spring)

Still, bin Laden’s demise could not have come at a worse time for al Qaeda. As I wrote in my recent Foreign Affairs article (“Terrorism After the Revolutions” May/June 2011), the Arab Spring posed a direct challenge to al Qaeda’s narrative because it offered a compelling alternative to bin Laden’s message that jihad against the United States and its allies was the key to change in the Arab world. This spring, Arabs, particularly Arab youth, proved that peaceful protest could defeat the region’s autocratic regimes without any of the violence that had tarnished al Qaeda.

Now, not only is bin Laden’s message under assault, the messenger is gone as well -- and al Qaeda appears on the run. And as both his admirers and his enemies readily concede, bin Laden was an impressive leader. He inspired thousands to take up arms and his charisma was well known. His death will surely leave a void within the organization.

Al Qaeda will probably try to regroup under a new leader, but Ayman al-Zawahiri, the presumed next-in-line, lacks bin Laden’s star power. Although intelligent and ruthless, Zawahiri is more apparatchik than visionary, and he has a divisive history within al Qaeda. His years fighting jihad give him street credibility (who else founded his own terrorist group as a teenager?), but no one describes him as charismatic, and he has at times fostered divisions within the jihadist movement. Neither potential funders nor recruits are as ready to flock to him as they were to bin Laden.

The aggressive U.S. drone campaign against al Qaeda leaders will make it even harder for Zawahiri to consolidate control

and lead the organization through the aftermath of the Arab Spring. To cement his position, he would have to give speeches, meet with lieutenants, and build trust within an organization that always depended heavily on personal relationships. Of course, all of these activities, particularly if done on a large scale, would risk exposing Zawahiri to U.S. intelligence. It would be devastating for al Qaeda if he were captured or killed soon after bin Laden’s death. None of the remaining lieutenants are obvious candidates to take over.

Zawahiri may pursue a more cautious approach, but that would entail exercising less control over operations and affiliate groups, such as al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. This would allow senior leaders in al Qaeda’s affiliates to exercise more autonomy, weakening organization’s unity of effort.

In the coming months, al Qaeda will have to be nimble. In my essay, I wrote about the opportunities that the Arab Spring opened up for al Qaeda, even while damaging its message. For example, the organization could exploit civil wars, build a presence in countries in which new regimes do not prioritize expelling jihadis, and take advantage of new governments’ likely reluctance to work with the United States. However, seizing such opportunities will prove more difficult if the organization is focused internally rather than externally.

#### No threatening programs and current defenses solve.

Orent 09 [Wendy, Ph.D. in anthropology from the University of Michigan, leading freelance science writer, and author of Plague: The Mysterious Past and Terrifying Future of the World's Most Dangerous Disease, "America's Bioterror Bugaboo." Los Angeles Times (Los Angeles, CA) 17 Jul 2009: A.29. SIRS Researcher. Web. 29 January 2010]

After the anthrax letter attacks of October 2001, the Bush administration pledged $57 billion to keep the nation safe from bioterror. Since then, the government has created a vast network of laboratories and institutions to track down and block **every remotely conceivable** form of bioterror threat. The Obama administration seems committed to continuing the biodefense push, having just appointed a zealous bioterror researcher as undersecretary of science and technology in the Department of Homeland Security. But is the threat really as great as we've been led to believe? Last summer, the FBI concluded that the anthrax letters that killed five Americans came not from abroad but from an American laboratory, the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases. Meanwhile, the Russian bioweapons program was officially shut down in 1992, and it's unlikely that anything remaining of it could pose much of a threat. Iraq, it has turned out, had no active program. And Al Qaeda's rudimentary explorations were interrupted, according to an Army War College report, by the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan.

#### No interest – religion.

Parachini 03 [John, policy analyst at RAND, Autumn, 2003, The Washington Quarterly, p. L/N]

The third explanation for the paucity of terrorist attacks using unconventional weapons is the technical hurdles involved. The technical capacity of groups to produce or acquire and effectively deliver unconventional weapons varies considerably. Achieving catastrophic outcomes with unconventional weapons requires a considerable scale of operations. Only in a very few cases have groups been able to amass the skills, knowledge, material, and equipment to perpetrate attacks with unconventional weapons on a scale that comes close to that of the danger posed by terrorist attacks with conventional explosives. To date, only Aum Shinrikyo and Al Qaeda have been able to achieve the scale of operations required to mount serious unconventional weapons programs, but even these two groups have encountered difficulties. Aum Shinrikyo, which had considerable financial resources, front companies, and members with scientific talents, failed in all 10 of its biological weapons attacks. n18 Similarly, the group's sarin attack on the Tokyo subway caused roughly the same number of fatalities as the average Palestinian suicide bomber attack. n19 Aside from some minor efforts to develop the toxin ricin, Al Qaeda and its affiliated groups tend to use explosives delivered by suicide attackers as its weapon of choice. During the last 25 years, terrorist attacks with unconventional weapons have inflicted far fewer casualties and fatalities than indiscriminate terrorist bombings or suicide hijackings, n20 the tragic toll of the September 11 attacks being the most pronounced example. In cases where terrorists have used unconventional weapons in the past, they mostly have used crude toxic materials, not sophisticated, military-grade weapons. Aum is the one group that developed a chemical agent that is commonly found in military arsenals. Otherwise, most cases have involved limited efforts to use industrial materials or industrial by-products as weapons. Toxic warfare can pose considerable security challenges, but on balance, these types of threats pale in comparison to the catastrophic terrorist attacks for which government authorities prepare in tabletop exercises. n21 In a survey of 60 tabletop exercises for federal departments and agencies, only a handful involve non -- military-grade weapons agents. An apparent lack of interest on the part of terrorist groups in acquiring unconventional weapons also helps explain why unconventional weapons attacks are so rare. In the case studies on the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the FARC, and Hamas, political vision, practical military utility, and moral codes all restrained them in part from seeking and using unconventional weapons. In some cases, group leaders indicated to members that the use of chemical or biological weapons would not be legitimate to their struggle. Hamas leader Abu Shannab, for one, stated that the use of poison was contrary to Islamic teachings. n22 Although Hamas is a religiously based organization, its struggle to establish a Palestinian state on Israeli territory and to eliminate Israel as a state is decidedly political.

#### Biological weapons won’t be used and won’t cause extinction

**Mueller** **05** (John, Professor of political science at Ohio State University, “Simplicity and Spook: Terrorism and the Dynamics of Threat Exaggeration,” International Studies Perspectives, 6, 208-234)

Properly developed and deployed, biological weapons could indeed, if thus far only in theory, kill hundreds of thousands, perhaps even millions, of people. The discussion remains theoretical because biological weapons have scarcely ever been used even though the knowledge about their destructive potential as weapons goes back decades, even centuries in some respects (the English, e.g., made some efforts to spread smallpox among American Indians in the French and Indian War) (Christopher, Cieslak, Pavlin, and Eitzen, 1997:412). Belligerents have eschewed such weapons with good reason:biological weapons are extremely difficult to deploy and to control. Terrorist groups or rogue states may be able to solve such problems in the future with advances in technology and knowledge, but the record thus far is unlikely to be very encouraging to them. For example, Japan reportedly infected wells in Manchuria and bombed several Chinese cities with plague-infested fleas before and during the Second World War. These ventures may have killedthousands of Chinese, but they apparently also caused thousands of unintended casualties among Japanese troops and seem to have had little military impact.18 In the 1990s, Aum Shinrikyo, a Japanese cult that had some300 scientists in its employ and an estimated budget of $1 billion, reportedly tried at least nine times over 5 years to set off biological weapons by spraying pathogens from trucks and wafting them from rooftops, hoping fancifully to ignite an apocalyptic war. These efforts failed to create a single fatalityin fact,nobody even noticed that the attacks had taken place (Broad, 1998; Rapoport, 1999:57). For the most destructive results, biological weapons need to be dispersed in very lowaltitude aerosol clouds: aerosols do not appreciably settle, and anthrax (which is not easy to spread or catch and is not contagious) would probably have to be sprayed near nose level (Meselson, 1995; Panofsky, 1998; Terry, 1998). Explosive methods of dispersion may destroy the organisms. Moreover, except for anthrax spores, long-term storage of lethal organisms in bombs or warheads is difficult, and, even if refrigerated, most of the organisms have a limited lifetime. The effects of such weapons can take days or weeks to have full effect, during which time they can be countered with civil defense measures. And their impact is very difficult to predict and in combat situations may spread back on the attacker (OTA, 1993:48–49, 62; Broad and Miller, 1998; Easterbrook, 2002).

**Zero data supports the resolve or credibility thesis**

Jonathan **Mercer 13**, associate professor of political science at the University of Washington in Seattle and a Fellow at the Center for International Studies at the London School of Economics, 5/13/13, “Bad Reputation,” <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136577/jonathan-mercer/bad-reputation>

Since then, **the debate about** what to do in **Syria has been sidetracked by discussions of** **how central reputation is to deterrence**, and whether protecting it is worth going to war.

There are two ways to answer those questions: through evidence and through logic. The first approach is easy. **Do leaders assume** that **other leaders who have been irresolute in the past** **will be irresolute in the future** **and that**, therefore, **their threats are not credible?** **No; broad and deep evidence dispels that notion**. In studies of the various political crises leading up to World War I and of those before and during the Korean War, I found that leaders did indeed worry about their reputations. But their worries were often mistaken.

For example, when North Korea attacked South Korea in 1950, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson was certain that America’s credibility was on the line. He believed that the United States’ allies in the West were in a state of “near-panic, as they watched to see whether the United States would act.” He was wrong. When one British cabinet secretary remarked to British Prime Minister Clement Attlee that Korea was “a rather distant obligation,” Attlee responded, “Distant -- yes, but nonetheless an obligation.” For their part, the French were indeed worried, but not because they doubted U.S. credibility. Instead, they feared that American resolve would lead to a major war over a strategically inconsequential piece of territory. Later, once the war was underway, Acheson feared that Chinese leaders thought the United States was “too feeble or hesitant to make a genuine stand,” as the CIA put it, and could therefore “be bullied or bluffed into backing down before Communist might.” In fact, Mao thought no such thing. He believed that the Americans intended to destroy his revolution, perhaps with nuclear weapons.

Similarly, Ted **Hopf, a professor of political science** at the National University of Singapore, has **found** that **the Soviet Union did not think the U**nited **S**tates **was irresolute for abandoning Vietnam**; instead, **Soviet officials were surprised that Americans would sacrifice so much for something the Soviets viewed as tangential to U.S. interests**. And, **in his study of Cold War showdowns**, **Dartmouth** College **professor** Daryl **Press found reputation to have been unimportant**. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviets threatened to attack Berlin in response to any American use of force against Cuba; **despite a long record of Soviet bluff and bluster over Berlin**, **policymakers in the U**nited **S**tates **took these threats seriously**. As **the record shows**, **reputations do not matter**.

1. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)