### 1AC

#### The Enlightenment represented the introduction of European epistemological hegemony-It created a binary thought system in which certain culture count and certain don’t. Postmodernity itself is trapped within that very system.

**Dussel and Fornazzari, 2** [Enrique D., Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the Iztapalapa campus of the Universidd Autonoma Metropolitana, and Alessandro, Associate Professor of Hispanic Studies at UC Riverside, “World-System and “Trans”-Modernity, Nepantla: Views from South, Volume 3, Issue 2, 2002, pp. 221-244, ALB]

Only Two Centuries of European Global Hegemony:

The People Excluded from Modernity¶ European hegemony, principally British and French (although the latter to a lesser extent), was a result of the Industrial Revolution, in turn ideologically based on the “Enlightenment” and “Romanticism.” If we take the French Revolution (1789) as a symbolic starting date, this hegemony, as I have indicated, is just two centuries old. Europe was not always the “end and center of world history,” as Hegel believed; nor did it enjoy, since the prophets of Israel, ethical-political superiority, as Max Weber thought. It had not even been the “center” of the “world-system” since 1492. (As I have already suggested, world-system theory, although a critical position against the “first Eurocentrism” of Hegel or Weber, and against the Eu- ropean “common sense” still prevalent today, can now be considered to be the “second Eurocentrism,” since European hegemony is not five hundred, but only two hundred years old.)¶ The task now is to explain the rise of the West articulated with the decline of the East. This requires a global thinking that overcomes the “second” Eurocentrism. The world-system, which was born as such by an- nexing the “New World” (the Spanish American connection) to the “Old World” (comprised of two extremes: from a disconnected and secondary Europe to a prominent China and Hindustan), moves as a whole, like a heart, with its diastole and systole, whose first palpitation is situated in the East. The decadence of the East allowed the “center” of the world-system to be organized under Western control, although this did not occur instanta- neously or miraculously (in this respect, Wallerstein’s criticism of Frank is correct). This reorganization also did not simply follow the exclusive condi- tions and attributes of previous European history (i.e., contra the method of interpretation that attempted to detect “intrinsically” Europe’s superiority over other cultures). To think “non-Eurocentrically” is to be able [SIC]\* to imag- ine that the Industrial Revolution was Europe’s response to a “vacuum” in the East Asian market, especially China and Hindustan; it is the effect of a structure (China’s being that of an imperial and autocratic state which impeded the triumph of the bourgeoisie) and of a crisis (a multiple political one produced by low salaries, the demographic explosion caused by the economic wealth accumulated since 1400, etc.). This “vacuum” attracted the “possibility” of being “filled” by a European production that had been growing since the fifteenth century. Marx correctly observed that market expansion, like all exchange, can lead to the expansion of production.Given the high European salaries and the low population in the United Kingdom (relative to China and Hindustan) the only solution (i.e., the only way to expand production and lower the proportion of the salary in the value or price of the product) was to increase use of the machine. In a few decades, the machine’s subsumption into the production process (which Marx describes adequately as the necessary means to create “relative surplus value” [see Dussel 2001]) gave Great Britain and France (and eventually all of Northern Europe) a significant comparative advantage over China, Hindustan, the Islamic world, Spanish America, and even Eastern and Southern Europe. This advantage was such that at the beginning of the nineteenth century (that is, by the 1820s, when Hegel gave his Lectures on the Philosophy of History [1970] in Berlin, scarcely five decades after Adam Smith, in The Wealth of Nations [1776], described China as the richest country in the world) all of the “Orient”20 would be seen as merely eternal and miserable “Oriental despotism.”¶ At the same time, Africa was being relegated even lower, as the continent of slaves (a view that ignored Egypt’s being a black African civilization [see Bernal 1987]). During the Berlin Congress of 1885 (little more than a century ago!) Africa would be divided up among the European powers. The South of Europe would remain, in the Eurocentric memory of the (Anglo-Saxon and Germanic) North, a moment of the late “Middle Ages” or the “northern part of Africa” (“Africa begins at the Pyrenees!”), and Latin America, with its indigenous and African population, would be relegated to the status of distant colonial world, on the periphery of the already semiperipheral and preindustrial Spain and Portugal. The “Enlightenment” vision would block off like a cement wall the old “disconnected Europe,” the “Dark Age” Europe that until the fifteenth century, in the most optimistic scenario, was a periphery of the Islamic, Chinese, and Hindustani world—that “Oriental” world, much more “refined” and developed, from all points of view, that was the “cen- ter” of the old world, and the densest part of the world-system until the end of the eighteenth century. From Hegel, Marx, and Comte to Weber— including Freud, Husserl, Heidegger, Popper, Levinas, Foucault, Lyotard, and Habermas—Eurocentrism shines unopposed. And it would dominate the colonial world with the brilliance [brillo] of “Western culture,” as hu- manity’s most developed center “since the beginning” (even though it may be a qualitatively irreplaceable critical conscience, as in the case of Haber- mas until the present).¶ Europeans, in their “civilizing” expansion (“England has trans- formed itself into the missionary of civilization in the world,” Hegel [1970, 538] stated triumphantly), thus felt justified in covering over, excluding, and ignoring as nonexistent all cultures that preceded theirs, as well as those contemporary civilizations (those “peoples without history”) not worthy of notice by “Western Culture.” This process, by which modern Rea- son “excluded,” negated, and confined to “Exteriority” all it considered worthless in terms of the modern values and “universal” criteria of civiliza- tion by which it deemed everything should be evaluated, rapidly extended itself from the beginning of the nineteenth century to all the non-European cultures. The results were surprisingly effective, so much so that those who were negated—given their evident industrial inferiority—applauded through their neocolonial elites (educated in Europe and later in the United States) a Eurocentric ideology that until very recently has had no critical opponent.¶ The exclusion, as a civilizing criterion, of everything non-European also gave Europe—which already had military, economic, and political hegemony—cultural and ideological domination. What was non- European finally disappeared from all practical and theoretical consider- ations. The Spanish and Portuguese (with respect to the first modernity) and the Chinese, the Hindustanis, and the members of the Islamic world, whether from Granada, Cairo, Baghdad, Samarqand, Delhi, Melaka, or Mindanao (with respect to their “centrality” in the Old World and to the be- ginning of the world-system until the end of the eighteenth century) would end up accepting the northern Eurocentric interpretation. Their Western- ized elites, even those leading leftist revolutionary projects, like Mao Ze- dong (is standard Marxism not a modality of Eurocentric expansion?) and, according to Jean-Paul Sartre in his introduction to The Wretched of the Earth, Frantz Fanon, would become peripheral “echoes” of the superiority of Western culture, a vision today globalized by transnational corporations and global financial capital (see Hardt and Negri 2000).¶ In this sense, postmodernity is as Eurocentric as modernity.

**\*Gendered and Abelist language Said in Context**

#### Much more recently, the U.S. has continued this project of frontier violence with its targeted killing missions-The U.S. uses new definitions of borders to justify its actions

Feldman, 11 [Keith P, Assistant Professor, Ethnic Studies, UC Berkeley, “Empire’s Verticality: The Af/Pak Frontier, Visual Culture, and Racialization from Above,” *Comparative American Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 4, December, 325-341, ALB]

How should we think of the relationship between the border of the United States as nation-state and the border of United States as ‘homeland’? How do these borders become defined and where are they extended? How do they draw on and innovate processes of racialization, and what forms do such processes take? These types of questions remain pressing, especially given the advancement, in the name of ‘homeland security’, of a cartography of open-ended counterinsurgency in West and Central Asia, a cartography whose remains, as the ‘Geronimo’ codename for the mission to kill Osama Bin Laden attests, are the residues of a late-nineteenth century settler colonial violence resuscitated in a contemporary project of extraterritorial jurisdiction. The mission initiated by Bill Clinton in the late 1990s and intensified under the war on terror to apprehend Bin Laden, that racialized non-state actor par excellence, has culminated in a targeted killing on the homeland’s globalized frontier, a zone that prominent US diplomat Richard Holbrooke called the ‘ill-defined’ border between Pakistan, a supposed US ally in the war on terror, and Afghanistan, where US empire has been advancing a halting mix of counterinsurgency and ‘nation-building.’ Recall George W. Bush’s pronouncement at the dawn of the Afghanistan invasion in 2001: ‘We’re steady, clear-eyed, and patient, but pretty soon we’ll have to start displaying scalps’ (quoted in Singh, 2006: 71). Almost 10 years later, there is Geronimo, enemy killed in action. ¶ How should we come to see this late-modern resuscitation of frontier violence, a move whose own reiterative logic is strewn across a history of US imperial warfare’s double-voiced linkage of ‘secure’ national borders and their persistent eclipse (Silliman, 2008)? On display in Bin Laden’s assassination have not been images of a mutilated body [SIC]\* extricated from the ambiguous ‘Af/Pak’ frontier, that key site for the performance of Holbrooke’s singular ‘theater of war’. There are no ‘spider holes’ or grainy cell-phone images of death by hanging, a la Saddam Hussein after the US invasion of Iraq. Instead, in the immediate aftermath of Bin Laden’s killing, we are invited to view the widely-circulated photograph of a crowded White House Situation Room, with Barack Obama surrounded by a dozen prominent figures in his administration. They gaze at an off-camera screen whose video content we learn was supplied by feeds from both the Central Intelligence Agency’s RQ-170 ‘Sentinel’ compound where Bin Alden was located and killed, and the cameras mounted on the helmets of the Navy SEAL Team 6 operatives penetrating the compound’s fortifications (see Figure I). ¶ In an image variously described in the blogosphere as ‘mesmerizing’ and ‘captivating,’ the target of imperial retribution remains just outside the visual field, even as its presence haunts our reading. We are drawn to witness the witnessing of Bin Laden’s assassination, with its spectral performance registered in the attempt to represent the imperial state’s right to extraterritorial killing. ¶ In this way, the Situation Room photography frames sovereign power through the absent presence of late modern warfare’s, and indeed the homeland security state’s, constitutive frontier violence, one whose geography abruptly extended from the ‘ill-defined’ space of the Durand Line to a zone ‘deep’ in one of Pakistan’s urban regions. While this highly-mediated scene captures something new about the present-an innovation I elaborate below-the photograph likewise allows us to see [SIC\* how the production of ambiguous national borders and their modes of racialization are hardly novel. Such forced ambiguity punctuates histories of US imperial sovereignty, whose contours routinely exceed the fiction of a stably-bounded nation-state. Indeed, they were drawn with typical blur in the late-nineteenth US policy to apprehend the Chiricahua Apache Geronimo inside Mexico through what historial Daniel S. Margolies (2011) calls ‘elastic approaches to issues of extraterritorial jurisdiction.’ ¶ The longue duree of the modern colonial world system itself evidences how the geographic homology of nation-state borders promised by the Treaty of Westphalia have stubbornly refused to remain still. Instead, they have been constituted through the persistent reproduction, constellation, and contestation of borders in manifestly unstable relation to one another, an instability indexed by the infusion of the ‘internalized’ circumscription of political life under transatlantic slavery and indigenous genocide (Mbembe, 2003; Mignolo, 2000; Sexton 2010). Analyses premised on this insight are obliged to track carefully histories of imperial sovereignty’s shifting categories and moving parts whose designated borders at any one time were not necessarily the force fields in which they operated’ (Stoler, 2006: 138).

\*Ableist Language Said in Context

**Drones and other targeted killings demand a new way for us to conceptualize of racialization**

Feldman, 11 [Keith P, Assistant Professor, Ethnic Studies, UC Berkeley, “Empire’s Verticality: The Af/Pak Frontier, Visual Culture, and Racialization from Above,” *Comparative American Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 4, December, 325-341, ALB]

Under contemporary regimes of homeland security, racialization on the ground has been supplemented by a differentially-embodied vertical vector of racialization, what I call racialization from above. This ‘politics of verticality’ leaves behind the strategic outposts of the border crossing, the fence, the check point, the guard tower, the high ground, and the hilltop as it heads skyward (Weizman, 2007). A particularly prominent technology of racialization from above has been condensed in the assemblage of aerial surveillance, policing, and state-sanctioned killing known as the unmanned [SIC]\* aircraft system (UAS). By fusing visuality, pre-emption, and a disregard for territorial sovereignty, unmanned aerial systems have become among the most popular technologies of the homeland security state. While more than 40 countries have developed UAS capacities in the past hundred years, the last decade has seen massive growth in these machines of death-dealing, with scholars and policy-making predicting widespread expansion in the years ahead. Under the auspices of security, they have been deployed across police, surveillance, and military theaters. While the ‘screening’ of warfare is intimately linked to technological developments in what James Der Derian calls the ‘military-industrial-media-entertainment network,’ assuming that unmanned (sic) aerial systems leave either the human or territory behind when they head skyward misses the centrality of visual perception so important to racialization from above (Der Derian, 2001). As Derek Gregory has recently explicated, a network of over 180 people are involved in any single mission, including ‘pilots,’ ‘sensor’ operators, mission controllers, senior commanders, intelligence officers, military lawyers, data analysts, and image technicians-as well as those military personnel ‘in theater’ (in press). Many of these actors train their gaze on a collage of video screens whose content is generated by infrared and daylight color TV cameras, satellite mappings, and laser rangefinders. This ‘human element,’ the military emphasizes, ‘is at the core of the overall system’ (*Eyes of the Army*, 2010: 9). ¶ As with all racial geographies, the temporal trails quietly alongside the spatial. Boundaries between civilization and barbarism, whiteness and non-whiteness, human and inhuman, are buttressed by asynchronous and even extra-temporal (out of time) temporalities whose past-tense grammar limns the elsewhere of racialized difference. Racial naturalism and racial historicism are the most notable forms here, differentiating populations based upon a highly-constructed framing of a past-tense relation to present political, cultural, and ontological norms (Goldberg, 2002). US empire’s liberal ideologies-of the ‘white man’s burden’ at the turn of the twentieth century, the ‘development’ and ‘modernization’ projects at mid-century, the color-blind arguments at century’s end, and the human rights strains in the war on terror-all hinge on such notion of history’s waiting room and its varied racialized exclusions (McAlister, 2001; Mills, 1997; Murphy, 2010; Singh, 2006.) Under the homeland security state, however, the waiting room has become infiltrated by threat and risk. To address this, racialization from above weaves permanently temporary observation into permanently temporary warfare, with ‘endurance’ its organizing chromos (Weizman, 2007). A future anterior grammar of pre-emption provides the temporal frame for the raciality of the war on terror, whose substantial differentiation from earlier forms of colonial warfare- where accumulation by dispossession was accomplished through extraterritorial conquest and settlement from without-brings to bear geographic ambiguities made sensible only through preventing what ‘will have been’ (Goldberg, 2008; Harvey, 2005; Pease, 2009). The war on terror seizes on that which appears as imminent, as probable, as possible. While questions of territorial sovereignty animate the predictable rhythm of oscillating troop deployments and withdrawals, they remain irresolvable when the horizon of war-making is always-already marked by an open-ended and indefinite futurity.

\*Gendered Language Said in Context

**Important to any study of decoloniality is a recognition that the problem is epistemological and not just material-The entire targeted killing system is justified based on modernity and the thought processes that enable coloniality**

Feldman, 11 [Keith P, Assistant Professor, Ethnic Studies, UC Berkeley, “Empire’s Verticality: The Af/Pak Frontier, Visual Culture, and Racialization from Above,” *Comparative American Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 4, December, 325-341, ALB]

Intensified as part of the raciality of the war on terror is its peculiarly ‘Muslim’ target. Since the time of the Spanish Inquisition, as Junaid Rana reminds us, processes of Muslim racialization have invested the visual with a heightened truth-regime meant to extract the purported core identity of its racial object through sustained visual scrutiny. The kernel of truth embodied in the ‘Islamist’ or ‘radical fundamentalist’ or Jihadi has required intensified forms of seeing that collapse sartorial, physiognomic, and behavioral signifiers into a racial threat. ‘Profiling the racialized Muslim,’ writes Rana, ‘means imagining levels of terror potential intertwined as fields of visible identity’ (2011: 54.) The identification of such a threat draws on the broader visual register of racialization, whose dialectical relationship was captured in Frantz Fanon’s signal phrase describing race-making’s colonial interpellation: ‘Look, a Negro; I’m scared!’ This practice of hailing, according to Fanon, deploys sight as the primary racial technology to lock a subject in place and force its ontology into a terrifying relation to white supremacy. ¶ In this way, the consolidation of visuality’s regime of truth as a sign of verification under modernity resuscitates the fantasy of ‘precision’ structuring the visual logic of Muslim racialization. The fungible figures of threat that give the raciality of the war on terror its coherence are exposed to the open-ended duration of targeted observation and personal video feeds-creating a video archive that routinely exceeds the capacity of the military to process. These fantasies of logical precision become all the more valued in those sites like ‘Af/Pak,’ whose long history of ambiguous sovereignty is mirrored in the drones beind deployed with little resource to any stably-defined borders of the US homeland security state. Even as Al Qaeda’s deterritorialized organizational structure has propped up the legitimacy narrative necessary for an extraterritorial logic of counterinsurgency, the genealogy of North and South Waziristan’s unruly relation to sovereignty proves a useful object of imperial violence. The very grounded contingencies of the region-its ‘inhuman’ mountainous topography and harsh weather conditions-have been easily and quite literally overcome by the eye of the unmanned [SIC]\* aerial vehicles.

\*Gendered Language Said in Context

These thought processes result in endless cycles of violence where populations are deemed as disposable to either death or life-in-death

Feldman, 11 [Keith P, Assistant Professor, Ethnic Studies, UC Berkeley, “Empire’s Verticality: The Af/Pak Frontier, Visual Culture, and Racialization from Above,” *Comparative American Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 4, December, 325-341, ALB]

This transmutation and persistent eclipse of national borders by the contemporary US homeland security state has at least two key effects. Felicitiously captured in the classic phrase ‘papers, please…’, the ubiquity of borders generates forms of verification meant to stabilize, make legible, and manage the inelecutable plurality of a population. In doing so, they incite the truth-telling desired by the nation-state as increasingly inscrutable-and increasingly surveilled-subjects of power in sites both beyond and beneath the horizon of the national. At the same time, the extension of bordering processes outside the geography of the nation-state creates flexible bio-political zones capable of traversing the globe, in which certain subjects-whose apogee in this case are the human figures in the [US Government] Situation Room photograph, the operators of the unmanned [SIC]\* aerial system, the members of Navy SEAL Team 6, and, if the photograph retains its structure of address, those interpellated into its frame-are invited to occupy categories of life and wield power over the lives of others, while others are banished from sociality to the point of death. I submit that this latter figure, of life-in-death, constitutes the kernel of the raciality of the war on terror. While its genealogy emerges out of forms of settler colonial violence that hails indigenous genocide, manifest destiny, and other products of US imperial sovereignty, at its back [SIC]\* is what Jared Sexton calls the ‘structure of gratuitous violence in which a body is rendered as flesh to be accumulated and exchanged’-that is, the reproduction of the structure of racial slavery (2010:38). Junaid Rana calls this the ‘fungibility of comparative racialization’, which moves swiftly in these socio-spatial processes

\*Gendered and Ableist Language Said in Context

**The topic provides a unique forum for studying the genealogy of imperial intervention-Executive actions done in the name of transparency like targeted killing are EXACTLY what promote this life in death exchange**

**Feldman, 11** [Keith P, Assistant Professor, Ethnic Studies, UC Berkeley, “Empire’s Verticality: The Af/Pak Frontier, Visual Culture, and Racialization from Above,” *Comparative American Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 4, December, 325-341, ALB]

Designating the operation to apprehend Bin Laden with the codename ‘Geronimo’ reveals how certain parts of the globe have been envisioned at the frontier of the US homeland. It is well worth recalling that the Apache warrior, whose name uncannily returns in the present, utilized porous borders between Arizona and Mexico to evade capture, even as the increasingly complex technologies of policing and surveillance devised by those sovereign powers and legitimized by their pursuit were extended into wider social fields, and upon whose incarceration hinged the temporal close of the Indian Wars (Margolies, 2011; Sadowski-Smith, 2008). Likewise, the colonial residues sedimented in the Durand Line between Afghanistan and Pakistan, drawn in the late 1890s to demarcate the border of British rule in the region, and where Bin Laden was presumed to reside, has generated a profound geopolitical ambiguity whose own radical porosity underwrites the legitimating logic to expand the geographical zone of US imperial violence (Gregory, 2011). That the Bin Laden operation was completed outside the Waziristan provinces and instead within a mid-sized city whose jurisdiction falls comfortable under the Pakistani state suggests that the bounds of this kind of violence have likewise remained porous. And that this city is called Abbottabad, named after its founder, British Major James Abbott in 1853, circles us back to another genealogy of imperial intervention, administration, and regulation. ¶ Even as the practices of racialization from above have remained in shadows cast across the Durand Line, to remediate the condition of Bin Laden’s own shadowy existence, the Geronimo operation involved bringing back to earth the veracity of life-in-death. Racialization from above was accomplished through a constellation of ‘pattern of life’ data that could construct a spectral version of Bin Laden’s identity, whose corporeality evaded capture. According to media accounts, his presence in Abbottabad compound was never completely visually verified. Rather, imaging data generated by the Sentinel drone flying several miles overhead and operated out of Langley and Shamsi Airfield suggested there was a resident whose physical size and stature was comparable to Bin Laden’s. Yet given the widespread narrative of Bin Laden’s capacity to wield control over the circulation of his visibility, such ‘partial’ imaging was not permitted to enter the war on terror’s visual archive. Something more, more real, more grounded, was required (Adelman, 2011). ¶ A strange symmetry has obtained between the spectacularized performance of violence in the attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Towers and the subsequent proliferation of staged images of bodies at war: George W. Bush’s ‘Mission Accomplished’ tableau of May 1, 2003 off the coast of San Diego, the tearing down of the Saddam statue in Central Baghdad, the staged torture photographs at Abu Gharib, the disheveled portraits of Saddam and Khaled Sheikh Mohammed (Kaplan, 2011). In the case of the Geronimo operation according to news reports, the Obama Administration ruled out a Hellfire missile strike because the intensity of destruction would not only destroy what was presumed to be a ‘treasure trove’ of intelligence about the inner workings of Al-Qaeda, but the body of Bin Laden itself would become unrecognizable for deploying Navy SEAL Team 6 was to place the ‘human element’ in close contact with its target and capture the image of Bin Laden on camera, and therefore have the option of adding to this archive. ¶ In this way, a different kind of ‘human’ encounter was required, needing a strategy of unmediated proximity whose ‘rush to the intimate’ could adequately respond to 9/11’s wound of punctuated domesticity (Gregory, 2008; Kaplan 2003). Members of Navy SEAL Team 6 wore night-vision contact lenses, ‘cat vision,’ as well as video cameras that reportedly relayed images to the Situation Room. There was, after all, a lot to see. But unlike much of the war on terror’s visual archive, the video feeds whose college was screened in the Situation Room have to date remained unseen. Who sighted the target through guns and cameras remains obscured by a discourse of homeland security, as are the images captured by the cameras themselves. The post-mortem images of Bin Laden himself have received nominal, if highly-restricted, circulation. After a brief public disagreement inside the Obama administration, the CIA made available a portfolio of photographs to select members of Congress, who then proceeded to release statements verifying the existence of the photographs, that they unquestionably contained images of Bin Laden, and also, importantly, that such visual verification was strangely unnecessary. The ability of sovereign power to point to the existence of a visual archive, and hence its truth, without making it visibly seen reproduces the flickering dance of light and shadow that remains an effect of racialization from above.¶ Standing in for a ‘scalp on display’ is the photograph of the White House Situation Room, taken by the official White House photographer Pete Souza and published on the White House’s Flickr photostream, itself lauded as an innovation in executive transparency. We come to know the death of Bin Laden through its absent presence, that just outside the frame he will have been executed. In this ‘mesmierizing,’ ‘captivating’ image, we are asked to identify with the sovereign power of observation. Each gaze is focused on a singular object just outside of the frame, with the exception of Brigadier General Marshall Webb (whose eyes are glued to his laptop.) This concentrated line of sight evokes the unwavering commitment to apprehend Bin Laden, a distinctive feature of the administration’s war policy. The out-of-frame flat-screen monitor collaged with visual data contrasts with the blank laptop computers positioned in front of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Necks crane from the rear of the room for an unobstructed view. Secretary Gates folds his arms across his chest, and while Vice President Joe Biden reclines slightly and watches with the calm demeanor of experience, Obama leans forward with a stare whose intensity was rarely captured in photos. Lips are tightly pursed, save Clinton’s. She has covered her mouth with her hand in what could be called a look of astonishment, dismay, or at least concern. Yet when asked, Clinton says she has ‘absolutely no idea’ what was on screen during that particular moment; she was ‘somewhat sheepishly concerned that it was my preventing one of my early spring allergic coughs. So it may have no meaning whatsoever.’ The Situation Room photograph in this way focuses solely on the bodies of the observers. It calibrates our identification with the sovereign subject for whom the execution provides legitimacy, whose variegated affective response is meant, like Clinton’s remark, to be rendered meaningless, and whose violence remains obfuscated by a fiction of embodied disembodiment [SIC]\*. ¶

\*Ableist Language Said in Context

**And, coloniality is the ULTIMATE form of dehumanization and degradation-It renders value meaningless**

Lugones, 10 [Maria, Associate Professor of Comparative Literature and Philosophy, Interpretation, and Culture and of Philosophy and of Women's Studies at Binghamton University in New York, “Toward a Decolonial Feminism,” *Hypatia*, vol. 25, no. 4, Fall, ALB]

Walter Mignolo begins Local Histories/Global Designs by telling us that ‘‘The main topic of this book is the colonial difference in the formation and trans- formation of the modern/colonial world system’’ (Mignolo 2000, ix). As the phrase ‘‘the colonial difference’’ moves through Mignolo’s writing, its meaning becomes open-ended. The colonial difference is not defined in Local Histories. Indeed, a definitional disposition is unfriendly to Mignolo’s introduction of the concept. So as I present some of the quotes from Mignolo’s text, I am not in- troducing them as his definition of ‘‘the colonial difference.’’ Rather, these quotes guide my thoughts on resistance to the coloniality of gender at the colonial difference from within the complexity of his text.¶ The colonial difference is the space where coloniality of power is enacted. (Mignolo 2000, ix)¶ Once coloniality of power is introduced into the analysis, the ‘‘colonial difference’’ becomes visible, and the epistemological fractures between the Eurocentric critique of Eurocentrism is distinguished from the critique of Eurocentrism, anchored in the colonial difference. . . . (37)¶ I have prepared us to hear these assertions. One can look at the colonial past and, as an observer, see the natives negotiating the introduction of foreign beliefs and practices as well as negotiating being assigned to inferior positions and being found polluting and dirty. Clearly, to see this is not to see the coloniality. It is rather to see people—anyone, really—pressed under difficult circum- stances to occupy demeaning positions that make them disgusting to the social superiors. To see [SIC]\* the coloniality is to see [SIC] the powerful reduction of human beings to animals, to inferiors by nature, in a schizoid [SIC] understanding of reality that dichotomizes the human from nature, the human from the non-human, and thus imposes an ontology and a cosmology that, in its power and constitution, disallows all humanity, all possibility of understanding, all possibility of human communication, to dehumanized beings. To see [SIC] the coloniality is to see both the jaqi, the persona, the being that is in a world of meaning without dichotomies, and the beast, both real, both vying under different powers for survival. Thus to see [SIC] the coloniality is to reveal the very degradation that gives us two renditions of life and a being rendered by them. The sole possibility of such a being lies in its full inhabitation of this fracture, of this wound, where sense is contradictory and from such contradiction new sense is made anew.¶ [The colonial difference] is the space where local histories in- venting and implementing global designs meet local histories, the space in which global designs have to be adapted, adopted, rejected, integrated, or ignored. (Mignolo 2000, ix)¶ [The colonial difference] is, finally, the physical as well as imag- inary location where the coloniality of power is at work in the confrontation of two kinds of local histories displayed in differ- ent spaces and times across the planet. If Western cosmology is the historically unavoidable reference point, the multiple con- frontations of two kinds of local histories defy dichotomies. Christian and Native American cosmologies, Christian and Amerindian cosmologies, Christian and Islamic cosmologies, Christian and Confucian cosmologies among others only enact dichotomies where you look at them one at a time, not when you compare them in the geohistorical confines of the modern/ colonial world system. (ix)

\*Ableist Language Said in Context

#### And, voting aff is critical to human survival-Only transmodernity and not postmodernity can solve

**Dussel and Fornazzari, 2** [Enrique D., Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the Iztapalapa campus of the Universidd Autonoma Metropolitana, and Alessandro, Associate Professor of Hispanic Studies at UC Riverside, “World-System and “Trans”-Modernity, Nepantla: Views from South, Volume 3, Issue 2, 2002, pp. 221-244, ALB]

Totality’s “exteriority” (a metacategory that Marx proposed with- out making explicit [see Jay 1984]) was consciously and productively created by Emmanuel Levinas (1969). With it, Levinas began the critique of “modern reason” differently than Heidegger and his French successors (such as Jean-François Lyotard and Jacques Derrida). Levinas is one of the initia- tors of French postmodernism, even though he does not adhere to this movement. The metacategory “exteriority” can illuminate an analysis of the cultural “positivity” not included by modernity, an analysis based not on postmodernity’s suppositions but rather on those of what I have called “trans”-modernity. That is to say, exteriority is a process that takes off, originates, and mobilizes [SIC]\* itself from an “other” place (one “beyond” the “world” and modernity’s “Being,” one that maintains a certain exteriority, as figure 2 indicates) than European and North American modernity. From this “exteriority,” negated and excluded by hegemonic Europe’s modern expansion, there are present-day cultures that predate European modernity, that have developed together with it, and that have survived until the present with enough human potential to give birth to a cultural plurality that will emerge after modernity and capitalism. These living and productive cultures, creative and in otherness [di-ferentes], are not just postmodern, since “postmodern” only labels a final stage of modernity. Rather, they are cul- tures that have developed on a “trans”-modern horizon, something beyond the internal possibility of simple modernity. This “beyond” (“trans-”) indi- cates the take-off point from modernity’s exteriority (arrow E in figure 2), that is, from what modernity excluded, denied, ignored as “insignificant,” “senseless,” “barbarous,” as a “nonculture,” an unknown opaque alterity, but at the same time evaluated as “savage,” uncivilized, underdeveloped, inferior, merely “Oriental despotism,” the “Asiatic mode of production,” and so on. These are the diverse names given to the nonhuman, the unre- coverable, the “historyless,” to what will be extinguished by the sweeping advance of Western “civilization” in the process of globalization. Like the tropical jungles with their immense quantity of plants and animals genetically essential for the future of humanity, the majority of humanity’s cultures excluded by modernity (which are not, and will not be, postmodern) and by globalization (because misery is “necessity without money,” without solvency, and therefore is not of the market) retains an immense capacity for and reserve of cultural invention essential for humanity’s survival. This creativity will also be needed if humanity is to redefine its relationship with nature based on ecology and interhuman solidarity, instead of reductively defining it on the solipsistic and schizoid criterion of increasing rates of profit.

\*Ableist Language Said in Context

#### The question becomes what now-The role of the ballot is to determine who best engages in gnosis to rupture the thought processes that allow the racialization-from-above which have justified the killing of Osama bin-Laden and drone strikes.

**Border gnosis is the best approach**

**Alcoff, 7** [Linda Martin, Professor of Philosophy at Hunter College and the CUNY Graduate Center, “Mignolo’s Epistemology of Coloniality,” CR: The New Centennial Review, Volume 7, Number 3, Winter, pp. 79-101, ALB]

That doubled positionality is key to the border’s epistemic resources. If the subaltern simply champions what the West has disparaged, there is a risk that what is being championed is a Western construct, represented through the concepts and imaginary of the colonial world. Yet border thinking is a “double critique” that implies an ability “to think from both traditions and, at the same time, from neither of them” (2000b, 67). If border thinking is what has been repressed from the imaginary of the colonial world-system, then decolonization should not be understood as a move into an entirely different space but as a transformation “of the rigidity of epistemic and territorial frontiers established and controlled by the coloniality of power” (12). Part of the project involves revealing the hybrid character of so-called Western knowledge itself, not in the sense of an internal debate but more in the sense that Le Doeuff has argued, that there is a keen rhetorical attentiveness and mythic content even within the principal domains of logocentrism. Thus border thinking implies a dissolution of borders or at least a transformation of how and where they are identified, rather than border control or an ap- proach that would try to accommodate both sides in a plural hermeneutic.¶ The goal of border thinking is de-subalternizing knowledge itself. This requires getting at the mechanisms by which knowledges are constructed as non-knowledges and non-knowledges are constructed as absolute. Here is where the concepts of gnosis and gnoseology come in. Gnosis is “a term that would take us away from the confrontation—in Western epistemology, between epistemology and hermeneutics, between nomothetic and ideographic ‘sciences’—and open up the notion of ‘knowledge’ beyond cultures of scholarship” (Mignolo 2000b, 9). The contrast between the nomothetic and the ideographic is the contrast between alphabetic and pictorial based representation, between law-based and exemplar-governed forms of communica- tion, a contrast that played a central role in determining which cultures had “writing” and which were deemed preliterate, and thus, uncivilized. In reviving the concept of gnoseology, Mignolo does not intend to signify anything having to do with the heterodox Christian Gnostic movement, although he¶ does probably enjoy invoking the association of gnosis with heresy. Rather, the concept of gnosis at work in his account is that more general concept that the Gnostics themselves made use of, which involves a more inclusive concept of knowledge that incorporates both doxa and episteme, both estab- lished and unconventional knowledges, both systematic and informal, and for Mignolo, both dominant and subjugated.

#### Put your generics away-gnosis avoids the decision making pitfalls of traditional epistemology debates

**Alcoff, 7** [Linda Martin, Professor of Philosophy at Hunter College and the CUNY Graduate Center, “Mignolo’s Epistemology of Coloniality,” CR: The New Centennial Review, Volume 7, Number 3, Winter, pp. 79-101, ALB]

The Greeks defined the project of epistemology through a splitting of doxa (opinion or mere belief) from episteme (justified belief). Epistemology then became the theory not of all belief or even of all that is considered knowledge (what Foucault calls “what passes for truth”), but only of that subset that can pass the test of justification. But this test is itself constructed by epistemology, leading to a circularity of reasoning that preempted the possibility of having an outside critique of epistemology from the sophists, the rhetoricians, or any discourse defined as outside of the domain of knowledge proper or justified belief. The sophists, of course, did not see themselves as not being concerned with knowledge; they simply had a different idea about what knowledge was, an idea that indexed it to a specific context of public disputation in a given time and place. Their contextualized account of truth—that truth is determined as the outcome of a public debate—emphasized human practice over reference to a transcendent real, and resembles not only contemporary consensus and pragmatist theories of truth, but also some versions of coher- ence theories. Nonetheless, this account of truth was not recognized by Plato or his followers as an alternative theory about the procedure and criterion of truth, but was instead misrepresented as interested only in persuasion and thus doxa or mere opinion. The Sophistic approach, as one might imagine, had its own analysis of Plato’s theory, emphasizing its rhetorical maneuvers, its conceptual imagery, what we might today call the unconscious of the text, all of which Plato’s rigid demarcations between episteme and doxa rendered irrelevant to consider.¶ In reviving the concept of gnosis and gnoseology, Mignolo intends to avoid being committed to any given side of this debate, and thus to begin from a more expansive account of what knowledge might include. By incorporating rather than rejecting these various traditions of thinking about what knowledge is, gnosis, as he uses the term, includes the possibility of pictographic,mimetic, and other forms of knowing—to include all the epistemes, for example, that Foucault describes in The Order of Things without one superceding, or sublating, the others (1970). The point of this is not to ignore incoherence or contradiction among all these diverse styles of reasoning, but to avoid epistemology’s circularity of reasoning by which it defines its own current doxa about justification as the only legitimate practice, which thus works to render it immune from external critique and unmotivated toward dialogue. Gnoseology has no a priori commitments to placing the borders of knowledge in any given way, thus it can more readily incorporate an analysis of specific borders, as well as the presumptive preference for borders. Border thinking is a play on two concepts: the concept of thinking from the border and thinking about the border

Reject their Western philosophy centric approach to make visible the border of colonial difference-Leaving out the aff causes colonial violence

Mignolo, 2 [Walter D., William H. Wannamaker Professor of Literature and Romance Studies at Duke University, joint appointment with Cultural Anthropology, “The Geopolitics of Knowledge and the Colonial Difference,” *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, Vol. 101, No. 1, Winter, pp. 57-96, ALB]

It is no longer possible, or at least it is not unproblematic, to ‘‘think’’ from the canon of Western philosophy, even when part of the canon is critical of modernity. To do so means to reproduce the blind epistemic ethnocentrism that makes difficult, if not impossible, any political philosophy of inclusion. The limit of Western philosophy is the border where the colonial difference emerges, making visible the variety of local histories that Western thought, from the right and the left, hid and suppressed. Thus there are historical experiences of marginalization no longer equivalent to the situation that engendered Greek philosophy and allowed its revamping in the Europe of nations, emerging together with the industrial revolution and the consoli- dation of capitalism. These new philosophies have been initiated by thinkers such as Frantz Fanon, Rigoberta Menchú, Gloria Anzaldúa, Subramani, Ab- delkhebir Khatibi, and Edouard Glissant, among others. Consequently, two points should be emphasized. The first is the ratio between places (geohistorically constituted) and thinking, the geopolitics of knowledge proper. If the notion of being was in- vented in Western philosophy, coloniality of being cannot be a continuation of the former. Because of coloniality of power, the concept of being can- not be dispensed with. And because of the colonial difference, coloniality of being cannot be a critical continuation of the former (a sort of postmodern displacement) but must be, rather, a relocation of the thinking and a critical awareness of the geopolitics of knowledge. Epistemology is not ahistorical. But not only that, it cannot be reduced to the linear history from Greek to contemporary North Atlantic knowledge production. It has to be geographical in its historicity by bringing the colonial difference into the game. The densities of the colonial experience are the location of emerging epistemologies, such as the contributions of Franz Fanon, that do not overthrow existing ones but that build on the ground of the silence of his- tory. In this sense Fanon is the equivalent of Kant, just as Guaman Poma de Ayala in colonial Peru could be considered the equivalent of Aristotle.35 One of the reasons why Guaman Poma de Ayala and Fanon are not easily per- ceived as equivalents of Aristotle and Kant is time. Since the Renaissance— the early modern period or emergence of the modern/colonial world—time has functioned as a principle of order that increasingly subordinates places, relegating them to before or below from the perspective of the ‘‘holders (of the doors) of time.’’ Arrangements of events and people in a time line is also a hierarchical order, distinguishing primary sources of thought from interesting or curious events, peoples, or ideas. Time is also the point of reference for the order of knowledge. The discontinuity between being and time and coloniality of being and place is what nourishes Dussel’s need to underline the difference (the colonial difference) between continental phi- losophy (Vattimo, Jürgen Habermas, Karl-Otto Apel, Michel Foucault) and philosophy of liberation.

**Finally, only an EXTERIOR approach that avoids the traps of postmodernity solves-The alt alone gets co-opted**

**Dussel and Fornazzari, 2** [Enrique D., Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the Iztapalapa campus of the Universidd Autonoma Metropolitana, and Alessandro, Associate Professor of Hispanic Studies at UC Riverside, “World-System and “Trans”-Modernity, Nepantla: Views from South, Volume 3, Issue 2, 2002, pp. 221-244, ALB]

Without contradicting this perspective, although implying a completely different intellectual commitment, the concept of “post”-modernity (the A moment I will show in figure 2) indicates that there is a process that emerges “from within modernity and reveals a state of crisis within globalization. “Trans-modernity, in contrast, demands a whole new interpretation of modernity in order to include moments that were never incorporated into the European vision. Subsuming the best of globalized European and North American modernity, “trans”- modernity affirms “from without” the essential components of modernity’s own excluded culture in order to develop a new civilization for the twenty-first century. Accepting this massive exteriority to European modernity allows one to comprehend that there are cultural moments situated “outside” of modernity. To achieve this, an interpretation that supposes a “second” and very subtle Eurocentrism must be overcome. One can then shift to a non-Eurocentric interpretation of the history of the world-system, a system only hegemonized by Europe for the last two hundred years (not five hundred). The emergence of other cultures, until now depreciated and unvalued, from beyond the horizon of European modernity is thus not a miracle arising from nothingness, but rather a return by these culture to their status as actors in the history of the world-system. Although Western culture is globalizing-on a certain technical, economic, political, and military level-this does not efface other moments of enormous creativity on these same levels, moments that affirm from their “exteriority” other culture that are alive, resistant, and growing.

#### Failure to make the aff the FIRST STEP means your attempt at breaking down epistemology fails-Gets co-opted like the Area Studies groups and reproduces coloniality

**Grosfoguel, 7** [Ramon, Associate Professor, UC Berkeley Ethnic Studies Department, “The Epistemic Decolonial Turn,” *Cultural Studies*, 21: 2, 211 — 223, ALB]

In October 1998, there was a conference/dialogue at Duke University between the South Asian Subaltern Studies Group and the Latin American Subaltern Studies Group. The dialogue initiated in this conference eventually resulted in the publication of several issues of the journal NEPANTLA. However, this conference was the last time the Latin American Subaltern Studies Group met before their split. Among the many reasons and debates that produced this split, there are two that I would like to stress. The Latin American Subaltern Studies Group composed primarily by Latinamericanist scholars in the USA. Despite their attempt at producing a radical and alternative knowledge, they reproduced the epistemic schema of Area Studies in the United States. With a few exceptions, they produced studies about the subaltern rather than studies with and from a subaltern perspective. Like the imperial epistemology of Area Studies, theory was still located in the North while the subjects to be studied are located in the South. This colonial epistemology was crucial to my dissatisfaction with the project. As a Puerto Rican in the United States, I was dissatisfied with the epistemic consequences of the knowledge produced by this Latinamericanist group. They under- estimated in their work ethnic/racial perspectives coming from the region, while giving privilege to Western thinkers. This is related to my second point: they gave epistemic privilege to what they called the ‘four horses of the apocalypse’,2 that is, Foucault, Derrida, Gramsci and Guha. Among the four main thinkers they privilege, three are Eurocentric thinkers while two of them (Derrida and Foucault) form part of the poststructuralist/postmodern Western canon. By privileging Western thinkers as their central theoretical apparatus, they betrayed their goal to produce subaltern studies. Among the many reasons for the split of the Latin American Subaltern Studies Group, one of them was between those who read subalternity as a postmodern critique (which represents a Eurocentric critique of eurocentrism) and those who read subalternity as a decolonial critique (which represents a critique of eurocentrism from subalternized and silenced knowledges) (Mignolo 2000, pp. 183􏰁186, pp. 213􏰁214). For those of us that took side with the decolonial critique, the dialogue with the Latin American Subaltern Studies Group as well as with the South Asian Subaltern School made evident the need to epistemologically transcend, decolonize the Western canon and epistemology. South Asian Subaltern School main project is a critique to Western European colonial historiography about India and to Indian nationalist eurocentric historiography of India. But by using a Western epistemology and privileging Gramsci and Foucault, constrained and limited the radicality of their critique to eurocentrism. Although they represent different epistemic projects, the South Asian Subaltern School privilege of Western epistemic canon overlapped with the sector of the Latin American Subaltern Studies Group that sided with postmodernism. However, with all its limits, South Asian Subaltern Studies Group was part of an intellectual movement known as postcolonial critique (a critique of modernity from the Global South) as opposed to the Latin American Subaltern Studies Group postmodern critique (a critique of modernity from the Global North) (Mignolo 2000). These debates made clear to us the need to decolonize not only Subaltern Studies but also Postcolonial Studies (Grosfoguel 2006).¶ This is not an essentialist, fundamentalist, anti-European critique. It a perspective that is critical of both Eurocentric and Third World fundamentalisms, colonialism and nationalism. What all fundamentalisms share (including the Eurocentric one) is the premise that there is only one sole epistemic tradition from which to achieve Truth and Universality. However, my main points here are three: (1) that a decolonial epistemic perspective requires a broader canon of thought than simply the Western canon (including the Left Western canon); (2) that a truly universal decolonial perspective cannot be based on an abstract universal (one particular that raises itself as universal global design), but would have to be the result of the critical dialogue between diverse critical epistemic/ethical/political projects towards a pluriversal as oppose to a universal world; (3) that decolonization of knowledge would require to take seriously the epistemic perspective/cosmologies/insights of critical thinkers from the Global South thinking from and with subalternized racial/ethnic/sexual spaces and bodies. Postmodernism and postructuralism as epistemological projects are caught within the Western canon reproducing within its domains of thought and practice a coloniality of power/knowledge.

**It is CRUCIAL that people in privileged social locations become a part of the decolonial option-Rejecting us because of our identity ENSURES that decoloniality remains at the margins. This must include a BREAK from continental philosophy.**

**Wanzer, 12** [Darrel Allan, Assistant Professor of Communication Studies at the University of Iowa and ALB’s former badass adviser, “Delinking Rhetoric, or Revising McGee’s Fragmentation Thesis Through Decolniality, Rhetoric & Public Affairs, Vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 647-658, ALB]

As an alternative, Maldonado-Torres stresses the importance of a dialogue that “breaks through Eurocentric [and U.S. American-centric] prejudices and seeks to expand the horizon of interlocutors beyond colonial and imperial differences. The de-colonial attitude seeks to be able to listen to what has been silenced.” Such a willingness to listen, however, is predicated upon an ethics of critique that goes beyond the skepticism of power advocated by scholars like McKerrow, or even the critical rhetoric with a “commitment to telos” advocated by Kent Ono and John Sloop. Listening, for Maldonado-Torres, requires something akin to an ethic of decolonial love. Here, the critic both struggles “against the structures of dehumanization” and positively expresses “non-indifference toward the Other.” The critic-theorist must give the gift of the self, who “is only able to see (theros) and grasp (comprehend), because it fırst hears and gives. Hearing the ‘cry’ of the wounded and the afflicted becomes, in this sense, the enlightening act par excellence.” On a practical level, this means that rhetoricians (who both theorize and critique) must begin hearing those voices excluded from our theorizing and the discourse communities we study, internalizing their thought, and seeking ways to delink from modern/coloniality.¶ In short, I would submit that we all (regardless of whether we are interested in discursive con/texts explicitly marked by colonialism or impe- rialism) must seek to become decolonial rhetoricians. Rather than be “at the service” of Continental philosophy as so many in our ranks seem to be, we should adopt a decolonial attitude that aids in “shifting the geography of reason, by unveiling and enacting geopolitics and body-politics of knowl- edge” by putting our disciplinary tools in rhetoric “at the service of the problem being addressed.”44 It is not enough, however, to leave this task to scholars of color. Such a move is dangerous insofar as it continues to relegate these important questions to the margins of the discipline while constructing a fıction of “inclusion” that remains authorized by the hubris of zero point epistemology.¶ We who are colonized or function in some way Otherwise cannot be the only ones leading the charge to delink rhetoric from modern/coloniality. An ethic of decolonial love requires those who benefıt most from the epistemic violence of the West to renounce their privilege, give the gift of hearing, and engage in forms of praxis that can more productively negotiate the borderlands between inside and outside, in thought and in being. We need not, as I have shown with McGee, throw out the baby with the bathwater; however, it is crucial that rhetoricians begin to take the decolo- nial option seriously if we wish to do more than perpetuate “a permanent state of exception” that dehumanizes people of color and maintains the hubris of a totalizing and exclusionary episteme.

And, we need to talk about these issues both in the debate space and outside of it

Feldman, 11 [Keith P, Assistant Professor, Ethnic Studies, UC Berkeley, “Empire’s Verticality: The Af/Pak Frontier, Visual Culture, and Racialization from Above,” *Comparative American Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 4, December, 325-341, ALB]

The contemporary US homeland security state has elaborated and capitalized on this instability through practices of ‘ubiquitous bordering’ at a variety of local, regional, and transnational scales that persistently rub against the Westphalian system (Graham, 2010: 132. In doing so, it propagates zones of differentiated inclusion and exclusion that comprise the geographic warp and weft of globalized warfare. Amy Kaplan suggests the ideological function of the term ‘homeland security’ itself is meant to legitimate these practices by suturing the intra-national contraction of proper spaces and subjects of the political with the transnational expansion of US imperial sovereignty (2003: 87). For Allen Feldman, the borders of the homeland no longer function solely as barriers between nationally-defined zones, but operate instead as ‘a flexible spatial pathogenesis that shifts around the globe and can move from the exteriority of the transnational frontier into the core of the securocratic state’ (Feldman, 2004: 336). ‘In this heteronymous organization of territorial rights and claims,’ argues Achille Mbembe, ‘it makes little sense to insist on distinctions between “internal” and “external” political realms, separated by clearly demarcated boundaries’ (2003: 31-32).

### 2AC—Language K

#### Language is not neutral, it is always controlled and manipulated by those in power. Taking control of language and empowering censorship endorses facism

**Deleuze and Guattari 72** (Gilles and Felix; Anti-Oedipus) 207-209

There is no linguistic field without biunivocal relations-whether between ideographic and phonetic values, or between articulations of different levels, monemes and phonemes-that finally ensure the independence and the linearity of the deterritorialized signs. But such a field remains defined by a transcendence, even when one considers this transcendence as an absence or an empty locus, performing the necessary foldings, levelings (rabattements), and subordinations-a transcendence whence issues throughout the system the inarticulate material flux in which this transcendence operates, opposes, selects, and combines: the signifier. It is curious, therefore, that one can show so well the servitude of the masses with respect to the minimal elements of the sign within the immanence of language, without showing how the domination is exercised through and in the transcendence of the signifier.\* There, however, as elsewhere, an irreducible exteriority of conquest asserts itself. For if language itself does not presuppose conquest, the leveling operations (les operations de rabattement) that constitute written language indeed presuppose two inscriptions that do not speak the same language: two languages (langages), one of masters, the other of slaves. Jean Nougayrol describes just such a situation: "For the Sumerians, [a given sign] is water; the Sumerians read this sign a, which signifies water in Sumerian. An Akkadian comes along and asks his Sumerian master: what is this sign? The Sumerian replies: that's a. The Akkadian takes this sign for a, and on this point there is no longer any relationship between the sign and water, which in Akkadian is called mil. ... I believe that the presence of the Akkadians determined the phoneticization of the writing system ... and that the contact of two peoples is almost necessary before the spark of a new writing can spring forth."55¶ One cannot better show how an operation of biunivocalization organizes itself around a despotic signifier, so that a phonetic and alphabetical chain flows from it. Alphabetical writing is not for illiterates, but by illiterates. It goes by way of illiterates, those unconscious workers. The signifier implies a language that overcodes another language, while the other language is completely coded into phonetic elements. And if the unconscious in fact includes the topical order of a double inscription, it is not structured like one language, but like two. The signifier does not appear to keep its promise, which is to give us access to a modern and functional understanding of language. The imperialism of the signifier does not take us beyond the question, "What does it mean T"; it is content to bar the question in advance, to render all the answers insufficient by relegating them to the status of a simple signified. It challenges exegesis in the name of recitation, pure textuality, and superior "scientificity" (scientificite). Like the young palace dogs too quick to drink the verse water, and who never tire of crying: The signifier, you have not reached the signifier, you are still at the level of the signifieds! The signifier is the only thing that gladdens their hearts. But this master signifier remains what it was in ages past, a transcendent stock that distributes lack to all the elements of the chain, something in common for a common absence, the authority that channels all the breaks-flows into one and the same locus of one and the same cleavage: the detached object, the phallus-and-castration, the bar that delivers over all the depressive subjects to the great paranoiac king. 0 signifier, terrible archaism of the despot where they still look for the empty tomb, the dead father, and the mystery of the name! And perhaps that is what incites the anger of certain linguists against Lacan, no less than the enthusiasm of his followers: the vigor and the serenity with which Lacan accompanies the signifier back to its source, to its veritable origin, the despotic age, and erects an infernal machine that welds desire to the Law, because, everything considered-so Lacan thinks-this is indeed the form in which the signifier is in agreement with the unconscious, and the form in which it produces effects of the signified in the unconscious.\* The signifier as the repressing representation, and the new displaced represented that it induces, the famous metaphors and metonymy-all of that constitutes the overcoding and de territorialized despotic machine.¶ The despotic signifier has the effect of overcoding the territorial chain. The signified is precisely the effect of the signifier, and not what it represents or what it designates. The signified is the sister of the borders and the mother of the interior. Sister and mother are the concepts that correspond to the great acoustic image, to the voice of the new alliance and direct filiation. Incest is the very operation of overcoding at the two ends of the chain in all the territory ruled by the despot, from the borders to the center: all the debts of alliance are converted into the infinite debt of the new alliance, and all the extended filiations are subsumed by direct filiation. Incest or the royal trinity is therefore the whole of the repressing representation insofar as it initiates the overcoding.¶ The system of subordination or signification has replaced the system of connotation. To the extent that graphism is flattened onto the voice-the graphism that, not so long ago, was inscribed flush with the body-body representation subordinates itself to word representation: sister and mother are the voice's signifieds. But to the extent that this flattening induces a fictitious voice from on high that no longer expresses itself except in the linear flux, the despot himself is the signifier of the voice that, along with the two signifieds, effects the overcoding of the whole chain. What made incest impossible-namely, that at times we had the appellations (mother, sister) but not the persons or the bodies, while at other times we had the bodies, but the appellations disappeared from view as soon as we broke through the prohibitions they bore-has ceased to exist. Incest has become possible in the wedding of the kinship bodies and family appellations, in the union of the signifier with its signifieds.

#### The 1NCs attempts to fold disability into the norm means you should reject it—don’t normalize

Bayliss 09. Phil Bayliss, professor of education studies at Exeter University, Against Interpretosis: Deleuze, Disability, and Difference Journal of Literary & Cultural Disability Studies, Volume 3, Number 3, 2009, pg. 282-3

In Narrative Prosthesis, Mitchell and Snyder argue that a theoretical position underpinning their thesis is that disability inaugurates interpretation. They argue that literary efforts to “illuminate the dark recesses of disability produce a form of discursive subjugation. The effort to narrate disability’s myriad deviations is an attempt to bring the body’s unruliness under control” (6). Interpretation uses systems of objectification to determine unruliness and to develop control. Significance—the relationship between signs, the signifier (what Deleuze and Guattari call expression) and their objects (the signified content)— assumes an object of disability, which can be understood through the way the object is interpreted. In Towards a Semiology of Paragrams, Julia Kristeva introduces the concept of signifiance: the signifying process as a dynamic understanding of how signs come to be formed and used. Kristeva’s object is to explore, within the entire set of signifying gestures, the “dynamic process whereby signs take on or change their significations” (28). Signifiance assumes a dynamic relationship between signifiers and the signified, which change over time according to interpretative frameworks. Narratives of the broken body, of theories of physiology, of psychology, all assume a univocality, a one-to-one isomorphism of the signifier and the signified, and within the discourses of the medical or social models the drive to control unruly bodies leads to what Deleuze and Guattari call interpretosis: It is well known that the psychoanalysts have ceased to speak, they interpret even more, or better yet, fuel interpretation on the part of the subject, who jumps from one circle of hell to the next. In truth, signifiance and interpretosis are the two diseases of the earth or the skin, in other words, human kind’s fundamental neurosis. (Plateaus 114) The relationship of the signified object and its signification is linked to its his- tory, signifiance, the history of concepts from Michel Foucault’s genealogy in the Birth of the Clinic to Mitchell and Snyder’s narrative prosthesis by way of Henri-Jacques Stiker’s History of Disability. Regimes of truth established through forms of expression (signifiance) have designated the disabled body as something static, not amenable to change without changing the corporeality of the disabled individual. Carlson shows, in her history of docile bodies, how understanding the disabled body as static is contrasted with a dynamic perspective, which sees the disabled body as inher- ently capable of change. For example, the classifications of the World Health Organization, in its use of concepts such as impairment, disability, and handicap, fix the body—these forms of expression fix a content, which creates the disabled body as visible, where before the disability lay beneath the surface of the impaired body, and was invisible. Function cannot be seen (is not visible); handicap lies in the realm of the social and must be inferred; both must be inferred through observation and interpretation. Here, interpretosis creates the content through its forms of expression. Thus, in bringing the invisible to visibility, we have the new conditions, for example, Attention Deficit and Hyperactivity Disorder (what Shannon Lowe calls a miskinetic neuropoliticology: the politics of constructing and disciplining the organism of the brain); and Asperger’s Syndrome (Klin, Volkmar, and Sparrow), which was not recognized by the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM–IV–R) until 1994. For Deleuze and Guattari, “(the) form of expres- sion becomes linguistic rather than genetic: in other words, it operates with symbols that are comprehensible, transmittable and modifiable from outside” (Plateaus 60). Where the relationship of expression and content (or form and matter) is one of interdependence, interpretosis, through creating new forms of expression, generates signifiance; creates visibility out of invisibility, through enunciating it. Foucault, in The Order of Things, makes the same point: that which can be articulated becomes visible. For Deleuze and Guattari: Content then constitutes bodies, things or objects, that enter physical systems, organ- isms and organizations ... all of this culminates in a language stratum that installs an abstract machine on the level of expression and takes the abstraction of content even further, tending to strip it of any form of its own (the imperialism of language, the pretensions to a general semiology). (Plateaus 143) I would call this the interaction between logos and nomos and its strongest formulation is within the field of nosology—the study of diagnosis, which pathologizes invisible differences made visible through expression and signifi- ance. Once expression and signifiance create a nomos through logos, the body is subjected to such articulation; subjection leads to subjectification: the body inscribed as disabled, becomes disabled. If forms of expression are linguistic (transmittable, modifiable...) they may take the form of a majoritarian theory.

### 2AC—Framework

#### the topical version of the aff doesn’t solve-Simply folding us into your arbitrary framework interpretation is coloniality

**Alcoff, 7** [Linda Martin, Professor of Philosophy at Hunter College and the CUNY Graduate Center, “Mignolo’s Epistemology of Coloniality,” CR: The New Centennial Review, Volume 7, Number 3, Winter, pp. 79-101, ALB]

In some respects Mignolo suggests that the cause of the problem is less in content than in goal. The target of his critique is rarely the content of specific epistemological positions or theories but rather of their imperial assumptions and scope of application. The philosophy of science, for example, never presents itself as the philosophy of Western science, but as the philosophy of science tout court. This leads me to the last aspect of Mignolo’s critique of epistemology I want to discuss before turning to the constructive project: his argument with social science. Mignolo takes issue with Immanuel Waller- stein’s idea that the social sciences need to be “opened up,” arguing that instead of being opened up, they need to be superceded. Wallerstein wants to open up the social sciences to a more planetary enterprise, to transcend the segregated model of area studies in favor of a unified domain of inquiry. Thus he wants to expand their scope and range of reference as a way to correct for Anglo- and Eurocentrism. The problem with this plan, Mignolo suggests, citing Orlando Fals-Borda, Vine Deloria, and others to support him, is that “opening is not the same as decolonizing” (2000a, .The project of opening up without decolonizing runs the risk of simply furthering colonial expansion if the methodology remains “dependent on the epistemology of North Atlantic modernity—the norms of the disciplines and the problems of the North Atlantic” (80), that is, on the conceptual imagery of colonial epistemologies.¶ For Mignolo, the basic problem is that the systems of knowing and representing that developed in European modernity were constituted by and within the coloniality of power. Thus, Mignolo has moved further and further afield of traditional Western philosophical concepts in his attempt to disentangle his approach to knowledge from the snares of colonizing as- sumptions. For this, as the recent critical discussion in South Atlantic Quar- terly indicates, he is losing some of his postmodern allies. Postmodernists, however radical their critiques, are rarely in the business of reconstructing epistemic norms, a project that in the next section I will argue has engaged Mignolo.

#### We must decolonize education by centering subaltern epistemologies-Education and the aff are net benefits to our interpretation

Richardson 12 (Troy A, Associate Professor, College of Agriculture and Life Sciences (CALS), Cornell University, "Disrupting the Coloniality of Being: Toward De-colonial Ontologies in Philosophy of Education." Studies in Philosophy and Education 31.6 (2012): 539-551)OG

Countering hierarchical social and educational relations in contexts of racialization is¶ outlined by Margonis (1999, 2000, 2011a, b) as an ontological project and philosophers of¶ education invested in a critical analysis of the intersections of race, class and colonialism¶ are indebted to his thinking. I think it is important to read Margonis as fostering a¶ de-colonial position in philosophy of education and his call for a dialogical pedagogical¶ practice is crucially important for shifting the location of philosophical knowledge generation and the languages of education. Indeed, Margonis’ dialogical (2007, 2011a, b)¶ project for anti-assimilatory education would suggests multilingualism to assist in moving¶ from the hegemonic languages of philosophy (German, French and English) to Indigenous¶ languages, African-American Vernacular English, creole and Chicano Spanish. Accordingly, his call for dialogue is in direct conversation with Mignolo (2000) and MaldonadoTorres (2004, 2009). For each of these thinkers, coming into and becoming through a¶ dialogical relation re-situates being by exposing and disrupting the colonialist claims that¶ Indigenous and African and African diaspora peoples were or are primitive. Likewise,¶ dialogue resituates being by placing minoritized knowledge systems and forms of being at¶ the center of relationships of learning.¶ Dialogue and multilingualism in the service of more expansive discussions of being¶ cannot then be grounded in a pre-formulated or normalized (continental) existentialist¶ language of philosophy. Rather, dialogue can be outlined according to a de-colonial¶ attitude (Maldonado-Torres 2007, 262) which takes as its primary effort the assertion of¶ the languages which relate those knowledge systems and forms of being that have been¶ conceived as outside or below the domain of Being. Dialogue conceived with a decolonial¶ attitude would necessitate bi- or multilingualism to undermine the ways in which the term¶ ‘‘enigma’’ is used to dismiss and denigrate minoritized knowledges and forms of life. As I¶ will elaborate below, multilingualism should be rethought according to languaging¶ (Mignolo 2000). Following the work of Khatibi (1999) and Anzaldua (1987) Mignolo has¶ used the terms languaging and bilanguaging to signal a shift away from a strictly technical¶ project for linguistic communication or translation (see also Sandoval 2000). For each of¶ these thinkers, bilanguaging operates to re-position being according to the ways of life of¶ the minoritized. In this way, African Americans, Latina/os and Native Americans are not¶ enigmas for philosophers of education but opportunities and invitations for a formulation¶ of being that is non-assimilationist to the privileged and hegemonic languages of¶ philosophy.¶ Dialogue and the Decolonial Attitude¶ Maldonado-Torres (2007) speaks of a Du Bois (1999) inspired de-colonial attitude that¶ ‘‘demands responsibility and the willingness to take many perspectives and [the] points of¶ view of those whose very existence is questioned and produced as insigniﬁcant’’ (262).¶ While dialogue is not explicitly named here, it is an assumed element in developing the¶ decolonial attitude. Indeed, elsewhere Maldonado-Torres (2004) elaborates how ‘‘radical¶ critique should take dialogical form’’ whereby philosophers ‘‘make space for the¶ enunciation of non-Western cosmologies and for the expression of different cultural,¶ political and social memories’’ (51). Du Bois (1999) is for Maldonado-Torres (2007) one¶ who made spaces for the memories of African and African diaspora peoples through a¶ radical form of dialogue. From this dialogue a different direction for the articulation and¶ formulation of African American forms of being was charted.¶ Moreover, as Maldonado-Torres (2007) goes on to note, Du Bois’ dialogue enabled ‘‘the¶ creation of black institutions in the United States as well as furthering Pan-African visions¶ and struggles’’ (262). Du Bois fostered and called forth spaces for Pan-African visions,¶ providing a ‘‘fundamental shift in perspective that leads one to see the world anew in a way¶ that targets its evil in a new way and gives us a better sense of what to do next’’¶ (Maldonado-Torres 2007, 262). On Maldonado-Torres’ (2004, 2007) reading, the institution building Du Bois achieved was a realization of a radicalized form of dialogue where¶ the knowledges, terms and forms of being expressed by African and African diaspora¶ peoples provide the intellectual, philosophical and ontological force for these projects.¶ There is in Maldonado-Torres’s description here an important complementarity to¶ Margonis’ (2011a, b) notion of being in dialogue with the sentiments and existential¶ situations of racialized/colonized peoples. Indeed, Margonis (2011a, b) echoes some of this¶ Du Boisian de-colonial attitude when he writes ‘‘educators would do well to invite broad¶ and cacophonous forms of interaction in the classroom; a mix of conservative, artistic,¶ comedic, and narrative patterns in the classroom gives a broader range of points of contact¶ with students’’ (3). Margonis arrives at this call for a cacophonous classroom in large part¶ through his careful reading and reworking of Freire’s (1993) notion of dialogue. ‘‘Freire’s¶ description of egalitarian, de-colonizing dialogue,’’ he writes, provide ‘‘means for setting¶ in motion social spaces of focused, passionate intellectual intensity’’ (Margonis 2011a, b,¶ 3). Like Maldonado-Torres (2004, 2007) the insistence here on dialogue as crucial to¶ providing the space for engagements with multiple intellectual traditions is crucial for¶ Margonis. As I have suggested above however, this space for dialogue has not prompted a¶ stance which works to expose the coloniality of being operating in Rousseau (1984) or¶ Heidegger (1962). Again, Margonis (2007, 2011a, b) seems to limit a more radical¶ understanding of dialogue provokes an anti-assimilationist stance toward Rousseau’s¶ (1984) and Heidegger’s (1962) philosophies of being. In this way, Margonis (1999, 2009)¶ inadvertently de-couples a particular existentialist philosophical discourse from its relationship to colonialism.¶ In stating this, I am not suggesting that Margonis, I or Maldonado-Torres (2007, 2009)¶ could easily ‘‘ﬁx’’ the discourse of primitive in Heidegger for example (1962) as a way to¶ deploy him otherwise. As Bernasconi (2005) has warned, we cannot simply enact a¶ ‘‘surgical [philosophical] operation’’ (243) to smooth over these tensions for a more¶ ‘‘inclusive’’ Heideggerian existentialism. A de-colonial dialogue can be more attentive to¶ shifts toward bilanguaging in the enunciations and learning of Indigenous, African and¶ African diaspora and Latino/a traditions of being.¶ Bilanguaging and/as Border Thinking for Trans-Ontologies¶ Finally, Mignolo (2000) identiﬁes the space of dialogue as a site of ‘‘border thinking’’ and¶ ‘‘bilanguaging.’’ Anticipating Maldonado-Torres’ (2004) idea of a more radical form of¶ dialogue, bilanguaging is ‘‘a form of life possible in the fractures of a hegemonic (national¶ or imperial) language’’ that ‘‘draw[s] in something that is beyond sound, syntax and¶ lexicon’’ (Mignolo 2000, 264). Margonis (2011a, b) pedagogy of cacophony solicits a form¶ of border thinking and hints at this idea of bilanguanging, but his philosophical framework¶ has not been fractured in ways that would shift us away from the Rousseauean (1994) and¶ Heideggerian (1962) coloniality of being. Dialogical practice as focused intellectual¶ intensity would seem to entail the kind of bilanguaging Mignolo (2000) speaks of here to¶ achieve a decolonial dialogue. This would more fully attend to the way trans-ontologies¶ undermine the coloniality of being enacted through professional philosophy. Taken¶ together, a decolonial trans-ontology is an emergent form of being stemming from a border¶ thinking and bilanguaging.¶ In the context of the United States and the Americas more broadly, it is not only an¶ intellectual and pedagogical project that would provide the opportunity for trans-ontologies¶ to emerge. An anti-assimilatory pedagogy seeking cacophony would entail a shift in¶ location to those physical borders where the complex forms and languages of being¶ continuously emerge. That is, philosophers and teachers would situate themselves where¶ African American youth are not conceived as enigmas. In this sense, Margonis’ (2007,¶ 2011a, b) teachers would not only seek a cacophonous classroom, but the cacophonous,¶ creative, driven and constructive locations of African American, Indigenous and Latino/a¶ being. Through radical dialogues in these shifted locations we learn the pre-situations of¶ such youth. Learning with minoritized youth in this way entails forms of bilanguaging¶ wherein European ontologies lose something of their habitability. In those, perhaps ﬂeeting¶ moments, decolonial trans-ontologies are more clearly recognized as the future which¶ denies the coloniality of being.¶ The processes of radical dialogue (Maldonado-Torres 2004) and bilanguaging (Mignolo¶ 2000) for trans-ontologies underscores the potentialities of a de-colonial turn in philosophy¶ of education. ‘‘The de-colonial turn,’’ writes Maldonado-Torres (2007), ‘‘marks the¶ deﬁnitive entry of enslaved and colonized subjectivities into the realm of thought at before¶ unknown institutional levels’’ (262). Margonis’ (1999, 2007, 2011a, b) efforts for antioppressive pedagogical practices and philosophical frameworks serves as an important¶ moment in a de-colonial turn in philosophy of education. Continuing with him toward a¶ critique of the coloniality of being provide a way to move past the terms of enigma and¶ primitive to decolonial trans-ontologies in philosophy of education.

#### Debate should be a question of shifting the geography of reason, not just resolving competing interpretations from the position of neutral observation. Their framework arguments are part and parcel of coloniality’s epistemological structure.

Mignolo 9 (Walter, Professor of literature-Duke University, Ph.D. from the Ecole des Hautes Etudes, academic director of [Duke in the Andes](http://www.aas.duke.edu/study_abroad/andes/index.php), an interdisciplinary program in Latin American and Andean Studies in Quito, Ecuador at Pontificia Universidad Católica del Ecuador and the Universidad Politécnica Salesiana, “Epistemic Disobedience,¶ Independent Thought and¶ De-Colonial Freedom” ,Theory, Culture & Society 2009)

The introduction of geo-historical and bio-graphical configurations in¶ processes of knowing and understanding allows for a radical re-framing (e.g.¶ de-colonization) of the original formal apparatus of enunciation.2 I have¶ been supporting in the past those who maintain that it is not enough to¶ change the content of the conversation, that it is of the essence to change¶ the terms of the conversation. Changing the terms of the conversation¶ implies going beyond disciplinary or interdisciplinary controversies and the¶ conflict of interpretations. As far as controversies and interpretations remain¶ within the same rules of the game (terms of the conversation), the control¶ of knowledge is not called into question. And in order to call into question¶ the modern/colonial foundation of the control of knowledge, it is necessary¶ to focus on the knower rather than on the known. It means to go to the very¶ assumptions that sustain locus enunciations.¶ In what follows I revisit the formal apparatus of enunciation from the¶ perspective of geo- and bio-graphic politics of knowledge. My revisiting is¶ epistemic rather than linguistic, although focusing on the enunciation is¶ unavoidable if we aim at changing the terms and not only the content of the¶ conversation. The basic assumption is that the knower is always implicated,¶ geo- and body-politically, in the known, although modern epistemology (e.g.¶ the hubris of the zero point) managed to conceal both and created the figure¶ of the detached observer, a neutral seeker of truth and objectivity who at¶ the same time controls the disciplinary rules and puts himself or herself in¶ a privileged position to evaluate and dictate.¶ The argument is structured as follows. Sections I and II lay out the¶ ground for the politics of knowledge geo-historically and bio-graphically,¶ contesting the hegemony of zero point epistemology. In Section III, I explore¶ three cases in which geo- and body-politics of knowledge comes forcefully¶ to the fore: one from Africa, one from India and the third from New Zealand.¶ These three cases are complemented by a fourth from Latin America: my¶ argument is here. It is not the report of a detached observer but the intervention¶ of a de-colonial project that ‘comes’ from South America, the Caribbean and Latinidad in the US. Understanding the argument implies that the¶ reader will shift its geography of reasoning and of evaluating arguments. In¶ Section IV, I come back to geo- and body-politics of knowledge and their¶ epistemic, ethical and political consequences. In Section V, I attempt to pull¶ the strings together and weave my argument with the three cases explored,¶ hoping that what I say will not be taken as the report of a detached observed¶ but as the intervention of a de-colonial thinker.¶

#### And, arguments like their framework argument are what uphold Western epistemology-The ENTIRE AFF is offense against this position

Breidlid 13 (Anders, Professor, Master programme in Multicultural and International Education, Oslo University College, “Education, Indigenous Knowledge, and Development in the Global South”, p. 57)

What is almost completely under-communicated in the South is how¶ the hegemonic educational discourse—across the curriculum of school and¶ university systems and across nations—has helped to promote the capitalist¶ world-system and globalization and defend positions of power. The sig-¶ nificance of privileging Western epistemology, beyond its alienating effect,¶ is how the hegemonic epistemology and educational discourse effectively¶ prevents a critique of the present neo-colonial epistemological legacy—the¶ hegemonic world system and its oppressive features.¶ This is made possible because the hegemonic epistemology and its trans-¶ lation into educational discourse is unrivalled in schools. Such an educa-¶ tional discourse reinforces the epistemic dominance in countries in the¶ semi-periphery or periphery, which already experience the negative aspects¶ of the present world order. To challenge this hegemonic knowledge neces-¶ sitates a deconstruction of the triad of Western epistemology-(neo)coloni-¶ zation-hegcmonic power and implies a decolonizing of the curricula and¶ the educational discourses globally.

### 2AC—Narrative Counteradvocacy

### 2AC—Ableism K

#### Embracing a permutation that combines strategies is the best way to expose fissures within the system-This also means that you should include both our privilege as well as the colonized in your analysis

**Alcoff, 7** [Linda Martin, Professor of Philosophy at Hunter College and the CUNY Graduate Center, “Mignolo’s Epistemology of Coloniality,” CR: The New Centennial Review, Volume 7, Number 3, Winter, pp. 79-101, ALB]

However, Mignolo has recently backed off from using the concept of pluritopic hermeneutics as a positive alternative. His adoption of pluritopic hermeneutics was aligned with the project of colonial semiosis, which aimed to effect a rerepresentation of the colonized other to free it from the hege- monic terms of Eurocentric conceptual imagery. That is, colonial semiosis is a way of revealing the multiple realities covered over by colonial systems of meaning. The point is not simply to reveal multiplicity, but to reveal the lines of tension and conflict, or the points of contradiction, between colonizing and colonized spaces. Thus, he explained, “colonial semiosis require[d] a pluritopic hermeneutics since in the conflict, in the cracks and fissures where the conflict originates, a description of one side of the epistemological divide won’t do” (17). We need to be able to see multiple sign systems at work, and under negotiation and contestation, in any given field of meaning.¶ In constituting this social classification, coloniality permeates all aspects of social existence and gives rise to new social and geocultural identities (Qui- jano 2000b, 342). "America" and "Europe" are among the new geocultural identities. "European," "Indian," "African" are among the "racial" identities.

#### The permutation is the best strategy – the negative’s claims foreclose the possibility of engaging with individuals who simultaneously experience racism and ableism

Ferri PhD in Disability Studies and Inclusive Education at Syracuse ‘12 (Beth, “A Dialogue We’ve Yet to Have: Race and Disability Studies,” <http://www.academia.edu/343849/A_Dialogue_weve_Yet_to_Have_Race_and_Disability_Studies>, Mike)

Certainly there are many connections between disability studies and critical race studies. As a group, scholars in both fields are not so much cohesive in terms of focus or methodology as they are committed to a shared interest in social justice (Bell, 2009). Both disability studies and critical race studies place ideology at the center of their analyses—exploring ways that ableism and/or racism are deeply engrained in the very structures of society (Parker & Lynn, 2009). Both reject biological determinism and view race and/or dis/ability as socially constructed, ever shifting in terms of meaning and shaped by intersecting political, social, and historical contexts. Finally, both fields value narrative and counter-narrative (Parker & Lynn, 2009), not simply as expressions of lived experience, but as important sites of knowledge production to resist hegemonic representations that valorize individuals, groups, and bodies of knowledge deemed “normal” and marginalize the “other.” Yet, despite these and other similarities, scholars in critical race studies and disability studies have yet to engage in any sustained dialogue about the interconnections between ableism and racism. Of course, we should not assume that these groups would agree on either the source of the problem or its solution. Thus, what is needed is not simply a cursory attending to race or ethnicity, but a sustained and careful analysis of the ways racism and ableism are interdependent. Unfortunately, too often, when scholars or activists do attempt to combine analyses of race and disability or gender and disability, they do so by analogizing between the two or placing these systems of oppression in a hierarchy (May & Ferri, 2005). This amounts to placing one type of oppression as overarching or as foundational to all others. A common claim is that disability cuts across all the other forms of oppression. Moreover, because anyone can acquire disability it is therefore thought to be more universal, as opposed to the particular interests of race or gender, I suppose. I admit to being puzzled by these assumptions. Don’t race, gender, and sexuality, for example, cut across social class? Moreover, what is universal about disability experience—Is there really one disability experience or isn’t it mediated by the particular social, historical, and political context? A slightly different approach attempts to garner attention to one type of oppression by linking it to another, usually through analogy. Consider a bumper sticker that reads something like, “Black people had to fight for the right to ride in the front of the bus, but we can’t even get on the bus.” Other examples use terms like being “shackled” by ableism or “crippled” by racism. These analyses ignore the ways that racism and ableism are dissimilar—ways that they cannot or should not be seen as interchangeable or analogous. Moreover, they all but erase those who experience racism and ableism simultaneously—a point cogently raised in the germinal collection of essays, All the Women Are White, All the Blacks are Men, But Some of Us Are Brave: Black Women’s Studies (Hull, Scott, & Smith, 1982).

#### And-their reference to our “privilege” is a LINK TO OUR ARGUMENT because it reinforces traditional binary categories of knowledge-The BETTER WAY to adopt subaltern reason is to question those traditional divisions

**Alcoff, 7** [Linda Martin, Professor of Philosophy at Hunter College and the CUNY Graduate Center, “Mignolo’s Epistemology of Coloniality,” CR: The New Centennial Review, Volume 7, Number 3, Winter, pp. 79-101, ALB]

The relationship between justificatory status and one’s social identity is not, of course, foreign to the traditions of Western epistemology. In both ancient and modern canonical writings, epistemic credibility is associated with identity, and sometimes determined by it. Gender, age, one’s status as a slave, the sort of work one performed, ethnic identities such as Jewishness, and since the modern period, one’s racialized features were variously used to assess epistemic competence by philosophers including Plato, Aristotle, Bacon, Locke, Hume, Kant, and Hegel. (For an interesting take on the mod- ern prejudices, see Shapin 1994.) Thus, identity-based assessments were integrated into epistemic practice as well as into epistemologies that justified favoring certain groups over oth- ers with a measure of presumptive credibility. Much of Mignolo’s analytics of epistemology, as we’ll see, concerns its role in creating, developing, and maintaining a hierarchy of knowledge and knowers particularly adapted for colonialism, in which the most relevant distinction concerned one’s cultural identity. Much of Mignolo’s attempt to formulate an alternative to this im- perial epistemology involves an effort to topple the cultural hierarchy that colonialism enforced. But more than this, “subaltern reason,” as he calls it, must aim to “rethink and reconceptualize the stories that have been told and the conceptualization that has been put into place to divide the world between Christians and pagans, civilized and barbarians, modern and pre- modern, and developed and undeveloped regions and people,” especially to the extent such divisions are based on putative cognitive capacity (2000b, 98). Such a reconstructive project demands not only a new sociology of knowledge but also a new normative epistemology that can correct and improve upon the colonial worldview.

#### Ableism is grounded in western notions of coloniality

Baker, 1999 (Bernadette Baker, “Disabling methodologies”, Pedagogy, Culture & Society, 7:1, 91-115 http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rpcs20)

Moreo ver, in critical post-structural studies where ‘the body’ is a central category for analysis ‘the body’ app ears automatically as a segregate d entity on which to pin disability and to locate the effects of its discursive or social construct ion. If body, mind an d person can be name d as separate , reco gnised as conce pts , then the y alread y auto poietically app ear as ‘culture’, have alread y been ‘pr ocesse d’ an d are alread y part of an intra -referent ial system of thou ght which claims the effects of environment . In having body, mind an d person operate as transcendenta l biome dical and/ or sociological extract ions available for nuanc ing, Disab ility Stud ies, not surp risingly, arr ives at th e dilemma of definition which susta ins the field. Last ly, an un derstan ding of an auto poietic effect pr ovides insight into a key parad ox th at inhabits Disab ility Stud ies an d which sub tly emer ges in definitional treatments . That para dox is how registers of movement an d stas is susta in the perce ptual structures throu gh which ableism is critique d. The conceptual movement of Westernness as an environment that is analytically centred an d then sideline d, leaves Westernness able to colonise and travel on, retreat an d recover, lie in opposition to or be allied with, sail by or engage. It is the paradoxical conceptual slipperiness of Westernness (name d an d dismissed ) that secures the illusory effect of its inertia and brings into port ‘disability’ (name d an d pr oblemat ised ) as the moving tar get. It is a movement , a series of substitutions an d reversals, of self-referencing, that secures a regeneration of Westernness ’ centra lity in the very midst of exposing ‘its’ ableism. In summar y, the ‘paradox’ of seeing universal definitions as difficult an d then providing them is the paradox of asserting ‘cultural difference ’ from within. This is not a ‘weakness ’ but an ‘histor ically cont ingent’ manifestat ion of an auto poietic effect . The various positionings of culture , Western and disability allow the continued presence of explanatory systems that utilise a subject/ world divide. This enables the attribution of everything to cultural influence , to an environment as a limit within. From the strate gies for treat ing com plexity, it becomes more certa in that things, like ‘Western thought’, can be shifting an d uncertain, and hence , the possibility for asymmetricising for opening out emerges. A belief in th e imp ossibility of being outs ide culture , outs ide systems of th ought, outs ide notions of ability, th us intens ifies th e possibility for openness at th e very same moment in which Western/non -Western , able/ disab led an d persona l/ cultura l dichotom ies regenerate .

### 1AR

#### social location does not determine ALL of truth-That’s reductionist and incorrect

**Alcoff, 91** [Linda, Professor of Philosophy at Hunter College and the CUNY Graduate Center, “The Problem of Speaking for Others,” *Cultural Critique*, University of Minnesota Press, No. 20, Winter, ALB]\*\*we reject any offensive language used in this evidence

First I want to consider the argument that the very formulation of the problem with speaking for others involves a retrograde, metaphysically insupportable essentialism that assumes one can read off the truth and meaning of what one says straight from the discursive context. Let's call this response the "Charge of Reductionism", because it argues that a sort of reductionist theory of justification (or evaluation) is entailed by premises (1) and (2). Such a reductionist theory might, for example, reduce evaluation to a political assessment of the speaker's location where that location is seen as an insurmountable essence that fixes one, as if one's feet are superglued to a spot on the sidewalk.¶ For instance, after I vehemently defended Barbara Christian's article, "The Race for Theory," a male friend who had a different evaluation of the piece couldn't help raising the possibility of whether a sort of apologetics structured my response, motivated by a desire to valorize African American writing against all odds. His question in effect raised the issue of the reductionist/essentialist theory of justification I just described.¶ I, too, would reject reductionist theories of justification and essentialist accounts of what it means to have a location. To say that location bears on meaning and truth is not the same as saying that location determines meaning and truth

. And location is not a fixed essence absolutely authorizing one's speech in the way that God's favor absolutely authorized the speech of Moses. Location and positionality should not be conceived as one-dimensional or static, but as multiple and with varying degrees of mobility. What it means, then, to speak from or within a group and/or a location is immensely complex. To the extent that location is not a fixed essence, and to the extent that there is an uneasy, underdetermined, and contested relationship between location on the one hand and meaning and truth on the other, we cannot reduce evaluation of meaning and truth to a simple identification of the speaker's location. Neither Premise (1) nor Premise (2) entail reductionism or essentialism. They argue for the relevance of location, not its singular power of determination, and they are non-committal on how to construe the metaphysics of location.