### 1NC CP – China Strike

#### Text: The President of the United States should issue an executive order executing a preemptive nuclear strikes against the People’s Republic of China.

#### US first strike means no escalation and no extinction

#### Lieber and Press 13

Keir A. Lieber, Associate Professor, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Daryl G. Press, Associate Professor of Government, Dartmouth College Coordinator of War and Peace Studies at the John Sloan Dickey Center, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Spring 2013, "The New Era of Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Conflict", http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/digital/pdf/spring\_13/lieber.pdf

The first set of arguments is about an important, yet virtually unnoticed, consequence of changes in military technology and the balance of power. In a nutshell, the same revolution in accuracy that has transformed conventional warfare has had equally momentous consequences for nuclear weapons and deterrence. 2 Very accurate delivery systems, new reconnaissance technologies, and the downsizing of arsenals from Cold War levels have made both conventional and nuclear counterforce strikes against nuclear arsenals much more feasible than ever before. Perhaps most surprising, pairing highly accurate delivery systems with nuclear weapons permits target strategies that would create virtually no radioactive fallout, hence, vastly reduced fatalities. For nuclear analysts weaned on two seeming truths of the Cold War era—that nuclear arsenals reliably deter attacks via the threat of retaliation, and that nuclear weapons use is tantamount to mass slaughter—the implications of the counterforce revolution should be jarring. The conventional view linking nuclear weapons to stalemate and slaughter was correct during the latter decades of the Cold War. By the mid 1960s, a truly effective nuclear counterforce strike by either side— that is, a disarming blow by one superpower against the nuclear arsenal of the other—had become impossible. 3 Each of the superpowers wielded an enormous arsenal, which was deployed on a diverse set of delivery systems. The sheer number of targets that would have to be destroyed, combined with the limitations of contemporary guidance systems, virtually guaranteed that any disarming attack would fail, leaving the enemy with a large number of surviving weapons with which to retaliate. Furthermore, any significant counterforce strike would have produced enormous quantities of lethal radioactive fallout and hence caused millions of civilian casualties. 4 Most Cold War strategists—many of whom are still active in the nuclear analytical community today—came to instinctively associate nuclear weapons with stalemate and nuclear use with Armageddon. But nuclear weapons—like virtually all other weapons—have changed dramatically over the past four decades. Modern guidance systems permit nuclear planners to achieve “probabilities of damage” against hardened nuclear targets that were unheard of during the Cold War. And heightened accuracy also permits nontraditional targeting strategies that would further increase the effectiveness of counterforce strikes and greatly reduce casualties. 5 The revolution in accuracy and sensors, and the relatively small contemporary arsenals, mean that nuclear balances around the world—for example, between the United States and China, the United States and North Korea, and perhaps in the future between Iran and Israel—bear little resemblance to the Cold War superpower standoff. To illustrate the revolution in accuracy, in 2006 we modeled the hardest case for our claim: a hypothetical US first strike on the next largest nuclear arsenal in the world, that of Russia. The same models that were used during the Cold War to demonstrate the inescapability of stalemate—the condition of “mutual assured destruction,” or MAD—now suggested that even the large Russian arsenal could be destroyed in a disarming strike. 6 Furthermore, the dramatic leap in accuracy—which is the foundation for effective counterforce—is based on widely available technologies within reach of other nuclear-armed states, including Russia, China, Pakistan, and others. Our overriding message is not about the US-Russian nuclear balance per se. Rather, our point is that key beliefs about nuclear weapons have been overturned; scholars and analysts need to reexamine their underlying assumptions about nuclear stalemate and deterrence. Since 2006, we have discussed these issues with many nuclear analysts, US government officials, and military officers involved with the nuclear mission. Almost everything we learned reinforced our views about the counterforce revolution and suggests our earlier work understated the leap in US counterforce capabilities—with one exception. We previously argued that US “nuclear primacy”—the ability to use nuclear weapons to destroy the strategic forces of any other country—appeared to be an intentional goal of US policymakers. We noted that even as the United States greatly reduced its nuclear arsenal, it retained, and in some cases improved, those nuclear forces that were ideally suited to the counterforce mission. Based on what we have subsequently learned, we would recast and sharpen this part of our argument to contend that the United States is intentionally pursuing “strategic primacy”—meaning that Washington seeks the ability to defeat enemy nuclear forces (as well as other WMD)—but that US nuclear weapons are but one dimension of that effort. In fact, the effort to neutralize adversary strategic forces—that is, achieve strategic primacy—spans nearly every realm of warfare: for example, ballistic missile defense, antisubmarine warfare, intelligencesurveillance-and-reconnaissance systems, offensive cyber warfare, conventional precision strike, and long-range precision strike, in addition to nuclear strike capabilities.

#### War is inevitable and China will first strike, Air-Sea battle makes crises instability inevitable and escalate

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The specter of economic doomsday makes war between China and the United States as unthinkable as fear of nuclear doomsday made Soviet-U.S. war. Or does it? In fact, Chinese and American military planners are thinking in exquisite detail, as they are expected to do, about how to win such a conflict. The problem is that the specific plans being concocted could make hostilities less unthinkable, and two great powers with every reason to avoid war could find themselves in one.¶ Having been impotent against two U.S. aircraft carriers during the Taiwan crisis of 1996, the People's Liberation Army has concluded, as Chinese military writings show, that the best way to avoid another such humiliation is by striking U.S. forces before they strike China. While not seeking war, the Chinese especially dread a long one, in which the full weight of American military strength would surely prevail. So they are crafting plans and fielding capabilities to take out U.S. carriers, air bases, command-and-control networks and satellites early and swiftly.¶ China now has the economic and technological heft such a plan requires, and it is China's top defense priority. The Chinese military is deploying vast numbers of missiles (including carrier killers), hard-to-find submarines, long-range sensors to track and target U.S. forces, anti-satellite weapons, digital networks to coordinate attacks and cyberwar weapons to crash U.S. networks. When the Department of Defense announced its “Asia pivot” last year, it made it clear that defeating such capabilities is now a major focus of the U.S. military.¶ Because defending U.S. forces against such capabilities is so hard and expensive, Pentagon strategists have come up with the idea (known as air-sea battle) of crippling such forces — missile launchers, air bases, submarine pens and command-and-control centers — before they can be unleashed. Most of these targets are in China. As with the Chinese war plan, the idea is to strike with speed, fury and little warning.¶ Such China-U.S. reciprocal planning implies a textbook case of “crisis instability” in which the price for failing to attack before the opponent does is defeat. Each side knows the other is thinking the same way and so has all the more incentive to act preemptively if war seems imminent. Or probable. Or maybe just possible. Given the penalty for attacking second, such spiraling logic can turn confrontation into conflagration.

#### War with China is inevitable—successful Chinese strike will kill hegemony, crush the economy and cause biological and nuclear warfare

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In October 1991, China’s paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping, went to watch the test flight of the Jian-9 fighter in Sichuan. After watching the fighter’s takeoff, Deng said that the recent changes in Eastern Europe were due to economic problems. “The key was that the [Soviet] economy had long been in bad shape….” On its side, said Deng, China had solved its economic problem. The People’s Republic was growing, and so was its capacity for building advanced weapons. Soon China would be able to build a powerful air force. During the 1980s Chinese leaders often revealed the strategy behind their country’s economic opening to the West. In statement after statement, the Chinese Communists affirmed that they were taking a page out of Lenin’s playbook. In the early 1920s Lenin initiated the Soviet Union’s New Economic Policy (NEP), opening Russia to capitalist investment. As one might expect, the Soviet economy prospered during the NEP period and Russia was able to lay the foundations of its military industry. Due to its proven track record, something akin to Lenin’s NEP has been adopted by China. The Chinese leaders assured the Communist Party elite that this policy was ideologically “correct.” Learning from capitalism and drawing foreign capital to China would be the basis for China’s future military superiority. It took a long time for Deng’s ideas to win acceptance in China. At one point he was demoted from his leadership position. For many years, Chairman Mao Zedong, the founder of the People’s Republic, attempted to build Chinese industry with slogans and half-baked schemes. On 28 June 1958 he told his generals, “We must build big ships, and be prepared to land in Japan, the Philippines, and San Francisco.” He hoped that his new socialist China would be able to produce an enormous fleet. “The Pacific Ocean is not peaceful,” he said. “It can only be peaceful when we take it over.” Mao even asked the Russians for help. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev tried to dissuade him. “Build submarines and light ships armed with missiles,” said Khrushchev. “A big warship is a steel coffin.” The Russians tried to explain the costs and technical difficulties of warship construction. Mao was irritated by their tedious explanations and humiliated by Moscow’s suggestion that China could ill afford large warships. “I don’t need a fleet, then,” he sourly interjected during a meeting with Khrushchev. “I know guerrilla warfare. China can always retreat from the coast and fight a guerrilla war.” Mao was possessed by a grand dream. “We must control the earth,” he told his associates. But China was economically weak. The People’s Liberation Army was equipped with obsolete weapons. Mao’s Great Leap Forward and his Cultural Revolution produced economic chaos. It was not possible to catch up with America through ideological slogans and political enthusiasm. And so, Mao realized that Deng Xiaoping was correct after all. As the People’s Daily later explained, “whether a socialist country should make use of capitalism or not is a question which has long been resolved both in theory and practice. It is of even greater importance for an economically backward socialist country to solve the question correctly.” Mao was in a hurry and got nowhere. Deng Xiaoping was patient. He was the tortoise to Mao’s hare. In some situations an attempted shortcut is self-defeating. The Chinese leadership saw the wisdom of Deng’s strategy. “For a relatively long time,” said Gen. Mi Zhenyu, “it will be absolutely necessary that we quietly nurse our sense of vengeance…. We must conceal our abilities and bide our time.” And that is what the Chinese Communists have done. Mao’s dream of controlling the Pacific Ocean and landing in San Francisco isn’t as farfetched as it was in 1958. China has prepared a large merchant fleet. It was Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev who first advised Mao on this matter. “We believe one should build a merchant fleet with the view of using it for military goals.” And why should China build such a fleet? “To resolve the issue of America we must be able to transcend conventions and restrictions,” said Chinese Gen. Chi Haotian in a secret speech to Party cadres. “In history when a country defeated another country or occupied another country, it could not kill all the people in the conquered land, because back then you could not kill people effectively with sabers or long spears, or even with rifles or machine guns.” According to Gen. Chi, “Only by using non-destructive weapons that can kill many people will we be able to reserve America for ourselves. There has been rapid development of modern biological technology, and new bio-weapons have been invented one after another. Of course we have not been idle; in the past years we have seized the opportunity to master weapons of this kind. We are capable of achieving our purpose of ‘cleaning up’ America all of a sudden.” Like all prospective mass murderers, the Chinese Communists see themselves as humanitarians. And so, it is only natural for them to have qualms. Chi Haotian described the **inevitable fight between America and China is a** tragic **necessity**. He spoke of the horror and cruelty of the work ahead. “Biological weapons are unprecedented in their ruthlessness,” he acknowledged, “but if the Americans do not die then the Chinese have to die, and that figure would be more than 800 million people!” The Chinese land cannot support 1.3 billion inhabitants indefinitely. The eco-system of China is already collapsing. So China has no choice. “From a humanitarian perspective,” said Chi, “we should issue a warning to the American people and persuade them to leave America … to the Chinese people.” Of course, such a warning would hardly be effective. Therefore China has only one choice. “That is,” said Chi, “use decisive means to ‘clean up’ America, and reserve America for our use…. Our historical experience has proven that as long as we make it happen, nobody in the world can do anything about us. Furthermore, if the United States as the leader is gone, then other enemies have to surrender to us.” Of course, this plan of battle is very dangerous. The Chinese strategists are therefore prepared for two scenarios: (1) A successful surprise attack on America, with little loss to China; (2) Full-blown U.S. nuclear retaliation that would kill 650 million Chinese. In facing this situation, explained Gen. Chi, the Communist leadership must be fearless. “In Chinese history, in the replacement of dynasties, the ruthless have always won and the benevolent have always failed.” One must not be deterred by the human cost. Modern warfare is mass destruction warfare. It involves the mass killing of human beings. “Maybe we can put it this way,” explained Gen. Chi: “death is the engine that moves history forward. During the period of the Three Kingdoms, how many people died? When Genghis Khan conquered Eurasia, how many people died? When Manchu invaded the interior of China, how many people died?” Chi then admitted, “It is indeed brutal to kill one or two hundred million Americans. But that is the only path that will secure a Chinese century, a century in which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leads the world. We, as revolutionary humanitarians, do not want deaths. But if history confronts us with a choice between deaths of Chinese and those of Americans, we’d have to pick the latter…. That is because, after all, we are Chinese and members of the CCP….” The outline of China’s military strategy is clear. The Chinese are building a large navy with many merchant ships because they want to control the Pacific Ocean and transport millions of colonists to a depopulated North American shore. The biological weapons for “cleaning up” America have already been built. The destruction of America’s early warning system and the decapitation of the U.S. government can be achieved through “terrorist” strikes (i.e., by special forces commandos). There is also an economic dimension to the attack plan. First, do everything possible to hasten America’s financial collapse. (To this end the Americans have made their own special contribution). Second, the bankruptcy of the U.S. government naturally brings about the spontaneous strategic disarmament of the American military; third, use the Arab terrorist threat as a diversion so that the Americans will react against the wrong countries when they are attacked with biological weapons; and fourth, finish off the Americans when they are defenseless and disoriented. Once China has vaccinated its own soldiers the biological assault can begin. The plan has many risks, and the average American would readily dismiss such a plan as madness. But we all should be reminded of the madness of Hitler, who attempted to exterminate the Jews in Europe. It is hard to believe that someone would exterminate people who were quite harmless. However, that is exactly what happened. The Nazis built their edifice on the myth of Jewish malevolence. This served as their justification. The Nazis merely projected their own malevolence onto their intended victims. Today the agents of Communism have constructed their justification for the extermination of America. The Russians and Chinese, together with their allies in the Third World, have carefully laid out their case. We have all heard the anti-American propaganda. It is everywhere. According to this propaganda the Americans are imperialist aggressors. The Americans are murdering millions of people. The Americans are stealing the world’s resources. The Americans are the cause of global warming. The planet itself is doomed unless the Americans are eradicated. Here we find a variation on Hitler’s theme. Instead of blaming the Jews, it blames the Americans (and their Zionist allies). Instead of gas chambers and ovens **the perpetrators will use nuclear and biological weapons**. Instead of looting a minority community in the midst of Europe, an entire continent will be looted. The plan of war aims at plunder in the form of empty buildings, infrastructure, machines and real estate. With that plunder comes global dominance. I end this column with one last thought supplied by the Wall Street Journal on March 7. In a column titled “China’s Military Mystique” we read of China’s “rapidly increasing defense budget.” The Bush administration wants an explanation. Why is China building so many ships and guns and planes? Everyone assumes that China is building up to attack Taiwan. “But China’s military advances are no longer just about attacking Taiwan,” says the Journal. Having tantalized us with an intriguing tidbit of geopolitical algebra the Journal trails off in the direction of China’s anti-satellite weaponry. The American mind has yet to wrap itself around the concept of a genocidal WMD assault. We watch as the Chinese prepare to slaughter us. We blink and avert our gaze.

#### Extinction

**Ochs 02** – MA in Natural Resource Management from Rutgers University and Naturalist at Grand Teton National Park [Richard, “BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS MUST BE ABOLISHED IMMEDIATELY,” Jun 9, http://www.freefromterror.net/other\_articles/abolish.html]

Of all the weapons of mass destruction, the genetically engineered biological weapons, many without a known cure or vaccine, are an extreme danger to the continued survival of life on earth. Any perceived military value or deterrence pales in comparison to the great risk these weapons pose just sitting in vials in laboratories. While a "nuclear winter," resulting from a massive exchange of nuclear weapons, could also kill off most of life on earth and severely compromise the health of future generations, they are easier to control. Biological weapons, on the other hand, can get out of control very easily, as the recent anthrax attacks has demonstrated. There is no way to guarantee the security of these doomsday weapons because very tiny amounts can be stolen or accidentally released and then grow or be grown to horrendous proportions. The Black Death of the Middle Ages would be small in comparison to the potential damage bioweapons could cause. Abolition of chemical weapons is less of a priority because, while they can also kill millions of people outright, their persistence in the environment would be less than nuclear or biological agents or more localized. Hence, chemical weapons would have a lesser effect on future generations of innocent people and the natural environment. Like the Holocaust, once a localized chemical extermination is over, it is over. With nuclear and biological weapons, the killing will probably never end. Radioactive elements last tens of thousands of years and will keep causing cancers virtually forever. Potentially worse than that, bio-engineered agents by the hundreds with no known cure could wreck even greater calamity on the human race than could persistent radiation. AIDS and ebola viruses are just a small example of recently emerging plagues with no known cure or vaccine. Can we imagine hundreds of such plagues? HUMAN EXTINCTION IS NOW POSSIBLE. Ironically, the Bush administration has just changed the U.S. nuclear doctrine to allow nuclear retaliation against threats upon allies by conventional weapons. The past doctrine allowed such use only as a last resort when our nation’s survival was at stake. Will the new policy also allow easier use of US bioweapons? How slippery is this slope? Against this tendency can be posed a rational alternative policy. To preclude possibilities of human extinction, "patriotism" needs to be redefined to make humanity’s survival primary and absolute. Even if we lose our cherished freedom, our sovereignty, our government or our Constitution, where there is life, there is hope. What good is anything else if humanity is extinguished? This concept should be promoted to the center of national debate.. For example, for sake of argument, suppose the ancient Israelites developed defensive bioweapons of mass destruction when they were enslaved by Egypt. Then suppose these weapons were released by design or accident and wiped everybody out? As bad as slavery is, extinction is worse. Our generation, our century, our epoch needs to take the long view. We truly hold in our hands the precious gift of all future life. Empires may come and go, but who are the honored custodians of life on earth? Temporal politicians? Corporate competitors? Strategic brinksmen? Military gamers? Inflated egos dripping with testosterone? How can any sane person believe that national sovereignty is more important than survival of the species? Now that extinction is possible, our slogan should be "Where there is life, there is hope." No government, no economic system, no national pride, no religion, no political system can be placed above human survival. The egos of leaders must not blind us. The adrenaline and vengeance of a fight must not blind us. The game is over. If patriotism would extinguish

losing the weapons themselves.49 The stronger U.S. side, too, will face incentives to act first, though its considerations would be different

War now is comparatively better, prevents World War 3

Babbin and Timperlake ‘6

[Jed, former Deputy Undersecretary of Defense, and Edward, a vetran defense analyst, “War with China: not only possible, but inevitable Here's a guide to how it may happen -- and how we can win Showdown: Why China Wants War with the United States” www.hebookservice.com/products/bookpage.asp?prod\_cd=c6926]

Will the U.S. go to war with China? Yes, say Ed Timperlake and Jed Babbin. Timperlake (a veteran defense analyst) and Babbin (former Deputy Undersecretary of Defense) show in their new book Showdown: Why China Wants War with the United States that the Chinese want that war, and think they can win it -- and will keep pushing the United States until it begins. It's shaping up to be a huge struggle for democracy and freedom: between America's commitment to defend Taiwan at any cost and China's increasingly bellicose attempts to expand its commercial and military reach at American expense, war between the U.S. and China is now virtually inevitable. But in Showdown, Babbin and Timperlake offer indispensable strategies and tactics for how the U.S. can and must respond to the Chinese military threat. Babbin (author of Inside the Asylum: Why the UN and Old Europe Are Worse Than You Think) and Timperlake (co-author of the New York Times bestselling Year of the Rat and Red Dragon Rising) here bring you the very latest developments in China's quest to become a superpower. They explain the combination of alliances and global tinderboxes that could turn China's quest for superpower status into nothing less than World War III. They detail China's aggressive military buildup, revealing how it has been even more rapid than that of Nazi Germany before World War II. They also expose China's military and commercial maneuvering to outflank the United States -- much as the Soviet Union tried to do at the height of the Cold War. But Babbin and Timperlake, both of whom are military veterans, do much more than just offer expert analysis. In a dramatic style worthy of Tom Clancy, they take you into the field with Navy SEALs and Air Force bomber pilots, invite you inside the war councils at the White House and the Pentagon, and peer within China's own Politburo in an exciting -- and all too likely -- series of war scenarios stretching from a Chinese invasion of Taiwan in 2008 to its extension of total control over the Pacific region within a few years. This is by no means an exercise in fiction: these disturbing, gripping scenarios are based on the latest and most reliable intelligence -- and they make clear that China is an immense and immediate threat to America's national security. If we don't stop China now, the coming war could engulf the entire world (particularly since the Chinese post-Communist regime is happy to make common cause with the forces of the worldwide Islamic jihad). Provocative, thrilling, exhaustively documented and sobering, Showdown is a wake-up call for our elected officials -- and for everyone who loves America.

#### China is preparing for a cyber Spacewar- It ensures they beat the United States

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Translated report reveals high-tech plans for cyber attacks, anti-satellite strikes”, ¶ China’s military is preparing for war in cyberspace involving space attacks on satellites and the use of both military and civilian personnel for a digital “people’s war,” according to an internal Chinese defense report.¶ “As cyber technology continues to develop, cyber warfare has quietly begun,” the report concludes, noting that the ability to wage cyber war in space is vital for China’s military modernization.¶ According to the report, strategic warfare in the past was built on nuclear weapons. “But strategic warfare in the information age is cyber warfare,” the report said.¶ “With the reliance of information warfare on space, cyberspace will surely become a hot spot in the struggle for cyberspace control,” the report said.¶ The new details of Chinese plans for cyber and space warfare were revealed in a report “Study on Space Cyber Warfare” by four engineers working at a Chinese defense research center in Shanghai.¶ The report presents a rare inside look of one of Beijing’s most secret military programs: Cyber warfare plans against the United States in a future conflict.¶ “Cyber warfare is not limited to military personnel. All personnel with special knowledge and skills on information system may participate in the execution of cyber warfare. Cyber warfare may truly be called a people’s warfare,” the report says.¶ People’s War was first developed by China’s Communist founder Mao Zedong as a Marxist-Leninist insurgency and guerrilla warfare concept. The article provides evidence that Chinese military theorists are adapting Mao’s peasant uprising stratagem for a future conflict with the United States.¶ A defense official said the report was recently circulated in military and intelligence circles. Its publication came as a surprise to many in the Pentagon because in the past, U.S. translations of Chinese military documents on similar warfighting capabilities were not translated under a directive from policy officials seeking to prevent disclosure of Chinese military writings the officials feared could upset U.S.-China relations.¶ A Chinese government spokesman could not be reached for comment. However, Chinese spokesmen in the past have denied reports that China engages in cyber attacks.¶ The study links China’s space warfare development programs with its extensive cyber warfare capabilities. Both programs are considered “trump card” weapons that would allow a weaker China to defeat a militarily stronger United States in a conflict.¶ “Cyber warfare is an act of war that utilizes space technology; it combines space technology and cyber technology and maintains and seizes the control of cyberspace,” the study says.¶ Because cyberspace relies on satellites, “space will surely be the main battlefield of cyber warfare,” the report said.¶ Satellites and space vehicles are considered the “outer nodes” of cyber space and “are clear targets for attack and may be approached directly,” the report said, adding that ground-based cyberspace nodes are more concealed and thus more difficult to attack.¶ Additionally, satellites have limited defenses and anti-jamming capabilities, leaving them very vulnerable to attack.¶ The report reveals that China’s military, which controls the country’s rapidly growing space program, is preparing to conduct space-based cyber warfare—“cyber reconnaissance, jamming, and attack”—from space vehicles.¶ Space-based cyber warfare will include three categories: space cyber attack, space cyber defense, and space cyber support. The space cyber support involves reconnaissance, targeting, and intelligence gathering.¶ “A space cyber-attack is carried out using space technology and methods of hard kill and soft kill,” the report said. “It ensures its own control at will while at the same time uses cyberspace to disable, weaken, disrupt, and destroy the enemy’s cyber actions or cyber installations.”

**Extinction**

**Mitchell, et al 01** -Associate Professor of Communication and Director of Debate at the University of Pittsburgh

(Dr. Gordon, ISIS Briefing on Ballistic Missile Defence, “Missile Defence: Trans-Atlantic Diplomacy at a Crossroads”, No. 6 July, <http://www.isisuk.demon.co.uk/0811/isis/uk/bmd/no6.html>)

A buildup of space weapons might begin with noble intentions of 'peace through strength' deterrence, but this rationale glosses over the tendency that '… the presence of space weapons…will result in the increased likelihood of their use'.33 This drift toward usage is strengthened by a strategic fact elucidated by Frank Barnaby: when it comes to arming the heavens, 'anti-ballistic missiles and anti-satellite warfare technologies go hand-in-hand'.34 The interlocking nature of offense and defense in military space technology stems from the inherent 'dual capability' of spaceborne weapon components. As Marc Vidricaire, Delegation of Canada to the UN Conference on Disarmament, explains: 'If you want to intercept something in space, you could use the same capability to target something on land'. 35 To the extent that ballistic missile interceptors based in space can knock out enemy missiles in mid-flight, such interceptors can also be used as orbiting 'Death Stars', capable of sending munitions hurtling through the Earth's atmosphere. The dizzying speed of space warfare would introduce intense 'use or lose' pressure into strategic calculations, with the spectre of split-second attacks creating incentives to rig orbiting Death Stars with automated 'hair trigger' devices. In theory, this automation would enhance survivability of vulnerable space weapon platforms. However, by taking the decision to commit violence out of human hands and endowing computers with authority to make war, military planners could sow insidious seeds of accidental conflict. Yale sociologist Charles Perrow has analyzed 'complexly interactive, tightly coupled' industrial systems such as space weapons, which have many sophisticated components that all depend on each other's flawless performance. According to Perrow, this interlocking complexity makes it impossible to foresee all the different ways such systems could fail. As Perrow explains, '[t]he odd term "normal accident" is meant to signal that, given the system characteristics, multiple and unexpected interactions of failures are inevitable'.36Deployment of space weapons with pre-delegated authority to fire death rays or unleash killer projectiles would likely make war itself inevitable, given the susceptibility of such systems to 'normal accidents'. It is chilling to contemplate the possible effects of a space war. According to retired Lt. Col. Robert M. Bowman, 'even a tiny projectile reentering from space strikes the earth with such high velocity that it can do enormous damage — even more than would be done by a nuclear weapon of the same size!'. 37 In the same Star Wars technology touted as a quintessential tool of peace, defence analyst David Langford sees one of the most destabilizing offensive weapons ever conceived: 'One imagines dead cities of microwave-grilled people'.38 Given this unique potential for destruction, it is not hard to imagine that any nation subjected to space weapon attack would retaliate with maximum force, including use of nuclear, biological, and/or chemical weapons. An accidental war sparked by a computer glitch in space could plunge the world into the most destructive military conflict ever seen.

War with China now is key – solves nanotech wars that cause the end of American civilization

Interview with Navrozov author who extensively studied superweapons and won the Albert Einstein Prize for outstanding intellectual achievements, ‘3, [Lev, News Max, 9/26 “an interview on nanoweapons,” http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2003/9/25/210250.shtml]

RM: What countries are developing the post-nuclear superweapons involving nanotechnology? LN: It is worthwhile to speak only of China, Russia if dictatorship comes back to that country, and the United States if it awakens from its sleep, which may well be its last. To make the nanoweapons useful, a country must have the ability and the will to either world domination or to the defense against another country’s world domination. RM: What do you believe are the motives and goals of the countries that are developing the post-nuclear superweapons? LN: The national student movement of 1989, associated with Tiananmen Square, endangered the Chinese dictatorship more than any group in Soviet Russia endangered the Soviet dictatorship two years later. Yet the Soviet dictatorship fell. What a lesson for the Chinese dictators! We know authentic information about the Tiananmen Square movement from Zhang Liang’s publication "The Tiananmen Papers,” a 514-page collection of Chinese government documents. It is clear that the dictators of China saw how absolutism was endangered in China and understood that the only way to prevent future Tiananmens was to annihilate or subjugate the source of subversion, viz., the West. RM: What do you believe are going to be China’s next steps in terms of acquiring territory? LN: In contrast to Hitler, who stupidly grabbed the rump of Czechoslovakia in 1939, China has been very cautious in its territorial claims, since the position of China now is the best for the development of "Superweapon No. 3,” such as the nano superweapon. RM: Who does China see as allies and enemies? LN: The worst enemy is the democratic West, whose very existence produces Tiananmens able to destroy the Chinese dictatorship. The best ally is the democratic West, supplying China with everything necessary for the annihilation or subjugation of the democratic West. RM: Are the other post-nuclear weapons being researched to this day? If so, are they known? If not, can you enlighten us? LN: Since the nano "Superweapon No. 3” is a hypothesis, and not an absolute certainty, the Chinese Project 863 has been engaged in genetic engineering and at least six or seven other fields. RM: If China has or is close to, molecular nanotechnology to be used in war, what is the purpose of having a large, advanced conventional army and "traditional” nuclear weapons? LN: Eric Drexler, the Newton of nanotechnology, alive and enriching us with his wisdom, discusses the problem in his historic book of 1986 "Engines of Creation.” My assistant Isak Baldwin says that, according to Drexler, "A nation armed with molecular nanotechnology-based weapons would not require nuclear weapons to annihilate a civilization. In fact, it seems that a rather surgical system of seeking and destroying enemy human beings as cancerous polyps could be developed--leaving the nation’s infrastructure intact to be repopulated.” Nevertheless conventional weapons might be useful even on the "D-day,” after nanotechnology has been successfully weaponized. Conventional non-nuclear weapons have been useful even after 1945. Please recall that two "atom bombs” were delivered in 1945 by conventional U.S. bombers with conventional machine guns and all. RM: What beliefs or desires are motivating the rulers of China? The belief that Communism must triumph over Capitalism? LN: A New York taxi robber risks his life, life imprisonment, or death sentence to acquire the taxi driver’s $200. Hence the bulletproof partitions in taxis. The dictators of China defend not $200, but their power, which is worth trillions of dollars, apart from what cannot be expressed in terms of money (royal grandeur, cult, and glorification). Remember the French king who said, "The state – it is me”? Many dictators have been saying and can always say: "Communism/capitalism/democracy/ freedom/socialism/national socialism/our great country/the meaning of life/the goal of history – it is me." RM: If the U.S. is the most technologically advanced country, does this mean we have been surpassed? LN: The "most technologically advanced country” is an ambiguous generality. In the 1950s, Russia was still a technologically backward country, with most of its population deprived of running water, to say nothing of passenger cars. Yet it did not prevent Russia from outstripping the United States in space rocketry, when the Soviet space satellite was launched before its American counterpart. In its annual "Soviet Military Power,” to which I subscribed, the Pentagon could not help praising certain Soviet weapons as second to none in the world. RM: What today is holding China back from becoming overtly aggressive and reshaping the geopolitical world? LN: The dictators of China are not insane! China’s government-controlled "capitalist corporations” have been penetrating the entrails of the Western economies, absorbing the latest science and technology – or sometimes entire Western corporations, induced to operate in China on cheap local labor. To become "overtly aggressive”? What for? To invade Taiwan? To perish, along with the West, in Mutually Assured Destruction? No, the dictators of China are not insane! They are developing superweapons able to annihilate the Western means of nuclear retaliation.

Nuclear Winter theory was disproven and radiation won’t poison the earth

Nyquist, renowned expert in geopolitics and international relations, 99

[J.R., WorldNetDaily contributing editor and renowned expert in geopolitics and international relations, and author of Origins ofthe Fourth World War, “Is Nuclear War Survivable?”, <http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=19722>, AVLB]

Two researchers, Starley Thompson and Stephen Schneider, debunked the nuclear winter hypothesis in the summer 1986 issue of Foreign Affairs. Thompson and Schneider stated: "the global apocalyptic conclusions of the initial nuclear winter hypothesis can now be relegated to a vanishingly low level of probability." OK, so nuclear winter isn't going to happen. What about nuclear fallout? Wouldn't the radiation from a nuclear war contaminate the whole earth, killing everyone? The short answer is: absolutely not. Nuclear fallout is a problem, but we should not exaggerate its effects. As it happens, there are two types of fallout produced by nuclear detonations. These are: 1) delayed fallout; and 2) short-term fallout. According to researcher Peter V. Pry, "Delayed fallout will not, contrary to popular belief, gradually kill billions of people everywhere in the world." Of course, delayed fallout would increase the number of people dying of lymphatic cancer, leukemia, and cancer of the thyroid. "However," says Pry, "these deaths would probably be far fewer than deaths now resulting from ... smoking, or from automobile accidents." The real hazard in a nuclear war is the short-term fallout. This is a type of fallout created when a nuclear weapon is detonated at ground level. This type of fallout could kill millions of people, depending on the targeting strategy of the attacking country. But short-term fallout rapidly subsides to safe levels in 13 to 18 days. It is not permanent. People who live outside of the affected areas will be fine. Those in affected areas can survive if they have access to underground shelters. In some areas, staying indoors may even suffice.

### Solvency

#### The affirmative doesn’t not solve- it is not an NFU as their glaser evidence declares, the commitment to not first use is key. The plan preserves the legislatures ability to first use

#### First use option key to defelct asteroids

Ragheb, Professor of Nuclear, Plasma, and Radiological Engineering, Univ of Ill, ‘9

[M., 7/26/09, “Nuclear defense against stellar objects,” <https://netfiles.uiuc.edu/mragheb/www/NPRE%20402%20ME%20405%20Nuclear%20Power%20Engineering/Nuclear%20Defense%20Against%20Stellar%20Objects.pdf>]

The best way to deflect an asteroid up to a mile in width is to detonate a nuclear charge nearby in a standoff nuclear blast. The intense x ray radiation would be absorbed on the surface, vaporizing and ablating it. The expanding vapor from the sacrificial layer would generate a rocket action propelling the asteroid away from its trajectory. Notice that because of the absence of air in space no blast wave would be formed. A nuclear explosive would totally vaporize an object the size of the Tunguska comet around 150 feet.

#### **Extinction**

SAGAN & OSTRO, Cornell Astronomy and Space Sciences Professor & Cal Institute of Technology Jet Propolsion Lab Senior Research Scientist, 1994

[Carl & Steven, Issues in Science and Technology, Summer]

The evolution of life on Earth seems to have been profoundly altered by collisions with such bodies. The best-attested such event, and the single-most important reason that interplanetary collision hazards are being taken seriously today, is the Cretaceous-Tertiary (K-T) catastrophe of about 66 million years ago, in which all the dinosaurs and about 75 percent of the other species of life on Earth were rendered extinct. The events attendant to that impact are thought to include a global immolation of land plant life, widespread tsunamis, chaotic ocean mixing, a decline in light levels toward and below the compensation point of photosynthesis (below which plants burn more chemical energy than they store), short-term average global temperature declines of 10degC or more, global acid rain, significant depletion of the protective ozone layer, and prolonged carbon-dioxide-induced global warming. The relative hazards provided by each of these factors is unknown, but it seems likely that a quick succession of environmental catastrophes is nonlinearly more dangerous, because organisms immune to or only weakened by one assault may be finished off by the next. Even an impact much less severe than the K-T event would pose a serious threat to our global civilization.

### Heg Adv

#### Aff doesn’t solve conventional forces- nuclear weapons spending a drop in the bucket

Michaela Dodge and Baker Spring, 1-4-13 (Michaela Bendikova is Research Associate for Strategic Issues in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies. Baker Spring is F. M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security Policy in the Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, at The Heritage Foundation. ,“Bait and Switch on Nuclear Modernization Must Stop”, Heritage)

The FY 2013 budget request for the Weapons Activities account is $7.58 billion. Not all the activities funded from this program, however, contribute directly to advancing knowledge about how to create better nuclear weapons capabilities for the United States. This is despite the fact that one of the goals stated in the Program Overview and Benefits is to "support U.S. leadership in science and technology."[21]¶ It is important to recognize that many activities under the Weapons Activities program contribute to U.S. security but should not take priority over, or divert funding from, addressing broader nuclear weapons modernization problems the United States currently faces. For example, the Directed Stockpile work program's targeted outcomes are: (1) "complete annual assessments of the stockpile to ensure it is safe, secure, and effective" and (2) "complete by 2022 the dismantlement of all weapon systems retired prior to 2009." Dismantlement activities do not contribute to the modernization of the U.S. nuclear weapons program.[22]

#### Unparalleled conventional superiority now

Stimson Center 2009, nonprofit, nonpartisan institution devoted to enhancing international peace and security through a unique combination of rigorous analysis and outreach, http://www.stimson.org/space/?SN=WS20040504680

The United States enjoys unparalleled and unprecedented military superiority. The US will spend close to half a trillion dollars this year on defense (over three times more than Russia, its closest peer competitor). In the 2003 Iraqi war, 130,000 troops decimated opposing forces and occupied a country the size of Montana in three weeks.¶ US conventional superiority provides a powerful deterrent and response to any other state that seeks to damage US space assets-particularly when asymmetric attacks against US space assets are far easier to assign responsibility to than asymmetric warfare waged against soft targets here on earth.

#### AND --- will maintain superiority into the future

Zhang 8 - Baohui Zhang, Associate Professor of Political Science, Lingnan University, Hong Kong, March 2008, “The Taiwan Strait and the Future of China's No-First-Use Nuclear Policy,” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 27, No. 2, p. 164-182

The RMA thus presents a serious problem for China's military planners: how to defeat a technologically far superior enemy such as the United States. In fact, China is no longer confident it can defeat such an enemy due to the vast gap with the United States in conventional military technologies. As Lewis and Xue observe, “As senior PLA planners dissected the American strategy from the Gulf War of 1991 to the lightening war against Iraq in 2003, it was to become painfully evident that no war with the United States could be won or even brought to a reasonable draw.”19¶ This bleak assessment by Chinese officers of the U.S. conventional dominance in the Taiwan Strait is echoed by American analysis. In a research project for the U.S. Department of Defense, the Rand Corporation analyzed how China may choose to conduct a war against the American military. According to Rand, in the coming decades the U.S. will possess “even greater military advantages over Chinese forces than it currently enjoys.”20 Therefore, if the China intends to fight the U.S. through conventional military modernization, “this option, taken alone, potentially condemns the PLA to evolving relative obsolescence.”21

#### Conventional wars against nuclear-armed adversaries require primacy to control escalation---otherwise adversaries will use nuclear weapons first

Lieber and Press 10 – Keir A. Lieber, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame, and Daryl G. Press, Associate Professor of Political Science at Dartmouth College, March/April 2010, “Second Strike: Is the U.S. Nuclear Arsenal Outmoded?,” Foreign Affairs

Nuclear weapons are a boon for vulnerable states. During the Cold War, the United States deployed them in Europe to defend NATO because Soviet conventional forces seemed overwhelming. Now, the tables are turned: the United States' potential adversaries see nuclear weapons as a vital tool to counter U.S. conventional military superiority. Facing defeat on the battlefield, adversaries would have powerful incentives to use nuclear forces coercively, just as NATO planned to do during the Cold War. The fates of Manuel Noriega, Slobodan Milosevic, Radovan Karadzic, and Saddam Hussein have taught a grim lesson: use every weapon at your disposal to prevent defeat.¶ When Jan Lodal and James Acton call for the elimination or devaluation of nuclear weapons, they assume that U.S. adversaries can be convinced to accept perpetual vulnerability. The Soviet Union could not talk NATO into surrendering its nuclear arsenal during the Cold War, nor can the United States dupe its adversaries into disarming today. The challenge is to grapple with the problem of deterring nuclear escalation during conventional wars, when U.S. adversaries will have every incentive to use their nuclear arsenals to compel a cease-fire. Toward this end, Washington must retain a range of counterforce capabilities, including conventional and low-casualty nuclear weapons.¶ Hans Kristensen, Matthew McKinzie, and Ivan Oelrich raise several technical objections concerning the United States' ability to launch a successful counterforce strike. They dispute whether 3,000 pounds per square inch (PSI) of overpressure produced by low-yield airbursts would be enough to wreck Chinese silos. The use of 3,000 PSI in our model, however, is conservative. Many analysts believe that U.S. Cold War estimates exaggerated the hardness of enemy silos, and analysts with considerable technical expertise on this matter believe that our estimated requirement of 3,000 PSI probably overstates the hardness of China's silos. Most important, our results are not sensitive to moderate changes in assumptions about silo hardness. The United States could conduct a low-casualty nuclear strike--producing fewer than 1,000 fatalities--against all 20 Chinese silos even if they were built to withstand 5,000 PSI.¶ Kristensen, McKinzie, and Oelrich also contend that airbursts alone cannot destroy missile silos. This is incorrect. Airbursts can produce sufficient overpressure to crush the caps that protect missiles in the ground. In fact, the Pentagon assigns "vulnerability numbers" to silos on the basis of their resistance to overpressure. And McKinzie co-authored a 2001 Natural Resources Defense Council report that contradicts the claims that he, Kristensen, and Oelrich make here. The report listed the overpressures required to destroy various Russian missile silos, and it argued that even Russia's silos--which are probably much more robust than China's--are highly vulnerable to a U.S. airburst attack.¶ Our critics further suggest that the existence of mobile missiles obviates our analysis. If the launchers can be located, the argument goes, conventional weapons are sufficient to destroy them; if the launchers cannot be found, even nuclear weapons are useless. But the greatest challenge of targeting mobile missiles is not locating them momentarily; it is continuously tracking them and identifying where they have stopped. Hitting mobile launchers with conventional weapons requires near-perfect real-time intelligence--locating them within a few dozen yards. Even low-yield nuclear warheads would significantly reduce the targeting problem; locating the launchers within about half a mile would suffice if a five-kiloton warhead were used.¶ Kristensen, McKinzie, and Oelrich also note that the U.S. military's current delivery systems are not optimized for a counterforce mission: the most accurate systems (bombs and cruise missiles) are not prompt, and the most prompt systems (ballistic missiles) are not the most accurate. This is true. But current U.S. delivery systems are adequate given the weakness of the adversaries the United States now faces. If Washington wishes to retain effective low-casualty counterforce options, the next generation of nuclear delivery systems should further combine prompt delivery with high accuracy.¶ Lodal tries to link our discussion of counterforce options with the views held by senior officials in the George W. Bush administration. The fact of the matter is that nuclear counterforce options have been a core element of U.S. deterrence doctrine during every administration since Harry Truman's. U.S. strategic planners have understood that for deterrence to be credible, the president needs retaliatory options that he might actually use. Especially today, low-yield nuclear counterforce strikes are a better retaliatory option than high-yield nuclear strikes that, regardless of their target, would kill millions of civilians. The latter would be a disproportionate response to many possible enemy uses of nuclear weapons.¶ Critics of our policy prescriptions must confront two core issues. First, nuclear weapons have fundamentally changed since the Cold War. They once produced stalemate, and nuclear war once meant mass slaughter. For good or ill, that has changed. The revolution in accuracy means that enemy arsenals can be destroyed, and in ways that produce few civilian casualties. Theories of deterrence and beliefs about strategic stability and nuclear force requirements must be reevaluated accordingly.¶

#### U.S. nuclear primacy prevents nuclear war over Taiwan---the war likely wouldn’t break out and wouldn’t escalate if it did

Lieber and Press 7 - Keir A. Lieber, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame, and Daryl G. Press, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, Winter 2007, “U.S. Nuclear Primacy and the Future of the Chinese Deterrent,” China Security, Issue No. 5, online: http://www.wsichina.org/cs5\_5.pdf

Ironically, one of the clearest explanations for how the United States may use nuclear primacy in a crisis or war with China appears in an earlier article by Blair. His recent article with Chen labels our suggestion that the United States might use nuclear threats “the zenith of provocation” and “unthinkable.”23 However, in the autumn 2005 issue of China Security, Blair describes exactly the crisis dynamics we envision leading to U.S. nuclear threats and perhaps even a preemptive nuclear attack. He notes that if China were to alert its strategic nuclear forces during a war with the United States over Taiwan, “the United States would likely act to beat China to the punch.” He continues, “Given constant U.S. surveillance of Chinese nuclear launch sites, any major Chinese preparations to fire peremptorily would be detected and countered by a rapid U.S. preemptive strike against the sites by U.S. conventional or nuclear forces… The United States could easily detect and react inside of the lengthy launch cycle time of Chinese forces.”24¶ Blair’s words mirror our argument and suggest the two ways that nuclear primacy may benefit the United States. First, if the Chinese were to threaten nuclear escalation in the context of a Taiwan war, the U.S. could strike first and likely destroy the Chinese force on the ground – “beat China to the punch,” as Blair puts it. Second, China’s knowledge of its vulnerability to nuclear preemption might prevent China from alerting its nuclear force – or even attacking Taiwan – in the first place.¶

#### War over Taiwan is structurally inevitable---U.S. conventional superiority ensures China will rollback their NFU and escalate to nuclear war ¶

Zhang 8 - Baohui Zhang, Associate Professor of Political Science, Lingnan University, Hong Kong, March 2008, “The Taiwan Strait and the Future of China's No-First-Use Nuclear Policy,” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 27, No. 2, p. 164-182¶ For the above reasons the no-first-use principle remained unchallenged until the 1990s, when a series of new issues began to force some in China to rethink its nuclear principles. These include the ascendance of the Taiwan issue as the central security challenge for China (and, as a result, the increased likelihood of American military intervention in the Taiwan Strait), and the revolution in military affairs (RMA) that has given the United States vast conventional advantage over China. ¶ According to John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, during the 1990s Taiwan's tendency to move toward de jure independence led to an increasingly pessimistic view inside China that the Taiwan issue could not be peacefully resolved. More and more Chinese analysts believed that, due to the internal political dynamics of a democratic Taiwan and the rise of Taiwanese identity among its people, peaceful reunification between Taiwan and the mainland has become increasingly hopeless.13 In fact, Jiang Zemin made the famous remark that “a war across the Taiwan Strait is unavoidable.”14 As a result, Taiwan has become the number-one security issue for China, and preparing for a war to prevent Taiwan's independence has become an obsession of the Chinese leadership and military.¶ The problem for China is that it also increasingly believes that American military intervention can be expected in the event of war in the Taiwan Strait. Inside the Chinese military, due to “America's proclaimed geostrategic interests and recent military actions the prevailing opinion was that U.S. forces would undoubtedly intervene.”15 This scenario presents an extremely daunting challenge: how to defeat the world's most powerful military. This task is particularly daunting since the Chinese military recognizes that the revolution in military affairs has given the United States vast advantages over China. According to military observers, the 1991 Gulf War and the 1999 NATO war against Serbia demonstrated the revolutionary change in warfare through the use of precision-guided weapons linked to information technologies in areas such as intelligence, command and control, and weapon guidance. The Chinese military was keenly aware of the new trend and organized systematic studies of how the American military conducted its operations in this new kind of war.16¶ In fact, the Chinese military was awed by the American dominance in conventional warfare. As observed by General Wang Baocun, a prominent strategist at the PLA Academy of Military Sciences, the U.S. revolution in military affairs has resulted in a new kind of gap with other countries. Previously, the gap was merely generational. This time, there is a “time gap” in that the U.S. military and others are fighting as if they were from different historical periods. According to Wang, “The time gap in military technologies allows the superior side to possess an absolute advantage while leaving the other side in a position of absolute disadvantage. … The time gap makes it impossible for developing countries to overcome their military disadvantage in confrontations with the United States.” Wang thus reaches a gloomy conclusion: “The military time gap results in serious threats to the national and military security of developing countries. In fact, they are almost in a defenseless situation.”17¶ Major General Xu Hezhen, who is the Commandant of PLA Army Command Academy in Shijiazhuang, suggests that the RMA allows the U.S. to conduct “no-contact combat” against other militaries through beyond visual range sensor technologies and precision-strike weapons. This revolution in combat “creates a battlefield situation where 'I can see you and hit you but you can't see me and hit back. The situation leaves the weaker side in a position of perpetual disadvantage until it loses the will of resistance.”18¶ The RMA thus presents a serious problem for China's military planners: how to defeat a technologically far superior enemy such as the United States. In fact, China is no longer confident it can defeat such an enemy due to the vast gap with the United States in conventional military technologies. As Lewis and Xue observe, “As senior PLA planners dissected the American strategy from the Gulf War of 1991 to the lightening war against Iraq in 2003, it was to become painfully evident that no war with the United States could be won or even brought to a reasonable draw.”19¶ This bleak assessment by Chinese officers of the U.S. conventional dominance in the Taiwan Strait is echoed by American analysis. In a research project for the U.S. Department of Defense, the Rand Corporation analyzed how China may choose to conduct a war against the American military. According to Rand, in the coming decades the U.S. will possess “even greater military advantages over Chinese forces than it currently enjoys.”20 Therefore, if the China intends to fight the U.S. through conventional military modernization, “this option, taken alone, potentially condemns the PLA to evolving relative obsolescence.”21¶ How to prevent a disastrous defeat in the Taiwan Strait led some in China to question the separation of conventional and nuclear doctrines in Chinese military thinking. While the no-first-use policy can prevent a nuclear attack against China, it cannot deter a large-scale conventional war by a technologically superior enemy. Some believe that the policy can no longer protect China's core national interests, such as preventing de jure independence of Taiwan. According to Alastair Iain Johnston, who was the first Western analyst to notice this trend in the 1990s, some Chinese strategists began to argue that China should develop a nuclear doctrine “suitable for economically and technologically weak states.”22

#### China would perceive any decline in primacy as a green-light to attack Taiwan

CAGS, Center on American and Global Security, 2009, Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Future of U.S. National Security: From Present Problems to Future Challenges, http://www.indiana.edu/~cags/docs/WMDReportFINAL.pdf

Third, the impact of China’s achievement of MAD with the United States would affect calculations concerning unresolved territorial disputes in Asia, especially concerning Taiwan. Under the scenario, the balance of conventional and nuclear forces in Asia has shifted away from the United States towards China, perhaps **increasing China’s willingness to risk conventional war to settle the Taiwan issue** or other territorial disputes it has. The bet would be that the United States would not risk nuclear war with China over Taiwan once China achieves MAD status. This incentive could be another factor influencing China’s decision to go for MAD. However, there is no precedent for determining the escalation risks of two established nuclear powers fighting a conventional war.4

#### Nuclear primacy’s key to hegemony

Craig 9 – Campbell Craig, Professor of International Relations at the University of Southampton, 2009, “American power preponderance and the nuclear revolution,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 35, p. 35-36

As Keir Lieber and Daryl Press have suggested, the US may be on the verge of acquiring a first-strike nuclear capability, which, combined with an effective system of anti-ballistic missile defence, could allow the US to destroy a rival’s nuclear capabilities and intercept any remaining retaliatory missiles before they hit American cities. While this possibility clearly reduces the likelihood of other states seeking to match American power with the aim of fighting and winning a nuclear war, and, if their argument becomes widely accepted, could lead American policy-makers to reject the logic of the nuclear revolution and consider pre-emptive nuclear strikes against large nuclear rivals, it clearly is less germane to the question of small-state deterrence.33 Lieber and Press contend that the US may have the capability to destroy the entire nuclear arsenal of another large nuclear state lest that state use it on America first for the purposes of winning a great war. That, as they say, would mean the end of Mutual Assured Destruction as it existed during the Cold War. However, Washington would have much less reason to use its new first-strike capability against a nation that cannot threaten to destroy the US, and has no ambition to defeat America in a war, but only possesses a second-strike minimum deterrent. Such an attack would turn much of the world against a US willing to use nuclear weapons and kill hundreds of thousands or millions in order to defeat a nation that did not threaten its survival. Perhaps more to the point, an attack like this would be tremendously risky. Even after a perfect first strike some retaliation might get through, which could mean the nuclear destruction of an American city or perhaps the city of an American ally. At the very least, survivors of the attacked state and their allies would seek to unleash destruction upon the US in other ways, including an unconventional delivery of a nuclear, chemical, or biological weapon. An imperfect first strike, or, even worse, a failure of the US anti-missile system, would constitute a total disaster for the US: not only would it incur the world’s wrath and suffer the destruction of one or more of its cities, but such a failure would also expose America as both a brutal and vulnerable state, surely encouraging other states to acquire nuclear weapons or otherwise defy it. The US might have reason to launch a first strike against a large rival that deployed a major arsenal and appeared ready to attack America, as implausible as this scenario is. It would have little reason to do so against a small nation with a second-strike minimum deterrent arsenal.¶ The nuclear revolution delivers a clear message to any large state considering major war with a powerful nuclear rival. The message is that such a war is likely to escalate to total nuclear exchange, and that in this event a large percentage of its citizenry will be killed or injured, its ability to govern what remains of the nation will be weakened or destroyed, and its power relative to other states that stayed out of the war will be radically diminished. It also delivers a message to any advanced small state eager to obtain security from the possible predation of large ones. The message is that if the small state possesses, or can quickly get its hands on, a few invulnerable and deliverable nuclear weapons, any large state contemplating invading it will have to weigh the benefits of invasion against a new kind of cost – not just a difficult or stalemated conventional war, such as the US faced in Vietnam and faces in Iraq, but the destruction of perhaps one, three, or five of its cities, and the death and injury of millions of its citizens. Unless it is able to obtain an absolutely fool-proof defence against any kind of nuclear retaliation, the choice that any large state is going to make when faced with this new circumstance is so likely to be peace that the small nuclear state can feel confident that it will be safe from conquest.34¶ The general relevance of these messages to American unipolar preponderance is clear. At the ‘great power’ level, rising states are unlikely to regard major war as a suitable means for overturning the international system and overthrowing American preponderance. The classic means of systemic change – hegemonic war – will not be an attractive option to any state hoping to survive, and the very existence of nuclear arsenals will make all states cautious about provoking conflict with nuclear rivals, especially the heavily armed US.35 Moreover, advanced smaller states know that they can provide for their own security, if they come to believe that it is endangered, not by embarking on large military build-ups or forming alliances with larger states, but by developing a small and invulnerable nuclear arsenal, or at least preparing the way to obtain such an arsenal quickly. This means that small states have a far greater ability to defend themselves from, and therefore be less afraid of, American predation today than comparable states facing dominant powers in previous eras.36¶ The main effects of the nuclear revolution, then, bolster the general claim of Power Preponderance that unipolarity is enduring. To support their claim, Brooks and Wohlforth specify three factors that dissuade would-be rivals to the US from balancing against it in traditional military terms: the effect of America’s relative geographical isolation from these potential rivals; the fact that American preponderance happened as a fait accompli about which no other nation could do anything; and the vast and growing ‘power gap’ between the US and all other rivals. The next section will describe each factor, and show how the nuclear revolution specifically reinforces each of them.

### Non Prolif Adv

1. Turn—A. Prolif is slow—Attempts to stop it are damaging   
Mueller, Prof of Political Science, Ohio State University 8

[John, “The Costs And Consequences Of Efforts To Prevent Proliferation,” Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSA08.pdf 7.16 T.a]

Since 1945 nuclear proliferation has been a major security policy preoccupation. However, compared to the dire predictions endlessly and urgently spun out over the decades, remarkably few countries have taken advantage of the opportunity actually to develop the weapons. Most important in this process perhaps is the realization, consistently underestimated by generations of somber alarmists, that the possession of such expensive armaments actually conveys in almost all cases rather little advantage to the possessor. Nuclear proliferation, while not necessarily desirable, is unlikely to accelerate or prove to be a major danger. However, the anxious quest to prevent the spread of these weapons has proved to be substantially counterproductive and has often inflicted dire costs.

b. That solves war

Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, 1995, p. 42

I have argued that the gradual spread of nuclear weap­ons is better than either no spread or rapid spread. We do not face happy choices. We may prefer that countries have conventional weapons only, do not run arms races, and do not fight. Yet the alternative to nuclear weapons may be ruinous arms races for some countries with a high risk of their becoming engaged in devastating con­ventional wars.

\*\*\*2. Turn—A. **Plan causes bioweapons\*\*\***

**Zilinskas Director, CBW Nonprolif Program, 2000**

[After earning a Ph.D. in 1981, Dr. Zilinskas worked at the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment (1981 - 1982), the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (1982 - 1986), and the Center for Public Issues in Biotechnology, University of Maryland Biotechnology Institute. In addition, while at Maryland he was an Adjunct Associate Professor at the Department of International Health, School of Hygiene and Public Health, the Johns Hopkins University. In 1993, Dr. Zilinskas was appointed a William Foster Fellow at the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), where he worked on biological and toxin warfare issues. In April 1994, ACDA seconded Dr. Zilinskas to the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) for seven months, during which time he participated in two biological warfare-related inspections in Iraq (June and October 1994) encompassing 61 biological research and production facilities. At UNSCOM headquarters, he set up a database containing data about key dual-use biological equipment in Iraq and developed a protocol to guide UNSCOM's on-going monitoring and verification program in the biological field. After the fellowship ended, Dr. Zilinskas returned to the Center for Public Issues in Biotechnology and Johns Hopkins University. In addition, he became a long-term consultant to ACDA (which now is part of the U.S Department of State), for which he carried out studies on Cuban allegations of U.S. biological attacks against its people, animals, and plants and investigations carried out by the United Nations of chemical warfare in Southeast Asia and the Arabian Gulf region. Dr. Zilinskas remains to this day a consultant to the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Department of Defense. On September 1, 1998, Dr. Zilinskas began working as a Senior Scientist in Residence at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS), Monterey, CA. His research focuses on achieving effective biological arms control, the proliferation potential of the former Soviet Union's biological warfare program, and meeting the threat of bioterrorism. He also is a Research Professor at the Graduate School of International Politics at MIIS, where he teaches courses on biological and chemical weapons and arms control and emerging issues in international public health. Biological Warfare: Modern Offense and Defense p1-2]

There are many who believe that today’s bioscientists and chemical engineers working in unison and wielding the techniques of molecular biology developed since the early 1970s could, if so commanded, develop militarily effective biological weapons within a fairly short time. If this supposition is correct, our perception of biological weapons as being undependable, uncontrollable and unreliable must change. The reason is simple: if these weapons are demonstrated to possess properties that make it possible for commanders to effect controlled, confined mass destruction on command, all governments would be forced to construct defenses against them and some undoubtedly would be attempted to arm their military with these weapons that would be both powerful and relatively inexpensive to acquire. Ironically, as tougher international controls are put into place to deter nations from seeking to acquire chemical and nuclear weapons, leaders may be even more drawn to biological arms as the most accessible form of weapon of mass destruction.

\*\*\*B.Bio attack causes extinction—could kill all health care workers making treatment and quarantine impossible.\*\*\*

Posner, federal appeals circuit judge who has written books on a variety of legal and social issues, 4 [Richard, *Catastrophe: Risk and Response*, Oxford University Press]

Yet before any of these dramatic climatic changes occurred, the human race might have exterminated itself through engineered plagues devised and disseminated by lunatics inspired with apocalyptic visions: With the aid of gene-splicing kits stolen from high school classrooms, religious terrorists and rogue scientists create a strain of the smallpox vaccine that is incurable, is immune to vaccine, and kills all its victims, rather than just 30 percent as in the case of natural smallpox. In a single round-the-world flight, a biological Unabomber, dropping off inconspicuous aerosol dispensers in major airports, infects several thousand people with the juiced-up smallpox. In the 12 to 14 days before symptoms appear, each of the initially infected victims infects five or six others, who in turn infect five or six others, and so on. Within a month more than 100 million people are infected, including almost all health workers and other "first responders," making it impossible to establish and enforce a quarantine. Before a vaccine or cure can be found, all but a few human beings, living in remote places, have died. Lacking the requisite research skills and production facilities, the remnant cannot control the disease and soon succumb as well.

3. We Have Never Threatened Nuclear First Use Against NonNuclear Weapon States – Proves No Internal Link to Prolif

Scoblic 2003 (J. Peter, Editor of Arms Control Today, Christian Science Monitor, February)  
For decades, under both Republican and Democratic presidents, the **US has promised not to use nuclear weapons that do not have them and are not allied with nuclear-weapon states.** There has been only one exception to this rule: If a nonnuclear state attacks it with a chemical or biological weapon, the US has hinted it might retaliate with nuclear weapons. **The Bush administration** recently reiterated this caveat, but it has never otherwise threatened nonnuclear states with nuclear weapons**.**For example, **President Bush has never publicly linked his new doctrine of preemption with the use of nuclear weapons.** Even the leaked version of the Pentagon's "nuclear posture review,**"** which was sharply criticized last spring for listing seven nations against which the US should be prepared to use nuclear weapons, did not authorize nuclear preemption against non-nuclear-weapon states.

4. Prolif inevitable

Graham Allison, Professor of Government at Harvard, 2006 Harvard International Review, "The Will to Prevent", Fall

In preparing for the 60th anniversary of the United Nations, Secretary-General Kofi Annan established a panel of leading thinkers to assess global threats to the world’s more than six billion people. The Commission gave primacy of place to renewed nuclear danger, driven by the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the possibility of nuclear terrorist attacks, warning starkly that the nonproliferation regime has eroded to the point of “irreversibility” that could trigger a “cascade of proliferation.” How might such a catastrophic cascade occur? Simply by continuing the trends of the past decade. North Korea’s nuclear test on October 9 announced the arrival of a “new nuclear age,” in the words of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Like a bolt of lightening that illuminates the landscape, this blast exposes deep fissures in the regime that has held back the nuclear tide for more than four decades. In essence, Kim Jong-Il has forced entry into the nuclear club, and his successful defiance will fuel further challenges to the international system and the global nuclear order. North Korea has successfully defied not just its NPT commitment and the IAEA, but the United States, China, and the world. US intelligence analysts now estimate that North Korea has enough plutonium for eight to ten weapons. This includes two weapons worth that went missing in 1999; six bombs worth that had been frozen in warehouses under the 1994 Agreed Framework and constantly inspected by the IAEA until 2003 when North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty; and two bombs worth of material in spent fuel unloaded in February 2006. The Yongbyon reactor, on standby for most of the 90’s, is now churning out enough plutonium for two more bombs a year. If, despite unambiguous warnings to North Korea, the United States and the world cannot roll back Pyongyang’s nuclear advances, the United States’ ability to deter the North from using a weapon will be in doubt. The governments of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have so far reiterated their societies’ long-standing commitment to reject nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, my best bet is that over the decade ahead, both Japan and South Korea will arm themselves with nuclear weapons—undermining the security and stability that has been the foundation of East Asia’s extraordinary economic growth.

5. Prefer our alternate causalities, can’t stop a determined state from going nuclear

Waltz 95

(Kenneth N. Waltz - adjunct professor of political science @ Columbia, senior research scholar in the Institute of War and Peace - 1995 “Peace, Stability, and Nuclear Weapons” Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation IGCC Policy Papers # PP15)

Nuclear weapons continue to spread ever so slowly, and the world seems to fare better as they do so. Yet the rapid spread—that is, the proliferation—of nuclear weapons remains a frightening prospect; the mind boggles at the thought of all or most countries having them. Whatever the policies of the United States and other countries may be, that prospect is hardly even a distant one. Many more countries can make nuclear weapons than do. One can believe that American opposition to nuclear arming stays the deluge only by overlooking the complications of international life. Any state has to examine many conditions before deciding whether or not to develop nuclear weapons. Our opposition is only one factor and is not likely to dissuade a determined state from seeking the weapons. Many states feel fairly secure living with their neighbors. Why should they want nuclear weapons? The answer usually given is “for prestige.” Yet it is hard to imagine a country entering the difficult and risky nuclear military business mainly for the sake of buoying its amour propre and gaining the attention that doing so may bring. We can play King Canute if we wish to, but like him, we will be unable to hold the (nuclear) tides at bay.