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#### Interpretation- “War powers authority” is explicitly delegated authority from Congress or the Constitution

Bahr and Blackman 2010 (Elizabeth and Josh, Assistant Counsel, Department of the Navy General Counsel; George¶ Mason University School of Law, J.D., May 2009; and Law Clerk for the Honorable Kim R. Gibson, U.S. District Court for¶ the Western District of Pennsylvania; George Mason University School of Law,¶ J.D., magna cum laude; Youngstown's Fourth Tier: Is There a¶ Zone of Insight Beyond the Zone of¶ Twilight?\*; 40 U. Mem. L. Rev. 541 2009-2010)

Hamdi also implicitly invoked a Youngstown Tier Four¶ scenario. He insisted that "[i]t is well-settled ... that 'the phrase¶ war power cannot be invoked as a talismanic incantation to support¶ any exercise of . . . power which can be brought within its ambit.'¶ ' 267 Citing Youngstown, Hamdi argued, "[b]ecause the Executive's¶ power 'must stem either from an act of Congress or from the¶ Constitution itself,' and the authority to indefinitely detain [him] is¶ derived from neither source, his detention is illegal., 268 Hamdi thus¶ asked the Court to make a ruling as to the scope and limit of the¶ President's unenumerated Article II war powers.

#### Authority REQUIRES delegation

Kelly, 2003 (judge for the State of Michigan, JOSEPH ELEZOVIC, Plaintiff, and LULA ELEZOVIC, Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY and DANIEL P. BENNETT, Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants., No. 236749, COURT OF APPEALS OF MICHIGAN, 259 Mich. App. 187; 673 N.W.2d 776; 2003 Mich. App. LEXIS 2649; 93 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 244; 92 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1557, lexis)

Applying agency principles, a principal is responsible for the acts of its agents done within the scope of the agent's authority, "even though acting contrary to instructions." [Dick Loehr's, Inc v Secretary of State, 180 Mich. App. 165, 168; 446 N.W.2d 624 (1989)](https://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=6cbcd97524abff5644c0987b135f7517&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b259%20Mich.%20App.%20187%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_butType=3&_butStat=2&_origin=TOASHLX&_butNum=115&_butInline=1&_butinfo=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b180%20Mich.%20App.%20165%2cat%20168%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=136&_startdoc=101&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkAk&_md5=708331d40466e4347936b73e103c82fb). This is because, in part, an agency relationship arises where the principal [\*\*\*36]  has the right to control the conduct of the agent. [St Clair Intermediate School Dist v Intermediate Ed Ass'n/Michigan Ed Ass'n, 458 Mich. 540, 558 n 18; 581 N.W.2d 707 (1998)](https://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=6cbcd97524abff5644c0987b135f7517&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b259%20Mich.%20App.%20187%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_butType=3&_butStat=2&_origin=TOASHLX&_butNum=116&_butInline=1&_butinfo=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b458%20Mich.%20540%2cat%20558%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=136&_startdoc=101&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkAk&_md5=c0a63a81a484a6ce53be229bc2290a07) (citations omitted). The employer is also liable for the torts of his employee if "'the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal and there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation,'" [McCann v Michigan, 398 Mich. 65, 71; 247 N.W.2d 521 (1976)](https://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=6cbcd97524abff5644c0987b135f7517&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b259%20Mich.%20App.%20187%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_butType=3&_butStat=2&_origin=TOASHLX&_butNum=117&_butInline=1&_butinfo=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b398%20Mich.%2065%2cat%2071%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=136&_startdoc=101&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkAk&_md5=5219d53b6a7119254f8041c911d87fd2), quoting [Restatement of Agency, 2d § 219(2)(d)](https://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=6cbcd97524abff5644c0987b135f7517&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b259%20Mich.%20App.%20187%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_butType=4&_butStat=0&_origin=TOASHLX&_butNum=118&_butInline=1&_butinfo=AGENCY%20SECOND%20219&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=136&_startdoc=101&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkAk&_md5=71c1bf8c001fe5ae1153be4268b8e9e9), p 481; see also [Champion v Nation Wide Security, Inc, 450 Mich. 702, 704, 712; 545 N.W.2d 596 (1996)](https://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=6cbcd97524abff5644c0987b135f7517&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b259%20Mich.%20App.%20187%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_butType=3&_butStat=2&_origin=TOASHLX&_butNum=119&_butInline=1&_butinfo=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b450%20Mich.%20702%2cat%20704%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=136&_startdoc=101&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkAk&_md5=3d1841dc7f4fb90804d8adb6349a6fae), citing [Restatement of Agency, 2d § 219(2)(d)](https://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=6cbcd97524abff5644c0987b135f7517&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b259%20Mich.%20App.%20187%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_butType=4&_butStat=0&_origin=TOASHLX&_butNum=120&_butInline=1&_butinfo=AGENCY%20SECOND%20219&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=136&_startdoc=101&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkAk&_md5=c1927abf5bf3954a85d211c044ada141), p 481 ("the master is liable for the tort of his servant if the servant 'was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation'"). In [Backus v  [\*213]  Kauffman (On Rehearing), 238 Mich. App. 402, 409; 605 N.W.2d 690 (1999)](https://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=6cbcd97524abff5644c0987b135f7517&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b259%20Mich.%20App.%20187%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_butType=3&_butStat=2&_origin=TOASHLX&_butNum=121&_butInline=1&_butinfo=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b238%20Mich.%20App.%20402%2cat%20409%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=136&_startdoc=101&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkAk&_md5=d9947545fee151274d489cbc14123160), this Court stated: The term "authority" is defined by Black's Law Dictionary to include "the power delegated by a principal to an agent." Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed), p [\*\*\*37]  127. "Scope of authority" is defined in the following manner: "The reasonable power that an agent has been delegated or might foreseeably be delegated in carrying out the principal's business." Id. at 1348.

#### Violation- the plan restricts JUSTIFICATION for an action- which isn’t derived from anywhere and isn’t a war power

#### Vote neg- explicit powers provides the neg a set caselist- allowing them to restrict ANYTHING means zero predictability- “justification” affs in particular are bad because it encourages affs to ban justifications that are NEVER used and criticizes them- the neg could NEVER win

#### Bidirectionality- they encourage affs that ban justifications to justify- for example they could ban missions justified by counterprolif everywhere except Iran

### Mil Masculinites

#### Strong perception of military options is key to deter Russia from going any further– plan is a reversal

Morrissey, 3/2 [2014, Ed, Avid political columnist for The Week and blogger, Kerry: “All options are on the table” in response to Russian invasion of Crimea , <http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/3128702/posts?page=34>]

Maybe the Obama administration is taking the Budapest Memorandum more seriously than we imagined — or at least want Russia to think we are. Secretary of State John Kerry told ABC’s This Week that “all options are on the table” for a response to Vladimir Putin’s Crimean invasion, including military options:¶ Secretary of State John Kerry said that “all options are on the table” when it comes to steps the U.S. can take to hold Russia accountable for its military movements in Ukraine, including economic sanctions and potentially military action.¶ In an interview with ABC’s George Stephanopoulos today on “This Week,” Kerry said Russian troops moving into the Ukrainian region of Crimea was “a military act of aggression” and that the U.S. will move swiftly to impose penalties if Russian President Vladimir Putin does not withdraw his troops.¶ While military force is among the options President Barack Obama is considering, Kerry said the U.S. and its allies hope they can avoid such action.¶ “The hope of the U.S. and everybody in the world is not to see this escalate into a military confrontation,” he said.¶ Sounds like tough talk, but would Russia buy it? Moving troops into Ukraine from the west would all but declare war between NATO and Russia, including the US. If Putin thought for a moment that the West would fight over Crimea again, he wouldn’t have taken it over this week in the first place.¶ That’s not to say that we have no options, and even some military signals can have an impact on the situation, argues retired Admiral James Stavridis at Foreign Policy:

#### Putin is playing chess- the plans removal of the option sends a dangerous signal

Stravridis, 3/1 [2014, James Stavridis is a retired 4-star Navy admiral who serves today as the 12th Dean of The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, NATO Needs to Move Now on Crimea, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/03/01/nato\_needs\_to\_move\_now\_on\_crimea]

Now that Vladimir Putin's Olympics are over, his gaze has turned inexorably to what he clearly regards as the premier foreign-policy priority of the Russian Federation: retaining determinative influence -- if not full control -- over Ukraine.¶ He went to the Russian parliament to formally request permission for what he has already done -- send troops into Ukraine -- and it approved the move. News reports indicate the Russian military has seized Crimea. This is a volatile, dangerous situation without foreign intervention; and his behavior is reckless. Like a chess player leaning forward, his moves are sweeping the board.¶ What is NATO's move?¶ The United States has responded strongly through normal diplomatic channels, with Secretary of State John Kerry calling this an action with "grave consequences" -- freighted language in the world of diplomacy. The president and secretary of defense have echoed this, and further condemnation will no doubt be forthcoming.¶ Certainly the shadow of recent Russian activity in Georgia, including the invasion and creation of the "independent" states of Abkhazia and Ossetia, looms over the situation, as does Russian activity in Transnistria. Will Crimea be next?¶ All of this, of course, is magnified by the strategic importance to Russia of the Black Sea port and the presence of a significant part of Russia's fleet and its guaranteed access to the Mediterranean and the Levant.¶ Hopefully, there can be high-level diplomatic discussions at the United Nations, European Union, and other international organizations that will lead to full territorial integrity of the sovereign state of Ukraine. And the state of the Russian Black Sea Fleet has to be sensibly resolved, as do important trading and energy relations. The hope is that cooler heads will prevail.¶ However, hope is not a strategy, and therefore further action should be considered. Planning is vital to laying out options to decision-makers, and NATO's military planners should have a busy weekend at least.¶ This is a classic case of a situation where the United States should be working in lock step with its allies around the world, but especially its European friends and most notably the 28 members of the NATO alliance.¶ NATO should call an immediate emergency session and weigh its options in the political, diplomatic, economic, and military dimensions.¶ In the military sphere, these include ordering the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), led by U.S. Gen. Phil Breedlove, to conduct prudent planning and present options in response to the situation. While such planning should be left to the current commanders and military experts, some ideas to consider would include:¶ Increasing all intelligence-gathering functions through satellites, Predator unmanned vehicles, and especially cyber.¶ Using the NATO-Ukrainian Commission and existing military partnerships with the Ukrainian military to share information, intelligence, and situational awareness with authorities in Kiev.¶ Providing advice to Ukrainian armed forces to prepare and position themselves in the event of further conflict.¶ Developing NATO contingency plans to react to full-scale invasion of Ukraine and to a partial invasion likely of Crimea. NATO contingency planning can be cumbersome, but in Libya it moved quickly.¶ Assigning one of the NATO Joint Force Commands (either Naples, Italy, or Brunssum, Netherlands) into direct overwatch of the situation.¶ Standing up NATO crisis centers to full manning, especially at SHAPE and the relevant Joint Force Command.¶ Ensuring that the Land and Maritime Component Commands (Izmir, Turkey, and Northwood in the United Kingdom, respectively) are conducting prudent planning in their areas of expertise and feeding their analysis to the Joint Force Command.¶ Bringing the NATO Response Force, a 25,000-man sea, air, land, and special forces capability, to a higher state of alert.¶ Convening allies with cyber-capabilities (this is not a NATO specialty) to consider options -- at a minimum to defend Ukraine if it is attacked in this domain (as Georgia was).¶ Sailing NATO maritime forces into the Black Sea and setting up contingency plans for their use.¶ Many will consider any level of NATO involvement provocative and potentially inflammatory. Unfortunately, the stakes are high and the Russians are moving. Sitting idle, without at least looking at options, is a mistake for NATO and would itself constitute a signal to Putin -- one that he would welcome.

#### Nuclear escalation, miscalc, and massive proliferation happen in a confrontation with Russia over Ukraine

Frontier Post, 3/17 [2014, US-Russia standoff over Ukraine may trigger nuclear attack, http://thefrontierpost.com/article/82657/US-Russia-standoff-over-Ukraine-may-trigger-nuclear-attack/]

UNITED NATIONS: The US-Russian confrontation over Ukraine, which is threatening to undermine current bilateral talks on North Korea, Iran, Syria and Palestine, is also in danger of triggering a nuclear fallout]

Secretary of State John Kerry told US legislators early this week that if the dispute results in punitive sanctions against Russia, things could “get ugly fast” and go “in multiple directions. ”Perhaps one such direction could lead to a nuclear impasse between the two big powers.¶ According to a state agency news report from Moscow, Russia has threatened to stop honouring its arms treaty commitments, and more importantly, to block U.S. military inspections of nuclear weapons, if Washington decides to suspend military cooperation with Moscow.¶ These mostly bilateral treaties between the United States and Russia include the 1994 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), the 2010 new START, the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty and the 1970 international Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).¶ A nuclear tug-of-war between the two big powers is tinged in irony because post-Soviet Ukraine undertook one of the world’s most successful nuclear disarmament programmes when it agreed to destroy all its weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).¶ Dr. Rebecca E. Johnson, executive director of the Acronym Institute for Disarmament and Diplomacy, told IPS, “Clearly the situation between Ukraine and Russia is deeply worrying.¶ “Without going into the politics of the situation on the ground, as I don’t have the kind of regional expertise for that, this is not a place for issuing nuclear threats or scoring nuclear points,” she said.¶ “I’ve been disgusted to see some British and French representatives try to use Ukraine’s crisis to justify retaining nuclear weapons in perpetuity.”¶ Russia is not directly threatening to attack Ukraine with nuclear weapons, and no one believes it would be useful for the United States and countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) to threaten Russia with a nuclear attack, no matter what they do, said Johnson.¶ Ukraine, which was once armed with the third largest nuclear arsenal after the United States and Russia, and possessed more nukes than France, Britain and China, dismantled and shipped its weapons to Russia for destruction beginning in 1994.¶ Dr. Ira Helfand, co-president of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), said Ukraine is commendable in being one of the few states to have given up its nuclear weapons peacefully, and the people of Ukraine should not have to fear nuclear weapons ravaging their country.¶ “Any war involves a terrible and lasting human toll, risks spreading and harming people’s health in the region and beyond,” he warned.¶ In a statement released last week, IPPNW said it underscores the absolute imperative to avoid the possibility of use of nuclear weapons.¶ “This danger exists with any armed conflict involving nuclear armed states or alliances, which could escalate in uncontrollable, unintended and unforeseeable ways,” it warned.¶ Dr Tilman A. Ruff, co-chair, International Steering Group and Australian Board member of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, told IPS the current agreements (e.g. START, New START and INF) are probably most important in that they demonstrate that verified reductions and elimination of whole classes of nuclear weapons are feasible, and hopefully reduce the risk of nuclear war between Russia and the United States.¶ However, continuing massive nuclear arsenals on both sides; the retention of almost 1,800 nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert missiles, ready to be launched within minutes; the aggressive eastward expansion of NATO, contrary to what Russian leaders were promised; and the rapid escalation of tension over recent events in Ukraine demonstrate the Cold War has not been firmly laid to rest.¶ “Any confrontation between nuclear-armed states runs the risk of escalating to the use of nuclear weapons, whether by inadvertence, accident, or bad decision-making,” said Dr Ruff, who is also an associate professor at the Nossal Institute for Global Health, School of Population and Global Health, University of Melbourne.¶ He said currently all the nuclear-armed states are massively investing in keeping and modernising their nuclear arsenals, and show no serious commitment to disarm, as they are legally bound to do. As long as nuclear weapons exist and are deployed, and policies countenance their possible use, the danger they will be used is real and present.¶ “The dangerous and unstable situation in Ukraine highlights this starkly, and should dispel any notion that nuclear danger ended 20 years ago with apparent end of the Cold War,” he said.¶ Dr Johnson told IPS Russian and US nuclear weapons in the region are demonstrably not contributing to deterrence.¶ “If anything, their presence complicates the current dangers, with the attendant risks of crisis instability and potential military or nuclear escalation or miscalculations, though I’d hope no one would be mad enough to actually use them,” she said.¶ Politicians that want to keep French or British nuclear weapons need to stop making arguments that undermine the NPT and encourage proliferators, she pointed out.¶ “It is extraordinarily irresponsible to jump on the bandwagon of this dangerous regional crisis and make Ukrainians feel that they were wrong to rid their newly independent country of nuclear weapons in 1992 and join the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states,” Johnson said.¶ It is clearly unacceptable for states armed with nuclear weapons to threaten non-nuclear nations, but this cannot be turned into a rationale either for risking nuclear war between Russia and NATO or for the non-nuclear countries to pull out of the NPT and start arming themselves with nuclear arsenals of their own, she noted.

The Potential for War is Inescapable and is the Root Construction of Gender Norms

Goldstein, Professor of IR @ American, 01

Joshua Goldstein Professor of IR @ American U 2001 War and Gender

In understanding gendered war roles, the potential for war matters more than the outbreak of particular wars. As Hobbes put it, war “consisteth not in actuall fighting; but in the known disposition thereto during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary.” Kant similarly distinguished between peace as it had been known in modern Europe through the eighteenth century – merely a lull or cease–fire – and what he called “permanent peace.” From 1815 to 1914, great–power wars largely disappeared, and some people thought warfare itself was withering away. But when conditions changed, the latent potential for warfare in the great–power system emerged again, with a vengeance, in the twentieth century. Thus, like a patient with cancer in remission, a society that is only temporarily peaceful still lives under the shadow of war.3 Plan of the book Chapter 1 describes a puzzle: despite the diversity of gender and of war separately, gender roles in war are very consistent across all known human societies. Furthermore, virtually all human cultures to date have faced the possibility, and frequently the actual experience, of war (although I do not think this generalization will last far into the future). In every known case, past and present, cultures have met this challenge in a gender–based way, by assembling groups of fighters who were primarily, and usually exclusively, male. The empirical evidence for these generalizations, reviewed in the chapter, shows the scope and depth of the puzzle. The chapter then reviews three strands of feminist theory that offer a variety of possible answers to the puzzle. From these approaches, I extract 20 hypotheses amenable to assessment based on empirical evidence (see Table 1.1). The results fill Chapter 2, Chapter 3, Chapter 4, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. All three feminist approaches turn out to contribute in different ways to understanding the puzzle of gendered war roles. Chapter 2 considers the numerous historical cases in which women for various reasons participated in military operations including combat. This historical record shows that women are capable of performing successfully in war. Thus, the near–total exclusion of women from combat roles does not seem to be explained by women’s inherent lack of ability. This evidence deepens the puzzle of gendered war roles. Many societies have lived by war or perished by war, but very few have mobilized women to fight. Why? Chapter 3 tests five explanations for the gendering of war based on gender differences in individual biology: (1) men’s genes program them for violence; (2) testosterone makes men more aggressive than women; (3) men are bigger and stronger than women; (4) men’s brains are adapted for long–distance mobility and for aggression; and (5) women are biologically adapted for caregiving roles that preclude participation in war. Each of these hypotheses except genetics finds some support from empirical evidence, but only in terms of average differences between genders, not the categorical divisions that mark gendered war roles. Chapter 4 explores dynamics within and between groups, drawing on animal behavior and human psychology. Several potential explanations come from this perspective: (1) “male bonding” is important to the conduct of war; (2) men operate better than women in hierarchies, including armies; (3) men see intergroup relations, as between the two sides in a war, differently from women; and (4) childhood gender segregation leads to later segregation in combat forces. The strongest empirical evidence emerges for childhood segregation, but that segregation does not explain the nearly total exclusion of women as combatants. Chapter 5 discusses how constructions of masculinity motivate soldiers to fight, across a variety of cultures and belief systems. Norms of masculinity contribute to men’s exclusive status as warriors, and preparation for war is frequently a central component of masculinity. I explore several aspects: (1) war becomes a “test of manhood,” helping overcome men’s natural aversion to participating in combat, and cultures mold hardened men suitable for this test by toughening up young boys; (2) masculine war roles depend on feminine roles in the war system, including mothers, wives, and sweethearts; and (3) women actively oppose wars. The last two of these contradict each other, but I argue that even women peace activists can reinforce masculine war roles (by feminizing peace and thus masculinizing war), creating a dilemma for the women’s peace movement. Overall, masculinity does contribute to motivating soldiers’ participation in war, and might do so less effectively with women present in the ranks. Chapter 6 asks whether, beyond their identities as tough men who can endure hardship, soldiers are also motivated by less heroic qualities. Misogyny and domination of women, according to some feminists, underlie male soldiers’ participation in war (thus explaining women’s rare participation as combatants). The chapter explores several diverse possibilities: (1) men’s sexual energies play a role in aggression; (2) women symbolize for male soldiers a dominated group and thus cannot be included in the armed ranks of dominators; and (3) women’s labor is exploited more in wartime than in peace, so patriarchal societies keep women in civilian positions. Chapter 6 explores both the men’s roles in these dynamics, and the corresponding women’s roles as prostitutes, victims, war support workers, and replacement labor for men at war. Chapter 7 concludes that the gendering of war appears to result from a combination of factors, with two main causes finding robust empirical support: (1) small, innate biological gender differences in average size, strength, and roughness; and (2) cultural molding of tough, brave men, who feminize enemies in dominating them. The gendering of war thus results from the combination of culturally constructed gender roles with real but modest biological differences. Neither alone would solve the puzzle. Causality runs both ways between war and gender. Gender roles adapt individuals for war roles, and war roles provide the context within which individuals are socialized into gender roles. For the war system to change fundamentally, or for war to end, might require profound changes in gender relations. But the transformation of gender roles may depend on deep changes in the war system. Multiple pathways of causality and feedback loops are common in biology, acting as stabilizing mechanisms in a dynamic system, and come to the fore at several points in this book. Although I focus mainly on gender’s effects on war, the reverse causality proves surprisingly strong. The socialization of children into gender roles helps reproduce the war system. War shadows every gendered relationship, and affects families, couples, and individuals in surprising ways. The diversity of war and of gender The cross–cultural consistency of gendered war roles, which this chapter will explore, is set against a backdrop of great diversity of cultural forms of both war and gender roles considered separately. Apart from war and a few biological necessities (gestation and lactation), gender roles show great diversity across cultures and through history. Human beings have created many forms of marriage, sexuality, and division of labor in household work and child care. Marriage patterns differ widely across cultures. Some societies practice monogamy and some polygamy (and some preach monogamy but practice nonmonogamy). Of the polygamous cultures, most are predominantly polygynous (one man, several wives) but some are predominantly polyandrous (one woman, several husbands). Regarding ownership of property and lines of descent, a majority of societies are patrilocal; women move to their husbands’ households. A substantial number are matrilocal, however, with husbands moving to their wives’ households. Most societies are patrilineal – tracing descent (and passing property) on the father’s side – but more than a few are matrilineal. Norms regarding sexuality also vary greatly across cultures. Some societies are puritanical, others open about sex. Some work hard to enforce fidelity – for example, by condoning killings of adulterers – whereas others accept multiple sexual relationships as normal. Attitudes towards homosexuality also differ across time and place, from relative acceptance to intolerance. Today, some countries officially prohibit discrimination against gay men and lesbians, while other countries officially punish homosexuality with death. Gender roles also vary across cultures when it comes to household and child care responsibilities. Different societies divide economic work differently by gender (except hunting). Political leadership, while never dominated by women and often dominated by men, shows a range of possibilities in different cultures, from near–exclusion to near–equality for women. Even child care (except pregnancy and nursing) shows considerable variation in the roles assigned to men and women. The areas where gender roles tend to be most constant across societies – political leadership, hunting, and certain coming–of–age rituals – are those most closely connected with war. Thus, overall, gender roles outside war vary greatly. Similarly, forms of war vary greatly, except for their gendered character. Different cultures fight in very different ways. The Aztecs overpowered and captured warriors from neighboring societies, then used them for torture, human sacrifice, and food. A central rack contained over 100,000 skulls of their victims. The Dahomey also warred for captives, but to sell into slavery to European traders. The Yanomamö declare that their wars are about the capture of women. The ancient Chinese states of the warring–states period sought to conquer their neighbors’ territories and populations intact in order to augment their own power. For the Mundurucú of Brazil, the word for enemy referred to any non–Mundurucú group, and war had no apparent instrumental purpose beyond being an “unquestioned part of their way of life.” The civil war in Lebanon had “no clear causes, no stable enemy… The chaos penetrated every aspect of daily life so that everyone participated always.”4 Some wars more than pay for themselves; others are economic disasters. The economic benefit of cheap oil was arguably greater than the cost of the Gulf War, for Western powers that chipped in to pay for the war. Similarly, the nomadic peoples of the Eurasian steppes who invented warfare on horseback found profit in raiding. But the Vietnam War bankrupted the “Great Society” in the United States, and incessant wars between France and Spain drove both into bankruptcy in 1557. The Thirty Years War so devastated central Europe’s economy that the mercenary soldier was described as “a man who had to die so as to have something to live on.”5 Some wars seem almost symbolic because they absorb great effort but produce few casualties. Among the Dani of New Guinea, formalistic battles across set front lines – fought with spears, sticks, and bow and arrows – lasted from midmorning until nightfall or rain, with a rest period at midday, and with noncombatants watching from the sidelines. A different form of ritualistic war occupied the two superpowers of the Cold War era, whose nuclear weapons were built, deployed, and maintained on alert, but never used. Other wars, such as the Napoleonic Wars, the US Civil War, and the World Wars, were all–too–real spectacles of pain and misery that defy comprehension. A quarter of the Aztecs’ central skull rack could be filled by a single day’s deaths, 26,000 people, at the battle of Antietam.6 Some wars take place far from home, when armies travel on expeditions to distant lands. In the Crusades, European armies pillaged Muslim and Jewish communities for the glory of a Christian God. Later, European armies occupied colonies worldwide. Americans fought in the World Wars “over there” (Europe). Cuban soldiers in the 1980s fought in Angola. For traveling soldiers, home was a long way away, and for their home societies, war was distant. For most European peasants of the sixteenth century, war seldom impinged on daily life except through taxation. Other wars, however, hit extremely close to home. In recent decades, civil wars often have put civilians and everyday life right in the firing line. The World Wars made entire societies into war machines and therefore into targets. In such cases the “home front” and the “war front” become intimately connected. Sometimes soldiers kill enemies that they have never met, who look different from them and speak languages they do not understand. The Incas of Peru assumed the incomprehensible Spanish invaders to be gods. By contrast, in some wars neighbors kill neighbors, as in the 1992 Serbian campaign of terror in Bosnia. Soldiers sometimes kill at great distances, as with over–the–horizon air and ship missiles. At other times, they kill at close quarters, as with bayonets. Some, like the soldiers who planted land mines in Cambodia and Angola in the 1980s, have no idea whom they killed. Others, such as snipers in any war, can see exactly whom they kill. Combatants react in many different ways. Many soldiers in battle lose the ability to function, because of psychological trauma. But some soldiers feel energized in battle, and some look back to their military service as the best time of their lives. They found meaning, community, and the thrill of surviving danger. In many societies, veterans of battle receive special status and privilege afterwards. Sometimes, however, returning soldiers are treated as pariahs. Some soldiers fight with dogged determination, and willingly die and kill when they could have run away. In other cases, entire armies simply crumble because they lack a will to fight, as happened to the well–armed government forces in Africa’s third largest country, Zaire (Democratic Congo), in 1997. The puzzle. War, then, is a tremendously diverse enterprise, operating in many contexts with many purposes, rules, and meanings. Gender norms outside war show similar diversity. The puzzle, which this chapter fleshes out and the remaining chapters try to answer, is why this diversity disappears when it comes to the connection of war with gender. That connection is more stable, across cultures and through time, than are either gender roles outside of war or the forms and frequency of war itself. The answer in a nutshell is that killing in war does not come naturally for either gender, yet the potential for war has been universal in human societies. To help overcome soldiers’ reluctance to fight, cultures develop gender roles that equate “manhood” with toughness under fire. Across cultures and through time, the selection of men as potential combatants (and of women for feminine war support roles) has helped shape the war system. In turn, the pervasiveness of war in history has influenced gender profoundly – especially gender norms in child–rearing.

**Democracy and economic liberalization checks their impacts**

**O’Kane 97  (“Modernity, the Holocaust, and politics”, Economy and Society, February, ebsco)**

Chosen policies cannot be relegated to the position of immediate condition (Nazis in power) in the explanation of the Holocaust.  Modern bureaucracy is not ‘intrinsically capable of genocidal action’ (Bauman 1989: 106).  Centralized state coercion has no natural move to terror.  In the explanation of modern genocides it is chosen policies which play the greatest part, whether in effecting bureaucratic secrecy, organizing forced labour, implementing a system of terror, harnessing science and technology or introducing extermination policies, as means and as ends. As Nazi Germany and Stalin’s USSR have shown, furthermore, those chosen policies of genocidal government turned away from and not towards modernity.  The choosing of policies,however, is not independent of circumstances.  An analysis of the history of each case plays an important part in explaining where and how genocidal governments come to power and analysis of political institutions and structures also helps towards an understanding of the factors which act as obstacles to modern genocide.  But it is not just political factors which stand in the way of another Holocaust in modern society.  Modern societies have not only pluralist democratic political systems but also economic pluralism where workers are free to change jobs and bargain wages and where independent firms, each with their own independent bureaucracies, exist in competition with state-controlled enterprises.  In modern societies this economic pluralism both promotes and is served by the open scientific method.  By ignoring competition and the capacity for people to move between organizations whether economic, political, scientific or social, Bauman overlooks crucial but also very ‘ordinary and common’ attributes of truly modern societies.  It is these very ordinary and common attributes of modernity which stand in the way of modern genocides.

#### Their invocation of the idea of structural violence doesn’t have predictive power and isn’t capable of solving

**Boulding 1977** – Kenneth, Prof Univ. of Michigan and UC Boulder, Journal of Peace Research; 14; 75 p. Boulding p. 83-4

Finally, we come to the great Galtung metaphors of ’structural violence’ and ’positive peace’. They are metaphors rather than models, and for that very reason are suspect. Metaphors always imply models and metaphors have much more persuasive power than models do, for models tend to be the preserve of the specialist. But when a metaphor implies a bad model it can be very dangerous, for it is both persuasive and wrong. The metaphor of structural violence I would argue falls right into this category. The metaphor is that poverty, deprivation, ill health, low expectations of life, a condition in which more than half the human race lives, is ’like’ a thug beating up the victim and taking his money away from him in the street, -or it is ’like’ a conqueror stealing the land of the people and reducing them to slavery. The implication is that poverty and its associated ills are the fault of the thug or the conqueror and the solution is to do away with thugs and conquerors. While there is some truth in the metaphor, in the modem world at least there is not very much. Violence, whether of the streets and the home, or of the guerilla, of the police, or of the armed forces, is a very different phenomenon from poverty. The processes which create and sustain poverty are not at all like the processes which create and sustain violence, although like everything else in the world, everything is somewhat related to everything else. There is a very real problem of the structures which lead to violence, but unfortunately Galtung’s metaphor of structural violence as he has used it has diverted attention from this problem. Violence in the behavioral sense, that is, somebody actually doing damage to somebody else and trying to make them worse off, is a ’threshold’ phenomenon, rather like the boiling over of a pot. The temperature under a pot can rise for a long time without its boiling over, but at some threshold boiling over will take place. The study of the structures which underlie violence are a very important and much neglected part of peace research and indeed of social science in general. Threshold phenomena like violence are difficult to study because they represent ’breaks’ in the system rather than uniformities. Violence, whether between persons or organizations, occurs when the ’strain’ on a system is too great for its ‘strength’. The metaphor here is that violence is like what happens when we break a piece of chalk. Strength and strain, however, especially in social systems, are so interwoven historically that it is very difficult to separate them. The diminution of violence involves two possible strategies, or a mixture of the two; one is the increase in the strength of the system, the other is the diminution of the strain. The strength of systems involves habit, culture, taboos, and sanctions, all these things, which enable a system to stand Increasing strain without breaking down into violence. The strains on the system are largely dynamic in character, such as arms races, mutually stimulated hostility, changes in relative economic position or political power, which are often hard to identify. Conflict of interest are only part of the strain on a system, and not always the most important part. It is very hard for people to know their interests, and misperceptions of interests take place mainly through the dynamic processes, not through the structural ones. It is only perceptions of interest which affect people’s behavior, not the ’real’ interests, whatever these may be, and the gap between perception and reality can be very large and resistant to change. However, what Galitung calls structural violence (which has been defined by one unkind commentator as anything that Galltung doesn’t like) was originally defined as any unnecessarily low expectation of life, an that assumption that anybody who dies before the allotted span has been killed, however unintentionally and unknowingly, by somebody else. The concept has been expanded to include all the problems off poverty, destitution, deprivation, and misery. These are enormously real and are a very high priority for research and action, but they belong to systems which are only peripherally related to the structures which, produce violence. This is not to say that the cultures of violence and the cultures of poverty are not sometimes related, though not all poverty cultures are culture of violence, and certainly not all cultures of violence are poverty cultures. But the dynamics of poverty and the success or failure to rise out off it are of a complexity far beyond anything which the metaphor of structural violence can offer. While the metaphor of structural violence performed a service in calling attention to a problem, it may have done a disservice in preventing us from finding the answer.

#### They’re wrong about predictions and voting for them makes it worse

**Fitzsimmons, 7** – Ph.D. in international security policy from the University of Maryland, Adjunct Professor of Public Policy, analyst in the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division at the Institute for Defense Analyses (Michael, “The Problem of Uncertainty in Strategic Planning”, Survival, Winter 06/07)

In defence of prediction Uncertainty is not a new phenomenon for strategists. Clausewitz knew that ‘many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncertain’. In coping with uncertainty, he believed that ‘what one can reasonably ask of an officer is that he should possess a standard of judgment, which he can gain only from knowledge of men and affairs and from common sense. He should be guided by the laws of probability.’34 Granted, one can certainly allow for epistemological debates about the best ways of gaining ‘a standard of judgment’ from ‘knowledge of men and affairs and from common sense’. Scientific inquiry into the ‘laws of probability’ for any given strate- gic question may not always be possible or appropriate. Certainly, analysis cannot and should not be presumed to trump the intuition of decision-makers. Nevertheless, Clausewitz’s implication seems to be that the **burden of proof** in any debates about planning should belong to the decision-maker who rejects formal analysis, standards of evidence and probabilistic reasoning. Ultimately, though, the value of prediction in strategic planning does not rest primarily in getting the correct answer, or even in the more feasible objective of bounding the range of correct answers. Rather, prediction requires decision-makers to expose, not only to others but to themselves, the beliefs they hold regarding **why** a given event is likely or unlikely and why it would be important or unimportant. Richard Neustadt and Ernest May highlight this useful property of probabilistic reasoning in their renowned study of the use of history in decision-making, Thinking in Time. In discussing the importance of probing presumptions, they contend: The need is for tests prompting questions, for sharp, straightforward mechanisms the decision makers and their aides might readily recall and use to dig into their own and each others’ presumptions. And they need tests that get at basics somewhat by indirection, not by frontal inquiry: not ‘what is your inferred causation, General?’ Above all, not, ‘what are your values, Mr. Secretary?’ ... If someone says ‘a fair chance’ ... ask, ‘if you were a betting man or woman, what odds would you put on that?’ If others are present, ask the same of each, and of yourself, too. Then probe the differences: why? This is tantamount to seeking and then arguing assumptions underlying different numbers placed on a subjective probability assessment. We know of no better way to force clarification of meanings while exposing hidden differences ... Once differing odds have been quoted, the question ‘why?’ can follow any number of tracks. Argument may pit common sense against common sense or analogy against analogy. What is important is that the expert’s basis for linking ‘if’ with ‘then’ gets exposed to the hearing of other experts before the lay official has to say yes or no.’35 There are at least three critical and related benefits of prediction in strate- gic planning. The first reflects Neustadt and May’s point – prediction enforces a certain level of discipline in making explicit the assumptions, key variables and implied causal relationships that constitute decision-makers’ beliefs and that **might otherwise remain implicit**. Imagine, for example, if Shinseki and Wolfowitz had been made to assign probabilities to their opposing expectations regarding post-war Iraq. Not only would they have had to work harder to justify their views, they might have seen more clearly the substantial chance that they were wrong and had to make greater efforts in their planning to prepare for that contingency. Secondly, the very process of making the relevant factors of a decision explicit provides a firm, or at least transparent, basis for making choices. Alternative courses of action can be compared and assessed in like terms. Third, the transparency and discipline of the process of arriving at the initial strategy should heighten the decision-maker’s sensitivity toward changes in the environment that would suggest the need for adjustments to that strategy. In this way, prediction enhances rather than under-mines **strategic flexibility**. This defence of prediction does not imply that great stakes should be gambled on narrow, singular predictions of the future. On the contrary, the central problem of uncertainty in plan- ning remains that any given prediction may simply be wrong. Preparations for those eventualities must be made. Indeed, in many cases, relatively unlikely outcomes could be enormously consequential, and therefore merit extensive preparation and investment. In order to navigate this complexity, strategists must return to the dis- tinction between uncertainty and risk. While the complexity of the international security environment may make it somewhat resistant to the type of probabilistic thinking associated with risk, a risk-oriented approach seems to be the only viable model for national-security strategic planning. The alternative approach, which categorically denies prediction, precludes strategy. As Betts argues, Any assumption that some knowledge, whether intuitive or explicitly formalized, provides guidance about what should be done is a presumption that there is reason to believe the choice will produce a satisfactory outcome – that is, it is a prediction, however rough it may be. If there is no hope of discerning and manipulating causes to produce intended effects, analysts as well as politicians and generals should all quit and go fishing.36 Unless they are willing to quit and go fishing, then, strategists must sharpen their tools of risk assessment. Risk assessment comes in many varieties, but identification of two key parameters is common to all of them: the consequences of a harmful event or condition; and the likelihood of that harmful event or condition occurring. With no perspective on likelihood, a strategist can have no firm perspective on risk. With no firm perspective on risk, strategists cannot purposefully discriminate among alternative choices. Without purposeful choice, there is no strategy. One of the most widely read books in recent years on the complicated relation- ship between strategy and uncertainty is Peter Schwartz’s work on scenario-based planning, The Art of the Long View. Schwartz warns against the hazards faced by leaders who have deterministic habits of mind, or who deny the difficult implications of uncertainty for strategic planning. To overcome such tenden- cies, he advocates the use of alternative future scenarios for the purposes of examining alternative strategies. His view of scenarios is that their goal is not to predict the future, but to sensitise leaders to the highly contingent nature of their decision-making.37 This philosophy has taken root in the strategic-planning processes in the Pentagon and other parts of the US government, and properly so. Examination of alternative futures and the potential effects of surprise on current plans is essential. Appreciation of uncertainty also has a number of organisational impli- cations, many of which the national-security establishment is trying to take to heart, such as encouraging multidisciplinary study and training, enhancing information sharing, rewarding innovation, and placing a premium on speed and versatility. The arguments advanced here seek to take nothing away from these imperatives of planning and operating in an uncertain environment. But appreciation of uncertainty carries hazards of its own. Questioning assumptions is critical, but assumptions must be made in the end. Clausewitz’s ‘standard of judgment’ for discriminating among alternatives must be applied. Creative, unbounded speculation must resolve to choice or else there will be no strategy. Recent history suggests that **unchecked scepticism** regarding the validity of prediction can marginalise analysis, trade significant cost for ambig- uous benefit, empower parochial interests in decision-making, and undermine flexibility. Accordingly, having fully recognised the need to broaden their strategic-planning aperture, national-security policymakers would do well now to reinvigorate their efforts in the messy but indispensable business of predicting the future.

#### Worst case scenarios in this setting are valuable

Lee Clarke 6, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Sociology at Rutgers University, Worst Cases: Terror and Catastrophe in the Popular Imagination, 2006, p. ix-xi

People are worried, now, about terror and catastrophe in ways that a short time ago would have seemed merely fantastic. Not to say that horror and fear suffuse the culture, but they are in the ascendant. And for good reason. There are possibilities for accident and attack, disease and disaster that would make September 11 seem like a mosquito bite. I think we have all become more alert to some of those possibilities, and it is wise to face them down. The idea of worst cases isn’t foreign to us. We have not, however, been given enough useful insight or guidance, either from academics or political leaders, regarding how to do that. In this book I look the worst full in the face. What I see is frightening but enlightening. I believe that knowing a thing permits more comfort with that thing. Sometimes the comfort comes from greater control. Sometimes it comes from knowing the enemy, or the scary thing, which proffers a way forward, toward greater safety. There is horror in disaster. But there is much more, for we can use calamity to glean wisdom, to find hope. Tragedy is with us now as never before. But that does not mean we need be consumed with fear and loathing. We can learn a lot about how society works, and fails to work, by looking at the worst. We can learn about the imagination, about politics, and about the wielding of power. We can learn about people’s capacities for despair and callousness, and for optimism and altruism. As we learn, our possibilities for improvement increase. Worst Cases is about the human condition in the modern world. Some say that September 11 changed everything. That’s not true. But it did imprint upon our imaginations scenes of horror that until then had been the province of novels and movies. We now imagine ourselves in those images, and our wide-awake nightmares are worse than they used to be. We must name, analyze, and talk about the beast. That’s our best hope, as a society, to come to terms with the evil, the human failings, the aspects of nature, and just plain chance that put us in harm’s way. Of course, talking about the worst can be a way to scare people into accepting programs that have other ends, and that they might not otherwise accept. The image of a nuclear mushroom cloud, for example, can be used to justify war because the possibility is so frightening that we would do almost anything to prevent it. The dark side of worst case thinking is apparent even at the level of personal relationships. Unleavened by evidence or careful thought it can lead to astonishingly poor policy and dumb decisions. No organizational culture can prevent or guard against it. The only response that will effectively mute such abuses is one that is organized and possessed of courage and vision. So warnings that the worst is at hand should be inspected closely, particularly if they call for actions that would serve ends the speaker cannot or does not freely acknowledge. I acknowledge my ends in this book. For better or worse, I always have. Worst Cases is a book full of stories about disasters. But it is not a disaster book. It is a book about the imagination. We look back and say that 9/11 was the worst terrorist attack ever in the United States, that the Spanish Flu of 1918, the Black Death, or AIDS was the worst epidemic ever, or that the 1906 San Francisco earthquake was the Great Earthquake. Nothing inherent to the events requires that we adorn them with superlatives. People’s imaginations make that happen. Similarly, we construct possible futures of terror and calamity: what happens if the nation’s power grid goes down for six months? what if smallpox sweeps the world? what if nuclear power has a particularly bad day? what if a monster tsunami slams southern California? These too are feats of imagination. There are those who say we shouldn’t worry about things that are unlikely to happen. That’s what your pilot means in saying, after a turbulent cross-country flight, “You’ve just completed the safest part of your trip.” We hear the same thing when officials tell us that the probability of a nuclear power plant melting down is vanishingly small. Or that the likelihood of an asteroid striking the earth is one in a million, billion, or trillion. There is similar advice from academics who complain that people are unreasonable because their fears don’t jibe with statistics. Chance, they reckon, is in our favor. But chance is often against us. My view is that disasters and failures are normal, that, as a colleague of mine puts it, things that have never happened before happen all the time. A fair number of those things end up being events we call worst cases. When they happen we’re given opportunities to learn things about society and human nature that are usually obscured. Worst case thinking hasn’t been given its due, either in academic writings or in social policy. We’re not paying enough attention to the ways we organize society that make us vulnerable to worst cases. We’re not demanding enough responsibility and transparency from leaders and policy makers. I am not an alarmist, but I am alarmed. That’s why I wrote Worst Cases. It is also why my tone and language are not technical. I am a sociologist, but I wrote Worst Cases so that nonsociologists can read it.

#### Even if complexity theory is true in a broader sense, government behaviors can be read with linear models of decision making – you should prefer our analysis

Wight 06 – Professor of IR @ University of Sydney –

(Colin, Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology, pgs. 48-50

One important aspect of this relational ontology is that these relations constitute our identity as social actors. According to this relational model of societies, one is what one is, by virtue of the relations within which one is embedded. A worker is only a worker by virtue of his/her relationship to his/her employer and vice versa. ‘Our social being is constituted by relations and our social acts presuppose them.’ At any particular moment in time an individual may be implicated in all manner of relations, each exerting its own peculiar causal effects. This ‘lattice-work’ of relations constitutes the structure of particular societies and endures despite changes in the individuals occupying them. Thus, the relations, the structures, are ontologically distinct from the individuals who enter into them. At a minimum, the social sciences are concerned with two distinct, although mutually interdependent, strata. There is an ontological difference between people and structures: ‘people are not relations, societies are not conscious agents’. Any attempt to explain one in terms of the other should be rejected. If there is an ontological difference between society and people, however, we need to elaborate on the relationship between them. Bhaskar argues that we need a system of mediating concepts, encompassing both aspects of the duality of praxis into which active subjects must fit in order to reproduce it: that is, a system of concepts designating the ‘point of contact’ between human agency and social structures. This is known as a ‘positioned practice’ system. In many respects, the idea of ‘positioned practice’ is very similar to Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of *habitus*. Bourdieu is primarily concerned with what individuals do in their daily lives. He is keen to refute the idea that social activity can be understood solely in terms of individual decision-making, or as determined by surpa-individual objective structures. Bourdieu’s notion of the *habitus* can be viewed as a bridge-building exercise across the explanatory gap between two extremes. Importantly, the notion of a habitus can only be understood in relation to the concept of a ‘social field’. According to Bourdieu, a social field is ‘a network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions objectively defined’. A social field, then, refers to a structured system of social positions occupied by individuals and/or institutions – the nature of which defines the situation for their occupants. This is a social field whose form is constituted in terms of the relations which define it as a field of a certain type. A *habitus* (positioned practices) is a mediating link between individuals’ subjective worlds and the socio-cultural world into which they are born and which they share with others. The power of the habitus derives from the thoughtlessness of habit and habituation, rather than consciously learned rules. The habitus is imprinted and encoded in a socializing process that commences during early childhood. It is inculcated more by experience than by explicit teaching. Socially competent performances are produced as a matter of routine, without explicit reference to a body of codified knowledge, and without the actors necessarily knowing what they are doing (in the sense of being able adequately to explain what they are doing). As such, the *habitus* can be seen as the site of ‘internalization of reality and the externalization of internality.’ Thus social practices are produced in, and by, the encounter between: (1) the *habitus* and its dispositions; (2) the constraints and demands of the socio-cultural field to which the habitus is appropriate or within; and (3) the dispositions of the individual agents located within both the socio-cultural field and the *habitus*. When placed within Bhaskar’s stratified complex social ontology the model we have is as depicted in Figure 1. The explanation of practices will require all three levels. Society, as field of relations, exists prior to, and is independent of, individual and collective understandings at any particular moment in time; that is, social action requires the conditions for action. Likewise, given that behavior is seemingly recurrent, patterned, ordered, institutionalised, and displays a degree of stability over time, there must be sets of relations and rules that govern it. Contrary to individualist theory, these relations, rules and roles are not dependent upon either knowledge of them by particular individuals, or the existence of actions by particular individuals; that is, their explanation cannot be reduced to consciousness or to the attributes of individuals. These emergent social forms must possess emergent powers. This leads on to arguments for the reality of society based on a causal criterion. Society, as opposed to the individuals that constitute it, is, as Foucault has put it, ‘a complex and independent reality that has its own laws and mechanisms of reaction, its regulations as well as its possibility of disturbance. This new reality is society…It becomes necessary to reflect upon it, upon its specific characteristics, its constants and its variables’.

#### Conservative Internationalism explains the world, our assumptions and impacts – it is necessary to solve extinction

Miller, ’14 [by Paul D. Miller¶ This commentary originally appeared on ForeignPolicy.com.¶ This commentary appeared on Foreign Policy on March 10, 2014¶ http://www.rand.org/blog/2014/ 03/i-predicted-russias-invasion-of-ukraine.html¶ Paul Miller is a political scientist at the nonprofit, nonpartisan Rand Corporation. He is a former CIA analyst and served from 2007 to 2009 as director for Afghanistan and Pakistan on the White House's National Security Staff.]

The Russian military intervention caught many foreign policy analysts by surprise. Articles explaining why Russia wouldn't intervene ran in Foreign Affairs, Time, and the New York Times; and even the intelligence community was caught off guard according to the Daily Beast (hat tip to Ben Domenech for his post on this in The Federalist). Events have proven them wrong.¶ Not everyone got it wrong. Two years ago I argued that, despite the end of the Cold War, the United States should still see Russia as a hostile great power. I cited the 2008 invasion of Georgia, said that we should “look for the sequel in Ukraine,” and argued that Putin would be happy to let a foreign crisis spiral dangerously to win nationalist plaudits at home. For a similar argument, I was criticized in the pages of Foreign Affairs for my “alarmist, worst-case scenarios.”¶ How is it that some got this so wrong? Many foreign policy analysts (like everyone) are the victim of self-imposed intellectual blinders. We use intellectual concepts to help us organize ideas and fit them into simple categories out of necessity. There are too many data in the world for us to absorb or make sense of, so we invent schemes to help us sift information quickly. The problem is that these inventions distort and simplify as much as they clarify and reveal. Sometimes, they are simply wrong.¶ The intellectual schemes that foreign policy analysts donned after the Cold War are wrong. The world is not safer. States are not declining. Great power war is not unthinkable. History has not ended. Europe is not a solved problem. Russia is not a democracy. Trade ties do not guarantee peace. Liberal internationalism — the belief that all states enjoy a harmony of interests and can join together in collective security mediated through intergovernmental organizations — is naive, simplistic, utopian, dangerous, and wrong.¶ That doesn't mean strict realism is the appropriate response. Realism, which argues that all states, regardless of how they are governed or what ideology they profess, rationally seek to defend (or maximize) their power, usually understood as their material capabilities, is as distorted and short-sighted, in different ways, as liberal internationalism. Realists have never fully appreciated that ideology matters, and thus democracy matters. Some academic realists warned of the breakup of NATO and a resurgent Japanese threat after the Cold War. To those who understood the impact of democracy on state behavior, this was self-evidently absurd. Old-school realism is an equally broken way of looking at the world.¶ These beliefs leave policymakers intellectually unprepared to consider the possibility of events and crises precipitated by those who do not share their assumptions. Some U.S. policymakers cannot conceive of a land war in Europe being in anyone's interest, but Vladimir Putin can. And some American policymakers commit the elementary error of mirror-imaging, assuming everyone else in the world is just like them. This seeming inability to comprehend that other people in other countries think differently than they do is baffling. Liberal internationalism in a world of tyrants and realists is the victory of hope over prudence.¶ New intellectual tools are needed. Henry Nau has advocated for something he calls “conservative internationalism,” an attempt at blending the strengths of realism and liberal internationalism. He argues that a conservative internationalist approach would have the United States remain engaged in a leading role abroad and continue fostering democracy where possible, while also being more prudent and realistic in its understanding of how the world works and not putting too much trust in global institutions or the good faith of other states.¶ This strikes me as a stab in the right direction, especially because it seems consistent with the older intellectual tradition of Christian Realism. Christian Realism was an attempt by theologian Reinhold Niebuhr to steer a middle course between the naive utopianism of Woodrow Wilson and the cynical realpolitik of Europe, based on his belief in both the dignity and depravity of human nature. He believed the United States should never stop trying to work for a more just, peaceful, and stable world, but that it also needed to do so with open eyes and a clear understanding of how the world actually works.¶ Such an approach would help U.S. policymakers be more intellectually prepared for crises and less surprised at behavior that strikes them as irrational or barbaric. Americans's constant surprise at the world's persistence in being what it is is touching, but not very efficient. Much of the world, after all, is governed by irrational men. The solution is not to pretend otherwise, nor to hunker down and build high walls around fortress America. The solution is to steer a course through the chaos that does the least damage while holding on to a hope, just a small one, that something better can be built.¶ In Ukraine, liberal internationalism would condemn Russia's intervention, levy sanctions, pass resolutions, and accomplish nothing despite strenuous effort. A defensive realism would conclude that U.S. interests are not at stake in Ukraine and would accomplish nothing by design. An offensive realism would view Ukraine as a battleground on which to fight Russia for global prestige and influence, and would risk a militarized crisis for a point of honor.¶ The middle course would acknowledge that there are limits to what America can achieve: It cannot stop Russia from believing Crimea is vitally important to Russian security, and it cannot fight a cost-effective war with a nuclear power. The United States should realistically accept some form of Russian presence or influence in the peninsula and not turn this into a litmus test of American credibility.¶ At the same time, the United States should ask what is right for the Ukrainians, not just for Americans. It should not cynically abandon all Ukraine to Russia's despotism. That may mean sustaining a large flow of aid to democratic dissidents in a Russian-dominated Ukraine, strengthening U.S. security assurances to the government if it manages to keep Russia at bay, or even bringing Ukraine fully into the orbit of Western institutions while letting Crimea secede or join the Russian Federation.¶ U.S. policymakers should explore all of these options in the coming days as the crisis unfolds. It is unclear which options are feasible, but they are all worth pursuing. It would be the worst imaginable tragedy if the United States loses its faith in the possibility of building a better world when it has so many opportunities to do so. The future of Ukraine, Europe, and the world depends on it.

### Fighting the Frames

#### Text: The United States federal government should statutorily cite humanitarian justifications as grounds for increasing the war powers authority of the President of the United States to engage in peacekeeping operations by: appropriating funds sufficient for the United States to fully pay its current United Nations peacekeeping assessments; permanently repealing the 25% cap on United States contributions to United Nations peacekeeping operations; supporting an increase in reimbursement rates for troop-committing countries; and supporting peacekeeping reforms directed at the Global Field Support Strategy.

#### The CP ensures sustained peacekeeping operations and reverses the international negative signal toward the U.S.

Enholm Executive Director of the Woodrow Wilson House and UN Expert ’11 (Robert, “U.S. Engagement in International Peacekeeping: From Aspiration to Implementation,” <http://globalsolutions.org/files/public/documents/U.S.-Engagement-in-International-Peacekeeping.pdf>, Mike)

In light of the negative impacts of U.S. failures to fulfill its financial obligations to the United Nations, as well as the broader need for timely, adequate, and effective funding for U.N. peacekeeping, we recommend that Congress and the Administration undertake the following actions with regards to peacekeeping funding: Each new Fiscal Year, Congress appropriates enough money for the United States to fully pay its current peacekeeping assessments. While the premise of this recommendation is relatively straightforward, nothing is more important towards ensuring that the U.S. lives up to its financial obligations to U.N. peacekeeping activities. As a permanent, veto-wielding member of the U.N. Security Council, the United States must agree before any peacekeeping mission can be authorized or expanded. Over the past two decades in particular, the U.S., under both Republican and Democratic presidents, has not only consented to, but has actively sought the expansion of U.N. peacekeeping activities in conflict zones around the world. Consequently, Congress should fund the State Department’s Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA) account at levels that fully fund the U.S.’s assessed peacekeeping dues for a given year. Congress permanently repeals the 25% cap on U.S. contributions to U.N. peacekeeping operations. The U.S. renegotiates its assessment rates with the U.N. every three years, and while the U.S. has been successful over the last two decades in renegotiating its peacekeeping assessment level from a high of 31.7% to the 27% rate we paid in 2010 35 , the 25% cap on U.S. assessments enacted 17 years ago remains in place. While Congress frequently waives the cap, the issue must still be revisited every year, sending a poor signal to countries who put their troops on the line to serve on missions the United States authorizes and often demands. Moreover, the cap contributed to a ballooning in U.S. arrears during the 1990s and 2000s, which meant many of our allies were not reimbursed. Instead of enacting ad hoc waivers for the cap, Congress should allow the U.S. to fully fund its commitments to peacekeeping and abolish the cap once and for all. The United States uses its voice and vote at the U.N. to increase Reimbursement rates for TCCs and index these payments to inflation. In addition to paying its peacekeeping dues in full, the United States should use its unique position as a permanent member of the Security Council and the U.N.’s largest contributor to advocate for the first increase in troop cost reimbursement rates for TCCs in nearly two decades. 36 Since the troop cost rates have not undergone formal consideration in nearly twenty years, addressing these payments will necessitate serious engagement by the United States this October when the advisory committee convenes to consider a possible increase. Due to inflation and the rising costs associated with training and maintaining peacekeeping forces, an increase in these payments is critical for the continued participation of many countries in U.N. peacekeeping operations and could potentially attract new contributors with more advanced military technology. Given the complexity of most new missions and need for newer technology, attracting new TCCs will take on added importance. Moreover, the U.S. should advocate that these reimbursement rates be pegged to inflation so they do not fall behind again. In light of the fact that decisions regarding reimbursement rates are generally adopted in the General Assembly on a consensus basis, the U.S. maintaining a commitment to pushing the issue (it has been generally supportive of a modest increase over the past year) could potentially make a significant difference. 38 At the same time, future decisions to raise reimbursement rates need to be made based on accurate and timely data supplied by the TCCs themselves in order to ensure that such increases are evidence-based and adequately take account of their needs. Consequently, in return for U.S. support of efforts to increase troop cost reimbursement payments, we also recommend that the U.S. use its voice and vote at the U.N. to convince TCCs to submit to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34) a report on how these reimbursement funds are utilized. Provided the troop cost reimbursement rates are increased, we also recommend that the U.S. use its voice and vote to convince TCCs to submit an additional report on this issue each year thereafter. The United States uses its voice and vote at the U.N. to push forward on peacekeeping reforms particularly related to the Global Field Support Strategy (GFSS). Given the number of peacekeeping missions and the size of the peacekeeping budget, it is critical that implementation of the Global Field Support Strategy (GFSS) continues. As the largest contributor, the United States has a vital role to play in ensuring that the efficiencies are maintained and that the progress made in the first year continues throughout the five-year project. As the implementation phase progresses, there will be a focus on further reducing ground and air transportation costs, enhancing support to deep field and short deployments, and strategic communications. These enhanced and faster support capabilities will be particularly important as they facilitate faster achievement of the missions mandates, which reduces the overall cost of operations.

#### Peacekeeping is key to heg – it’s the most effective force multiplier there is

Enholm Executive Director of the Woodrow Wilson House and UN Expert ’11 (Robert, “U.S. Engagement in International Peacekeeping: From Aspiration to Implementation,” <http://globalsolutions.org/files/public/documents/U.S.-Engagement-in-International-Peacekeeping.pdf>, Mike)

Peacekeeping operations conducted by the United Nations are a boon to United States national security and foreign policy objectives and, despite their increasing costs in recent years, represent an extremely cost-effective force multiplier for the United States in hotspots around the world. In light of the significant benefits the U.S. derives from U.N. peacekeeping, and the new and evolving challenges currently facing these crucial missions, it is more important than ever that our nation fully meet its peacekeeping dues payments and not accumulate arrears. For all of these reasons, the United States should reaffirm its commitment to pay its contributions that support U.N. peacekeeping operations.

#### Heg solves dampens all global violence – it reduces security dilemmas by deterring challengers AND restraining allies from taking provocative actions

Brooks et al 13

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Assessing the Security Benefits of Deep Engagement Even if deep engagement’s costs are far less than retrenchment advocates claim, they are not worth bearing unless they yield greater benefits. We focus here on the strategy’s major security benefits; in the next section, we take up the wider payoffs of the United States’ security role for its interests in other realms, notably the global economy—an interaction relatively unexplored by international relations scholars. A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global security environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United States’ overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking provocative action. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the “American Pacifier” is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war.72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia’s security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions.73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia’s major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays.74 The result might be a Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington— notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the region’s prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engaged United States.75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism’s sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism’s optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on its particular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences, however, undermines that core assumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives.76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case.77 In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the world’s key regions. We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that the withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with associated insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, and the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional great power war). Hence it is unsurprising that retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the world’s core regions is not a U.S. national interest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers, but at what cost? Much of the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasons why decisionmakers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place. Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition, one would see overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regional proxy wars and arming of client states—all of which would be concerning, in part because it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the United States. Greater regional insecurity could well feed proliferation cascades, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose to create nuclear forces.78 It is unlikely that proliferation decisions by any of these actors would be the end of the game: they would likely generate pressure locally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem.79 Usually carried out in dyadic terms, the debate over the stability of proliferation changes as the numbers go up. Proliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In social science, however, such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse. Confidence in such probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation—including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces—seem prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows.80 Moreover, the risk of “unforeseen crisis dynamics” that could spin out of control is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions, acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement. For many supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy for a power such as the United States, which has attained regional hegemony and is separated from other great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over the horizon and “pass the buck” to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. The United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great power appears to be a credible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the midtwentieth century. The problem is that China’s rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term. As Mearsheimer notes, “The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves.”81 Therefore, unless China’s rise stalls, “the United States is likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War.”82 It follows that the United States should take no action that would compromise its capacity to move to onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably expensive military capacity to intervene there. The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia— just what the United States is doing.83 In sum, the argument that U.S. security commitments are unnecessary for peace is countered by a lot of scholarship, including highly influential realist scholarship. In addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacity that dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover, switching between offshore and onshore balancing could well be difficult. Bringing together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines the degree to which the case for retrenchment misses the underlying logic of the deep engagement strategy. By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, the United States lowers security competition in the world’s key regions, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse atmosphere for growing new military capabilities. Alliance ties dissuade partners from ramping up and also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals. On top of all this, the United States’ formidable military machine may deter entry by potential rivals. Current great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical lows, and thus far other major powers have shied away from seeking to match top-end U.S. military capabilities. In addition, they have so far been careful to avoid attracting the “focused enmity” of the United States.84 All of the world’s most modern militaries are U.S. allies (America’s alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts for some 80 percent of global military spending), and the gap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking.85 In the end, therefore, deep engagement reduces security competition and does so in a way that slows the diffusion of power away from the United States. This in turn makes it easier to sustain the policy over the long term.

#### Peacekeeping solves failed states – the impact spills over globally

Enholm Executive Director of the Woodrow Wilson House and UN Expert ’11 (Robert, “U.S. Engagement in International Peacekeeping: From Aspiration to Implementation,” <http://globalsolutions.org/files/public/documents/U.S.-Engagement-in-International-Peacekeeping.pdf>, Mike)

The United States supports international peacekeeping because it is the right thing to do and because peacekeeping is effective and serves the interests of the United States. The effectiveness of peacekeeping is evidenced in the growing demand for peacekeepers. Since 1999, the number of U.N. peacekeepers has grown from 12,000 to over 120,000. International peacekeeping serves fundamental national interests of the United States in maintaining peace and promoting the establishment of stable nations around the globe. International peacekeeping missions have succeeded repeatedly in tamping down violence and providing the space in which disputants can resolve their differences politically. In the absence of peacekeeping, hostilities may simmer and flare up. Nations may devolve into failed states, creating problems that the United States cannot ignore. Failed states are associated with illegal drug and weapons trade, human trafficking, and contraband nuclear materials. They increase risks of famine, piracy, and pandemic. Failed states increase the danger of armed conflict within one country spilling into other countries, and their failures create migrations of internally displaced persons and trans-border refugees and attendant international instability and humanitarian risks.

Piracy causes extinction

The Independent, 1999 (July 4th, “Pirates could snatch plutonium”, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/pirates-could-snatch-plutonium-1104109.html>)

BRITAIN is about to ship enough plutonium for more than 60 atomic bombs half way around the world in freighters vulnerable to armed attack from "nuclear pirates". Military experts say there is a real possibility that the vessels could be targeted by terrorist groups or rogue states intent on acquiring nuclear weapons. They say the guns mounted on the ships are inadequate to fend off a well orchestrated attack by pirates with superior weapons. Janes, the internationally renowned arms and naval authority, agrees. "It would not take much fire-power to knock them out," it said. The ships were "capable of repelling only a lightly armed attack" and should be protected by "at least one well-armed frigate". The shipment, which will take place in the next few months, is planned as the first of many over the next year. The number will increase sharply if ministers allow a new plutonium plant at Sellafield, the controversial Cumbrian complex, to start up. The plutonium, for power stations, is extracted from spent Japanese fuel which is reprocessed at Sellafield and at Cap la Hague, France. The prospect of such shipments has long worried security experts. Eleven years ago the US defence department said they would be "accessible and vulnerable throughout the voyage, particularly when the vessel is passing through channels, straits, and other restricted waterways, or when it is near the coast". The last plutonium shipment from Europe to Japan, in 1992, was accompanied by a specially built patrol boat operated by the Japanese Maritime Security Agency. The US, which provided the original nuclear fuel to Japan and, under a special agreement, has to approve security arrangements for shipments of plutonium extracted from it, has repeatedly promised that all of them would be accompanied by "an armed escort vessel". But it is now clear that the new shipment will not be protected by a warship. Britain, France and Japan all refuse to give details of the route or the security arrangements and will only name the ships, describe what they are carrying, and say when they are setting out, "only on one or two days before departure from Europe". US government documents show that the two freighters - the Pacific Teal and the Pacific Pintail - will each carry three 30mm guns and will be staffed by officers of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority armed with "assault rifles, shotguns and hand weapons". Paul Leventhal, director of Washington's Nuclear Control Institute, said: "Two freighters riding shotgun for each other will not repel a real-world attack." Dr Fr ank Barnaby, former director of Stockholm Peace Research Institute, said maritime hijackings were "becoming more frequent and violent" - there were 66 in the first three months of this year - and added: "The attacks are generally made at night using speedboats. This should give those responsible for the security of nuclear cargoes pause for thought." Many studies have shown that a terrorist group, let alone a rogue state, could get the plutonium from the fuel and make it into nuclear weapons. The US has approved the scaled-down security because, critics say, it does not want to antagonise France, Britain and Japan. It says the freighters count as armed escort vessels because the shipments are being carried out "on government service" by British Nuclear Fuels (BNFL), a nationalised industry. Critics say security has been lessened partly to save money and partly as a public relations exercise because using a warship escort would demonstrate vividly how dangerous the cargo is. Martin Foreward, campaign co-ordinator of Cumbrians Opposed to a Radioactive Environment, who has been monitoring the arming of the freighters at Barrow-in-Furness, said: "Once again BNFL is taking the cheap option, but this time it is putting not just Cumbria but the whole world at risk."

#### Pandemics cause extinction

Evans 10 (Jane Evans Department of Military Strategic Studies, writing for global security studies “Pandemics and National Security” <http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Evans%20PANDEMICS.pdf>, Donnie)

Recent developments in medicine, hygiene, and public health have virtually eliminated widespread disease from industrialized countries like the U.S., making pandemics of new or emerging diseases the salient national security issue. A pandemic is an epidemic spread over a wide geographical area and affecting many people, and while a pandemic does not threaten the survival of humanity, it challenges the prosperity and stability of political institutions and human society. Andrew Price-Smith argues that “rapid worldwide changes may accelerate the diffusion, the lethality, and the resistance of the plethora of species within the microbial world” (5). For instance, changes in agricultural practices have created new ecological niches for disease – vast bovine, avian, and swine farms, in huge numbers and often in close proximity that can facilitate cross-species infection. Transportation of persons, animals, and food products around the world also presents a serious problem. New pathogens are emerging at an increasingly accelerated rate; “Alteration in the processing of cattle feed in the U.K. resulted in extended host range and emergence of [mad cow disease]… New opportunities can be created by climatic changes such as global warming and ecologic alterations facilitated through changed land use and movements of infected hosts, susceptible animals, or disease vectors” (Cutler 2). A disease can change in several important ways: it can jump to a new species (swine to human), change transmission method (blood-borne to aerosol dispersion), become more lethal, or become drug-resistant (Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus – MRSA). Emerging diseases or those thought to be wiped out are becoming more of an issue with globalization and changing societal practices. There are many ways diseases can threaten national security. First, they cause increased rates of morbidity and mortality – people sicken and die, putting huge strains on public health and the nation’s workforce, leading to political instability, class strife, and economic volatility. For example, AIDS has led to numerous problems in many African countries. When marginalized or poor people cannot afford treatment and the government cannot or will not provide it, faith in the political system crumbles; class and ethnic conflict emerges and without a sufficient working class, GDP decreases and each problem begets more problems. Second, in the article “Epidemic Disease and National Security,” author Susan Peterson argues that the most direct threat posed by a disease to the United States arises from its vulnerability to biological weapons attack (45). It is important to note that the result of a naturally spreading disease and something like bioterrorism is one and the same. Failure to prevent a biological weapons attack results in the same outcome – infection of the population – and requires the same solution. Preparation for widespread disease should therefore be a key focus of national security. More indirect threats to national security include “the health of the armed forces and, most significantly, to the social, economic, and political stability of certain key regions – especially Russia – that also challenge American security” (Peterson 46). In this sense, diseases lower the ability of the State Department or the Department of Defense to adequately provide international security to the United States. Both internal and external national security is threatened by the spread of disease. In October 2009, the Center for Biosecurity of UPMC organized a conference that addressed many of the issues pertaining to the threat of biological weapons attacks. The Director of the Center referenced a recent National Intelligence Estimate that identified bioterrorism as the intelligence community’s most important WMD concern, because “the knowledge, equipment, and pathogens required to construct a biological weapon are now globally dispersed, and there is no single technological methodology chokepoint or process that can be regulated to prevent the development of biological weapons” (Gronvall 433). For many of the reasons listed so far in this paper, the outcome of a biological attack is particularly worrisome, necessitating a closer examination of malicious bio-threats. Unlike nuclear technologies, biological materials and information are easy to obtain, and the nature of biosciences is such that equipment, expertise, and infrastructure in the field supports an important function to society and cannot, nor should it, be limited. Any attempt to prevent the development of biological weapons would also limit much needed medical advancements. The CDC defines a bioterrorism attack as “the deliberate release of viruses, bacteria, or other germs (agents) used to cause illness or death in people, animals, or plants” (CDC/Bioterrorism). These agents have a high potential for abuse by terrorist groups for several reasons. First, a disease can be difficult to detect due to the incubation period between when an individual is infected and when symptoms begin to show. Second, the dispersion capability of some diseases allows a wider range of influence than an explosive device. Third, one bioweapon can have a multiplicative effect – although only 100 people are initially infected, with a disease like smallpox, each person can then infect multiple other people, who in turn pass it on to even more. Outside the anthrax attacks of 2001, the U.S. has yet to experience a serious confirmed bioterrorist attack. However, this does not mean the threat should be minimized until an incident such as 9/11 acts as the catalyst; biological weapons are a direct threat to national security. Of the more indirect threats to U.S. national security, there are three mechanisms through which infectious diseases cause instability within a foreign nation of the outbreak of military conflict. Peterson describes these as the balance of power among adversaries, health and human rights policy conflicts, and domestic instability (55). The first and most obvious mechanism involves one side of a dispute or conflict disproportionately suffering from a disease, leading to an imbalance of power and a possible preemptive attack. If a nation’s military capabilities are strongly affected by AIDS, this can present a vulnerable weakness. However, as with all three causal mechanisms, this type of situation will generally only occur when a pandemic is particularly severe or when the involved nations are unstable to begin with; this can be seen in warring African states with high HIV/AIDS incidence rates. The second mechanism concerns policies in response to an outbreak. For example, a nation may restrict freedom of movement and goods, or impose involuntary quarantine of infected individuals. While these policies likely will not cause conflict, they can lead to social and economic volatility if the practices persist. The third and most important mechanism is domestic instability. Consider AIDS, which largely affects people in their most economically productive years, and leads to the destruction of a country’s workforce, diminished productivity, and a dwindling professional and middle class (Peterson 59). Furthermore, the AIDS crisis is leaving behind a generation of orphans which the CIA says are “unable to cope and vulnerable to exploitation and radicalization,” as seen by the violence of alienated youths in Zimbabwe (Peterson 61). All of the examples above are representative of a critical pattern; as Price-Smith writes, “infectious disease may in fact contribute to societal destabilization and to chronic low-intensity intrastate violence, and in extreme cases it may accelerate the processes that lead to state failure” (121). The U.S. should be concerned on the level of national security, because it has been demonstrated repeatedly that failed states foster terrorism, regional instability, and often necessitate foreign aid and humanitarian assistance.

#### The CP is key to UN Credibility and burden sharing

Friends Committee on National Legislation ‘2k (“The Future of UN Peacekeeping at a Crossroads: U.S. Leadership is Key,” <http://fcnl.org/resources/newsletter/may00/the_future_of_un_peacekeeping_at_a_crossroads_us_leadership_is_key/>, Mike)

What do Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Congo have in common? They are all regions or countries which have been torn apart by violent conflict. They are also regions or countries in which the United Nations has begun new peacekeeping operations (UNPKO) during the past year. Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Congo are not alone, either in their agony or in their need for assistance from the international community. Each of these missions is unique, tremendously complex, and full of obstacles to success. These missions are (or will be) carried out in places where people have endured unspeakable horrors. These regions have little of the social, political, or economic institutions and other infrastructure needed for building a just, enduring peace. The success of these peacekeeping missions hinges on the political will and cooperation of former combatants along with the international community. Both former combatants and the international community must remain committed to the peace process for, perhaps, years to come. The recent challenges faced by the UNPKO in Sierra Leone reflect the extreme problems within the country, the slowness of the U.S. and the international community in taking effective preventive measures, and the current weakness of the UN in conducting effective PKO. The U.S. has a key role to play in fostering the success to these missions. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council with veto authority, U.S. support is essential for any new operation. The U.S. is the wealthiest country with the greatest financial and logistical capacity to support UNPKO when needed. It is the largest contributor to UNPKO. When the U.S. fails to honor its commitments to UNPKO, as it has in recent years, the U.S. jeopardizes the success of missions currently underway and puts at risk peoples’ lives. This, in turn, tarnishes the credibility of the UN and jeopardizes future UNPKO. The Administration has recognized the important role that the UN can play in helping the governments and peoples in these countries/regions to restore peace and rebuild society. Through its permanent representative to the Security Council, the Administration approved each of these operations and promised that the U.S. government would contribute to them (albeit at a lower rate than the U.S. is currently assessed by the UN1). President Clinton has asked Congress for an additional $107 million to pay anticipated increased assessments for the UN peacekeeping missions in Kosovo and East Timor this year. Moreover, in his FY2001 budget request, the President has asked for $739 million to cover anticipated increased assessments for UNPKO. Now it is up to Congress to take the next step by providing sufficient funds to fulfill the U.S. government’s promise to the UN. Governments around the world will be waiting to see what Congress decides. A decision to meet U.S. obligations to the UN will strongly encourage other countries to share the burden of these new peacekeeping missions. It may also help in the congressionally-mandated effort to have the UN General Assembly reduce the U.S. assessment rate to 25%.

#### Credible UN solves prolif

Wirth ‘11 (Timothy – former senator from Colorado, served as the Undersecretary for Global Affairs in the Clinton Administration, president of the United Nations Foundation, The US-UN partnership: greater engagement will bring a greater institution, Harvard International Review, March 22, p. EBSCO Host)

The greatest challenges to US national security today are problems that also threaten many of our global allies and neighbors. These challenges are global in nature and require robust global instruments and solutions--and fortunately, the United Nations is on the frontlines to address them. The organization is a critical partner in global efforts to curb the nuclear ambitions of Iran and North Korea; sanction terrorist networks and leaders; safeguard nuclear weapons from getting into the hands of terrorists and rogue regimes; translate democratic aspirations of people in South Sudan, Iraq, and elsewhere into new and more transparent governments; secure and coordinate humanitarian assistance in crises like those in Haiti and Pakistan; manage climate change and its social and economic implications; and keep the peace in conflict areas such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Cote D’Ivore. The list could go on. The United Nations is effectively operating in many places, so that the United States and our allies do not have to. For US diplomatic and foreign policy interests, engaging the United Nations is one of the best ways that the United States can influence the behavior of other countries, particularly those that do not already share our values or that are outside the scope of US influence. For instance, terrorism is a transnational threat that can only be addressed thoroughly and effectively through the combined efforts of the international community. As we learned after September 11, 2001, terror networks can thrive in countries that lack diplomatic relations with the United States, or in which the United States lacks sufficient credibility among the populations to operate. The United Nations is an important and critical partner in counter-terrorism because it can amplify and broaden the reach of US counter-terrorism efforts, particularly in places such as Somalia and Yemen. Another example of the United Nations' ability to broaden the impact of US foreign policy is the passage of the UN Security Council resolution on Iran sanctions. In June 2010, the UN Security Council voted overwhelmingly for Resolution 1929, which punished Iran for its continued failure to live up to its obligations by putting in place the toughest sanctions the Iranian government has ever faced. This included new measures to restrict Iran's nuclear activities, its ballistic missile program, and, for the first time, its conventional military. The resolution also put in place a new regime to inspect suspicious cargo, detect and stop Iranian smuggling, set restrictions on Iranian banks and financial transactions, and target individuals, entities, and institutions--including those associated with the Revolutionary Guard--that have supported Iran's nuclear program and prospered from its illicit activities.

#### Prolif causes extinction

Utgoff 2 (Deputy Director of the Strategy Forces, and Resources Division of the Institute for Defense Analyses, Victor, “Proliferation, Missile Defence, and American Ambitions,” Survival, Volume 44, Number 2, Summer) ET

In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the, late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear 'six-shooters' on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.

**Primacy has resulted in the lowest level of war in history – best statistics prove**

**Owen 11** [John Owen, Associate professor in the University of Virginia's Department of Politics, recipient of fellowships from the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard, and the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford, and the Center of International Studies at Princeton, PhD in international relations from Harvard, February 11, 2011, “Don’t Discount Hegemony, [www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/11/john-owen/dont-discount-hegemony/](http://www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/11/john-owen/dont-discount-hegemony/)]

Andrew Mack and his colleagues at the Human Security Report Project are to be congratulated. Not only do they present a study with a striking conclusion, driven by data, free of theoretical or ideological bias, but they also do something quite unfashionable: they bear good news. Social scientists really are not supposed to do that. Our job is, if not to be Malthusians, then at least to point out disturbing trends, looming catastrophes, and the imbecility and mendacity of policy makers. And then it is to say why, if people listen to us, things will get better. We do this as if our careers depended upon it, and perhaps they do; for if all is going to be well, what need then for us? Our colleagues at Simon Fraser University are brave indeed. That may sound like a setup, but it is not. I shall challenge neither the data nor the general conclusion that violent conflict around the world has been decreasing in fits and starts since the Second World War. When it comes to violent conflict among and within countries, things have been getting better. (The trends have not been linear—Figure 1.1 actually shows that the frequency of interstate wars peaked in the 1980s—but the 65-year movement is clear.) Instead I shall accept that Mack et al. are correct on the macro-trends, and focus on their explanations they advance for these remarkable trends. With apologies to any readers of this forum who recoil from academic debates, this might get mildly theoretical and even more mildly methodological. Concerning international wars, one version of the “nuclear-peace” theory is not in fact laid to rest by the data. It is certainly true that nuclear-armed states have been involved in many wars. They have even been attacked (think of Israel), which falsifies the simple claim of “assured destruction”—that any nuclear country A will deter any kind of attack by any country B because B fears a retaliatory nuclear strike from A. But the most important “nuclear-peace” claim has been about mutually assured destruction, which obtains between two robustly nuclear-armed states. The claim is that (1) rational states having second-strike capabilities—enough deliverable nuclear weaponry to survive a nuclear first strike by an enemy—will have an overwhelming incentive not to attack one another; and (2) we can safely assume that nuclear-armed states are rational. It follows that states with a second-strike capability will not fight one another. Their colossal atomic arsenals neither kept the United States at peace with North Vietnam during the Cold War nor the Soviet Union at peace with Afghanistan. But the argument remains strong that those arsenals did help keep the United States and Soviet Union at peace with each other. Why non-nuclear states are not deterred from fighting nuclear states is an important and open question. But in a time when calls to ban the Bomb are being heard from more and more quarters, we must be clear about precisely what the broad trends toward peace can and cannot tell us. They may tell us nothing about why we have had no World War III, and little about the wisdom of banning the Bomb now. Regarding the downward trend in international war, Professor Mack is friendlier to more palatable theories such as the “democratic peace” (democracies do not fight one another, and the proportion of democracies has increased, hence less war);the interdependence or “commercial peace” (states with extensive economic ties find it irrational to fight one another, and interdependence has increased, hence less war); and the notion that people around the world are more anti-war than their forebears were. Concerning the downward trend in civil wars, he favors theories of economic growth (where commerce is enriching enough people, violence is less appealing—a logic similar to that of the “commercial peace” thesis that applies among nations) and the end of the Cold War (which end reduced superpower support for rival rebel factions in so many Third-World countries). These are all plausible mechanisms for peace. What is more, none of them excludes any other; all could be working toward the same end. That would be somewhat puzzling, however. Is the world just lucky these days? How is it that an array of peace-inducing factors happens to be working coincidentally in our time, when such a magical array was absent in the past? The answer may be that one or more of these mechanisms reinforces some of the others, or perhaps some of them are mutually reinforcing. Some scholars, for example, have been focusing on whether economic growth might support democracy and vice versa, and whether both might support international cooperation, including to end civil wars. We would still need to explain how this charmed circle of causes got started, however. And here let me raise another factor, perhaps even less appealing than the “nuclear peace” thesis, at least outside of the United States. That factor is what international relations scholars call hegemony—specifically American hegemony. A theory that many regard as discredited, but that refuses to go away, is called hegemonic stability theory. The theory emerged in the 1970s in the realm of international political economy. It asserts that for the global economy to remain open—for countries to keep barriers to trade and investment low—one powerful country must take the lead. Depending on the theorist we consult, “taking the lead” entails paying for global public goods (keeping the sea lanes open, providing liquidity to the international economy), coercion (threatening to raise trade barriers or withdraw military protection from countries that cheat on the rules), or both. The theory is skeptical that international cooperation in economic matters can emerge or endure absent a hegemon. The distastefulness of such claims is self-evident: they imply that it is good for everyone the world over if one country has more wealth and power than others. More precisely, they imply that it has been good for the world that the United States has been so predominant. There is no obvious reason why hegemonic stability theory could not apply to other areas of international cooperation, including in security affairs, human rights, international law, peacekeeping (UN or otherwise), and so on. What I want to suggest here—suggest, not test—is that American hegemony might just be a deep cause of the steady decline of political deaths in the world. How could that be? After all, the report states that United States is the third most war-prone country since 1945. Many of the deaths depicted in Figure 10.4 were in wars that involved the United States (the Vietnam War being the leading one). Notwithstanding politicians’ claims to the contrary, a candid look at U.S. foreign policy reveals that the country is as ruthlessly self-interested as any other great power in history. The answer is that U.S. hegemony might just be a deeper cause of the proximate causes outlined by Professor Mack. Consider economic growth and openness to foreign trade and investment, which (so say some theories) render violence irrational. American power and policies may be responsible for these in two related ways. First, at least since the 1940s Washington has prodded other countries to embrace the market capitalism that entails economic openness and produces sustainable economic growth. The United States promotes capitalism for selfish reasons, of course: its own domestic system depends upon growth, which in turn depends upon the efficiency gains from economic interaction with foreign countries, and the more the better. During the Cold War most of its allies accepted some degree of market-driven growth. Second, the U.S.-led western victory in the Cold War damaged the credibility of alternative paths to development—communism and import-substituting industrialization being the two leading ones—and left market capitalism the best model. The end of the Cold War also involved an end to the billions of rubles in Soviet material support for regimes that tried to make these alternative models work. (It also, as Professor Mack notes, eliminated the superpowers’ incentives to feed civil violence in the Third World.) What we call globalization is caused in part by the emergence of the United States as the global hegemon.

No Risk of Solvency – Academia Proves That Others Will Be Highly Resistant or Ignore the Demand for Change Unless It is Framed in the Context of War

Goldstein, Professor of IR @ American U, 01

Joshua Goldstein Professor of IR @ American U 2001 War and Gender

In North American political science and history, male war scholars’ interest in the puzzle of gendered war roles has been minimal. The topic has not attracted the funding or publications among male scholars as, for example, the similarly intriguing regularity known as the “democratic peace” (democracies rarely fight each other). Feminist political scientists and historians – nearly all women – pay attention to gender in war, but others relegate gender to the dark margins beyond their (various) theoretical frameworks for studying war. Feminist literatures about war and peace of the last 15 years have made little impact as yet on the discussions and empirical research taking place in the predominantly male mainstream of political science or military history. This omission is measurable by counting the number of headings and subheadings in a book’s index on topics relating to gender. The typical political science and history books about war – the “big” books about war’s origins and history – score zero.56

Doyle’s recent and comprehensive survey of scholarship on war and peace contains six gender–related index entries but devotes only about one–tenth of 1 percent of its space to gender. All the gender references concern women; men still do not have gender. Similarly, when gender occasionally shows up in other mainstream war studies, it does so gratuitously, as a passing note – something that could be interesting, but plays no substantive role in any of the main competing theories about war. By contrast, anthropology – in North America and since decades ago – gives serious attention to gender–related subjects in studying war. Margaret Mead’s conclusion in the first major anthropological symposium on war (1967) called for paying “particular attention…to the need of young males to validate their strength and courage, and to…the conspicuous unwillingness of most human societies to arm women.” Anthropological thinking that connects war and gender is not limited to one ideological perspective, nor just to female scholars. Also, anthropology engages gender even though women are poorly represented among anthropologists studying war. Similarly, independent scholars outside of anthropology, political science, or history – such as Gwynne Dyer (a man) and Barbara Ehrenreich – have engaged both the mainstream war studies literatures and feminist theories of gender in war. And in 1929, sociologist Maurice Davie devoted two whole chapters of his book on war to gender.58 The gender blinders in mainstream war studies carry over to the foreign policy establishment. For example, a recent mainstream foreign policy book about “contending paradigms in international relations” – which sounds promising for the inclusion of gender – lacks any reference to gender in its 19 chapters, all written by men. The influential monthly Foreign Affairs did not carry a single article about gender issues in 1990–96. In 1998, an article on gender appeared, written by a man and arguing that biological gender differences make women more peaceful, so the “feminization of world politics” over the last century (since the suffrage movement) has created today’s “democratic zone of peace.” Foreign Affairs treated the article as a novelty, retitling it “What if Women Ran the World?” on the cover and illustrating it with bizarre century–old cartoons and photos of women in poses dominating men (e.g., with boxing gloves).59 The gender blinders also extend to male postmodern international relations scholars. Each of several recent edited volumes in postmodern international relations contains a requisite chapter about gender, written by a woman, and typically no mention of gender at all in the chapters written by men. In fact, the author’s gender is a highly significant predictor of whether the chapter includes or omits gender (see Table 1.2). Thus, even in postmodern international relations, gender is ghettoized.60

#### everyday violence doesn’t cause war and genocide because of significant differences in the degree of intentionality

Bradby & Hundt 10 – Hannah Bradby, Co-Director of the Institute of Health at the University of Warwick, Lecturer in Sociology at Warwick Medical School, and Gillian Lewando Hundt, Professor of Social Sciences in Health at the University of Warwick, 2010, “Introduction,” in Global perspectives on war, gender and health: the sociology and anthropology of suffering, p. 5-6

Far from being a uniquely horrific activity Scheper-Hughes (2002) views genocide as an extension of the dehumanising processes identifiable in many daily interactions. Drawing on analysis of the holocaust as the outcome of the general features of modernity, Scheper-Hughes posits a ‘genocidal continuum’ that connects daily, routine suffering and concomitant insults to a person’s humanity with genocide (Scheper-Hughes 2002: 371). The institutional ‘destruction of personhood’, as seen in the withdrawal of humane empathy from the poor or the elderly, creates the conditions which eventually make genocide possible. The argument that conditions of modernity including western rational legal metaphysics facilitate genocide has been criticised as too unifying and as conferring ‘super-eminence’ on the holocaust (Rose 1996: 11). The holocaust has become a crucial emblem through which we have sought to understand subsequent violence, wars and genocides. But the centrality of the holocaust in developing European thinking around conflict and suffering has made the resultant theoretical perspectives difficult to apply in non-European settings and in instances where conflict is less focussed around a clash of ideology. While the scale of the death toll of the holocaust should continue to shock, as should the organised nature of the attempted destruction of Jews, Roma, Gays and the disabled, there is very little to be gained in comparing scales or forms of suffering. It should be possible to use the study of the holocaust to inform understanding of other genocides in the context of other wars, to interrogate the link between war and suffering and to think through gendered perspectives without essentialising gender or making it the only explanatory variable. This collection does not primarily seek to add to the discussion of the role of the holocaust in theories of human suffering. Our chapters are, however, an unfortunate witness to the fact that despite contemporary hopes and the scale of combatant and non-combatants deaths, the two World Wars were not the wars to end all wars. Rather wars, and their associated suffering, have been ongoing ever since, both in Europe and beyond. War and Medicine While structural approaches can problematise a division between intentional and unintentional suffering, intentionality is nonetheless crucial to the contradictory relationship that war and medicine have with suffering. War is an organised conflict between two military groups and armed conflict is bound to be accompanied by suffering. Although ‘rules of engagement’ and the rhetoric of ‘targeted interventions’ deploying ‘surgical strikes’ suggest that ‘unnecessary’ blood shed can be avoided, war entails suffering, even if this is restricted to combatants. A limited, or targeted war is an oxymoron since war tends to be found in company with the other horsemen of the apocalypse, that is, pestilence, famine and death. Moreover, while the effect of war on soldiers is closely monitored by both sides, the disproportionate way in which the apocalyptic horsemen affect non-combatants and particularly those who are already disempowered such as women, the old and the young, has been less subject to scrutiny.

**Util is good – maximizing all lives is the only way to affirm equality**

**Cummiskey 90** – Professor of Philosophy, Bates (David, Kantian Consequentialism, Ethics 100.3, p 601-2, p 606, jstor, AG)

We must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract "social entity." It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive "overall social good." Instead, the question is whether some persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons. Nozick, for example, argues that "to use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has."30 Why, however, is this not equally true of all those that we do not save through our failure to act? By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act, one fails to sufficiently respect and take account of the many other separate persons, each with only one life, who will bear the cost of our inaction. In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational beings, choose? We have a duty to promote the conditions necessary for the existence of rational beings, but both choosing to act and choosing not to act will cost the life of a rational being. Since the basis of Kant's principle is "rational nature exists as an end-in-itself' (GMM, p. 429), the reasonable solution to such a dilemma involves promoting, insofar as one can, the conditions necessary for rational beings. If I sacrifice some for the sake of other rational beings, I do not use them arbitrarily and I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings. **Persons** may **have "dignity**, an unconditional and incomparable value" that transcends any market value (GMM, p. 436), **but**, as rational beings, persons **also** have **a fundamental equality which dictates that some must** sometimes **give way for the sake of others.** The formula of the end-in-itself thus does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others. If one focuses on the equal value of all rational beings, then equal consideration dictates that one sacrifice some to save many. [continues] According to Kant, the objective end of moral action is the existence of rational beings. Respect for rational beings requires that, in deciding what to do, one give appropriate practical consideration to the unconditional value of rational beings and to the conditional value of happiness. Since agent-centered constraints require a non-value-based rationale, the most natural interpretation of the demand that one give equal respect to all rational beings lead to a consequentialist normative theory. We have seen that there is no sound Kantian reason for abandoning this natural consequentialist interpretation. In particular, a consequentialist interpretation does not require sacrifices which a Kantian ought to consider unreasonable, and it does not involve doing evil so that good may come of it. It simply requires an uncompromising commitment to the equal value and equal claims of all rational beings and a recognition that, in the moral consideration of conduct, one's own subjective concerns do not have overriding importance.

**Hegemony is key to maintain human rights**

**Ignatieff 03, Director of the Carr Center at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard** (Michael, Hamilton Spectator, January 18)

Regime change also raises the difficult question for Americans of whether their own freedom entails a duty to defend the freedom of others beyond their borders. Yet it remains a fact -- as disagreeable to those left wingers who regard American imperialism as the root of all evil as it is to the right-wing isolationists, who believe that the world beyond our shores is none of our business -- that there are many peoples who owe their freedom to an exercise of American military power. It's not just the Japanese and the Germans who became democrats under the watchful eye of Generals MacArthur and Clay. There are the Bosnians whose nation survived because American air power and diplomacy forced an end to a war the Europeans couldn't stop. There are the Kosovars who would still be imprisoned in Serbia, if not for Gen. Wesley Clark and the Air Force. The list of people whose freedom depends on American air and ground power also includes the Afghans and, most inconveniently of all, the Iraqis. The moral evaluation of empire gets complicated when one of its benefits might be freedom for the oppressed. Iraqi exiles are adamant: even if the Iraqi people might be the immediate victims of an American attack, they would also be its ultimate beneficiaries. Whenever it has exerted power overseas, America has never been sure whether it values stability -- which means not only political stability but also the steady, profitable flow of goods and raw materials -- more than it values its own rhetoric about democracy. When the two values have collided, American power has come down heavily on the side of stability, for example, toppling democratically elected leaders from Mossadegh in Iran to Allende in Chile. Next door in Iran, America had backed stability over democracy, propping up the autocratic rule of the shah, only to reap the whirlwind of an Islamic fundamentalist revolution in 1979 that delivered neither stability nor real democracy. Does the same fate await an American operation in Iraq? International human rights groups such as Amnesty International are dismayed at the way both the British government of Tony Blair and the Bush administration are citing the human rights abuses of Hussein to defend the idea of regime change. Certainly British and U.S. governments maintained a dishonourable silence when Hussein gassed the Kurds in 1988. Yet human rights groups seem more outraged by the prospect of action than by the abuses they once denounced. The fact that states are late and hypocritical in adopting human rights does not deprive them of the right to use force to defend them. The disagreeable reality for those who believe in human rights is that there are some occasions -- and Iraq may be one of them -- when war is the only real remedy for regimes that live by terror. The choice is one between two evils, between containing and leaving a tyrant in place and the targeted use of force, which will kill people but free a nation from the tyrant's grip.

**Hegemony is crucial to ending poverty and creating prosperity**

**Thayer, ‘7** – Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota

[Bradley A. American Empire: A Debate. Routledge Press: Taylor and Francis Group, NY. Page # below in < >]

Perhaps the greatest testament to the benefits of the American Empire comes from Deepak Lal, a former Indian foreign service diplomat, researcher at the World Bank, prolific author, and now a professor who started his career confident in the socialist ideology of post-independence India that strongly condemned empire. He has abandoned the position of his youth and is now one of the strongest proponents of the American Empire. Lal has traveled the world and, in the course of his journeys, has witnessed great poverty and misery due to a lack of economic development. He realized that free markets were necessary for the development of poor countries, and this led him to recognize that his faith in socialism was wrong. Just as a conservative famously is said to be a liberal who has been mugged by reality, the hard "evidence and experience" that stemmed from "working and traveling in most parts of the Third World during my professional career" caused this profound change.6'

Lal submits that the only way to bring relief to the desperately poor countries of the Third World is through the American Empire. Empires provide order, and this order "has been essential for the working of the benign processes of globalization, which promote prosperity."62 Globalization is the process of creating a common economic space, which leads to a growing integration of the world economy through the increasingly free movement of goods, capital, and labor. It is the responsibility of the United States, Lal argues, to use the LIED to promote the well-being of all economies, but particularly those in the Third World, so that they too may enjoy economic prosperity. <44>

# 2NC CP Overview

#### The CP ensures the continuation of peacekeeping operations and reverses the international signal that the U.S. has selfish motivations for intervening in humanitarian crises

#### NO permutations – the plan refuses the authority of the President to engage in peacekeeping operations which means they couldn’t fund them or increase their capacity – it also links to all of our peacekeeping good offense which are net benefits to the counterplan.

#### Peacekeeping reduces unilateral U.S. military intervention – that internal-link turns ALL of their security and imperialism claims – we have qualitative and quantitative data to support our argument

Enholm Executive Director of the Woodrow Wilson House and UN Expert ’11 (Robert, “U.S. Engagement in International Peacekeeping: From Aspiration to Implementation,” <http://globalsolutions.org/files/public/documents/U.S.-Engagement-in-International-Peacekeeping.pdf>, Mike)

U.N. peacekeeping, while not a panacea, has proven to be an extremely effective means of reducing violence and preventing its resurgence. The effectiveness of U.N. peacekeeping in ending conflict and instability was highlighted in a RAND Corporation study comparing the success rates of eight U.S.-led nation-building missions and eight U.N.-led peacekeeping operations. 4 The study, which compared the missions based on the criteria of whether the countries they served were peaceful or not, found that of the eight U.S.-led cases, only four had achieved peace. Conversely, seven of the eight U.N.-led peacekeeping missions were determined to be at peace. In addition to this success rate, the study also identified the U.N.’s decision-making apparatus, unified command and control structure, and high-level of international legitimacy as major advantages of U.N. peacekeeping operations over missions conducted by other international organizations, such as NATO, the European Union, or the African Union. 5 The effectiveness of U.N. peacekeeping in preventing the resurgence of Conflict was also documented in a 2004 study which found that, in the post-Cold War era, deploying U.N. peacekeepers reduces the hazard that a country will slide back into all-out war by 50%. 6 In addition to decreasing the likelihood of a resurgence of conflict, peacekeeping has also been shown to bolster GDP growth in conflict-affected areas. Indeed, one recent study found that in the first three years after a conflict, U.N. peacekeeping missions have a substantial effect on GDP, with annual growth rates nearly 2.4% higher in post-conflict countries where peacekeeping missions are present. 7 Besides demonstrating the sheer effectiveness of peacekeeping itself, these benefits also speak to the longer-term cost-effectiveness of U.S. financial contributions to U.N. peacekeeping missions. By decreasing 14 the likelihood of further conflict, and spurring economic growth in the first several years after the end of a conflict, the presence of these reduces the likelihood that additional U.S. resources will be necessary, either for military or humanitarian purposes over the long-run. This point was corroborated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, who said that, “[United Nations] peacekeepers help promote stability and help reduce the risks that major U.S. military interventions may be required to restore stability in a country or region. Therefore, the success of these operations is very much in our national interest.” 8

Means only the CP solves the harms of the aff- No Risk of Solvency – Academia Proves That Others Will Be Highly Resistant or Ignore the Demand for Change Unless It is Framed in the Context of War

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### Permutations

#### 1. The permutation is severance – the plan has Congress refuse the ability for the President to engage in peacekeeping operations – the CP increases monetary and technical support for them which means the U.S. would still participate in missions – voter for fairness and education because it makes the aff a moving target and destroys neg ground

#### 2. Perm is intrinsic – reject- CP is opposite and proves the CP is philosophically competitive- competition is a game changer when you get to interpret he way fiat functions for your aff in a other than normal means – CP is opposite

#### 3. No Solvency – not genuine after the CP because most intervention is based on HR which was their arg on T

#### 4. Links to the NB Humanitarian Justifications are THE JUSTIFICATION for Peacekeeping Operations

Sorenson and Wood ‘5 (David and Pia, *The Politics of Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era*, pg. 96, Google Books, Mike)

The key characteristics of this development are (i) the definition of a ‘robust’ doctrine and practice of peacekeeping which was deemed necessary after the experiences of the UK military in civil wars in the 1990s, especially in Bosnia, where post-deployment assessments suggested that the rules of engagement and principles which characterized traditional UN peacekeeping were dangerously ineffective in these environments; (ii) the development of projects which aim to support the emergence of more robust peacekeeping capacities in Africa, which has witnessed some of the worst civil wars during the post-Cold War period; and (iii) the emergence and influence of a concept of humanitarian intervention which justified the use of peacekeeping forces to protect human rights and also to protect civilian populations from militias, warlords and other ‘predators’ such as criminal mafias. This form of peacekeeping has been deployed now in a number of conflicts where justification for deployment has come, initially at least, not from a UN mandate but from some kind of reference to international human rights and humanitarian norms (Sierra Leone and Kosovo). More recently Britain has deployed peacekeepers to take action against international terrorism and (controversially) to confront rogue states which threaten international peace and security by harbouring terrorists (Afghanistan) and developing weapons of mass destruction (Iraq, April 2003). We review controversies about the motives for these more recent deployments of UK peacekeepers in Sierra Leone and in Kosovo, and suggest in conclusion that while robust or muscular peacekeeping as developed in UK doctrine (referred to as peace support operations) has had some success militarily, the challenge is to develop in policy and in practice the mechanisms for harnessing military peacekeeping power to the longer-term and more arduous tasks of conflict resolution and democratic post-conflict peace building. In particular, we conclude that the use of military forces as peacekeepers in the ‘war on terror,’ in which UK forces are now involved in both Afghanistan and in southern Iraq, will require a renewed commitment to the multilateral coordination of policies centered on long-term conflict prevention and post-conflict peace building.

#### 6. Multiple perms are a voting issue

#### 7. At worst reject the CP its not needed for the Turns- no non-uniqueness args in the 2AC

## Heg Turn

#### Peacekeeping operations are a crucial force-multiplier for the U.S. armed forces – allows international coop to contain challenges in every global hot spot – that’s 1NC Enholm

#### Their critique of hegemony is essentialist – academic and political scholarship prove that U.S. leadership mediates conflicts by ensuring actors not allied with the U.S. do not initiate wars **AND** it restrains allies from taking provocative actions

#### No turns – the CP solves overstretch and cost burdens

Enholm Executive Director of the Woodrow Wilson House and UN Expert ’11 (Robert, “U.S. Engagement in International Peacekeeping: From Aspiration to Implementation,” <http://globalsolutions.org/files/public/documents/U.S.-Engagement-in-International-Peacekeeping.pdf>, Mike)

The effectiveness of U.N. peacekeeping in preventing the resurgence of conflict and reducing the size of future potential investments by the U.S. also points to another major benefit of peacekeeping activities: they serve as a crucial force-multiplier for the United States. This is because peacekeeping missions advance key foreign policy and national security interests, while simultaneously requiring little from the U.S. in terms of personnel and spreading the financial burden among all U.N. Member States. Simply out, as large, influential, and resource-rich as it is, the United States cannot take on the responsibility of safeguarding international security alone. Each day, U.N. peacekeepers and civilian personnel do just that, working to stabilize conflict zones and prevent the collapse of fragile states around the world by supporting the implementation of peace agreements, demobilizing combatants, facilitating humanitarian assistance, and creating conditions for political reconciliation and free and fair elections. As evidenced by our nation’s strong and consistent support over the years for the creation of new peacekeeping missions and the expansion of many already in existence, these missions are carried out in places that, while critically important to U.S. foreign policy or national security goals, are unlikely to see U.S. boots on the ground. Consequently, U.N. peacekeeping represents an extremely effective tool for U.S. policymakers, helping to pacify volatile regions and deny potential safe havens and recruiting grounds for terrorists, drug traffickers and other criminals, at a relatively low cost to the United States.

### A/T Cost

#### Cost does not make heg unsustainable, we can stay engaged despite future cuts – plus balancing isn’t any cheaper

**We can stay engaged despite future cuts – balancing isn’t any cheaper**

**Brookies, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth 13** (Stephen Brooks, John Ikenberry and William Wohlforth, Jan/Feb 2013, Foreign Affairs, (Brooks is a professor at Darmouth, Ikenberry is a professor at Princeton and Wohlforth is a professor at Dartmouth), "Lean forward: in defense of american engagement," 92.1, Proquest)

Many advocates of retrenchment consider the United States' assertive global posture simply too expensive. The international relations scholar Christopher Layne, for example, has warned of the country's "ballooning budget deficits" and argued that "its strategic commitments exceed the resources available to support them." Calculating the savings of switching grand strategies, however, is not so simple, because it depends on the expenditures the current strategy demands and the amount required for its replacement-numbers that are hard to pin down.¶ If the United States revoked all its security guarantees, brought home all its troops, shrank every branch of the military, and slashed its nuclear arsenal, it would save around $900 billion over ten years, according to Benjamin Friedman and Justin Logan of the Cato Institute. But few advocates of retrenchment endorse such a radical reduction; instead, most call for "restraint," an "offshore balancing" strategy, or an "over the horizon" military posture. The savings these approaches would yield are less clear, since they depend on which security commitments Washington would abandon outright and how much it would cost to keep the remaining ones. If retrenchment simply meant shipping foreign-based U.S. forces back to the United States, then the savings would be modest at best, since the countries hosting U.S. forces usually cover a large portion of the basing costs. And if it meant maintaining a major expeditionary capacity, then any savings would again be small, since the Pentagon would still have to pay for the expensive weaponry and equipment required for projecting power abroad.¶ The other side of the cost equation, the price of continued engagement, is also in flux. Although the fat defense budgets of the past decade make an easy target for advocates of retrenchment, such high levels of spending aren't needed to maintain an engaged global posture. Spending skyrocketed after 9/11, but it has already begun to fall back to earth as the United States winds down its two costly wars and trims its base level of nonwar spending. As of the fall of 2012, the Defense Department was planning for cuts of just under $500 billion over the next five years, which it maintains will not compromise national security. These reductions would lower military spending to a little less than three percent of gdp by 2017, from its current level of 4.5 percent. The Pentagon could save even more with no ill effects by reforming its procurement practices and compensation policies.¶ Even without major budget cuts, however, the country can afford the costs of its ambitious grand strategy. The significant increases in military spending proposed by Mitt Romney, the Republican candidate, during the 2012 presidential campaign would still have kept military spending below its current share of gdp, since spending on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq would still have gone down and Romney's proposed nonwar spending levels would not have kept pace with economic growth. Small wonder, then, that the case for pulling back rests more on the nonmonetary costs that the current strategy supposedly incurs.

**Pursuit of heg is inevitable**

**Dorfman 12** (Zach Dorfman, assistant editor of Ethics and International Affairs, the journal of the Carnegie Council, and co-editor of the Montreal Review, “What We Talk About When We Talk About Isolationism”, May 18, <http://dissentmagazine.org/online.php?id=605>)

¶ The rise of China notwithstanding, the United States remains the world’s sole superpower. Its military (and, to a considerable extent, political) hegemony extends not just over North America or even the Western hemisphere, but also Europe, large swaths of Asia, and Africa. Its interests are global; nothing is outside its potential sphere of influence. There are an estimated 660 to 900 American military bases in roughly forty countries worldwide, although figures on the matter are notoriously difficult to ascertain, largely because of subterfuge on the part of the military. According to official data there are active-duty U.S. military personnel in 148 countries, or over 75 percent of the world’s states. The United States checks Russian power in Europe and Chinese power in South Korea and Japan and Iranian power in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Turkey. In order to maintain a frigid peace between Israel and Egypt, the American government hands the former $2.7 billion in military aid every year, and the latter $1.3 billion. It also gives Pakistan more than $400 million dollars in military aid annually (not including counterinsurgency operations, which would drive the total far higher), Jordan roughly $200 million, and Colombia over $55 million.¶ U.S. long-term military commitments are also manifold. It is one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, the only institution legally permitted to sanction the use of force to combat “threats to international peace and security.” In 1949 the United States helped found NATO, the first peacetime military alliance extending beyond North and South America in U.S. history, which now has twenty-eight member states. The United States also has a trilateral defense treaty with Australia and New Zealand, and bilateral mutual defense treaties with Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and South Korea. It is this sort of reach that led Madeleine Albright to call the United States the sole “indispensible power” on the world stage.¶ The idea that global military dominance and political hegemony is in the U.S. national interest—and the world’s interest—is generally taken for granted domestically. Opposition to it is limited to the libertarian Right and anti-imperialist Left, both groups on the margins of mainstream political discourse. Today, American supremacy is assumed rather than argued for: in an age of tremendous political division, **it is a bipartisan first principle of foreign policy, a presupposition**. In this area at least, one wishes for a little less agreement.¶ In Promise and Peril: America at the Dawn of a Global Age, Christopher McKnight Nichols provides an erudite account of a period before such a consensus existed, when ideas about America’s role on the world stage were fundamentally contested. As this year’s presidential election approaches, each side will portray the difference between the candidates’ positions on foreign policy as immense. Revisiting Promise and Peril shows us just how narrow the American worldview has become, and how our public discourse has become narrower still.¶ Nichols focuses on the years between 1890 and 1940, during America’s initial ascent as a global power. He gives special attention to the formative debates surrounding the Spanish-American War, U.S. entry into the First World War, and potential U.S. membership in the League of Nations—debates that were constitutive of larger battles over the nature of American society and its fragile political institutions and freedoms. During this period, foreign and domestic policy were often linked as part of a cohesive political vision for the country. Nichols illustrates this through intellectual profiles of some of the period’s most influential figures, including senators Henry Cabot Lodge and William Borah, socialist leader Eugene Debs, philosopher and psychologist William James, journalist Randolph Bourne, and the peace activist Emily Balch. Each of them interpreted isolationism and internationalism in distinct ways, sometimes deploying the concepts more for rhetorical purposes than as cornerstones of a particular worldview.¶ Today, isolationism is often portrayed as intellectually bankrupt, a redoubt for idealists, nationalists, xenophobes, and fools. Yet the term now used as a political epithet has deep roots in American political culture. Isolationist principles can be traced back to George Washington’s farewell address, during which he urged his countrymen to steer clear of “foreign entanglements” while actively seeking nonbinding commercial ties. (Whether economic commitments do in fact entail political commitments is another matter.) Thomas Jefferson echoed this sentiment when he urged for “commerce with all nations, [and] alliance with none.” Even the Monroe Doctrine, in which the United States declared itself the regional hegemon and demanded noninterference from European states in the Western hemisphere, was often viewed as a means of isolating the United States from Europe and its messy alliance system.¶ In Nichols’s telling, however, modern isolationism was born from the debates surrounding the Spanish-American War and the U.S. annexation of the Philippines. Here isolationism began to take on a much more explicitly anti-imperialist bent. Progressive isolationists such as William James found U.S. policy in the Philippines—which it had “liberated” from Spanish rule just to fight a bloody counterinsurgency against Philippine nationalists—anathema to American democratic traditions and ideas about national self-determination.¶ As Promise and Peril shows, however, “cosmopolitan isolationists” like James never called for “cultural, economic, or complete political separation from the rest of the world.” Rather, they wanted the United States to engage with other nations peacefully and without pretensions of domination. They saw the United States as a potential force for good in the world, but they also placed great value on neutrality and non-entanglement, and wanted America to focus on creating a more just domestic order. James’s anti-imperialism was directly related to his fear of the effects of “bigness.” He argued forcefully against all concentrations of power, especially those between business, political, and military interests. He knew that such vested interests would grow larger and more difficult to control if America became an overseas empire.¶ Others, such as “isolationist imperialist” Henry Cabot Lodge, the powerful senator from Massachusetts, argued that fighting the Spanish-American War and annexing the Philippines were isolationist actions to their core. First, banishing the Spanish from the Caribbean comported with the Monroe Doctrine; second, adding colonies such as the Philippines would lead to greater economic growth without exposing the United States to the vicissitudes of outside trade. Prior to the Spanish-American War, many feared that the American economy’s rapid growth would lead to a surplus of domestic goods and cause an economic disaster. New markets needed to be opened, and the best way to do so was to dominate a given market—that is, a country—politically. Lodge’s defense of this “large policy” was public and, by today’s standards, quite bald. Other proponents of this policy included Teddy Roosevelt (who also believed that war was good for the national character) and a significant portion of the business class. For Lodge and Roosevelt, “isolationism” meant what is commonly referred to today as “unilateralism”: the ability for the United States to do what it wants, when it wants.¶ Other “isolationists” espoused principles that we would today call internationalist. Randolph Bourne, a precocious journalist working for the New Republic, passionately opposed American entry into the First World War, much to the detriment of his writing career. He argued that hypernationalism would cause lasting damage to the American social fabric. He was especially repulsed by wartime campaigns to Americanize immigrants. Bourne instead envisioned a “transnational America”: a place that, because of its distinct cultural and political traditions and ethnic diversity, could become an example to the rest of the world. Its respect for plurality at home could influence other countries by example, but also by allowing it to mediate international disputes without becoming a party to them. Bourne wanted an America fully engaged with the world, but not embroiled in military conflicts or alliances.¶ This was also the case for William Borah, the progressive Republican senator from Idaho. Borah was an agrarian populist and something of a Jeffersonian: he believed axiomatically in local democracy and rejected many forms of federal encroachment. He was opposed to extensive immigration, but not “anti-immigrant.” Borah thought that America was strengthened by its complex ethnic makeup and that an imbalance tilted toward one group or another would have deleterious effects. But it is his famously isolationist foreign policy views for which Borah is best known. As Nichols writes:¶ He was consistent in an anti-imperialist stance against U.S. domination abroad; yet he was ambivalent in cases involving what he saw as involving obvious national interest….He also without fail argued that any open-ended military alliances were to be avoided at all costs, while arguing that to minimize war abroad as well as conflict at home should always be a top priority for American politicians.¶ Borah thus cautiously supported entry into the First World War on national interest grounds, but also led a group of senators known as “the irreconcilables” in their successful effort to prevent U.S. entry into the League of Nations. His paramount concern was the collective security agreement in the organization’s charter: he would not assent to a treaty that stipulated that the United States would be obligated to intervene in wars between distant powers where the country had no serious interest at stake.¶ Borah possessed an alternative vision for a more just and pacific international order. Less than a decade after he helped scuttle American accession to the League, he helped pass the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928) in a nearly unanimous Senate vote. More than sixty states eventually became party to the pact, which outlawed war between its signatories and required them to settle their disputes through peaceful means. Today, realists sneer at the idealism of Kellogg-Briand, but the Senate was aware of the pact’s limitations and carved out clear exceptions for cases of national defense. Some supporters believed that, if nothing else, the law would help strengthen an emerging international norm against war. (Given what followed, this seems like a sad exercise in wish-fulfillment.) Unlike the League of Nations charter, the treaty faced almost no opposition from the isolationist bloc in the Senate, since it did not require the United States to enter into a collective security agreement or abrogate its sovereignty. This was a kind of internationalism Borah and his irreconcilables could proudly support.¶ The United States today looks very different from the country in which Borah, let alone William James, lived, both domestically (where political and civil freedoms have been extended to women, African Americans, and gays and lesbians) and internationally (with its leading role in many global institutions). But different strains of isolationism persist. Newt Gingrich has argued for a policy of total “energy independence” (in other words, domestic drilling) while fulminating against President Obama for “bowing” to the Saudi king. While recently driving through an agricultural region of rural Colorado, I saw a giant roadside billboard calling for American withdrawal from the UN.¶ Yet in the last decade, the Republican Party, with the partial exception of its Ron Paul/libertarian faction, has veered into such a belligerent unilateralism that its graybeards—one of whom, Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana, just lost a primary to a far-right challenger partly because of his reasonableness on foreign affairs—were barely able to ensure Senate ratification of a key nuclear arms reduction treaty with Russia. Many of these same people desire a unilateral war with Iran.¶ And it isn’t just Republicans. Drone attacks have intensified in Yemen, Pakistan, and elsewhere under the Obama administration. Massive troop deployments continue unabated. We spend over $600 billion dollars a year on our military budget; the next largest is China’s, at “only” around $100 billion. Administrations come and go, but **the national security state appears here to stay**.

### Data proves Heg

**Social science proves heg is good**

**Wohlforth 09**

professor of government at Dartmouth (William, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,” World Affairs, January, project muse)

The upshot is a near scholarly consensus that unpolarity’s consequences for great power conflict are indeterminate and that a power shift resulting in a return to bipolarity or multipolarity will not raise the specter of great power war. This article questions the consensus on two counts. First, I show that it depends crucially on a dubious assumption about human motivation. Prominent theories of war are based on the assumption that people are mainly motivated by the instrumental pursuit of tangible ends such as physical security and material prosperity. This is why such theories seem irrelevant to interactions among great powers in an international environment that diminishes the utility of war for the pursuit of such ends. Yet we know that people are motivated by a great many noninstrumental motives, not least by concerns regarding their social status. 3 As John Harsanyi noted, “Apart from economic payoffs, social status (social rank) seems to be the most important incentive and motivating force of social behavior.”4 This proposition rests on much firmer scientific ground now than when Harsanyi expressed it a generation ago, as cumulating research shows that humans appear to be hardwired for sensitivity to status and that relative standing is a powerful and independent motivator of behavior.5 [End Page 29] Second, I question the dominant view that status quo evaluations are relatively independent of the distribution of capabilities. If the status of states depends in some measure on their relative capabilities, and if states derive utility from status, then different distributions of capabilities may affect levels of satisfaction, just as different income distributions may affect levels of status competition in domestic settings. 6 Building on research in psychology and sociology, I argue that even capabilities distributions among major powers foster ambiguous status hierarchies, which generate more dissatisfaction and clashes over the status quo. And the more stratified the distribution of capabilities, the less likely such status competition is. Unipolarity thus generates far fewer incentives than either bipolarity or multipolarity for direct great power positional competition over status. Elites in the other major powers continue to prefer higher status, but in a unipolar system they face comparatively weak incentives to translate that preference into costly action. And the absence of such incentives matters because social status is a positional good—something whose value depends on how much one has in relation to others.7 “If everyone has high status,” Randall Schweller notes, “no one does.”8 While one actor might increase its status, all cannot simultaneously do so. High status is thus inherently scarce, and competitions for status tend to be zero sum.9

## Failed States Turn

#### Peacekeeping operations empirically absolve the violence that collapses fragile states – our evidence is reverse causal – lack of peacekeeping guarantees national devolutions that cause weapons trade which releases fissile material – also guarantees no response to piracy and pandemics that spill over globally – that’s 1NC Enholm

#### Piracy causes extinction – enriched nuclear material is transported across seas that enter close proximities to unstable states – tankers cannot fight off an orchestrated attack by pirates who can sell or use the weapons – that’s 1NC Independent

#### Pandemics cause extinction – pathogens emerge at alarming rates and cannot be contained in failing states which completely crumbles political systems and erupts in ethnic conflict – causes an imbalance of power to result in pre-emptive attacks that escalate to global war

#### And nuke terror risk is high – attack causes extinction

Dvorkin, Major General (retired), doctor of technical sciences, professor, and senior fellow at the Center for International Security of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences, ’12 (Vladimir, The Center participates in the working group of the U.S.-Russia Initiative to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism, 9/21/12, "What Can Destroy Strategic Stability: Nuclear Terrorism is a Real Threat," belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/22333/what\_can\_destroy\_strategic\_stability.html)

Hundreds of scientific papers and reports have been published on nuclear terrorism. International conferences have been held on this threat with participation of Russian organizations, including IMEMO and the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies. Recommendations on how to combat the threat have been issued by the International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe, Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, Russian-American Elbe Group, and other organizations. The UN General Assembly adopted the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in 2005 and cooperation among intelligence services of leading states in this sphere is developing.¶ At the same time, **these efforts fall short for a number of reasons, partly because various acts of nuclear terrorism are possible. Dispersal of radioactive material by detonation of conventional explosives (“dirty bombs”) is a method that is most accessible for terrorists. With the wide spread of radioactive sources, raw materials for such attacks have become much more accessible than weapons-useable nuclear material or nuclear weapons.** The use of **“**dirty bombs**”** will not cause many immediate casualties, but it **will result into long-term radioactive contamination, contributing to the spread of** panic and socio-economic destabilization**.**¶ Severe **consequences can be caused by sabotaging nuclear power plants, research reactors, and radioactive materials storage facilities. Large cities are especially vulnerable to such attacks. A large city may host dozens of research reactors with a nuclear power plant or a couple of spent nuclear fuel storage facilities and dozens of large radioactive materials storage facilities located nearby.** The past few years have seen significant efforts made to enhance organizational and physical aspects of security at facilities, especially at nuclear power plants. **Efforts have also been made to improve security culture. But these efforts do not preclude the possibility that** well-trained terrorists may be able to penetrate nuclear facilities**.**¶ **Some estimates show that sabotage of a research reactor in a metropolis may expose hundreds of thousands to high doses of radiation. A formidable part of the city would become uninhabitable for a long time**.¶ Of all the scenarios, it **is building an improvised nuclear device by terrorists that poses the** maximum risk**. There are no engineering problems that cannot be solved if terrorists decide to build a simple “gun-type” nuclear device.** **Information on the design of such devices, as well as implosion-type devices, is available in the public domain**. It is the acquisition of weapons-grade uranium that presents the sole serious obstacle. Despite numerous preventive measures taken, we cannot rule out the possibility that **such materials can be bought on the black market.** Theft of weapons-grade uranium is also possible**. Research reactor fuel is considered to be particularly vulnerable to theft, as it is scattered at sites in dozens of countries. There are about 100 research reactors in the world that run on weapons-grade uranium fuel, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).**¶ **A terrorist “gun-type” uranium bomb can have a yield of least 10-15 kt, which is** comparable to the yield of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima**.** **The explosion of such a bomb in a modern metropolis can kill and wound hundreds of thousands and cause serious economic damage. There will also be long-term sociopsychological and political consequences**.¶ The vast majority of states have introduced unprecedented security and surveillance measures at transportation and other large-scale public facilities after the terrorist attacks in the United States, Great Britain, Italy, and other countries. These measures have proved burdensome for the countries’ populations, but the public has accepted them as necessary. **A nuclear terrorist attack will make the public accept further measures meant to enhance control even if these measures significantly restrict the democratic liberties they are accustomed to. Authoritarian states could be expected to adopt even more restrictive measures**.¶ If a nuclear terrorist act occurs, **nations will delegate tens of thousands of their secret services’ best personnel to investigate and attribute the attack. Radical Islamist groups are among those capable of such an act.** We can imagine what would happen if they do so, **given the anti-Muslim sentiments and resentment that conventional terrorist attacks by Islamists have generated in developed democratic countries. Mass deportation of the non-indigenous population and severe sanctions would follow such an attack in what will cause violent protests in the Muslim world. Series of armed clashing terrorist attacks may follow. The prediction that Samuel Huntington has made in his book “**The Clash of Civilizations **and the Remaking of World Order” may come true**. Huntington’s book clearly demonstrates that it is not Islamic extremists that are the cause of the Western world’s problems. Rather there is a deep, intractable conflict that is rooted in the fault lines that run between Islam and Christianity. **This is especially dangerous for Russia because these fault lines run across its territory.** To sum it up, the political leadership of Russia has every reason to revise its list of factors that could undermine strategic stability.  BMD does not deserve to be even last on that list because its effectiveness in repelling massive missile strikes will be extremely low. BMD systems can prove useful only if deployed to defend against launches of individual ballistic missiles or groups of such missiles. Prioritization of other destabilizing factors—that could affect global and regional stability—merits a separate study or studies. But even without them I can conclude that nuclear terrorism should be placed on top of the list. The threat of nuclear terrorism is real, and a successful nuclear terrorist attack would lead to a radical transformation of the global order.  All of the threats on the revised list must become a subject of thorough studies by experts. States need to work hard to forge a common understanding of these threats and develop a strategy to combat them.

#### Poverty causes millions of deaths every year

Abu-Jamal**,** journalist and political activist, ‘98

[Mumia, A Quiet and Deadly Violence, 9-19, [http://wwwflashpoints.net/mQuietDeadlyViolence.html](http://www.flashpoints.net/mQuietDeadlyViolence.html)]

**We live**, equally immersed, and to a deeper degree, **in a nation that** condones and **ignores** wide-ranging "**structural' violenc**e, of a kind that destroys human life with a breathtaking ruthlessness. Former Massachusetts prison official and writer, Dr. James Gilligan observes;   By "structural violence" I mean the increased rates of death and disability suffered by those who occupy the bottom rungs of society, as contrasted by those who are above them. Those excess deaths (or at least a demonstrably large proportion of them) are a function of the class structure; and that structure is itself a product of society's collective human choices, concerning how to distribute the collective wealth of the society. These are not acts of God. I am contrasting "structural" with "behavioral violence" by which I mean the non-natural deaths and injuries that are caused by specific behavioral actions of individuals against individuals, such as the deaths we attribute to homicide, suicide, soldiers in warfare, capital punishment, and so on. --(Gilligan, J., MD, Violence: Reflections On a National Epidemic (New York: Vintage, 1996), 192.)   **This form of violence**, not covered by any of the majoritarian, corporate, ruling-class protected media, **is** invisible to us and because of its invisibility, all the more **insidious**. How dangerous is it--really? Gilligan notes:  [E]very fifteen years, on the average, **as many people die because of relative poverty as would be killed in a nuclear war that caused 232 million deaths**; and every single year, two to three times as many people die from poverty throughout the world as were killed by the Nazi genocide of the Jews over a six-year period. **This is**, in effect, **the equivalent of an ongoing, unending, in fact accelerating**, **thermonuclear war**, or genocide **on the** weak and **poor every year of every decade, throughout the world**. [Gilligan, p. 196]    Worse still, in a thoroughly capitalist society, **much of that violence became internalized, turned back on the Self, because**, in a society based on the priority of wealth, **those who own nothing are taught to loathe themselves**, as if something is inherently wrong with themselves, instead of the social order that promotes this self-loathing. This intense self-hatred was often manifested in familial violence as when the husband beats the wife, the wife smacks the son, and the kids fight each other.   This vicious, circular, and invisible violence, unacknowledged by the corporate media, uncriticized in substandard educational systems, and un-understood by the very folks who suffer in its grips, feeds on the spectacular and more common forms of violence that the system makes damn sure -that we can recognize and must react to it.

### A2: No Internal Link (War, Disease, Terrorism)

#### Failed states cause WW3, Disease, and Terrorism

Ottaway Senior Associate in the Democracy and Rule of Law Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Mair Deputy Director at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs ‘4 (Marina and Stefan, “States at Risk and Failed States, September, <http://d1lj51l9p3qzy9.cloudfront.net/handle/10207/bitstreams/6593.pdf>, Mike)

Failing and failed states present a grave danger to international stability as well as to the well-being of their populations. Internationally, they can become safe havens for terrorist organizations, centers for the trade of drugs and arms, and breeding grounds for dangerous diseases. Regionally, they can spill instability well past their borders and create a conflict dynamic affecting neighboring countries. Domestically, they cannot provide security for their citizens or deliver essential public goods. Beyond these immediate threats, failure of states also means the appearance of a growing number of stateless territories, a phenomenon with which the governments of Western countries are poorly prepared to deal. Despite all the astute reflections on the importance of non-state actors in international affairs and on the need to rethink the concept of sovereignty, states are still the central actors and units of global governance. There is no doubt that failed and failing states present an international threat and require international intervention. Contrary to the developing consensus, however, such interventions should be narrowly focused, dealing above all with problems of state security. The ambitious models for intervention that are often advocated—models that emphasize human over state security—are too complex and costly to be implemented, and even in the best-case scenario would produce results only in the long run.

### \*A2: Case Outweighs – Terrorism First\*\*\*

#### Failed states cause terrorism and outweigh great power war

Piazza Political Scientist at University of North Carolina at Charlotte ‘8 (James, “Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational Terrorism?” *International Studies Quarterly 52*, 469-488, Mike)

Addressing the problem of failed and failing states will undoubtedly yield significant security and humanitarian dividends for the international system. Is a reduction in transnational terrorism one of them? United States policymakers regard failed and failing states such as Afghanistan, Somalia, and Sudan to be festering incubators of terrorism, and lament that for too long United States foreign policy has ignored the threat that these types of states pose to the international order and to national security. Post September 11th national security documents explicitly describe failed states as, ‘‘ ... safe havens for terrorists’’ (National Security Council 2006, 15), while Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice proclaims, ‘‘Today ... the greatest threats to our security are defined more by the dynamics within weak and failing states than by the borders between strong and aggressive ones ... ’’ (Rice 2006). Addressing the threat of transnational terrorism is a high priority policy objective, and in addition to direct counterterrorism measures, U.S. policymakers have come to advocate the alleviation of conditions in countries that foster terrorism, such as severe political instability, humanitarian crises, and the breakdown of governability (Hagel 2004; Krasner and Pascual 2005). Officials also charge that it is not acceptable, in the post-September 11th world, for the international community, or its great powers, to continue to ignore the challenges posed by failed and failing states because their problems tend to spill across their borders, and a serious manifestation of this is increased transnational terrorist attacks (U.S. National Security Council 2002). U.S. officials are joined by academics and others who proclaim failed and failing states to be significant international security risks by providing safe havens for international terrorist groups, in addition to transnational criminal syndicates, and by facilitating the growth and recruitment activities of terrorist groups (Crocker 2003; Diamond 2002; Fukuyama 2004; Hamre and Sullivan 2002; Kahler 2002; Mallaby 2002; Rotberg 2002; Sanderson 2004; Takeyh and Gvosdev 2002). These authors, consequently, argue in favor of robust multi- or unilateral intervention to prevent state failure and proscribe a range of policy courses, such as: building stable democratic institutions, increasing economic assistance, multilateral military intervention, and the creation of an American empire. But are concerns that failed and failing states increase transnational terrorism empirically valid? The existing body of work on the subject is primarily qualitative and is focused on either case-study investigations or is engaged in theorybuilding on the relationship between state failure and terrorism. This study seeks to test some hypotheses generated by this ‘‘first generation’’ of work and demonstrates, using cross-national empirical analysis, that failed and failing states do indeed disproportionately contribute to transnational terrorism and argues, therefore, that such concerns are not misplaced. States rated highly in terms of state failures, irrespective of the type of state failure experienced, are more likely to be targeted by terrorist attacks, more likely to have their nationals commit terrorist attacks in third countries, and are more likely to host active terrorist groups that commit attacks abroad. The findings of this study provide empirical substance to policy and academic discussions of the relationship between terrorism and failed or failing states, and hopefully mark a first step towards understanding the nature of the danger failed and failing states pose to the international system.

#### Terrorism defense doesn’t apply – failed states magnify the internal link

Piazza Political Scientist at University of North Carolina at Charlotte ‘8 (James, “Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational Terrorism?” *International Studies Quarterly 52*, 469-488, Mike)

Both failed and failing states, scholars argue, are theoretically more likely to contain terrorist groups, experience terrorist attacks, have their citizens join in and perpetrate terrorist acts, and see their territory used as bases from which to launch attacks abroad. This pattern occurs because failed and failing states are easier for terrorist movements to penetrate, recruit from, and operate within. This is because they lack the ability to police for and deter terrorist activity, and because they provide important opportunities for terrorist movements. Takeyh and Gvosdev (2002) construct the most comprehensive explanation of the mechanics of the relationship between failed and failing states and terrorism, to which I add some elaboration. First, because they lack the ability to project power internally and have incompetent and corrupt law enforcement capacities, failed and failing states provide opportunities, and lower costs, for terrorist groups to organize, train, generate revenue, and set up logistics and communications beyond those afforded by the network of safe houses in non-failed states. 1 Terrorist groups can therefore develop their own capabilities with little governmental interference or scrutiny. This phenomenon is also referred to as the exploitation of ‘‘stateless areas,’’ or the use of actual, spatial regions of a country that are beyond the policing control of the central government and within which non-state actors can set up autonomous political, economic, and social institutions, or the segments of the polity of a country that are impenetrable by state power and provide networks of resistance to state authority. An example of the former would be the southern region of Afghanistan where the Taliban is active, and an example of the latter would be the system of radical ‘‘madrassas’’ or religious schools in Pakistan. The presence of stateless areas within states frees-up group resources otherwise allocated towards evading government agents and permit more extensive and aggressive fundraising, recruitment, and training efforts. Those groups with ambitions to launch transnational attacks, in particular have more extensive logistical and training needs and therefore need autonomous space without the costs of evading law enforcement. Second, failed states offer terrorist groups a larger pool of potential recruits because they contain large numbers of insecure, disaffected, alienated, and disloyal citizens for whom political violence is an accepted avenue of behavior. 2 Failed states are chronically unable to provide basic security and economic sustenance to their citizens, and thereby give rise to what Ehrlich and Liu (2002) and O’Neil (2002) identify as a key contributing factor to the growth of terrorism—‘‘basic human insecurity.’’ Also, Gunaratna (2002) argues that poor governance, poor economic development, corruption, and lack of human rights—all hallmarks of failed states—sharpen the appeal of fanaticism, and by extension terrorism, among potential political actors. Failed states, through their incompetence, create ‘‘political goods vacuums’’ into which terrorist groups can step and parcel out personal security, economic assistance, or other services to win the support of the local population and widen their activities.

### \*A2: K of “Failing States”\*\*\*

#### Experts and academics vote aff – robust intervention solves political instability that fosters conditions of terrorist activity

Piazza Political Scientist at University of North Carolina at Charlotte ‘8 (James, “Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational Terrorism?” *International Studies Quarterly 52*, 469-488, Mike)

Addressing the problem of failed and failing states will undoubtedly yield significant security and humanitarian dividends for the international system. Is a reduction in transnational terrorism one of them? United States policymakers regard failed and failing states such as Afghanistan, Somalia, and Sudan to be festering incubators of terrorism, and lament that for too long United States foreign policy has ignored the threat that these types of states pose to the international order and to national security. Post September 11th national security documents explicitly describe failed states as, ‘‘ ... safe havens for terrorists’’ (National Security Council 2006, 15), while Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice proclaims, ‘‘Today ... the greatest threats to our security are defined more by the dynamics within weak and failing states than by the borders between strong and aggressive ones ... ’’ (Rice 2006). Addressing the threat of transnational terrorism is a high priority policy objective, and in addition to direct counterterrorism measures, U.S. policymakers have come to advocate the alleviation of conditions in countries that foster terrorism, such as severe political instability, humanitarian crises, and the breakdown of governability (Hagel 2004; Krasner and Pascual 2005). Officials also charge that it is not acceptable, in the post-September 11th world, for the international community, or its great powers, to continue to ignore the challenges posed by failed and failing states because their problems tend to spill across their borders, and a serious manifestation of this is increased transnational terrorist attacks (U.S. National Security Council 2002). U.S. officials are joined by academics and others who proclaim failed and failing states to be significant international security risks by providing safe havens for international terrorist groups, in addition to transnational criminal syndicates, and by facilitating the growth and recruitment activities of terrorist groups (Crocker 2003; Diamond 2002; Fukuyama 2004; Hamre and Sullivan 2002; Kahler 2002; Mallaby 2002; Rotberg 2002; Sanderson 2004; Takeyh and Gvosdev 2002). These authors, consequently, argue in favor of robust multi- or unilateral intervention to prevent state failure and proscribe a range of policy courses, such as: building stable democratic institutions, increasing economic assistance, multilateral military intervention, and the creation of an American empire. But are concerns that failed and failing states increase transnational terrorism empirically valid? The existing body of work on the subject is primarily qualitative and is focused on either case-study investigations or is engaged in theorybuilding on the relationship between state failure and terrorism. This study seeks to test some hypotheses generated by this ‘‘first generation’’ of work and demonstrates, using cross-national empirical analysis, that failed and failing states do indeed disproportionately contribute to transnational terrorism and argues, therefore, that such concerns are not misplaced. States rated highly in terms of state failures, irrespective of the type of state failure experienced, are more likely to be targeted by terrorist attacks, more likely to have their nationals commit terrorist attacks in third countries, and are more likely to host active terrorist groups that commit attacks abroad. The findings of this study provide empirical substance to policy and academic discussions of the relationship between terrorism and failed or failing states, and hopefully mark a first step towards understanding the nature of the danger failed and failing states pose to the international system.

## Burden Sharing Turn

**U.N. missions are inevitable – U.S. involvement is key to successful operations and it’s reverse causal – if the U.S. fails to act when it is called upon for a peacekeeping operation it wrecks U.N. credibility and jeopardizes the lives of all parties involved**

#### The counterplan solves – it sends a signal that fosters international cooperation and ensures multilateral approaches to global problems – that’s 1NC FNL

#### U.N. coordination is key to safeguard nuclear weapons – it allows the U.S. to effectively mediate between our allies and emerging nuclear powers- also enhances counter-terrorism efforts and prevents proliferation because it creates a diplomatic channel for engagement – that’s 1NC Wirth

#### **Iran proves mediation curbs nuclear weapons**

Landay 9-26-13 (Jonathan, “Iran, U.S. Nuclear Deal Could be Just Months Away After UN Talks,” <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/09/26/203391/irans-leader-says-us-russia-should.html>, Mike)

World powers and Iran agreed Thursday to pursue what appears to be the most promising bid in years to resolve the standoff over Iran’s nuclear program, an effort that was boosted by a brief but unprecedented face-to-face meeting between the United States and the Islamic Republic after more than three decades of hostility. The ambitious initiative, reached on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly, aims to seal within months a negotiated settlement that meets Iran’s demands for access to peaceful nuclear technology and an end to devastating sanctions, while dispelling international fears that Tehran is using its program to hide the development of nuclear weapons.

#### Prolif causes extinction – it lowers the threshold for miscalculation that results in global conflagration – that’s 1NC Utgoff

#### Each new nuclear state makes it more likely

Richard Betts Professor and the Director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia 2000 "Universal Deterrence or Conceptual Collapse? Liberal Pessimism and Utopian Realism," The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, U.S. Interests, and World Order

The notion that widespread nuclear capability would inhibit aggression by creating a world of porcupines or a "unit veto system" of omnilateral deterrence is an old one. The suppression of military interventionism, however, could simply channel impulses to meddle into covert political action or other less direct methods. These in turn could increase diplomatic tension and the chances of miscalculation, especially since many of the political systems of the potential proliferators are likely to be weak, permeable, and praetorian, unlike the stable institutionalized governments of the developed world. Internal political weakness and externally deployable military strength (via WMD) are a volatile combination. It was reckless enough for the Argentine junta in 1982 to divert public attention from internal economic problems by grabbing the Falkland (or Malvinas) Islands-one of only two cases of a non-nuclear state initiating combat against a nuclear power (the other being Egypt and Syria against Israel in 1973).

### A2: Imperialism

#### Multilateral operations are not perpetual war from insecurity – there should be a moral requirement for peacekeeping when the globe is threatened

Beauchamp, 8/22/2011 (Zack - former research associate at the Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics at the University of Oxford, Daily Dish apprentice at Newsweek and the Daily Beast, Libya, "Leading From Behind," And Global Policemen, The Daily Beast, p. http://andrewsullivan.thedailybeast.com/2011/08/libya-leading-from-behind-and-global-policemen.html)

Police forces aren't made up of one member. There's a chief, sure, but there are also detectives and uniformed officers who work with the chief. The chief guides their efforts, but each of them works on their own towards the general goal of enforcing the law. It's better to think of the U.S. as the global police chief rather than sole policeman. We may be the strongest of our allies, but by no means do we take lead role in solving every problem. American allies work like detectives: they conduct crucial operations in support of the general task of keeping the global peace and creating a better world. Libya demonstrates how the police chief system works. After the initial phase designed to halt Qaddafi's move into Benghazi, American forces played only a supporting role, letting NATO allies take the lead. Though our contributions (especially in terms of high-tech capabilities) were invaluable, no one would say American forces were doing most of the legwork. That's the essence of "leading from behind:" convincing other states to shoulder some of the burden of creating a just international order. The U.S. provides limited help in areas where it has a significant advantage, but it outsources lead responsibilities to allies whenever possible. U.S. influence is exercised indirectly through bilateral contacts between states, mulitlateral organizations like NATO and the U.N., transnational networks, and "soft power" ideological and cultural means of influence. The idea is to limit U.S. involvement in order to husband the resources that America needs to lead in the first place. Ultimately, that's why neoconservative critics of Obama's "weakness" and realist critics of American "empire" both get it wrong. "Leading from behind" isn't about abandoning American leadership - it's about exercising in a manner that's not completely self-defeating. Being a global policeman doesn't mean "wars all the time everywhere!" - it means enlisting allies to help us with global governance.  Yes, that occasionally means military intervention by the U.S. and/or allies when the intervention in question passes basic just war theory tests, but doesn't mean the hallmark of the international order is perpetual use of military force. And our allies aren't limited to Old Europe - the U.S. can, with skillful diplomacy, work with rising states like India, which has demonstrated its commitment to global governance through its significant contributions to U.N. peacekeeping operations. International police work is important. Not only is it morally required for rich, powerful states, but it's good for them in the long run by limiting dangerous instability. Luckily, Americans don't have to conduct every patrol on their own.

#### Security interdependence from burden-sharing is key to progressive change for international approaches to global problems

**Ikenberry**, January-February **2010** (G. John – Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Global Eminence scholar at Kyung Hee University, The Right Grand Strategy, The American Interest, p. http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=760)

President Obama inherited the most daunting and intractable tangle of foreign policy challenges of any American leader since the early years of the Cold War. The new Administration found itself saddled with crises and festering problems complex in character and long in the making: unfinished and unpopular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, stalled peace talks in the Middle East, hostile states acquiring nuclear capabilities and a deteriorating non-proliferation regime, a global financial crisis and deep economic recession, looming climate and environmental dangers, mounting public debt and strained budgets, and growing “multipolar” worries brought on by a rising China and an estranged Russia. Added to this, the new Administration entered office after years of turmoil in which American popularity around the world and standing among Western allies had fallen to unprecedented lows. Under these circumstances, it is probably forgivable if the new Administration has not yet achieved a long list of breakthroughs and successes. The question to ask is: Has the Obama team articulated a grand strategy that is responsive to these looming global problems? In a world where the threats and challenges are so diffuse and deeply entrenched, the United States needs a grand strategy of global order-building that puts in place frameworks for sustained partnership and collective action on many fronts. The good news is that the Obama Administration seems to be animated by precisely this vision. It appears to have learned the right lessons from the misadventures of the recent past. It is not leading a weary America backward into a retreat from global leadership and engagement. Instead, it is articulating a moderate internationalist grand strategy built on both liberal and realist sensibilities. It is liberal in its orientation toward engagement, multilateralism and progressive change. It is realist in its orientation toward great power restraint and accommodation. Reflecting this synthesis, candidate Obama remarked to a reporter in 2007: “We can and should lead the world, but we have to apply wisdom and judgment. Part of our capacity to lead is linked to our capacity to show restraint.” As President, Obama has moved American foreign policy back into the postwar mainstream, emphasizing alliances, partnerships, multilateralism, great power forbearance and democratic community. There are two ways in which the Obama grand strategy is putting the United States on a more solid footing to tackle 21st-century international security challenges. First, Obama himself has clearly and repeatedly articulated a coherent vision of these challenges. The specific threats are many—terrorist networks, WMD proliferation, global warming, health pandemics, financial upheavals and so forth. But what these threats have in common is that they all reflect a worldwide rise in “security interdependence.” America’s security is increasingly linked to how other people live and act—in more places and more ways. This understanding of America’s national security predicament is recognized by Obama and is at the center of every one of his major foreign policy statements. We cannot be secure alone; we can only be secure together. Security interdependence was dramatically revealed to the world during the Cold War with the advent of nuclear weapons. The United States could not secure itself. It would only be secure if the leaders in the Kremlin understood the logic of deterrence and acted accordingly. Today, security interdependence has been dramatically intensified. What people do and how they live matter in ways that were irrelevant in earlier eras. How people burn energy, provide public health, treat minorities and establish rules and enforce treaties matter more today—and will matter even more tomorrow. This has created a growing demand for security cooperation—deep, intrusive, institutionalized, multifaceted. The Obama Administration’s focus on reviving the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and its vision of radical reductions in nuclear weapons, together with its emphasis on development, human security and multilateral cooperation, are promising markers in the reorientation of American foreign policy to an age of escalating security interdependence. Second, and more generally, the Obama Administration has begun to redefine and reposition the United States as the central hub of the international system. And this, too, is creating a more congenial environment for the United States to pursue its interests. Americans often forget—and the Bush Administration largely ignored—the fact that the United States has for half a century been the provider of global governance. The United States was not just the patron of an open, rule-oriented order after World War II. It became the hegemonic organizer and manager of Western (and later global) order. The American political system—and its alliances, technology, currency and markets—became fused to the wider international order. The United States played the leading role in the provisioning of rule and stability. In effect, the world contracted out to the United States for global governance. The United States provided “services” to the world, and it operated more or less within mutually acceptable rules and institutions. In return, other states tied themselves to the United States and accepted Washington’s leadership. In the view of many friends and allies around the world, the Bush Administration—under the banner of unipolarity and a post-9/11 revisionist agenda—attempted to break out of the old hegemonic arrangements. Its unilateralist tendencies, “war on terror” grand strategy and invasion of Iraq had the effect of triggering a “constitutional crisis” in world politics. The United States appeared to be relinquishing its role as the linchpin of global order, threatening to substitute a more heavy-handed—even imperial—form of that order. The election of Obama brought this failed experiment to an end. In effect, the Obama Administration has re-affirmed the old terms of the postwar “constitutional settlement” between the United States and the rest of the world. And much of the world has uttered a collective sigh of relief. Looking into this brave new world, the United States will find itself needing to share power and rely in part on others to ensure its security. It will not be able to depend on unipolar capacities or air-tight borders. To operate in this coming world the United States will need—more than anything else—authority and respect as a global leader. It has lost both in recent years. In committing itself to a grand strategy of moderate realist internationalism and liberal order building, the Obama Administration is beginning the process of gaining it back.

#### And – their offense doesn’t apply to our DA – it’s impossible to divorce “American” interests from “global interests”

Flournoy Center for a New American Security and Former US Undersecretary of Defense ’12 (Michele, “A Plea for Smart, Forward U.S. Military Engagement,” July 10, <http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2012/07/10/a-plea-for-smart-forward-u-s-military-engagement/>, Mike)

The recent global economic downturn has generated doubts about American resilience and our ability to lead in the world. Far from being a nation in decline, however, the United States’ global standing remains unmatched and the imperative for it to lead in today’s tumultuous environment is clear. Those who assume that in order to recover economically the United States must close its overseas bases and bring its military forces home misunderstand the role the U.S. military plays in promoting global prosperity. The United States has benefited enormously from a highly interdependent and globalized economy – one that has relied on the security and stability underwritten by our armed forces and our alliances for over 70 years. In this context, we simply cannot divorce “American” interests from “global” interests or otherwise opt out of the system economically or militarily. As the U.S. military downsizes following a decade of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, we face a strategic inflection point with respect to how we restructure and re-posture our forces abroad. The United States has an opportunity and a responsibility to shape the global environment through its leadership, global reach, and ability to catalyze positive multilateral activity that enables and encourages others to share the burden of global stability and security. This means being present in key regions of the world where threats are likely to emerge and focusing our military activities on prevention and preparedness. Our military posture should thus be tailored in a strategic way that reflects the imperatives of regional threats and respects the interests of partners and allies. In places such as the Korean peninsula, the Straits of Hormuz, or Malacca, a clear, visible U.S. posture is required; in other regions a less visible, over-the-horizon presence may be more appropriate. In some places, part-time use of shared facilities and flexible access agreements may constitute the extent of U.S. military presence. In all of these regions, the United States can and should continue to build and lead powerful partnerships and alliances founded on shared norms such as freedom of navigation, peaceful resolution of disputes, respect for the rule of law, human rights, and civilian control over the military.

### 2NC Structural Violence

Ignoring The Causality Between War and Gender Makes Violence Inevitable – We Must Recognize the Social Conventions Created by Systems of War in Order to Deconstruct Gender Relations

Goldstein, Professor of IR @ American U, 01

Joshua Goldstein Professor of IR @ American U 2001 War and Gender

The persistent strength of “reverse causality” from war to gender pervades this study. The war system influences the socialization of children into all their gender roles – a feedback loop that strengthens and stabilizes gendered war roles. War’s influence shadows all of tour lives. Betty Reardon writes: “Once the actuality or possibility of war becomes the context within which we live, men and women are forced into set roles.” Gender serves as a medium or vector, as it were, for war’s presence in our most intimate social settings. Unfortunately, the spot for war on the bookstore’s gender shelf is nearly (though not quite) as empty as the spot for gender on the war shelf. For example, British feminist scholar Lynee Segal’s book on men and masculinity bypases war and the military, and treats “male violence” as meaning violence against women, keeping inter-male violence out of view. Mary Roth Walsh’s recent edited volume, covering the spectrum of gender topics, also omits war. So do many other works on gender. Denial may best explain these omissions. Social conventions keep war silent in our everyday lives because it represents trauma. Psychologist Judith Herman emphasizes the gulf between war and daily life: “The war story is closely kept among men of a particular era, disconnected from the broader society that includes two sexes and many generations. Thus the fixation on the trauma – the sense of a moment frozen in time – may be perpetuated by social customs that foster the segregation of warriors from the rest of society.” Historian John Keegan calls war “a world apart” from politics and diplomacy, “a very ancient world, which exists in parallel with the everyday world but does not belong to it.” (Jean Elshtain considers this seperation a European bourgeois phenomenon, however.) The single main lesson of this book for those interested in gender is to pay attention to war. To end denial and face war’s influence on gender is, I believe, an important step in changing both sexism and the war system.

### Framing

#### Scenario planning is good, even with uncertainty—the 1nc isn’t a research paper so you can always reject false claims

Wimbush, 8 – director of the Center for Future Security Strategies (S. Enders, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and the author of several books and policy articles, “A Parable: The U.S.-ROK Security Relationship Breaks Down”, Asia Policy, Number 5 (January 2008), 7-24)

What if the U.S.-ROK security relationship were to break down? This essay explores the alternative futures of such a scenario. Analyzing scenarios is one technique for trying to understand the increasing complexity of strategic environments. A scenario is an account of an imagined sequence of events. The intent of a scenario is to suggest how alternative futures might arise and where they might lead, where conflicts might occur, how the interests of different actors might be challenged, and the kinds of strategies actors might pursue to achieve their objectives. Important to keep in mind is that scenarios are nothing more than invented, in-depth stories—stories about what different futures could look like and what might happen along plausible pathways to those futures. The trends and forces that go into building a scenario may be carefully researched, yet a scenario is not a research paper. Rather, it is a work of the imagination. As such, scenarios are, first, tools that can help bring order to the way analysts think about what might happen in future security environments; second, scenarios are a provocative way of revealing possible dynamics of future security environments that might not be apparent simply by projecting known trends into the future. Scenarios are particularly useful in suggesting where the interests and actions of different actors might converge or collide with other forces, trends, attitudes, and influences. By using scenarios, to explore the question “what if this or that happened?” in a variety of different ways, with the objective of uncovering as many potential answers as possible, analysts can build hedging strategies for dealing with many different kinds of potential problems. Though they may choose to discount some of these futures and related scenarios, analysts will not be ignorant of the possibilities, with luck avoiding having to say: “I never thought about that.”

#### Failure to engage in comparative institutional analysis means vote neg on presumption – they make change less likely to occur

**Heminway, 05** (Joan, professor of law at the University of Tennessee, 10 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 225, lexis)

This article offers a model for comparative institutional choice specifically for use in the context of federal corporate governance reforms. It also, however, constitutes part of the larger academic movement advocating comparative institutional analysis. Comparative institutional analysis is **critically important** to the work of scholars and other proponents of law reform. These rule proponents should not suggest changes in legal rules without also suggesting the vehicle for the suggested reforms. The determination of the appropriate rulemaking body should be accomplished by employing some rigorous form of comparative institutional analysis. In this regard, the framework included in this article is intended to endorse in full the views of Professor Neil Komesar when he says: [\*384] Unless we do better with the difficult issues of institutional choice, any reforms, changes and proposals will remain **illusory or cosmetic**. We will continue to cycle through the same proposals with the same arguments. Today's policy will always have feet of clay and be replaced by yesterday's rejected panacea, which somehow reappears (without blemishes) as tomorrow's solution. Attempts to fashion proposals and programs cannot stop until we fully understand institutional choice. That understanding will be long in coming and is more likely to occur if judges, lawyers and law reformers seriously struggle with the subject **as they make** their decisions and proposals. It is that struggle that I hope for. I want those who make or seek to change law to seriously confront and address institutional choice and comparison. I recognize that, to do so, they will often have to rely on intuition and guesses. It is the **responsibility** of legal academics to provide deeper understanding of these central issues and, therefore, to improve the ability of those who struggle with these decisions. 581

### Complexity

#### Applying complexity theory leads to policy inaction

Hendrick 09 (Diane; Department of Peace Studies – University of Bradford, “Complexity Theory and Conflict Transformation: An Exploration of Potential and Implications,” June, [http://143.53.238.22/acad/confres/papers/pdfs/CCR17.pdf)\*\*we](http://143.53.238.22/acad/confres/papers/pdfs/CCR17.pdf)**we)

It is still relatively early days in the application of complexity theory to social sciences and there are doubts and criticisms, either about the applicability of the ideas or about the expectations generated for them. It is true that the translation of terms from natural science to social science is sometimes contested due to the significant differences in these domains, and that there are concerns that the meanings of terms may be distorted, thus making their use arbitrary or even misleading. Developing new, relevant definitions for the new domain applications, where the terms indicate a new idea or a new synthesis that takes our understanding forward, are required. In some cases, particular aspects of complexity theory are seen as of only limited applicability, for example, self-organisation (see Rosenau‘s argument above that it is only relevant in systems in which authority does not play a role). There are those who argue that much that is being touted as new is actually already known, whether from systems theory or from experience, and so complexity theory cannot be seen as adding value in that way. There are also concerns that the theory has not been worked out in sufficient detail, or with sufficient rigour, to make itself useful yet. Even that it encourages woolly thinking and imprecision. In terms of application in the field, it could be argued that it may lead to paralysis, in fear of all the unexpected things that could happen, and all the unintended consequences that could result, from a particular intervention. The proposed adaptability and sensitivity to emerging new situations may lead to difficulties in planning or, better expressed, must lead to a different conception of what constitutes planning, which is, in itself, challenging (or even threatening) for many fields. The criteria for funding projects or research may not fit comfortably with a complexity approach, and evaluation, already difficult especially in the field of conflict transformation, would require a re-conceptualisation. Pressure for results could act as a disincentive to change project design in the light of emergent processes. There may be the desire to maintain the illusion of control in order to retain the confidence of funders. On the other hand, there are fears that complexity may be used as an excuse for poor planning, and implementation, which is a valid concern for funders. In addition, there may be scepticism that the co-operation and co-ordination between different researchers or interveners, (let alone transdisciplinary undertakings) appropriate to working on complex problem domains, will not work due to differing mental models, competing interests and aims, competition for funding, prestige, etc. Such attempts appear, therefore, unrealistic or unfeasible.

# 1NR

## Russia

Conceded US-russia war over ukarine goes nuclear – drawsi n all countries – distinct from their complexity args – they have no specific ev

#### Turns the aff – Russia implements awful gender policies

Reidy, ’13 [In Vladimir Putin's macho Russia, nailing your scrotum to the floor is mad but revolutionary¶ By Padraig Reidy World Last updated: November 15th, 2013 http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/padraigreidy/100246118/in-vladimir-putins-macho-russia-nailing-your-scrotum-to-the-floor-is-mad-but-revolutionary/]

The one thing you can be very sure of is that Vladimir Putin is a man. A man’s man. Running a man’s Russia. No girls allowed. And definitely no gay people.¶ Macho, macho man. I wanna be a macho man¶ This is the context in which this week’s “what the hell?” story took place. Last Sunday, performance artist Pyotr Pavlensky (previously known for sewing his lips together in protest at the treatment of jailed feminist punks Pussy Riot) went to Red Square, took off his clothes, sat down, and nailed his scrotum to the paving stones. Pavlensky was there for an hour and a half before being detained by police. He called the act "Fixation", and said it was designed to highlight the apathy that allowed corruption and the police state to flourish in Russia.¶ But there is another meaning, even if unintended by Pavlensky. In a society dominated by the machismo of Putin, the misogyny of the church, and the characterisation of such deviance as homosexuality and feminism as “un-Russian”, there is enormous symbolic power in this act of self-emasculation. To walk to the centre of power and deliberately harm your God-given symbol of potency as a Russian man is deeply subversive.¶ Genitals have been important in recent Russian protest art. In 2010, the Voina (“War”) collective painted an enormous phallus on a St Petersburg drawbridge, which, when the bridge opened, pointed directly at the city’s FSB headquarters. In another episode, a female member of the group was recorded stealing a supermarket chicken and inserting it where no supermarket chicken should ever go. The very name Pussy Riot, though it doesn’t mean much to Russians not familiar with English slang, is another evocation of private parts against the machine.¶ This may all seem terribly prurient, but in fact the prurience is all in Putinism, which, in common with all authoritarian regimes, is utterly obsessed with who puts what where. The country’s “homosexual propaganda” ban, the fear of the sexually liberated agenda of Pussy Riot, and Putin’s fierce heterosexual machismo are all part of this same need to keep people in strictly defined roles, the easier to control them and stifle dissent.

#### Violence against women goes ignored by the government in Russia

HRHN 2007 [Human Rights House Network, “Do women have equal rights with men in Russia?” March 6, 2007, <http://humanrightshouse.org/Articles/7821.html>] CPO

Violence against women¶ Violence, in the form of domestic violence, rape and sexual harassment is widespread and yet has elicited minimal state attention. Psychological and physical violence in marriage is not uncommon. 56% of women were threatened with beatings or were victims of violence al least once by their husbands. Almost a quarter of those women experienced sexual violence, and approximately 80% encountered psychological violence. Cases of rape are not usually reported in the Russian Federation. Women report that sexual harassment in the workplace is so common that it is almost considered as the “norm”. Moreover, the notion that violence against women is a “private” matter is widespread in law enforcement structures, in juridical system and among population as a whole.¶ Who helps the victims?¶ Meanwhile, there is no service for protection and rehabilitation of victims of family violence and rape. There is also no federal program on the prevention of trafficking of sexual slaves, although sex tourism, as well as the involvement of minors in prostitution is on the rise. Only some women’s non-governmental organizations in the Russian Federation provide assistance to victims of rape, slavery and family violence free of charge.

### A2: turn war

Goldstein says war turns structural violence – during war time people accept masculine gendered norms – they create national security heroes

**Direct violence, not structural oppression, causes war**

**Thompson 03**

William, Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for the Study of International Relations at Indiana University, “A Streetcar Named Sarajevo: Catalysts, Multiple Causation Chains, and Rivalry Structures,” International Studies Quarterly, 47(3), AD: 7-10-9

Richard Ned Lebow (2000–2001) has recently invoked what might be called a streetcar interpretation of systemic war and change. According to him, all our structural theories in world politics both overdetermine and underdetermine the explanation of the most important events such as World War I, World War II, or the end of the Cold War. Not only do structural theories tend to fixate on one cause or stream of causation, they are inherently incomplete because the influence of structural causes cannot be known without also identifying the necessary role of catalysts. As long as we ignore the precipitants that actually encourage actors to act, we cannot make accurate generalizations about the relationships between more remote causation and the outcomes that we are trying to explain. Nor can we test the accuracy of such generalizations without accompanying data on the presence or absence of catalysts. In the absence of an appropriate catalyst (or a ‘‘streetcar’’ that failed to arrive), wars might never have happened. Concrete information on their presence (‘‘streetcars’’ that did arrive) might alter our understanding of the explanatory significance of other variables. But since catalysts and contingencies are so difficult to handle theoretically and empirically, perhaps we should focus instead on probing the theoretical role of contingencies via the development of ‘‘what if ’’ scenarios.

**War turns structural violence**

**Bulloch 08**

*Millennium - Journal of International Studies May 2008 vol. 36 no. 3 575-595*

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But the idea that poverty and peace are directly related presupposes that wealth inequalities are – in and of themselves – unjust, and that the solution to the problem of war is to alleviate the injustice that inspires conflict, namely poverty. However, it also suggests that poverty is a legitimate inspiration for violence, otherwise there would be no reason to alleviate it in the interests of peace. It has become such a commonplace to suggest that poverty and conflict are linked that **it rarely suffers any examination**. To suggest that war causes poverty is to utter **an obvious truth,** but to suggest the opposite is – on reflection – quite **hard to believe.** War is an expensive business in the twenty-first century, even asymmetrically. And just to examine Bangladesh for a moment is enough at least to raise the question concerning the actual connection between peace and poverty. The government of Bangladesh is a threat only to itself, and despite 30 years of the Grameen Bank, Bangladesh remains in a state of incipient civil strife. So although Muhammad Yunus should be applauded for his work in demonstrating the efficacy of micro-credit strategies in a context of development, it is not at all clear that this has anything to do with resolving the social and political crisis in Bangladesh, nor is it clear that this has anything to do with resolving the problem of peace and war in our times. It does speak to the Western liberal mindset – as Geir Lundestad acknowledges – but then perhaps this exposes the extent to which the Peace Prize itself has simply become an award that reflects a degree of Western liberal wish-fulfilment. It is perhaps comforting to believe that **poverty causes violence,** as it serves to endorse a particular kind of concern for the developing world that in turn regards all problems as fundamentally economic rather than deeply – and potentially radically – political.

### L

#### Taking military options of the table are a concession- Missile Defense proves – gotta look strong

Cohen, 2013 [Studied economic development and political reform in the former Soviet republics, U.S. energy security, the global War on Terrorism and the continuing conflict in the Middle East. March 19th, How Not to Negotiate with Russia: The Missile Defense Fiasco, http://blog.heritage.org/2013/03/19/how-not-to-negotiate-with-russia-the-missile-defense-fiasco/]

Russia’s objections to U.S. missile defense development and deployment have been on the agenda of consecutive American Administrations starting with Ronald Reagan in the 1980s. For President Obama, it became a high priority as Moscow turned missile defense disagreement into a principal bone of contention. But he threw it under the bus, sending all the wrong signals to friend and foe alike. He has also forgone an opportunity to extract important concessions from the Kremlin on Syria and Iraq, for example.¶ Moscow and Obama’s White House view the missile defense dispute through the prism of a broader U.S. political agenda—and disagreements, such as efforts to further reduce U.S. and Russian nuclear forces, Moscow’s continuous support of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, Russia’s lack of real opposition to Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons, and North Korea’s truculence.¶ Yet the Obama Administration’s decision last Friday to “restructure” European missile defense, announced by Secretary Chuck Hagel, came as a surprise—and a unilateral concession to Moscow.¶ U.S. abandonment of the SM-3 IIB interceptor might be influenced by the U.S.’s desire to assure Russia that European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) is not a threat.¶ However, “restructuring” the SM-3 IIB out of existence would not change Russia’s negative position toward EPAA Phase III. It would also not remove Russia’s concerns related to future development of the U.S. system.¶ As the Russian Foreign Ministry stated, the Kremlin will continue to insist on legally binding guarantees that U.S. missile defenses are not aimed at it and that would allow Russia to access sensitive telemetric data and limit vital parameters of a U.S. strategic defensive system.¶ Unsurprisingly, the Hagel statement was not enough to satisfy the Kremlin. It pocketed the unprecedented concession and asked for more.¶ Washington’s decision to scrap plans to place SM-3 IIB missile defense elements in Poland does nothing to address Moscow’s national security concerns and will not affect its stance on the issue, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said. Ryabkov added that there was no connection between Russia’s objections to the deployment of a U.S. missile defense system in Europe and Hagel’s announcement, possibly because there were no negotiations: “That is not a concession to Russia, nor do we regard it as such.… All aspects of strategic uncertainty related to the creation of a US and NATO missile defense system remain. Therefore, our objections also remain.”¶ Russia has threatened a range of countermeasures against NATO’s missile defenses, including tactical nuclear missile deployment in its Baltic exclave of Kaliningrad and improvements to its strategic nuclear missile arsenal.¶ The decision to scrap Phase IV of EPAA will damage relations with Poland and signal to Central European states that the Obama Administration cares little about them, as it did not consult or prepare those governments for its action.¶ This decision reflects the shift away from a Euro-centric strategic posture and is undoing the post–Cold War security system in Europe. All the talk of NATO expansion now sounds hollow, as the U.S. is increasingly focusing in the Asia–Pacific region. With the disengagement from Afghanistan approaching, our allies will wonder about the ability of the alliance to shape a long-term strategy in its out-of-area engagements. Budget concerns may be the driver in D.C., but Europeans may come away questioning the advantages of an Atlantic connection, which would not be in their interest—or ours.¶ Finally, this is exactly the wrong signal to Iran on the eve of President Obama’s trip to the Middle East. Not only will the U.S. not support a military action of last resort against the Iranian nuclear program; limiting missile defense will severely limit our ability to protect our European allies against the Iranian missile threat.

#### All options need to be no the table

Gardiner, 3/8 [2014, The crisis in Ukraine - America can be deferrential no more, Nile, Nile Gardiner is director of the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom at The Heritage Foundation and a former aide to Lady Thatcher, http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2014/3/the-crisis-in-ukraine-america-can-be-deferrential-no-longer]

The Obama administration's Russian reset, designed by then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, was premised on the idea of Russia as a partner with the United States. Hand in hand, the former rivals would address the major international crises of the day. This initiative will be remembered as one of the biggest foreign policy follies of the modern era — a staggeringly naïve exercise in appeasement that emboldened Moscow at Washington's expense.¶ From Damascus to Tehran to Kiev, the Russians have been running rings around a U.S. presidency that believes “leading from behind” is a serious strategy, rather than a policy of surrender.¶ There can be no doubt that Russian President Vladimir Putin, a man schooled in the Soviet-era KGB, sees Barack Obama as a figure of considerable weakness. With a vacuum of leadership on the world stage, Moscow has gotten its way over Syria, propping up the brutal regime of Bashar al-Assad.¶ The Kremlin has also successfully enticed the United States to enter into futile, direct negotiations with Tehran over its nuclear program. This buys the mullahs valuable time to advance their nuclear ambitions while building their long-range missile capability.¶ And now Mr. Putin is massing his forces on the border of Ukraine, threatening the new government in Kiev, convinced that the free world is too weak to stand in his way. Thousands of his soldiers are already on the ground inside the Crimea, a de facto occupying army, hiding under the guise of pro-Russian “self-defense” forces.¶ In many respects this is a defining moment for the free world in the 21st century and for American leadership in particular. There are those who say this isn't the West's fight, that we have no vital interests at stake. They are wrong. Ukraine is at the heart of Europe, bordering four NATO member states. Its 50 million inhabitants share an aspiration to be part of the West.¶ Allowing Russian tanks to roll into the Crimea with impunity will set an extremely dangerous precedent. Moscow will feel emboldened to enter into other parts of its “near abroad,” intervening under the pretext of protecting ethnic Russians. The Baltic States, with their large Russian-speaking minorities, could be next.¶ This is no time for a deer-in-the-headlights response from the White House. The world's superpower must do all it can to warn Russia against an invasion of Ukraine, while bolstering NATO allies in the region.¶ It is simply not enough to merely talk about expelling Moscow from the G8 — a group that is little more than a glorified talking shop. It would be far more effective to announce the withdrawal of the United States from the New START Treaty. Signed by the Obama administration in 2010, this fundamentally flawed pact hampers Washington's ability to deploy an effective global missile defense system.¶ Simultaneously, Washington, as it says it will, should implement targeted sanctions against any Russian officials implicated in aggression against Ukraine, including the freezing of financial assets and the imposition of wide-ranging visa bans. Further, it must be prepared to enforce the Magnitsky Act, passed by Congress in 2012, which restricts travel to the United States for Russian officials implicated in human rights violations.¶ Additionally, the United States must rally key European allies, including Britain and Germany, to implement similar sanctions against Russia. Such sanctions will hit hard among the Russian elites surrounding Vladimir Putin, many of whom conduct business in the major Western capitals.¶ But sanctions against Moscow must be coupled with robust support for NATO allies in proximity to Russia and Ukraine. Washington must reassure our NATO allies that their security is guaranteed and the United States should deploy additional military assets to the region to warn Moscow against any expansionist ambitions into NATO territory.¶ Additionally, U.S. restrictions on the export of liquefied natural gas to NATO partners in Eastern Europe should be eased. This would reduce their energy dependence on Russia.¶ Barack Obama is clearly no Ronald Reagan but he should take a page from the Gipper's playbook on global leadership. To be respected on the world stage and exert real influence, the United States must be prepared to stand up to tyrannical regimes that seek to bully those around them while threatening international peace.¶ President Reagan, together with Margaret Thatcher, brought down the might of the Soviet Empire through a policy of strength and unwavering support for the principles of liberty. The enemies of freedom must be confronted if the free world is to be secure in the 21st century.

### A2 rothkopf

No ev about Russia 1nc ev says we’re dufficient to deter now

**Rothkopf = wrong – Syria goes our way**

**Posner, 9/3** [Eric, professor at the University of Chicago Law School, “Obama is Only Making His War Powers Mightier,” <http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2013/09/obama_going_to_congress_on_syria_he_s_actually_strengthening_the_war_powers.html>, ALB]

President Obama’s surprise announcement that he will ask Congress for approval of a military attack on Syria is being hailed as a vindication of the rule of law and a revival of the central role of Congress in war-making, even by critics. But all of this is wrong. Far from breaking new legal ground, President Obama has reaffirmed the primacy of the executive in matters of war and peace. The war powers of the presidency remain as mighty as ever.¶ It would have been different if the president had announced that only Congress can authorize the use of military force, as dictated by the Constitution, which gives Congress alone the power to declare war. That would have been worthy of notice, a reversal of the ascendance of executive power over Congress. But the president said no such thing. He said: “I believe I have the authority to carry out this military action without specific congressional authorization.” Secretary of State John Kerry confirmed that the president “has the right to do that”—launch a military strike—“no matter what Congress does.”

**Prez powers are high-Recent Syria crisis INCREASED prez powers-NOT the other way around**

**Posner, 9/3** [Eric, professor at the University of Chicago Law School, “Obama is Only Making His War Powers Mightier,” <http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2013/09/obama_going_to_congress_on_syria_he_s_actually_strengthening_the_war_powers.html>, ALB]

Thus, the president believes that the law gives him the option to seek a congressional yes or to act on his own. He does not believe that he is bound to do the first. He has merely stated the law as countless other presidents and their lawyers have described it before him.¶ The president’s announcement should be understood as a political move, not a legal one. His motive is both self-serving and easy to understand, and it has been all but acknowledged by the administration. If Congress now approves the war, it must share blame with the president if what happens next in Syria goes badly. If Congress rejects the war, it must share blame with the president if Bashar al-Assad gases more Syrian children. The big problem for Obama arises if Congress says no and he decides he must go ahead anyway, and then the war goes badly. He won’t have broken the law as he understands it, but he will look bad. He would be the first president ever to ask Congress for the power to make war and then to go to war after Congress said no. (In the past, presidents who expected dissent did not ask Congress for permission.)¶ People who celebrate the president for humbly begging Congress for approval also apparently don’t realize that his understanding of the law—that it gives him the option to go to Congress—maximizes executive power vis-à-vis Congress. If the president were required to act alone, without Congress, then he would have to take the blame for failing to use force when he should and using force when he shouldn’t. If he were required to obtain congressional authorization, then Congress would be able to block him. But if he can have it either way, he can force Congress to share responsibility when he wants to and avoid it when he knows that it will stand in his way.

## Case

### High Mag

#### Even if they win it’s a low-probability impact – our inclusion of them in decision-calculus key to getting others to take action to deal with them

**Wagner 08 (**[**Cynthia G Wagner**](javascript:void(0);)**.** [**The Futurist**](http://proquest.umi.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/pqdweb?RQT=318&pmid=22993&TS=1235163055&clientId=42567&VInst=PROD&VName=PQD&VType=PQD)**. Washington:** [**Jan/Feb 2008**](http://proquest.umi.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/pqdweb?RQT=572&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD&pmid=22993&pcid=37836731&SrchMode=3)**. Vol. 42, Iss. 1; pg. 6)**

"Failure of imagination" gets a lot of blame for the events that blindside us, but as futurists Peter Schwartz and Doug Randall note, the blame game is past-focused and does little to advance foresight capabilities or improve policy strategies. The most common tool for handling surprises is the scenario-imagining alternative potential events, analyzing their impacts, and creating strategies to avoid the negative ones and promote the positive ones. As Schwartz and Randall point out, the difficult part of scenarios-particularly low-probability surprises-is making them believable enough for decision makers to take seriously so they will take action. Another challenge is to focus on the wild-card events that truly are "strategic surprises"-that is, events that directly impact the organization or entity for which decisions are being made. Schwartz and Randall note that a significant natural disaster such as the December 2004 tsunami in southeast Asia was momentous but not a "game-changing event" for most businesses in the United States, for instance. "The sudden collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 is one of the greatest strategic surprises of the twentieth century," they write. "It fits the definition of a strategic surprise because it made a huge difference to global politics and economics, it challenged the conventional wisdom that the Soviet Union would exist forever, and it was difficult to imagine how anyone could prepare a response to such a radically new world. Although it was a 'surprise' that had been foreseen well in advance, most people did not act." Sensing the forces of change underlying potential strategic surprises is something everyone can do-if they make it a priority and commit themselves to a systematic approach, advise Schwartz and Randall. They recommend being imaginative and systematic: "It is important to look for events that seem to have a low probability of happening but that would have a high impact if they were to occur." The authors encourage leaders to go on "learning journeys" that explore areas outside their specialties and to role-play in order to understand other points of view. Using multiple filters helps compile seemingly unrelated information. Instead of departmentalizing the types of intelligence that your organization reviews-such as market research or financial research-Schwartz and Randall recommend creating a portfolio of databases that can "capture and relate varied information like data on demographics, economics, and energy use." Information can also be processed in new ways. Trend analysis-the study of social, technological, economic, and political forces-allows the strategic decision maker to make connections among data from multiple sources.

#### Even if nuclear war is usually a low probability our disad links prove it’s now likely to happen

**Chirp 06 (November 6, pg.** [**http://reports.typepad.com/pandemic\_plan/**](http://reports.typepad.com/pandemic_plan/)

**2006/11/low\_probability.html)**

"Low probability" does not mean "never happens"One thing I'm sure of: "low probability" does *not* mean "never happens."In the overall, long-term context, "low probability" simply means "it doesn't happen very often." But what about now? How close are we to the day it *does* happen?And the day an event does happen, it no longer matters what its probability is. It is, in fact, happening. It's still a low-probability, doesn't-happen-very-often event. So it likely won't happen again for a while (if ever). But at that moment, it IS happening.What if it's the day before a low-probability event occurs? Statistically, it may still be a low-probability event. But you're about to experience it.That's what we don't know with respect to the next flu pandemic. It's a low-probability phenomenon. It doesn't happen very often. But are we on the verge of the next time it does happen?Others have thought this throughWhy are federal and local governments, hospitals, major corporations, and others so busy making pandemic plans and preparations? I would suggest that these entities have thought about "low probability, high impact" ... have looked at the characteristics of current strains of the H5N1 virus ... have thought about the chances of successfully containing any H5N1 pandemic virus that might emerge ... have thought about how high a "high impact" might be ... and have decided that - even if the probability of a pandemic occurring is low - the potential loss demands mitigating action. So they're acting.Should you follow their lead?That's a subjective, personal decision you must make.We have to make many subjective judgments about the threat of a flu pandemic. There are many risks, rewards, and trade-offs to consider. The task is compounded because there's much we don't know about flu viruses in general and the influenza A (H5N1) virus in particular.My plea is simply that you not dismiss the possibility because the probability is low. Because the impact would be high - perhaps very high.

### Util/SV

**Util is best – takes into account everyone – they link to their trade-off arguments worse because they ignore how people are drone striked and only focus on what affects them – but not also what affects others**

**Use of util is inevitable – if you had 2 structural violence impacts, the only way to determine which outweighs is by looking at numbers – it’s impossible to know which form of oppression is worse**

**Extinction outweighs because it’s irreversible – but you can fix the status quo later through things like reform – and you have a mraol obligation to give other countries a chance to live**

Nuclear terrorism outweighs – conceded that it causes us-russia war – that causes extinction – nuclear war outweighs

It’s the worst form of structural violence

Ppl no have food and live in poverty after nuke war

### A2: Devalued Now

**Gotta focus on maintaining life – any existence is better than nothing – moral obligation to give future generations a chance to live**

**Kateb 92, Professor of Politics at Princeton University, (George, The Inner Ocean, pg. 141)**

But neither of these responses will do in the nuclear situation. To affirm existence as such is to go beyond good and evil; it is to will its perpetual prolongation for no particular reason. To affirm existence is not to praise it or love it or find it good. These responses are no more defensible than their contraries—no more defensible than calling exis­tence absurd, or meaningless, or worthless. All such responses are appro­priate only for particulars. Existence does not have systemic attributes amenable to univocal judgments. At least some of us cannot accept the validity of revelation, or play on ourselves the trick of regarding existence as if it were the designed work of a personal God, or presume to call it good, and bless it as if it were the existence we would have created if we had the power, and think that it therefore deserves to exist and is justifia­ble just as it is. No: these argumentative moves are bad moves; they are hopeless stratagems. The hope is to go beyond the need for reasons, to go beyond the need for justifying existence, and in doing so to strengthen, not weaken, one's attachment. Earthly existence must be preserved whatever we are able or unable to say about it. There is no other human and natural existence. The alternative is earthly nothingness. Things are better than nothing; anything is better than nothing.

**No one’s life is ever valueless cuz there’s always meaning – gotta focus on allowing everyone to live**

**Bernstein 02** (Richard J., Vera List Prof. Phil. – New School for Social Research, “Radical Evil: A Philosophical Interrogation”, p. 188-192)

This is precisely what Jonas does in The Phenomenon of Life, his rethinking of the meaning of organic life. He tealizes that his philosophical project goes against many of the deeply embedded prejudices and dogmas of contemporary philosophy. He challenges two well-entrenched dogmas: that there is no metaphysical truth, and that there is no path from the "is" to the "ought". To escape from ethical nihilism, we must show that there is a metaphysical ground of ethics, an objective basis for value and purpose in being itself. These are strong claims; and, needless to say, they are extremely controversial. In defense of Jonas, it should be said that he approaches this task with both boldness and intellectual modesty. He frequently acknowledges that he cannot "prove" his claims, but he certainly believes that his "premises" do "more justice to the total phenomenon of man and Being in general" than the prevailing dualist or reductionist alternatives. "But in the last analysis my argument can do no more than give a rational grounding to an option it presents as a choice for a thoughtful person — an option that of course has its own inner power of persuasion. Unfortunately I have nothing better to offer. Perhaps a future metaphysics will be able to do more." 8 To appreciate how Jonas's philosophical project unfolds, we need to examine his philosophical interpretation of life. This is the starting point of his grounding of a new imperative of responsibility. It also provides the context for his speculations concerning evil. In the foreword to The Phenomenon of Life, Jonas gives a succinct statement of his aim. Put at its briefest, this volume offers an "existential" interpretation of biological facts. Contemporary existentialism, obsessed with man alone, is in the habit of claiming as his unique privilege and predicament much of what is rooted in organic existence as such: in so doing, it withholds from the organic world the insights to be learned from the awareness of self. On its part, scientific biology, by its rules confined to the physical, outward facts, must ignore the dimension of inwardness that belongs to life: in so doing, it submerges the distinction of "animate" and "inanimate." A new reading of the biological record may recover the inner dimension — that which we know best -- for the understanding of things organic and so reclaim for psycho-physical unity of life that place in the theoretical scheme which it had lost through the divorce of the material and the mental since Descartes. p. ix) Jonas, in his existential interpretation of bios, pursues "this underlying theme of all of life in its development through the ascending order of organic powers and functions: metabolism, moving and desiring, sensing and perceiving, imagination, art, and mind — a progressive scale of freedom and peril, culminating in man, who may understand his uniqueness anew when he no longer sees himself in metaphysical isolation" (PL, p. ix). The way in which Jonas phrases this theme recalls the Aristotelian approach to bios, and it is clear that Aristotle is a major influence on Jonas. There is an even closer affinity with the philosophy of nature that Schelling sought to elaborate in the nineteenth century. Schelling (like many post- Kantian German thinkers) was troubled by the same fundamental dichotomy that underlies the problem for Jonas. The dichotomy that Kant introduced between the realm of "disenchanted" nature and the realm of freedom leads to untenable antinomies. Jonas differs from both Aristotle and Schelling in taking into account Darwin and contemporary scientific biology. A proper philosophical understanding of biology must always be compatible with the scientific facts. But at the same time, it must also root out misguided materialistic and reductionist interpretations of those biological facts. In this respect, Jonas's naturalism bears a strong affinity with the evolutionary naturalism of Peirce and Dewey. At the same time, Jonas is deeply skeptical of any theory of evolutionary biology that introduces mysterious "vital forces" or neglects the contingencies and perils of evolutionary development.' Jonas seeks to show "that it is in the dark stirrings of primeval organic substance that a principle of freedom shines forth for the first time within the vast necessity of the physical universe" (PL 3). Freedom, in this broad sense, is not identified exclusively with human freedom; it reaches down to the first glimmerings of organic life, and up to the type of freedom manifested by human beings. " 'Freedom' must denote an objectively discernible mode of being, i.e., a manner of executing existence, distinctive of the organic per se and thus shared by all members but by no nonmembers of the class: an ontologically descriptive term which can apply to mere physical evidence at first" (PL 3). This coming into being of freedom is not just a success story. "The privilege of freedom carries the burden of need and means precarious being" (PL 4). It is with biological metabolism that this principle of freedom first arises. Jonas goes "so far as to maintain that metabolism, the basic stratum of all organic existence, already displays freedom — indeed that it is the first form freedom takes." 1 ° With "metabolism — its power and its need — not-being made its appearance in the world as an alternative embodied in being itself; and thereby being itself first assumes an emphatic sense: intrinsically qualified by the threat of its negative it must affirm itself, and existence affirmed is existence as a concern" (PL 4). This broad, ontological understanding of freedom as a characteristic of all organic life serves Jonas as "an Ariadne's thread through the interpretation of Life" (PL 3). The way in which Jonas enlarges our understanding of freedom is indicative of his primary argumentative strategy. He expands and reinterprets categories that are normally applied exclusively to human beings so that we can see that they identify objectively discernible modes of being characteristic of everything animate. Even inwardness, and incipient forms of self; reach down to the simplest forms of organic life. 11 Now it may seem as if Jonas is guilty of anthropomorphism, of projecting what is distinctively human onto the entire domain of living beings. He is acutely aware of this sort of objection, but he argues that even the idea of anthropomorphism must be rethought. 12 We distort Jonas's philosophy of life if we think that he is projecting human characteristics onto the nonhuman animate world. Earlier I quoted the passage in which Jonas speaks of a "third way" — "one by which the dualistic rift can be avoided and yet enough of the dualistic insight saved to uphold the humanity of man" (GEN 234). We avoid the "dualistic rift" by showing that there is genuine continuity of organic life, and that such categories as freedom, inwardness, and selfhood apply to everything that is animate. These categories designate objective modes of being. But we preserve "enough dualistic insight" when we recognize that freedom, inwardness, and selfhood manifest themselves in human beings in a distinctive manner. I do not want to suggest that Jonas is successful in carrying out this ambitious program. He is aware of the tentativeness and fallibility of his claims, but he presents us with an understanding of animate beings such that we can discern both continuity and difference.' 3 It should now be clear that Jonas is not limiting himself to a regional philosophy of the organism or a new "existential" interpretation of biological facts. His goal is nothing less than to provide a new metaphysical understanding of being, a new ontology. And he is quite explicit about this. Our reflections [are] intended to show in what sense the problem of life, and with it that of the body, ought to stand in the center of ontology and, to some extent, also of epistemology. . . The central position of the problem of life means not only that it must be accorded a decisive voice in judging any given ontology but also that any treatment of itself must summon the whole of ontology. (PL 25) The philosophical divide between Levinas and Jonas appears to be enormous. For Levinas, as long as we restrict ourselves to the horizon of Being and to ontology (no matter how broadly these are conceived), there is no place for ethics, and no answer to ethical nihilism. For Jonas, by contrast, unless we can enlarge our understanding of ontology in such a manner as would provide an objective grounding for value and purpose within nature, there is no way to answer the challenge of ethical nihilism. But despite this initial appearance of extreme opposition, there is a way of interpreting Jonas and Levinas that lessens the gap between them. In Levinasian terminology, we can say that Jonas shows that there is a way of understanding ontology and the living body that does justice to the nonreducible alterity of the other (l'autrui). 14 Still, we might ask how Jonas's "existential" interpretation of biological facts and the new ontology he is proposing can provide a metaphysical grounding for a new ethics. Jonas criticizes the philosophical prejudice that there is no place in nature for values, purposes, and ends. Just as he maintains that freedom, inwardness, and selfhood are objective modes of being, so he argues that values and ends are objective modes of being. **There is a basic value inherent in organic being, a basic affirmation, "The Yes' of Life**" (IR 81). 15 "**The self-affirmation of being becomes emphatic in the opposition of life to death. Life is the explicit confrontation of being with not-being**. . . . The 'yes' of all striving is here sharpened by the active `no' to not-being" (IR 81-2). Furthermore — and this is the crucial point for Jonas — **this affirmation of life that is in all organic being has a binding obligatory force upon human beings**. This blindly self-enacting "yes" gains obligating force in the seeing freedom of man, who as the supreme outcome of nature's purposive labor is no longer its automatic executor but, with the power obtained from knowledge, can become its destroyer as well. He must adopt the "yes" into his will and impose the "no" to not-being on his power. But precisely this transition from willing to obligation is the critical point of moral theory at which attempts at laying a foundation for it come so easily to grief. Why does now, in man, that become a duty which hitherto "being" itself took care of through all individual willings? (IR 82). We discover here the transition from is to "ought" — from the self-affirmation of life to the binding obligation of human beings to preserve life not only for the present but also for the future. But why do we need a new ethics? The subtitle of The Imperative of Responsibility — In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age — indicates why we need a new ethics. Modern technology has transformed the nature and consequences of human ac-tion so radically that the underlying premises of **traditional ethics are no longer valid**. For the first time in history human beings possess the knowledge and the power to destroy life on this planet, including human life. Not only is there the new possibility of total nuclear disaster; there are the even more invidious and threatening possibilities that result from the unconstrained use of technologies that can destroy the environment required for life. The major transformation brought about by modern technology is that the consequences of our actions frequently exceed by far anything we can envision. Jonas was one of the first philosophers to warn us about the unprecedented ethical and political problems that arise with the rapid development of biotechnology. He claimed that this was happening at a time when there was an "ethical vacuum," when there did not seem to be any effective ethical principles to limit ot guide our ethical decisions. In the name of scientific and technological "progress," there is a relentless pressure to adopt a stance where virtually anything is permissible, includ-ing transforming the genetic structure of human beings, as long as it is "freely chosen." We need, Jonas argued, a new categorical imperative that might be formulated as follows: "Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life"; or expressed negatively: "Act so that the effects of your action are not destructive of the future possibility of such a life"; or simply: "**Do not compromise the conditions for an indefinite continuation of humanity on earth**"; or again turned positive: "In your present choices, include the future wholeness of Man among the objects of your will." (IR 11)

### A2: Bernstein

#### Bernstein is wrong and predictions are good

Chernoff 09 (Fred, “Conventionalism as an Adequate Basis for Policy-Relevant IR Theory” European Journal of International Relations Vol. 15(1): 157–194)

Other reflexivist theorists reject prediction more by omission. For example, Walker and Wendt are less explicit but are still quite clear in their rejections of prediction in IR. While Walker (1993) offers a sustained critique of naturalism and the empiricist (though not empirical) approach to the social sciences, he focuses on the logic of explanation and the presuppositions of the dominant forms of theory rather than questions connected to ‘prediction’. He ignores the notion of ‘prediction’. Wendt is of course one of the principal figures in American constructivism and, like others in that group, emphasizes scientific-style explanation. But at no point does he endorse prediction. Wendt lays out his extensive metatheory in Social Theory of International Politics (1999) but barely even mentions ‘prediction’. Rationalist scholars rarely note the problem that prediction – scepticism creates for the empirical value that IR theory might have. John Mearsheimer is one of the exceptions. He observes that reflexivists hope to improve the world by making it more cooperative and peaceful, which they hold will be advanced by eliminating the ‘hegemonic discourse’ of realism. But, as Mearsheimer points out, if the reflexivists were to eliminate the hegemonic discourse, then, since they do not have any way to predict what would follow in its place, the change may be a shift from realism to fascism.12 There is a related but somewhat more radical implication, which Mearsheimer does not mention, namely that without any ability to predict in the social world, it is possible that reflexivists may succeed in creating a more institutionally oriented discourse, but that discourse might not produce any change whatever in real-world politics. If they reject causal (probabilistic) connections projected into the future between events, states of affairs, or event-types, then there is no reason to believe that any specific change will lead to any effect at all.13 While it is clear that prediction-scepticism creates severe problems for the claim that the work of IR scholars might contribute to the needs of policymaking, the question remains, ‘are the arguments against predictiveness of social science theory well founded?’ On what are these rejections based? The trend in IR toward rejecting or downgrading ‘prediction’ is based on and reinforced by various developments in current philosophy of social science. IR scholars draw on three different sources of prediction – scepticism in the philosophy of social science: the indeterminacy of social theory (Weber, 1949, 1974; Habermas, 1971, 1987; Bohman, 1993; and Bernstein et al., 2000); the lack of governing regularities in the social sciences (Cartwright, 1983; Little, 1991) and the effects of nonlinearities (Doran, 1991, 1999). I have argued elsewhere that all three sorts of anti-predictive arguments are defective and that the latter two presuppose an unjustifiably narrow notion of ‘prediction’.14 A determined prediction sceptic may continue to hold that there is too great a degree of complexity of social relationships (which comprise ‘open systems’) to allow any prediction whatsoever. Two very simple examples may circumscribe and help to refute a radical variety of scepticism. First, we all make reliable social predictions and do so with great frequency. We can predict with high probability that a spouse, child or parent will react to certain well-known stimuli that we might supply, based on extensive past experience. More to the point of IR prediction – scepticism, we can imagine a young child in the UK who (perhaps at the cinema) (1) picks up a bit of 19th-century British imperial lore thus gaining a sense of the power of the crown, without knowing anything of current balances of power, (2) hears some stories about the US–UK invasion of Iraq in the context of the aim of advancing democracy, and (3) hears a bit about communist China and democratic Taiwan. Although the specific term ‘preventative strike’ might not enter into her lexicon, it is possible to imagine the child, whose knowledge is thus limited, thinking that if democratic Taiwan were threatened by China, the UK would (possibly or probably) launch a strike on China to protect it, much as the UK had done to help democracy in Iraq. In contrast to the child, readers of this journal and scholars who study the world more thoroughly have factual information (e.g. about the relative military and economic capabilities of the UK and China) and hold some cause-and-effect principles (such as that states do not usually initiate actions that leaders understand will have an extremely high probability of undercutting their power with almost no chances of success). Anyone who has adequate knowledge of world politics would predict that the UK will not launch a preventive attack against China. In the real world, China knows that for the next decade and well beyond the UK will not intervene militarily in its affairs. While Chinese leaders have to plan for many likely — and even a few somewhat unlikely — future possibilities, they do not have to plan for various implausible contingencies: they do not have to structure forces geared to defend against specifically UK forces and do not have to conduct diplomacy with the UK in a way that would be required if such an attack were a real possibility. Any rational decision-maker in China may use some cause-and-effect (probabilistic) principles along with knowledge of specific facts relating to the Sino-British relationship to predict (P2) that the UK will not land its forces on Chinese territory — even in the event of a war over Taiwan (that is, the probability is very close to zero). The statement P2 qualifies as a prediction based on DEF above and counts as knowledge for Chinese political and military decision-makers. A Chinese diplomat or military planner who would deny that theory-based prediction would have no basis to rule out extremely implausible predictions like P2 and would thus have to prepare for such unlikely contingencies as UK action against China. A reflexivist theorist sceptical of ‘prediction’ in IR might argue that the China example distorts the notion by using a trivial prediction and treating it as a meaningful one. But the critic’s temptation to dismiss its value stems precisely from the fact that it is so obviously true. The value to China of knowing that the UK is not a military threat is significant. The fact that, under current conditions, any plausible cause-and-effect understanding of IR that one might adopt would yield P2, that the ‘UK will not attack China’, does not diminish the value to China of knowing the UK does not pose a military threat. A critic might also argue that DEF and the China example allow non-scientific claims to count as predictions. But we note that while physics and chemistry offer precise ‘point predictions’, other natural sciences, such as seismology, genetics or meteorology, produce predictions that are often much less specific; that is, they describe the predicted ‘events’ in broader time frame and typically in probabilistic terms. We often find predictions about the probability, for example, of a seismic event in the form ‘some time in the next three years’ rather than ‘two years from next Monday at 11:17 am’. DEF includes approximate and probabilistic propositions as predictions and is thus able to catagorize as a prediction the former sort of statement, which is of a type that is often of great value to policy-makers. With the help of these ‘non-point predictions’ coming from the natural and the social sciences, leaders are able to choose the courses of action (e.g. more stringent earthquake-safety building codes, or procuring an additional carrier battle group) that are most likely to accomplish the leaders’ desired ends. So while ‘point predictions’ are not what political leaders require in most decision-making situations, critics of IR predictiveness often attack the predictive capacity of IR theory for its inability to deliver them. The critics thus commit the straw man fallacy by requiring a sort of prediction in IR (1) that few, if any, theorists claim to be able to offer, (2) that are not required by policy-makers for theory-based predictions to be valuable, and (3) that are not possible even in some natural sciences.15 The range of theorists included in ‘reflexivists’ here is very wide and it is possible to dissent from some of the general descriptions. From the point of view of the central argument of this article, there are two important features that should be rendered accurately. One is that reflexivists reject explanation–prediction symmetry, which allows them to pursue causal (or constitutive) explanation without any commitment to prediction. The second is that almost all share clear opposition to predictive social science.16 The reflexivist commitment to both of these conclusions should be evident from the foregoing discussion. The preceding section raised the objection to reflexivism that it fails to meet the third challenge identified at the outset. A reflexivist might still object that the third challenge is misplaced, that is, that the founders of IR were simply wrong in believing that IR theories could support reliable predictions that provide a basis for changing the world. This section looks at two studies of the track record of IR prediction in order to provide empirical support for the claim that IR theory-based prediction can succeed, and thus that the founders of IR were not aiming for an unrealizable goal. The Prediction Track Record — Ray and Russett on the End of the Cold War When the Cold War came to an end, critics of prediction in IR bolstered their sceptical position by seizing on scholars’ failure to foresee that event — perhaps the most important international development of the second half of the 20th century. James Lee Ray and Bruce Russett responded by arguing that, despite the widespread perception of failure, there were three ‘streams of research’ that, especially when taken together, showed a grasp of the transition taking place and hold promise for predicting political phenomena (Ray and Russett, 1996). These are democratic peace studies, certain sorts of rational choice models, combined (since both of these require inputs or knowledge about domestic politics) with the work of experts in regional and domestic politics. Ray and Russett looked at work published (though considered also some classified material) prior to 1991 as their focus, noting that once predictions are published, it is difficult for authors to ‘fiddle’ with them.17 In assessing the record of, and prospects for, predictive success of IR and political science, we must remember that Ray and Russett are both well-known IR scholars who have argued for some theories as correct (such as those that include the dyadic democratic peace hypothesis) and against others as wrong (e.g. realist theories that reject the dyadic hypothesis relevance of regimetype). Thus like all theorists, they would expect that proponents of inferior theories would fail to produce accurate predictions. So from their point of view it is no surprise that many IR theories, especially realist theories, that pertained to superpower relations and were published prior to the end of the Cold War, should fail to yield correct predictions. With regard to predictions about the end of the Cold War, Ray and Russett cite several individuals whose insights appear to have been impressively on target. They quote a very prescient-looking comment of John Mueller, just 12 months into the Gorbachev era, according to which, ‘there is a great deal in the present situation to suggest that this condition could be on the verge of terminal improvement; the incentives for the Soviet Union to reduce its commitment to worldwide revolution are considerable. This could eventually result in the end of the cold war.’18 However, true to their methodological constraints, Ray and Russett resist the temptation to place a great deal of weight on it in their evaluation of theory-based prediction because Mueller did not make explicit use of theoretical principles. The authors also focus on the examination of democratic peace (DP) hypotheses published by Russett. Those who study the dyadic DP hypothesis generally agree that mature democracies are indeed quite peaceful toward one another. One of the predictions derived from the dyadic DP hypothesis is that, as more states become mature democracies, those states will be less likely to fight wars against one another; another is that, as states become less authoritarian and more democratic, they are less likely to fight wars against mature democracies. As DP studies were first receiving the serious attention of theorists, Russett himself, as early as 1981, offered the conditional prediction that if the USSR were to become more democratic, then a more cooperative relationship with the US would be likely.19 Ray and Russett acknowledge that those works did not study or identify the internal changes taking place inside the Soviet Union; hence the prediction remained conditional (though still satisfying the terms of DEF). However, they point out that scholars who were examining the level of democracy in the USSR after Gorbachev rose to power did indeed publish claims of dramatic changes. They note that the Polity database, which uses a 0–10 ‘institutionalized democracy index’, scored the USSR at a 0 in 1986 and at 5 in 1989 (Ray and Russett, 1996: 460, n. 80). The predictive accuracy of the dyadic DP hypothesis continues past the publication of Ray and Russett’s article. The historical record in the 20 years that followed Russett’s first DP predictions on the subject shows that peaceful relations among democracies continued. Between 1980 and 2001 there were 492 violent interstate disputes, none of which were between mature democracies.20 Ray and Russett go beyond DP studies and endorse the theoretical and methodological merits of other sorts of methods of analysis and theories of IR that are successful in terms of their ability to produce reliable predictions, especially the formal model of Bueno de Mesquita and his collaborators. They note that the model had been applied to many different problems over a period of years, producing over 2000 predictions. One source reports that the model ‘consistently outperformed’ predictions of the experts who were supplying the domestic political analysis with roughly a 90 percent success rate.21 Ray and Russett argue that many of the familiar and often-devastating criticisms of rational choice modelling in the social sciences do not apply to the model of Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al., since the latter model is different from more familiar models in some key respects.22 One difference is that it does not rely exclusively on the nation-state as the principal actor. The model is used at all levels of analysis — interest groups, individuals, political parties, etc., as well as the state. The sort of actor modelled in each case depends upon the particular sort of question about the future that is being asked. A second difference is that the model is not static but rather allows information processing and updating of cognitively relevant factors. And a third difference is that the utility functions are not exogenously given but are based on psychological studies; knowledge about each actor’s attitudes towards risks, threats, etc. is specifically factored into the model. The use of computers allows the model to use multiple-iteration simulations to consider the alternate paths if the data turn out to be faulty. There are many ways in which these models make use of real-world politics and attitudes that are usually absent in simpler rational choice models. The coding of the data is done by those most familiar with the relevant real-world politics (regional, area or national specialists), rather than by modelling specialists.

### A2: Bias

**Their bias arguments are wrong – experts are cautious about making bold claims because they will get blamed if they are wrong. Also, you have to disprove our specific claim, not make a blanket assertion – the process of debate filters out bad impact claims**

**Campbell and Currie** **06** (Scott and Greg, both of the University of Nottingham in the UK, “Against Beck: In defence of risk analysis,” Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 36)

Note that Beck's argumenthere is not at all an epistemological one; he is not arguing that we are all equally well placed, in terms of knowledge and skill, to make assessments of risk. His argument is that whatever knowledge experts possess is nullified by theirhaving an interest—whether conscious or not—in misrepresenting the degree of risk that attaches to harmful events that may possibly occur.If this claim was the weaker claim that sometimes there are reasons for discounting what risk analysts say about X because what they say may be influenced by the fact that they were involved in the creation or approval of X, then there would be less to object to—but, then, the claim itself would be an unexceptional one. Also, any claim that this has occurred in specific situations would have to be assessed empirically, on a case-by-case basis. What Beck is offering, though, is a much more general and bold claim—that there is a "permanent compulsion" to distort and deny the risks that really exist; hence, risk experts are always to be presumed to be untrustworthy. But this is a very strong claim, and no reason is given to support it, other than the claim that the very involvement of scientists and risk experts in the growth of technology itself cannot fail to bias them against recognizing risks.But why should we think this is so? It is one thing to assert that in some cases such bias may exist, but is it true that it always does? The fact that so many risk experts have warned of risks—even in cases where they have defied the companies they worked for—suggeststhat thestronger claim is not true.' It seems just as plausible to suppose that scientists and risk experts are likely to bemore cautious aboutthe risksof technology than they would otherwise be, because they are the ones who will take the blameif anything goes wrong. Indeed, this is what some commentators on risk analysis have argued.' This is an issue that cannot ultimately be decided without a study of the relevant empirical evidence. As Beck does notoffer anysuch study, he cannot be said to have made astrong case. Our own view is that there is likely to be a mix—some scientists and risk analysts are likely to be more cautious, and some are likely to be less cautious, because of their involvement in the development and approval of technology. This fits with the weaker claim, but not with Beck's attention-grabbing stronger claim. In the absence of a good argument for it, we see no reason to accept the latter.10