### Off

#### Interpretation: The affirmative must present and defend the hypothetical implementation of a plan to substantially increase statutory and/or judicial restrictions on the war powers authority of the President of the United States in one or more of the following areas: targeted killing, indefinite detention, offensive cyber operations, or introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities.

#### “Resolved” proves the framework for the resolution is to enact a policy.

Words and Phrases 64 Permanent Edition

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### The USFG is the government in Washington D.C.

Encarta 2k http://encarta.msn.com

“The federal government of the United States is centered in Washington DC”

#### B. Violation – the affirmative doesn’t defend the hypothetical implementation of a USFG action

#### C. Vote neg

#### 1. Topicality – they don’t defend the resolution, which is a voting issue to preserve competitive equity and jurisdictional integrity

#### 2. Fairness – their framework allows infinite non-falsifiable, unpredictable, totalizing, and personal claims – impossible to be neg

#### 3. Switch-side debate – spending every round theorizing about your K is unproductive – you cannot know your argument is true unless you consider both sides of it

#### 4. No offense – you can read this arg when you’re negative – to win this round, they have to prove why reading this aff and not being topical is good

#### 5. Topicality before advocacy – vote negative to say that you think they are not topical, not that you don’t believe in their project

#### This is an a priori issue

Shively, 2k (Assistant Prof Political Science at Texas A&M, Ruth Lessl, Partisan Politics and Political Theory, p. 181-2)JFS

The requirements given thus far are primarily negative. The ambiguists must say "no" to-they must reject and limit-some ideas and actions. In what follows, we will also find that they must say "yes" to some things. In particular, they must say "yes" to the idea of rational persuasion. This means, first, that they must recognize the role of agreement in political contest, or the basic accord that is necessary to discord. The mistake that the ambiguists make here is a common one. The mistake is in thinking that agreement marks the end of contest-that consensus kills debate. But this is true only if the agreement is perfect-if there is nothing at all left to question or contest. In most cases, however, our agreements are highly imperfect. We agree on some matters but not on others, on generalities but not on specifics, on principles but not on their applications, and so on. And this kind of limited agreement is the starting condition of contest and debate. As John Courtney Murray writes: We hold certain truths; therefore we can argue about them. It seems to have been one of the corruptions of intelligence by positivism to assume that argument ends when agreement is reached. In a basic sense, the reverse is true. There can be no argument except on the premise, and within a context, of agreement. (Murray 1960, 10) In other words, we cannot argue about something if we are not communicating: if we cannot agree on the topic and terms of argument or if we have utterly different ideas about what counts as evidence or good argument. At the very least, we must agree about what it is that is being debated before we can debate it. For instance, one cannot have an argument about euthanasia with someone who thinks euthanasia is a musical group. One cannot successfully stage a sit-in if one's target audience simply thinks everyone is resting or if those doing the sitting have no complaints. Nor can one demonstrate resistance to a policy if no one knows that it is a policy. In other words, contest is meaningless if there is a lack of agreement or communication about what is being contested. Resisters, demonstrators, and debaters must have some shared ideas about the subject and/or the terms of their disagreements. The participants and the target of a sit-in must share an understanding of the complaint at hand. And a demonstrator's audience must know what is being resisted. In short, the contesting of an idea presumes some agreement about what that idea is and how one might go about intelligibly contesting it. In other words, contestation rests on some basic agreement or harmony.

#### We control external impacts – abandoning politics causes war, slavery, and authoritarianism

Boggs 2k (CAROL BOGGS, PF POLITICAL SCIENCE – SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, 00, THE END OF POLITICS, 250-1)

But it is a very deceptive and misleading minimalism. While Oakeshott debunks political mechanisms and rational planning, as either useless or dangerous, the actually existing power structure-replete with its own centralized state apparatus, institutional hierarchies, conscious designs, and indeed, rational plans-remains fully intact, insulated from the minimalist critique. In other words, ideologies and plans are perfectly acceptable for elites who preside over established governing systems, but not for ordinary citizens or groups anxious to challenge the status quo. Such one-sided minimalism gives carte blanche to elites who naturally desire as much space to maneuver as possible. The flight from “abstract principles” rules out ethical attacks on injustices that may pervade the status quo (slavery or imperialist wars, for example) insofar as those injustices might be seen as too deeply embedded in the social and institutional matrix of the time to be the target of oppositional political action. If politics is reduced to nothing other than a process of everyday muddling-through, then people are condemned to accept the harsh realities of an exploitative and authoritarian system, with no choice but to yield to the dictates of “conventional wisdom”. Systematic attempts to ameliorate oppressive conditions would, in Oakeshott’s view, turn into a political nightmare. A belief that totalitarianism might results from extreme attempts to put society in order is one thing; to argue that all politicized efforts to change the world are necessary doomed either to impotence or totalitarianism requires a completely different (and indefensible) set of premises. Oakeshott’s minimalism poses yet another, but still related, range of problems: the shrinkage of politics hardly suggests that corporate colonization, social hierarchies, or centralized state and military institutions will magically disappear from people’s lives. Far from it: the public space vacated by ordinary citizens, well informed and ready to fight for their interests, simply gives elites more room to consolidate their own power and privilege. Beyond that, the fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian civil society, not too far removed from the excessive individualism, social Darwinism and urban violence of the American landscape could open the door to a modern Leviathan intent on restoring order and unity in the face of social disintegration. Viewed in this light, the contemporary drift towards antipolitics might set the stage for a reassertion of politics in more authoritarian and reactionary guise-or it could simply end up reinforcing the dominant state-corporate system. In either case, the state would probably become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of those universal, collective interests that had vanished from civil society.16 And either outcome would run counter to the facile antirationalism of Oakeshott’s Burkean muddling-through theories.

### Off

#### THE AFFIRMATIVES FOCUS ON THE DISCURSIVE/SYMBOLIC REVEALS THE EXTENT TO WHICH THEY HAVE GIVEN UP ON ACTUALLY CHALLENGING THE STRUCTURES OF OPPRESSION. BUT FAR FROM BEING A POST-CAPITALIST AGE IN WHICH ALL SOCIAL EXPERIENCE IS TEXTUALLY OR DISCURSIVELY PRODUCED, IT IS A MATERIAL WORLD. ONLY A MATERIALIST METHOD CAN ACCOUNT FOR THE WAYS IN WHICH CERTAIN CLASSES CREATE AND DEPLOY RHETORIC TO LEGITIMIZE A CAPITALIST MODE OF SOCIAL RELATIONS

CLOUD (Prof of Comm at Texas) 2001

[Dana, “The Affirmative Masquerade”, p. online: http://www.acjournal.org/holdings/vol4/iss3/special/cloud.htm //wyo-tjc]

At the very least, however, it is clear that poststructuralist discourse theories have left behind some of historical materialism’s most valuable conceptual tools for any theoretical and critical practice that aims at informing practical, oppositional political activity on behalf of historically exploited and oppressed groups. As Nancy Hartsock (1983, 1999) and many others have argued (see Ebert 1996; Stabile, 1997; Triece, 2000; Wood, 1999), we need to retain concepts such as standpoint epistemology (wherein truth standards are not absolute or universal but arise from the scholar’s alignment with the perspectives of particular classes and groups) and fundamental, class-based interests (as opposed to understanding class as just another discursively-produced identity). We need extra-discursive reality checks on ideological mystification and economic contextualization of discursive phenomena. Most importantly, critical scholars bear the obligation to explain the origins and causes of exploitation and oppression in order better to inform the fight against them. In poststructuralist discourse theory, the "retreat from class" (Wood, 1999) expresses an unwarranted pessimism about what can be accomplished in late capitalism with regard to understanding and transforming system and structure at the level of the economy and the state. It substitutes meager cultural freedoms for macro-level social transformation even as millions of people around the world feel the global reach of capitalism more deeply than ever before. At the core of the issue is a debate across the humanities and social sciences with regard to whether we live in a "new economy," an allegedly postmodern, information-driven historical moment in which, it is argued, organized mass movements are no longer effective in making material demands of system and structure (Melucci, 1996). In suggesting that global capitalism has so innovated its strategies that there is no alternative to its discipline, arguments proclaiming "a new economy" risk inaccuracy, pessimism, and conservatism (see Cloud, in press). While a thoroughgoing summary is beyond the scope of this essay, there is a great deal of evidence against claims that capitalism has entered a new phase of extraordinary innovation, reach, and scope (see Hirst and Thompson, 1999). Furthermore, both class polarization (see Mishel, Bernstein, and Schmitt, 2001) and the ideological and management strategies that contain class antagonism (see Cloud, 1998; Parker and Slaughter, 1994) still resemble their pre-postmodern counterparts. A recent report of the Economic Policy Institute concludes that in the 1990s, inequality between rich and poor in the U.S. (as well as around the world) continued to grow, in a context of rising worker productivity, a longer work week for most ordinary Americans, and continued high poverty rates. Even as the real wage of the median CEO rose nearly 63 percent from 1989, to 1999, more than one in four U.S. workers lives at or below the poverty level. Among these workers, women are disproportionately represented, as are Black and Latino workers. (Notably, unionized workers earn nearly thirty percent more, on average, than non-unionized workers.) Meanwhile, Disney workers sewing t-shirts and other merchandise in Haiti earn 28 cents an hour. Disney CEO Michael Eisner made nearly six hundred million dollars in 1999--451,000 times the wage of the workers under his employ (Roesch, 1999). According to United Nations and World Bank sources, several trans-national corporations have assets larger than several countries combined. Sub-Saharan Africa and the Russian Federation have seen sharp economic decline, while assets of the world’s top three billionaires exceed the GNP of all of the least-developed countries and their combined population of 600 million people (Shawki and D’Amato, 2000, pp. 7-8). In this context of a real (and clearly bipolar) class divide in late capitalist society, the postmodern party is a masquerade ball, in which theories claiming to offer ways toward emancipation and progressive critical practice in fact encourage scholars and/as activists to abandon any commitment to crafting oppositional political blocs with instrumental and perhaps revolutionary potential. Instead, on their arguments, we must recognize agency as an illusion of humanism and settle for playing with our identities in a mood of irony, excess, and profound skepticism. Marx and Engels’ critique of the Young Hegelians applies equally well to the postmodern discursive turn: "They are only fighting against ‘phrases.’ They forget, however, that to these phrases they themselves are only opposing other phrases, and that they are in no way combating the real existing world when they are merely combating the phrases of this world" (1976/1932, p. 41). Of course, the study of "phrases" is important to the project of materialist critique in the field of rhetoric. The point, though, is to explain the connections between phrases on the one hand and economic interests and systems of oppression and exploitation on the other. Marxist ideology critique, understands that classes, motivated by class interest, produce rhetorics wittingly and unwittingly, successfully and unsuccessfully. Those rhetorics are strategically adapted to context and audience.

Yet Marxist theory is not naïve in its understanding of intention or individual agency. Challenging individualist humanism, Marxist ideology critics regard people as "products of circumstances" (and changed people as products of changed circumstances; Marx, 1972b/1888, p. 144).

Within this understanding, Marxist ideology critics can describe and evaluate cultural discourses such as that of racism or sexism as strategic and complex expressions of both their moment in history and of their class basis. Further, this mode of critique seeks to explain both why and how social reality is fundamentally, systematically oppressive and exploitative, exploring not only the surface of discourses but also their often-complex and multi-vocal motivations and consequences. As Burke (1969/1950) notes, Marxism is both a method of rhetorical criticism and a rhetorical formation itself (pp. 109-110). There is no pretense of neutrality or assumption of transcendent position for the critic. Teresa Ebert (1996) summarizes the purpose of materialist ideology critique: Materialist critique is a mode of knowing that inquires into what is not said, into the silences and the suppressed or missing, in order to uncover the concealed operations of power and the socio-economic relations connecting the myriad details and representations of our lives. It shows that apparently disconnected zones of culture are in fact materially linked through the highly differentiated, mediated, and dispersed operation of a systematic logic of exploitation. In sum, materialist critique disrupts ‘what is’ to explain how social differences--specifically gender, race, sexuality, and class--have been systematically produced and continue to operate within regimes of exploitation, so that we can change them. It is the means for producing transformative knowledges.

#### NEXT, THE REDUCTION OF CLASS TO A NEUTRAL LEVEL AMONG A LONG LIST OF OTHER OPPRESSIONS SUCH AS RACE AND GENDER, DESTROYS THE EMANCIPATORY POTENTIAL OF CLASS TO REACH ACROSS ALL LINES OF INDENTITY AND FORGE POLITICAL ACTION. CLASS MUST BE RECOGNIZED AS QUALITATIVELY MORE IMPORTANT—OTHERWISE THE SYSTEM IS ABLE TO SATISFY DEMANDS ON GROUNDS OF FORMAL EQUALITY, DESTROYING ATTEMPTS TO OVERCOME CAPITALIST OPPRESSION\*\*\*

GIMENEZ (Prof. Sociology at UC Boulder) 2001

[Martha, “Marxism and Class; Gender and Race”, Race, Gender and Class, Vol. 8, p. online: <http://www.colorado.edu/Sociology/gimenez/work/cgr.html> //wyo-tjc]

There are many competing theories of race, gender, class, American society, political economy, power, etc. but no specific theory is invoked to define how the terms race, gender and class are used, or to identify how they are related to the rest of the social system. To some extent, race, gender and class and their intersections and interlockings have become a mantra to be invoked in any and all theoretical contexts, for a tacit agreement about their ubiquitousness and meaning seems to have developed among RGC studies advocates, so that all that remains to be dome is empirically to document their intersections everywhere, for everything that happens is, by definition, raced, classed, and gendered. This pragmatic acceptance of race, gender and class, as givens, results in the downplaying of theory, and the resort to experience as the source of knowledge. The emphasis on experience in the construction of knowledge is intended as a corrective to theories that, presumably, reflect only the experience of the powerful. RGC seems to offer a subjectivist understanding of theory as simply a reflection of the experience and consciousness of the individual theorist, rather than as a body of propositions which is collectively and systematically produced under historically specific conditions of possibility which grant them historical validity for as long as those conditions prevail. Instead, knowledge and theory are pragmatically conceived as the products or reflection of experience and, as such, unavoidably partial, so that greater accuracy and relative completeness can be approximated only through gathering the experiential accounts of all groups. Such is the importance given to the role of experience in the production of knowledge that in the eight page introduction to the first section of an RGC anthology, the word experience is repeated thirty six times (Andersen and Collins, 1995: 1-9).

I agree with the importance of learning from the experience of all groups, especially those who have been silenced by oppression and exclusion and by the effects of ideologies that mystify their actual conditions of existence. To learn how people describe their understanding of their lives is very illuminating, for "ideas are the conscious expression -- real or illusory -- of (our) actual relations and activities" (Marx, 1994: 111), because "social existence determines consciousness" (Marx, 1994: 211). Given that our existence is shaped by the capitalist mode of production, experience, to be fully understood in its broader social and political implications, has to be situated in the context of the capitalist forces and relations that produce it. Experience in itself, however, is suspect because, dialectically, it is a unity of opposites; it is, at the same time, unique, personal, insightful and revealing and, at the same time, thoroughly social, partial, mystifying, itself the product of historical forces about which individuals may know little or nothing about (for a critical assessment of experience as a source of knowledge see Sherry Gorelick, "Contradictions of feminist methodology," in Chow, Wilkinson, and Baca Zinn, 1996; applicable to the role of experience in contemporary RGC and feminist research is Jacoby's critique of the 1960s politics of subjectivity: Jacoby, 1973: 37- 49). Given the emancipatory goals of the RGC perspective, it is through the analytical tools of Marxist theory that it can move forward, beyond the impasse revealed by the constant reiteration of variations on the "interlocking" metaphor. This would require, however, a) a rethinking and modification of the postulated relationships between race, class and gender, and b) a reconsideration of the notion that, because everyone is located at the intersection of these structures, all social relations and interactions are "raced," "classed," and "gendered."In the RGC perspective, race, gender and class are presented as equivalent systems of oppression with extremely negative consequences for the oppressed. It is also asserted that the theorization of the connections between these systems require "a working hypothesis of equivalency" (Collins, 1997:74). Whether or not it is possible to view class as just another system of oppression depends on the theoretical framework within class is defined. If defined within the traditional sociology of stratification perspective, in terms of a gradation perspective, class refers simply to strata or population aggregates ranked on the basis of standard SES indicators (income, occupation, and education) (for an excellent discussion of the difference between gradational and relational concepts of class, see Ossowski, 1963). Class in this non-relational, descriptive sense has no claims to being more fundamental than gender or racial oppression; it simply refers to the set of individual attributes that place individuals within an aggregate or strata arbitrarily defined by the researcher (i.e., depending on their data and research purposes, anywhere from three or four to twelve "classes" can be identified).From the standpoint of Marxist theory, however, class is qualitatively different from gender and race and cannot be considered just another system of oppression. As Eagleton points out, whereas racism and sexism are unremittingly bad, class is not entirely a "bad thing" even though socialists would like to abolish it. The bourgeoisie in its revolutionary stage was instrumental in ushering a new era in historical development, one which liberated the average person from the oppressions of feudalism and put forth the ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity. Today, however, it has an unquestionably negative role to play as it expands and deepens the rule of capital over the entire globe. The working class, on the other hand, is pivotally located to wage the final struggle against capital and, consequently, it is "an excellent thing" (Eagleton, 1996: 57). While racism and sexism have no redeeming feature, class relations are, dialectically, a unity of opposites; both a site of exploitation and, objectively, a site where the potential agents of social change are forged. To argue that the working class is the fundamental agent of change does not entail the notion that it is the only agent of change. The working class is of course composed of women and men who belong to different races, ethnicities, national origins, cultures, and so forth, so that gender and racial/ethnic struggles have the potential of fueling class struggles because, given the patterns of wealth ownership and income distribution in this and all capitalist countries, those who raise the banners of gender and racial struggles are overwhelmingly propertyless workers, technically members of the working class, people who need to work for economic survival whether it is for a wage or a salary, for whom racism, sexism and class exploitation matter. But this vision of a mobilized working class where gender and racial struggles are not subsumed but are nevertheless related requires a class conscious effort to link RGC studies to the Marxist analysis of historical change. In so far as the "class" in RGC remains a neutral concept, open to any and all theoretical meanings, just one oppression among others, intersectionality will not realize its revolutionary potential.Nevertheless, I want to argue against the notion that class should be considered equivalent to gender and race. I find the grounds for my argument not only on the crucial role class struggles play in processes of epochal change but also in the very assumptions of RGC studies and the ethnomethodological insights put forth by West and Fenstermaker (1994). The assumption of the simultaneity of experience (i.e., all interactions are raced, classed, gendered) together with the ambiguity inherent in the interactions themselves, so that while one person might think he or she is "doing gender," another might interpret those "doings" in terms of "doing class," highlight the basic issue that Collins accurately identifies when she argues that ethnomethodology ignores power relations. Power relations underlie all processes of social interaction and this is why social facts are constraining upon people. But the pervasiveness of power ought not to obfuscate the fact that some power relations are more important and consequential than others. For example, the power that physical attractiveness might confer a woman in her interactions with her less attractive female supervisor or employer does not match the economic power of the latter over the former. In my view, the flattening or erasure of the qualitative difference between class, race and gender in the RGC perspective is the foundation for the recognition that it is important to deal with "basic relations of domination and subordination" which now appear disembodied, outside class relations. In the effort to reject "class reductionism," by postulating the equivalence between class and other forms of oppression, the RGC perspective both negates the fundamental importance of class but it is forced to acknowledge its importance by postulating some other "basic" structures of domination. Class relations -- whether we are referring to the relations between capitalist and wage workers, or to the relations between workers (salaried and waged) and their managers and supervisors, those who are placed in "contradictory class locations," (Wright, 1978) -- are of paramount importance, for most people's economic survival is determined by them. Those in dominant class positions do exert power over their employees and subordinates and a crucial way in which that power is used is through their choosing the identity they impute their workers. Whatever identity workers might claim or "do," employers can, in turn, disregard their claims and "read" their "doings" differently as "raced" or "gendered" or both, rather than as "classed," thus downplaying their class location and the class nature of their grievances. To argue, then, that class is fundamental is not to "reduce" gender or racial oppression to class, but to acknowledge that the underlying basic and "nameless" power at the root of what happens in social interactions grounded in "intersectionality" is class power.

#### FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF STRUCTURAL KRITIK, THERE CAN BE NO SUCH THING AS ‘MAKING THINGS BETTER’— THEIR MODEL OF POLITICS, NO MATTER HOW SUBVERSIVE OR CONSERVATIVE, ALL FUNDAMENTALLY EXAGERATE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FORMAL INSTITUTION OF POLITICS AND POWER, IGNORING THE WAYS SUCH A SYSTEM CREATES KNOWLEDGE—ONLY A MARXIST SHIFT TO KRITIK THE STRUCTURE AND CREATE MASS SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS WILL OVERCOME THIS FAILURE OF POLITICS

HARNECKER 2000

[Marta, Dir of MEPLA, Links, p. online: <http://www.dsp.org.au/links/back/issue16/harnecker.html> //wyo]

To think about the construction of forces and the correlation of forces is to change the traditional vision of politics. This vision tends to reduce politics to the struggle over judicial and political institutions and to exaggerate the role of the state. Immediately one thinks of political parties and the fight over the control and orientation of the formal instruments of power.17

The most radical sectors focus all their political action on the conquest of political power and the destruction of the state. The reformists focus on the administration of political power and the exercise of government as the fundamental and sole form of political practice. The popular sectors and their struggles are the ignored colossus. This is what Helio Gallardo calls the "politicism" of the Latin American left.18

2) Overcoming the narrow conception of power

To think about constructing forces is also to overcome the narrow vision that reduces the concept of right-wing power to that of the repressive aspects of the state. The power of the enemy is not only repressive but also, as Carlos Ruiz says, constructive, moulding, disciplining. If the power of the dominant classes were only for the purpose of subjecting the left to censorship, exclusion, obstacles or repression, it would be more fragile. Its strength derives from the fact that, in addition to eliminating those things it doesn't want, it is capable of creating what it does want: building channels, producing knowledge, rationales and consciousness. It is the power to impose its own way of being seen and of looking at the world.19

To think about how to construct forces is also to overcome the old and deeply rooted mistake of trying to build political forces whether through arms or the ballot box without building social force.20

3) Politics as the art of building social force in opposition to the system

The rise of a social force opposing the system is what the ruling classes fear most. That is the source of their narrow conception of politics as the struggle to win positions of power within the institutionalised judicial and political apparatus.

For the left, on the other hand, politics must be the art of building social force in opposition to the system. The left must not, therefore, see the people or popular social force as something given that can be manipulated and only needs to be stirred up, but as something that has to be built.

#### Vote Negative to validate and adopt the method of structural/historical criticism that is the 1NC.

#### THIS IS NOT THE ALTERNATIVE, BUT IN TRUTH THE ONLY OPTION— METHOD IS THE FOREMOST POLITICAL QUESTION BECAUSE ONE MUST UNDERSTAND THE EXISTING SOCIAL TOTALITY BEFORE ONE CAN ACT ON IT—GROUNDING THE SITES OF POLITICAL CONTESTATION OR KNOWLEDGE OUTSIDE OF LABOR AND SURPLUS VALUE MERELY SERVE TO HUMANIZE CAPITAL AND PREVENT A TRANSITION TO A SOCIETY BEYOND OPPRESSION

TUMINO (Prof. English @ Pitt) 2001

[Stephen, “What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever”, Red Critique, p. online //wyo-tjc]

Any effective political theory will have to do at least two things: it will have to offer an integrated understanding of social practices and, based on such an interrelated knowledge, offer a guideline for praxis. My main argument here is that among all contesting social theories now, only Orthodox Marxism has been able to produce an integrated knowledge of the existing social totality and provide lines of praxis that will lead to building a society free from necessity.

But first I must clarify what I mean by Orthodox Marxism. Like all other modes and forms of political theory, the very theoretical identity of Orthodox Marxism is itself contested—not just from non-and anti-Marxists who question the very "real" (by which they mean the "practical" as under free-market criteria) existence of any kind of Marxism now but, perhaps more tellingly, from within the Marxist tradition itself. I will, therefore, first say what I regard to be the distinguishing marks of Orthodox Marxism and then outline a short polemical map of contestation over Orthodox Marxism within the Marxist theories now. I will end by arguing for its effectivity in bringing about a new society based not on human rights but on freedom from necessity.

I will argue that to know contemporary society—and to be able to act on such knowledge—one has to first of all know what makes the existing social totality. I will argue that the dominant social totality is based on inequality—not just inequality of power but inequality of economic access (which then determines access to health care, education, housing, diet, transportation, . . . ). This systematic inequality cannot be explained by gender, race, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, or nationality. These are all secondary contradictions and are all determined by the fundamental contradiction of capitalism which is inscribed in the relation of capital and labor. All modes of Marxism now explain social inequalities primarily on the basis of these secondary contradictions and in doing so—and this is my main argument—legitimate capitalism. Why? Because such arguments authorize capitalism without gender, race, discrimination and thus accept economic inequality as an integral part of human societies. They accept a sunny capitalism—a capitalism beyond capitalism. Such a society, based on cultural equality but economic inequality, has always been the not-so-hidden agenda of the bourgeois left—whether it has been called "new left," "postmarxism," or "radical democracy." This is, by the way, the main reason for its popularity in the culture industry—from the academy (Jameson, Harvey, Haraway, Butler,. . . ) to daily politics (Michael Harrington, Ralph Nader, Jesse Jackson,. . . ) to. . . . For all, capitalism is here to stay and the best that can be done is to make its cruelties more tolerable, more humane. This humanization (not eradication) of capitalism is the sole goal of ALL contemporary lefts (marxism, feminism, anti-racism, queeries, . . . ).

Such an understanding of social inequality is based on the fundamental understanding that the source of wealth is human knowledge and not human labor. That is, wealth is produced by the human mind and is thus free from the actual objective conditions that shape the historical relations of labor and capital. Only Orthodox Marxism recognizes the historicity of labor and its primacy as the source of all human wealth. In this paper I argue that any emancipatory theory has to be founded on recognition of the priority of Marx's labor theory of value and not repeat the technological determinism of corporate theory ("knowledge work") that masquerades as social theory.

### Off

#### World unity is impossible, the concept of humanity is a tool used to justify wars and deny humanness to the enemy

Schmitt 96. Carl, legal and political theorist, “The Concept of the Political”, p. 53-54

The political entity presupposes the real existence of an enemy and therefore coexistence with another political entity. As long as a state exists, there will thus always be in the world more than just one state. A world state which embraces the entire globe and all of humanity cannot exist. The political world is a pluriverse, not a universe. In this sense every theory of state is pluralistic, even though in a different way from the domestic theory of pluralism discussed in Section 4. The political entity cannot by its very nature be universal in the sense of embracing all of humanity and the entire world. If the different states, religions, classes, and other human groupings on earth should be so unified that a conflict among them is impossible and even inconceivable and if civil war should forever be foreclosed in a realm which embraces the globe, then the distinction of friend and enemy would also cease. What remains is neither politics nor state, but culture, civilization, eco- nomics, morality, law, art, entertainment, etc. If and when this condition will appear, I do not know. At the moment, this is not the case. And it is self-deluding to believe that the termination of a modern war would lead to world peace—thus setting forth the idyllic goal of complete and final depoliticalization—simply because a war between the great powers today may easily turn into a world war. Humanity as such cannot wage war because it has no enemy, at least not on this planet. The concept of humanity excludes the concept of the enemy, because the enemy does not cease to be a human being—and hence there is no specific differentiation in that concept. That wars are waged in the name of humanity is not a contradiction of this simple truth; quite the contrary, it has an especially intensive political meaning. When a state fights its polit- ical enemy in the name of humanity, it is not a war for the sake of humanity, but a war wherein a particular state seeks to usurp a universal concept against its military opponent. At the expense of its opponent, it tries to identify itself with humanity in the same way as one can misuse peace, justice, progress, and civilization in order to claim these as one's own and to deny the same to the enemy.

#### The aff’s dissolution of sovereignty brings an end to the friend/enemy distinction. This enables total and unlimited warfare waged in the absence of the political.

Moreiras 04 (Alberto, Anne and Robert Bass Professor of Romance Studies and Literature, and Director of the Center for European Studies at Duke University, “A God Without Sovereignty. Political Jouissance. The Passive Decision”, CR: The New Centennial Review 4.3 (2004) 71-108, pMUSE)

Schmitt's position in The Nomos of the Earth seems to contradict his earlier position on the political successfully: the notion of a nomos of the earth, of an order of the political, accomplishes, perhaps against Schmitt's own will, a deconstruction of his notion of the political. Or perhaps, on the contrary, we are faced with the fact that Schmitt's own indications of the Kantian position deconstruct the notion of an order of the political beyond every concrete friend-enemy grouping and send us back to the absolute primacy of the friend/enemy division in terms of a determination of the political. Do we prefer to uphold the notion of a nomic order, or do we prefer to abide by a savage, anomic notion of the political? Is there a choice?4 [End Page 82] If all enemies are unjust enemies, all enemies must be exterminated. There is no end and no limitation to war: war is total, and that is so both for the friends of the nomos, and for their unjust enemies. But total war cannot be a fundamental orientation and a principle of order. The notion of total war announces the end of any possible reign of nomic order. It also announces a radicalization of the political, precisely as it opens itself to its most extreme determination as war, now total. But a total war without a nomos is a totally unregulated, totally nondiscriminatory war, without legality. And a war under those conditions cannot abide by a concept of friendship, since it has generalized the friend/enemy division into their complete disruption. Friendship presupposes legality. Faced with total war, humanity finds itself deprived of amity, just as it finds itself deprived of enmity. At the logical end of the concept, the political division finds its own end. Total war is the end of the political. The whole notion of an order of the political has now been placed beyond the line. Total war is an absolute threat. Derrida says that all Western or American efforts to identify "terrorist" states or rogue states are "rationalizations destined to deny more than the absolute anxiety, the panic, or the terror before the fact that the absolute threat no longer comes or rests upon the control of some state, of whatever stately form. It was necessary to dissemble, by means of this identificatory projection, it was necessary above all to dissemble from oneself the fact that nuclear power or weapons of mass destruction are virtually produced and accessible in places that no longer depend upon any state. Not even a rogue state" (Derrida 2003, 150). The interstate order of the political is no longer the primary determination of the political state of affairs. Derrida is careful to note that the present situation brings to "a limit and an end" (150) the concept of rogue states, which is in itself essentially connected to the interstate order of political modernity, to the political order of stately sovereignty, or even of interstate democracy (since "international law . . . pretends to be fundamentally democratic" [137]). But "sovereignty and democracy are at the same time, and also in turn, indissociable and contradictory with each other" (143). Democracy requires force—a democratic order of the political must posit itself as a sovereign order, not subordinate [End Page 83] to any other order. "If the constitution of this force," however, "is effectively, in principle, destined to represent and protect [a] global democracy, it in fact betrays and threatens it" (143)—for the simple reason that "the abuse of power is constitutive of sovereignty itself" (145). On the one hand, then, it is not possible to give sovereignty a democratic sense: "to confer sense on sovereignty, to justify it, to find a reason for it, is already to curtail its exceptionality concerning decision, to subject it to rules, to right, to a general law, to a concept. It is therefore to divide it, to submit it to partition, to participation, to a parceling out" (Derrida 2003, 144). But, on the other hand, it is not impossible to give sovereignty a democratic sense either, because the conferring of sense goes on and on, it never ceases, once sovereignty is discussed, mentioned, included in language, and therefore shared. Thus, "pure sovereignty does not exist, it is always positing itself by belying itself, denying itself or disavowing itself, in a process of self-immunization, betraying itself upon betraying a democracy that, nevertheless, cannot exist without it" (144). This aporetic structure of sovereignty at the same time determines for our time the rhetoric of the rogue state and brings it to an end. Every sovereign state abuses its power and is therefore a rogue state. Derrida considers it too easy, even if legitimate, to conclude therefore that "there where all states are rogue states, . . . there are no longer rogues" (2003, 146). He proposes a stronger hypothesis, namely, that the end of the Cold War balance between the two superpowers effectively destroyed the interstate system in favor of nominal American sovereignty. It was then a matter of time: "With the two towers of the World Trade Center the whole (logical, semantical, rhetorical, juridical, and political) apparatus that made the ultimately reassuring denunciation of rogue states useful and significant visibly collapsed" (147) The attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon was a consequence of the dissolution of the interstate system of impossibly shared sovereignty, a consequence of the impossible primacy of American sovereignty, an index of the dissolution of containment, of the limit and the end of a long-standing order of the political. If there was a trauma, then, it was not primarily the trauma, the wound of what came to pass, and passed; it was rather "the undeniable apprehension of a worse threat to come" (148): [End Page 84] the apprehension of the absolute threat. The panic or the terror of the threat beyond the state order is the closure of the order of the political—of an order of the political. To that order, another one could succeed, uncertainly. Could it be the order of a nonsovereign principle of salvation, the order of the nonsovereign god, what Derrida calls the "democracy-to-come"? Nothing is less certain. Will it take . . . a partisan? A new figure of political militancy? Is partisanship what is required for the sake of the construction of a nonsovereign order of the political, if it were to come? Derrida, as I quoted, says that we are not at the moment of a partisan war—at the same time referring to Schmitt's understanding of the notion as "interesting." What does that mean?

#### The alternative is to affirm exceptional decisionism as a necessary condition of the political

Rasch 00¶ (William, Professor and Chair of Germanic Studies at Indiana University, “Conflict as a Vocation: Carl Schmitt and the Possibility of Politics”, Theory, Culture & Society Vol. 17(6): 1-32)

To rescue the political, Schmitt reaches back to an older, a Hobbesian version of the state, in which the state ensures a structure that allows for the possibility of politics. The `achievement of the state', he writes in 1930, con- sists of its ability to `determine the concrete situation in which moral and legal norms can be valid'. Since norms are neither divinely revealed nor rationally reconstructed (as Rickert would like us to believe), they must be determined by their situatedness. `Every norm presupposes a normal situation', Schmitt writes, deliberately emphasizing, by word-play, the conven- tionalism involved (1988a: 155).2 Thus, states neither arise nor are legitimized by way of a logical deduction from universal norms; rather, norms presuppose the legitimacy of states. One can then say that the articulation of a concrete norm is not the result of a derivation, but the effect of a per- formative. Declarations such as `We, the people' do not describe, they con- stitute the `we' and the `people' in their very utterance. They may presuppose such an entity — `people' — and they may presuppose that the utterer is a duly qualified representative of that entity, a legitimate enunciator of the `we', but that which is presupposed only actually comes into being in the act of articulating the declaration. What is needed for such an emergence is a `sovereign' space (logical or physical) within which the language can be heard. It is the situation, the condition, the `state', which structures this enabling space. `No norm is valid in emptiness' (`Keine Norm gilt im Leeren') (1988a: 155). Sovereignty is the name Schmitt gives to this condition and this space. His famous definition reads: `Sovereign is he who decides on the exception' (1985b: 5). But before we can begin to explore what this might mean, we need to examine the description he rejects. The classical definition, trace- able back to Jean Bodin and always repeated, has a more rational, a more logical ring: `Sovereignty is the highest, legally independent, underived power' (1985b: 17). Schmitt, however, finds this definition useless, unreal. `It utilizes', he says: ... the superlative, `the highest power', to characterize a true quantity, even though from the standpoint of reality, which is governed by the law of causal- ity, no single factor can be picked out and accorded such a superlative. In political reality there is no irresistible highest or greatest power that operates according to the certainty of natural law. (1985b: 17) Schmitt's dismissal of the traditional definition is not casual and not merely strategic. It rehearses, in nuce, a long-standing critique of Western rationalism that Schmitt uses to undermine the self-understanding of the liberal rule of law. Central to this critique is the recognition of the para- doxical limits of the law of causality. The law states that for every effect there must be a cause, for every Y there must be an X — and this chain of reasons for reasons necessarily goes on to infinity. Within the immanent chain of cause and effect there can be no originary cause. If we imagine the law of causality as an infinite series in which every cause of an effect is itself an effect of a prior cause, then there would be no ultimate, no sufficient reason, no point or origin that could serve as explanatory ground, no reason for things that itself has no reason. Leibniz saw this clearly and thus suggested a meta- level solution. `We cannot find in any of the individual things, or even in the entire collection and series of things, a sufficient reason for why they exist', he writes, because no matter how `far back we might go into previous states, we will never find in those states a complete explanation [ratio] for why, indeed, there is any world at all, and why it is the way it is' (Leibniz, 1989: 149). Consequently, Leibniz is necessarily led to conclude that: Therefore, the reasons for the world lie hidden in something extramundane, different from the chain of states, or from the series of things, the collection of which constitutes the world. And so we must pass from the physical or hypo- thetical necessity, which determines the later things in the world from the earlier, to something which is of absolute or metaphysical necessity, some- thing for which a reason cannot be given. (1989: 150)

### Case

#### Their fear of “violence and aggression” straight turns the aff

Loy, 3

(David Robert Loy is a professor, writer, and Zen teacher in the Sanbo Kyodan tradition of Japanese Zen Buddhism. “The Great Awakening” pg. 19-20) Henge

“Suffering,” the usual English translation for dukkha, is not very enlightening, especially today, when those of us who live in wealthy countries have many ways to entertain and distract ourselves. The point of the Buddhist term is that we nonetheless experience a basic dissatisfaction, a dis-ease, which continues to fester. That there is something inherently frustrating about our lives is not accidental or coincidental. It is the nature of an unawakened mind to be bothered about something. At the core of our being we feel a free-ﬂoating anxiety, which has no particular object but can plug into any problematic situation. We may try to evade this anxiety by dulling ourselves with alcohol, tobacco or other drugs, television, consumerism, sex, and so forth, or we may become preoccupied with various goals we pursue, but the anxiety is always there; and when we slow down enough to become sensitive to what is occurring in our minds, we become aware of it—which is one reason we do not like to slow down. This implies that everything we normally understand as suffering is only a subset—for some of us a relatively small subset—of dukkha. The Pali sutras distinguish dukkha into three different types.10 The ﬁrst, dukkha-dukkhata, includes everything that we usually think of as suffering: all physical, emotional, and mental pain or discomfort, including being separated from people we like to be with, and being stuck with those we do not. This also includes the types of social dukkha mentioned above. A second and different type is viparinama-dukkhata, the dukkha that arises from impermanence, from knowing that nothing lasts forever and most things do not last long. Even when we are thoroughly enjoying ourselves, we know the moment will not last, and there is something frustrating about that awareness. However delicious that ice cream may taste, we know the last bite is coming soon—and even if we buy another cone, it does not taste as good because we begin to feel sated. The most problematic dukkha of this type is, of course, death: not the physical pain of dying (that is included in the ﬁrst type of dukkha) but the awareness that I will die. This awareness of our inevitable end often pervades and colors everything we do—so thoroughly that it poisons life. Insofar as I am afraid to die, I also become unable to live. To live fully is not possible when we are hypersensitive to the fact that danger and maybe death lurk around every corner, because any little accident could be our last.

#### The aff’s imposition of universalized Buddhist theory also turns the case

Loy, 3

(David Robert Loy is a professor, writer, and Zen teacher in the Sanbo Kyodan tradition of Japanese Zen Buddhism. “The Great Awakening” pg. 16) Henge

Unlike some other more aggressive religions, Buddhism has been so successful as a missionary religion because of its adaptability, a ﬂexibility consistent with its own emphasis on impermanence and emptiness (the “selﬂessness” of everything). In China, for example, a natural aﬃnity between Mahayana and Taoism led to the development of Chan/Zen. In Tibet interaction with the native Bon religion led to a distinctive form of tantric Vajrayana Buddhism. So what is Buddhism adapting to today, as it inﬁltrates the West? Although Buddhist-Christian dialogue has been a fruitful site of interreligious conversation, a more important point of entry seems to be Western psychology, especially psychotherapy. There is, however, another signiﬁcant way in which the West has been interacting with Buddhism, not only assimilating it but inﬂuencing it. Historically, the Abrahamic religions—Judaism, Christianity, Islam—have had a strong prophetic dimension concerned to promote social justice, an issue that has not been crucial in the development of Buddhism. Asian Buddhism has focused on individual liberation by transforming the greed, ill will, and delusion in our own minds. The Abrahamic focus on social justice has inﬂuenced the history of the West by encouraging a liberation that challenges and reforms oppressive social structures. Does this shared concern for liberation suggest aﬃnity between the two traditions? One fruit of this common focus is socially engaged Buddhism, which has become an important practice for a growing number of Buddhists, in Asia as well as in the West. What is speciﬁcally Buddhist about socially engaged Buddhism? Insofar as Buddhism traditionally focuses on alleviating dukkha rather than speculating on its metaphysical origins, it tends to adopt a pragmatic, hands-on approach that does not worry much about social issues. Nevertheless, the question remains important for helping to determine whether Buddhist social engagement may have something unique to contribute to the concern for compassionate action emphasized by all religions (in theory, at least). One answer is that the Buddhist emphasis on nonduality between ourselves and the world encourages identiﬁcation with “others”: hence com-passion, suffering with, because we are not separate from them. Is that what makes Buddhist social engagement Buddhist?

#### Consequences are key

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As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness. WHAT WOULD IT mean for the American left right now to take seriously the centrality of means in politics? First, it would mean taking seriously the specific means employed by the September 11 attackers--terrorism. There is a tendency in some quarters of the left to assimilate the death and destruction of September 11 to more ordinary (and still deplorable) injustices of the world system--the starvation of children in Africa, or the repression of peasants in Mexico, or the continued occupation of the West Bank and Gaza by Israel. But this assimilation is only possible by ignoring the specific modalities of September 11. It is true that in Mexico, Palestine, and elsewhere, too many innocent people suffer, and that is wrong. It may even be true that the experience of suffering is equally terrible in each case. But neither the Mexican nor the Israeli government has ever hijacked civilian airliners and deliberately flown them into crowded office buildings in the middle of cities where innocent civilians work and live, with the intention of killing thousands of people. Al-Qaeda did precisely this. That does not make the other injustices unimportant. It simply makes them different. It makes the September 11 hijackings distinctive, in their defining and malevolent purpose--to kill people and to create terror and havoc. This was not an ordinary injustice. It was an extraordinary injustice. The premise of terrorism is the sheer superfluousness of human life. This premise is inconsistent with civilized living anywhere. It threatens people of every race and class, every ethnicity and religion. Because it threatens everyone, and threatens values central to any decent conception of a good society, it must be fought. And it must be fought in a way commensurate with its malevolence. Ordinary injustice can be remedied. Terrorism can only be stopped. Second, it would mean frankly acknowledging something well understood, often too eagerly embraced, by the twentieth century Marxist left--that it is often politically necessary to employ morally troubling means in the name of morally valid ends. A just or even a better society can only be realized in and through political practice; in our complex and bloody world, it will sometimes be necessary to respond to barbarous tyrants or criminals, with whom moral suasion won't work. In such situations our choice is not between the wrong that confronts us and our ideal vision of a world beyond wrong. It is between the wrong that confronts us and the means--perhaps the dangerous means--we have to employ in order to oppose it. In such situations there is a danger that "realism" can become a rationale for the Machiavellian worship of power. But equally great is the danger of a righteousness that translates, in effect, into a refusal to act in the face of wrong. What is one to do? Proceed with caution. Avoid casting oneself as the incarnation of pure goodness locked in a Manichean struggle with evil. Be wary of violence. Look for alternative means when they are available, and support the development of such means when they are not. And never sacrifice democratic freedoms and open debate. Above all, ask the hard questions about the situation at hand, the means available, and the likely effectiveness of different strategies. Most striking about the campus left's response to September 11 was its refusal to ask these questions. Its appeals to "international law" were naive. It exaggerated the likely negative consequences of a military response, but failed to consider the consequences of failing to act decisively against terrorism. In the best of all imaginable worlds, it might be possible to defeat al-Qaeda without using force and without dealing with corrupt regimes and political forces like the Northern Alliance. But in this world it is not possible. And this, alas, is the only world that exists. To be politically responsible is to engage this world and to consider the choices that it presents. To refuse to do this is to evade responsibility. Such a stance may indicate a sincere refusal of unsavory choices. But it should never be mistaken for a serious political commitment.

#### The idea of unifying identities is rooted in violence and prevents effective solutions

Devadas and Mummery, 7

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1. The idea of community and identity formation has had a vexed history within critical theory. It has come under critique from various fronts: traditional Marxists are critical of its focus on culture not economics; postcolonial studies is critical of its appeal to a romanticized view of community; and it has been criticized, specifically by the poststructuralists, because of the essentialism and politics of othering that takes place in the affirmation of community and identity. These criticisms or interventions are highly instructive as they call on us to rethink the terms of community by asking for a re-consideration of the ways in which notion of community is conceived, how it is constituted, and what are the implications of constituting the discourse of community in specific ways? What does it mean to say, as Agamben (1993: 1) puts it, "to a concept, for example: being red, being French, being Muslim"? What does it mean to say to a concept like community? 2. To articulate such an idea, in terms of the various interventions, begins by first rejecting or challenging conceptions of community that reproduce a collectivity that is built upon, engenders and fosters a sense of closure, continuity, unity and universalism. In other words, we must reject the kinds of assumptions that prevail in the work of Benedict Anderson's (1983) Imagined Communities (as well as those that unproblematically draw upon Anderson's conception of community) precisely because this contribution is premised upon the notion of community as collectivity that is unified, continuous and enclosed. As Anderson says clearly, the community that he imagines, within the auspices of the idea of nation, "regardless of the actual inequalities and exploitation that may prevail ... is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship" (1983: 16). In other words, the idea of community that is manifested here not only enacts a closure of potential and possible forms of collectivization, but more crucially proposes that such an idea of community breaks down the complex relations and networks of power that constitute the notion of community. In a certain sense, one could perhaps argue that Anderson's idea of community is highly egalitarian, especially if we take this up through the Subaltern Studies route and its commitment to producing a politics of "horizontal affiliations" (Chakrabarty, 2000: 16). But such an attempt to rescue Anderson cannot be sustained. For Subaltern Studies, the reorganization of community through horizontal affiliations opens up an alternative form of affiliation that disrupts established and nationally sanctioned means of conceiving community. In short, the idea of horizontal affiliation as a means of community formation opens up other potential and possible forms of association: this is an opening up of the idea of community. For Anderson however, it is not the same thing because he sees horizontal affiliation as a way of producing a community whose fraternity is premised upon a shared and undifferentiated sense of belonging to the nation: this is a closing down operation that seeks to silence differences, inconsistencies and contradictions within the idea of community. Anderson is not alone in this: Charles Taylor and Michael Walzer for instance in Sources of the Self and Interpretation and Social Criticism respectively, in seeking to appeal to shared understanding as the foundation for values idealise modern society as a harmonious, non-conflictual community. 3. The idea of community that Anderson (and Taylor and Walzer) conceptualise is built on closure or closing down multiple forms of affiliations. In other words, it is premised upon a foundational violence (Derrida, 1992). And here the foundational violence of the collective, unified community erases differences, contradictions, and forms of being and belonging that do not necessarily align with the constitution of the idea of community. Against this idea of community, we wish to recuperate the potential of community informed by the poststructuralist tradition. While there are various scholars in this tradition who have intervened in the notion of community (Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard, and so on) we will keep to two - Jean-Luc Nancy and Giorgio Agamben - to reclaim the idea of community in these terms: as "community without unity" (Nancy, 1991), a "coming community" (Agamben, 1993). This rethinking of community not only marks a turn in the way we might conceive of the constitution of the idea of community, but also a shift in the way in which we might mobilise community as a means of rethinking the terms of solidarity.

#### And, the separation of God from the polis has led to a time of failed conditions. The need for God has been replaced by supposedly enlightened self-legislation. Blind to the immanence of their world, secularists practice a form of self-mutilation by denying that which is present alongside them. The refusal of a future beyond our immanent social order is a violent denial that takes being-towards-death as the only authentic future we may have.

Blond in 1998

(Phillip, Senior Lecturer in Christian theology at the University of Cumbria, Post-Secular Philosophy: Between Philosophy and Theology, p. 1-3)

We live in a time of failed conditions. Everywhere people who have no faith in any possibility, either for themselves, each other, or for the world, mouth locutions they do not understand. With words such as ‘politics’, they attempt to formalize the unformalisable and found secular cities upon it. They attempt to live in the in-between and celebrate ambiguity as the new social horizon, always however bringing diversity into accord with their own projections. Always and everywhere, these late moderns make competing claims about the a priori, for they must be seen to disagree. Indeed such thinkers feel so strongly about the ethical nature of their doubt that they argue with vehemence about overcoming metaphysics, about language and the dangers of presence. Since God is committed to presence, they assume that theology is no longer an option sustainable by serious minds. These secular scholars accept without question the philosophical necessity of their position (they are happy autonomous creators these atheists), even though with a certain magnanimity of gesture they might concede in an informal discussion that God could perhaps exist in some possible world, but they tell us in all likelihood it is not this one. To an external observer such gestures might suggest that these minds are grasping for enemies in a world that they are no longer sure of. But of course such external positions are now no longer considered possible. Blind to the immanence of such a world, unable to disengage themselves from whatever transcendental schema they wish to endorse, these secular minds are only now beginning to perceive that all is not as it should be, that what was promised to them – self-liberation through the limitation of the world to human faculties – might after all be a form of self-mutilation.¶ Indeed, ever since Kant dismissed God from human cognition and relegated access to Him to the sphere of practical ethics and moral motivation, human beings have been very pragmatic indeed. They have found value in self-legislation and see no reason for God. For after all, they now maintain, there can be no moral realism, the good cannot possess any actuality outside the conditional and conditioning nature of the human mind. Nor apparently, according to these late moderns, can a transcendent value escape any of the contemporary surrogates – language, pragmatics, power – which transcendental thinking has engendered in order to preserve itself. These proxies, which are viewed as the ruling a prioris of the day, supposedly determine or foreclose upon any other possibility. No, their advocates say, ‘your values are ancillary to this, in respect of this discernment everything else is subordinate, this is the prior discourse that secures our descriptions, and we, we who ascertained this, we are the authors and judges of this world and there is no other’. Perhaps unsurprisingly this state of affairs is viewed as a cause of much joy and self-affirmation.¶ And what a world it is that is so blithely affirmed. Every day in the contemporary polis new beings are unearthed, new subjectivities are claimed as excluded with fresh litigations being initiated on their behalf for mutual and communal benefit. The pious speak righteously to each other about the Other, about how they are keeping faith with the world, about the need to be vigilant against the illegitimacy of hierarchies. For we are told there can be no discrimination in this secular city. In this polis the lowest has become the highest, and equality names itself as the only value that cannot be devalued. ¶ However, without true value, without a distinction between the better and the worse, of course the most equal and the most common will hold sway. Of course the lowest common denominator will be held up to be the foundation of human civil life. What yardstick then for such a society, what measure do the public who must measure themselves require? If they themselves now realize, as some do, that human beings cannot (and indeed must not), provide their own calibration, where do they look?¶ Not surprisingly, most still attempt a modern solution; either they seek the pale of immanence or they accept the necessity of a transcendental methodology. The latter turn away from the world as if it were too fearful a thing to confront, and seek safety in allying the formal conditions of thought with those of behavior; whereas the former, too convinced by the hopelessness of their position, deduce themselves to be avid powerless creatures, and as beings who desire nothing but the affect of their own potency they throw themselves into the void, embracing the anonymity therein as if it were a true destiny and a real proof of their ultimate autonomy. ¶ Those who seek to refrain from such extremes of philosophical candour do so by turning away and celebrating and debating their own immanent social order. They will deny that the preceding positions mark the outermost boundaries of their own possibilities. They will speak of thinking beyond these binaries, and not consider the possibility that these oppositions might merely think them. In consequence, though these creatures of perspicacity and unconcealment speak almost endlessly about difficulty, inherent paradox and suddenly discovered aporia, they cannot bring themselves to acknowledge the conditions that gave rise to their world. Oscillating without resolution of recognition between transcendental hope and immanentist conjecture, they lack a perception of their position. Holding the middle of a lie, they feel profoundly comfortable with themselves and even more so with their enemies. ¶ Always and everyday those trapped in such worlds practice the violence of denial. They deny that any world or order might precede them; through turning away from the transcendent they violate that which is present alongside and before them, and with the intoxicating compulsion of ressentiment, they complete it all with the refusal of a future, taking being-towards-death (*Sein zum Tode*) as the definitive mark of the only subjectivity to come. Death, they say, is the only future that both you and I can authentically have as individuals. As they sadly ponder the reality of their own deaths (no doubt by casting themselves into the role of the tragic), these thinkers return almost unthinkingly to the positivism that has authored their whole lives: ‘After all beyond one’s life how could one know anything else?’ Or they might say, with a smile accompanied by a slight incline of the neck, ‘no other possibility has ever made itself known to me’. Happy in their respective oppositions, they will indeed be, until their deaths, unaware of that which they never sought to address.

#### The aff’s theory is purely pragmatic and short-circuits transcendent ethics

Loy, 3

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To say it again, perhaps the main reason for Buddhism’s successful diversity in Asia has been its pragmatism. Buddhism is not primarily a philosophy, nor even (by some criteria) a religion. It is a path we follow to end our dukkha. The most important thing, therefore, is to present the teachings in a form that encourages people to follow that path and enables them to do so. Crossculturally we ﬁnd a certain consistency to human dukkha but great variation in the ways different Buddhist cultures have symbolized it and institutionalized the path for ending it. This practical approach to addressing dukkha may be traced back to Shakyamuni himself. Soon after establishing the sangha (community of monks), he declined to formalize his teachings into any official language(e.g., Sanskrit). Instead, he sent out his disciples in different directions, to teach the Dharma in whatever language was suitable. This pragmatism applies to the Buddhist teachings themselves. Many sutras in the Pali canon attest to Shakyamuni’s lack of interest in metaphysical speculation. Some questions—Does a Buddha exist after death? Is the universe eternal or inﬁnite?—he declined to answer, declaring that he had only one thing to teach: dukkha and how to end it. Today such an anti-metaphysical attitude toward theory has become quite postmodern. The failure of the structuralist approach in the human sciences has led to another conception of what theory is and what it can do, an approach David Scott has summarized as follows: By “theory” (at least what I have been able to make of it) is meant that diverse combination of textual or interpretive (or “reading”) strategies— among them, deconstruction, feminism, genealogy, psychoanalysis, postmarxism—that, from about the early 1970s or so had initiated a challenge to the protocols of a general hermeneutics.... Theory, in this sense, offered itself as de-disciplinary, as in fact antidisciplinary, the virtual undoer of disciplinary self-identities. It oﬀered itself as a mobile and nomadic ﬁeld of critical operations without a proper name, and therefore without a distinctivedomain of objects. Indeed what theory went after was precisely the assumption (common to the disciplines and their rage for “method”) of the authentic self-authoring presence of things, of histories, of cultures, of selves, the assumption of stable essences, in short, that could be made to speak themselves once and for all through the transparency of an unequivocal and analytical language. On theory’s account there could be no ﬁnal description, no end to re-description, no ultimate perspective which could terminate once and for all the possibility of another word on the matter. 13

#### Only transcendence gives meaning to our inevitable deaths—their nihilistic rejection of divinity wrecks life’s only value

Cunningham in 2002

(Conor, Professor of Theology @ Cambridge, “Genealogy of Nihilism”, pp. 174-175)

What we may begin to realize is that the form of nihilism’s discourse is complicit with a certain ‘holocaust’. It will speak a ‘holocaust’. But how can one speak a holocaust? We do so if when we speak, something (or someone) disappears, or if out speech is predicated only on the back of such an erasure. We have to think of those who are ‘too many to have disappeared’. They must have been made to disappear; we may be able to discern three noticeable moments in modern discourse which encourage the speaking of a ‘holocaust’. The first moment is when the systemic description effects a disappearance. This is accomplished by placing what is described outside the divine mind, rendering it ontologically neutral – a given rather than a gift. The notion of a given allows for the invention of such neutrality. That which ‘is’ becomes structurally amenable to experimentation, dissection, indefinite epistemic investigation. For the first time there is something which can render the idea of detached, de-eroticised, study intelligible. There is now an object which is itself neutral, the structural prerequisite for ‘objectivity’. This ‘holocaust’ is the a priori of modern knowledge. The second moment comes when modern discourse describes the initial disappearance, the first moment. Consequently, the first moment, the event of disappearance, disappears. Modernity will ask us ‘what can it mean to disappear’? Any ‘hole’ is filled up, every trace erased. More obviously, but with greater caution and difficulty, we see modern discourse describe the disappearance of a ‘number-too-great’ to disappear; in terms that are completely neutral. It is unable to describe this dia-bolic (meaning to take apart) event in a way that is different from its description of the aforementioned leaf. The loss of countless lives can only be described in neutral terms, however emotionally. But discourse is predicated on a nothing to which every entity is reduced. (For example, a human is reduced to itse genes, while consciousness is reduced to chemicals, atoms, and so on.) Our knowledge of a ‘holocaust’ causes that ‘holocaust’ to disappear (like leaves from a tree in a garden fire: kaustos). We see the disappearance of a ‘holocaust’ as it is erased by its passage through the corridors of modern description: sociology, psychology, biology, chemistry, physics, and so on. All these discourses speak its disappearance. ‘Holocaust’, ice-cream, there can be no difference except that of epistemic difference, which is but formal. Both must be reducible to nothing: the very possibility of modern discourse hangs on it. In this sense all ‘holocausts’ are modern. The structures, substructures, molecules and the molecular all carry away the ‘substance’ of every being and of the whole (holos) of being. The third moment comes upon the first two. We see modernity cause all that is described to disappear, then we see this disappearance disappear. In this way a loss of life, and a loss of death is witnessed. It is here that we see the last moment. If we think of a specific holocaust, is here that we see the last moment. If we think of a specific holocaust, the historical loss of six million Jews during the Second World War, we see that the National Socialist description of the Jews took away their lives and took away their deaths. For those who were killed were exterminated, liquidated, in the name of solutions. The Jews lose their lives because they have already lost their deaths. For it is this loss of death that allows the Nazis to ‘remove’ the Jews. That is to say, if the Jews lose their deaths then the Nazis, by taking their lives, do not murder. This knowledge, that is National Socialism, will, in taking away life, take away the possibility of losing that life (death becomes wholly naturalized). This must be the case so that there is no loss in terms of negation. In this way National Socialism emulates the ‘form’ of nihilistic discourse. There is nothing and not even that. There is an absence and an absence from absence. (This is the form Nietzsche’s joyous nihilism took.) So we will not have a lack which could allow the imputation of metaphysical significance: The mass and majesty of this world, all That carries weight and always weighs the same Lay in the hands of others; they were small And could not hope for help and no help came: What their foes liked to do was done, their shame Was all the worst could wish; they lost their pride And died as men before their bodies died. W.H. Auden, “The Shield of Achilles’ The life that is lost is always lost before its death. They who lose their life are already lost in terms of epistemic description. When their life is ‘physically’ lost it is unable to stop the disappearance of that life and the death of that life. So the living-dead are always unable to die; death is taken away from them before their life, in order that their life can be made to disappear without trace and without ‘loss’. Thus, the living are described in the same manner as the dead. Modern discourse cannot it seems, discriminate between them. In some sense, it takes a loss of life and a loss of death to engender ‘holocaust’. For it is this which forbids the registration of any significance – any significant difference between life and death. ‘Modern’ description has no ability to speak differently about lose lives, because before any physical even dissolution’ has already begun to occur (all that remains is for the bodies to be swept away). The preparation is carefully carried out so that a ‘nonoccurrence’ can occur.