### Off

#### Interpretation: the affirmative must answer the question: Is the enactment of topical action by the USFG better than the status quo or a competitive option?

1. Resolved requires a policy action

Louisiana House 2005, (3-8-5 http://house.louisiana.gov/house-glossary.htm

Resolution A legislative instrument that generally is used for making declarations, stating policies, and making decisions where some other form is not required. A bill includes the constitutionally required enacting clause; a resolution uses the term "resolved". Not subject to a time limit for introduction nor to governor's veto. ( Const. Art. III, §17(B) and House Rules 8.11 , 13.1 , 6.8 , and 7.4)

2. Should denotes an expectation of enacting a plan

American Heritage Dictionary – 2000 [www.dictionary.com]

Used to express probability or expectation

3. The USFG is the government in Washington D.C.

Encarta Microsoft Encarta Online Encyclopedia 2000 [http://encarta.msn.com]

“The federal government of the United States is centered in Washington DC.”

#### B. Violation – (insert specific violation)

#### C. Prefer our interpretation

#### 1. **The affirmatives action is out side the “game space of debate” which makes predictable research impossible and destroys dialogue in debate**

Hanghøj 2008 (Thorkild Hanghøj PhD, author affiliated with Danish Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials PLAYFUL KNOWLEDGE An Explorative Study of Educational Gaming <http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information_til/Studerende_ved_SDU/Din_uddannelse/phd_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf> ) MT

Debate games are often based on pre-designed scenarios that include descriptions of issues to be debated, educational goals, game goals, roles, rules, time frames etc. In this way, debate games differ from textbooks and everyday classroom instruction as debate scenarios allow teachers and students to actively imagine, interact and communicate within a domain-specific game space. However, instead of mystifying debate games as a “magic circle” (Huizinga, 1950), I will try to overcome the epistemological dichotomy between “gaming” and “teaching” that tends to dominate discussions of educational games. In short, educational gaming is a form of teaching. As mentioned, education and games represent two different semiotic domains that both embody the three faces of knowledge: assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Gee, 2003; Barth, 2002; cf. chapter 2). In order to understand the interplay between these different domains and their interrelated knowledge forms, I will draw attention to a central assumption in Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy. According to Bakhtin, all forms of communication and culture are subject to centripetal and centrifugal forces (Bakhtin, 1981). A centripetal force is the drive to impose one version of the truth, while a centrifugal force involves a range of possible truths and interpretations. This means that any form of expression involves a duality of centripetal and centrifugal forces: “Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear” (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). If we take teaching as an example, it is always affected by centripetal and centrifugal forces in the on-going negotiation of “truths” between teachers and students. In the words of Bakhtin: “Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984a: 110). Similarly, the dialogical space of debate games also embodies centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, the election scenario of The Power Game involves centripetal elements that are mainly determined by the rules and outcomes of the game, i.e. the election is based on a limited time frame and a fixed voting procedure. Similarly, the open-ended goals, roles and resources represent centrifugal elements and create virtually endless possibilities for researching, preparing, 1 presenting, debating and evaluating a variety of key political issues. Consequently, the actual process of enacting a game scenario involves a complex negotiation between these centrifugal/centripetal forces that are inextricably linked with the teachers and students’ game activities. In this way, the enactment of The Power Game is a form of teaching that combines different pedagogical practices (i.e. group work, web quests, student presentations) and learning resources (i.e. websites, handouts, spoken language) within the interpretive frame of the election scenario. Obviously, tensions may arise if there is too much divergence between educational goals and game goals. This means that game facilitation requires a balance between focusing too narrowly on the rules or “facts” of a game (centripetal orientation) and a focusing too broadly on the contingent possibilities and interpretations of the game scenario (centrifugal orientation). For Bakhtin, the duality of centripetal/centrifugal forces often manifests itself as a dynamic between “monological” and “dialogical” forms of discourse. Bakhtin illustrates this point with the monological discourse of the Socrates/Plato dialogues in which the teacher never learns anything new from the students, despite Socrates’ ideological claims to the contrary (Bakhtin, 1984a). Thus, discourse becomes monologised when “someone who knows and possesses the truth instructs someone who is ignorant of it and in error”, where “a thought is either affirmed or repudiated” by the authority of the teacher (Bakhtin, 1984a: 81). In contrast to this, dialogical pedagogy fosters inclusive learning environments that are able to expand upon students’ existing knowledge and collaborative construction of “truths” (Dysthe, 1996). At this point, I should clarify that Bakhtin’s term “dialogic” is both a descriptive term (all utterances are per definition dialogic as they address other utterances as parts of a chain of communication) and a normative term as dialogue is an ideal to be worked for against the forces of “monologism” (Lillis, 2003: 197-8). In this project, I am mainly interested in describing the dialogical space of debate games. At the same time, I agree with Wegerif that “one of the goals of education, perhaps the most important goal, should be dialogue as an end in itself” (Wegerif, 2006: 61).

#### **2. Debating over controversial issues is essential to learn about political thinking to understand how policies happen – the affirmatives truth statements destroy our ability to make decisions about right/wrong - leading to a subjective view of politics and we never change anything – turns the aff**

Steinberg and Freeley 2008  
(David L Steinberg is a professor of communication studies – University of Miami, and Austin J Freeley is a criminal, civil rights law, and personal injury attorney., Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pg.3-4 ) MT

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a fact or value or policy, there is no need for debate; the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate “Resolved: That two plus two equals four,” because there is simply no controversy about this statement. Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity to gain citizenship? Does illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? How are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification card, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this “debate” is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007. Someone disturbed by the problem of a growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, “Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms.” That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as “We ought to do something about this” or, worse, “It’s too complicated a problem to deal with.” Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as “What can be done to improve public education?”—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements “Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities” and “Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program” more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about “homelessness” or “abortion” or “crime” or “global warming” we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement “Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword” is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does “effectiveness” mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be, “Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Laurania of our support in a certain crisis?” The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as “Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treaty with Laurania.” Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### **3. Without traditional political simulations we become passive spectators in the political sphere - leading to alienation and the worst form of politics – switch side debate is key**

Joyner 1999 – Christopher C Jouner Professor of International Law in the Government Department at Georgetown University Spring, 1999 5 ILSA J Int'l & Comp L 377 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law

Use of the debate can be an effective pedagogical tool for education in the social sciences. Debates, like other role-playing simulations, help students understand different perspectives on a policy issue by adopting a perspective as their own. But, unlike other simulation games, debates do not require that a student participate directly in order to realize the benefit of the game. Instead of developing policy alternatives and experiencing the consequences of different choices in a traditional role-playing game, debates present the alternatives and consequences in a formal, rhetorical fashion before a judgmental audience. Having the class audience serve as jury helps each student develop a well-thought-out opinion on the issue by providing contrasting facts and views and enabling audience members to pose challenges to each debating team. These debates ask undergraduate students to examine the international legal implications of various United States foreign policy actions. Their chief tasks are to assess the aims of the policy in question, determine their relevance to United States national interests, ascertain what legal principles are involved, and conclude how the United States policy in question squares with relevant principles of international law. Debate questions are formulated as resolutions, along the lines of: "Resolved: The United States should deny most-favored-nation status to China on human rights grounds;" or "Resolved: The United States should resort to military force to ensure inspection of Iraq's possible nuclear, chemical and biological weapons facilities;" or "Resolved: The United States' invasion of Grenada in 1983 was a lawful use of force;" or "Resolved: The United States should kill Saddam Hussein." In addressing both sides of these legal propositions, the student debaters must consult the vast literature of international law, especially the nearly 100 professional law-school-sponsored international law journals now being published in the United States. This literature furnishes an incredibly rich body of legal analysis that often treats topics affecting United States foreign policy, as well as other more esoteric international legal subjects. Although most of these journals are accessible in good law schools, they are largely unknown to the political science community specializing in international relations, much less to the average undergraduate. By assessing the role of international law in United States foreign policy- making, students realize that United States actions do not always measure up to international legal expectations; that at times, international legal strictures get compromised for the sake of perceived national interests, and that concepts and principles of international law, like domestic law, can be interpreted and twisted in order to justify United States policy in various international circumstances. In this way, the debate format gives students the benefits ascribed to simulations and other action learning techniques, in that it makes them become actively engaged with their subjects, and not be mere passive consumers. Rather than spectators, students become legal advocates, observing, reacting to, and structuring political and legal perceptions to fit the merits of their case. The debate exercises carry several specific educational objectives. First, students on each team must work together to refine a cogent argument that compellingly asserts their legal position on a foreign policy issue confronting the United States. In this way, they gain greater insight into the real-world legal dilemmas faced by policy makers. Second, as they work with other members of their team, they realize the complexities of applying and implementing international law, and the difficulty of bridging the gaps between United States policy and international legal principles, either by reworking the former or creatively reinterpreting the latter. Finally, research for the debates forces students to become familiarized with contemporary issues on the United States foreign policy agenda and the role that international law plays in formulating and executing these policies. n8 The debate thus becomes an excellent vehicle for pushing students beyond stale arguments over principles into the real world of policy analysis, political critique, and legal defense.

### Off

#### First, their criticism of Obama fuels anti-state libertarian racism.

Carrington in 2009

(Ben, teaches sociology at the University of Texas at Austin, and is a Carnegie Visiting Research Fellow at Leeds Metropolitan University, “Fear of a black president: in the US a barely concealed racist backlash is helping to undermine fragile moves towards progress”, Soundings, 43, p. 114, rcheek)

It was often said during the election campaign that Obama's greatest skill was to allow people to project their hopes and desires onto him. He then reflected back and amplified progressive yearnings for a better today and a more just tomorrow. Obama's rhetorical move in his speeches would be to suggest that Change did not come with himself but with 'the people' themselves - 'you'- in the audience. Obama became the great interpellator. People left his rallies feeling empowered as historical agents of change. Yes we can.¶ But if this was the case then Obama has also become an amplifier for the fear that the Republicans produced during the campaign. Just as millions celebrated The Age of Obama as signaling the chance and possibility for a more socially progressive, economically egalitarian and internationally engaged America, so did almost equal numbers see his election as the end of America itself. That fear did not dissipate with Obama's inauguration. It had to go somewhere. And it has gone, in part, into producing record gun sales across the US, driven by the belief that Obama is coming to take away gun-owners' semi-automatic weapons, rifles and handguns. Ammunition at gun shows and gun stores has run out in many States. In the midst of a recession, the trade in guns has become one of America's most profitable industries.¶ Anti-Obama meetings have sprung up across America. These so-called 'town hall meetings' have been organised and funded, in large part, by a fragile coalition of anti-state libertarians and pro-market Republican groups, mixed with elements from the anti-immigrant far-right and the Christian conservatives. Their discourse is driven by a fervent belief that Obama is a fascist, Muslim and/or socialist/Marxist, who is destroying America and turning the country into a communist state through his taxation and spending policies. The Obama administration is variously accused of 'taking over' the banking sector, car industry and health care system, while over-taxing 'the people' to pay for unwanted government subsidies to big business and handouts to the undeserving poor. The charges against Obama floated by McCain, and particularly by Palin, during the election - that Obama was a socialist, a terrorist sympathiser and a threat to America itself - have morphed into a pro-gun, anti-abortion, libertarian racism that has fuelled the revival of the anti-government militia organisations that once thrived during Clinton's administration, and found their terrible expression in the bombings of Oklahoma City in 1995 and Atlanta the following year.¶ While American politics has, historically speaking, always included a sizeable proportion of disaffected citizens, driven by populist forms of racism and anti-government rhetoric that often includes accusations of 'treason' and worse, what is significant about the current conjuncture is the level of influence it has within the mainstream of the Republican Party, and the public legitimation it is receiving from elements of the mass media, particularly Talk Radio and the Fox News Network. Talk of Obama as a black supremacist who has desires to enslave and intern white people as part of a secret Jihadist/communist plot is no longer restricted to fringe groups on the internet; it is allowed airtime within mainstream media outlets, and sometimes is actively encouraged and promoted by media pundits themselves. The Fox News host Glenn Beck has gone on record as stating that he believes Obama has a deep-seated hatred of white people and white culture, while leading Republican politicians openly talk about the American people being in a state of 'rebellion'. Right-wing protesters have been turning up at rallies and town hall meetings carrying loaded guns. Others have brought pictures of Obama depicted as Hitler, or sometimes as an African witch doctor, and carry signs calling him a traitor.¶ By the end of the summer of 2009, as right-wing protests against Obama's health care reforms descended into a more generalized anti-government frenzy, mainstream political commentators were beginning to openly discuss what many in the black community had talked about from the day he announced his candidacy, namely the possibility of Obama's assignation. In September 2009, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, said during a news conference: 'I have concerns about some of the language that is being used because ... I saw this myself in the late '70s in San Francisco. This kind of rhetoric is ... really frightening and it created a climate in which ... violence took place and ... I wish that we would all, again, curb our enthusiasm in some of the statements that are made'. Following on from Pelosi's comments, New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman noted the parallels between contemporary American politics and the 'poisonous political environment' that existed in Israel in 1995 just before Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated: 'I have no problem with any of the substantive criticism of President Obama from the right or left. But something very dangerous is happening. Criticism from the far right has begun tipping over into delegitimation and creating the same kind of climate here that existed in Israel on the eve of the Rabin assassination'. (5) Many on the right responded by rejecting this analysis, and instead upping their rhetoric to charge that Obama was now stifling free speech, just as the fascists had done in the past.

#### And, for a country that once took whiteness as the foundation of citizenship, the election of a black president is a victory we should celebrate. Criticisms of Obama’s presidency are mired in white supremacy.

Coates in 2012

(Ta-Nehisi, senior editor at The Atlantic, “Fear of a Black President”, The Atlantic, September 2012, <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/09/fear-of-a-black-president/309064/>, rcheek)

The idea that blacks should hold no place of consequence in the American political future has affected every sector of American society, transforming whiteness itself into a monopoly on American possibilities. White people like Byrd and Buckley were raised in a time when, by law, they were assured of never having to compete with black people for the best of anything. Blacks used in­ferior public pools and inferior washrooms, attended inferior schools. The nicest restaurants turned them away. In large swaths of the country, blacks paid taxes but could neither attend the best universities nor exercise the right to vote. The best jobs, the richest neighborhoods, were giant set-asides for whites—universal affirmative action, with no pretense of restitution.¶ Slavery, Jim Crow, segregation: these bonded white people into a broad aristocracy united by the salient fact of unblackness. What Byrd saw in an integrated military was the crumbling of the ideal of whiteness, and thus the crumbling of an entire society built around it. Whatever the saintly nonviolent rhetoric used to herald it, racial integration was a brutal assault on whiteness. The American presidency, an unbroken streak of nonblack men, was, until 2008, the greatest symbol of that old order.¶ Watching Obama rack up victories in states like Virginia, New Mexico, Ohio, and North Carolina on Election Night in 2008, anyone could easily conclude that racism, as a national force, had been defeated. The thought should not be easily dismissed: Obama’s victory demonstrates the incredible distance this country has traveled. (Indeed, William F. Buckley Jr. later revised his early positions on race; Robert Byrd spent decades in Congress atoning for his.) That a country that once took whiteness as the foundation of citizenship would elect a black president is a victory. But to view this victory as racism’s defeat is to forget the precise terms on which it was secured, and to ignore the quaking ground beneath Obama’s feet.¶ During the 2008 primary, The New Yorker’s George Packer journeyed to Kentucky and was shocked by the brazen declarations of white identity. “I think he would put too many minorities in positions over the white race,” one voter told Packer. “That’s my opinion.” That voter was hardly alone. In 2010, Michael Tesler, a political scientist at Brown University, and David Sears, a professor of psychology and political science at UCLA, were able to assess the impact of race in the 2008 primary by comparing data from two 2008 campaign and election studies with previous surveys of racial resentment and voter choice. As they wrote in Obama’s Race: The 2008 Election and the Dream of a Post-Racial America:¶ No other factor, in fact, came close to dividing the Democratic primary electorate as powerfully as their feelings about African Americans. The impact of racial attitudes on individual vote decisions … was so strong that it appears to have even outstripped the substantive impact of racial attitudes on Jesse Jackson’s more racially charged campaign for the nomination in 1988.¶ Seth Stephens-Davidowitz, a doctoral candidate in economics at Harvard, is studying how racial animus may have cost Obama votes in 2008. First, Stephens-­Davidowitz ranked areas of the country according to how often people there typed racist search terms into Google. (The areas with the highest rates of racially charged search terms were West Virginia, western Pennsylvania, eastern Ohio, upstate New York, and southern Mississippi.) Then he compared Obama’s voting results in those areas with John Kerry’s four years earlier. So, for instance, in 2004 Kerry received 50 percent of the vote in the media markets of both Denver and Wheeling (which straddles the Ohio–West Virginia border). Based on the Democratic groundswell in 2008, Obama should have received about 57 percent of the popular vote in both regions. But that’s not what happened. In the Denver area, which had one of the nation’s lowest rates of racially charged Google searching, Obama received the predicted 57 percent. But in Wheeling, which had a high rate of racially charged Google searching, Obama’s share of the popular vote was only 48 percent. Of course, Obama also picked up some votes because he is black. But, aggregating his findings nationally, Stephens-Davidowitz has concluded that Obama lost between 3 and 5 percentage points of the popular vote to racism.¶ After Obama won, the longed-for post-­racial moment did not arrive; on the contrary, racism intensified. At rallies for the nascent Tea Party, people held signs saying things like Obama Plans White Slavery. Steve King, an Iowa congressman and Tea Party favorite, complained that Obama “favors the black person.” In 2009, Rush Limbaugh, bard of white decline, called Obama’s presidency a time when “the white kids now get beat up, with the black kids cheering ‘Yeah, right on, right on, right on.’ And of course everybody says the white kid deserved it—he was born a racist, he’s white.” On Fox & Friends, Glenn Beck asserted that Obama had exposed himself as a guy “who has a deep-seated hatred for white people or the white culture … This guy is, I believe, a racist.” Beck later said he was wrong to call Obama a racist. That same week he also called the president’s health-care plan “reparations.”¶ One possible retort to this pattern of racial paranoia is to cite the Clinton years, when an ideological fever drove the right wing to derangement, inspiring militia movements and accusations that the president had conspired to murder his own lawyer, Vince Foster. The upshot, by this logic, is that Obama is experiencing run-of-the-mill political opposition in which race is but a minor factor among much larger ones, such as party affiliation. But the argument assumes that party affiliation itself is unconnected to race. It pretends that only Toni Morrison took note of Clinton’s particular appeal to black voters. It forgets that Clinton felt compelled to attack Sister Souljah. It forgets that whatever ignoble labels the right wing pinned on Clinton’s health-care plan, “reparations” did not rank among them.¶ Michael Tesler, following up on his research with David Sears on the role of race in the 2008 campaign, recently published a study assessing the impact of race on opposition to and support for health-care reform. The findings are bracing. Obama’s election effectively racialized white Americans’ views, even of health-care policy. As Tesler writes in a paper published in July in The American Journal of Political Science, “Racial attitudes had a significantly greater impact on health care opinions when framed as part of President Obama’s plan than they had when the exact same policies were attributed to President Clinton’s 1993 health care initiative.”¶ While Beck and Limbaugh have chosen direct racial assault, others choose simply to deny that a black president actually exists. One in four Americans (and more than half of all Republicans) believe Obama was not born in this country, and thus is an illegitimate president. More than a dozen state legislatures have introduced “birther bills” demanding proof of Obama’s citizenship as a condition for putting him on the 2012 ballot. Eighteen percent of Republicans believe Obama to be a Muslim. The goal of all this is to delegitimize Obama’s presidency. If Obama is not truly American, then America has still never had a black president.¶ White resentment has not cooled as the Obama presidency has proceeded. Indeed, the GOP presidential-primary race featured candidates asserting that the black family was better off under slavery (Michele Bachmann, Rick Santorum); claiming that Obama, as a black man, should oppose abortion (Santorum again); or denouncing Obama as a “food-stamp president” (Newt Ging­rich).¶ The resentment is not confined to Republicans. Earlier this year, West Virginia gave 41 percent of the popular vote during the Democratic primary to Keith Judd, a white incarcerated felon (Judd actually defeated Obama in 10 counties). Joe Manchin, one of West Virginia’s senators, and Earl Ray Tomblin, its governor, are declining to attend this year’s Democratic convention, and will not commit to voting for Obama.¶ It is often claimed that Obama’s unpopularity in coal-­dependent West Virginia stems from his environmental policies. But recall that no state ranked higher on Seth Stephens-­Davidowitz’s racism scale than West Virginia. Moreover, Obama was unpopular in West Virginia before he became president: even at the tail end of the Democratic primaries in 2008, Hillary Clinton walloped Obama by 41 points. A fifth of West Virginia Democrats openly professed that race played a role in their vote.¶ What we are now witnessing is not some new and complicated expression of white racism—rather, it’s the dying embers of the same old racism that once rendered the best pickings of America the exclusive province of unblackness. Confronted by the thoroughly racialized backlash to Obama’s presidency, a stranger to American politics might conclude that Obama provoked the response by relentlessly pushing an agenda of radical racial reform. Hardly. Daniel Gillion, a political scientist at the University of Pennsylvania who studies race and politics, examined the Public Papers of the Presidents, a compilation of nearly all public presidential utterances—­proclamations, news-conference remarks, executive orders—and found that in his first two years as president, Obama talked less about race than any other Democratic president since 1961. Obama’s racial strategy has been, if anything, the opposite of radical: he declines to use his bully pulpit to address racism, using it instead to engage in the time-honored tradition of black self-hectoring, railing against the perceived failings of black culture.¶ His approach is not new. It is the approach of Booker T. Washington, who, amid a sea of white terrorists during the era of Jim Crow, endorsed segregation and proclaimed the South to be a land of black opportunity. It is the approach of L. Douglas Wilder, who, in 1986, not long before he became Virginia’s first black governor, kept his distance from Jesse Jackson and told an NAACP audience: “Yes, dear Brutus, the fault is not in our stars, but in ourselves … Some blacks don’t particularly care for me to say these things, to speak to values … Somebody’s got to. We’ve been too excusing.” It was even, at times, the approach of Jesse Jackson himself, who railed against “the rising use of drugs, and babies making babies, and violence … cutting away our opportunity.”¶ The strategy can work. Booker T.’s Tuskegee University still stands. Wilder became the first black governor in America since Reconstruction. Jackson’s campaign moved the Democratic nominating process toward proportional allocation of delegates, a shift that Obama exploited in the 2008 Democratic primaries by staying competitive enough in big states to rack up delegates even where he was losing, and rolling up huge vote margins (and delegate-count victories) in smaller ones.¶ And yet what are we to make of an integration premised, first, on the entire black community’s emulating the Huxt­ables? An equality that requires blacks to be twice as good is not equality—it’s a double standard. That double standard haunts and constrains the Obama presidency, warning him away from candor about America’s sordid birthmark.

#### The alternative is to wage war on white supremacy.

#### We have a moral obligation to reject white supremacy in all of its manifestations. This violent ideology is responsible for killing masses of people physically and mentally. All of humanity depends on our collective commitment to end it before it puts an end to us all.

Comissiong in 13

(Solomon, educator, community activist, author, host of the Your World News media collective and founding member of the Pan-African collective for Advocacy & Action, “The War on White Supremacy”, Black Agenda Report, <http://blackagendareport.com/content/war-white-supremacy>, rcheek)

The struggle to end White Supremacy is one that must continue and grow even stronger – countless youth of color simply depend on it. Resistance to white supremacist ideology is paramount. If you believe in humanity (regardless of the color of your skin) you must join in this resistance. White Supremacy is a most deadly social malady. It has given birth to Apartheid, Jim Crow, mass murder, chattel slavery – the list literally goes on and on.¶ People of color must resist White Supremacy in every way they can. We must organize ourselves to combat it – teaching our youth to recognize it is an important first step. People of color must collectively resist White Supremacy, and good intentioned white people must play their own critical roles within this struggle. It is the obligation of any good intentioned white person to go in to white communities and organize an end to the social disease there. After all, White Supremacy emanates from white communities. It is frequently birthed from ignorance and hatred, among several social maladies and complexes.¶ White people, it is your responsibility to put an end to White Supremacy in your communities just as it is the responsibility of men to bury Male Supremacy and sexual/physical abuse of women. White Supremacy is killing masses of people (physically and mentally). When will we all decide to wage a war on this pervasive social illness/ideology, and put and end to it? Humanity depends on our collective commitment to end it before it metastasizes and puts and end to us all.

### Off

#### Terror attack likely now.

Zimmerman 9/25 (Katherine, senior analyst for the American Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Project., “Al-Qaeda’s African Surge Threatens the U.S.” AEI, <http://www.criticalthreats.org/somalia/zimmerman-al-qaedas-african-surge-threatens-us-september-25-2013> -Veeder)

U.S. intelligence officials fear that the score or so of American passport holders believed to be members of al Shabaab might return to the U.S. to commit terrorism. Al Shabaab's leadership has not espoused attacks on America, but security experts fear that recruitment targeting Americans increases the probability of an attack. Last month, al Shabaab released a video featuring what it called its "Minnesota Martyrs." Minnesota is home to the largest U.S. population of Somalis. The 40-minute video, the first in a promised series, featured three Americans. The video glorified the three young men, saying they had given their lives on what is now a global battlefield. Although some within the group may see Africa as their battleground, those who have cemented the relationship with al Qaeda understand that jihad stretches from Morocco to the Philippines, from Tanzania to Iraq. And as al Qaeda leader Ayman Zawahiri has made clear, to the United States. If reports now surfacing regarding Americans involved in the Nairobi attack—al Shabaab's response to the Kenyan military presence in Somalia—are confirmed, it will be difficult for the Obama administration to continue claiming that al Shabaab is purely local. The terror group has the means for a major attack, and al Qaeda's focus on the U.S. provides the motive. From the triumphalism after Osama bin Laden's death to the president's most recent speeches trumpeting an end to the war on terror, the Obama administration continues to proclaim al Qaeda's demise. Implicit in this claim is that the Obama counterterrorism strategy is succeeding and "the tide of war is receding," which in turn underpin substantial cuts to security spending and retreat from foreign entanglements. Alas, reciting a mantra does not make it true. Far from defeated, al Qaeda is stronger now than ever.

Aff withdraws from the war on terror

#### Flexibility in counterterrorism policy is key to fighting changing terrorist groups.

Zarate , Juan, former deputy national security adviser for combating terrorism and Thomas Sanderson, co-director of the Transnational Threats Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. August 6th, 2013. “Adapting to terrorism 2.0.” Washington Post. Lexis Nexis. -Veeder

Though the al-Qaida core has been decimated, its regional affiliates have adapted - embedding themselves in local insurgencies such as al-Shabab in Somalia; supporting operations between groups, such as al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb and Boko Haram in Nigeria; and engaging in criminality, including smuggling, drug trafficking, bank robberies and kidnapping in the Maghreb, Iraq, Southeast and Central Asia.¶ Militant groups in this arc of instability exploit havens where weak or corrupt governments have neither the will nor the capacity to constrain their reach. Our recent fieldwork in South and Central Asia - including in Afghanistan and Pakistan - reveals a patchwork of violent extremist groups, fractured yet adapting to wage international plots after years of U.S. counterinsurgency operations. They are waiting for the withdrawal of U.S. troops to energize a narrative of defeat of the world's remaining superpower - equating 2014 to the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989. Meanwhile, the Internet amplifies terrorist ideologies and messages for a global jihadi community.¶ Perhaps the most worrisome development is that the Levant is now at the center of this instability. As turmoil, violence and disillusionment grip the region from Tunis to Baghdad, al-Qaida's ideological adherents have more political and physical space in which to adapt.¶ In Syria, al-Qaida has a new cause to galvanize foreign fighters and fuel its mythology in the region central to its strategy. Groups fighting under the al-Qaida banner, such as Jabhat al-Nusra, are learning from past mistakes and establishing social services - baking bread and mending wounds - to win the hearts and minds of their constituency. This contrasts with the alienating brutality of Taliban rule and the horrific campaigns by al-Qaida in Iraq.¶ Dangerously, the fighting has stirred the historic Sunni extremist funding networks - supported by states and donors from the Arabian Peninsula - with calls from Sunni clerics to send money and manpower to fight Syrian President Bashar Assad and the Shiite "devils."¶ We therefore cannot assume that the terrorist threat to the United States will manifest itself as it has in the past. Identifying threatening groups or cells will be difficult - as seen in Benghazi. Distinguishing between terrorism, local militancy and criminality will grow more challenging - as seen in West Africa. Predicting which affiliates or groups present an imminent threat to the United States may become a nearly impossible task - as seen in Yemen.¶ Recognizing the adaptations matters now.¶ Leveraging regional alliances to constrict the reach of regional terror groups is essential. Law enforcement authorities need to aggressively pursue the terror-crime nexus. Our withdrawal from Afghanistan must be calibrated to account for the realities of emerging threats, not just the original threat that caused us to destroy the al-Qaida haven. Ensuring that Syria does not become the locus for al-Qaida's rebirth should also be a principal policy goal, along with the fall of Assad.¶ The debate around the Authorization for Use of Military Force should address how we define the enemy and preserve the ability to fight whatever emerges from this cauldron of conflict. Just as President Obama was given the tools and strategies needed to fight al-Qaida - and amplified many of them - his administration must continue to ensure that the country can adapt to looming threats.¶ Now is the time to shape a counterterrorism approach that is not simply reacting to battles of the past but preparing for the tide of threats that may reach our shores. The fight against the al-Qaida core may be coming to an end, but we can't blind ourselves to the terrorist adaptations already underway.

#### Continual pressure on terrorist groups is necessary to prevent them from reorganizing and gaining a foothold in new and transitioning governments.

Shields, Nathan E. School of Graduate and Continuing Studies in Diplomacy, Norwich University. 2012. “Unrest in the Middle East: Potential implications for international terrorism and counterterrorism policy.” *Global Security Studies, Spring 2012, Vol. 3, Issue 2.* Pg. 20 --Veeder

In assessing the potential impact that the Arab Spring will have on Counter Terrorism ¶ policy it is important to look back in history and compare present day events with historical ones¶ in order to ¶ better get a base line of understanding. In the case of the Arab Spring, Carothers ¶ points out that “never in the Arab world have any Islamist election gains resulted in a theocracy, ¶ and established Islamist parties across the region have proved willing to work within multiparty ¶ systems.” (Carothers, 2011) Despite this historical track record, there is no guarantee that any of ¶ the radical Islamist groups in the ¶ region will not find success in establishing themselves in one of ¶ the new governments.¶ Western states ¶ would¶ benefit by attempting to engage in a strategic dialogue with the ¶ emerging political parties in these countries. The United States has met some succ¶ ess in the past ¶ in dealing¶ with¶ counter terrorism issues ¶ under the old ¶ regimes in Egypt and Tunisia and others in ¶ North Africa and the Middle East¶ . ¶ However, now there could be some ¶ potential blowback for its ¶ previous¶ support to those authoritarian regimes¶ . Even though blowback is possible, it is more ¶ likely that “whoever is elected president in Tunisia or Egypt will face mobilized populations with ¶ little patience for fresh dictatorial methods as well as secular militaries likely to resist any ¶ theocratic i¶ mpulses.” ¶ (Carothers, 2011)¶ The politically left leaning Muslim population will ¶ likely still have some resentment towards the West and especially Israel. ¶ But¶ , cooperation with ¶ the West will still be needed for these fledgling democracies¶ in order to gain¶ a stable footing in ¶ the international community. ¶ The U.S. and their allies must exploit this need as part of their CT ¶ policy.¶ Much like ¶ how ¶ they support¶ ed¶ the old regimes in the region, showing support for these ¶ newly minted democracy without putting Sold¶ iers on the ground could have huge benefits. ¶ With the success of the non¶ -¶ violent protesters¶ , ¶ the prospects of ¶ peace in the region ¶ is¶ likely¶ higher¶ now than at any other time in recent history. With that being said, there still needs ¶ to be an active pursuit of terrorist groups in the region by the Unites States and its allies. The ¶ dramatic and sudden Killing of Osama Bin Laden on May 1¶ st¶ 2011 by U.S. Special Operators ¶ was a huge blow to the Global Jihadist movement. But even with the charismatic Arab le¶ ader ¶ dead Al¶ -¶ Qaeda will live on. Letting up on them now would only give them a chance to regroup ¶ and reorganize. Constant pressure from counter terrorism and intelligence agency as well as ¶ diplomatic efforts with the new governments in the Arab world will help to ensure that the ¶ radical Islamic movement that had been terrorizing the world for decades will slowly drift into ¶ the annals of time.

#### There is a significant risk that terrorist groups in Pakistan could obtain a nuclear weapon.

Costello, Ryan. Policy Fellow at National Iranian American Council, Program Coordinator Fissle Materials Working Group at Connect U.S. Fund, Researcher at Center for the Study of Threat Convergence at the Fund for Peace. 2011. “Threat Convergence in Pakistan.” Fund for Peace. Pg. 5 --Veeder

Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and materials represent a ¶ significant ¶ proliferation risk that could become a target for terrorist groups operating ¶ within the country and in neighboring countries, such as ¶ Afghanistan. Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and materials exist in the ¶ context of state instability and fragility, the legacy o¶ f ¶ the A.Q. Khan network, and alleged ties between the ¶ government and Islamist militants. The possibility ¶ that ¶ terrorists could obtain nuclear weapons or materials, ¶ either through an assault on nuclear facilities or with ¶ internal assistance, should not be underestimated. ¶ Pakistan possesses a sizable nuclear arsenal estimated ¶ to contain more than 100 nuclear weapons. This ¶ nuclear stockpile is likely to continue to expand as ¶ Pakistan develops new nuclear-capable missiles and ¶ increases its capacity to produce weapons-grade ¶ material. An expansion will require supplementary ¶ security to guard the additional nuclear material, ¶ facilities, and waste. As a result, there will be more¶ vulnerabilities in the system and a greater chance that ¶ Pakistan’s nuclear security could break down. ¶ There are several terrorist groups operating within ¶ Pakistan that have challenged and weakened the ¶ Pakistani state. For example, as part of an upsurge of ¶ violence within Pakistan, suicide bombings have ¶ increased from two in 2002 to eighty-nine in 2009. In ¶ addition, Al-Qaeda and its Taliban allies have utilized ¶ the mountainous, semi-autonomous Federally ¶ Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan as a safe ¶ haven in order to launch local, regional, and ¶ international attacks. Al-Qaeda has also expressed its ¶ desire to obtain a nuclear weapon, demonstrated by the ¶ reported meeting between two Pakistani nuclear ¶ scientists and Osama bin-Laden prior to the September¶ 11¶ th¶ attacks. The scientists allegedly provided bin-¶ Laden with a “rough sketch” of how to construct a ¶ nuclear weapon. ¶ Given the numerous terrorist groups threatening the ¶ Pakistani state and its nuclear materials, Pakistan ¶ remains one of the world’s greatest nuclear security ¶ vulnerabilities. The threat of terrorist attack on nu¶ clear ¶ facilities is high, and there is a strong potential f¶ or ¶ collaboration between terrorist groups and rogue ¶ elements within the Pakistani security services. Th¶ e ¶ threat of insider collaboration with terrorist groups ¶ is ¶ enhanced by the legacy of the A.Q. Khan network and ¶ allegations that elements of the Pakistani government ¶ support Islamist militants. Over the long-term, th¶ ere is ¶ a somewhat distant threat that the Pakistani state could ¶ collapse or weaken to the point that nuclear safeguard¶ s ¶ would be unable to protect Pakistan’s nuclear ¶ weapons. However, the threats of external attack and ¶ internal collaboration are partially addressed by ¶ current safeguards. Total state collapse is unlikely,¶ particularly if the United States and the international ¶ community remain engaged in the region. ¶ Nevertheless, nuclear Pakistan is a state confronting ¶ multiple internal and external threats to its security ¶ from rogue and terrorist entities and, as such, remains¶ at significant risk for exploitation and proliferation.

#### Nuclear Terrorism causes miscalculation that draws in Russia and China and culminates in extinction

Ayson 2010 (Robert Ayson, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld)

A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability? If Washington decided to use, or decided to threaten the use of, nuclear weapons, the responses of Russia and China would be crucial to the chances of avoiding a more serious nuclear exchange. They might surmise, for example, that while the act of nuclear terrorism was especially heinous and demanded a strong response, the response simply had to remain below the nuclear threshold. It would be one thing for a non-state actor to have broken the nuclear use taboo, but an entirely different thing for a state actor, and indeed the leading state in the international system, to do so. If Russia and China felt sufficiently strongly about that prospect, there is then the question of what options would lie open to them to dissuade the United States from such action: and as has been seen over the last several decades, the central dissuader of the use of nuclear weapons by states has been the threat of nuclear retaliation. If some readers find this simply too fanciful, and perhaps even offensive to contemplate, it may be informative to reverse the tables. Russia, which possesses an arsenal of thousands of nuclear warheads and that has been one of the two most important trustees of the non-use taboo, is subjected to an attack of nuclear terrorism. In response, Moscow places its nuclear forces very visibly on a higher state of alert and declares that it is considering the use of nuclear retaliation against the group and any of its state supporters. How would Washington view such a possibility? Would it really be keen to support Russia’s use of nuclear weapons, including outside Russia’s traditional sphere of influence? And if not, which seems quite plausible, what options would Washington have to communicate that displeasure? If China had been the victim of the nuclear terrorism and seemed likely to retaliate in kind, would the United States and Russia be happy to sit back and let this occur? In the charged atmosphere immediately after a nuclear terrorist attack, how would the attacked country respond to pressure from other major nuclear powers not to respond in kind? The phrase “how dare they tell us what to do” immediately springs to mind. Some might even go so far as to interpret this concern as a tacit form of sympathy or support for the terrorists. This might not help the chances of nuclear restraint.

### Case

#### Heidegger’s philosophy is reminiscent of Nietzhe’s nihilism – rejecting all technology makes life meaningless, culminating in extinction

Hicks 3 (Steven V., Professor of Philosophy @ Queens, “Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Foucault: Nihilism and Beyond,” Foucault and Heidegger: Critical Encounters, Ed. Alan Milchman and Alan Rosenberg, p. 109, Questia)

Why a “philosphical shock”? The answer, in part, may be that from Foucault's perspective, Heidegger's insightful reading of Nietzsche and the problem of nihilism is itself too ascetic. Heidegger's emphasis on “silence” as proper to Dasein's being, his frequent use of quasireligious (even Schopenhauerean) terms of “grace” and “call of conscience, ” his many references to the destiny of the German Volk, his avoidance of politics and the serious “quietistic” tone of Heideggerian Gelassenheit are all reminiscent of the life-denying ascetic ideal Nietzsche sought to avoid. 65 Moreover, Foucault seems to join with Derrida and other “neo-Nietzscheans” in regarding Heidegger's idea of “letting Being be”—his vision of those who have left traditional metaphysics behind and with it the obsession with mastery and technology that drives contemporary civilization—as too passive or apathetic a response to the legitimate problems of post-Nietzschean nihilism that Heidegger's own analysis uncovers. 66 Here we have arrived at a key difference between Heidegger and Foucault: for Foucault, Heidegger takes insufficient account of the playful and even irreverent elements in Nietzsche and of Nietzsche's critique of the dangers of the ascetic ideal. Foucault joins with other new Nietzscheans in promoting, as an alternative to Heideggerian Gelassenheit, the more Nietzschean vision of “playing with the text”—which in Foucault's case means promulgating active and willful images of resistance and struggle against particular practices of domination, rebellion against “micro-powers, ” and blatant disregard for tradition (cf. DP, 27). 67 This context-specific, unambiguously confrontational nature of Foucault's critique of the forms of domination and technologies of power lodged in modern institutions offers a more Nietzsche-like response than the one Heidegger offers to the nihilistic problems of Western civilization. As Foucault sees it, the lessons Heidegger would have us draw from Nietzsche throw us back to the passive “nihilism of emptiness” that Nietzsche feared. While not predicting the emergence of better times, Foucault tries to offer a better (less passive, less ascetic) model for reforming our “background practices” and for cultivating an affirmative attitude toward life that he and other neo-Nietzscheans think may be “our only chance to keep from extinguishing life on earth altogether.”

#### A more just politics requires the immediate decision to combat forms of domination—this ethical obligation precedes questions of ontology

Campbell 99 (David, Prof of Int’l Politics @ Univ. of Newcastle, Moral Spaces, p. 45)

In that essay, subsequent to making the case for the intrinsic deconstructibility of the law and noting how this is good news for politics and historical progress, Derrida argues that the law's deconstructibility is made possible by the undeconstructibility of justice. Justice is outside and beyond the law. "Justice is the experience of the impossible."" Justice is not a principle, or a foundation, or a guiding tradition. Justice is infinite, and-in a favorable comparison to Levinas's notion of justice-"the heteronomic relation to others, to the faces of otherness that govern me, whose infinity I cannot thematize and whose hostage I remain."' In these terms, justice is like the pre-original, an-archic relation to the other, and akin to the undecidable. It represents the domain of the impossible and the unrepresentable that lies outside and beyond the limit of the possible and the representable. But it cannot be understood as "utopian," at least insofar as that means the opposite of "realistic." It is not indeterminate. It is undecidable. It is that which marks the limit of the possible; indeed, it is that which brings the domain of the possible into being and gives it the ongoing chance for transformation and refiguration, that which is one of the conditions of possibility for ethics and politics.¶ In this context, justice enables the law, but the law is that which "is never exercised without a decision that cuts, that divides."" The law works from the unrepresentable and seeks to represent; it takes from the impossible and conceives the possible; it is embedded in the undecidable but nevertheless decides. Nonetheless, "the undecidable remains caught, lodged, at least as a ghost-but an essential ghost-in every decision, in every event of decision. Its ghostliness deconstructs from within any assurance of presence, any certitude or any supposed criteriology that would assure us of the justice of the decision, in truth of the very event of a decision. "89¶ The undecidable within the decision does not, however, prevent the decision or avoid its urgency. As Derrida observes, "a just decision is always required immediately, `right away.'" This necessary haste has unavoidable consequences because the pursuit of "infinite information and the unlimited knowledge of conditions, rules or hypothetical imperatives that could justify it" are unavailable in the crush of time. Nor can the crush of time be avoided, even by unlimited time, "because the moment of decision, as such, always remains a finite moment of urgency and precipitation." The decision is always "structurally finite," it "always marks the interruption of the juridico- or ethico- or politico-cognitive deliberation that precedes it, that must precede it." This is why, invoking Kierkegaard, Derrida declares that "the instant of decision is a madness.","The finite nature of the decision may be a "madness" in the way it renders possible the impossible, the infinite character of justice, but Derrida argues for the necessity of this madness. Most importantly, although Derrida's argument concerning the decision has, to this point, been concerned with an account of the procedure by which a decision is possible, it is with respect to the necessity of the decision that Derrida begins to formulate an account of the decision that bears upon the content of the decision. In so doing, Derrida's argument addresses more directly- more directly, I would argue, than is acknowledged by Critchley-the concern that for politics (at least for a progressive politics) one must provide an account of the decision to combat domination.

#### Technology can be used without assigning meaning

Dreyfus 96 [Hubert, “Being and Power: Heidegger and Foucault” University of California Berkeley <http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~hdreyfus/html/paper_being.html>]

In the end, however, he seems clearly to hold that technology can treat people and things as resources to be enhanced without setting meaning-giving subjects over against objectified things. A year after the previous remark about subjects and objects reaching extreme dominance Heidegger appears to retract his view about objects at least, in his observation that nature has become "a system of information" and a modern airliner is not an object at all, but just a flexible and efficient cog in the transportation system. Passengers are presumably not autonomous subjects either, but resources recruited by the tourist industry to fill the planes. Heidegger concludes: "Whatever stands by in the sense of standing-reserve no longer stands over against us as object."

#### An ethical obligation to prevent specific atrocities precedes ontology—the death of the "other" calls our very being into question

Bulley 04 (Dan, PhD Candidate @ Department of Politics and International Studies--University of Warwick, "Ethics and Negotiation," www.lancs.ac.uk/fss/politics/events/aber/ethics%20and%20negotiation%20-%20bulley.doc)

Crucially an openness to justice cannot be an a priori good thing. Indeed, like the future, one can say it can only be “anticipated in the form of an absolute danger.” As incalculable and unknowable, an unconditional openness to the future-to-come of justice risks the coming of what he calls the “worst.” The most obvious figures of this “worst,” or, “perverse calculation,” are atrocities such as genocide, Nazism, xenophobia, so-called ‘ethnic cleansing.’ These we can and must oppose or prevent. But why? Why only these? Derrida states that what we can oppose is only those “events that we think obstruct the future or bring death,” those that close the future to the coming of the other. We can oppose this future-present (a future that will be present) coming then on the basis of the future-to-come (a future with no expectation of presence). Or to put it in terms of the other, we can oppose those others who prevent our openness to other others. Such was the ideology of National Socialism in its desire to entirely negate the Jews. We have a duty to guard against the coming of such a theory or idea. Why? Because such an other closes us to the other; a future that closes the future.

However, if, as Derrida says there is no ultimate way of judging between our responsibility for others, as “Every other (one) is every (bit) other,” whose calculation can we say is perverse, or the ‘worst’? Why are we responsible to victims rather than the perpetrators of atrocities if both are equally ‘other’? Who makes this decision and how can it be justified? Levinas suggests that our “being-in-the-world” our being-as-we-are, is only conceivable in relation to, and because of, the other. Thus the death of the other calls our very being into question. Ethics in this sense precedes ontology as our responsibility to the other precedes our own being. We may say then that our commitment is to those that accept the other as other, that allow the other to be. There is a danger though that this becomes foundational, treated as a grounding principle outside traditional modernist ethics on which we can build a new ‘theory of ethics’. This is not the value of Derridean and Levinasian thinking however. What makes their different ways of thinking the other interesting is not that they are absolutely right or ‘true,’ but rather that they take traditional ethical thinking to its limit. Whether or not a Jewish tradition is privileged over Greek, they remain within the bounds of Western metaphysics. Derrida’s “responsibility [to the Other] without limits,” does not escape this, establishing itself unproblematically as a ‘ground’ outside traditional thinking. Rather, his thinking of the ethical shows that we can think these things differently, while still accepting the exigency to prevent the ‘worst’. There can be no ultimate foundation for what we think is the worst. And such a foundation cannot come from outside Western metaphysics. Limit thinking is not an immovable basis for judgement of the worst, and this is why it is so dangerous and troubling. The non-basis of judgement is rather the desire to stay as open as possible, while recognising that a judgement necessarily closes. The goal is for our closure to have the character of an opening (closing the future-present to allow the future-to-come), but it nevertheless remains a closure. And every closure is problematic.

**Subjectivity is shaped historically not theoretically- focus on ontology and value to life produces mass murder**

Philip **Graham 99** School of Communication Queensland University of Technology, Heidegger’s Hippies Sep 15 http://www.geocities.com/SunsetStrip/Palms/8314/index.html

Societies should get worried when Wagner’s music becomes popular because it usually means that distorted interpretations of Nietzsche’s philosophy are not far away. Existentialists **create problems** about what is, especially identity (Heidegger 1947). Existentialism inevitably leads to an authoritarian worldview: this, my Dionysian world of the eternally self-creating, the eternally self-destroying, this mystery world of twofold voluptuous delight, my “beyond good and evil,” without a goal, unless the joy of the circle itself is a goal; without will, unless a ring feels good will towards itself – do you want a name for this world? A solution to all its riddles? A light for you, too, you best-concealed, strongest, most intrepid, most midnightly men? – This world is the will to power – and nothing besides! And you yourselves are also this will to power – and nothing besides! (Nietzsche 1967/1997).¶ Armed with a volume of Nietzsche, some considerable oratory skills, several Wagner records, and an existentialist University Rector in the form of Martin Heidegger, Hitler managed some truly astounding feats of strategic identity engineering (cf. Bullock, 1991). Upon being appointed to the Freiberg University, Heidegger pronounced the end of thought, history, ideology, and civilisation: ‘No dogmas and ideas will any longer be the laws of your being. The Fuhrer himself, and he alone, is the present and future reality for Germany’ (in Bullock 1991: 345). Heidegger signed up to an ideology-free politics: Hitler’s ‘Third Way’ (Eatwell 1997). The idealised identity, the new symbol of mythological worship, Nietzsche’s European Superman, was to rule from that day hence. Hitler took control of the means of propaganda: the media; the means of mental production: the education system; the means of violence: the police, army, and prison system; and pandered to the means of material production: industry and agriculture; and proclaimed a New beginning and a New world order. He ordered Germany to look forward into the next thousand years and forget the past. Heidegger and existentialism remain influential to this day, and history remains bunk (e.g. Giddens , 1991, Chapt. 2).Giddens’s claims that ‘humans live in circumstances of … existential contradiction’, and that ‘subjective death’ and ‘biological death’ are somehow unrelated, is a an ultimately repressive abstraction: from that perspective, life is merely a series of subjective deaths, as if death were the ultimate motor of life itself (cf. Adorno 1964/1973). History is, in fact, the simple and straightforward answer to the “problem of the subject”. “The problem” is also **a handy device for confusing,** entertaining, and selling trash to the masses. By emphasising the problem of the ‘ontological self’ (Giddens 1991: 49), informationalism and ‘consumerism’ confines the navel-gazing, ‘narcissistic’ masses to a permanent present which they self-consciously sacrifice for a Utopian future (cf. Adorno 1973: 303; Hitchens 1999; Lasch 1984: 25-59). Meanwhile transnational businesses go about their work, raping the environment; swindling each other and whole nations; and inflicting populations with declining wages, declining working conditions, and declining social security. Slavery is once again on the increase (Castells, 1998; Graham, 1999; ILO, 1998). There is no “problem of the subject”, just as there is no “global society”; there is only the mass amnesia of utopian propaganda, the strains of which have historically accompanied revolutions in communication technologies. Each person’s identity is, quite simply, their subjective account of a unique and objective history of interactions within the objective social and material environments they inhabit, create, and inherit. The identity of each person is their most intimate historical information, and they are its material expression: each person is a record of their own history at any given time. Thus, each person is a recognisably material, identifiable entity: an identity. This is their condition. People are not theoretical entities; they are people. As such, they have an intrinsic identity with an intrinsic value. No amount of theory or propaganda will make it go away. The widespread multilateral attempts to prop up consumer society and hypercapitalism as a valid and useful means of sustainable growth, indeed, as the path to an inevitable, international democratic Utopia, are already showing their disatrous cracks. The “problem” of subjective death threatens to give way, once again, to **unprecedented mass slaughter.** The numbed condition of a narcissistic society, rooted in a permanent “now”, a blissful state of Heideggerian Dasein, threatens to wake up to a world in which “subjective death” and ontology are the least of all worries.

#### Forming political solutions even if they are flawed is better than doing nothing---it’s the only internal link to effectively solving global problems

**Walt 10** (Stephen M., Professor of International Affairs @ Harvard University, Phd in Political Science @ Cal Berkeley, “What's the matter with the world today?”, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/04/19/whats\_the\_matter\_with\_the\_world\_today)

People like me tend to focus on problems, mostly because we are interested in finding ways to address them and thereby improve the human condition. Nonetheless, we should occasionally remind ourselves that all is not doom-and-gloom. In fact, there are plenty of reasons to be cautiously optimistic about the state of the world today, and maybe even about the future. The overall level of global violence is at historic lows (despite some tragic conflicts that still defy solution), the world economy has done very well over the past half-century (despite its recent problems) and life expectancy, public health, and education levels have risen dramatically in many parts of the world (though conditions in a few places have deteriorated badly). So Cassandra-like pessimism may not be appropriate, even for a realist. Nonetheless, I am beginning to wonder if our ability to deal with various global problems is decreasing, mostly due to the deterioration of political institutions at both the global and domestic level. Here are some tentative thoughts in that direction. One way to think about the current state of world politics is as a ratio of the number of important problems to be solved and our overall "problem-solving capacity." When the ratio of "emerging problems" to "problem-solving capacity" rises, challenges pile up faster than we can deal with them and we end up neglecting some important issues and mishandling others. Something of this sort happened during the 1930s, for example, when a fatal combination of global economic depression, aggressive dictatorships, inadequate institutions, declining empires, and incomplete knowledge overwhelmed leaders around the world and led to a devastating world war. Human society is not static, which means that new challenges are an inevitable part of the human condition. New problems arise from the growth of societies, from new ideas, from our interactions with the natural world, and even from the unintended consequences of past successes. As a result, policymakers are always going to face new problems, even when the old ones remain unresolved. Moreover, a key feature of contemporary globalization is that today's problems tend to be more complex and more far-reaching, and tend to spread with greater speed. A volcano in Iceland disrupts air travel in Europe. A failed state in Afgahanistan nurtures a terrorist network that eventually strikes on several continents. The Internet doesn't even exist in 1990, but now it empowers democratic forces, facilitates commerce and intellectual exchange, and enable extremists to recruit supporters and transmit tactical advice all around the world. The HIV virus emerges in Africa and eventually infects millions of human beings on every continent. Bankers in America's mortgage industry makes foolish and venal decisions, and a global financial collapse wipes out trillions of dollars of wealth and affects the lives of billions of people, some of them dramatically. Human beings in the developed world burn carbon fuels for a couple of centuries and now poor countries on the other side of the world face the risk of widespread coastal flooding (or worse) in the decades ahead. In short, the numerator of our critical ratio -- i.e., the rate at which big problems are emerging-seems to be rising. What about the denominator, our "problem-solving capacity?" Solving problems requires things: 1) accurate knowledge, 2) sufficient resources, and 3) the political capacity to direct our knowledge and resources to the problem at hand. If you lack sufficient knowledge, you won't know what to do when a new problem comes along. (This was the problem governments faced during the Great Depression, because orthodox neo-classical economics prescribed the wrong remedies.) If you don't have sufficient resources, you might figure out what needs to be done but be unable to afford it. Finally, even when knowledge and resources are available, the responsible authorities still need to be able to make decisions and allocate resources in the prescribed manner, before the problem gets worse. I would argue that most of the problems we face in addressing current global problems are due neither to a lack of knowledge nor to insufficient resources. Our understanding of problems such as climate change, how to secure nuclear materials, the eradication of disease, budget deficits, or even the regulation of global financial markets has never been greater, and there are a vast array of non-partisan academic and other intellectual institutions to help us analyze and understand new problems. In many cases we know pretty much what needs to be done, even if there's still some uncertainty about the details. Similarly, societies around the world are wealthier than ever before, and even some of the most expensive global challenges (e.g., climate change) could be addressed with manageable effects on economic growth. Similarly, problems like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or Iran's nuclear program are not persisting because we are too poor to address them. The real challenge lies in the declining capacity of political institutions to combine knowledge and resources in a timely fashion, so that problems get addressed before they become too large. This problem exists at both the global and national level, and if I am right, it suggests that the achievements of the past fifty years may be difficult to duplicate. In the worst case, in fact, even major powers will gradually be overwhelmed by a rising tide of new challenges that they have become incapable of addressing quickly and/or adequately. At the global level, for example, the various institutions established after World War II are showing clear signs of age. For example, it's been clear for years that the composition of the United Nations Security Council no longer reflects the distribution of global power-why is France a permanent member but not Germany, India, Japan, or Brazil?-but nobody agrees on the remedy for this problem so nothing is done. The replacement of GATT by the World Trade Organization was heralded as a major achievement back in the 1990s, but there has been little or no progress since the 1994 Uruguay Round -- that's 16 years ago -- and the Doha Round that began in 2001 has been an abject failure. The European Union has been a remarkable achievement in many ways, but the Greek financial crisis has exposed the downside of monetary union and Germany's new-found reluctance to subordinate its own national interests to the broader European project suggests that the EU itself may be facing a rocky future. Nor does one see much evidence of successful global coordination to the 2008-09 recession, even among the EU member states themselves, while talk of a "common foreign and security policy" remains just that -- talk. In the security realm, the global non-proliferation regime has been fraying for decades, and failed to halt the spread of nuclear weapons to countries like North Korea, Pakistan, India, Israel, and perhaps, at some point in the future, Iran. NATO is in the process of losing the war in Afghanistan, with the European participants going through the motions primarily to keep Uncle Sam happy. Nor should we forget the failure of key states or international agencies to do very much about the Rwandan genocide in 1994, the collapse of Somalia, or the downward spiral in Zimbabwe. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the dispute over Kashmir, and the Sudanese civil war remain unresolved as well, and does anyone seriously believe that any of them will be settled anytime soon? Similarly, the recent U.N. climate change summit in Copenhagen demonstrates that trying to get 192 countries to agree to limit greenhouse gas emissions is a fool's errand, and various well-publicized efforts to address other commons issues -- including sex trafficking, narcotics trade, money laundering, etc. -- do not seem to be making much progress either. Even the more-or-less successful nuclear security summit held in Washington last week did little more than make an initial stab at the problem, and it remains to be seen in the participating states will follow through. One sees similar trends in national politics as well. Washington D.C. has become synonymous with the term "gridlock," leading the Economist magazine to describe the U.S. political system as "a study in paralysis." Obama did get a health care reform package through, but it still took an enormous effort to pass a watered-down bill that pandered to insurance companies and other well-funded special interests. Meanwhile, decisive action to address climate change, the persistent U.S. budget deficit, or financial sector reform remain elusive, and it's going to get a lot tougher if the GOP makes big gains in the 2010 midterms. Nor is it reassuring to realize that the Republican Party seems to be taking its marching orders from two entertainers -- Rush Limbaugh and Glenn Beck -- the latter of whom has made it clear that he's interested in making money and doesn't really care about public affairs at all. And let's not forget that even popular Presidents like Ronald Reagan had trouble pushing major initiatives after their first year or two in office. Hey Houston: if you're still not convinced we have a problem, consider what has happened to the state of California, whose once-vaunted universities, schools, parks and public infrastructure are visibly eroding, largely because of a wholly dysfunctional political system. Nor is this problem confined to the United States. Japan's ossified political order remains incapable of either decisive action or meaningful reform; the Berlusconi-government in Italy is an exercise in opera bouffe rather than responsible leadership, French President Nicolas Sarkozy's early flurry of reform efforts have stalled and Mexico remains beset by drug-fueled violence and endemic corruption. Britan's ruling Labor Party is a spent force, but the rival Conservatives do not present a very appealing alternative and may even lose an election that once seemed in the bag. And so on. There are some countries where decision leadership is not lacking, of course, such as China (at one end of the size scale) and Dubai (at the other). Yet in both these cases, a lack of genuine democratic accountability creates the opposite problem. These government can act quickly and launch (overly?) ambitious long-term plans, but they are also more likely to make big mistakes that are difficult to correct them in time. Indeed, as James Scott warns in his indispensable book Seeing Like a State, dictatorships that combine ambitious development goals with inadequate accountability sometimes achieve impressive results in the short term but produce wide-ranging disasters in the end. In short, what I am suggesting is that our inability to cope with a rising number of global challenges is not due to a lack of knowledge or insufficient resources, but rather to the inability of existing political institutions to address these problems in a timely and appropriate way. Please note that I am not talking about our ability to achieve perfect solutions, only responses that are good enough to keep problems from getting worse and that can be improved over time as we acquire even more experience. Describing how to fix this problem is beyond the scope of a single blog post, but let me suggest three potential remedies. 1. Less is More. As outgoing FP editor Moises Naim suggested in his essay on "minilateralism," we need to focus less on universal agreements that all states adhere to, and more on achieving agreements among a smallest number of the most important actors in a given realm. I was skeptical of this idea when I first heard it, but I'm increasingly convinced that he was onto something. Instead of a new Doha Round, for instance, a multilateral trade regime involving the G20 would be far easier (though not easy) to negotiate. Instead of trying for a climate agreement approved by the nearly 200 U.N. member states, focus on achieving an agreement among the top ten producers of greenhouse gases (or maybe even just the top five) and then try to bring in the rest over time. And if the bottom 100 countries never join in, it probably won't matter that much. And while we're at it, we might think about getting rid of some global institutions that don't seem to be doing much of anything anymore. I've heard at least one retired diplomat complain that nothing ever gets done because foreign offices spend all their time preparing for the next (probably meaningless) international summit. He was obviously exaggerating, but do we really need NATO, the EU, the WEU, the OSCE, the G20, the and the entire alphabet soup of existing international organizations? Might allowing some of these organizations to quietly shut their doors help us get the others to work better? 2. Emphasize Accountability. Both internationally and domestically, leaders have to be held accountable for mistakes. Here in the United States, about the only thing that can derail a politician's career and reputation permanently is a sex scandal (and sometimes even that doesn't even do it). The architects of major disasters like the Iraq war remain ubiquitous and respected members of the foreign policy establishment, the pundits who backed it continue to publish, and Democrats who backed the war now occupy most of the top foreign policy positions in the Obama administration. So if you curious why we seem to repeating some of the same mistakes in Afghanistan, maybe there's your answer. I'm all for hiring experienced people, but shouldn't we try to recruit people who have been right on the really big issues in the past? 3. Raise the Salience of Institutional Reform. Fixing dysfunctional institutions isn't sexy; it is in fact the essence of wonkish drudgery. Most of us (myself included) prefer to focus on the issues themselves and offer various prescriptions, instead of thinking about how to design political institutions that can bring knowledge and resources together for the common good. Put simply, fixing institutions is boring. But I'm beginning to think that we neglect it at our peril, and it is intriguing to see that some academics are way ahead of me on this issue. In sum, unless we repair our domestic political orders and renovate the global political architecture, problems are going to pile up faster than we can fix them and the end result will not be pretty. Taken far enough, one could even imagine some sort of major global cataclysm, which would provide the opportunity -- just as World War II did -- to reshape the global order anew. But given what such an event would cost, that's a route to reform that I'd prefer to avoid.

#### No policy failure. Language is clear enough to use common assumptions. Policy and theory do succeed on this basis.

**Harvey ’97** (Frank, Associate Prof. Pol. Sci. – Dalhousie U., “The Future’s Back: Nuclear Rivalry, Deterrence Theory, and Crisis Stability after the Cold War”, p. 138-139)

Linguistic Relativism. One approach of postmodernists is to point to the complex nature of language and meaning as a critique of positiv¬ism; this critique is, in turn, relevant to the overwhelming amount of work in IR (Phillips 1977; Giddens 1979; George and Campbell 1990). Although a comprehensive assessment of the linguistic relativism debate is beyond the scope of this project, it is possible to address the underlying philosophical argument, which is fairly straightforward. Building on the work of Wittgenstein (1968), the linguistic variant of the criticism contends that any attempt to reduce everyday terms "to a singular essentialist meaning" is problematic given "the multiplicity of meaning to be found in social activity" (George and Campbell 1990, 273). By implication, a concept, term, word, or symbol cannot correspond "to some ... externally derived foundation or object" and ulti¬mately is context-dependent. Similarly, Phillips argues that the validity of theory cannot be determined because "There is no standard or objective reality (always fixed, never changing) against which to com¬pare a universe of discourse ... nothing exists outside of our language and actions which can be used to justify ... a statement's truth or falsity" (1977, 273). Of course, it is not entirely clear how this "multiplicity of meaning" is sufficient to render meaningless an approach that assumes the existence of an objective reality. An important distinction must be drawn between the assertion that these discrepancies might have a significant impact on scientific theorizing and the assertion that they do have such an effect. In most cases, errors of interpretation and generalization produced by linguistic nuances are relatively insignificant and ultimately have very little impact on the generalizability of social theories. There are numerous words, symbols, concepts, and ideas, for example, that are commonly understood, regardless of other linguistic variations, but the implications of this standardized concep¬tual framework are frequently overlooked and ignored in the post¬modern critique. In any case, it is contingent upon the theorist to specify the precise meaning of any variable or symbol that is central to a theory. Although definitions may vary — possibly partly, but not entirely, as a conse¬quence of language — scholars nevertheless are more likely than not to understand and agree on the underlying meaning of most words, symbols and phrases. The point is that theorists generally do have a common starting point and often suspend, at least temporarily, coun¬terproductive debates over meaning in order to shift emphasis towards the strength and logical consistency of the theory itself, a more important issue that has nothing to do with language. Evaluating the internal consistency of the central assumptions and propositions of a theory, that is, criticising from within, is likely to be more conducive to theoretical progress than the alternative, which is to reject the idea of theory building entirely. Finally, the lack of purity and precision, another consequence of linguistic relativism, does not necessarily imply irrelevance of purpose or approach. The study of international relations may not be exact, given limitations noted by Wittgenstein and others, but precision is a practical research problem, not an insurmountable barrier to progress. In fact, most observers who point to the context-dependent nature of language are critical not so much of the social sciences but of the incorrect application of scientific techniques to derive overly precise measurement of weakly developed concepts. Clearly, **our understanding of the causes of international conflict** — and most notably war — **has improved considerably as a consequence of applying sound scientific methods and valid operationalizations** (Vasquez 1987, 1993). The alternative approach, implicit in much of the postmodern literature, is to fully accept the inadequacy of positivism, throw one's hands up in failure, given the complexity of the subject, and repudiate the entire enterprise. The most relevant question is whether we would know more or less about international relations if we pursued that strategy.

#### Political simulation’s critical to generating pragmatic solutions --- radical approaches are doomed to failure

**Lewis 94** (Martin, lecturer in international history and interim director of the program in International Relations at Stanford University, Green Delusions: An Environmentalist Critique of Radical Environmentalism, Page 18-19)

Finally, where radical greens often emphasize philosophical (or even spiritual) purity, this work stresses pragmatic gains. Since the anarchic utopianism that marks the dominant strains of radical environmentalism stands little chance of gaining public acceptance, much less of creating a feasible alternative economy, an emphasis on the purity of ideals can lead only to the frustration of goals. I would suggest that a pragmatic approach stands a much better chance of accomplishing our shared ends. The prospect of humankind someday coexisting easily with the earth’s other inhabitants—a vision entertained by Arcadian and Promethean environmentalists alike—can best be achieved through gradual steps that remain on the track of technological progress.

#### Ontological hierarchies devalue life and engender genocide

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What Heidegger wants to say is that the victims of the concentration camps could not be dead because they were not, in their essence, mortal: they did not sufficiently love death, they were not "in custody of Being." Behind this, there is the entire Nazi conception of death as Opfer, as sacrifice of the individual for the community, that we find already stated in Being and Time, with the notion of self-sacrifice, and celebrated by Heidegger on 26 May 1933, in his speech praising Albert-Leo Schlageter, gunned down in 1926 and designated as a hero by the Nazis. "To die for the German people and for one's Reich," for Heidegger, is the strongest and most noble death (GA 16, 759–760). But those who perished in the concentration camps, they are, he says, grausig ungestorben: "horribly un-dead" (GA 79, 56). They are not dead, they cannot even die, they were not mortal. This is why I spoke of an ontological negationism, which calls into question the very being of the victims. This judgment coincides with the profoundly pertinent analyses of Adorno on the so-called "authentic" conception of death in Being and Time, and the way in which he shows that with Heidegger, death itself took on a racial meaning."4 In conclusion, recall that philosophy has as its vocation to serve the fulfillment of man and not his destruction. But Heidegger, through the völkisch and racist principle which is explicitly his starting point, destroys man in his very being. And in a profoundly perverse manner, he [End Page 65] imputes to philosophy itself the responsibility for the totalitarian aberrations of the modern age. The radically discriminatory and racist principles upon which Heidegger's work rests demand a complete re-evaluation of the status of that work. It is not, in its foundations, a philosophy, but rather an attempt to destroy philosophy. Therefore, it is the role of philosophy to explore, through further research, the real significance of his writings. This is an essential task for contemporary thought.

#### Death precedes all other impacts – it ontologically destroys the subject and prevents any alternative way of knowing the world

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Contrary to those accounts, I would argue that it is death per se that is really the objective evil for us, not because it deprives us of a prospective future of overall good judged better than the alternative of non-being. It cannot be about harm to a former person who has ceased to exist, for no person actually suffers from the sub-sequent non-participation. Rather, **death in itself is an evil to us because it ontologically destroys the current existent subject** — it is the ultimate in metaphysical lightening strikes. The evil of death is truly an ontological evil borne by the person who already exists, independently of calculations about better or worse possible lives. **Such an evil need not be consciously experienced in order to be an evil for the kind of being a human person is.** Death is an evil because of the change in kind it brings about, a change that is destructive of the type of entity that we essentially are. Anything, whether caused naturally or caused by human intervention (intentional or unintentional) that drastically interferes in the process of maintaining the person in existence is an objective evil for the person. What is crucially at stake here, and is dialectically supportive of the self-evidency of the basic good of human life, is that death is a radical interference with the current life process of the kind of being that we are. In consequence, death itself can be credibly thought of as a ‘primitive evil’ for all persons, regardless of the extent to which they are currently or prospectively capable of participating in a full array of the goods of life.

In conclusion, concerning willed human actions, it is justifiable to state that any intentional rejection of human life itself cannot therefore be warranted since it is an expression of an ultimate disvalue for the subject, namely, the destruction of the present person; a radical ontological good that we cannot begin to weigh objectively against the travails of life in a rational manner. To deal with the sources of disvalue (pain, suffering, etc.) we should not seek to irrationally destroy the person, the very source and condition of all human possibility.

#### Heidegger’s philosophy rejects democracy and justifies domination of those deemed “inauthentic.”

**Wolin 90** - Distinguished Professor of History at the City University of New York Graduate Center - 1990 (Richard Wolin, *The Politics of Being*, P. 46)

The political philosophical implications of this theory are as unequivocal as they are distasteful to a democratic sensibility. On the basis of the philosophical anthropology outlined by Heidegger, the modern conception of popular sovereignty becomes a sheer non sequitur: for those who dwell in the public sphere of everydayness are viewed as essentially incapable of self-rule. Instead, the only viable political philosophy that follows from this standpoint would be brazenly elitist: since the majority of citizens remain incapable of leading meaningful lives when left to their own devices, their only hope for "redemption" lies in the imposition of a "higher spiritual mission" from above. Indeed, this was the explicit political conclusion drawn by Heidegger in 1933. In this way, Heidegger's political thought moves precariously in the direction of the "Fuhrerprinzip" or "leadership principle." In essence, he reiterates, in keeping with a characteristic antimodern bias, a strategem drawn from Platonic political philosophy: since the majority of men and women are incapable of ruling themselves insofar as they are driven by the base part of their souls to seek after inferior satisfactions and amusements, we in effect do them a service by ruling them from above.77T o date, however, there has never been a satisfactory answer to the question Marx poses concerning such theories of educational dictatorship: "Who shall educate the educator?”

#### The desire for “authentic” leaders justifies totalitarianism.

**Wolin 90** - Distinguished Professor of History at the City University of New York Graduate Center - 1990 (Richard Wolin, *The Politics of Being*, P. 115-116)

There are many dangers lurking in the statist conception of politics advanced by Heidegger in the preceding citation. The specifically political danger of this theory of the polis/state is that it is latently totalitarian: when the state-and the "destiny of a historical Volk" that is its raison d'ttre-are accorded unchallenged ontological primacy as "the work for the works," the autonomy and integrity of the other spheres of life (social, cultural, religious) disappears: they are gleichgeschaltet or immediately subsumed within the political sphere. The Greeks could solve this potential danger via the institution of direct democracy: by virtue of this medium, political space was opened up to its maximum extent. But in Heidegger's contemporary pan-Germanic "repetition" of the ancient polis, the opposite is true: since his twentieth century polis/ state is integrally tied to the Fiihrerprinzip, it becomes a Fiihrerstaat, a new form of political tyranny, in which political space shrivels up into the person of the Fuhrer and his sycophantic entourage.6 As the remarks just cited suggest, for Heidegger, the concept of a Fiihrerstaat is unproblematical provided there be "rulers alone, but then really rulers." That is, the rulers must be "authentic" and not imposters. And as we will soon see, Heidegger develops a theory of world-historical "leader-creators" in order to ground his partisanship for the Fiihrerprinzip philosophically.

#### The aff ignores the issues created by nature, blaming everything on new technologies.

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Proponents of biomimicry assume that nature will always act favorably toward humans, when just as often, nature dishes out problems and we must use our uniquely human ingenuity to solve them. No one today is criticizing nature for smiting us with floods, fires, and diseases, but plenty of people take issue with new technologies. The Buddhist philosopher John McClellan finds much of this criticism arbitrary:

Deep ecologists seem to have the same fear and loathing toward today's out of control technology as humans have had until just recently toward Uncontrolled Nature, with her savage, untamed wastelands. They call technology inhuman, cruel, and heartless, using the same words we once used to describe cruel wilderness - and like humans of the 19th century waging war on wild nature, environmentalists today long only to conquer technology, to subdue and control it, as we have nature herself. Nature is no wiser than technology, and claiming adherence to nature's laws is an attempt to bypass the messy business of ethics and values. When environmentalists urge us to follow nature's way, they are referring to a mythical nature that never changes, that is necessarily always in balance; that is the root of all things good. But this conception of nature is nostalgia masquerading as values. This nature has no place in politics; it belongs in a museum. And of course, a true museum of the planet's history would contain a catalog of horrors: long stretches without oxygen or anything green; obliteration after obliteration; Edward Abbey's jagged desert monuments miles underwater. Nature, like technology, follows one prime rule: change. As the natural and technological scenery changes, it transforms politics, economics, and society with it.

#### Heidegger’s theory reduces the value to life—he forces joyless disconnection from the real world.

**Wolin 90** - Distinguished Professor of History at the City University of New York Graduate Center - 1990 (Richard Wolin, *The Politics of Being*, P. 49-50)

Heidegger's characterization of everydayness is so disproportionately negative that we are seemingly left with no immanent prospects for realizing our authentic natures in the domain of ontic life as such. For on the basis of his phenomenological descriptions, it would seem that the ontic sphere in general- "worldliness" in its entirety-has been "colonized" by the They. Here, we see that Heidegger's pessimistic philosophical anthropology and his "joyless" social ontology ultimately join forces. The result is a radical devaluation of the life-world, that delicate substratum of everyday human sociation which existential phenomenology claims to redeem. At this point, one might raise against Heidegger's social ontology the same charge he levels against Husserl's theory of the pure, transcendental ego: it suffers from an impoverishment of world-relations-a fact clearly evinced in Heidegger's self-defeating celebration of the "non-relational" character of authentic Dasein cited above. For how can the authenticity of a Dasein that is essentially "non -relational" ever attain realization in the sphere of ontic life?