# Round 1 UMKC

# 1AC

## Plan

#### Plan: The United States federal government should establish a federal court with jurisdiction over targeted killing orders.

## Terrorism

#### The status quo expansion of drone warfare undermines the United States credibility, and breeds Anti-Americanism

Brooks 13

Rosa Brooks, Prof of Law @ Georgetown University Law Center and Bernard Schwartz Senior Fellow at the New America Foundation, Statement for the Record Submitted the Senate Committee on Armed Services, May 16, 2013.

Mr. Chairman, let me close with a plea for perspective. We live in a dangerous world: ¶ adversarial states such as North Korea and Iran remain bellicose; the changing role of near-peer ¶ powers such as China and Russia poses challenges to U.S. interests and global stability; the ¶ Middle East remains awash in violence, and technological advances could place lethal tools in ¶ the hands of irresponsible actors. We also face unprecedented challenges from our increased ¶ global interdependence: climate change, the interdependence of global financial systems and our ¶ ever-increasing reliance on the internet all create new vulnerabilities. Against the backdrop of ¶ these many dangers, old and new, the fear of terrorist attack should not be the primary driver of ¶ U.S. national security policy.¶ Terrorism is a very real problem, and we cannot ignore it, any more than we should ¶ ignore violent organized crime or large-scale public health threats. Like everyone else, I worry ¶ about terrorists getting ahold of weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, we should ¶ recognize that terrorism is neither the only threat nor the most serious threat the U.S. faces.29¶ With the sole exception of 2001, terrorist groups worldwide have never succeeded in killing¶ more than a handful of Americans citizens in any given year. According to the State ¶ Department, seventeen American citizens were killed by terrorists in 2011, for instance. The ¶ terrorist death toll was fifteen in 2010 and nine in 2009.30¶ These deaths are tragedies, and we should continue to strive to prevent such deaths—but ¶ we should also keep the numbers in perspective. On average, about 55 Americans are killed by ¶ lightning strikes each year,31 and ordinary criminal homicide claims about 16,000 U.S. victims ¶ each year.32 No one, however, believes we need to give the executive branch extraordinary legal ¶ authorities to keep Americans from venturing out in electricalstorms, or use armed drones to ¶ preemptively kill homicide suspects.¶ What’s more, we should keep in mind that military force is not the only tool in the U.S.¶ arsenal against terrorism.33 Since 9/11, we’ve gotten far more effective at tracking terrorist ¶ activity, disrupting terrorist communications and financing, catching terrorists and convicting ¶ them in civilian courts,¶ 34 and a wide range of other counterterrorism measures. Much of the ¶ time, these non-lethal approaches to counterterrorism are as effective as targeted killings. And in ¶ fact, there’s growing reason to fear that the expansion of U.S. drone strikes is strategically ¶ counterproductive. ¶ Former vice-chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General James Cartwright recently ¶ expressed concern that as a result of U.S. drone strikes, the U.S. may have “ceded some of our ¶ moral high ground.”35 Retired General Stanley McChrystal has expressed similar concerns:¶ “The resentment created by American use of unmanned strikes… is much greater than the ¶ average American appreciates. They are hated on a visceral level, even by people who’ve never ¶ seen one or seen the effects of one,” and fuel “a perception of American arrogance.” 36 Former ¶ Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair agrees: the U.S. needs to “pull back on unilateral ¶ actions… except in extraordinary circumstances,” Blair told CBS news in January. U.S. drone ¶ strikes are “alienating the countries concerned [and] …threatening the prospects for long-term ¶ reform raised by the Arab Spring…. [U.S. drone strategy has us] walking out on a thinner and ¶ thinner ledge and if even we get to the far extent of it, we are not going to lower the fundamental ¶ threat to the U.S. any lower than we have it now.”37¶ Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe, I believe it is past time for a serious overhaul of U.S.¶ counterterrorism strategy. This needs to include a rigorous cost-benefit analysis of U.S. drone ¶ strikes, one that takes into account issues both of domestic legality and international legitimacy, ¶ and evaluates the impact of targeted killings on regional stability, terrorist recruiting, extremist ¶ sentiment, and the future behavior or powerful states such as Russia and China. If we undertake ¶ such a rigorous cost-benefit analysis, I suspect we may come to see scaling back on kinetic ¶ counterterrorism activities less as an inconvenience than as a strategic necessity—and we may¶ come to a new appreciation of counterterrorism measures that don’t involve missiles raining ¶ from the sky.¶ This doesn’t mean we should never use military force against terrorists. In some ¶ circumstances, military force will be justifiable and useful. But it does mean we should ¶ rediscover a long-standing American tradition: reserving the use of exceptional legal authorities ¶ for rare and exceptional circumstances. ¶ Thank you for the opportunity to testify today.

#### Exclusive executive decision making in drone strikes makes groupthink and errors inevitable

Chebab, 2012

[Ahmad, Georgetown University Law Center, Retrieving the Role of Accountability in the Targeted Killings Context: A Proposal for Judicial Review, 3-30-12, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2031572] /Wyo-MB

The practical, pragmatic justification for the COAACC derives largely from considering¶ social psychological findings regarding the skewed potential associated with limiting unchecked decision-making in a group of individuals. As an initial point, psychologists have long pointed out how individuals frequently fall prey to cognitive illusions that produce systematic errors in judgment.137 People simply do not make decisions by choosing the optimal outcome from available alternatives, but instead employ shortcuts (i.e., heuristics) for convenience.138 Cognitive biases like groupthink can hamper effective policy deliberations and formulations.139 Groupthink largely arises when a group of decision-makers seek conformity and agreement, thereby avoiding alternative points of view that are critical of the consensus position.140 This theory suggests that some groups—particularly those characterized by a strong leader, considerable internal cohesion, internal loyalty, overconfidence, and a shared world view or value system—suffer from a deterioration in their capacity to engage in critical analysis.141 Many factors can affect such judgment, including a lack of crucial information, insufficient timing for decision-making, poor judgment, pure luck, and/or unexpected actions by adversaries.142 Moreover, decision-makers inevitably tend to become influenced by irrelevant information,143 seek out data and assessments that confirm their beliefs and personal hypotheses notwithstanding contradictory evidence,144 and “[i]rrationally avoid choices that represent extremes when a decision involves a trade-off between two incommensurable values.”145 Self-serving biases can also hamper judgment given as it has been shown to induce well-intentioned people to rationalize virtually any behavior, judgment or action after the fact.146 The confirmation and overconfidence bias, both conceptually related to groupthink, also result in large part from neglecting to consider contradictory evidence coupled with an irrational persistence in pursuing ideological positions divorced from concern of alternative viewpoints.147¶ Professor Cass Sunstein has described situations in which groupthink produced poor results precisely because consensus resulted from the failure to consider alternative sources of information.148 The failures of past presidents to consider alternative sources of information, critically question risk assessments, ensure neutral-free ideological sentiment among those deliberating,149 and/or generally ensure properly deliberated national security policy has produced prominent and devastating blunders,150 including the Iraq War of 2003,151 the Bay of Pigs debacle in the 1960’s,152 and the controversial decision to wage war against Vietnam.153¶ Professor Sunstein also has described the related phenomenon of “group polarization,” which includes the tendency to push group members toward a “more extreme position.”154 Given that both groupthink and group polarization can lead to erroneous and ideologically tainted policy positions, the notion of giving the President unchecked authority in determining who is eligible for assassination can only serve to increase the likelihood for committing significant errors.155 The reality is that psychological mistakes, organizational ineptitude, lack of structural coherence and other associated deficiencies are inevitable features in Executive Branch decision-making.

#### Judicial review solves groupthink

Chebab, 2012

[Ahmad, Georgetown University Law Center, Retrieving the Role of Accountability in the Targeted Killings Context: A Proposal for Judicial Review, 3-30-12, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2031572] /Wyo-MB

To check the vices of groupthink and shortcomings of human judgment, the psychology literature emphasizes a focus on accountability mechanisms in which a better reasoned decision- making process can flourish.156 By serving as a constraint on behavior, “accountability functions as a critical norm-enforcement mechanism—the social psychological link between individual decision makers on the one hand and social systems on the other.”157 Such institutional review can channel recognition for the need by government decision-makers to be more self-critical in policy targeted killing designations, more willing to consider alternative points of view, and more willing to anticipate possible objections.158 Findings have also shown that ex ante awareness can lead to more reasoned judgment while also preventing tendentious and ideological inclinations (and political motivations incentivized and exploited by popular hysteria and fear).159¶ Requiring accounting in a formalized way prior to engaging in a targeted killing—by providing, for example, in camera review, limited declassification of information, explaining threat assessments outside the immediate circle of policy advisors, and securing meaningful judicial review via a COAACC-like tribunal—can promote a more reliable and informed deliberation in the executive branch. With process-based judicial review, the COAACC could effectively reorient the decision to target individuals abroad by examining key procedural aspects—particularly assessing the reliability of the “terrorist” designation—and can further incentivize national security policy-makers to engage in more carefully reasoned choices and evaluate available alternatives than when subject to little to no review.

#### Effective drones are the best internal to solve blowback

Masood 13

(Hassan, Monmouth College, “Death from the Heavens: The Politics of the United States’ Drone Campaign in Pakistan’s Tribal Areas,” 2013) /wyo-mm

Those who support the use of drones as an important counter-insurgency tactic nonetheless point out that the current campaign is not always conducted in the most effective manner. The authors of “Sudden Justice” for example, argue that the campaign should be focused on ‘high value targets’ and not be used frequently to take down the lower level operatives. The more you can destroy and disrupt the activities of personnel in the Taliban and al-Qaeda from the top-down instead of the bottom-up, the more of an impact it will have. The leadership qualities, organizational skills, and strategic awareness of various high-level commanders in both the Taliban and al-Qaeda cannot be easily replaced after their deaths at the hands of U.S. drones. Fricker and Plaw use the example of Baitullah Mehsud, a Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP) leader who was killed by a drone strike on the roof of his uncle’s house on August 5, 2009. His death provoked an internal struggle in his organization that ultimately led to enough confusion and tension within the TTP that the Pakistan Army was able to launch the South Waziristan Offensive, putting the TTP on the defensive. But the lower level Taliban and al-Qaeda members have skills and abilities that are more common and more easily replaced. The amount of time and energy, the article asserts, that the U.S. is spending killing lower-level members (and increasing civilian casualties in the process, as the majority of the time these strikes happen during funeral processions or wedding parties) could instead be used to seriously disrupt the activities of the entire organization by targeting its leaders, much like the death of Osama bin Laden did to al-Qaeda in South/Central Asia in 2011. David Rohde agrees that the drones should be used, as they are an effective and efficient way of disrupting and destroying the extremist power base there, but their usage should be both selective and surgical. There is no consensus among scholars when it comes to evaluating the effectiveness of the use of drones as a counter-insurgency tactic. As Hassan Abbas points out “the truth is we don’t know whether U.S. drone strikes have killed more terrorists or produced more terrorists.”

#### Plans review process is key to avoid massive casualties from signature strikes

Guiora, 2012

[Amos, Professor of Law, S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah, Targeted killing: when proportionality gets all out of proportion, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law. 45.1-2 (Fall 2012): p235., Academic onefile] /Wyo-MB

The unitary executive theory aggressively articulated, and implemented, by the Bush Administration has been adopted in toto by the Obama Administration. While the executive clearly prefers to operate in a vacuum, the question whether that most effectively ensures effective operational counterterrorism is an open question. The advantage of institutionalized, process-based input into executive action prior to decision implementation is worthy of discussion in operational counterterrorism.¶ The solution to this search for an actionable guideline is the strict scrutiny standard. What is strict scrutiny, and how is it to be implemented in the context of operational counterterrorism? Why is there a need, if at all, for an additional standard articulating self-defense? The strict scrutiny standard would enable operational engagement of a non-state actor predicated on intelligence information that would meet admissibility standards akin to a court of law. The strict scrutiny test seeks to strike a balance enabling the state to act sooner but subject to significant restrictions.¶ The ability to act sooner is limited, however, by the requirement that intelligence information must be reliable, viable, valid, and corroborated. The strict scrutiny standard proposes that for states to act as early as possible in order to prevent a possible terrorist attack the information must meet admissibility standards similar to the rules of evidence. The intelligence must be reliable, material, and probative.¶ The proposal is predicated on the understanding that while states need to engage in operational counterterrorism, mistakes regarding the correct interpretation and analysis of intelligence information can lead to tragic mistakes. Adopting admissibility standards akin to the criminal law minimizes operational error.¶ Rather than relying on the executive branch making decisions in a "closed world" devoid of oversight and review, the intelligence information justifying the proposed action must be submitted to a court that would ascertain the information's admissibility. The discussion before the court would necessarily be conducted ex parte; however, the process of preparing and submitting available intelligence information to a court would significantly contribute to minimizing operational error that otherwise would occur.¶ The logistics of this proposal are far less daunting than they might seem--the court before which the executive would submit the evidence is the FISA Court. Presently, FISA Court judges weigh the reliability of intelligence information in determining whether to grant government ex parte requests for wire-tapping warrants. Under this proposal, judicial approval is necessary prior to undertaking a counterterrorism operation predicated solely on intelligence information. The standard the court would adopt in determining the information's reliability is the same applied in the traditional criminal law paradigm. The intelligence must be reliable, material, and probative.¶ While the model is different--a defense attorney cannot question state witnesses--the court will assume a dual role. In this dual role capacity the court will cross-examine the representative of the intelligence community and subsequently rule as to the information's admissibility. While some may suggest that the FISA court is largely an exercise in "rubber-stamping," the importance of the proposal is in requiring the government to present the available information to an independent judiciary as a precursor to engaging in operational counterterrorism.

#### Civilian casualties are key to AQAP Recruitment

Johnsen 12

Gregory D. Johnsen, author, former Fulbright Fellow in Yemen, currently a Ph.D. candidate in Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University and the author of the Yemen blog, Waq al-Waq, “A Profile of AQAP’s Upper Echelon,” Jul 24, 2012

[1] There have been conflicting reports as to whether or not U.S. airstrikes and resulting civilian casualties have indeed led to a spike in recruiting for AQAP. According to the U.S. and Yemeni governments, however, AQAP has grown in strength from 200-300 fighters in late 2009 to more than 1,000 in 2012. Material in both Arabic and English suggests that this increase is being driven, at least in part, by civilian deaths. See, for instance, reports in al-Maddad newsletter, published by Ansar al-Shari`a, as well as Kelly McEvers, “Yemen Airstrikes Punish Militants, and Civilians,” NPR All Things Considered, July 6, 2012.

#### AQAP is developing chemical weapons

Schmitt and Shanker 11

(Eric and Thom, "Qaeda Trying to Harness Toxin, Ricin, for Bombs, US Says," New York Times, August 12, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/13/world/middleeast/13terror.html?\_r=1)

WASHINGTON — American counterterrorism officials are increasingly concerned that the most dangerous regional arm of Al Qaeda is trying to produce the lethal poison ricin, to be packed around small explosives for attacks against the United States. For more than a year, according to classified intelligence reports, Al Qaeda’s affiliate in Yemen has been making efforts to acquire large quantities of castor beans, which are required to produce ricin, a white, powdery toxin that is so deadly that just a speck can kill if it is inhaled or reaches the bloodstream. Intelligence officials say they have collected evidence that Qaeda operatives are trying to move castor beans and processing agents to a hideaway in Shabwa Province, in one of Yemen’s rugged tribal areas controlled by insurgents. The officials say the evidence points to efforts to secretly concoct batches of the poison, pack them around small explosives, and then try to explode them in contained spaces, like a shopping mall, an airport or a subway station. President Obama and his top national security aides were first briefed on the threat last year and have received periodic updates since then, top aides said. Senior American officials say there is no indication that a ricin attack is imminent, and some experts say the Qaeda affiliate is still struggling with how to deploy ricin as an effective weapon. These officials also note that ricin’s utility as a weapon is limited because the substance loses its potency in dry, sunny conditions, and unlike many nerve agents, it is not easily absorbed through the skin. Yemen is a hot, dry country, posing an additional challenge to militants trying to produce ricin there. But senior American officials say they are tracking the possibility of a threat very closely, given the Yemeni affiliate’s proven ability to devise plots, including some thwarted only at the last minute: a bomb sewn into the underwear of a Nigerian man aboard a commercial jetliner to Detroit in December 2009, and printer cartridges packed with powerful explosives in cargo bound for Chicago 10 months later. “The potential threat of weapons of mass destruction, likely in a simpler form than what people might imagine but still a form that would have a significant psychological impact, from Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen, is very, very real,” Michael E. Leiter, who retired recently as director of the National Counterterrorism Center, said at a security conference last month. “It’s not hard to develop ricin.” A range of administration officials have stated that the threat of a major attack from Al Qaeda’s main leadership in Pakistan has waned after Osama bin Laden’s death in May, on top of the Central Intelligence Agency’s increasing drone assaults on Qaeda targets in Pakistan’s tribal areas over the past three years. But the continuing concern over a ricin plot underscores the menace that regional Qaeda affiliates, especially Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, now pose to the United States and American interests overseas. “That line of threat has never abated,” said a senior American official, who referred to the terrorist group by its initials. “That’s been taken seriously by this government. What we know about A.Q.A.P. is that they do what they say.” Al Qaeda’s arm in Yemen has openly discussed deploying ricin and other deadly poisons against the United States. “Brothers with less experience in the fields of microbiology or chemistry, as long as they possess basic scientific knowledge, would be able to develop other poisons such as ricin or cyanide,” the organization posted to its online English-language journal, Inspire, last fall, in an article titled “Tips for Our Brothers in the United States of America.” Senior administration officials say ricin is among the threats focused on by a secret government task force created after the printer-cartridge plot. The task force is working closely with Saudi intelligence officials and the remnants of Yemen’s intelligence agencies, and it is using information gleaned from the shipboard interrogation of a Somali terrorist leader with ties to the Yemeni branch of Al Qaeda, who was captured by Navy Seal commandos in April. The intelligence reports indicating ricin plots by Al Qaeda’s Yemeni affiliate were first uncovered during reporting for a book, “Counterstrike: The Untold Story of America’s Secret Campaign Against Al Qaeda.” It will be published next week by Times Books, an imprint of Henry Holt & Company. American officials now say that Al Qaeda’s most direct threat to the United States comes from the Yemeni affiliate. These officials have also expressed growing alarm at the way the affiliate is capitalizing on the virtual collapse of Yemen’s government to widen its area of control inside the country, and is strengthening its operational ties to the Shabab, the Islamic militancy in Somalia, to exploit the chaos in both countries. “It continues to demonstrate its growing ambitions and strong desire to carry out attacks outside its region,” Daniel Benjamin, the State Department’s counterterrorism coordinator, said in a speech last month, referring to Al Qaeda’s Yemeni branch. The affiliate has also become a magnet for terrorists fleeing the increasing pressure from drone strikes in Pakistan, and is recruiting specialists in bomb-making and other skills. “These guys have got some notoriety,” said a senior United States official who follows Al Qaeda and its affiliates closely. “They have a natural, charismatic attraction value for people who want to be jihadists and plot against the West.”

#### Chemical weapons attack causes nuclear retaliation

Conley 03

(Harry W., chief of the systems analysis Branch, Directorate of Requirements, Air and Space Power Journal- Spring 2003- [http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj03/spr03/conley.html](http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj03/spr03/conley.html" \t "_blank))

**The number of American casualties suffered due to a WMD attack may well be the most important variable in determining the nature of the US reprisal. A key question here is how many Americans would have to be killed to prompt a massive response by the United States.** The bombing of marines in Lebanon, the Oklahoma City bombing, and the downing of Pan Am Flight 103 each resulted in a casualty count of roughly the same magnitude (**150–300 deaths). Although these events caused anger and a desire for retaliation among the American public, they prompted no serious call for massive or nuclear retaliation. The body count from a single biological attack could easily be one or two orders of magnitude higher than the casualties caused by these events**. Using the rule of proportionality as a guide, one could justifiably debate whether the United States should use massive force in responding to an event that resulted in only a few thousand deaths. However, **what if the casualty count was around 300,000? Such an unthinkable result from a single CBW incident is not beyond the realm of possibility: “According to the U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment, 100 kg of anthrax spores delivered by an efficient aerosol generator on a large urban target would be between two and six times as lethal as a one megaton thermo-nuclear bomb.”46 Would the deaths of 300,000 Americans be enough to trigger a nuclear response**? In this case, **proportionality does not rule out the use of nuclear weapons.** Besides simply the total number of casualties, the types of casualties- predominantly military versus civilian- will also affect the nature and scope of the US reprisal action. Military combat entails known risks, and the emotions resulting from a significant number of military casualties are not likely to be as forceful as they would be if the attack were against civilians.World War II provides perhaps the best examples for the kind of event or circumstance that would have to take place to trigger a nuclear response. A CBW event that produced a shock and death toll roughly equivalent to those arising from the attack on Pearl Harbor might be sufficient to prompt a nuclear retaliation. President Harry Truman’s decision to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki- based upon a calculation that up to one million casualties might be incurred in an invasion of the Japanese homeland47- is an example of the kind of thought process that would have to occur prior to a nuclear response to a CBW event. Victor Utgoff suggests that “**if nuclear retaliation is seen at the time to offer the best prospects for suppressing further CB attacks and speeding the defeat of the aggressor, and if the original attacks had caused severe damage that had outraged American or allied publics, nuclear retaliation would be more than just a possibility, whatever promises had been made**.”48

#### Terrorist retaliation causes nuclear war – draws in Russia and China

Ayson 10

Robert Ayson, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, 2010 (“After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld)

A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. t may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response.

#### AQAP has the intent and capacity to shut down the Bab al-Mandeb

Thomas 11

(Matthew, MA Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies, “Al Qaeda in the Land of Faith and Wisdom: The Fall of Saleh and March on Al-Aqsa,” Monterey Institute of International Studies, May 8)

AQAP is well aware of the positive implications of Yemen’s strategic location in the Gulf of Aden. One of the world’s five energy chokepoints, the Bab al-Mandeb strait or Gate of Tears adjoining Yemen, is a strategic link between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, via the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. “An estimated 3.2 million bbl/d flowed through this waterway in 2009 (vs. 4 million bbl/d in 2008) toward Europe, the United States, and Asia.” Bab al-Mandeb has also proven vulnerable to terrorist and pirate attacks, as demonstrated by the previous bombings of the USS Cole in 2000 and Limburg French oil tanker in 2002. Yemen’s sparse oil resources, which are concentrated in the southern half of the country, are projected to be completely gone in the very near future. This is unfortunate for AQAP, which coincidentally maintains a power base in the southern half of Yemen. AQAP has made its intentions to exploit Yemen’s strategic position quite clear. If AQAP can overcome other tribal rulers and secessionists and dominate the state, it intends to cut off the oil lifeline from its Western enemies, and any remnants of Saleh’s government should it by way of some miracle hold on to poser. As Emir al-Wuhayshi explains: The interest that is shown towards AQAP is because of the strategic importance of the Arabian Peninsula. This is the place of the revelation, the birthplace of Islām, the land of the two holy Mosques and the blood of the saĥāba runs through the veins of its sons. Because of the greed of the Americans, they have vital interests in the Arabian Peninsula. The passage ways of commerce pass through its waters and oil is stolen from it. So this place is a vein of life for the Americans. AQAP recruits from both within the region and internationally. Yemen’s political destabilization is advantageous to AQAP, as the group appeals to potential recruits disillusioned and frustrated with Saleh’s regime. Also, in order to maintain ties with the wealthy Saudi counterparts, AQAP consistently seeks recruits from within the Kingdom. AQAP’s recruiting method “uses a combination of theological and socioeconomic issues” that call for the entire Muslim community to wage jihad, but uses messages “with specific appeals targeting Yemenis and Saudis.” The organization’s international objectives of attacking the U.S. and Western interests in general are supported by targeting individuals within the U.S. homeland, such as the Fort Hood shooter Major Nidal Hassan and Christmas Day bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab. The fiery clerical leader of AQAP, Anwar al-Awlaki, having been born and raised for the majority of his life in the U.S. is familiar with the Western culture and lifestyle. As a result, he has been able to use this familiarity with Western society to AQAP’s advantage in recruiting and radicalizing American Muslims. The media arm of AQAP, Sada al-Malahim (echo of epics), continues to urge Muslims to take up jihad and attack infidels wherever they may be. One interesting section in the second issue of Inspire magazine even suggested American Muslims purchase a large pick-up truck to mow down, or run over, as many infidels as possible. Indeed, the magazine proves to be a valuable propaganda tool in enticing others to join AQAP’s ranks and take up the black banner of Islam in waging armed jihad. AQAP maintains ties with several terrorist groups both locally and internationally. There is documented evidence of collaboration between AQAP and other al-Qaeda affiliates. The alliance between AQAP and the Somali terrorist group Ḥarakat al-Shabab al-Mujahidin, better known as al-Shabab, personifies a combination of interests to uniting as one force in the Gulf of Aden. At one point, al-Qaeda even called for creating a united jihadist maritime force. The established tie between AQAP and al-Shabab represents a considerable threat to Western interests in the region, particularly in the Gulf of Aden. AQAP has, also, sought to cooperate with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in a recently foiled plot in France. Indeed, AQAP coordinated with another al Qaeda affiliate AQIM, to dispatch a cell of North Africans across the Mediterranean Sea by boat from North Africa to carry out an attack France. AQAP’s operational funding comes mainly from contributions through its wealthy Saudi members and associates. By strengthening ties with members and sympathizers from Saudi Arabia, AQAP is able to channel funds from wealthy donators. Money has even been reported to come to AQAP by way of fellow mujahidin in Iraq. Also, AQAP relies on Zakat or alms giving for funding. Zakat is similar to tithing in the Christian world and is one of the pillars of Islam. Several charities and front groups associated with AQAP present a façade of good-will for Islam and for the group. Funds are solicited for the stated intent of building mosques and schools but are often diverted to support AQAP and other terrorist organizations. Some of the organizations through which AQAP is able to radicalize, recruit, and finance include: al-Iman University; al-Haramain Foundation; al-Islah charity; al-Hikmah al-Yamania Charity; al-Manhal Charitable Society; Charitable Society for Social Welfare; the Commission on Scientific Signs in the Quran and Sunnah. The use of Hawala, an informal value transfer system, is a preferable AQAP financial management mechanism which operates outside of the formal banking system and leaves no paper trail. The Hawala system has come under more scrutiny since 9/11, and been a consistent problem in combatting terrorism financing for al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Another source of AQAP funding is the black market in the failed state of Somalia. In consort with al-Shabab, the al Qaeda affiliate in Somalia, AQAP is involved in the lucrative drug, arms, and human trafficking trade in the region. Arms trafficking is big business in Yemen and the inability of the Saleh regime to control it is indicative of just how weak the regime is presently. A recent plot (March 2011) to smuggle 16,000 pistols from Turkey to Yemen is a case in point. The shipment was intercepted by Dubai police but many believe other shipments are getting through and are a harbinger of more disruption and violence. In such a destabilizing scenario AQAP stands to gain in its quest for political power in Yemen. However, to hold power the AQAP must convince, cajole, and perhaps defeat Yemen’s other powerful tribes that value tribal allegiance above all else. Dealing with the tribes is unavoidable for AQAP and inevitable in the case of a political revolution which becomes increasingly likely given the number of governments to fall in the region these past few months. The following quote from Faris Sanabani, creator and publisher of the English language Observer in Yemen, accurately depicts AQAP’s gravitas in Yemen, Al Qaida in Yemen is more than an organisation, it is a melting pot for whomever has an issue and wants to go violent. So if you have an issue that you can’t deal with, if you feel you are the victims of injustice, if you’re broke, al Qaida increasingly seems to be an option. As Yemenis struggle to cope with the lack of basic services such as access to food and water, employment, and education, they are finding more in common with AQAP and those tribal authorities opposed to Saleh’s regime. If this situation continues to persist, Yemen—particularly the southern half of the nation—will become almost entirely devoid of government control. Also, AQAP’s resilience against increased U.S. operations targeting training camps in southern Yemen has bolstered the group’s image among those who have suffered because of American airstrikes and likewise increased AQAP’s recruiting opportunities among those disenfranchised by U.S. attacks. As a result, AQAP is on the road to establishing a firm base in the highly martial tribal provinces, and subsequently should be able to expand operations into other areas in the region like Saudi Arabia, as well as, overseas in Europe and the U.S. AQAP’s previous declaration to attack Western interests and cut off America’s oil lifeline were not idle threats as demonstrated by past attacks on oil wells and pipelines in the region. In addition, given AQAP’s strategic position in territory near the Bab al-Mandeb strait and increased cooperation with al-Shabab in Somalia, it is highly plausible that AQAP could conduct future attacks on oil shipments in the Gulf of Aden, much like the previous attack against the French Limburg. AQAP’s relationship with Saudi donors in terms of recruiting and financing is key to its calls to overthrow the apostate Saudi regime, and the August 2009 failed assassination attempt against Prince Muhammad bin Nayif suggests that AQAP related attacks might continue and possibly intensify within the Saudi Kingdom. AQAP is smart. It has studied and learned from the “Anbar awakening” and other al-Qaeda in Iraq failures which resulted in the alienation of the local population. AQAP avoids making similar mistakes and is proving an ability to adapt to Yemen’s dynamic socio-political circumstance. Indeed, AQAP has proven more successful than other al-Qaeda affiliates by “pursuing a shrewd strategy” of focusing exclusively on attacking U.S., Yemeni and the Saudi governments, while avoiding attacks against the local populace. Ultimately, the group’s success has been in large part to the group’s patient foresight and restraint in not overextending itself in waging global jihad. What effects would a failed state in Yemen have on AQAP? What are the regional and international consequences? What is the appropriate U.S. response to a potential failed state in Yemen? These questions are increasingly relevant demanding a deeper examination of the conditions of a failed state and positive correlations with non-state actors, such as terrorist organizations. The risk of Yemen becoming a failed state grows daily and will undoubtedly prove advantageous to AQAP’s future modus operandi. As David Carment observes, If Yemen continues on its current trajectory it will become a failed state in the next several months. Yemen's implosion would have a significant impact on Saudi Arabia, itself feeling the direct effects of upheaval on its border with Yemen. Failure would also give al-Qaida unprecedented operational space in the south. The impending fall of Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh coincides with an era of unprecedented political upheaval in the Middle East. Yemen as a failed state would exacerbate cross-border issues with Saudi Arabia, allowing smugglers, refugees, illegal workers, and terrorists to move even more freely between the two countries. The lack of border security may lead to an increase in AQAP agents infiltrating into Saudi Arabia and subsequent rise in terrorist attacks within the Kingdom. Furthermore, AQAP’s relationship with al-Shabab in neighboring Somalia will certainly become heightened should Yemen become a failed state. The proximity of two failed states with increased terrorist collaboration and prevalence of transnational organized crime, located in the strategic Gulf of Aden is a potential doomsday scenario in which the region, already struggling to recover from rampant political revolutions could follow Yemen into chaos.

#### Closing the strait collapses the economy—It controls 30% of world trade

UPI 10

(“Al-Qaida threatens to close key oil artery,” Feb. 24, 2010. UPI. http://www.upi.com/Top\_News/Special/2010/02/24/Al-Qaida-threatens-to-close-key-oil-artery/UPI-27151267027462/#ixzz1XPTj8CWP. CR)

SANAA, Yemen, Feb. 24 (UPI) -- Amid the growing war jitters infecting much of the Middle East and fears Iran may seek to close the Gulf's Strait of Hormuz, a key oil artery, there are growing concerns that jihadists in Yemen plan to block another maritime choke point to disrupt oil supplies. Said al-Shihri, the deputy commander of al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, recently outlined a radical strategy: joining forces with Islamist militants in Somalia, across the Gulf of Aden from Yemen, to take control of the Bab el-Mandab, a narrow waterway between Yemen and Eritrea that links the Indian Ocean with the Mediterranean via the Red Sea. For that to be anywhere near effective, AQAP would need freedom of access in southern Yemen, where it has bases and where the central government in Sanaa is grappling with a growing secessionist movement. This goes a long way to explaining AQAP's recent statements voicing support for southern secessionists, who are led by old-style socialists who once formed a separate state until the union with the north in 1990. AQAP recently described supporting the southern cause as a religious duty for all Muslims. AQAP leader Nasser al-Wahishi declared, "We are obligated to support them." Al-Shihri, a former Guantanamo detainee from Saudi Arabia, said in a 12-minute audiotape released Feb. 8 that controlling the Bab al-Mandeb -- Arabic for "Gate of Tears" because of the navigational hazards ancient seafarers faced there -- would "bring it back under the protection of Islam." He urged Somali jihadists, who have links to al-Qaida, to join with AQAP to "create a great victory and international power for us … "Then the strait will be closed and the grip of will be tightened around the throat of the Jews, because the U.S. supports them through (the strait), by means of the Red Sea in particular." That is in line with Osama bin Laden's recent call for an economic jihad to bleed the West. Following an offer by the al-Shebab militants in Somalia, who are fighting a U.S.-backed transitional federal government, to join forces with AQAP, al-Shihri declared they would wage war on the Americans on two fronts. The Red Sea, which is linked to the Mediterranean at its northern end via the Suez Canal, is one of the most critical maritime routes in the world. Thirty percent of world trade runs through the Bab al-Mandeb. Since the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, it has become a vital security issue for the countries along its littoral and to the major powers who depend on its for swift military deployments, as in the 1990-91 Gulf War and the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. A major new operational theater in the conflict against Islamist extremism in that region would cause considerable problems for the United States, Egypt and Israel, as well as for Saudi Arabia and the Arab states of the Gulf. They depend on access to the Red Sea to transport oil and gas exports to the West. A jihadist breakthrough in the strait would also open the way for Iranian expansion into the region and into Africa, where it is making a major effort to secure allies and markets.

#### Economic decline causes protectionism and war – their defense doesn’t assume accompanying shifts in global power.

Royal 10 – Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defense behavior of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson’s (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crisis could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin, 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fearon, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner, 1999). Seperately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland’s (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that ‘future expectation of trade’ is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behavious of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations, However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crisis could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states. Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write, The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favor. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflict self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. P. 89) Economic decline has been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. ‘**D**iversionary theory’ suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increase incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a ‘rally around the flag’ effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995), and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlated economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels. This implied connection between integration, crisis and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

## Drone Prolif

#### First, the global drone arms race is underway now

Boyle 2013

[MICHAEL J. BOYLE, Ph.D- Michael Boyle is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at La Salle University in Philadelphia. “The costs and consequences of drone warfare,” International Affairs, January 1, 2013, http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=946befe6-cb0f-406e-8eeb-8cf208339510%40sessionmgr10&vid=1&hid=25//wyo-ng]

A global arms race for drone technology is already under way. According to one estimate, global spending on drones is likely to be more than US$94 billion by 2021.126 One factor that is facilitating the spread of drones (particularly non-lethal drones) is their cost relative to other military purchases. The top-of-the line Predator or Reaper model costs approximately US$10.5 million each, compared to the US$150 million price tag of a single F-22 fighter jet.127 At that price, drone technology is already within the reach of most developed militaries, many of which will seek to buy drones from the US or another supplier. With demand growing, a number of states, including China and Israel, have begun the aggressive selling of drones, including attack drones, and Russia may also be moving into this market.128 Because of concerns that export restrictions are harming US competitiveness in the drones market, the Pentagon has granted approval for drone exports to 66 governments and is currently being lobbied to authorize sales to even more.129 The Obama administration has already authorized the sale of drones to the UK and Italy, but Pakistan, the UAE and Saudi Arabia have been refused drone technology by congressional restrictions.130 It is only a matter of time before another supplier steps in to offer the drone technology to countries prohibited by export controls from buying US drones. According to a study by the Teal Group, the US will account for 62 per cent of research and development spending and 55 per cent of procurement spending on drones by 2022.131 As the market expands, with new buyers and sellers, America’s ability to control the sale of drone technology will be diminished. It is likely that the US will retain a substantial qualitative advantage in drone technology for some time, but even that will fade as more suppliers offer drones that can match US capabilities

#### Second, Drone courts limit executive behavior and are key to solve transparency in drone strikes

Wexler 13

(Lesley, Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law, “The Role of the Judicial Branch during the Long War: Drone Courts, Damage Suits, and FOIA Requests,” 2013, Social Science Research Network/) /wyo-mm

This chapter suggests the judiciary may play an important role in the debate over the executive branch’s decisions regarding IHL even if it declines to speak to the substance of such cases. First, advocates may use courts as a visible platform in which to make their arguments and spur conversations about alternative, non-judicially mandated transparency and accountability measures. As they did with the trio of detention cases, advocates can leverage underlying constitutional concerns about the treatment of citizens to stimulate interest in the larger IHL issues. Second, litigants may use courts to publicize and pursue Freedom of Information (FOIA) requests and thus enhance transparency. Even if courts decline to grant FOIA requests, the lawsuits can generate media attention about what remains undisclosed. Third, and most robustly, Congress may pass legislation that would facilitate either prospective review of kill lists through a so-called drone court or remove procedural barriers to retrospective damage suits for those unlawfully killed by a drone strike. Even the threat of such judicial role may influence executive branch behavior.

#### Third, now is key, the US has a narrow window of opportunity to shape drone proliferation, only US reform based on transparency and restraint will solve

Zenko, 2013

[Micah, Council of Foreign Relations, Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies, January 2013, Council Special Report No. 65, Online] /Wyo-MB

In short, a world characterized by the proliferation of armed drones—used with little transparency or constraint—would under- mine core U.S. interests, such as preventing armed conflict, promoting human rights, and strengthening international legal regimes. It would be a world in which targeted killings occur with impunity against anyone deemed an “enemy” by states or nonstate actors, without accountability for legal justification, civilian casualties, and proportionality. Perhaps more troubling, it would be a world where such lethal force no longer heeds the borders of sovereign states. Because of drones’ inherent advantages over other weapons platforms, states and nonstate actors would be much more likely to use lethal force against the United States and its allies. Much like policies governing the use of nuclear weapons, offensive cyber capabilities, and space, developing rules and frameworks for innovative weapons systems, much less reaching a consensus within the U.S. government, is a long and arduous process. In its second term, the Obama administration has a narrow policy window of opportunity to pursue reforms of the targeted killings program. The Obama admin- istration can proactively shape U.S. and international use of armed drones in nonbattlefield settings through transparency, self-restraint, and engagement, or it can continue with its current policies and risk the consequences. To better secure the ability to conduct drone strikes, and potentially influence how others will use armed drones in the future, the United States should undertake the following specific policy recommendations.

#### Fourth, China will follow US precedent

CBS 5-3 (China emerges as new force in drone warfare, Associated Press, 3 May 2013, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202\_162-57582699/china-emerges-as-new-force-in-drone-warfare/, da 8-3-13) PC

China's move into large-scale drone deployment displays its military's growing sophistication and could challenge U.S. military dominance in the Asia-Pacific. It also could elevate the threat to neighbors with territorial disputes with Beijing, including Vietnam, Japan, India and the Philippines. China says its drones are capable of carrying bombs and missiles as well as conducting reconnaissance, potentially turning them into offensive weapons in a border conflict.¶ China's increased use of drones also adds to concerns about the lack of internationally recognized standards for drone attacks. The United States has widely employed drones as a means of eliminating terror suspects in Pakistan and the Arabian Peninsula.¶ "China is following the precedent set by the U.S. The thinking is that, `If the U.S. can do it, so can we. They're a big country with security interests and so are we'," said Siemon Wezeman, a senior fellow at the arms transfers program at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in Sweden, or SIPRI.¶ "The justification for an attack would be that Beijing too has a responsibility for the safety of its citizens. There needs to be agreement on what the limits are," he said.

#### Fifth, Chinese Drone proliferation collapses Japan China relations, and increases instability between China and the U.S. in the South China Sea

Narayani Basu, 13

Writes for the IPCS, Institute of Peace and Conflict Stories “China: The Dawn of the Drones” <http://www.ipcs.org/article/military/china-the-dawn-of-the-drones-3948.html>, accessed 9/2/13,WYO/JF

¶ The primary role of China’s growing drone programme is to help Beijing control and monitor disputed territories in the Asia-Pacific region. Put simply, drones help China deter countries from intervening in the area by helping to detect and target potential violators of the areas they are trying to deny. Indeed, Beijing’s deployment of drones near the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands impacted Sino-Japanese relations [recently](http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jan/08/china-japan-drone-race), prompting Tokyo to place its own defence programme under review, with the aim of introducing its own drones to patrol the disputed waters by 2015. For China then, drones could act as the ideal surveillance tool in the event of a crisis - a proxy weapon to deter assertive behaviour over territories China considers its own - such as the South China Sea and the Senkaku Islands. China’s move into large-scale drone deployment is a significant indication of its military’s growing sophistication. It could not only challenge American dominance in the Asia-Pacific, but could also elevate the threat to any neighbours with which China has territorial disputes, such as Vietnam, Japan, India or the Philippines. Within China, drones are already patrolling the borders, and a navy drone was deployed to the western province of Sichuan to provide aerial surveillance, in the aftermath of last month’s deadly earthquake. However, on a wider geopolitical canvas, Chinese drones could be the tipping point for giving the Chinese an edge in possible future disputes in Asia with the US, as American foreign policy continues its rebalancing trends within the Asia-Pacific. Indeed, China has already made it clear that the drones are capable of carrying bombs and missiles as well as conducting reconnaissance missions, potentially turning them into offensive weapons in the event of a border conflict. The thought of armed UAVs patrolling the skies over disputed territories like the Paracel and the Spratly Islands is enough to cause anxiety among ASEAN members, besides greatly enhancing China’s ocean surveillance. On the other hand, it is equally important to remember that Chinese drones are not yet as sophisticated as their US counterparts in terms of range, hardware, and engines. Official makers COSIC admit that progress is needed in half a dozen major areas, from airframe designs to digital linkups. Secondly, the Chinese drones on display at the Zhuhai Airshow are prototypes and not finished products. Nor have Chinese drones ever been put to military use. In the light of these facts, it is perhaps safe to say that the Chinese agenda for impact is twofold: to maintain surveillance over key territories in dispute, and to stoke fears of a UAV race between the US and China, which has already manifested itself - as evidenced by the DSB report - in the top echelons of the Pentagon.

#### That draws in the US

John Blaxland 13, Senior Fellow at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, the Australian National University, and Rikki Kersten, Professor of modern Japanese political history in the School of International, Political and Strategic Studies at the College of Asia and the Pacific, the Australian National University, 2/13/13, “Escalating territorial tension in East Asia echoes Europe’s descent into world war,” http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/02/13/escalating-territorial-tension-in-east-asia-echoes-europes-descent-into-world-war/

The recent activation of Chinese weapons radars aimed at Japanese military platforms around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands is the latest in a series of incidents in which China has asserted its power and authority at the expense of its neighbours.¶ The radars cue supersonic missile systems and give those on the receiving end only a split second to respond. With Japanese law empowering local military commanders with increased discretion to respond (thanks to North Korea’s earlier provocations), such incidents could easily escalate. In an era of well-established UN-related adjudication bodies like the International Court of Justice (ICJ), how has it come to this? These incidents disconcertingly echo past events. ¶ In the early years of the 20th century, most pundits considered a major war between the great powers a remote possibility. Several incidents prior to 1914 were handled locally or successfully defused by diplomats from countries with alliances that appeared to guarantee the peace. After all, never before had the world been so interconnected — thanks to advanced communications technology and burgeoning trade. But alliance ties and perceived national interests meant that once a major war was triggered there was little hope of avoiding the conflict. Germany’s dissatisfaction with the constraints under which it operated arguably was a principal cause of war in 1914. Similarly, Japan’s dissatisfaction helped trigger massive conflict a generation later. ¶ A century on, many of the same observations can be made in East Asia. China’s rise is coupled with a disturbing surge in jingoism across East and Southeast Asia. China resents the territorial resolution of World War II, in which the United States handed responsibility for the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands to Japan while large chunks of the South China Sea were claimed and occupied by countries that emerged in Southeast Asia’s post-colonial order. Oil and gas reserves are attractive reasons for China to assert itself, but challenging the US place in East Asian waters is the main objective. China resents American ‘re-balancing ‘as an attempt at ‘containment’, even though US dependence on Chinese trade and finance makes that notion implausible. China is pushing the boundaries of the accepted post-Second World War order championed by the United States and embodied by the UN. ¶ China’s rapid rise and long-held grievances mean its powerbrokers are reluctant to use institutions like the ICJ. But China’s assertiveness is driving regional states closer into the arms of the United States. Intimidation and assertive maritime acts have been carried out, ostensibly by elements not linked to China’s armed forces. China’s white-painted Chinese Maritime Services and Fisheries Law Enforcement Command vessels operating in the South China Sea and around the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands have evoked strong reactions. ¶ But Japan’s recent allegation that China used active radars is a significant escalation. Assuming it happened, this latest move could trigger a stronger reaction from Japan. China looks increasingly as if it is not prepared to abide by UN-related conventions. International law has been established mostly by powers China sees as having exploited it during its ‘century of humiliation’. Yet arguably, it is in the defence of these international institutions that the peaceful rise of China is most likely to be assured. China’s refusal to submit to such mechanisms as the ICJ increases the prospect of conflict. ¶ For the moment, Japan’s conservative prime minister will need to exercise great skill and restraint in managing domestic fear and resentment over China’s assertiveness and the military’s hair-trigger defence powers. A near-term escalation cannot be ruled out. After all, Japan recognises that China is not yet ready to inflict a major military defeat on Japan without resorting to nuclear weapons and without triggering a damaging response from the United States. And Japan does not want to enter into such a conflict without strong US support, at least akin to the discreet support given to Britain in the Falklands War in 1982. Consequently, Japan may see an escalation sooner rather than later as being in its interests, particularly if China appears the aggressor. ¶ China’s domestic environment has nurtured jingoism. The Chinese state has built up the public’s appetite for vengeance against Japan by manipulating films and history textbooks. On the other hand, Chinese authorities recognise that the peaceful rise advocated by Deng Xiaoping is not yet complete (militarily at least). In the meantime it is prudent to exercise some restraint to avoid an overwhelming and catastrophic response. If the 1914–18 war taught us anything, it is that the outcome of wars is rarely as proponents conceived at the outset.

#### CONFLICT IN THE SCS ESCALATES TO FULL-SCALE NUCLEAR WAR

STRAITS TIMES 1995

[staff, “Choose Your Own Style of Democracy”, May 21, p. ln// wyo-tjc]

In his speech, Dr Mahathir also painted three scenarios for Asia.

**In the first -the worst possible scenario -Asian countries would go to war against each other, he said. It might start with clashes** between Asian countries **over the Spratly Islands** because of China's insistence that the South China Sea belonged to it along with all the islands, reefs and seabed minerals. **In this scenario, the United States would offer to help** and would be welcomed by Asean, he said. The Pacific Fleet begins to patrol the South China Sea. **Clashes occur between the Chinese navy and the US Navy. China declares war on the US and a full-scale war breaks out with both sides resorting to nuclear weapons.**

#### And, Drone use erodes norms for war and causes global conflict that causes extinction

Falk, 2012

[Richard, Richard Falk is Chair of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and Professor Emeritus at Princeton University, The Menace of Present and Future Drone Warfare, 2-13-12, http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/db\_article.php?article\_id=328] /Wyo-MB

Perhaps, the most important difference between the torture and drone debates has to do with future implications. Although there are some loopholes involving extraordinary rendition and secret CIA operated overseas black sites, torture has been credibly prohibited by President Obama. Beyond this, the repudiation of torture has been understood in a manner that conforms to the general international consensus rather than the narrowed conception insisted upon by the Bush-era legalists. In contrast, drones seem destined to be central to operational planning for future military undertakings of the United States, with sharply escalating appropriations to support both the purchase of increasing numbers and varieties of drone. The government is engaging in a major research program designed to make drones available for an expanding range of military missions and to serve as the foundation of a revolutionary transformation of the way America will fight future wars. Some of these revolutionary features are already evident: casualty-free military missions; subversion of territorial sovereignty; absence of transparency and accountability; further weakening of political constraints on recourse to war.¶ Future war scenarios involve attacks by drones swarms, interactive squadrons of drones re-targeting while in a combat zone without human participation, and covert attacks using mini-drones. A further serious concern is the almost certain access to drone technology by private sectors actors. These musings are not science fiction, but well financed undertakings at or beyond the development stage. It is in these settings of fhere, especially, where the analogy to nuclear weapons seems most pertinent, and discouraging. Given the amount invested and the anticipated profitability and utility of drones, it may already be too late to interrupt their development, deployment, and expanding sphere of use. Unlike nuclear weaponry, already some 50 countries reportedly possess drones, mainly adapted to surveillance. As with nuclear weaponry, the United States, and other leading political actors, will not agree to comprehensive prohibitions on the use of drones for lethal purposes.¶ If this line of reasoning is generally correct, there are two likely futures for attack drones: an unregulated dispersion of the weaponry to public and private actors with likely strategic roles undermining traditional international law limits on war making and public order; or a new non-proliferation regime for drones that permits all states to possess and use surveillance drones within sovereign space and allows some states to make discretionary use of drones globally and for attack purposes until a set on constraining regulations can be agreed upon by a list of designated states. That is, drone military technology will perpetuate the two-tier concept of world order that has taken shape in relation to nuclear weapons, and reflects the consensus that both nuclear disarmament and unrestricted proliferation of nuclear weaponry are unacceptable. In this regard, a counter-proliferation regime for drones is a lesser evil, but still an evil.¶ The technological momentum that has built up in relation to drones is probably too strong to be challenged politically. The military applications are too attractive, the technology is of a cutting edge fantasy quality, the political appeal of war fighting that involves minimum human risk is too great. At the same time, for much of the world this kind of unfolding future delivers a somber message of a terrifying unfolding vulnerability. At present, there seems to be no way to insulate societies from either intrusive and perpetual surveillance or the prospect of targeted killing and devastation conducted from a remote location. It may be contended that such an indictment of drones exaggerates their novelty. Has not the world lived for decades with weapons of mass destruction possessed by a small number of non-accountable governments and deliverable anywhere on the planet in a matter of minutes? This is superficially true, and frightening enough, but the catastrophic quality of nuclear weaponry and its release of atmospheric radioactivity operates as an inhibitor of uncertain reliability, while with drone their comparative inexpensiveness and non-apocalyptic character makes it much easier to drift mindlessly until an unanticipated day of reckoning occurs by which time all possibilities of control will have been long lost.¶ As with nuclear weaponry, climate change, and respect for the carrying capacity of the earth, we who are alive at present may be the last who have even the possibility of upholding the life prospects of future generations. It seems late, but still not too late to act responsibly, but we will not be able to make such claims very much longer. Part of the challenge is undoubtedly structural. For most purposes, global governance depends on cooperation among sovereign states, but in matters of war and peace the world order system remains resolutely vertical and under the control of geopolitical actors, perhaps as few as one, who are unwilling to restrict their military activities to the confines of territorial boundaries, but insist on their prerogative to manage coercively the planet as a whole. When it comes to drones the fate of humanity is squeezed between the impotence of state-centric logic and the grandiose schemes of the geopolitical mentality.

# 2AC

### 2AC – Framework

#### First, Our Interpretation: The resolution asks the question of desirability of USFG action. The Role of ballot is to say yes or no to the action and outcomes of the plan.

#### Second, is reasons to prefer:

#### (\_\_\_) A. Aff Choice, any other framework or role of the ballot moots 9 minutes of the 1ac

#### (\_\_\_) B. It is predictable, the resolution demands USFG action

#### (\_\_\_) C. It is fair, Weigh Aff Impacts and the method of the Affirmative versus the Kritik, it’s the only way to test competition and determine the desirability of one strategy over another

#### Finally, It is a voter for competitive equity—prefer our interpretation, it allows both teams to compete, other roles of the ballot are arbitrary and self serving

#### Perm do both—the aff is key to solve arbitrary use of state power—solves their K impacts

Alford, 2011

[Ryan Patrick, Assistant Professor, Ave Maria School of Law, THE RULE OF LAW AT THE CROSSROADS: CONSEQUENCES OF TARGETED KILLING OF CITIZENS, UTAH LAW REVIEW, NO. 4, Online] /Wyo-MB

The Al-Aulaqi lawsuit makes it clear that the same arguments that the Plantagenet and Stuart kings used in attempts to weaken the Magna Carta and subsequent constitutional protections have been revived in a modern form. The complaint correctly asserts that “[t]he right to life is the most fundamental of all¶ rights.”25 However, the response to the Defendants’ motion to dismiss notes that “the upshot of its arguments is that the executive, [who] must obtain judicial approval to monitor a U.S. citizen’s communications or search his briefcase, may execute that citizen without any obligation to justify its actions to a court or to the public.”26 These arguments were of no avail in the District Court, which held that these allegations were indeed unreviewable in any court, because the executive had asserted, purportedly correctly, that addressing a violation of the right of life involves a nonjusticiable political question. Al-Awlaki was thus told that he was to have no day in court before being killed.27¶ Accordingly, seven hundred years after the executive death warrants issued by King Edward I (and four hundred years after a decisive rejection of King James I’s tentative attempts to revive the practice), we appear to be at a similar crossroads of history. However, it remains to be seen whether carrying out an executive order to kill an American citizen will lead to a backlash that reaffirms the importance of the bulwarks against this exercise of arbitrary power over life and death, or whether it leads to an implicit decision to abandon the rule of law and the constraints on executive power that have defined our constitutional tradition for centuries.¶ The early history of the resistance to arbitrary executive authority is important to the worldview and legal theory of the Framers of the Constitution. This Article argues that this history provides the best lens through which we might scrutinize the constitutionality of the targeted killing of American citizens. In doing so, this Article attempts to bring back to the forefront what is at stake in the Al-Aulaqi lawsuit: not merely the potential harm to the targeted individual, but the damage this might inflict on our constitutional tradition. Specifically, this Article will argue that if the courts uphold a decision declaring that the president’s powers are so broad as to preclude any judicial determination of whether the targeted killing program is prohibited by the Due Process Clause, we stand to lose the benefits of a seven-hundred year old tradition of resistance to arbitrary power.¶

#### And, Drones are inevitable

Henning, 2-20-12

[Job, NYT, Embracing the Drone, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/21/opinion/embracing-the-drone.html?pagewanted=all&\_r=0] /Wyo-MB

Drones — more formally armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, or UAVs — are “in.” Since a Predator strike in Yemen against Al Qaeda in November 2002 — the first known use of a drone attack outside a theater of war — the United States has made extensive use of drones. There were nearly four times as many drone strikes in Pakistan during the first two years of the Obama administration as there were during the entire Bush administration.¶ The United States is now conducting drone strikes in Somalia as well, and their use is expected to dramatically increase in Afghanistan over the next five years as NATO troops withdraw from there.¶ Armed drones are both inevitable, since they allow the fusing of a reconnaissance platform with a weapons system, and, in many respects, highly desirable. They can loiter, observe and strike, with a far more precise application of force. They eliminate risk to pilots and sharply reduce the financial costs of projecting power. Moreover, polls show that a vast majority of Americans support the use of drones.¶

Our aff is a step in the right direction for the k

#### Security is inevitable—rejecting it causes the state to become more interventionist, flipping the impact

**McCormack 10**

[Tara McCormack, ’10, is Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester and has a PhD in International Relations from the University of Westminster. 2010, (Critique, Security and Power: The political limits to emancipatory approaches, page 59-61)]

The following section will briefly raise some questions about the rejection of the old security framework as it has been taken up by the most powerful institutions and states. Here we can begin to see the political limits to critical and emancipatory frameworks. In an international system which is marked by great power inequalities between states, the rejection of the old narrow national interest-based security framework by major international institutions, and the adoption of ostensibly emancipatory policies and policy rhetoric, has the consequence of **problematising weak or unstable states** and allowing international institutions or major states **a more interventionary role**, yet without establishing mechanisms by which the citizens of states being intervened in might have any control over the agents or agencies of their emancipation. Whatever the problems associated with the pluralist security framework **there were at least formal and clear demarcations**. This has the consequence of **entrenching international power inequalities** and allowing for a shift towards a hierarchical international order in which the citizens in weak or unstable states may arguably have even less freedom or power than before. Radical critics of contemporary security policies, such as human security and humanitarian intervention, argue that we see an assertion of Western power and the creation of liberal subjectivities in the developing world. For example, see Mark Duffield’s important and insightful contribution to the ongoing debates about contemporary international security and development. Duffield attempts to provide a coherent empirical engagement with, and theoretical explanation of, these shifts. Whilst these shifts, away from a focus on state security, and the so-called merging of security and development are often portrayed as positive and progressive shifts that have come about because of the end of the Cold War, Duffield argues convincingly that these shifts are highly problematic and unprogressive. For example, the rejection of sovereignty as formal international equality and a presumption of nonintervention has eroded the division between the international and domestic spheres and led to an international environment in which Western NGOs and powerful states have a major role in the governance of third world states. Whilst for supporters of humanitarian intervention this is a good development, Duffield points out the depoliticising implications, drawing on examples in Mozambique and Afghanistan. Duffield also draws out the problems of the retreat from modernisation that is represented by sustainable development. The Western world has moved away from the development policies of the Cold War, which aimed to develop third world states industrially. Duffield describes this in terms of a new division of human life into uninsured and insured life. Whilst we in the West are ‘insured’ – that is we no longer have to be entirely self-reliant, we have welfare systems, a modern division of labour and so on – sustainable development aims to teach populations in poor states how to survive in the absence of any of this. Third world populations must be taught to be self-reliant, they will remain uninsured. Self-reliance of course means **the condemnation of millions to** **a barbarous life of inhuman bare survival**. Ironically, although sustainable development is celebrated by many on the left today, by leaving people to fend for themselves rather than developing a society wide system which can support people, sustainable development actually leads to a less human and humane system than that developed in modern capitalist states. Duffield also describes how many of these problematic shifts are embodied in the contemporary concept of human security. For Duffield, we can understand these shifts in terms of Foucauldian biopolitical framework, which can be understood as a regulatory power that seeks to support life through intervening in the biological, social and economic processes that constitute a human population (2007: 16). Sustainable development and human security are for Duffield technologies of security which aim to *create* self-managing and self-reliant subjectivities in the third world, which can then survive in a situation of serious underdevelopment (or being uninsured as Duffield terms it) without causing security problems for the developed world. For Duffield this is all driven by a neoliberal project which seeks to control and manage uninsured populations globally. Radical critic Costas Douzinas (2007) also criticises new forms of cosmopolitanism such as human rights and interventions for human rights as a triumph of American hegemony. Whilst we are in agreement with critics such as Douzinas and Duffield that these new security frameworks cannot be empowering, and **ultimately lead to more power for powerful states**, we need to understand why these frameworks have the effect that they do. We can understand that these frameworks have political limitations without having to look for a specific plan on the part of current powerful states. In new security frameworks such as human security we can see the political limits of the framework proposed by critical and emancipatory theoretical approaches.

#### Shifting away from the security framework causes conflict and causes intervention – only the perm gives political content to rights

**McCormack 10**

[Tara McCormack, ’10, is Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester and has a PhD in International Relations from the University of Westminster. 2010, (Critique, Security and Power: The political limits to emancipatory approaches, page 59-61)]

A corollary of this retreat from a political interpretation of conflict or social instability, is the delegitimation of social transformation in developing countries. Historically, social and political transformation has often been accompanied by war and strife. By pathologising conflict, the human security framework acts to prohibit social or political transformation, as such changes can only be understood in an entirely negative way (see for further discussion, Cramer 2006). As an important contributor to the human security framework has argued: ‘much human insecurity surely results from structural factors and the distribution of power, which are essentially beyond the reach of individuals’ (Newman, 2004b: 358). Thus to actually overcome human insecurity, collective action and change is needed. But this **may result in** **internal conflict or strife**, **precisely the changes that human security problematises in the first place**. People may be prepared to experience disruptions to their daily existence, or even severe societal conflict or economic deprivation in the pursuit of some other goals which are understood as worthy. The shift away from the pluralist security framework is **highly problematic**. The formal links between the state and its citizens are problematised and weak and failing states are potentially held up to increased international scrutiny and international intervention. International institutions and states have potentially greater freedom to intervene in other states, but with no reciprocal methods of control to replace the old political links between the state and its citizens which are weakened. The shift away from the pluralist security framework and the rhetorical adoption by international institutions and states of a more cosmopolitan security framework **does not challenge contemporary power inequalities, rather it serves to entrench them**. Once we separate rights from any rights bearing subject, these rights are only things that can be given by external agencies, indeed as Chandler (2009) has argued, here the subject is created by external powers. Ultimately the cosmopolitan and emancipatory framework which seeks to give universal human rights through international law or forms of intervention posits abstract rights, seeking to make the world conform to universal human rights and justice in the absence of a political constituency to give it content. Indeed this is seen as necessary in the face of the current global injustices. Yet the problem is that **without a political constituency to give content to those rights these rights are gifts of the powerful, they are closer to charity**. **Rights in themselves, without political form, are of little value**. Here rights are assumed to be able to correct political and economic and social wrongs, such as inequality or disempowerment. Yet such problems are not the result of a lack of rights, and cannot be corrected through rights. A lack of development is a political, economic and social problem (Lewis, 1998; Heartfield, 1996), the lack of rights or equality and empowerment stem from the real inequalities and power relations in the world. Divorcing rights from rights bearing subjects, and positing abstract individual rights that can only be ‘given’ by external agencies, does not enhance rights but ends up formalising real inequality (Lewis, 1998). Indeed, this is precisely what we can see with, for example, human security and contemporary interventions. Here, the old formal equality of the pluralist security framework is no longer relevant and it is increasingly accepted that more powerful states have a right to intervene in other states and to frame certain states as ‘outlaw states’ (Simpson, 2005). Conclusion In this chapter I have argued that there have been significant shifts in the post-Cold War security problematic which cannot be understood in terms of the pluralist security framework. The most striking aspect of the contemporary international security problematic seems to be a shift away from and problematisation of the old security framework in both international and national security policy discourse. I have already discussed that the pluralist security framework with its underlying commitments of non-intervention and sovereign equality is held to be both anachronistic and immoral. This chapter lends support to broadening the initial conclusions drawn about the critical security theory more generally. In their own terms critical security theorists do not seem to be very critical. Critical security theorists **are not** **critically engaging and explaining the contemporary security problematic and offering an alternative** to contemporary power inequalities. A critical question to ask would be why have international institutions and states framed their security policies in terms of a rejection of the pluralist security framework and taken up cosmopolitan rhetoric? Where does this shift come from? Despite their ostensible focus on power and power inequalities, it is striking that critical security theorists exclude the way in which power is being exercised in the post-Cold War international order from their analysis. Were critical security theorists to include this in their analysis they would discover that they seem to be sharing many of the assumptions and aims of the post-Cold War international order. Specifically in the context of the shifting international security problematic, critical security theorists seem to share a normative and ethical critique of the old security framework, combined with a depoliticised account of conflict and social, economic and political instability, and a depoliticised and idealised view of the potential of major international institutions and states to intervene. Moreover, in the behaviour and rhetoric of international institutions, the problematic theoretical implications of critical security theory’s idealised assumptions of the potential of international institutions or transnational organisations to be a force for emancipation and freedom for individuals is shown to be problematic in practice. I have argued that this rejection of the pluralist security framework does not challenge the status quo, but serves to further entrench power inequalities. In fact, it seems to reflect the increased freedom of the international community to intervene in other states.

#### Scenario creation isn't the same as threat construction, it’s crucial to see if policies are a good idea and reduce the risk of nuclear war.

Darryl S.L.**Jarvis** - School of Economics & Political Science, U. of Sydney - **2K3** "Political Risk in International Relations: Empirical Experiences and Conceptual Approaches" School of Economics and Political Science, Working Papers

Scenario generation has its origins in the Cold War when strategic analysts developed the method for helping to think futuristically about driving forces, chains of events, or possible trigger points that might lead to conflict between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, and how, if this occurred, the conflict might proceed. In essence, scenario generation was used to plot logically plausible possibilities and then to model responses, strategic positioning strategies, and to formulate war-fighting and contingency plans. Cold War scenario generation was said to be so successful in modeling circumstances of possible nuclear confrontation with devastating and mass annihilation outcomes, that policy makers were moved to develop the doctrine of MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) and various avoidance strategies to avert the possibility of nuclear confrontation.64 The essence of scenario generation is defined by Geoff Coyle as “a justified and traceable sequence of events which might plausibly be imagined to occur in the future.”65 Importantly, scenarios are not “forecasts, preferences or predictions, but plausible, challenging descriptions of what might happen—in the form of a set of stories about alternative futures.”66 To this end, scenario analysis builds on many of the techniques of the Delphi method. But rather than use intermediaries to design survey questionnaires, identify experts and synthesize and interpret responses, scenario generation allows experts to develop scenarios that lay bare assumptions and the rationale on which interpretations are made, and to develop possible sketches of anticipated events and their probable time lines. The thinking behind this is to allow those who utilize scenarios to make informed decisions and to evaluate the scenarios generated relative to the assumptions on which they have been based. Apart from the military, some of the first institutions to employ scenario generation were commercial organizations. The Royal Dutch Shell Company, for example, pioneered scenario analysis under the auspices of three prominent individuals, Peter Schwartz, Kees van der Heijden and Peter Checkland.67 However, despite some 30 years of scenario generation no formal models exist; indeed the notion of formal techniques is actively resisted. Rather, scenario generation stresses creative, imaginary, challenging discourses about possible futures by looking at the dominant drivers of societal change and risk. These are normally categorized under the well known PEST acronym (political, economic, social and technological factors) as the primary drivers of change and risk, and primary determinations of future worlds, processes and events. Scenarios, however, are not used to write the future but to outline possibilities in relation to key decisions that need to be taken today and of the possible future implications of these decisions given a constantly changing environment. It is, in this sense, an attempt to map possible trajectories and outcomes and logically construct images of cause and effect so that the ramifications of decision making can be understood in terms of its collateral implications and consequences. Peter Schwartz encapsulated the process with the provocative title of his book: The art of the Long View.68 The precise methods associated with scenario generation are numerous and the method employed normally contingent on the intended purpose. Angela Wilkinson and Esther Eidinow, for example, suggest that scenario generation falls into four discrete categories: identified objectives, known constitutive / environmental elements; formally mapped trajectories; scenarios generated. 2. Inductive Method: Development of a series of scenarios from an assemblage of a series of possible events. 3. Incremental Approach: Develops images and maps and describes an “official future”—or the one the organization thinks most likely to emerge, and then develops scenarios on the basis of decisions and how they will interact with the “official future” and their possible consequences and effects. 4. Normative Approach: Starts with a set of characteristics of assumed conditions, or a scenario framed in a forward time horizon, and works backwards to see what it requires (decisions, events, processes, attributes) to get there and if this is feasible.69 Peter Schwartz suggested that just as novels have themes which provide continuity, logical connections, and thus a central narrative enabling interpretation and assessment, scenarios too need a theme. But what? Schwartz suggested several themes; challenge and response, for example: “Perhaps London’s position as a centre for financial services is challenged by Frankfurt or Tokyo; what are the drivers and uncertainties which will affect the viability of a strategic response?” Other themes suggested included winners and losers or infinite possibility. The theme is not important per se, but a tool providing a catalyst or fulcrum via which to stress test the assumptions, the logicality of outcomes, the implications of strategic decisions and the risks and opportunities that might present. As with other third generation approaches, scenario analysis is not a panacea, offering both insights but also displaying limitations. It embraces lateral creative thinking and challenges organizations (commercial, non-commercial and state based) to think about alternative futures or events otherwise not anticipated. To the extent that it is able to do this successfully, it has obvious advantages for contingency planning, risk identification, mitigation planning and risk avoidance. It thus helps various commercial, state and non-commercial actors to navigate uncertainty and risk environments rather than stumble upon them without due thought to management and response. The normal caveats about such approaches apply, however: the quality of the analysis is directly proportionate to the quality of the analysts; interpretative discretion if not managed and appropriately tested and checked, can derail the construction of quality scenarios and their utility.

#### Attempting to solve the root cause of terror is impossible, encourages more terrorism and casualties, only way to defeat is to incapacitate terrorism completely

Dershowitz 02

(Alan M., Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Challenge, Pgs. 24-26//wyo-mm)

The reason terrorism works—and will persist unless there are significant changes in the response to it—is precisely because its perpetrators believe that by murdering innocent civilians they will succeed in attracting the attention of the world to their perceived grievances and their demand that the world “understand them” and “eliminate their root causes.” To submit to this demand is to send the following counterproductive message to those with perceived grievances: if you resort to terrorism, we will try harder to understand your grievances and respond to them than we would have if you employed less violent methods. This is precisely the criterion for success established by the terrorist themselves. Listen to the words of Zehdi Labib Terzi, the Palestine Liberation Organization’s chief observer at the United Nations: “The first several hijackings aroused the consciousness of the world and awakened the media and the world opinion much more—and more effectively—than twenty years of pleading at the United Nations.” If this is true—and the Palestinians surely believe it is—then it should come as no surprise that hijackings and other forms of terrorism increased dramatically after the Palestinians were rewarded for their initial terrorism by increased world attention to its “root causes”—attention that quickly resulted in their leader being welcomed by the U.N. General Assembly, their organization being granted observer status at the United Nations, and their “government” being recognized by dozens of nations.9 We must take precisely the opposite approach to terrorism. We must commit ourselves never to try to understand or eliminate its alleged root causes, but rather to place it beyond the pale of dialogue and negotiation. Our message must be this: even if you have legitimate grievances, if you resort to terrorism as a means toward eliminating them we will simply not listen to you, we will not try to understand you, and we will certainly never change any of our policies toward you. Instead, we will hunt you down and destroy your capacity to engage in terror. Any other approach will encourage the use of terrorism as a means toward achieving ends—whether those ends are legitimate, illegitimate, or anything in between. Nor is there any single substantive root cause of all, or even most, terrorism. If there were—if poverty, for example, were the root cause of all terrorism—then by fixing that problem we could address the root cause of specific terrorist groups without encouraging others. But the reality is that the “root causes” of terrorism are as varied as human nature. Every single “root cause” associated with terrorism has existed for centuries, and the vast majority of groups with equivalent or more compelling causes—and with far greater poverty and disadvantage—have never resorted to terrorism. The search for “root causes” smacks more of after-the-fact political justification than inductive scientific inquiry. The variables that distinguish aggrieved groups willing to target innocent civilians from equally situated groups unwilling to murder children have far less to do with the legitimacy of their causes or the suffering of their people than with religious, cultural, political, and ethical differences.10 They also relate to universalism versus parochialism and especially to the value placed on human life. To focus on such favors as poverty, illiteracy, disenfranchisement, and others all too common around our imperfect world is to fail to explain why so many groups with far greater grievances and disabilities have never resorted to terrorism.11 Instead, the focus must be on the reality that using an act of terrorism as the occasion for addressing the root causes of that act only encourages other groups to resort to terrorism in order to have their root causes advanced on the international agenda. Put another way, the “root cause” of terrorism that must be eliminated is its success.

**Assessing Chinese motivation is possible and epistemologically useful---**

Joseph K. **Clifton 11**,

Claremont McKenna College “DISPUTED THEORY AND SECURITY POLICY: RESPONDING TO “THE RISE OF CHINA”,” 2011, http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1164&context=cmc\_theses

First, **motives can be known**. Mearsheimer is correct in observing that assessing motives can be difficult, but this does not mean that the task is impossible. There clearly are ways of finding out information about the goals of states and the means with which they plan to achieve them. One of the most important roles of intelligence analysts, for example, is to determine state interests and expected behavior based on obtained information. The **possibility** that information may be flawed should **not lead to a rejection of all information**. People make decisions based on less than perfect knowledge all of the time. This ability to know motives extends to future motives, because an analyst can use information such as historical trends to observe consistencies or constant evolutions of motives. Prediction of the future is necessarily less certain in its accuracy, but the prediction can still be made.104¶ Second, even if there is still some uncertainty of motives, the rational response is not to assume absolute aggression. Assuming aggressive motive in a situation of uncertainty ignites the security dilemma, which could actually decrease a state’s security. Mearsheimer calls this tragic, but it is not necessary. An illustrative example is Mearsheimer’s analysis of the German security situation were the United States to withdraw its military protection. Mearsheimer argues that it would be rational for Germany to develop nuclear weapons, since these weapons would provide a deterrent, and it would also be rational for nuclear European powers to wage a preemptive war against Germany to prevent it from developing a nuclear deterrent. 105 This scenario is not rational for either side because it ignores motives. If Germany knows that other states will attack if it were to develop nuclear weapons, then it would not be rational for it to develop nuclear weapons. And if other states know that Germany’s development of nuclear weapons is only as a deterrent, then it would not be rational to prevent German nuclear development. The point is that the security dilemma exists because of a **lack of motivational knowledge,** so the proper response is to try to **enhance understanding of motives,** **not discard motivational knowledge altogether**. Misperception is certainly a problem in international politics, but reducing misperception would allow states to better conform to defensive realist logic, which results in preferable outcomes relative to offensive realism. 106¶ **Assessing motives is vital in the case of the rise of China**, because mutually preferable outcomes **can be achieved** if China is not an aggressive power, as offensive realism would have to assume, but is actually a status quo power with aims that have limited effect on the security of the U.S. and other potentially affected countries. I do not mean here to claim with certainty that China is and will always be a status quo power, and policymakers likely have access to more intentional information than what is publicly known. At the very least, **valuing motivational assessments empowers policymakers** to act on this knowledge, which is preferable because of the possibility of **reducing competition and conflict**.

#### States will inevitably compete—any attempt to deviate causes violence

Mearscheimer 2001

[John J., Prof. of Pol. Sci @ U. of Chicago, The Tragedy of Great Power Warfare]

Great powers fear each other. They regard each other with suspicion, and they worry that war might be in the offing. They anticipate danger. There is little room for trust among states. For sure, the level of fear varies across time and space, but it cannot be reduced to a trivial level. From the perspective of any one great power, all other great powers are potential enemies. This point is illustrated by the reaction of the United Kingdom and France to German reunification at the end of the Col War. Despite the fact that these three states had been close allies for almost forty-five years, both the United Kingdom and France immediately began worrying about the potential danger of a united Germany. The basis for this fear is that in a world where great powers have the capability to attack each other and might have the motive to do so any state bent on survival must be at least suspicious of other states and reluctant to trust them. Add to this the “911” problem – the absence of a central authority to which a threatened state can turn for help – and states have even greater incentive to fear each other. Morever, there is no mechanism, other than the possible self-interest of third parties, for punishing an aggressor. Because it is sometimes difficult to deter potential aggressors, states have ample reason not to trust other states and to be prepared for war with them. The possible consequences of falling victim to aggression further amplify the importance of fear as a motivating force in world politics. Great powers do not compete with each other as if international marketplace. Political competition among states is a much more dangerous business than mere economic intercourse, the former can lead to war, and war often means mass killing on the battlefield as well as mass murder of civilians. In extreme cases, war can even lead to the destruction of states. The horrible consequences of war sometimes cause states to view each other not just as competitors, but as potentially deadly enemies. Political antagonism, in short, tends to be intense because the stakes are great. States in the international system also aim to guarantee their own survival. Because other states are potential threats, and because there is no higher authority to come to their rescue when they dial 911, states cannot depend on others for their own security. Each state tends to see itself as vulnerable and alone, and therefore it aims to provide for its own survival. In international politics, God helps those who help themselves. This emphasis on self-help does not preclude states from forming alliances. But alliances are only temporary marriages of convenience: today’s alliance partner might be tomorrow’s enemy, and today’s enemy might be tomorrow’s alliance partner. For example, the United States fought with China and the Soviet Union against Germany and Japan in World War II, but soon thereafter flip-flopped enemies and partners and allied with West Germany and Japan against China and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. States operating in a self-help world almost always act according to their own self-interest and do not subordinate their interests to the interests of other states, or the so-called international community. The reason is simple: it pays to be selfish in a self-help world. This is true in the short term as well as in the long term, because if a state loses in the short run, it might not be around for the long haul. Apprehensive about the ultimate intentions of other states, and a ware that they oeprate in a self-help system, states quickly understand that the best way to ensure their survival is to be the most powerful state in the system. The stronger a state is relative to its potential rivals, the less likely it is that any of those rivals will attack it and threaten its survival. Weaker states will be reluctant to pick fights with more powerful states because the weaker states are likely to suffer military defeat. Indeed, the bigger the gap in power between any two states, the less likely it is that the weaker will attack the stronger. Neither Canada nor Mexico, for example, would countenance attacking the United States, which is far more powerful than its neighbors. The ideal situation is to be the hegemon in the system. As Immanuel Kant said, “It is the desire of every state, or of its ruler, to arrive at a condition of perpetual peace by conquering the whole world, if that were possible.” Survival would then be almost guaranteed.

#### Realism opens up space for criticism, making alternatives possible

Murray, Professor Politics at the University of Wales, 1997 (Alastair J.H., Reconstructing Realism: Between Power Politics and Cosmopolitan Ethics, p. 193-6)

For realism man remains, in the final analysis, limited by himself. As such, it emphasizes caution, and focuses not merely upon the achievement of long-term objectives, but also upon the resolution of more- immediate difficulties. Given that, in the absence of a resolution of such difficulties, longer-term objectives are liable to be unachievable, realism would seem to offer a more effective strategy of transition than relativism itself. Whereas, in constructivism, such strategies are divorced from an awareness of the immediate problems which obstruct such efforts, and, in critical theoretical perspectives, they are divorced from the current realities of international politics altogether, realism's emphasis on first addressing the immediate obstacles to development ensures that it at least generates strategies which offer us a tangible path to follow. If these strategies perhaps lack the visionary appeal of reflectivist proposals, emphasizing simply the necessity of a restrained moderate diplomacy in order to ameliorate conflicts between states, to foster a degree of mutual understanding in international relations, and, ultimately, to develop a sense of community which might underlie a more comprehensive international society, they at least seek to take advantage of the possibilities of reform in the current international system without jeopardizing the possibilities of order. Realism's gradualist reformism, the careful tending of what it regards as an essentially organic process, ultimately suggests the basis for a more sustainable strategy for reform than reflectivist perspectives, however dramatic, can offer. For the realist, then, if rationalist theories prove so conservative as to make their adoption problematic, critical theories prove so progressive as to make their adoption unattractive. If the former can justifiably be criticized for seeking to make a far from ideal order work more efficiently, thus perpetuating its existence and legitimating its errors, reflectivist theory can equally be criticized for searching for a tomorrow which may never exist, thereby endangering the possibility of establishing any form of stable order in the here and now. Realism's distinctive contribution thus lies in its attempt to drive a path between the two, a path which, in the process, suggests the basis on which some form of synthesis between rationalism and relativism might be achieved. Oriented in its genesis towards addressing the shortcomings in an idealist transformatory project, it is centrally motivated by concern to reconcile vision with practicality, to relate utopia and reality. Unifying technical and a practical stance, it combines aspects of the positivist methodology employed by problem-solving theory with the interpretative stance adopted by critical theory, avoiding the monism of perspective which leads to the self-destructive conflict between the two. Ultimately, it can simultaneously acknowledge the possibility of change in the structure of the international system and the need to probe the limits of the possible, and yet also question the proximity of any international transformation, emphasize the persistence of problems after such a transformation, and serve as a reminder of the need to grasp whatever semblance of order can be obtained in the mean time. Indeed, it is possible to say that realism is uniquely suited to serve as such an orientation. Simultaneously to critique contemporary resolutions of the problem of political authority as unsatisfactory and yet to support them as an attainable measure of order in an unstable world involves one in a contradiction which is difficult to accept. Yet, because it grasps the essential ambiguity of the political, and adopts imperfectionism as its dominant motif, realism can relate these two tasks in a way which allows neither to predominate, achieving, if not a reconciliation, then at least a viable synthesis. Perhaps the most famous realist refrain is that all politics are power politics. It is the all that is important here. Realism lays claim to a relevance across systems, and because it relies on a conception of human nature, rather than a historically specific structure of world politics, it can make good on this claim. If its observations about human nature are even remotely accurate, the problems that it addresses will transcend contingent formulations of the problem of political order. Even in a genuine cosmopolis, conflict might become technical, but it would not be eliminated altogether.67 The primary manifestations of power might become more economic or institutional rather than (para)military but, where disagreements occur and power exists, the employment of the one to ensure the satisfactory resolution of the other is inevitable short of a wholesale transformation of human behaviour. Power is ultimately of the essence of politics; it is not something which can be banished, only tamed and restrained. As a result, realism achieves a universal relevance to the problem of political action which allows it to relate the reformist zeal of critical theory, without which advance would be impossible, with the problem-solver's sensible caution that before reform is attempted, whatever measure of security is possible under contemporary conditions must first be ensured.

#### Focusing on epistemology or ontology selfishly ignores real world problems

Jarvis, 2K – Prof Philosophy @ U South Carolina (Darryl, Studies in International Relations, “International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism”, pg. 2)

While Hoffmann might well be correct, these days one can neither begin nor conclude empirical research without first discussing epistemological orientations and ontological assumptions. Like a vortex, metatheory has engulfed us all and the question of "theory" which was once used as a guide to research is now the object of research. Indeed, for a discipline whose purview is ostensibly outward looldng and international in scope, and at a time of ever encroaching globalization and transnationalism, International Relations has become increasingly provincial and inward looking. Rather than grapple with the numerous issues that confront peoples around the world, since the early 1980s the discipline has tended more and more toward obsessive self-examination.3 These days the politics of famine, environmental degradation, underdevelopment, or ethnic cleansing, let alone the cartographic machinations in Eastern Europe and the reconfiguration of the geo-global political-economy, seem scarcely to concern theorists of international politics who define the urgent task of our time to be one of metaphysical reflection and epistemological investigation. Arguably, theory is no longer concerned with the study of international relations so much as the "manner in which international relations as a discipline, and international relations as a subject matter, have been constructed."4 To be concerned with the latter is to be "on the cutting edge," where novelty has itself become "an appropriate form of scholarship."5

#### Policy analysis should precede discourse – most effective way to challenge power

Jill Taft-Kaufman, Speech prof @ CMU, 1995, Southern Comm. Journal, Spring, v. 60, Iss. 3, “Other Ways”, p pq

The postmodern passwords of "polyvocality," "Otherness," and "difference," unsupported by substantial analysis of the concrete contexts of subjects, creates a solipsistic quagmire. The political sympathies of the new cultural critics, with their ostensible concern for the lack of power experienced by marginalized people, aligns them with the political left. Yet, despite their adversarial posture and talk of opposition, their discourses on intertextuality and inter-referentiality isolate them from and ignore the conditions that have produced leftist politics--conflict, racism, poverty, and injustice. In short, as Clarke (1991) asserts, postmodern emphasis on new subjects conceals the old subjects, those who have limited access to good jobs, food, housing, health care, and transportation, as well as to the media that depict them. Merod (1987) decries this situation as one which leaves no vision, will, or commitment to activism. He notes that academic lip service to the oppositional is underscored by the absence of focused collective or politically active intellectual communities. Provoked by the academic manifestations of this problem Di Leonardo (1990) echoes Merod and laments: Has there ever been a historical era characterized by as little radical analysis or activism and as much radical-chic writing as ours? Maundering on about Otherness: phallocentrism or Eurocentric tropes has become a lazy academic substitute for actual engagement with the detailed histories and contemporary realities of Western racial minorities, white women, or any Third World population. (p. 530) Clarke's assessment of the postmodern elevation of language to the "sine qua non" of critical discussion is an even stronger indictment against the trend. Clarke examines Lyotard's (1984) The Postmodern Condition in which Lyotard maintains that virtually all social relations are linguistic, and, therefore, it is through the coercion that threatens speech that we enter the "realm of terror" and society falls apart. To this assertion, Clarke replies: I can think of few more striking indicators of the political and intellectual impoverishment of a view of society that can only recognize the discursive. If the worst terror we can envisage is the threat not to be allowed to speak, we are appallingly ignorant of terror in its elaborate contemporary forms. It may be the intellectual's conception of terror (what else do we do but speak?), but its projection onto the rest of the world would be calamitous....(pp. 2-27) The realm of the discursive is derived from the requisites for human life, which are in the physical world, rather than in a world of ideas or symbols.(4) Nutrition, shelter, and protection are basic human needs that require collective activity for their fulfillment. Postmodern emphasis on the discursive without an accompanying analysis of how the discursive emerges from material circumstances hides the complex task of envisioning and working towards concrete social goals (Merod, 1987). Although the material conditions that create the situation of marginality escape the purview of the postmodernist, the situation and its consequences are not overlooked by scholars from marginalized groups. Robinson (1990) for example, argues that "the justice that working people deserve is economic, not just textual" (p. 571). Lopez (1992) states that "the starting point for organizing the program content of education or political action must be the present existential, concrete situation" (p. 299). West (1988) asserts that borrowing French post-structuralist discourses about "Otherness" blinds us to realities of American difference going on in front of us (p. 170). Unlike postmodern "textual radicals" who Rabinow (1986) acknowledges are "fuzzy about power and the realities of socioeconomic constraints" (p. 255), most writers from marginalized groups are clear about how discourse interweaves with the concrete circumstances that create lived experience. People whose lives form the material for postmodern counter-hegemonic discourse do not share the optimism over the new recognition of their discursive subjectivities, because such an acknowledgment does not address sufficiently their collective historical and current struggles against racism, sexism, homophobia, and economic injustice. They do not appreciate being told they are living in a world in which there are no more real subjects. Ideas have consequences. Emphasizing the discursive self when a person is hungry and homeless represents both a cultural and humane failure. The need to look beyond texts to the perception and attainment of concrete social goals keeps writers from marginalized groups ever-mindful of the specifics of how power works through political agendas, institutions, agencies, and the budgets that fuel them.

#### Putting Language first cedes politics to the Right

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Weak thinking on the American left is especially glaring after September 11, 2001, as I’ll argue in part III, but this is hardly to say that the right has been more impressive at making the world comprehensible. For decades the right has cultivated its own types of blindness and more than that: having risen to political power, it has been in a position to make blindness the law of the land. The neoconservatives’ foreign policy is largely hubris under a veneer of ideals. The antigovernment dogma of deregulation, privatization, and tax cuts exacerbates economic and social troubles. A culture war against modernity—against secularism, feminism, and racial justice—flies in the face of the West’s distinctive contribution to the history of civilization, namely, the rise of individual rights and reason. To elaborate on these claims is the work of other books. The reasons for the right-wing ascendancy are many, among them—as I argued in letter 7 of Letters to a Young Activist (2003)—the organizational discipline that the right cherishes and the left, at least until recently, tends to abhor. The left’s institutions, in particular, unions, are weak. But my focus here is another reason for the right’s ascendancy: the left’s intellectual disarmament. Some of the deficiency is institutional. Despite efforts to come from behind after the 2000 election, there remain decades’ worth of shortfall in the left’s cultural apparatus. In action-minded think tanks, talk radio and cable television, didactic newspapers, subsidies for writers, and so on, the right has held most of the high cards.1 Left and liberal analyses and proposals do emerge from universities and research centers, but their circulation is usually choked off for lack of focus, imagination, and steady access to mass media—except in the cheapened forms of punditry and agitprop. The right’s masterful apparatus for purveying its messages and organizing for power is not the only reason why the left has suffered defeat after defeat in national politics since the 1960s. The left’s intellectual stockpile has been badly depleted, and new ideas are more heralded than delivered. When the left has thought big, it has been clearer about isms to oppose—mainly imperialism and racism—than about values and policies to further. At that, it has often preferred the denunciatory mode tothe analytical, mustering full-throated opposition rather than full-brained exploration. While it is probably true that many more reform ideas are dreamt of than succeed in circulating through the brain-dead media, the liberal-left conveys little sense of a whole that is more than the sum of its parts. While the right has rather successfully tarred liberals with the brush of “tax-and-spend,” those thus tarred have often been unsure whether to reply “It’s not so” or “It is so, we’re proud to say.” A fair generalization is that the left’s expertise has been constricted in scope, showing little taste for principle and little capacity to imagine a reconstituted nation. It has been conflicted and unsteady about values. It has tended to disdain any design for foreign policy other than “U.S. out,” which is no substitute for a foreign policy—and inconsistent to boot when you consider that the left wants the United States to intervene, for example, to push Israel to end its occupation of the West Bank. All this is to say that the left has been imprisoned in the closed world of outsider politics. Instead of a vigorous quest for testable propositions that could actually culminate in reform, the academic left in particular has nourished what has come to be called “theory”: a body of writing (one can scarcely say its content consists of propositions) that is, in the main, distracting, vague, self-referential, and wrong-headed. “Theory” is chiefly about itself: “thought to the second power,” as Fredric Jameson defined dialectical thinking in an early, dazzling American exemplar of the new theoretical style.2 Even when “theory” tries to reconnect from language and mind to the larger social world, language remains the preoccupation. Michel Foucault became a rock star of theory in the United States precisely because he demoted knowledge to a reflex of power, merely the denominator of the couplet “power/knowledge,” yet his preoccupation was with the knowledge side, not actual social structures. His famous illustration of the power of “theory” was built on Jeremy Bentham’s design of an ideal prison, the Panopticon—a model never built.3 The “linguistic turn” in the social sciences turns out to be its own prison house, equipped with funhouse mirrors but no exit. When convenient, “theory” lays claim to objective truth, but in fact the chief criterion by which it ascended in status was aesthetic, not empirical. Flair matters more than explanatory power. At crucial junctures “theory” consists of flourishes, intellectual performance pieces: things are said to be so because the theorist says so, and even if they are not, isn’t it interesting to pretend? But the problem with “theory” goes beyond opaque writing—an often dazzling concoction of jargon, illogic, and preening. If you overcome bedazzlement at the audacity and glamour of theory and penetrate the obscurity, you find circularity and self-justification, often enough (and self-contradictorily) larded with populist sentimentality about “the people” or “forces of resistance.” You see steadfast avoidance of tough questions. Despite the selective use of the still-prestigious rhetoric of science, the world of “theory” makes only tangential contact with the social reality that it disdains. Politically, it is useless. It amounts to secession from the world where most people live.

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#### You should evaluate ALL epistemology claims through the lens of specificity—Drawing inferences from empirical reality is possible EVEN IF there is no possibility for pure certainty.

Wight 7

[Colin, Department of Politics, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, The University of Exeter, Journal of International Relations and Development, “Inside the epistemological cave all bets are off”, p. asp//wyo-tjc]

Kratochwil’s attempt to push beyond the epistemological wars by remaining inside the epistemological cave is not as puzzling as it might seem given that **he assumes all meta-theoretical debate to be epistemological.** Thus, for example, he argues that he aims to ‘review some of the issues that meta-theorizing was supposed to address and show how this project of securing knowledge through hierarchization and finding absolute foundations failed’(Kr atochwil 2007: 2). Likewise, he suggests that issues such as incommensurability, reductionism and materialism vs idealism are arcane epistemological concerns (Kratochwil 2007: 2). **But in what sense, for example, is the materialism vs idealism question epistemological**? **As it has developed in IR, this is a debate about whether social outcomes are best explained in terms of material factors or ideational ones**.8 A related debate within philosophy attempts to grasp whether being or ideas ultimately matter. **In either debate, no epistemological issues are involved until a specific claim is made.**9 **We can certainly ask any theorist** who takes a position of either side of this debate **how they know (the epistemological question) their chosen factor is determinate in the last instance**. **But their epistemological response** to this question **is not the same as the claim itself, but rather defends the claim on one or other basis**. And we assess these claims on a number of grounds. **Given that we do not know in advance what the epistemological support for any given claim may be**, then it also follows that **scientists cannot afford to be epistemological dogmatists, pinning their colours to only one epistemological mast.** **Philosophers can trouble themselves with convoluted debates about the relative merits of one particular epistemological stance** over another— empiricism vs rationalism, for example—after all it is their job, **but scientists need to be epistemological opportunists** (Einstein 1949) **using a wide range of** epistemological **supports** **and never knowing in advance which one, or which mix of them, is relevant until a specific claim is made**. In some respects, this might seem to place me close to the position that Kratochwil suggests is absurd. For **is not my position a form of ‘anything goes’?** Well, again agreeing with Kratochwil that we should reject traditional logic and its associated yes or no answers, I will reply both yes and no.10 **Yes, it is an ‘anything goes’ position insofar as I reject outright that we need to commit ourselves to any particular epistemological position in advance of making or judging** particular **knowledge claims**. **I can see no good reason for giving any specific epistemological standpoint a position of a priori privilege**. **But I can also answer no because this position does not mean that we are unable to make informed judgements on the basis of the evidence for the claim**. **The fact that philosophers have been unable to provide secure foundations** for one or other epistemological stance **does not alter the fact that we continue to use these positions to get along in the world**. In this respect, I agree completely with Kratochwil’s claim (2007: 11) that b**oth absolute certainty and absolute doubt are impossible positions to hold, and that we ‘go on’in a situation located somewhere in between**. **It may be philosophically naıve of me to claim that if I wish to know how many cars are parked in my drive, then the easiest way is to probably go and look. But I can do this without needing philosophy to prove empiricism infallible.** Equally, in certain circumstances I might be able to ascertain how many cars are in my drive without looking; if, for example, I know that at time T1 that there were three cars and that one went away at time T2, then, if asked at time T3 (assuming these events are sequential), I have a legitimate case to say ‘two’. Of course, in either case, **I could still be wrong but the point is that the claim** about the existence of a certain number of cars **can justifiably be supported on various epistemological grounds and we do not know in advance which will be the most appropriate**. **Hence the context in which the claim emerges is also an important aspect of its validity**. In both cases, there is no doubt that observation or the process of rational deduction is theoretically laden, but **to say that our concepts help carve up the world in certain ways is not to accept that they either determine the physicality of what exists or can,** in all cases, **stop an object from existing**.