# 1NC

**1**

#### Interpretation—“Hostilities” require an active exchange of fire with enemy force[ Blue]

Lee, U.S. Senator from Utah, and Koh, Legal Adviser of the U.S. Department of State and Sterling Professor of International Law at Yale, 6/28/2011

(Mike and Harold, Libya and War Powers, hearing of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, CQ Testimony, Lexis)

First question I'd like to ask you relates to the definition of -- of **the term "hostilities" as used in Section 1541** and elsewhere in the War Powers Resolution. How do you sort of define the term "hostilities" as used in the War Powers Resolution? KOH: As our testimony sets forth, **the effort to define it** -- and -- and this is described in the descriptions of the conversations of Senator Javits, the sponsor, et cetera -- **was to leave the matter for subsequent executive practice**. Senator Corker had mentioned the House conference report had originally proposed the term "armed conflict." There's an irony in the question which is that arm conflicts is term of international law. They deliberately did not import that term into the statute precisely so that international law would not be the controlling factor. And the net result was that in 1975 under the Ford administration -- and -- and you know it well because of service that your own family did in that administration. The Congress -- and this is in the first footnote of my testimony -- invited the legal adviser, my predecessor, Monroe Leigh, **to come forth with a definition of hostilities** from the executive branch applying exactly the judgments that we're describing here. And in my testimony, I described the response that was given by Mr. Leigh and his co-author in which they essentially set forth a standard. And this is on page six of the testimony in which they said the executive branch understands the term "to mean **a situation in which units of U.S. armed forces are actively engaged in exchanges of fire with opposing units of hostile forces**" **and** then said that **the term should not include situations** which were -- ones **in which the nature of the mission is limited**, **where the exposure of U.S. forces is limited**, **where the risk of escalation is limited**, **or** when they're conducting **something less than full military encounters** as opposed to surgical military activity. LEE: Where is that from? Where is that from, Mr. Koh? KOH: It's described on page six of my testimony and it's in the first footnote of a letter from State Department of Legal Adviser Monroe Leigh with regard to the Mayaguez incident to the International Security and Scientific Affairs of the House Committee on International Relations. **It's an important document**, Senator, **because Congress acknowledged that it didn't know what** "**hostilities**" **meant from the legislative history alone**. And **so they invited the executive branch to give clarification**.

#### Violation: Aff increases environmental restrictions on armed forces

**C. REASONS TO PREFER.**

**1. Limits.**

Their interpretation opens aff case choice to any regulation of military activities, including how troops relate to each other interpersonally, like sexual harassment. Case specific preparation would be impossible

**2. Ground**

Changing military activities should be negative counterplan ground against reducing presidential war powers. They steal DA ground on presidential powers by regulating internal military affairs.

**3. Bright line**

Plan should restrict presidential war power to commit troops to hostilities. They have no bright line, which requires subjective judge intervention

**D. TOPICALITY IS A VOTER.**

For reasons of education, fairness and jurisdiction.

# 2

#### **Contemporary security is contingent on lashing out against those who are strange or unknown and is borne out of a fear of certain death that generates ressentiment because we cannot tame death nor truly ever be secure because the will to power ensures that there will always be violence [Green]**

Der Derian, 1995

(James, IR theorist and Philosopher, On Security “The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche and Baudrillard. Ed Ronnie Lipshutz” Online)

Nietzsche transvalues both Hobbes's and Marx's interpretations of security through a genealogy of modes of being. His method is not to uncover some deep meaning or value for security, but to destabilize the intolerable fictional identities of the past which have been created out of fear, and to affirm the creative differences which might yield new values for the future. 33 Originating in the paradoxical relationship of a contingent life and a certain death, the history of security reads for Nietzsche as an abnegation, a resentment and, finally, a transcendence of this paradox. In brief, the history is one of individuals seeking an impossible security from the most radical "other" of life, the terror of death which, once generalized and nationalized, triggers a futile cycle of collective identities seeking security from alien others--who are seeking similarly impossible guarantees. It is a story of differences taking on the otherness of death, and identities calcifying into a fearful sameness. Since Nietzsche has suffered the greatest neglect in international theory, his reinterpretation of security will receive a more extensive treatment here. One must begin with Nietzsche's idea of the will to power, which he clearly believed to be prior to and generative of all considerations of security. In Beyond Good and Evil , he emphatically establishes the primacy of the will to power: "Physiologists should think before putting down the instinct of self-preservation as the cardinal instinct of an organic being. A living thing seeks above all to discharge its strength--life itself is will to power; self-preservation is only one of the most frequent results." 34 The will to power, then, should not be confused with a Hobbesian perpetual desire for power. It can, in its negative form, produce a reactive and resentful longing for only power, leading, in Nietzsche's view, to a triumph of nihilism. But Nietzsche refers to a positive will to power, an active and affective force of becoming, from which values and meanings--including self-preservation--are produced which affirm life. Conventions of security act to suppress rather than confront the fears endemic to life, for ". . . life itself is essentially appropriation, injury, overpowering of what is alien and weaker; suppression, hardness, imposition of one's own forms, incorporation and at least, at its mildest, exploitation--but why should one always use those words in which slanderous intent has been imprinted for ages." 35 Elsewhere Nietzsche establishes the pervasiveness of agonism in life: "life is a consequence of war, society itself a means to war." 36 But the denial of this permanent condition, the effort to disguise it with a consensual rationality or to hide from it with a fictional sovereignty, are all effects of this suppression of fear. The desire for security is manifested as a collective resentment of difference--that which is not us, not certain, not predictable. Complicit with a negative will to power is the fear-driven desire for protection from the unknown. Unlike the positive will to power, which produces an aesthetic affirmation of difference, the search for truth produces a truncated life which conforms to the rationally knowable, to the causally sustainable. In The Gay Science , Nietzsche asks of the reader: "Look, isn't our need for knowledge precisely this need for the familiar, the will to uncover everything strange, unusual, and questionable, something that no longer disturbs us? Is it not the instinct of fear that bids us to know? And is the jubilation of those who obtain knowledge not the jubilation over the restoration of a sense of security?" 37 The fear of the unknown and the desire for certainty combine to produce a domesticated life, in which causality and rationality become the highest sign of a sovereign self, the surest protection against contingent forces. The fear of fate assures a belief that everything reasonable is true, and everything true, reasonable. In short, the security imperative produces, and is sustained by, the strategies of knowledge which seek to explain it. Nietzsche elucidates the nature of this generative relationship in The Twilight of the Idols : The causal instinct is thus conditional upon, and excited by, the feeling of fear. The "why?" shall, if at all possible, not give the cause for its own sake so much as for a particular kind of cause --a cause that is comforting, liberating and relieving. . . . That which is new and strange and has not been experienced before, is excluded as a cause. Thus one not only searches for some kind of explanation, to serve as a cause, but for a particularly selected and preferred kind of explanation--that which most quickly and frequently abolished the feeling of the strange, new and hitherto unexperienced: the most habitual explanations. 38 A safe life requires safe truths. The strange and the alien remain unexamined, the unknown becomes identified as evil, and evil provokes hostility--recycling the desire for security. The "influence of timidity," as Nietzsche puts it, creates a people who are willing to subordinate affirmative values to the "necessities" of security: "they fear change, transitoriness: this expresses a straitened soul, full of mistrust and evil experiences." 39 The unknowable which cannot be contained by force or explained by reason is relegated to the off-world. "Trust," the "good," and other common values come to rely upon an "artificial strength": "the feeling of security such as the Christian possesses; he feels strong in being able to trust, to be patient and composed: he owes this artificial strength to the illusion of being protected by a god." 40 For Nietzsche, of course, only a false sense of security can come from false gods: "Morality and religion belong altogether to the psychology of error : in every single case, cause and effect are confused; or truth is confused with the effects of believing something to be true; or a state of consciousness is confused with its causes." 41 Nietzsche's interpretation of the origins of religion can shed some light on this paradoxical origin and transvaluation of security. In The Genealogy of Morals , Nietzsche sees religion arising from a sense of fear and indebtedness to one's ancestors: The conviction reigns that it is only through the sacrifices and accomplishments of the ancestors that the tribe exists --and that one has to pay them back with sacrifices and accomplishments: one thus recognizes a debt that constantly grows greater, since these forebears never cease, in their continued existence as powerful spirits, to accord the tribe new advantages and new strength. 42 Sacrifices, honors, obedience are given but it is never enough, for The ancestors of the most powerful tribes are bound eventually to grow to monstrous dimensions through the imagination of growing fear and to recede into the darkness of the divinely uncanny and unimaginable: in the end the ancestor must necessarily be transfigured into a god . 43 As the ancestor's debt becomes embedded in institutions, the community takes on the role of creditor. Nietzsche mocks this originary, Hobbesian moment: to rely upon an "artificial strength": "the feeling One lives in a community, one enjoys the advantages of communality (oh what advantages! we sometimes underrate them today), one dwells protected, cared for, in peace and trustfulness, without fear of certain injuries and hostile acts to which the man outside , the "man without peace," is exposed . . . since one has bound and pledged oneself to the community precisely with a view to injury and hostile acts. 44 The establishment of the community is dependent upon, indeed it feeds upon, this fear of being left outside. As the castle wall is replaced by written treaty, however, and distant gods by temporal sovereigns, the martial skills and spiritual virtues of the noble warrior are slowly debased and dissimulated. The subject of the individual will to power becomes the object of a collective resentment. The result? The fear of the external other is transvalued into the "love of the neighbor" quoted in the opening of this section, and the perpetuation of community is assured through the internalization and legitimation of a fear that lost its original source long ago. This powerful nexus of fear, of external and internal otherness, generates the values which uphold the security imperative. Indeed, Nietzsche locates the genealogy of even individual rights, such as freedom, in the calculus of maintaining security: - My rights - are that part of my power which others not merely conceded me, but which they wish me to preserve. How do these others arrive at that? First: through their prudence and fear and caution: whether in that they expect something similar from us in return (protection of their rights); or in that they consider that a struggle with us would be perilous or to no purpose; or in that they see in any diminution of our force a disadvantage to themselves, since we would then be unsuited to forming an alliance with them in opposition to a hostile third power. Then : by donation and cession. 45 The point of Nietzsche's critical genealogy is to show that the perilous conditions that created the security imperative--and the western metaphysics that perpetuate it--have diminished if not disappeared; yet, the fear of life persists: "Our century denies this perilousness, and does so with a good conscience: and yet it continues to drag along with it the old habits of Christian security, Christian enjoyment, recreation and evaluation." 46 Nietzsche's worry is that the collective reaction against older, more primal fears has created an even worse danger: the tyranny of the herd, the lowering of man, the apathy of the last man which controls through conformity and rules through passivity. The security of the sovereign, rational self and state comes at the cost of ambiguity, uncertainty, paradox--all that makes a free life worthwhile. Nietzsche's lament for this lost life is captured at the end of Daybreak in a series of rhetorical questions: Of future virtues--How comes it that the more comprehensible the world has grown the more solemnities of every kind have decreased? Is it that fear was so much the basic element of that reverence which overcame us in the presence of everything unknown and mysterious and taught us to fall down before the incomprehensible and plead for mercy? And has the world not lost some of its charm for us because we have grown less fearful? With the diminution of our fearfulness has our own dignity and solemnity, our own fearsomeness , not also diminished? 47 It is of course in Nietzsche's lament, in his deepest pessimism for the last man, that one finds the celebration of the overman as both symptom and harbinger of a more free-spirited yet fearsome age. Dismissive of utopian engineering, Nietzsche never suggests how he would restructure society; he looks forward only so far as to sight the emergence of "new philosophers" (such as himself?) who would restore a reverence for fear and reevaluate the security imperative. Nietzsche does, however, go back to a pre-Christian, pre-Socratic era to find the exemplars for a new kind of security. In The Genealogy of Morals , he holds up Pericles as an example, for lauding the Athenians for their "rhathymia "--a term that incorporates the notion of "indifference to and contempt for security." 48 It is perhaps too much to expect Nietzsche's message to resonate in late modern times, to expect, at the very time when conditions seem most uncertain and unpredictable, that people would treat fear as a stimulus for improvement rather than cause for retrenchment. Yet Nietzsche would clearly see these as opportune times, when fear could be willfully asserted as a force for the affirmation of difference, rather than canalized into a cautious identity constructed from the calculation of risks and benefits.

**Exterminate Unkown !**

**K of Causality:**

Turn Strange to Familiar

**Negative vs Postive W2P**

Negative Will to Pwr:

Supress Fear

Sovereignty

Rational Consensus

Positive Will to Pwr:

Embrace Fear

Becoming

Aesthetic Affirm of Difference

Security Bad

🡪 ficiontal ID from fear

History of security is resentment

Generalize the fear of death into the fear of difference

**K of Transcend:**

Causality wrong – never answer cause-effect question. All things are effect of discourse

No bounded truth

**Geneology of Security**

State has taken the place of God

Communities bounded by fear: external and internal threats.

War no longer beautiful.

**NV2L !**

**Herd outweighs:**

Fear controls through conformity and rules through docile subjects.

Security at the cost of meaningful life

**Now key:**

Conditions uncertain and predicable.

#### These discourses of danger allow for the constructions of threats against the humanity when the real risk is nil, it also allow for the state to go after its geopolitical interests

Jackson 05

[Richard Jackson, Lecturer in International Security at The University of Manchester, “Security, Democracy, and the Rhetoric of Counter-Terrorism”, Democracy and Security, Volume 1, Issue 2, 2005, pages 147-171, Taylor and Francis Online Database, \\wyo-bb]

As David Campbell has shown, discourses of danger and foreign threat have been integral in constituting and disciplining American identity as practiced through its foreign policy. 43 Collectivities, especially those as disparate and diverse as America, are often only unified by an external threat or danger; in this sense, threat creation can be functional to political life. Historically, the American government has relied on the discourse of threat and danger on numerous occasions: the “red scares” of the native Americans who threatened the spread of peaceful civilization along the Western frontier, the workers’ unrest at the time of the Bolshevik Revolution, and the threat to the American way of life during the cold war; the threat of “rogue states” like Libya, Panama, Iran, North Korea, and Iraq; and the threats posed by the drug trade, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and now of course, terrorism. These discourses of danger are scripted for the purposes of maintaining inside/outside, self/other boundaries—they write American identity—and for enforcing unity on an unruly and (dis)United States.¶ Of course, there are other more mundane political functions for constructing fear and moral panic: provoking and allaying anxiety to maintain quiescence, de-legitimizing dissent, elevating the status of security actors, diverting scarce resources into ideologically driven political projects, distracting the public from more complex and pressing social ills. 44 This is not to say that terrorism poses no real threat; the dangers can plainly be seen in the images of falling bodies and the piles of rubble. Rather, it is to point out that dangers are those facets of social life interpreted as threats (in one sense, dangers do not exist objectively, independent of perception), and what is interpreted as posing a threat may not always correspond to the realities of the actual risk of harm. Illegal narcotics, for example, pose less of a risk than the abuse of legal drugs, but a “war on drugs” makes it otherwise. Similarly, the “war on terrorism” is a multi-billion dollar exercise to protect Americans from a danger that, excluding the September 11, 2001 attacks, killed less people per year over several decades than bee stings and lightening strikes. Even in 2001, America's worst year of terrorist deaths, the casualties from terrorism were still vastly outnumbered by deaths from auto-related accidents, gun crimes, alcohol and tobacco-related illnesses, suicides, and a large number of diseases like influenza, cancer, and heart disease. Globally, terrorism, which kills a few thousand per year, pales into insignificance next to the 40,000 people who die every day from hunger, the half a million people who die every year from small wars, the 150,000 annual deaths from increased diseases caused by global warming, 45 and the millions who die from AIDS. And yet, the whole world is caught up in the global “war on terrorism” whose costs so far run into the hundreds of billions. In a world of multiple threats, many of which pose a far greater risk to individual safety, the fact that terrorism is widely seen as posing the greatest and most immediate threat is due to the deliberate construction of a discourse of danger.¶ The initial construction of the threat of terrorism involved fixing the attacks of 9/11 as the start of a whole new “age of terror,” rather than as an extraordinary event, or an aberration (out of 18,000 terrorist attacks since 1968 only a dozen or so have caused more than 100 deaths; high-casualty terrorist attacks are extremely rare and 9/11 was the rarest of the rare). Instead, the attacks were interpreted as the dawning of a new era of terrorist violence that knew no bounds. As Bush stated, “All of this was brought upon us in a single day—and night fell on a different world.” 46 Vice-President Dick Cheney made it even clearer:¶ Today, we are not just looking at a new era in national security policy, we are actually living through it. The exact nature of the new dangers revealed themselves on September 11, 2001, with the murder of 3,000 innocent, unsuspecting men, women, and children right here at home. 47¶ This construct was only possible by severing all links between this act of terrorism and countless others that had preceded it, and by de-contextualizing it from the history of al Qaeda's previous attacks. As we saw earlier, “9/11” was constructed without a pre-history; it stands alone as a defining act of cruelty and evil. This break with the past makes it possible to assign it future significance as the start of “super-terrorism,” “catastrophic terrorism,” or simply “the new terrorism.” Logically, if there's a new super-terrorism, then a new super-war-on-terrorism seems reasonable.¶ A second feature of this discourse of danger is the hyperbolic language of threat. It is not just a threat of sudden violent death, it is actually a “threat to civilization,” a “threat to the very essence of what you do,” 48 a “threat to our way of life,” 49 and a threat to “the peace of the world.” 50 The notion of a “threat to our way of life” is a Cold War expression that vastly inflates the danger: instead of a tiny group of dissidents with resources that do not even begin to rival that of the smallest states, it implies that they are as powerful as the Soviet empire was once thought to be with its tens of thousands of missiles and its massive conventional army. Moreover, as Cheney reminds us, the threat of terrorism, like the threat of Soviet nuclear weapons, is supremely catastrophic:¶ The attack on our country forced us to come to grips with the possibility that the next time terrorists strike, they may well be armed with more than just plane tickets and box cutters. The next time they might direct chemical agents or diseases at our population, or attempt to detonate a nuclear weapon in one of our cities. [ … ] no rational person can doubt that terrorists would use such weapons of mass murder the moment they are able to do so. [ … ] we are dealing with terrorists [ … ] who are willing to sacrifice their own lives in order to kill millions of others. 51¶ In other words, not only are we threatened by evil terrorists eager to kill millions (not to mention civilization itself, the peace of the world, and the American way of life), but this is a rational and reasonable fear to have. We should be afraid, very afraid: “If they had the capability to kill millions of innocent civilians, do any of us believe they would hesitate to do so?.” 52¶ As if this was not enough to spread panic throughout the community, officials then go to great lengths to explain how these same terrorists (who are eager to kill millions of us) are actually highly sophisticated, cunning, and extremely dangerous. As John Ashcroft put it: “The highly coordinated attacks of September 11 make it clear that terrorism is the activity of expertly organized, highly coordinated, and well–financed organizations and networks.” 53 Moreover, this is not a tiny and isolated group of dissidents, but “there are thousands of these terrorists in more than 60 countries” and they “hide in countries around the world to plot evil and destruction”; 54 or, like the plot of a popular novel: “Thousands of dangerous killers, schooled in the methods of murder, often supported by outlaw regimes, are now spread throughout the world like ticking time bombs, set to go off without warning.” 55 In other speeches, officials inflate the numbers of the terrorists to “tens of thousands” of killers spread throughout the world.¶ The next layer of fear is the notion that the threat resides within; that it is no longer confined outside the borders of the community, but that it is inside of us and all around us. As Ashcroft constructs it:¶ The attacks of September 11 were acts of terrorism against America orchestrated and carried out by individuals living within our borders. Today's terrorists enjoy the benefits of our free society even as they commit themselves to our destruction. They live in our communities—plotting, planning, and waiting to kill Americans again [ … ] a conspiracy of evil. 56¶ Like the “red scares” of the past, the discourse of danger is deployed in this mode to enforce social discipline, mute dissent, and increase the powers of the national security state. It is designed to bring the war home, or, as Bush puts it: “And make no mistake about it, we've got a war here just like we've got a war abroad.” 57¶ In another genealogical link to previous American foreign policy, the threat of terrorism is from a very early stage reflexively conflated with the threat of “weapons of mass destruction” and the “rogue states” who might hand them on to terrorists. According to the discourse, rogue states are apparently eager to assist terrorists in killing millions of Americans. As Bush stated in his now infamous “axis of evil” speech,¶ States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. 58¶ This is actually an ingenious discursive slight of hand which allows America to re-target its military from a war against a tiny group of individual dissidents scattered across the globe, to territorially defined states who also happen to be the target of American foreign policy. It transforms the “war against terrorism” from a largely hidden and unspectacular intelligence gathering and criminal apprehension program, to a flag-waving public display of awesome military firepower that re-builds a rather dented American self-confidence. More importantly, it allows for the simultaneous pursuit of geo-strategic objectives in crucial regions such as the Middle East under the banner of the “war on terrorism.” 59¶ Instead of reassuring the nation that the attacks were an exceptional and a unique event in a long line of terrorist attacks against America (that have thus far failed to overthrow freedom), the Bush administration chose instead to construct them as the start of a whole new age of terror—the start of a deadly new form of violence directed at Americans, civilized people all over the world, freedom, and democracy. The Bush administration could have chosen to publicize the conclusions of the Gilmore Commission in 1999, a Clinton-appointed advisory panel on the threat of WMD falling into the hands of terrorists. Its final report concluded that “rogue states would hesitate to entrust such weapons to terrorists because of the likelihood that such a group's actions might be unpredictable even to the point of using the weapon against its sponsor,” and they would be reluctant to use such weapons themselves due to “the prospect of significant reprisals.” 60 Condoleeza Rice herself wrote in 2000 that there was no need to panic about rogue states, because “if they do acquire WMD—their weapons will be unusable because any attempt to use them will bring national obliteration.” 61 Instead, officials engaged in the deliberate construction of a world of unimaginable dangers and unspeakable threats; they encouraged social fear and moral panic. Within the suffocating confines of such an emergency, where Americans measure their daily safety by the color of a national terrorist alert scale (reflected in the glow of every traffic light), it seems perfectly reasonable that the entire resources of the state be mobilized in defense of the homeland, and that pre-emptive war should be pursued. It also seems reasonable that national unity be maintained and expressions of dissent curtailed.¶ The reality effect of scripting such a powerful danger moreover, can be seen in the two major wars fought in two years (followed by costly ongoing “security operations” in each of those states to root out the terrorists), the arrest of thousands of suspects in America and around the world, and the vast sums spent unquestioningly (even by the Democrats) on domestic security, border control and the expansion of the military. Only the “reality” of the threat of terrorism allows such extravagance; in fact, the manner in which the threat has been constructed—catastrophic, ubiquitous, and ongoing—normalizes the entire effort. If an alternative interpretation of the threat emerged to challenge the dominant orthodoxy (that it was vastly over-blown, or misdirected, for example), support for the consumption of such massive amounts of resources might be questioned and the political order destabilized. A massive threat of terrorism then, is necessary for the continued viability of the “war on terrorism”; writing the threat of terrorism is co-constitutive of the practice of counter-terrorism.

#### Fantasizing about an ideal world causes us to hate this world because it causes us pain we can’t deal with. This association of all that is good as not of this world expresses a hatred for the only one we’ve got—turns case. Only our relationship to life can escape this paradox of resentment.

Turlani in 2003

(Aydan, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences Faculty of Letters and Sciences   
Istanbul Technical University, “Nietzsche and the Later Wittgenstein: An Offense to the Quest for Another World”, The Journal of Nietzsche Studies, 26 (2003), 55-63)

The craving for absolutely general specifications results in doing metaphysics. Unlike Wittgenstein, Nietzsche provides an account of how this craving arises. The creation of the two worlds such as apparent and real world, conditioned and unconditioned world, being and becoming is the creation of the *ressentiment* of metaphysicians. Nietzsche says, "to imagine another, more valuable world is an expression of hatred for a world that makes one suffer: the ressentiment of metaphysicians against actuality is here creative" (*WP* III 579). Escaping from this world because there is grief in it results in asceticism. **[End Page 61]** Paying respect to the ascetic ideal is longing for the world that is pure and denaturalized. Craving for frictionless surfaces, for a transcendental, pure, true, ideal, perfect world, is the result of the ressentiment of metaphysicans who suffer in this world. Metaphysicians do not affirm this world as it is, and this paves the way for many explanatory theories in philosophy. In criticizing a philosopher who pays homage to the ascetic ideal, Nietzsche says, "he wants *to escape from torture*" (*GM* III 6). The traditional philosopher or the ascetic priest continues to repeat, "'My kingdom is not of *this* world'" (*GM* III 10). This is a longing for another world in which one does not suffer. It is to escape from this world; to create another illusory, fictitious, false world. This longing for "the truth" of a world in which one does not suffer is the desire for a world of constancy. It is supposed that contradiction, change, and deception are the causes of suffering; in other words, the senses deceive; it is from the senses that all misfortunes come; reason corrects the errors; therefore reason is the road to the constant. In sum, this world is an error; the world as it ought to be exists. This will to truth, this quest for another world, this desire for the world as it ought to be, is the result of unproductive thinking. It is unproductive because it is the result of avoiding the creation of the world as it ought to be. According to Nietzsche, the will to truth is "the impotence of the will to create" (*WP* III 585). Metaphysicians end up with the creation of the "true" world in contrast to the actual, changeable, deceptive, self-contradictory world. They try to discover the true, transcendental world that is already there rather than creating a world for themselves. For Nietzsche, on the other hand, the transcendental world is the "denaturalized world" (*WP* III 586). ¶ The way out of the circle created by the *ressentiment* of metaphysicians is the will to life rather than the will to truth. The will to truth can be overcome only through a Dionysian relationship to existence. This is the way to a new philosophy, which in Wittgenstein's terms aims "to show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle" (*PI* §309).

#### The creature of ressentiment seeks a blame for its misfortune—this blame creates its desire for endless violence and revenge against who is the cause of misfortune—it will portray the other as evil to ensure its moral calculus seems good

Deleuze 83 [Giles Deleuze, Prof of Philosophy @ U of Lyon, Paris, and Lycees, “Nietzsche and Philosophy,” p. 116-119]

We must not be deceived by the expression "spirit of revenge". Spirit does not make revenge an intention, an unrealised end but, on the contrary, gives revenge a means. We have not understood ressentiment if we only see it as a desire for revenge, a desire to rebel and triumph. The topological principle of ressentiment entails a state of real forces: the state of reactive forces that no longer let themselves act, that evade the action of active forces. It gives revenge a means: a means of reversing the normal relation of active and reactive forces. This is why ressentiment itself is always a revolt and always the triumph of this revolt. Ressentiment is the triumph of the weak as weak, the revolt of the slaves and their victory as slaves. It is in their victory that the slaves form a type. The type of the master (the active type) is defined in terms of the faculty of forgetting and the power of acting reactions. The type of slave (the reactive type) is defined by a prodigious memory, by the power of ressentiment; several characteristics which determine this second type follow from this.¶ Inability to admire, respect or love (BGE 260, GM I 10). The memory of traces is itself full of hatred. Hatred or revenge is hidden even in the most tender and most loving memories. The ruminants of memory disguise this hatred by a subtle operation which consists in reproaching themselves with everything with which, in fact, they reproach the being whose memory they pretend to cherish. For this reason we must beware of those who condemn themselves before that which is good or beautiful, claiming not to understand, not to be worthy: their modesty is frightening. What hatred of beauty is hidden in their declarations of inferiority. Hating all that is experienced as lovable or admirable, diminishing by buffoonery or base interpreta- tions, seeing traps to be avoided in all things: always saying, "please don't engage me in a battle of wits". What is most striking in the man of ressentiment is not his nastiness but his disgusting malevolence, his capacity for disparagement. Nothing can resist it. He does not even respect his friends or even his enemies. He does not even respect misfortune or its causes . 9 Think of the Trojans who, in Helen, respected and admired the cause of their own misfortune. But the man of ressentiment must turn misfortune into something mediocre, he must recriminate and distribute blame: look at his inclination to play down the value of causes, to make misfortune "someone's fault". By contrast, the aristocrat's respect for the causes of misfortune goes together with an ability to take his own misfortunes seriously. The way in which the slave takes his misfortunes seriously shows a difficult digestion and a base way of thinking which is incapable of feeling respect.¶ "Passivity". In ressentiment happiness "appears essentially as a narco- tic drug, rest, peace, `sabbath', slackening of tension and relaxing of imbs, in short passively" (GM I 10 p. 38). In Nietzsche "passive" does not mean "non-active"; "non-active" means "reactive"; but "passive" means "non-acted". The only thing that is passive is reac- tion insofar as it is not acted. The term "passive" stands for the triumph of reaction, the moment when, ceasing to be acted, it becomes a ressentiment. The man of ressentiment does not know how to and does not want to love, but wants to be loved. He wants to be loved, fed, watered, caressed and put to sleep. He is the impotent, the dyspeptic, the frigid, the insomniac, the slave. Furthermore the man of ressentiment is extremely touchy: faced with all the activities he cannot undertake he considers that, at the very least, he ought to be compensated by benefiting from them. He therefore considers it a proof of obvious malice that he is not loved, that he is not fed. The man of ressentiment is the man of profit and gain. Moreover, ressenti-ment could only be imposed on the world through the triumph of the principle of gain, by making profit not only a desire and a way of thinking but an economic, social and theological system, a complete system, a divine mechanism. A failure to recognise profit — this is the theological crime and the only crime against the spirit. It is in this sense that slaves have a morality, and that this morality is that of utility (BGE 260). We asked: who considers action from the standpoint of its utility or harmfulness? And even: who considers action from the standpoint of good and evil, of praiseworthiness and blameworthi- ness? If we review all the qualities that morality calls "praiseworthy" or "good" in themselves, for example, the incredible notion of disin-terestedness, we realise that they conceal the demands and recrimina- tions of a passive third party: it is he who claims an interest in actions that he does not perform; he praises the disinterested character of precisely the actions from which he benefits.'° Morality in itself conceals the utilitarian standpoint; but utilitarianism conceals the standpoint of the passive third party, the triumphant standpoint of a slave who intervenes between masters.¶ The imputation of wrongs, the distribution of responsibilities, perpetual accusation. All this replaces aggression. "The aggressive pathos belongs just as necessarily to strength as vengefulness and rancour belong to weakness" (EH I 7 p. 232). Considering gain as a right, considering it a right to profit from actions that he does not perform, the man of ressentiment breaks out in bitter reproaches as soon as his expectations are disappointed. And how could they not be disap- pointed, since frustration and revenge are the a prioris of ressentiment? "It is your fault if no one loves me, it is your fault if I've failed in life and also your fault if you fail in yours, your misfortunes and mine are equally your fault." Here we rediscover the dreadful feminine power of ressentiment: it is not content to denounce crimes and criminals, it wants sinners, people who are responsible. We can guess what the creature of ressentiment wants: he wants others to be evil, he needs others to be evil in order to be able to consider himself good. You are evil, therefore I am good; this is the slave's fundamental formula, it expresses the main point of ressentiment from the typological point of view, it summarises and brings together all the preceding characteris- tics. This formula must be compared with that of the master: I am good, therefore you are evil. The difference between the two measures the revolt of the slave and his triumph: "This inversion of the value- positing eye . . . is of the essence of ressentiment: in order to exist, slave morality always first needs a hostile world" (GM I 10 pp. 36-37). The slave needs, to set the other up as evil from the outset.

#### **Value is Not Based on Duration of life – trying to evade death is not the same as living life—only by acknowledging that death is inevitable can we have value in life**

Razinsky, 2k9(Liran Razinsky. “How to Look Death in the Eyes: Freud and Bataille” SubStance, Issue 119 (Volume 38, Number 2). 2009. Pg 76-81 ProjectMuse)

Thus far we have mainly discussed our first two questions: the limitation in imagining death and the possible solution through a form of praxis, in either a channeled, ritualized or a spontaneous encounter with the death of an other, overcoming the paradox of the impossibility of representation by involving oneself through deep identification. We shall now turn to our third question, of the value of integrating death into our thoughts. We have seen that Bataille’s perspective continuously brings up the issue of the value of approaching death. The questions of whether we can grasp death and, if we can, how, are not merely abstract or neutral ones. The encounter with death, that we now see is possible, seems more and more to emerge as possessing a positive value, indeed as fundamental. What we shall now examine is Freud’s attempt to address that positive aspect directly, an attempt that betrays, however, a deep ambivalence. As mentioned, Freud’s text is very confused, due to true hesitation between worldviews (see Razinsky, “A Struggle”). One manifestation of this confusion is Freud’s position regarding this cultural-conventional attitude: on the one hand he condemns it, yet on the other hand he accepts it as natural and inevitable. For him, it results to some extent from death’s exclusion from unconscious thought (“Thoughts” 289, 296-97). Death cannot be represented and is therefore destined to remain foreign to our life.17 But then Freud suddenly recognizes an opposite necessity: not to reject death but to insert it into life. Not to distance ourselves from it, but to familiarize ourselves with it: But this attitude [the cultural-conventional one] of ours towards death has a powerful effect on our lives. **Life is impoverished, it loses in interest, when the highest stake in the game of living, life itself, may not be risked**. It becomes as shallow and empty as, let us say, an American flirtation, in which it is understood from the first that nothing is to happen, as contrasted with a Continental love-affair in which both partners must constantly bear its serious consequences in mind. Our emotional ties, the unbearable intensity of our grief, make us disinclined to court danger for ourselves and for those who belong to us. We dare not contemplate a great many undertakings which are dangerous but in fact indispensable, such as attempts at artificial flight, expeditions to distant countries or experiments with explosive substances. We are paralyzed by the thought of who is to take the son’s place with his mother, the husband’s with his wife, the father’s with his children, if a disaster should occur. **Thus the tendency to exclude death from our calculations in life brings in its train many other renunciations and exclusions**. Yet the motto of the Hanseatic League ran: ‘Navigare necesse est, vivere non necesse.’ (“It is necessary to sail the seas, it is not necessary to live.”) (“Thoughts” 290-91) Readers unfamiliar with Freud’s paper are probably shaking their heads in disbelief. Is it Freud who utters these words? Indeed, the oddity of this citation cannot be over-estimated. It seems not to belong to Freud’s thought. One can hardly find any other places where he speaks of such an intensification of life and fascination with death, and praises uncompromising risk-taking and the neglect of realistic considerations. In addition to being unusual, the passage itself is somewhat unclear.18 The examples—not experimenting with explosive substances—seem irrelevant and unconvincing. The meaning seems to slide. It is not quite clear if the problem is that we do not bring death into our calculations, as the beginning seems to imply, or that, rather, we actually bring it into our calculations too much, as is suggested at the end But what I wish to stress here is that the passage actually opposes what Freud says in the preceding passages, where he describes the cultural-conventional attitude and speaks of our inability to make death part of our thoughts. In both the current passage and later passages he advocates including death in life, but insists, elsewhere in the text, that embracing death is impossible**.** In a way, he is telling us that **we cannot accept the situation where death is** constantly **evaded.** Here again Bataille can be useful in rendering Freud’s position more intelligible. He seems to articulate better than Freud the delicate balance, concerning the place of death in psychic life, between the need to walk on the edge, and the flight into normalcy and safety. As I asserted above, where in Freud there are contradictory elements, in Bataille there is a dialectic. Bataille, as we have seen, presents the following picture: It might be that, guided by our instincts, we tend to avoid death. But we also seem to have a need to intersperse this flight with occasional peeps into the domain of death. **When we invest all of our effort in surviving**, something of the true nature of **life evades us**. It is **only when the finite human** being **goes beyond** the **limitations** “necessary for his preservation,” that he “asserts the nature of his being” (La Littérature 214; 68). The approaches of both Bataille and Freud are descriptive as well as normative. Bataille describes a tendency to distance ourselves from death and a tendency to get close to it. But he also describes Man’s need to approach death from a normative point of view, in order to establish his humanity: **a life that is only fleeing death has less value.** Freud carefully describes our tendency to evade death and, in the paragraph under discussion, calls for the contrary approach. This is stressed at the end of the article, where he encourages us to “give death the place in reality and in our thoughts which is its due” (“Thoughts” 299). Paradoxically, it might be what will make life “more tolerable for us once again” (299). But since Freud also insists not only on a tendency within us to evade death, but also on the impossibility of doing otherwise, and on how death simply cannot be the content of our thought, his sayings in favor of bringing death close are confusing and confused. Freud does not give us a reason for the need to approach death. He says that life loses in interest, but surely this cannot be the result of abstaining from carrying out “experiments with explosive substances.” In addition, his ideas on the shallowness of a life without death do not seem to evolve from anything in his approach. It is along the lines offered by Bataille’s worldview that I wish to interpret them here. Sacrifice, Bataille says, brings together life in its fullness and the annihilation of life. We are not mere spectators in the sacrificial ritual. Our participation is much more involved. Sacrificial ritual creates a temporary, exceptionally heightened state of living. “The sacred horror,” he calls the emotion experienced in sacrifice: “the richest and most agonizing experience.” It “opens itself, like a theater curtain, on to a realm beyond this world” and every limited meaning is transfigured in it (“Hegel” 338; 288). Bataille lays stress on vitality. Death is not humanizing only on the philosophical level, as it is for Hegel or Kojève. Bataille gives it an emotional twist. **The presence of death, which he interprets in a more earthly manner, is stimulating, vivifying, intense. Death and other related elements (violence) bring life closer to a state where individuality melts, the mediation of the intellect between us and the world lessens, and life is felt at its fullest**. **Bataille calls this state**, or aspect of the world, **immanence or intimacy**: “immanence between man and the world, **between the subject and the object”** (“The Festival” 307-311; 210-213). Moments of intensity are moments of excess and of fusion of beings (La Littérature 215; 70). **They are a demand of life itself**, even though they sometimes seem to contradict it. Death is problematic for us, but it opens up for us something in life. This line of thought seems to accord very well with the passage in Freud’s text with which we are dealing here, and to extend it**. Life without death is life lacking in intensity, an impoverished, shallow and empty life.** Moreover, the repression of death is generalized and extended: “**the tendency to exclude death from our calculations in life brings in its train many other renunciations and exclusions**.” Freud simply does not seem to have the conceptual tools to discuss these ideas. The intuition is even stronger in the passage that follows, where Freud discusses war (note that the paper is written in 1915): When war breaks out, he says, this cowardly, conservative, risk-rejecting attitude is broken at once. War eliminates this conventional attitude to death. “Death could no longer be denied. We are forced to believe in it. People really die. . . . Life has, indeed, become interesting again; it has recovered its full content” (“Thoughts” 291). **Thus what is needed is more than the mere accounting of consequences, taking death into consideration as a future possibility. What is needed is exposure to death, a sanguineous imprinting of death directly on our minds, through the “accumulation of deaths” of others**. Life can only become vivid, fresh, and interesting when death is witnessed directly. Both authors speak of a valorization of death, and in both there is a certain snobbery around it. While the masses follow the natural human tendency to avoid death, like the American couple or those who are busy with the thought of “who is to take our place**,” the individualists do not go with the herd, and by allowing themselves to approach death, achieve a fuller sense of life, neither shallow nor empty**.19 Yet again, Freud’s claims hover in the air, lacking any theoretical background. Bataille supplies us with such background. **He contests**, as we have seen, the **sole focus on survival. Survival, he tells us, has a price. It limits our life. As if there were an inherent tension between preserving life and living it.** Freud poses the same tension here. **Either we are totally absorbed by the wish to survive, to keep life intact, and therefore limit our existence to the bare minimum, or else we are willing to risk it to some extent in order to make it more interesting, more vital and valuable**. **Our usual world**, according to Bataille, **is characterized by the duration of things, by the “future” function, rather than by the present. Things are constituted as separate objects in view of future time.** This is one reason for **the threat of death**: it **ruins value where value is only assured through duration**. **It also exposes the intimate order of life that is continuously hidden from us in the order of things where life runs its normal course**. Man “is afraid of death as soon as he enters the system of projects that is the order of things” (“The Festival” 312; 214). Sacrifice is the opposite of production and accumulation. **Death is not so much a negation of life, as it is an affirmation of the intimate order of life, which is opposed to the normal order of things and is therefore rejected. “The power of death signifies that this real world can only have a neutral image of life […]. Death reveals life in its plenitude”** (309; 212). **Bataille’s “neutral image of life” is the equivalent of Freud’s “shallow and empty” life. What** **Freud denounces is a life trapped within the cowardly economical system of considerations. It is precisely the economy of value and future-oriented calculations that stand in opposition to the insertion of death into life**. “Who is to take the son’s place with his mother, the husband’s with his wife, the father’s with his children.” Of course there is an emotional side to the story, but it is **this insistence on replacement** that **leaves us on the side of survival and stops us sometimes from living the present. “The need for duration,**” in the words of Bataille, “**conceals life from us**” (“The Festival” 309; 212). For both authors, **when death is left out, life “as it is” is false and superficial.**

#### The Alternative is an affirmation of chance through a dicethrow—life is should be seen under a Dionysian paradigm, accepting life as it is, there is no certainty, but only perspective

Deleuze 83 [Giles Deleuze, Prof of Philosophy @ U of Lyon, Paris, and Lycees, “Nietzsche and Philosophy,” p. 25-27]

The game has two moments which are those of a dicethrow — the dice that is thrown and the dice that falls back. Nietzsche presents the dicethrow as taking place on two distinct tables, the earth and the sky. The earth where the dice are thrown and the sky where the dice fall back: "if ever I have played dice with the gods at their table, the earth, so that the earth trembled and broke open and streams of fire snorted forth; for the earth is a table of the gods, and trembling with creative new words and the dice throws of the gods" (Z III "The Seven Seals" 3 p. 245). "0 sky above me, you pure and lofty sky! This is now your purity to me, that there is no eternal reason-spider and spider's web in you; that you are to me a dance floor for divine chances, that you are to me a god's table for divine dice and dicers" (Z III "Before Sunrise" p. 186). But these two tables are not two worlds. They are the two hours of a single world, the two moments of a single world, midnight and midday, the hour when the dice are thrown, the hour when the dice fall back. Nietzsche insists on the two tables of life which are also the two moments of the player or the artist; "We temporarily abandon life, in order to then temporarily fix our gaze upon it." The dicethrow affirms becoming and it affirms the being of becoming.¶ It is not a matter of several dicethrows which, because of their number, finally reproduce the same combination. On the contrary, it is a matter of a single dicethrow which, due to the number of the combination produced, comes to reproduce itself as such. It is not that a large number of throws produce the repetition of a combination but rather the number of the combination which produces the repetition¶ of the dicethrow. The dice which are thrown once are the affirmation of chance, the combination which they form on falling is the affirma-tion of necessity. Necessity is affirmed of chance in exactly the sense that being is affirmed of becoming and unity is affirmed of multip-licity. It will be replied, in vain, that thrown to chance, the dice do not necessarily produce the winning combination, the double six which brings back the dicethrow. This is true, but only insofar as the player did not know how to affirm chance from the outset. For, just as unity does not suppress or deny multiplicity, necessity does not suppress or abolish chance. Nietzsche identifies chance with multiplicity, with fragments, with parts, with chaos: the chaos of the dice that are shaken and then thrown. Nietzsche turns chance into an affirmation. The sky itself is called "chance-sky", "innocence-sky" (Z III "Before¶ Sunrise"); the reign of Zarathustra is called "great chance" (Z IV "The Honey Offering" and III "Of Old and New Law Tables"; Zarathustra calls himself the "redeemer of chance"). "By chance, he is the world's oldest nobility, which I have given back to all things; I have released them from their servitude under purpose . . . I have found this happy certainty in all things: that they prefer to dance on the feet of chance" (Z III "Before Sunrise" p. 186); "My doctrine is `Let chance come to me: it is as innocent as a little child!' " (Z III "On the Mount of Olives" p. 194). What Nietzsche calls necessity (destiny) is thus never the abolition but rather the combination of chance itself. Necessity is affirmed of chance in as much as chance itself affirmed. For there is only a single combination of chance as such, a single way of combining all the parts of chance, a way which is like the unity of multiplicity, that is to say number or necessity. There are many numbers with increasing or decreasing probabilities, but only one number of chance as such, one fatal number which reunites all the fragments of chance, like midday gathers together the scattered parts of midnight. This is why it is sufficient for the player to affirm chance once in order to produce the number which brings back the dice- throw ."¶ To know how to affirm chance is to know how to play. But we do not know how to play, "Timid, ashamed, awkward, like a tiger whose leap has failed. But what of that you dicethrowers! You have not learned to play and mock as a man ought to play and mock!" (Z IV "Of the Higher Man" 14 p. 303). The bad player counts on several throws of the dice, on a great number of throws. In this way he makes¶ use of causality and probability to produce a combination that he sees as desirable. He posits this combination itself as an end to be obtained, hidden behind causality. This is what Nietzsche means when he speaks of the eternal spider, of the spider's web of reason, "A kind of spider of imperative and finality hidden behind the great web, the great net of causality — we could say, with Charles the Bold when he opposed Louis XI, "I fight the universal spider" (GM III 9). To abolish chance by holding it in the grip of causality and finality, to count on the repetition of throws rather than affirming chance, to anticipate a result instead of affirming necessity — these are all the operations of a bad player. They have their root in reason, but what is the root of reason? The spirit of revenge, nothing but the spirit of revenge, the spider (Z II "Of the Tarantulas"). Ressentiment in the repetition of throws, bad conscience in the belief in a purpose. But, in this way, all that will ever be obtained are more or less probable relative numbers. That the universe has no purpose, that it has no end to hope for any more than it has causes to be known — this is the certainty necessary to play well (VP III 465). The dicethrow fails because chance has not been affirmed enough in one throw. It has not been affirmed enough in order to produce the fatal number which necessarily reunites all the fragments and brings back the dicethrow. We must therefore attach the greatest importance to the following conclusion: for the couple causality-finality, probability-finality, for the opposition and the synthesis of these terms, for the web of these terms, Nietzsche substitutes the Dionysian correlation of chance- necessity, the Dionysian couple chance-destiny. Not a probability distributed over several throws but all chance at once; not a final, desired, willed combination, but the fatal combination, fatal and loved, amor fati; not the return of a combination by the number of throws, but the repetition of a dicethrow by the nature of the fatally obtained number. 23

# Case

## Warming

**The apocalyptic imagining of climate change produces technological or treaty fixes which leave root cause of environment destruction intact**

**Crist, 2k7**

Eileen Crist, Associate Professor of Science and Technology Studies in the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies at Virginia Tech “Beyond the Climate Crisis: A Critique of Climate Change Discourse” Telos 141 Winter 2007

While the dangers of climate change are real, I argue that there are even greater dangers in representing it as the most urgent problem we face. Framing climate change in such a manner deserves to be challenged for two reasons: it encourages the restriction of proposed solutions to the technical realm, by powerfully insinuating that the needed approaches are those that directly address the problem; and it detracts attention from the planet’s ecological predicament as a whole, by virtue of claiming the limelight for the one issue that trumps all others. Identifying climate change as the biggest threat to civilization, and ushering it into center stage as the highest priority problem, has bolstered the proliferation of technical proposals that address the specific challenge. The race is on for figuring out what technologies, or portfolio thereof, will solve “the problem.” Whether the call is for reviving nuclear power, boosting the installation of wind turbines, using a variety of renewable energy sources, increasing the efficiency of fossil-fuel use, developing carbon-sequestering technologies, or placing mirrors in space to deflect the sun’s rays, the narrow character of such proposals is evident: confront the problem of greenhouse gas emissions by technologically phasing them out, superseding them, capturing them, or mitigating their heating effects. In his *The Revenge of Gaia*, for example, Lovelock briefly mentions the need to face climate change by “changing our whole style of living.”16 But the thrust of this work, what readers and policy-makers come away with, is his repeated and strident call for investing in nuclear energy as, in his words, “the one lifeline we can use immediately.”17 In the policy realm, the first step toward the technological fix for global warming is often identified with implementing the Kyoto protocol. Biologist Tim Flannery agitates for the treaty, comparing the need for its successful endorsement to that of the Montreal protocol that phased out the ozone-depleting CFCs. “The Montreal protocol,” he submits, “marks a signal moment in human societal development, representing the first ever victory by humanity over a global pollution problem.”18 He hopes for a similar victory for the global climate-change problem. Yet the deepening realization of the threat of climate change, virtually in the wake of stratospheric ozone depletion, also **suggests that dealing with global problems treaty-by-treaty is no solution to the planet’s predicament**. **Just as** the risks of unanticipated ozone depletion have been followed by the dangers of a long underappreciated climate crisis, so it would be naïve not to anticipate another (perhaps even entirely unforeseeable) catastrophe arising after the (hoped-for) resolution of the above two. Furthermore, if greenhouse gases were restricted successfully by means of technological shifts and innovations, the root cause of the ecological crisis as a whole would remain unaddressed. The destructive patterns of production, trade, extraction, land-use, waste proliferation, and consumption, coupled with population growth, would go unchallenged, continuing to run down the integrity, beauty, and biological richness of the Earth. Industrial-consumer civilization has entrenched a form of life that admits virtually no limits to its expansiveness within, and perceived entitlement to, the entire planet.19 But questioning this civilization is by and large sidestepped in climate-change discourse, with its single-minded quest for a global-warming techno-fix.20 Instead of confronting the forms of social organization that are causing the climate crisis—among numerous other catastrophes—climate-change literature often focuses on how global warming is endangering the culprit, and agonizes over what technological means can save itfrom impending tipping points.21 The dominant frame of climate change funnels cognitive and pragmatic work toward specifically addressing global warming, while muting a host of equally monumental issues. Climate change looms so huge on the environmental and political agenda today that it has contributed to downplaying other facets of the ecological crisis: mass extinction of species, the devastation of the oceans by industrial fishing, continued old-growth deforestation, topsoil losses and desertification, endocrine disruption, incessant development, and so on, are made to appear secondary and more forgiving by comparison with “dangerous anthropogenic interference” with the climate system. In what follows, I will focus specifically on how climate-change discourse encourages the continued marginalization of the biodiversity crisis—a **crisis** that has been soberly described as a holocaust,22 and which despite decades of scientific and environmentalist pleas remains a virtual non-topic in society, the mass media, and humanistic and other academic literatures. Several works on climate change (though by no means all) extensively examine the consequences of global warming for biodiversity, 23 but rarely is it mentioned that biodepletion predates dangerous greenhouse-gas buildup by decades, centuries, or longer, and will not be stopped by a technological resolution of global warming. Climate change is poised to exacerbate species and ecosystem losses—indeed, is doing so already. But while technologically preempting the worst of climate change may temporarily avert some of those losses, such a resolution of the climate quandary will not put an end to—will barely address—the ongoing destruction of life on Earth.

**Their author concludes the courts need to EXPLICITLY cite International law in order to have a global signal – We have the paragraphs before and after their evidence**

**Long 8** – Professor of Law @ Florida Coastal School of Law Andrew Long, “International Consensus and U.S. Climate Change Litigation,” 33 Wm. and Mary Envtl. L. and Pol'y Rev. 177, Volume 33 | Issue 1 Article 4 (2008)

**The remainder of this Article poses straightforward, narrow, nor-mtive questions: Should domestic courts explicitly use norms derived from international treaties and customary law in deciding climate change cases?** **If so, in what ways?** The answers to these questions turn partially on the legitimacy-derived from U.S. legal tradition and constitutional principles-of using international sources in domestic decisions, and partially on a more functionalist assessment of the value or effect of such use.¶ A. Legitimacy of Invoking International Environmental Law in Domestic Climate Change Cases¶ The legitimacy of U.S. court decisions depends, first and foremost, upon fidelity to the constitution. As noted above, the constitutional text is [\*209] not clearly dualist and, indeed, early Supreme Court opinions viewed international and domestic law as "deeply intertwined." [n182](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.327990.730538573&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18204002057&parent=docview&rand=1379822287768&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n182) Although the extent of dualism in the United States is hotly contested, [n183](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.327990.730538573&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18204002057&parent=docview&rand=1379822287768&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n183) even a strictly dualistic conception of the constitution is not a complete bar from judicial cognizance of certain elements of international law. [n184](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.327990.730538573&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18204002057&parent=docview&rand=1379822287768&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n184) In any event, movement toward "a more monistic approach [to consideration of international sources in domestic cases] can be reconciled with the constitutional text" [n185](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.327990.730538573&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18204002057&parent=docview&rand=1379822287768&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n185) and has deeper historical support than willed judicial ignorance of international law. [n186](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.327990.730538573&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18204002057&parent=docview&rand=1379822287768&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n186)¶ To the extent certain traditions weigh against incorporation, we must consider that legitimacy depends as much on our narrative of what the constitution requires as it does on fidelity to doctrine. [n187](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.327990.730538573&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18204002057&parent=docview&rand=1379822287768&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n187) "[A] constitutional culture that is open to law made elsewhere will find the doctrine to render transnational norms acceptable." [n188](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.327990.730538573&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18204002057&parent=docview&rand=1379822287768&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n188)¶ Even in the current doctrinal landscape, use of climate change norms to buttress, rather than trump, domestic law decisions is constitutionally acceptable. In climate change cases as elsewhere, courts should proceed cautiously, "taking care to anchor their use of international sources in a firm commitment to view their roles as, first and foremost, domestic actors." [n189](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.327990.730538573&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18204002057&parent=docview&rand=1379822287768&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n189) For climate change cases, the over fifteen year existence of the UNFCCC without contrary legislation supports construing domestic law as consistent with the international norm requiring state action. [n190](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.327990.730538573&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18204002057&parent=docview&rand=1379822287768&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n190) [\*210] ¶ Legitimacy of using international norms is enhanced by clear U.S. accession to them. [n191](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.327990.730538573&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18204002057&parent=docview&rand=1379822287768&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n191) U.S. accession to basic climate change norms is evi-dent in the UNFCCC and, to a lesser extent, domestic climate-related le- gislation. [n192](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.327990.730538573&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18204002057&parent=docview&rand=1379822287768&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n192) In addition, continuing participation in, and proclaimed support for, international negotiations toward a post-2012 climate regime support a conclusion that the U.S. accepts the consensus on climate change. [n193](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.327990.730538573&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18204002057&parent=docview&rand=1379822287768&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n193)¶ A preliminary requirement for incorporating international norms is definitional. [n194](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.327990.730538573&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18204002057&parent=docview&rand=1379822287768&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n194) Just as human rights treaties provide clear evidence of international human rights norms, so evidence must exist to support definition of climate change norms before they can be legitimately incorporated into U.S. decisions. Once identified, however, a major function of international environmental norms is "providing a framework for interpretation and application of domestic environmental laws and policies." [n195](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.327990.730538573&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18204002057&parent=docview&rand=1379822287768&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n195) In the case of climate change, the norms necessary for domestic administrative law litigation are rather easy to identify and define.¶ Kyoto was effectively rejected by both the legislature and the executive and, therefore, has limited value for U.S. courts. [n196](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.327990.730538573&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18204002057&parent=docview&rand=1379822287768&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n196) However, the UNFCCC states a key norm for understanding the U.S. commitment to ad-dress climate change. [n197](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.327990.730538573&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18204002057&parent=docview&rand=1379822287768&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n197) The norm against transboundary environmental harm may also be relevant. To a lesser extent, more recent U.S. actions in working toward a post-2012 regime may be helpful in understanding the U.S. commitment and translating it to proper interpretation of domestic law.¶ From these sources, we can roughly state the following general consensus norms and principles. First, the problem: anthropocentric climate change is occurring as a result of greenhouse gas emissions. This [\*211] factual statement reflecting a global consensus was accepted by the Supreme Court in Massachusetts in a manner approaching recognition of **international consensus.** The normative element of problem definition was also employed by the Court: this change presents a grave threat that should be addressed. The second element of the consensus on climate change is the more pressing and le-gally significant norm: states have an obligation to take mitigation measures. [n198](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.327990.730538573&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18204002057&parent=docview&rand=1379822287768&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n198) The Vermont District Court essentially recognized this norm in Green Mountain, but the Court skirted discussing it in Massachusetts.[n199](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.327990.730538573&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18204002057&parent=docview&rand=1379822287768&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n199)¶ In some contexts, invoking **international consensus** may give rise to an "international countermajoritarian difficulty." [n200](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.327990.730538573&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18204002057&parent=docview&rand=1379822287768&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n200) However, several considerations undermine this concern in the context of the climate change cases. First, even at its most substantive, international law would be primarily for the interpretation of domestic statutes. [n201](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.327990.730538573&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18204002057&parent=docview&rand=1379822287768&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n201) Thus, potential countermajoritarian concerns are undermined by the direct consideration of legislative intent, which should not be overridden by consideration of international sources. Second, to the extent that Congress disagrees with a court's construction of a statute, the statute may be amended.¶ In short, there is no compelling reason that courts cannot look to in- ternational sources in climate change cases. **The question**, then, **is whether making international norms explicitly relevant to domestic law adds value.¶** B. Advantages of Bringing International Norms into Domestic Climate Change Cases¶ Although domestic U.S. climate change cases to date have an important role in the international dialogue concerning climate change action, a more explicit and direct discussion of the relationship would be beneficial in several ways. In particular, such discussion would enhance the United States' leadership position in the international community, promote the effectiveness of the international climate regime, encourage [\*212] consistency in domestic climate change law, and enable additional checks on agency actions at the domestic-global interface. [n202](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.327990.730538573&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18204002057&parent=docview&rand=1379822287768&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n202)¶ 1. Enhancing U.S. International Leadership¶ In a time of unfavorable global opinion toward the United States, **explicit judicial involvement with international norms will move the United States closer to the international community** by acknowledging the relevance of international environmental norms for our legal system. As in other contexts, explicit judicial internalization of climate change norms would "build[] U.S. 'soft power,' [enhance] its moral authority, and strengthen[] U.S. capacity for global leadership" [n203](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.327990.730538573&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18204002057&parent=docview&rand=1379822287768&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n203) on climate change, and other global issues. More specifically, domestic judicial consideration of the global climate regime would reaffirm that although the United States has rejected Kyoto, we take the obligation to respect the global commons seri-ously by recognizing that obligation as a facet of the domestic legal system.¶ U.S. courts' overall failure to interact with the international climate regime, as in other issue areas, has "serious consequences for their roles in international norm creation." [n204](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.327990.730538573&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18204002057&parent=docview&rand=1379822287768&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n204) As judicial understandings of climate change law converge, the early and consistent contributors to the transnational judicial dialogue will likely play the strongest role in shaping the emerging international normative consensus. [n205](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.327990.730538573&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18204002057&parent=docview&rand=1379822287768&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n205) As Justice L'Heureux-Dube of the Canadian Supreme Court noted in an article describing the decline of the U.S. Supreme Court's global influence, "[d]ecisions which look only inward . . . have less relevance to those outside that jurisdiction." [n206](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.327990.730538573&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18204002057&parent=docview&rand=1379822287768&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n206) [\*213] Thus, if U.S. courts hope to participate in shaping the normative position on climate change adopted by judiciaries throughout the world, explicit recognition of the relationship between domestic and international law is vital.¶ With climate change in particular, norm development through domestic application should be an important aspect of global learning. The problem requires a global solution beyond the scope of any prior multi-lateral environmental agreements. This provides a situation in which U.S. judicial reasoning in applying aspects of climate regime thinking to concrete problems will fall into fertile international policy soil.¶ Accordingly, the recognition of international norms in domestic climate change litigation may play a strengthening role in the perception of U.S. leadership, encourage U.S. development and exportation of effective domestic climate strategies, and promote international agreements that will enhance consistency with such approaches. In short, explicit judicial discussion of international climate change norms as harmonious with U.S. law can enhance U.S. ability to regain a global leadership position on the issue and, thereby, more significantly shape the future of the international climate regime.¶ **2.** . Promoting the Effectiveness of the International Response¶ Along with promoting U.S. interests and standing in the international community, climate change litigation has a direct role to play in developing the international regime if courts directly engage that regime. [n207](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.327990.730538573&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18204002057&parent=docview&rand=1379822287768&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n207)Just as the United States as an actor may benefit from acknowledging and applying international norms, the regime in which the actions occur will benefit through application and acceptance. Indeed, a case such as Massachusetts v. EPA that directly engages only domestic law can nonetheless be understood to impact international lawmaking by considering its actors. [n208](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.327990.730538573&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18204002057&parent=docview&rand=1379822287768&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n208) More important, however, will be cases in which the domestic judiciary gives life to international agreements through direct engagement-a "role [that] is particularly important as a check on the delegitimization of international legal rules that are not enforced."[n209](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.327990.730538573&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18204002057&parent=docview&rand=1379822287768&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n209) [\*214] ¶ **Assuming, as we must in the arena of climate change, that international law can only effect significant changes in behavior through penetration of the domestic sphere**, domestic litigation that employs international law not only provides an instance in which the international appears ef-fective but, more importantly, molds it into a shape that will enable further use in domestic cases or suggest necessary changes internationally.¶ By engaging the international, domestic cases can also provide articulation for the norms that have emerged. The precise meaning of the UNFCCC obligation that nations take measures must be hammered out on the ground. In the United States, if Congress has not acted, it is appropriate for the courts to begin this process by measuring particular actions against the standard.

**Can’t solve climate – too fast, stays in the air, and cuts won’t happen.**

David G. **Victor et al 12,** Professor at the School of International Relations and Pacific Studies at the University of California, San Diego, May/Jun (with Charles F. Kennel and Veerabhadran Ramanathan, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91 Issue 3)

FOR MORE than two decades, diplomats have struggled to slow global warming. They have negotiated two major treaties to achieve that goal, the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. And last year, at the UN Climate Change Conference in Durban, South Africa, they agreed to start talking about yet another treaty. A small group of countries, including Japan and the members of the European Union, now regulate their emissions in accord with the existing agreements. But most states, including the largest emitters of greenhouse gases, China and the United States, have failed to make much progress. As a result, total **emissions** of carbon dioxide, the leading long-term cause of global warming, **have risen by more than 50 percent** since the 1980s **and are poised to rise by more than 30 percent** in the next two to three decades.¶ **The ever-increasing quantity of emissions** could **render moot the aim** that has guided international climate diplomacy for nearly a decade: **preventing the global temp**erature **from rising by** more than **two degrees** Celsius above its preindustrial level. In fact, in the absence of significant international action, **the planet is now on track to warm by at least 2.5 degrees** during the current century -- and **maybe** even **more**. The known effects of this continued warming are deeply troubling: rising sea levels, a thinning Arctic icecap, extreme weather events, ocean acidification, loss of natural habitats, and many others. Perhaps even more fearsome, however, are the effects whose odds and consequences are unknown, such as the danger that melting permafrost in the Arctic could release still more gases, leading to a vicious cycle of still more warming.¶ All these risks are rising sharply because the traditional approach to international climate diplomacy has failed. For too long, climate science and policymaking have focused almost exclusively on emissions of carbon dioxide, most of which come from burning fossil fuels. **Weaning** the planet **off fossil fuels has proved difficult**, partly because expensive and rapid shifts to new energy systems could have negative effects on the competitiveness of modern economies. What is more, **carbon dioxide** inconveniently **remains** in the atmosphere **for centuries**, and so **even** keeping carbon dioxide **at current levels would require deep cuts** sustained over many decades -- **with economic consequences** that states are unlikely to be willing to bear unless they are confident that their competitors will do the same. No permanent solution to the climate problem is feasible without tackling carbon dioxide, but **the** economic and geophysical **realities of** carbon dioxide **emissions** almost **guarantee** political **gridlock.**

## Bioterrorism

#### It is absolutely absurd to think that bioweapons safety lab is going to give a shit about court deference on environmental action—just overturning that deference isn’t going to automatically cause a shift in the heads of bioterror safety experts

**The worst case scenario happened – no extinction**

**Dove 12** [Alan Dove, PhD in Microbiology, science journalist and former Adjunct Professor at New York University, “Who’s Afraid of the Big, Bad Bioterrorist?” Jan 24 2012, http://alandove.com/content/2012/01/whos-afraid-of-the-big-bad-bioterrorist/]

The second problem is much more serious. Eliminating the toxins, we’re left with a list of infectious bacteria and viruses. With a single exception, these organisms are probably near-useless as weapons, and history proves it.¶ There have been at least three well-documented military-style deployments of infectious agents from the list, plus one deployment of an agent that’s not on the list. I’m focusing entirely on the modern era, by the way. There are historical reports of armies catapulting plague-ridden corpses over city walls and conquistadors trying to inoculate blankets with Variola (smallpox), but it’s not clear those “attacks” were effective. Those diseases tended to spread like, well, plagues, so there’s no telling whether the targets really caught the diseases from the bodies and blankets, or simply picked them up through casual contact with their enemies.¶Of the four modern biowarfare incidents, two have been fatal. The first was the 1979 Sverdlovsk anthrax incident, which killed an estimated 100 people. In that case, a Soviet-built biological weapons lab accidentally released a large plume of weaponized Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) over a major city. Soviet authorities tried to blame the resulting fatalities on “bad meat,” but in the 1990s Western investigators were finally able to piece together the real story. The second fatal incident also involved anthrax from a government-run lab: the 2001 “Amerithrax” attacks. That time, a rogue employee (or perhaps employees) of the government’s main bioweapons lab sent weaponized, powdered anthrax through the US postal service. Five people died.¶ That gives us a grand total of around 105 deaths, entirely from agents that were grown and weaponized in officially-sanctioned and funded bioweapons research labs. Remember that.¶Terrorist groups have also deployed biological weapons twice, and these cases are very instructive. The first was the 1984 Rajneeshee bioterror attack, in which members of acult in Oregon inoculated restaurant salad bars with Salmonella bacteria (an agent that’s not on the “select” list). 751 people got sick, but nobody died. Public health authorities handled it as a conventional foodborne Salmonella outbreak, identified the sources and contained them. Nobody even would have known it was a deliberate attack if a member of the cult hadn’t come forward afterward with a confession. Lesson: our existing public health infrastructure was entirely adequate to respond to a major bioterrorist attack.¶ The second genuine bioterrorist attack took place in 1993. Members of the Aum Shinrikyo cult successfully isolated and grew a large stock of anthrax bacteria, then sprayed it as an aerosol from the roof of a building in downtown Tokyo. The cult was well-financed,and had many highly educated members, so **this** release over the world’s largest city really **represented a worst-case scenario**.¶ **Nobody got sick** or died. From the cult’s perspective, it was a complete and utter failure. Again, the only reason we even found out about it was a post-hoc confession. Aum members later demonstrated their lab skills by producing Sarin nerve gas, with far deadlier results. Lesson: one of the top “select agents” is extremely hard to grow and deploy even for relatively skilled non-state groups. It’s a really crappy bioterrorist weapon.¶ Taken together, these events point to an uncomfortable but inevitable conclusion: our biodefense industry is a far greater threat to us than any actual bioterrorists.

#### It’ll just kill the host—no spread

**Too many technical and epidemiological barriers**

**Washington Post 04** (12/30, “Technical Hurdles Separate Terrorists From Biowarfare.” John Mintz, staff writer. Lexis.)

**In 2002, a** panel of biowarfare experts concluded in a report co-published by the National Defense University (NDU) **that while** terrorists **could mount some small-scale bioattacks, larger** assaults **would** require **them to overcome** many technical hurdles. Some key biotechnologies would be achievable only three to four years from then, the panel found. "When we sent out the report for review to [hands-on] bench scientists, we got the response, 'What do you mean we can't do this? We're doing it now,' " said Raymond Zilinskas, a co-author of the report who heads biowarfare studies at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, a California think tank. "It shows how fast the field is moving." **Those skeptical of the prospect of large-scale bioattacks cite the tiny number of biological strikes in recent decades**. Members of the Rajneeshee cult sickened 750 people in 1984 when they contaminated salad bars in 10 Oregon restaurants with salmonella. Among the few others were the 2001 anthrax attacks through the U.S. mail that killed five people. **One reason for the small number of attacks is that nearly** every aspect of a bioterrorist's job is difficult**. The best chance of acquiring the anthrax bacterium,** Bacillus anthracis, **is either from commercial culture collections in countries with lax security controls, or by digging in soil where livestock recently died of the disease** -- a tactic Aum Shinrikyo tried unsuccessfully in the Australian Outback. **Once virulent stocks of anthrax have been cultured,** it is no trivial task to propagate pathogens with the **required** attributes for an aerosolized weapon: the hardiness to survive in an enclosed container and upon release into the atmosphere, the ability to lodge in the lungs, and the toxicity to kill. **The particles' size is crucial: If they are too big, they fall to the ground, and if they are too small, they are exhaled from the body. If they are improperly made, static electricity can cause them to clump**. Making a bug that defeats antibiotics, a desired goal for any bioweaponeer, is relatively simple but can **require laborious trial and error, because conferring antibiotic resistance** often reduces **a bioweapon's** killing power. Field-testing germ weapons is necessary

even for experienced weapons makers, and that is likely to require open spaces where animals or even people can be experimentally infected. Each bioagent demands specific weather conditions and requires unforgiving specifications for the spraying device **employed. "Dry" anthrax is harder to make -- it requires special equipment, and scientists must perform the dangerous job of milling particles to the right size. "Wet" anthrax is easier to produce but not as easily dispersed**. Experts agree that **anthrax is the potential mass-casualty agent most accessible to terrorists**. The anthrax letter sent in 2001 to then-Senate Minority Leader Thomas A. Daschle (D-S.D.) contained one gram of anthrax, or 1 trillion spores.

# 2NC

## Fw

### 2nc AT Aff framework

#### WM- we’re a critique of the plan’s justifications for action.

#### WM- We’re an impact turn to the aff

#### C/I – The negative should be able to critique the affirmative’s ethical, ontological, or epistemological justifications for the plan

#### Education- allows different perspectives on why the plan is a bad idea- this requires both teams to research different perspectives and worldviews, which allows us to rethink our insulated views on IR and see the world in a different light.

#### Predictability—it’s a security K, it’s not like this is out of the ordinary.

#### Nothing in this debate will have an effect on policy implementation—the only thing we can do is better ourselves and improve the way we relate to the world.

#### Self-Perfection comes first—our self-enhancement allows the improvement of humankind

Conway 97 [Daniel Conway, Professor and Department Head 19th Century Philosophy at Texas A&M, 1997, Nietzsche and the Political, pg. 9, wyo-sc]

Great human beings accomplish the catalysis of culture not as a consciously articulated goal, but as an indirect and unintended by-product of their “private” pursuits of self-perfection. While they directly enhance the lives only of themselves and those select few who share their refined aesthetic sensibilities, they indirectly enhance the lives of all who are even minimally invested in the project of culture. Indeed, everyone who enters “the circle of culture” stands to benefit from the production of exemplary human types, for a justification of human existence would be impossible in their absence. Hence the central paradox of Nietzsche’s perfectionism: the enhancement of humanity and the enrichment of ethical life are dependent upon the exploits of “immoral” exemplars who hold no conscious or intentional stake in the lives of those whom they succor and renew. In fact, he insists, these exotic specimens must be allowed (and indeed encouraged) to free themselves from the chains of conventional morality if they are to contribute to the permanent enhancement of humankind.

#### ROLEPLAYING CREATES INAUTHENTICITY IN ITS SUBJECTS—THEY TRY AND LEVEL ALL DEBATERS TO THE HERD, WHICH ALLOWS RESSENTIMENT TOWARDS ANYONE WHO DOESN’T MEET THEIR INTERPRETATION OF WHAT DEBATE SHOULD LOOK LIKE

ANTONIO 1995 [Robert Antonio; Professor of Sociology at the University of Kansas; “Nietzsche’s Antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History” ; *American Journal of Sociology* , Volume 101, No. 1; July 1995]

According to Nietzsche, the "subject" is Socratic culture's most central, durable foundation. This prototypic expression of ressentiment, master reification, and ultimate justification for slave morality and mass discipline "separates strength from expressions of strength, as if there were a neutral substratum . . . free to express strength or not to do so. But there is no such substratum; there is no 'being' behind the doing, effecting, becoming; 'the doer' is merely a fiction added to the deed" (Nietzsche 1969b, pp. 45-46). Leveling of Socratic culture's "objective" foundations makes its "subjective" features all the more important. For example, the subject is a central focus of the new human sciences, appearing prominently in its emphases on neutral standpoints, motives as causes, and selves as entities, objects of inquiry, problems, and targets of care (Nietzsche 1966, pp. 19-21; 1968a, pp. 47-54). Arguing that subjectified culture weakens the personality, Nietzsche spoke of a "remarkable antithesis between an interior which fails to correspond to any exterior and an exterior which fails to correspond to any interior" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 78-79, 83). The "problem of the actor," Nietzsche said, "troubled me for the longest time."'12 He considered "roles" as "external," "surface," or "foreground" phenomena and viewed close personal identification with them as symptomatic of estrangement. While modern theorists saw differentiated roles and professions as a matrix of autonomy and reflexivity, Nietzsche held that persons (especially male professionals) in specialized occupations overidentify with their positions and engage in gross fabrications to obtain advancement. They look hesitantly to the opinion of others, asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" They are so thoroughly absorbed in simulating effective role players that they have trouble being anything but actors-"The role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers devastating inauthenticity. The powerful authority given the social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." Integrity, decisiveness, spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing overconcern about possible causes, meanings, and consequences of acts and unending internal dialogue about what others might think, expect, say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4, 316-17). Nervous rotation of socially appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized "shadows," "abstracts," or simulacra. One adopts "many roles," playing them "badly and superficially" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play." Nietzsche asked, "Are you genuine? Or only an actor? As representative or that which is represented? . . . [Or] no more than an imitation of an actor?" Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the genuine article; social selves "prefer the copies to the originals" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232- 33, 259; 1969b, pp. 268, 300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine attachment to others. This type of actor cannot plan for the long term or participate in enduring net- works of interdependence; such a person is neither willing nor able to be a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94). Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape. Neitzsche (1974, p. 259) stated, "One thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one always 'might miss out on something. ''Rather do anything than nothing': this principle, too, is merely a string to throttle all culture. . . . Living in a constant chase after gain compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretense and overreaching and anticipating others." Pervasive leveling, improvising, and faking foster an inflated sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the fortuitous circumstances that contribute to role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity). The most mediocre people believe they can fill any position, even cultural leadership. Nietzsche respected the self-mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socrates, and praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick" harmless. But he deeply feared the new simulated versions. Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, these impostors amplify the worst inclinations of the herd; they are "violent, envious, exploitative, scheming, fawning, cringing, arrogant, all according to circumstances. " Social selves are fodder for the "great man of the masses." Nietzsche held that "the less one knows how to command, the more ur- gently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely- a god, prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience. The deadly combination of desperate conforming and overreaching and untrammeled ressentiment paves the way for a new type of tyrant (Nietzsche 1986, pp. 137, 168; 1974, pp. 117-18, 213, 288-89, 303-4).

#### Their predictions and rush to secure the world produces bureaucratic bungling that creates error replication—the solutions we prescribe make the problems worse

Der Derian 5 [James, Director of the Global Security Program and Research Professor of International Studies at the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University, “National Security: An Accident Waiting to Happen,” *Harvard International Review* 27.3 (Fall 2005): 82-83]

It often takes a catastrophe to reveal the illusory beliefs we continue to harbor in national and homeland security. To keep us safe, we place our faith in national borders and guards, bureaucracies and experts, technologies and armies. These and other instruments of national security are empowered and legitimated by the assumption that it falls upon the sovereign country to protect us from the turbulent state of nature and anarchy that permanently lies in wait offshore and over the horizon for the unprepared and inadequately defended. But this parochial fear, posing as a realistic worldview, has recently taken some very hard knocks. Prior to September 11, 2001, national borders were thought to be necessary and sufficient to keep our enemies at bay; upon entry to Baghdad, a virtuous triumphalism and a revolution in military affairs were touted as the best means to bring peace and democracy to the Middle East; and before Hurricane Katrina, emergency preparedness and an intricate system of levees were supposed to keep New Orleans safe and dry. The intractability of disaster, especially its unexpected, unplanned, unprecedented nature, erodes not only the very distinction of the local, national, and global, but, assisted and amplified by an unblinking global media, reveals the contingent and highly interconnected character of life in general. Yet when it comes to dealing with natural and unnatural disasters, we continue to expect (and, in the absence of a credible alternative, understandably so) if not certainty and total safety at least a high level of probability and competence from our national and homeland security experts However, between the mixed metaphors and behind the metaphysical concepts given voice by US Homeland Security Director Michael Chertoff early into the Katrina crisis, there lurks an uneasy recognition that this administration—and perhaps no national government—is up to the task of managing incidents that so rapidly cascade into global events. Indeed, they suggest that our national plans and preparations for the “big one”—a force-five hurricane, terrorist attack, pandemic disease—have become part of the problem, not the solution. His use of hyberbolic terms like “ultracatastrophe” and “fall-out” is telling: such events exceed not only local and national capabilities, but the capacity of conventional language itself. An easy deflection would be to lay the blame on the neoconservative faithful of the first term of US President George W. Bush, who, viewing through an inverted Wilsonian prism the world as they would wish it to be, have now been forced by natural and unnatural disasters to face the world as it really is—and not even the most sophisticated public affairs machine of dissimulations, distortions, and lies can close this gap. However, the discourse of the second Bush term has increasingly returned to the dominant worldview of national security, realism. And if language is, as Nietzsche claimed, a prisonhouse, realism is its supermax penitentiary. Based on linear notions of causality, a correspondence theory of truth, and the materiality of power, how can realism possibly account—let alone prepare or provide remedies—for complex catastrophes, like the toppling of the World Trade Center and attack on the Pentagon by a handful of jihadists armed with box-cutters and a few months of flight-training? A force-five hurricane that might well have begun with the flapping of a butterfly’s wings? A northeast electrical blackout that started with a falling tree limb in Ohio? A possible pandemic triggered by the mutation of an avian virus? How, for instance, are we to measure the immaterial power of the CNN-effect on the first Gulf War, the Al-Jazeera-effect on the Iraq War, or the Nokia-effect on the London terrorist bombings? For events of such complex, non-linear origins and with such tightly-coupled, quantum effects, the national security discourse of realism is simply not up to the task. Worse, what if the “failure of imagination” identified by the 9/11 Commission is built into our national and homeland security systems? What if the reliance on planning for the catastrophe that never came reduced our capability to flexibly respond and improvise for the “ultra-catastrophe” that did? What if worse-case scenarios, simulation training, and disaster exercises—as well as border guards, concrete barriers and earthen levees—not only prove inadequate but might well act as force-multipliers—what organizational theorists identify as “negative synergy” and “cascading effects” —that produce the automated bungling (think Federal Emergency Management Agency) that transform isolated events and singular attacks into global disasters? Just as “normal accidents” are built into new technologies—from the Titanic sinking to the Chernobyl meltdown to the Challenger explosion—we must ask whether “ultracatastrophes” are no longer the exception but now part and parcel of densely networked systems that defy national management; in other words, “planned disasters.”

### AT: Owen Specifically

#### OWEN CONCLUDES NEG- CRITICISM KEY

Owen 2

(David, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, Millennium, Vol 31, No 3, Sage)

 Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, **it is** **clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars.** In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no **doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions.** Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn.

#### YOUR CARD IS OUT OF CONTEXT – OWEN CONCLUDES INEVITABLE CONFUSION IN IR CAUSES HIS ‘VICIOUS CYCLE’, NOT OUR CRITICAL INTERROGATION

Owen 2

(David, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, Millennium, Vol 31, No 3, Sage)

[YELLOW]

 It should be noted that **I am not claiming that such a vicious circle has been established in IR by** virtue of the **philosophical turn,** nor am I claiming that IR is alone in its current exposure to this threat; on the contrary, Shapiro’s remarks are directed at (primarily North American) political science. I am simply concerned to point out that the philosophical turn in IR increases its exposure to these dangers and, hence, its vulnerability to the kind of vicious circle that they can, collectively, generate. Having specified these dangers, however**, I want to turn to a confusion within much of IR that has, I will argue, acted to encourage this philosophical turn and so increase its exposure to these risks**. As a preface to this task, though, it is useful to sketch out two main lines of debate within the IR theory wars; these are not the only lines of debate, but they are important ones.

### 2NC AT Util

#### Utilitarian ethics are a slave morality

Anomaly in 2005 (Jonny, Tulane University, “Nietzsche’s Critique of Utilitarianism”, The Journal of Nietzsche Studies”, pMUSE)

In interpreting Nietzsche's attacks on utilitarianism, it is crucial to understand the (often tenuous) connection Nietzsche makes between utilitarianism and Christianity. Because Nietzsche considers utilitarianism a secular offspring of Christian morality, many of his global attacks on utilitarianism resemble his more familiar critique of Christian "slave morality"—the morality of the herd. In particular, Nietzsche contends that utilitarianism inherited Christianity's commitment to the equal worth of each person, and perpetuated its erroneous assumption that a timeless, universal criterion for morality is tenable. Nietzsche's preliminary account of the difference between master morality and slave morality in *Beyond Good and Evil* culminates with the conclusion that "[s]lave morality is essentially a morality of utility" (260). Although Nietzsche develops the notorious distinction between master and slave morality most fully in the *Genealogy*, he articulates the sense in which he considers utilitarianism a form of slave morality in a revealing passage in *Beyond Good and Evil*. Here he speculates that the noble, aristocratic man first identifies himself and those like him (powerful, proud, distinguished men) as good, and then contrasts himself with those he contemptuously regards as "the cowardly, the timid, the petty" and, above all, "those who think only of narrow utility" (*BGE* 260). The noble's power consists not only in his ability to exploit others with his superior acumen or physical strength but also in exercising "power over himself," by refraining from acting on the inclination of pity that characterizes those whom he despises. The slave, conversely, identifies himself negatively; he is part of the group that resents those who unabashedly exercise their power. Nietzsche scorns slave morality because its proponents meekly resign themselves to whatever master morality is not, and yet consider their own moral principles universally binding rather than acknowledging them as narrowly useful for members of their own group. In the Christian tradition, "pity, the kind and helping hand, the warm heart, patience, industriousness, humility, friendliness come into honor—for these are the most *useful* qualities [for the slave]" (*BGE* 260).

#### Slave morality creates an enemy that must be eliminated

Nietzsche, 1887 (Friedrich, philosopher, “The Genealogy of Morals” Online, MB)

The slave revolt in morality begins when the resentment itself becomes creative and gives birth to values: the resentment of those beings who are prevented from a genuinely active reaction and who compensate for that with a merely imaginary vengeance. While all noble morality grows out of a triumphant self-affirmation, slave morality from the start says No to what is "outside," "other," "a non-self". And this No is its creative act. This transformation of the glance which confers value - this necessary projection towards what is outer instead of back into itself that is inherent in resentment: in order to arise. Slave morality always requires first an opposing world, a world outside itself. Psychologically speaking, it needs external stimuli in order to act at all. Its action is basically reaction. The reverse is the case with the noble method of valuing: it acts and grows spontaneously. It seeks its opposite only to affirm itself even more thankfully, with even more rejoicing. Its negative concept of "low," "common," "bad" is only a pale contrasting image after the fact in relation to its positive basic concept, intoxicated with life and passion, "We are noble, good, beautiful, and happy!" When the noble way of evaluating makes a mistake and abuses reality, that happens with reference to the sphere which it does not know well enough, indeed, the sphere it has strongly resisted learning the truth about: under certain circumstances it misjudges the sphere it despises - the sphere of the common man, the low people. On the other hand, we should consider that even assuming that the effect of contempt, of looking down or looking superior, falsifies the image of the person despised, such distortion will fall short by a long way of the distortion with which the repressed hatred and vengeance of the powerless man mistakenly assaults his opponent - naturally, in effigy. In fact, in contempt there is too much negligence, too much dismissive ness, too much looking away and impatience, all mixed together, even too much feeling of joy, for it to be capable of converting its object into a truly distorted monster. We should not fail to hear the almost benevolent nuances which for a Greek noble, for example, lay in all the words with which he set himself above the lower people - how a constant type of pity, consideration, and forbearance is mixed in there, sweetening the words, to the point where almost all words which refer to the common man finally remain as expressions for "unhappy," "worthy of pity" (compare deilos [cowardly], deilaios [lowly, mean], poneros [oppressed by toil, wretched], mochtheros [suffering, wretched]â€”the last two basically designating the common man as a slave worker and beast of burden). On the other hand, for the Greek ear the words "bad," "low," "unhappy" have never stopped echoing a single note, one tone colour, in which "unhappy" predominates. That is the inheritance of the old, noble, aristocratic way of evaluating, which does not betray its principles even in contempt. (Philologists might recall the sense in which oizuros [miserable], anolbos [unblessed], tlemon [wretched], dustychein [unfortunate], xymfora [misfortune] were used). The "well born" felt that they were "the happy ones"; they did not have to construct their happiness artificially first by looking at their enemies, or in some circumstance to talk themselves into it, to lie to themselves (the way all men of resentment habitually do). Similarly they knew, as complete men, overloaded with power and thus necessarily active, they must not separate action from happiness. They considered being active necessarily associated with happiness (that`s where the phrase eu prattein [do well, succeed] derives its origin) - all this very much the opposite of "happiness" at the level of the powerless, the oppressed, those festering with poisonous and hostile feelings, among whom happiness comes out essentially as a narcotic, an anesthetic, quiet, peace, "Sabbath", relaxing the soul, stretching one`s limbs, in short, as something passive. While the noble man lives for himself with trust and candour (gennaios, meaning "of noble birth" stresses the nuance "upright" and also probably "naÃ¯ve"), the man of resentment is neither upright nor naÃ¯ve, nor honest and direct with himself. His soul squints. His spirit loves hiding places, secret paths, and back doors. Everything furtive attracts him as his world, his security, his refreshment. He understands about remaining silent, not forgetting, waiting, temporarily diminishing himself, humiliating himself. A race of such men will necessarily end up cleverer than any noble race. It will value cleverness to a very different extent, that is, as a condition of existence of the utmost importance; whereas, cleverness among noble men easily acquires a delicate aftertaste of luxury and sophistication about it. Here it is not nearly so important as the complete certainly of the ruling unconscious instincts or even a certain lack of cleverness, something like brave recklessness, whether in the face of danger or of an enemy, or wildly enthusiastic, sudden fits of anger, love, reverence, thankfulness, and vengefulness, by which in all ages noble souls have recognized each other. The resentment of the noble man himself, if it comes over him, consumes and exhausts itself in an immediate reaction and therefore does not poison. On the other hand, in countless cases it just doesn`t appear, whereas in the case of all weak and powerless people it is unavoidable. The noble man cannot take his enemies, his misfortunes, even his bad deeds seriously for very long - that is the mark of a strong, complete nature, in whom there is a surplus of plastic, creative, healing power, which also can make one forget (a good example for that from the modern world is Mirabeau, who had no memory of the insults and maliciousness people directed at him, and who therefore could not forgive, because he just forgot). Such a man with one shrug throws off him all those worms which eat into other men. Only here is possible (provided that it is at all possible on earth) the real "love for one`s enemy." How much respect a noble man already has for his enemies! And such a respect is already a bridge to love . . . In fact, he demands his enemy for himself, as his mark of honour. Indeed, he has no enemy other than one who has nothing to despise and a great deal to respect! By contrast, imagine for yourself "the enemy" as a man of resentment conceives him - and right here we have his action, his creation: he has conceptualized "the evil enemy,: "the evil one," and as a fundamental idea - and from that he now thinks his way to an opposite image and counterpart, a "good man" - himself!

### 2NC AT no value to life

#### Impossible to ascribe value to life for everyone, your life may have value to you, but existence itself is aimless

Nietzsche, 1878 (Friedrich, philosopher, “Human, All Too Human.” The Nietzsche Channel, online, MB)

**33** *Error about life necessary for life*.— Every belief in the value and worth of life is based on impure thinking and is only possible because the individual's sympathy for life in general, and for the suffering of mankind, is very weakly developed. Even uncommon men who think beyond themselves at all do not focus on life in general, but rather on limited parts of it. If one knows how to keep his attention primarily on exceptions, that is, on the great talents and pure souls, if one takes their coming into existence to be the goal of all world evolution and rejoices in their activity, then one may believe in the value of life—for one is overlooking other men, which is to say, thinking impurely. And likewise, if one does focus on all men, but takes only one type of drive, the less egoistical type, as valid and excuses mankind in respect to its other drives, then too one can hope something about mankind as a whole, and believe to this extent in the value of life—in this case, too, through impurity of thought. But whichever is the case, such a stance makes one an *exception* among men. Most men tolerate life without grumbling too much and believe thus in the value of existence, but precisely because everyone wills himself alone and stands his ground alone, and does not step out of himself as do those exceptional men, everything extrapersonal escapes his notice entirely, or seems at the most a faint shadow. Thus the value of life for ordinary, everyday man is based only on his taking himself to be more important than the world. The great lack of fantasy from which he suffers keeps him from being able to empathize with other beings, and he therefore participates in their vicissitudes and suffering as little as possible. *He*, on the other hand, who would be truly able to participate in it would have to despair about the value of life; if he were able to grasp and feel mankind's overall consciousness in himself, he would collapse with a curse against existence—for mankind, as whole, has no goal and consequently, considering the whole affair, man cannot find his comfort and support in it, but rather his despair. If, in everything he does, he considers the ultimate aimlessness of men, his own activity acquires the character of squandering in his eyes. But to feel *squandered* as mankind (and not just as an individual), as we see the single blossom squandered by nature, is a feeling above all feelings.

# 1NR

### A2 Secure environment turns

#### Concept of resource wars is useless—need to interrogate the securitized context from which resources wars are situated

Humphreys, 2012

[Jasper, Resource Wars: Searching for a new definition, International Affairs 88: 5 (2012) 1065–1082, Wiley online library] /Wyo-MB

Today’s debates about the ‘securitization’ of resources and commodities are conducted within a context of massive ‘criminalization’ as opposed to conflict and war. By deciding what is legal and illegal in terms of trade, governments bestow upon themselves the power to control commerce; but governments tend to be better suited to fighting conflicts and wars than to dealing with ‘criminal­ ization’, which entails a vast array of grinding legal and political issues leading to unpredictable outcomes. However, failure to stem ‘criminalization’ provokes a public perception that governments do not care and thereby are abetting the wildlife trade and its attendant cruelty and misery, further undermining trust in politicians.¶ Globalization rests on a central paradox: the same forces which enable the market liberalization and deregulation that promote wealth creation and social order also foster the ‘criminalization’ of international transactions, the ‘shadow trade’ and the potential for ‘network war’. The concept of ‘resource wars’ has become meaningless, not only because of its lack of clarity but also because the absence of resources is a primary driver in war and conflict. The same applies to ‘commodity conflicts’. However, this is not the same thing as saying that resources and commodities have not played a role in wars and commodities, as various UN reports have demonstrated.¶ Conflicts around resources and commodities are more usefully framed within ideas of ‘environmental confrontation’ and ‘criminalization’. These confronta­ tions, from a specifically local campaign to stop a mining company to an inter­ national campaign such as those to halt whaling or to stop rhino horn sales, are driven by the passion and will of people assisted by the power of NGOs and special interest groups, making the burden on governments of initiating just due process even heavier.¶ Also, ecological protection is adopting the mechanics of the marketplace with initiatives like The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB), the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation programme (REDD), and ‘catch share’ schemes that encourage long­term sustainable manage­ ment of fish stocks. Furthermore, while peace accords have damped down the open warfare in places such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Sudan, and the egregious examples of ‘commodity conflicts’ that occurred in the 1990s are no longer visible, the intervening decades have given time for the ‘networks’ of commodity trading to coalesce, harden and expand, both within and outside the ‘shadow economy’. To that degree, Fukuyama’s prediction of a post­modern history built on trade might well be correct; but the democratic processes of environmental protection will be an ever­increasing challenge for governments.¶

#### Environmental destruction is inevitable without a focus on consumption

Tucker, 2002

[Richard Tucker, is Adjunct Professor of Natural Resources at the University of Michigan. He is an environmental historian, specializing in the ecological impacts of colonial regimes, Confronting Consumption, “Environmentally damaging consumption.” Pg. 178-195. Published by The MIT press] /Wyo-MB

In the half millennium since Europeans began to fling their nets across the planet, Western Europe and the United States have built their prosperity and power to an important extent on the appropriation of tropical and colonial natural resources. Many of the agricultural and forest products that have contributed to northern affluence have been grown in tropical climates, where they have damaged or displaced natural ecosystems. Remarkably, the causal links between the economic expansion of Europe and North America and the environmental degradation of the tropics have not been studied with any precision, for they cross the lines of both geographic and disciplinary specialization. As Sidney W. Mintz observes, it is not a simple task to keep in mind both arenas— consumption and production, consumer markets and agroecosystems— and beyond that, to comprehend the complex causal links between them. Yet awareness of those connections is vital for our understanding of the modern world and the relation of human culture to its biosphere home. In today’s era of global free trade, with its insatiable demand for expanding material production and consumption, the issue of the environmental consequences of expanding consumption demands scholarly attention as never before. As social critic Robert D. Sack has written, ‘‘Our economies are geared to increase people’s desires for goods. Mass consumption powers the economy, but it does more. Since mass consumption transforms nature and since the economy of mass consumption dominates the world, these transformations have a global reach.’’ 2 Historians have barely begun to explore the specifics of how the rise of mass consumerism has resulted in the depletion of the natural resources

of distant and ‘‘less developed’’ lands. Perhaps even this assertion is inadequate: some social scientists assert that the study of consumerism itself is grossly neglected, especially as regards the varied values that different cultures ascribe to material consumption. As social historian Grant McCracken emphatically puts it, ‘‘The history of consumption has no history, no community of scholars, no tradition of scholarship.’’ 3 In recent years leading social theorists have similarly begun to assert that the blindness to the links between the cultural and economic world of material goods and the living world of ecology has been a similar fundamental failing in their disciplines. 4 Among historians the gap is equally wide. 5 Historians of the American industrial and consumer economy, for example, have not adequately probed the environmental transformations that accompanied the rise of urban, affluent North America. Nor have diplomatic historians concerned themselves with the environmental aspects of the global reach of the American imperium. 6 Thomas Princen observes that in order to describe land-use change and social dislocation in less developed countries, it may be sufficient to document those changes along with the activities of transnational corporations there. Or if the object is to explain the evolution of production patterns and the international division of labor, it is probably sufficient to trace foreign direct investment, trade flows, and relevant government policies. ‘‘But if one wants to explain the ever-increasing use and abuse of resources and waste sinks, the strain on ecosystem services from the local to the global, then one must do more,’’ Princen urges. ‘‘In particular,’’ he continues, ‘‘one must ask not just how the commodities are produced, but how they are consumed: how distribution, marketing, advertising, pricing, retailing, and government policies and programs affect consumer demand.’’

#### Reform fails—need to interrogate the ideology behind consumption

Conca, 2002

[Ken Conca, Program Director the School of Global Environmental Politics at American University, Confronting Consumption, “Consumption and Environment in a Global Economy.” Pg. 133-153. Published by The MIT press] /Wyo-MB

A second way that global economic change is giving new salience to consumption is political. Changes in the organization of production and the scope and complexity of international transactions are making traditional regulatory approaches to global environmental protection increasingly ineffective. Power in global production systems has shifted both upstream and downstream from the factory floor, where traditional environmental approaches have focused. If efforts to protect the planet and its peoples from environmental harm are to be effective, they will have to follow that shift in power. In particular, activism and advocacy will have to follow power downstream to the ideologies, symbols, relationships, and practices that drive consumption.

## Links

### RC of War

#### **The desire for security from the other makes us think of the other as eager to attack—this presupposition is the root cause of war—only by establishing peace of mind can we change this thought**

Nietzsche 1880 [Friedrich, “Aphorism #284,” *The Wanderer & His Shadow*, 1880, trans. Helen Zimmern, 1908, <http://www.davemckay.co.uk/philosophy/nietzsche/nietzsche.php?name=nietzsche.1878.humanalltoohuman.zimmern.12>]

The means to real peace.— No government admits any more that it keeps an army to satisfy occasionally the desire for conquest. Rather the army is supposed to serve for defense, and one invokes the morality that approves of self-defense. But this implies one’s own morality and the neighbor’s immorality; for the neighbor must be thought of as eager to attack and conquer if our state must think of means of self-defense. Moreover, the reasons we give for requiring an army imply that our neighbor, who denies the desire for conquest just as much as does our own state, and who, for his part, also keeps an army only for reasons of self-defense, is a hypocrite and a cunning criminal who would like nothing better than to overpower a harmless and awkward victim without any fight. Thus all states are now ranged against each other: they presuppose their neighbor’s bad disposition and their own good disposition. This presupposition, however, is inhumane, as bad as war and worse. At bottom, indeed, it is itself the challenge and the cause of wars, because, as I have said, it attributes immorality to the neighbor and thus provokes a hostile disposition and act. We must abjure the doctrine of the army as a means of self-defense just as completely as the desire for conquests. And perhaps the great day will come when people, distinguished by wars and victories and by the highest development of a military order and intelligence, and accustomed to make the heaviest sacrifices for these things, will exclaim of its own free will, “We break the sword," and will smash its entire military establishment down to its lowest foundations. Rendering oneself unarmed when one had been the best-armed, out of a height of feeling—that is the means to real peace, which must always rest on a peace of mind; whereas the so-called armed peace, as it now exists in all countries, is the absence of peace of mind. One trusts neither oneself nor one’s neighbor and, half from hatred, half from fear, does not lay down arms. Rather perish than hate and fear, and twice rather perish than make oneself hated and feared—this must someday become the highest maxim for every single commonwealth. Our liberal representatives, as is well known, lack the time for reflecting on the nature of man: else they would know that they work in vain when they work for a “gradual decrease of the military burden." Rather, only when this kind of need has become greatest will the kind of god be nearest who alone can help here. The tree of war-glory can only be destroyed all at once, by a stroke of lightning: but lightning, as indeed you know, comes from a cloud—and from up high.