## 1

#### Text: The Executive Branch of the United States should issue an executive order requiring congressional approval for preemptive use of Armed Forces into hostilities.

#### Executive action is De Facto and De Jure self-binding create accountability from the courts and risk political alienation for going back on promises

Posner and Vermeule 2010 [Eric A. , Professor of Law at the University of Chicago Law School and Editor of The Journal of Legal Studies; Adrian , Harvard Law Professor, The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic, Oxford Press, p. 138-139//wyo-sc]

Many of our mechanisms are unproblematic from a legal perspective, as they involve presidential actions that are clearly lawful. But a few raise legal questions; in particular, those that involve self-binding.59 Can a president bind himself to respect particular first-order policies? With qualifications, the answer is "yes, at least to the same extent that a legislature can." Formally, a duly promulgated executive rule or order binds even the executive unless and until it is validly abrogated, thereby establishing a new legal status quo.60 The legal authority to establish a new status quo allows a president to create inertia or political constraints that will affect his own future choices. In a practical sense, presidents, like legislatures, have great de facto power to adopt policies that shape the legal landscape for the future. A president might commit himself to a long-term project of defense procurement or infrastructure or foreign policy, narrowing his own future choices and generating new political coalitions that will act to defend the new rules or policies. More schematically, we may speak of formal and informal means of selfbinding: 1. The president might use formal means to bind himself. This is possible in the sense that an executive order, if otherwise valid, legally binds the president while it is in effect and may be enforced by the courts. It is not possible in the sense that the president can always repeal the executive order if he can bear the political and reputational costs of doing so. 2. The president might use informal means to bind himself. This is not only possible but frequent and important. Issuing an executive rule providing for the appointment of special prosecutors, as Nixon did, is not a formal self-binding.61 However, there may be political costs to repealing the order. This effect does not depend on the courts' willingness to enforce the order, even against Nixon himself. Court enforcement makes the order legally binding while it is in place, but only political and reputational enforcement can protect it from repeal. Just as a dessert addict might announce to his friends that he is going on a no-dessert diet in order to raise the reputational costs of backsliding and thus commit himself, so too the repeal of an executive order may be seen as a breach of faith even if no other institution ever enforces it. In what follows, we will invoke both formal and informal mechanisms. For our purposes, the distinction between the authority to engage in de jure self-binding (legally limited and well-defined) and the power to engage in de facto self-binding (broad and amorphous) is secondary. So long as policies are deliberately chosen with a view to generating credibility, and do so by constraining the president’s own future choices in ways that impose greater costs on ill-motivated presidents than on well-motivated ones, it does not matter whether the constraint is formal or informal.

## 2

#### **Will pass now; Obama and Boehner on board, but Obama’s PC key**

Kuhnhenn, 1-7

[JIM KUHNHENN, Associated Press, “For Obama, Congress, a Last Grasp at Immigration,” abcnews.com, January 7, 2014, <http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory/obama-congress-grasp-immigration-21444316> //uwyo-baj]

His agenda tattered by last year's confrontations and missteps, President Barack Obama begins 2014 clinging to the hope of winning a lasting legislative achievement: an overhaul of immigration laws. It will require a deft and careful use of his powers, combining a public campaign in the face of protests over his administration's record number of deportations with quiet, behind-the-scenes outreach to Congress, something seen by lawmakers and immigration advocates as a major White House weakness. In recent weeks, both Obama and House Speaker John Boehner, R-Ohio, have sent signals that raised expectations among overhaul supporters that 2014 could still yield the first comprehensive change in immigration laws in nearly three decades. If successful, it would fulfill an Obama promise many Latinos say is overdue. The Senate last year passed a bipartisan bill that was comprehensive in scope that addressed border security, provided enforcement measures and offered a path to citizenship for 11 million immigrants in the United States illegally. House leaders, pressed by tea party conservatives, demanded a more limited and piecemeal approach. Indicating a possible opening, Obama has stopped insisting the House pass the Senate version. And two days after calling Boehner to wish him happy birthday in November, Obama made it clear he could accept the House's bill-by-bill approach, with one caveat: In the end, "we're going to have to do it all." Boehner, for his part, in December hired Rebecca Tallent, a former top aide to Sen. John McCain and most recently the director of a bipartisan think tank's immigration task force. Even opponents of a broad immigration overhaul saw Tallent's selection as a sign legislation had suddenly become more likely. Boehner also fed speculation he would ignore tea party pressure, bluntly brushing back their criticism of December's modest budget agreement.

#### Fighting to defend his war power will sap Obama’s capital, trading off with rest of agenda

**Kriner, 10** --- assistant professor of political science at Boston University

(Douglas L. Kriner, “After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War”, University of Chicago Press, Dec 1, 2010, page 68-69)

**While congressional support leaves the president’s reserve of political capital intact, congressional criticism saps energy from other initiatives on the home front by forcing the president to expend energy and effort defending his international agenda. Political capital spent shoring up support for a president’s foreign policies is capital that is unavailable for his future policy initiatives**. Moreover, any weakening in the president’s political clout may have immediate ramifications for his reelection prospects, as well as indirect consequences for congressional races.59 Indeed, Democratic efforts to tie congressional Republican incumbents to President George W. Bush and his war policies paid immediate political dividends in the 2006 midterms, particularly in states, districts, and counties that had suffered the highest casualty rates in the Iraq War. 60 **In addition to boding ill for the president’s perceived political capital and reputation, such partisan losses in Congress only further imperil his programmatic agenda, both international and domestic.** Scholars have long noted that President Lyndon **Johnson’s dream of a Great Society also perished in the rice paddies of Vietnam. Lacking** the requisite funds in a war-depleted treasury and **the political capital needed to sustain his legislative vision, Johnson gradually let his domestic goals slip away** as he hunkered down in an effort first to win and then to end the Vietnam War. In the same way, **many of** President **Bush’s highest second-term domestic proprieties, such as Social Security and immigration reform, failed perhaps in large part because the administration had to expend so much energy and effort waging a rear-guard action against congressional critics of the war in Iraq.**61 **When making their cost-benefit calculations, presidents surely consider these wider political costs of congressional opposition to their military policies.** If congressional opposition in the military arena stands to derail other elements of his agenda, all else being equal, the president will be more likely to judge the benefits of military action insufficient to its costs than if Congress stood behind him in the international arena.

#### Immigration reform is key to generate jobs and attract high skilled workers that solves for competitiveness and the econ

Johnson 13

(Simon Johnson, former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, is the Ronald A. Kurtz Professor of Entrepreneurship at the M.I.T. Sloan School of Management and co-author of “White House Burning: The Founding Fathers, Our National Debt, and Why It Matters to You.” “How Immigration Reform Would Help the Economy” 6-20-13 http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/20/how-immigration-reform-would-help-the-economy//wyoccd)

The assessment is positive. This precise immigration proposal would improve the budget picture (see this helpful chart) and stimulate economic growth. The immediate effects are good and the more lasting effects even better. If anything, the long-run positive effects are likely to be even larger than the C.B.O. is willing to predict, in my assessment. (I’m a member of the office’s Panel of Economic Advisers but I was not involved in any way in this work.)¶ The debate over immigration is emotionally charged and, judging from recent blog posts, the Heritage Foundation in particular seems primed to dispute every detail in the C.B.O. approach – and to assert that it is underestimating some costs (including what happens when illegal immigrants receive an amnesty and subsequently claim government-provided benefits, a point Heritage has emphasized in its own report).¶ There is good reason for the C.B.O.’s careful wording in its analysis; it operates within narrow guidelines set by Congress, and its staff is wise to stick to very well-documented points. Still, as the legislation gains potential traction, it is worth keeping in mind why there could be an even larger upside for the American economy.¶ In 1776, the population of the United States was around 2.5 million; it is now more than 316 million (you can check the real-time Census Bureau population clock, but of course that is only an estimate).¶ Think about this: What if the original inhabitants had not allowed immigration or imposed very tight restrictions – for example, insisting that immigrants already have a great deal of education? It’s hard to imagine that the United States would have risen as an economy and as a country. How many United States citizens reading this column would be here today? (I’m proud to be an immigrant and a United States citizen.)¶ The long-term strength of the United States economy lies in its ability to create jobs. For more than 200 years as a republic (and 400 years in total) immigrants have not crowded together on a fixed amount of existing resources – land (in the early days) or factories (from the early 1800s) or the service sector (where most modern jobs arise). Rather the availability of resources essential for labor productivity has increased sharply. Land is improved, infrastructure is built and companies develop.¶ Most economic analysis about immigration looks at wages and asks whether natives win or lose when more immigrants show up in particular place or with certain skills. At the low end of wage distribution, there is reason to fear adverse consequences for particular groups because of increased competition for jobs. In fact, the C.B.O. does find that income per capita would decline slightly over the next 10 years before increasing in the subsequent 10 years: “Relative to what would occur under current law, S. 744 would lower per capita G.N.P. by 0.7 percent in 2023 and raise it by 0.2 percent in 2033, according to C.B.O.’s central estimates.”¶ And it is reasonable to ask who will pay how much into our tax system – and who will receive what kind of benefits. This is the terrain that the C.B.O. and the Heritage Foundation are contesting. (See, too, a letter to Senator Marco Rubio, Republican of Florida, from Stephen Gross, the chief actuary of the Social Security Administration. Mr. Gross said immigration reform would be a net positive; of the current 11.5 million illegal immigrants, “many of these individuals already work in the country in the underground economy, not paying taxes, and will begin paying taxes” if the immigration legislation are adopted. New illegal immigration would decline but not be eliminated.)¶ But the longer-run picture is most obviously quite different. The process of creating businesses and investing – what economists like to call capital formation – is much more dynamic than allowed for in many economic models.¶ People will save and they will invest. Companies will be created. The crucial question is who will have the ideas that shape the 21st century. (See, for example, the work of Charles I. Jones of Stanford University on this point and a paper he and Paul Romer wrote for a broader audience.)¶ This is partly about education – and the proposed legislation would tilt new visas more toward skilled workers, particularly those in science, technology, engineering, and math (often referred to as STEM).¶ But it would be a mistake to limited those admitted – or those allowed legal status and eventual citizenship – to people who already have or are in the process of getting a university-level education. To be clear, under the new system there may well be more low-wage immigrants than high-wage immigrants, but the transition to a point system for allocating green cards is designed to increase the share of people with more education and more scientific education, relative to the situation today and relative to what would otherwise occur.¶ Many people have good ideas. The Internet has opened up the process of innovation. I don’t know anyone who can predict where the next big technologies will come from. I also don’t know who will figure out how to organize production – including the provision of services – in a more effective manner.¶ We are competing in a world economy based on human capital, and people’s skills and abilities are the basis for our productivity. What we need more than anything, from an economic point of view, is more people (of any age or background) who want to acquire and apply new skills.¶ Increasing the size of our domestic market over the last 400 years has served us well. Allowing in immigrants in a fiscally responsible manner makes a great deal of sense — and the reports from the Joint Committee on Taxation and C.B.O. are very clear that this is now what is on the table. If the children of immigrants want to get more education, we should welcome the opportunity that this presents. When you cut off the path to higher education, you are depriving people of opportunity – and you are also hurting the economy.¶ The deeper political irony, of course, is that if the Heritage Foundation and its allies succeed in defeating immigration legislation, there are strong indications that this will hurt the Republican Party at the polls over the next decade and beyond. Yet, even so, House Republicans seem inclined to oppose immigration reform. That would be a mistake on both economic and political grounds.¶ We are 316 million people in a world of more than 7 billion – on its way to 10 billion or more (read this United Nations report if you like to worry about the future).¶ We should reform immigration along the lines currently suggested and increase the supply of skilled labor in the world. This will both improve our economy and, at least potentially, help ensure the world stays more prosperous and more stable.

**Nuclear war**

**Harris and Burrows ‘9**

**(**Mathew, PhD European History at Cambridge, counselor in the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer, member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” <http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf>, AM)

Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, **history may be more instructive than ever**. While we continue to believe that **the Great Depression** is not likely to be repeated, the **lessons** to be drawn from that period **include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies** (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) **and** on the **sustainability of multilateral institutions** (think League of Nations in the same period). **There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century.** For that reason, the ways in which **the potential for greater conflict could grow** would seem to be even more apt **in a constantly volatile economic environment** as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. **Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced.** For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. **Terrorist groups** in 2025 **will** likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups\_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks\_and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that **become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would** almost certainly **be the Middle East**. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, **worries** about a nuclear-armed Iran **could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions**. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity **conflict** and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella **could lead to an** unintended escalation **and broader conflict** if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. **The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals** combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also **will produce inherent difficulties** in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, **short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty** of Iranian intentions **may place more focus on preemption** rather than defense, potentially **leading to** escalatingcrises**.** 36 Types of **conflict** that the world continues to experience, such as **over resources, could reemerge**, particularly if **protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions** of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this **could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources,** for example, to be **essential for** maintaining domestic stability and the **survival of their regime**. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. **If** the **fiscal stimulus focus for** these **countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional** naval **capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves**, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. **With water** also **becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.**

## 3

#### Obama has cultivated broad enforcement discretion and that makes executive flexibility inevitable in the status quo.

Will 13

[George F. Will, Pulitzer Prize winning journalist and Washington Post columnist, “Obama’s extreme use of executive discretion,” Washington Post, December 18, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/george-will-obamas-extreme-use-of-executive-discretion/2013/12/18/656ae4be-680d-11e3-ae56-22de072140a2\_story.html // wyo-ch]

Congressional Republicans’ long-simmering dismay about Barack Obama’s offenses against the separation of powers became acute when events compelled him to agree with them that the Affordable Care Act (ACA) could not be implemented as written. But even before he decreed alterations of key ACA provisions — delaying enforcement of certain requirements for health insurance and enforcement of employers’ coverage obligations — he had effectively altered congressionally mandated policy by altering work requirements of the 1996 welfare reform; and compliance requirements of the No Child Left Behind education law; and some enforcement concerning marijuana possession; and the prosecution of drug crimes entailing mandatory minimum sentences; and the enforcement of immigration laws pertaining to some young people. Republicans tend to regard Obama’s aggressive assertion of enforcement discretion as idiosyncratic — an anti-constitutional impatience arising from his vanity. This interpretation is encouraged by his many assertions that he “can’t wait” for our system of separated powers to ratify his policy preferences. Still, to understand not only the extravagance of Obama’s exercises of executive discretion but also how such discretion necessarily grows as government does, read Zachary S. Price’s “Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty” forthcoming in the Vanderbilt Law Review. Price, a visiting professor at the University of California’s Hastings College of the Law, demonstrates that the Constitution’s “text, history, and normative underpinnings” do not justify the permissive reading Obama gives to its take care clause, which says the president “shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.” It is, says Price, part of America’s “deeply rooted constitutional tradition” that “presidents, unlike English kings, lack authority to suspend statutes” or make them inapplicable to certain individuals or groups. Indeed, the take care clause may have been intended to codify the Framers’ repudiation of royal suspending prerogatives. Hence the absence of an anti-suspension provision in the Bill of Rights. Congress’s excessive expansion of the number of federal crimes, however, has required the husbanding of scarce prosecutorial and judicial resources, which has made enforcement discretion central to the operation of today’s federal criminal justice system. But Obama’s uses of executive discretion pertain to the growth of the administrative state. The danger, Price says, is that the inevitable non-enforcement of many federal criminal laws will establish “a new constitutional norm of unbounded executive discretion” beyond the criminal justice system. Price says the enforcement discretion exercised in the context of the resource-constrained criminal justice system provides “no support for presidential authority to decline enforcement with respect to any other given civil regulatory regime, such as the Affordable Care Act.” The difference is between priority-setting and policy-setting, the latter being a congressional prerogative because of Congress’s primacy in lawmaking. Absent “a clear statutory basis, an executive waiver of statutory requirements” is “presumptively impermissible.” It has, however, become “a nearly irresistible temptation” for presidents to infer permission from the courts’ abandonment of judicial review that limits Congress’s power to delegate essentially legislative powers to the executive branch. So, Price asks: “If President Obama may postpone enforcement of the ACA’s insurance requirements and employer mandate, could a subsequent president ignore the Affordable Care Act altogether?”

**Congressional encroachment on the president’s ability to introduce armed forces into hostilities violates the separation of powers and undermines national security**

**Turner 2012**

[Professor Turner holds both professional and academic doctorates from the University of Virginia School of Law, where in 1981 he co-founded the Center for National Security Law with Professor John Norton Moore—who taught the nation’s first course on national security law in 1969. Turner served as chairman of the ABA Standing Committee on Law and National Security from 1989–1992., The War Powers Resolution at 40: Still an Unconstitutional, Unnecessary, and Unwise Fraud That Contributed CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW·VOL. 45·2012, Directly to the 9/11 Attacks, <http://law.case.edu/journals/JIL/Documents/45CaseWResJIntlL1&2.pdf>, uwyo//amp]

[**T]he War Powers resolution** does not work, because it **oversteps the constitutional bounds on Congress’ power to control the Armed Forces** in situations short of war **and** because **it** potentially **undermines our ability to effectively defend our national interests. By enabling Congress to require**—by its own inaction—**the withdrawal of troops from a situation of hostilities, the resolution unduly restricts the authority granted by the Constitution to the President** as Commander in Chief. . . . Although portrayed as an effort “to fulfill—not to alter, amend or adjust—the intent of the framers of the U.S. Constitution,” **the War Powers Resolution** actually **expands Congress’ authority beyond the power to declare war to the power to limit troop deployment** in situations short of war. . . . **The War Powers Resolution therefore threatens not only the delicate balance of power established by the Constitution. potentially undermines America’s ability to effectively defend our national security**.46 On February 29, 1996, it was my honor to take part in a debate on Capitol Hill under the sponsorship of the Center for National Security Law on the proposition that the War Powers Resolution should be repealed. I was paired in the affirmative with the late House Judiciary Committee Chairman Henry Hyde, and our opponents were former House Foreign Affairs and Intelligence committees chairman Lee Hamilton and Dr. Louis Fisher of the Library of Congress. As the debate unfolded, I was pleasantly shocked to hear that neither Representative Hamilton nor my old friend Lou Fisher was willing to actually defend the War Powers Resolution. Shortly thereafter, Lou co-authored an article calling for the statute’s repeal,47 and in 2008 Representative Hamilton served on the bipartisan National War Powers Commission, which unanimously concluded that the War Powers Resolution was unconstitutional and should be repealed.48It

#### Unhindered executive key to check rogue nations—history proves and prefer this ev, it’s comparative

Nzelibe & Yoo 06

[Jide Nzelibe and John C. Yoo. , Yoo is a professor of law at the University of California at Berkeley School of Law , , Rational war and constitutional design.(Symposium on Executive Power).

Yale Law Journal 115.9 (July 2006): p2512(30), uwyo//amp]

This Essay has sought to introduce a more sophisticated functional perspective to the war powers debate, without focusing on the normative question of what types of war the United States should fight. Previous arguments had raised a conflict between formalism and functionalism. Formalist claims in favor of a requirement that Congress pre-authorize hostilities are no longer as compelling as they once seemed. We believe that the better reading of formalist sources is that the Constitution creates a flexible system for malting war. If the formalist debate over war has reached a stalemate, then functionalist arguments only gain in importance. Functional analysis of war powers, however, has been fairly rudimentary. It has assumed that a Congress-first approach would slow down decision-malting regarding war, which would benefit the nation by reducing entry into imprudent wars. This assumption, however, ignores the possibility that Congress might not only reduce Type I errors, but might also increase Type II errors. A casual review of American history does not support the conclusion that congressional participation reduces either Type I or II errors when compared with a system of unilateral presidential initiative in war. A better functional approach views the war powers question as a principal-agent problem. The executive branch bears certain advantages in terms of speed, unity of purpose, and secrecy in launching wars; while agency costs may certainly arise, it is not clear that congressional participation ex ante would significantly reduce them. Congressional participation, however, while unwise to establish as a constitutional rule, may nonetheless benefit the nation in helping it to avoid costly wars. This occurs, however, not because congressional participation slows down the progress toward war, but because it allows the President to engage in costly signaling that could promote a negotiated settlement with a potential enemy. Such a dynamic would not make a significant difference in regard to rogue nations or international terrorist organizations that lack the proper incentives to appreciate such signals or that are uninterested in reaching a settlement. In those cases, the benefits of relying upon executive speed and unity outweigh any benefits that might arise from congressional participation.

**An unchecked North Korea causes global catastrophe**

**Hayes and Green, 10**

[\*Victoria University AND Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute (Peter and Michael, “-“The Path Not Taken, the Way Still Open: Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia”, 1/5, http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/10001HayesHamalGreen.pdf) uwyo//amp]

**The consequences of failing to address the proliferation threat posed by the North Korea developments, and related political and economic issues, are serious, not only for the Northeast Asian region but for the whole international community. At worst, there is the possibility of nuclear attack1, whether by intention, miscalculation, or merely accident, leading to the resumption of Korean War hostilities.** On the Korean Peninsula itself, **key population centres are well within short or medium range missiles.** **The whole of Japan is likely to come within North Korean missile range**. Pyongyang has a population of over 2 million, Seoul (close to the North Korean border) 11 million, and Tokyo over 20 million. **Even a limited nuclear exchange would result in a holocaust of unprecedented proportions. But the catastrophe within the region would not be the only outcome. New research indicates that even a limited nuclear war in the region would rearrange our global climate far more quickly than global warming.** Westberg draws attention to new studies modelling the effects of even a limited nuclear exchange involving approximately 100 Hiroshima-sized 15 kt bombs2 (by comparison it should be noted that the United States currently deploys warheads in the range 100 to 477 kt, that is, individual warheads equivalent in yield to a range of 6 to 32 Hiroshimas).The studies indicate that **the soot from the fires produced would lead to a decrease in global temperature by 1.25 degrees Celsius for a period of 6-8 years**.3 In Westberg’s view: **That is not global winter, but the nuclear darkness will cause a deeper drop in temperature than at any time during the last 1000 years.** The temperature over the continents would decrease substantially more than the global average. **A decrease in rainfall over the continents would also follow…The period of nuclear darkness will cause much greater decrease in grain production than 5% and it will continue for many years...hundreds of millions of people will die from hunger…To make matters even worse, such amounts of smoke injected into the stratosphere would cause a huge reduction in the Earth’s protective ozone.4** These, of course, are not the only consequences. **Reactors might also be targeted, causing further mayhem and downwind radiation effects, superimposed on a smoking, radiating ruin left by nuclear next-use.** Millions of refugees would flee the affected regions. **The direct impacts, and the follow-on impacts on the global economy via ecological and food insecurity, could make the present global financial crisis pale by comparison. How the great powers, especially the nuclear weapons states respond to such a crisis, and in particular, whether nuclear weapons are used in response to nuclear first-use, could make or break the global non proliferation and disarmament regimes. There could be many unanticipated impacts on regional and global security relationships5, with subsequent nuclear breakout and geopolitical turbulence, including possible loss-of-control over fissile material or warheads in the chaos of nuclear war, and aftermath chain-reaction affects involving other potential proliferant states.** The Korean nuclear proliferation issue is not just a regional threat but a global one that warrants priority consideration from the international community.

**4**

**The logic of the affirmative asks how war should be waged rather than if war should be waged at all—their methods only spark temporary interest in the military-industrial complex—it leads to free reign of the mentality of constant war**

**Lichterman 3**

[Andrew, Program Director of the Western States Legal Foundation, Missiles of Empire: America’s 21st Century Global Legions, WSLF Information Bulletin, Fall 2003, http://www.wslfweb.org/nukes.htm]

**Criticizing the Hubcaps while the Juggernaut Rolls On** **The U.S. military-industrial complex today is** so **immense** as to defy comprehension. **Even those** few **paying attention tend to focus on one small piece at a time. One month it may be** proposals for **nuclear weapons** with certain new capabilities. **Then the attention may shift to missile defense– but** there too, **only a small part of the program attracts public debate, with** immense **programs like the airborne laser proceeding almost invisibly. Proposals for** the intensive **militarization of space** like the Space Plane **come to light for a day or two, attracting a brief flurry of interest**; the continuing, broad development of military space technologies, from GPS-aided guidance to radiation hardened microchips to space power generation, draw even less scrutiny. There is so broad a consensus among political elites supporting the constant refinement of conventional armaments that new generations of strike aircraft, Navy ships, and armored vehicles attract little notice outside industry and professional circles, with only spectacular cost overruns or technical failures likely to draw the occasional headline. **A few Congresspeople will** **challenge one or another particularly extreme new** **weapon** (e.g. the “Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator”), **but usually on** narrow **pragmatic** **grounds: we can accomplish the same “mission”** **with less risky or cheaper weapons. But the question of “why,” seldom is asked, only “how,”** or “how much does it cost?” Most of **the programs** **that constitute the military machine glide silently onward undisturbed,** like the body of a missile submarine invisible below the deceptively small surfaces that rise above the sea. The United States emerged after both World War II and the Cold War as the most powerful state on earth-- the one with the most choices. The first time, all of this was still new. We could perhaps understand our ever deeper engagement with the machinery of death as a series of tragic events, of the inevitable outcome of fallible humans grappling with the titanic forces they had only recently unleashed, in the context of a global confrontation layered in secrecy, ideology, and fear. But this time around, since the end of the Cold War, **we must see the United States as truly choosing, with every new weapon and every new war, to lead the world into** a renewed spiral towards **catastrophe**. The past is written, but our understanding of it changes from moment to moment. The United States began the nuclear age as the most powerful nation on earth, and proclaimed the character of the “American Century” with the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, a cryptic message written in the blood of innocents. Its meaning has come clear over fifty years of technocratic militarism, punctuated by the deaths of millions in neo-colonial warfare and underscored always by the willingness to end the world rather than share power with anyone. **The path ahead still can be changed, but we must begin with an understanding of where we are, and how we got here.** In the United States, there is a very long way to go before we have a debate about the uses of military force that addresses honestly the weapons we have and seek to develop, much less about the complex social forces which impel the United States to maintain its extraordinary levels of forces and armaments. Most Americans don’t know what their government is doing in their name, or why. Their government, regardless of the party in power, lies about both its means and its ends on a routine basis. And there is nothing the government lies about more than nuclear weapons, proclaiming to the world for the last decade that the United States was disassembling its nuclear facilities and leading the way to disarmament, while rebuilding its nuclear weapons plants and planning for another half century and more of nuclear dominance.74 It is clear by now that **fighting violence with yet more violence**, claiming to stop the spread of nuclear weapons by threatening the use of nuclear weapons, **is a dead end.** **The very notion of “enforcement,”** that some countries have the right to judge and punish others for seeking “weapons of mass destruction,” **has become an excuse for war making, a cover and justification for the power and profit agenda of secretive and undemocratic elites. The only solution that will increase the security of ordinary people anywhere is for all of us**, in our respective societies, **to do everything** we can **to get** **the most violent elements in our cultures– whether in or out of uniform– under control.** In the United States, **this will require far more than changing a few faces in Washington. We will need a genuine peace movement, ready to make connections to** movements for **ecological balance,** and **for social and economic justice**, and by doing so **to address the causes of war. Before we can expect others to join us, it must be clear that we are leaving the path of violence.**

**Awareness of militarism key – our internalized acceptance of war guarantees endless violence that ensures planetary destruction and structural violence**

**Lawrence 9**

[Grant, “Military Industrial "War" Consciousness Responsible for Economic and Social Collapse,” OEN—OpEdNews, March 27]

As a presidential candidate, [Barack Obama](http://obama.senate.gov/) called [Afghanistan](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_in_Afghanistan_%282001%E2%80%93present%29) ''the war we must win.'' He was absolutely right. Now it is time to win it... Senators [John McCain](http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0564587/) and Joseph Lieberman [calling](http://www.miamiherald.com/opinion/inbox/story/960269.html) for an expanded war in Afghanistan "How true it is that **war can destroy everything of value.**" Pope Benedict XVI [decrying](http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iuue8kE-e0lYZVFpt4RlbX4M_IEw) the suffering of Africa Where troops have been quartered, brambles and thorns spring up. In the track of great armies there must follow lean years. Lao Tzu on [War](http://www.sacred-texts.com/tao/salt/salt09.htm) **As Americans we are raised on the utility of war to conquer every problem. We have a drug problem so we wage war on it. We have a cancer problem so we wage war on it. We have a crime problem so we wage war on it. Poverty cannot be dealt with but it has to be warred against. Terror is another problem that must be warred against.** **In the** [**United States**](http://maps.google.com/maps?ll=38.8833333333,-77.0166666667&spn=10.0,10.0&q=38.8833333333,-77.0166666667%20%28United%20States%29&t=h)**, solutions can only be found in terms of wars. In a society that functions to support a massive military industrial war machine** and empire, **it is important that the terms promoted support the conditioning of its citizens. We are conditioned to see war as the solution to** major **social ills and** major **political disagreements.** That way **when we see so much of our resources devoted to war then we don't question the utility of it. The term "war" excites** mind and body **and creates a fear mentality** that looks at life in terms of attack. In war, there has to be an attack and a must win attitude to carry us to victory. **But is this war mentality working for us?** In an age when **nearly half of our tax money goes to support the war machine** and a good deal of the rest is going to support the elite that control the war machine, we can see that our present war mentality is not working. Our values have been so perverted by our war mentality that we see sex as sinful but killing as entertainment. **Our society is dripping violence. The violence is fed by poverty, social injustice,** the break down of family **and** community that also arises from **economic injustice**, and by the managed media. **The cycle of violence that exists in our society exists because it is useful to those that control society. It is easier to sell the war machine when your population is conditioned to violence. Our military industrial consciousness may not be working for** nearly **all of the life of the planet but it does work for the very few that are the master manipulators of our values** and our consciousness. Rupert Murdoch, the media monopoly man that runs the "Fair and Balanced" [Fox Network](http://www.fox.com/), Sky Television, and [News Corp](http://www.newscorp.com/) just to name a few, [had](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rupert_Murdoch) all of his 175 newspapers editorialize in favor of the [Iraq war](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq_War). Murdoch snickers when [he says](http://www.newscorpse.com/ncWP/?p=341) "we tried" to manipulate public opinion." The Iraq war was a good war to Murdoch [because,](http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2004/07/b122948.html) "The death toll, certainly of Americans there, by the terms of any previous war are quite minute." But, to the media manipulators, the phony politicos, the military industrial elite, a million dead Iraqis are not to be considered. **War is big business and it is supported by a war consciousness that allows it to prosper. That is why** more war in Afghanistan, the war on Palestinians, and the **other wars around the planet** in which the [military industrial complex](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military-industrial_complex) builds massive wealth and power **will continue. The military industrial war mentality is not only killing, maiming, and destroying but it is also contributing to the present social and economic collapse.** As mentioned previously, **the massive wealth transfer that occurs when the American people give half of their money to support death and destruction is money that could have gone to support a just society. It is no accident that after years of war and preparing for war, our society is crumbling. Science and technological resources along with economic and natural resources have been squandered in the never-ending pursuit of enemies. All of that energy could have been utilized for the good of humanity,** ¶ **instead of maintaining the power positions of the** very few **super wealthy.** So the suffering that we give is ultimately the suffering we get. **Humans want to believe that they can escape the consciousness that they live in. But that consciousness determines what we experience and how we live. As long as we choose to live in "War" in our minds then we will continue to get "War" in our lives. When humanity chooses to wage peace on the world then there will be a flowering of life.** But until then we will be forced to live the life our present war consciousness is creating.

**The alternative is to reject the 1AC in favor of a pacifistic solution to problems.**

**The only way to solve is by adopting a pacifistic mindset—the shift away from militarism is key**

**Demenchonok 9**

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**Where, then, does the future lie? Unilateralism, hegemonic political anarchy, mass immiseration, ecocide, and global violence**—a Hobbesian bellum omnium contra omnes? **Or international cooperation, social justice, and genuine collective—political and human—security?** Down which path lies cowering, fragile hope?¶ **Humanistic thinkers** approach these problems from the perspective of their concern about the situation of individuals and the long-range interests of humanity. They **examine** in depth the **root causes of** these **problems, warning about the consequences of escalation and, at the same time, indicating the prospect of their possible solutions through nonviolent means and a growing global consciousness. Today's world is in desperate need of realistic alternatives to violent conflict. Nonviolent action—properly planned and executed—is a powerful and effective force for political and social change. The ideas of peace and nonviolence, as expressed by** Immanuel **Kant,** Leo **Tolstoy,** Mahatma **Gandhi,** **M**artin **L**uther **K**ing**, and many contemporary philosophers**—supported by peace and civil rights movements—**counter the ~~paralyzing~~** **fear with hope and offer a realistic alternative: a rational approach to the** solutions to the **problems**, encouraging people to be the masters of their own destiny.¶ **Fortunately, the memory of the tragedies of war and the growing realization of this new existential situation of humanity has awakened the global conscience and generated protest movements demanding necessary changes. During the four decades of the Cold War,** which polarized the world, **power politics was challenged by the** common perspective of humanity, of the supreme value of human life, and **the ethics of peace.** Thus, in Europe, which suffered from both world wars and totalitarianism, spiritual-**intellectual efforts to find solutions to these problems generated ideas of** "new thinking," aiming for **peace, freedom, and democracy. Today, philosophers, intellectuals, progressive political leaders, and peace-movement activists continue to promote a peaceful alternative.** In the asymmetry of power, despite being frustrated by war-prone politics, **peaceful projects emerge** each time, like a phoenix arising from the ashes, **as the only viable alternative for the survival of humanity. The new thinking** in philosophy **affirms the supreme value of** human and nonhuman **life, freedom, justice, and the future of human civilization. It asserts that the** transcendental task of the **survival of humankind and the rest of the biotic community must have an unquestionable primacy in comparison to particular interests** of nations, social classes, and so forth. In applying these principles to the nuclear age, **it considers a just and lasting peace as a categorical imperative for the survival of humankind, and thus proposes a world free from nuclear weapons** and from **war and organized violence.**44 In tune with the Charter of the United Nations, **it calls for** the **democratization** of international relations and for **dialogue and cooperation in order to secure peace, human rights, and solutions to global problems.** It further calls for the transition toward a cosmopolitan order.¶ **The escalating global problems are symptoms of** what might be termed **a** contemporary **civilizational disease**, developed over the course of centuries, in which techno-economic progress is achieved at the cost of depersonalization and dehumanization. Therefore, **the possibility of an effective "treatment" today depends on** whether or not **humankind** will be able to regain its humanity, thus establishing new relations of the individual with himself or herself, with others, and with nature. **Hence the need for a new philosophy of humanity and an ethics of nonviolence and planetary co-responsibility to help us make sense not only of our past historical events, but also of the extent, quality, and urgency of our present choices.**

## SOP

#### Congressional Supremacy is inevitable in SOP framework—closest to the people, power of the purse, and lawmaking power

Zuckert 12 [Michael Zuckert , Chair of Political Science department at Notre Dame, “ON THE SEPARATION OF POWERS: LIBERAL AND PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM,” Social Philosophy & Policy, suppl. Natural Rights Individualism and Progressivism in American, Vol: 29 Issue 2, P. 335-364, Jul 2012, Proquest, wyo-sc]

Americans believed that they had a decentralized, dispersed system of power, but in reality "there is always a centre of power." 20 "The balances of the Constitution are for the most part only ideal. For all practical purposes the national government is supreme over the state governments, and Congress predominant over its so-called co-ordinate branches." The separation of powers along with federalism is the target of Wilson's attack, in the first instance, not because it disperses power, as many of the other Progressives, like Herbert Croly or Theodore Roosevelt argued, but because it fails to disperse power as it was intended to do. The "checks and balances which once obtained are no longer effective.... The actual form of our present government is simply a scheme of congressional supremacy." 21¶ Wilson devotes a fair amount of his text to probing the reasons for this concentration of power in Congress, so contrary to the original intentions of the Founders. The chief causes seem to be three in number. First, the "natural, the inevitable tendency of every system of self-government like our own and the British is to exalt the representative body, the people's parliament, to a position of absolute supremacy." 22 Although he does not do it, he could have quoted James Madison on the "legislative vortex." This "political law ... written in our hearts," overrides the merely written parchment law of the Constitution. The power to make laws and the power to control taxing and spending overwhelms all other powers; it "practically sets [the popular legislative] assembly to rule the nation as supreme overlord." 23 Although Wilson does not explicitly draw the conclusion, his point is that experience has shown that the Constitution's Framers did not adequately understand the dynamics of democratic politics. They established a representative popular democracy with huge powers centered in the branch closest to the people. The result--congressional supremacy--was inevitable, or nearly so.

#### Party polarization makes effective SOP impossible

Marshall ‘8

[William P. Marshall, Kenan Professor of Law, University of North Carolina. Boston Law Review 88:505, “The Inceasingly Polarized Two-Party System,”

http://www.bu.edu/law/central/jd/organizations/journals/bulr/documents/MARSHALL.pdf ETB]

The final reason why presidential power has increased relates to the rise of a ¶ highly polarized two-party system in which party loyalty trumps institutional ¶ concerns. The beginnings of this polarization can be traced to the enactment of ¶ the Civil Rights Act of 1964.82 The passage of that Act ended an era that had ¶ effectively been a three-party system in the United States: the northern ¶ Democrats, the southern Democrats, and the Republicans. During this “threeparty” era, members of Congress needed to work across party lines to develop ¶ working majorities on particular issues.83 Their political fortunes and ¶ reputations, therefore, were closely tied to the success of Congress as an ¶ institution.¶ In contrast, in the highly polarized two-party system currently dominating¶ national politics, a member’s political success depends more on the fortunes of ¶ her particular party than on the stature of Congress. This means members of ¶ Congress have a greater personal interest in the President’s success as leader of their party than they have in Congress as an institution. Correspondingly, ¶ because the President is the leader of his or her political party, the President ¶ can expect greater loyalty and discipline from party members than occurred in ¶ previous eras. The result of this is that when the President’s party controls the ¶ Congress, he or she can proceed virtually uncontested.84 Consequently, in an ¶ era of highly polarized parties, there no longer exists the constitutional balance ¶ purportedly fostered by separation of powers. Rather, the constitutional ¶ balance becomes what Daryl Levinson and Richard Pildes term a “separation ¶ of parties.”85 The problem, of course, is that separation of parties serves as no ¶ balance at all when both the Presidency and the Congress are controlled by the ¶ same party. In those circumstances, the power of the Presidency is effectively ¶ unchecked.

#### Data disproves hegemony impacts

Fettweis, 11

Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO

It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.

#### New great powers are rising and will soon be on par with the us—prefer our evidence because it cites the two most important indicators of a power shift

Layne 12

[Chris, Professor of IR and Political Science at Texas A&M, “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana”, p. online //wyo-tjc]

American decline is part of a broader trend in international politics: the shift of economic power away from the Euro-Atlantic core to rising great and regional powers (what economists sometimes refer to as the ‘‘emerging market’’ nations). Among the former are China, India, and Russia. The latter category includes Indonesia, Turkey, South Korea, Brazil, and South Africa. In a May 2011 report, the World Bank predicted that six countries—China, India, Brazil, Russia, Indonesia, and South Korea—will account for one-half of the world’s economic growth between 2011 and 2025 (Politi 2011; Rich 2011). In some respects, of course, this emergence of new great powers is less about rise than restoration. As Figure 1 indicates, in 1700 China and India were the world’s two largest economies. From their perspective—especially Beijing’s—they are merely regaining what they view as their natural, or rightful, place in the hierarchy of great powers. The ascent of new great powers is the strongest evidence of unipolarity’s end. The two most important indicators of whether new great powers are rising are relative growth rates and shares of world GDP (Gilpin 1981; Kennedy 1987). The evidence that the international system is rapidly becoming multipolar—and that, consequently, America’s relative power is declining—is now impossible to deny, and China is Exhibit A for the shift in the world’s center of economic and geopolitical gravity. China illustrates how, since the Cold War’s end, potential great powers have been positioning themselves to challenge the United States.

#### Multipolarity will arrive in two decades as other powers catch up to the US—transition to offshore balancing now is key to avoid unending cycles of warfare\*\*

Layne 9

[Christopher, Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, Review of International Studies, “America’s Middle East grand strategy after Iraq: the moment for offshore balancing has arrived”, 2009, p. asp]

Some primacists believe that the US is immune to being counter-balanced because, as the only great power in a ‘unipolar’ system, it is so much more powerful than its nearest possible competitors.4 Yet, recent studies by the CIA offer compelling evidence that by 2020 the era of America’s unipolar ascendancy will be drawing to a close as new poles of power in the international system approach the US share of world power.5 And, of course, growing apprehensions about the military, as well as economic, implications of China’s rapid ascent are – at the very least – an implicit acknowledgment that the days of unchallenged US dominance in world affairs are numbered. Offshore balancers believe the US must adjust to incipient multipolarity because they understand that – unless the US is prepared to fight an unending series of preventive wars – new great powers inevitably will emerge in the next decade or two.

#### The US should punt its overseas commitments—it preserves American power, eliminates counter-balancing and solves for our flashpoint war scenarios\*\*

Parent & Mac Donald 11

[Joseph and Paul, Assistant Professors of Political Science at the University of Miami and at Wellesley College, “The Wisdom of Retrenchment”, Foreign Affairs, Nov/Dec, p. asp//wyo-tjc]

In fact, far from auguring chaos abroad and division at home, a policy of prudent retrenchment would not only reduce the costs of U.S. foreign policy but also result in a more coherent and sustainable strategy. In the past, great powers that scaled back their goals in the face of their diminishing means were able to navigate the shoals of power politics better than those that clung to expensive and overly ambitious commitments. Today, a reduction in U.S. forward deployments could mollify U.S. adversaries, eliminate potential flashpoints, and encourage U.S. allies to contribute more to collective defense--all while easing the burden on the United States of maintaining geopolitical dominance. A policy of retrenchment need not invite international instability or fuel partisan rancor in Washington. If anything, it could help provide breathing room for reforms and recovery, increase strategic flexibility, and renew the legitimacy of U.S. leadership.

#### Conflict with China is inevitable unless we accept retrenchment—no amount of accommodation or good relations can avoid a hegemonic clash

Layne 12

[Chris, Professor of IR and Political Science at Texas A&M, “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana”, p. online //wyo-tjc]

Revealingly, Ikenberry makes clear this expectation when he says that the deal the United States should propose to China is for Washington ‘‘to accommodate a rising China by offering it status and position within the regional order in return for Beijing’s acceptance and accommodation of Washington’s core interests, which include remaining a dominant security provider within East Asia’’ (Ikenberry 2011:356). It is easy to see why the United States would want to cut such a deal but it is hard to see what’s in it for China. American hegemony is waning and China is ascending, and there is zero reason for China to accept this bargain because it aims to be the hegemon in its own region. The unfolding Sino- American rivalry in East Asia can be seen as an example of Dodge City syndrome (in American Western movies, one gunslinger says to the other: ‘‘This town ain’t big enough for both of us’’) or as a geopolitical example of Newtonian physics (two hegemons cannot occupy the same region at the same time). From either perspective, the dangers should be obvious: unless the United States is willing to accept China’s ascendancy in East (and Southeast) Asia, Washington and Beijing are on a collision course.

#### EXTENDED DETERRENCE GUARANTEES WAR WITH CHINA WITHIN 10 YEARS—TAIWAN DISPUTE

Layne in ‘7

[Christopher, Professor of Political Science @ Texas A&M, American Empire: A Debate , P. 75 //wyo-tjc]

Finally, Taiwan is a powder-keg issue in Sino-American relations. China remains committed to national reunification, yet Taiwan is moving percepti- bly toward independence. Almost certainly, Beijing would regard a Taiwanese declaration of independence as a casus belli. It is unclear how the United States would respond to a China-Taiwan conflict, although President George \V Bush created a stir in 2001 when he declared that the United States would intervene militarily in the event of a Chinese attack on Taiwan. For sure, how- ever, it is safe to predict that there would be strong domestic political pressure in favor of American intervention. Beyond the arguments that Chinese mili- tary action against Taiwan would undermine U.S. interests in a stable world order and constitute "aggression," ideological antipathy toward China and support for a democratizing Taiwan would be powerful incentives for Ameri- can intervention. On Taiwan, in other words, the arguments of U.S. primacists have come close to locking-in Washington to a potentially dangerous policy The primacists' claim that the United States must be prepared to defend Taiwan from Chinese invasion overlooks three points. First, for nearly a quar- ter century, the United States has recognized that Taiwan is a Chinese prov- ince, not an independent state. Second, America's European and Asian allies have no interest in picking a quarrel with China over Taiwan's fate. If Wash- ington goes to the mat with Beijing over Taiwan, it almost certainly will do so alone. (Given their unilateralist bent, however, the prospect of fighting China without allies might not be much concern to American primacists.) Third, by defending Taiwan, the United States runs the risk of armed confronta- tion with China-probably not in the immediate future, but almost certainly within the next decade or so.

#### SECOND, WAR WITH CHINA LEADS TO DETERRENCE BREAKDOWNS AND NUCLEAR HOLOCAUST

Johnson in 1

[Chalmers, “Time to Bring the Troops Home”, The Nation, May 14, p. lexis // wyo-tjc]

China is another matter. No sane figure in the Pentagon wants a war with China, and all serious US militarists know that China's minuscule nuclear capacity is not offensive but a deterrent against the overwhelming US power arrayed against it (twenty archaic Chinese warheads versus more than 7,000 US warheads). Taiwan, whose status constitutes the still incomplete last act of the Chinese civil war, remains the most dangerous place on earth. Much as the 1914 assassination of the Austrian crown prince in Sarajevo led to a war that no one wanted, a misstep in Taiwan by any side could bring the United States and China into a conflict that neither wants. Such a war would bankrupt the United States, deeply divide Japan and probably end in a Chinese victory, given that China is the world's most populous country and would be defending itself against a foreign aggressor. More seriously, it could easily escalate into a nuclear holocaust. However, given the nationalistic challenge to China's sovereignty of any Taiwanese attempt to declare its independence formally, forward-deployed US forces on China's borders have virtually no deterrent effect.

## Credibility

#### US needs to retreat from the global stage, not pursue a diabolical form of soft power

Falk 12

(Richard Falk is the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Palestinian human rights. “When soft power is hard” July 12 http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/07/201272212435524825.html//wyoccd)

While it might have seemed unproblematic in 1996 for Nye/Owens to write about planting the seeds of US democracy throughout the world, by 2012 such a project has become nothing less than diabolical. The best the world can hope for is not such an aggressive version of soft power geopolitics but a US turn toward passivity, what used to be called "isolationism", and was perhaps briefly reborn by the Obama posture during the 2011 Libyan intervention of "leading from behind", as if that is leading at all.¶ Of course, such a realistic retreat begets the fury of the Republicans who seem to have not lost any of their appetite for the red meat of military adventures, despite a string of defeats and their constant wailing about the fiscal deficit. When it comes to militarism, all of their firepower is directed at the alleged wimpishness of US foreign policy in the hands of a Democratic president.¶ There is a second sense of soft power that I advocate, which, in its strongest form, applies Gandhian principles to the practice of diplomacy. A weaker form that may be more consistent with the world as it is, would restrict the role of hard power to self-defence strictly constrained as it is by the UN charter, and to humanitarian interventions in exceptional circumstances - but even then under the operational control of the UN Security Council, and implemented by a UN peace force trained to minimise recourse to violence.¶ If we want to respect the politics of self-determination, we need to be prepared to accept the prospect of some tragic struggles for control of national space. Geopolitical passivity needs to be recognised as an essential political virtue in this century, and reliance on the wisdom of collective procedures subject to constitutional constraints as a necessary adjustment to the realities of a globalising world that may go awry on some occasions.¶ But it is far better than entrusting peace and security to the untender mercies of a single sovereign state, no matter how democratic its credentials purport to be.

#### Credibility has been ineffective under Obama-Syria, Iran, and North Korea all prove

Glassman 13

(James, former under secretary of state for public diplomacy and public affairs, is executive director of the George W. Bush Institute. May 9, 2013 http://thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/298077-president-obama-surprisingly-ineffective-at-using-soft-power-#ixzz2ZRG3utja//wyoccd)  
In an article in The New Yorker two years ago, reporter Ryan Lizza famously quoted an anonymous adviser to President Obama characterizing the president’s strategy in Libya as “leading from behind.” That’s not a bad way to describe the president’s foreign policy in general. Obama takes great pains not to lead too conspicuously, not to step on toes, not to offend allies or enemies. Libya, in fact, was the ideal: Let the Europeans and the Arabs take the lead, and we’ll quietly help out. Or not. ¶ Lizza wrote, “It’s a different definition of leadership than America is known for, and it comes from two unspoken beliefs: that the relative power of the U.S. is declining, as rivals like China rise, and that the U.S. is reviled in many parts of the world. Pursuing our interests and spreading our ideals thus requires stealth and modesty as well as military strength.”¶ He quoted Benjamin Rhodes, one of the president’s deputy national security advisers. “If you were to boil it all down to a bumper sticker, it’s ‘Wind down these two wars, reestablish American standing and leadership in the world, and focus on a broader set of priorities, from Asia and the global economy to a nuclear-nonproliferation regime.’ ”¶ So how’s it working for you? In my view, not particularly well. Look at the last 100 days. The revolt against the Syrian regime has become one of the most brutal repressions in decades. The situation has grown worse, with the almost certain use of chemical weapons crossing what the president drew as a “red line.” North Korea, developing nuclear weapons and the capacity to deliver them over long distances, has denigrated America and threatened to attack us. And, speaking of nukes — and the goal of nuclear nonproliferation — Iran remains undeterred as well, with its own “red line” in doubt. Meanwhile, the United States suffered its first terrorist bombing since 9/11, with three killed and more than 200 wounded — an event that occurred eight months after the attack on our consulate in Benghazi, Libya, where a U.S. ambassador was killed for the first time in 33 years.¶ The problem of America being “reviled in many parts of the world” is vastly overblown, but it has surely not been remedied. Europeans and the Japanese like us more, but they were pretty fond of us to start with. Muslims, according to the Pew Research Center, like us less. In Pakistan, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey and Lebanon, the average favorability rating for the United States in 2012 was 21 percent; in 2008, it was 26 percent.¶ Foreign policy is not easy. The challenges are unpredictable, which is why the best policy rests on a solid foundation of principle and a clear strategy. The George W. Bush administration’s national security strategy was simple: keep America safe and promote freedom. These goals are linked; free nations rarely threaten the United States or their own neighbors. Achieving both these goals requires leadership — a consistency that reassures our allies and deters our enemies. ¶

#### Credibility is a false concept—only wealth and power affect influence

Doctorow 2013(Gilbert, Research Fellow of the American University in Moscow, May 20, "Soft power is largely an American PR gimmick", http://english.ruvr.ru/2013\_05\_20/Soft-power-is-largely-an-American-PR-gimmick/)

There is not much in all of this for the Kremlin to use in furtherance of its foreign policy objectives. But then the fact that Hilary Clinton chose Nye as the State Department’s house philosopher during her tenure did not change the substance of Obama’s foreign policy even if it may have influenced the sound bites. And it could not be otherwise, because soft power is largely a public relations gimmick.¶ Since Nye is an idealist rather than a realist, he systematically fails to understand that soft power is above all a by-product of wealth and success. America’s undisputed power of attraction to peoples around the world (when it is not invading hapless countries) has more to do with its per capita GDP than with any other factor. This explains the passion of ambitious people everywhere to send their children to American colleges, whatever their ratings. It explains the popularity of Hollywood and pop culture and much more. There is nothing wrong with this; it is all understandable in human terms. But it has relatively little to do with vibrant civil society or any beacon of human rights radiating from Washington, D.C. In this respect, the best thing that Russia or China can do to further their soft power is to get richer quick.

#### Credibility doesn’t work—military power is the only influence

Fan 2007 (Ying, Senior Lecturer in Marketing at Brunel Business School, Brunel University in London, November 14, “Soft power: Power of attraction or confusion?”)

Despite its popularity, the concept soft power remains a power of confusion. The definition is at best loose and vague. Because of such confusion it is not surprising that the concept has been misunderstood, misused and trivialised ( Joffe, 2006a ). Criticisms of soft power centre mainly around three aspects: defi nition, sources and limitations. There may be little or no relationship between the ubiquity of American culture and its actual influence. Hundreds of millions of people around the world wear, listen, eat, drink, watch and dance American, but they do not identify these accoutrements of their daily lives with America ( Joffe, 2006b ). To Purdy (2001) soft power is not a new reality, but rather a new word for the most effi cient form of power. There are limits to what soft power could achieve. In a context dominated by hard power considerations, soft power is meaningless ( Blechman, 2004 ). The dark side of soft power is largely ignored by Nye. Excessive power, either hard or soft, may not be a good thing. In the affairs of nations, too much hard power ends up breeding not submission but resistance. Likewise, big soft power does not bend hearts; it twists minds in resentment and rage ( Joffe, 2006b ).¶ Nye’s version of soft power that rests on affection and desire is too simplistic and unrealistic. Human feelings are complicated and quite often ambivalent, that is, love and hate co-exist at the same time. Even within the same group, people may like some aspects of American values, but hate others. By the same token, soft power can also rest on fear ( Cheow, 2002 ) or on both affection and fear, depending on the context. Much of China ’ soft power in south-east Asia testifi es to this. Another example is provided by the mixed perception of the United States in China: people generally admire American technological superiority and super brands but detest its policies on Taiwan.

#### Alliances don’t solve anything – Gulf War proves that countries will hate us no matter what.

Krauthammer, ‘3 (Charles, The National Interest, Winter 2002/2003)

A third critique comes from what might be called pragmatic realists, who see the new unilateralism I have outlined as hubristic, and whose objections are practical. They are prepared to engage in a pragmatic multilateralism. They value great power concert. They seek Security Council support not because it confers any moral authority, but because it spreads risk. In their view, a single hegemon risks far more violent resentment than would a power that consistently acts as primus inter pares, sharing rule-making functions with others.12 I have my doubts. The United States made an extraordinary effort in the Gulf War to get un support, share decision-making, assemble a coalition and, as we have seen, deny itself the fruits of victory in order to honor coalition goals. Did that diminish the anti-American feeling in the region? Did it garner support for subsequent Iraq policy dictated by the original acquiescence to the coalition? The attacks of September 11 were planned during the Clinton Administration, an administration that made a fetish of consultation and did its utmost to subordinate American hegemony and smother unipolarity. The resentments were hardly assuaged. Why? Because the extremist rage against the United States is engendered by the very structure of the international system, not by the details of our management of it.

# 2NC

### Econ

#### Economically unsustainable—federal deficits, entitlement crises, debt-to-gdp ratio all ensure the loss of the dollar’s reserve currency status

Layne 12

[Chris, Professor of IR and Political Science at Texas A&M, “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana”, p. online //wyo-tjc]

Following the Great Recession, it has become increasingly apparent that unless dramatic measures to reign-in federal spending are implemented, by the end of this decade there will be serious questions about the United States’ ability to repay its debts and control inflation.8 The causes of mounting US indebtedness are many. One is the Great Recession, which caused the Obama administration and the Federal Reserve to inject a massive amount of dollars into the economy, in the form of stimulus spending, bail-outs, and ‘‘quantitative easing,’’ to avert a replay of the Great Depression of the 1930s. A longer-term cause is the mounting costs of entitlement programs like Medicare, Social Security, and Medicaid—costs which will escalate because of the aging of the ‘‘Baby Boomer’’ generation. Another factor is the cost of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which have been financed by borrowing from abroad rather than raising taxes to pay for them. These wars have been expensive. Joseph Stiglitz, the Nobel laureate in economics, and his coauthor Linda Bilmess have calculated that the ultimate direct and indirect costs of the Iraq war will amount to $3 trillion (Stiglitz and Bilmiss 2008). No similar study has as yet been done of the Afghanistan war’s costs. However, the United States currently is expending about $110–120 billion annually to fight there, and fiscal considerations played a major role in the Obama administration’s decision to begin drawing down US forces in Afghanistan (Woodward 2010; Cooper 2011). Because of the combined costs of federal government expenditures—on stimulus, defense, Iraq and Afghanistan, and entitlements—in 2009 the Congressional Budget Office forecast that the United States will run unsustainable annual budget deficits of $1 trillion or more until at least the end of this decade, and observed that, ‘‘Even if the recovery occurs as projected and the stimulus bill is allowed to expire, the country will face the highest debt ⁄GDP ratio in 50 years and an increasingly urgent and unsustainable fiscal problem’’ (CBO 2009:13). In a subsequent 2010 report, the CBO noted that if the United States stays on its current fiscal trajectory, the ratio of US government debt to GDP will be 100% by 2020 (CBO 2010). Economists regard a 100% debt-to-GDP ratio as critical indicator that a state will default on its financial obligations. In an even less sanguine 2011 analysis, the International Monetary Fund forecast that the United States will hit the 100% debt-to-GDP ratio in 2016 (IMF 2011). If these estimates are correct, over the next decade the growing US national debt—and the budget deficits that fuel it—could imperil the dollar by undermining foreign investors’ confidence in the United States’ ability to repay its debts and keep inflation in check. This is important because, for the foreseeable future, the United States will depend on capital inflows from abroad both to finance its deficit spending and private consumption and to maintain the dollar’s position as the international economic system’s reserve currency.

#### And the inevitable dollar crisis outweighs—loss of reserve status literally makes hegemony unaffordable overnight

Layne 12

[Chris, Professor of IR and Political Science at Texas A&M, “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana”, p. online //wyo-tjc]

America’s geopolitical preeminence hinges on the dollar’s reserve currency role. If the dollar loses that status, US hegemony will literally be unaffordable. The dollar’s reserve currency status has, in effect, been a very special kind of ‘‘credit card.’’ It is special because the United States does not have to earn the money to pay its bills. Rather, when the bills come due, the United States borrows funds from abroad and ⁄ or prints money to pay them. The United States can get away with this and live beyond its means, spending with little restraint on maintaining its military dominance, preserving costly domestic entitlements, and indulging in conspicuous private consumption, as long as foreigners are willing to lend it money (primarily by purchasing Treasury bonds). Without the use of the ‘‘credit card’’ provided by the dollar’s reserve currency status, the United States would have to pay for its extravagant external and internal ambitions by raising taxes and interest rates, and by consuming less and saving more; or, tightening its belt and dramatically reducing its military and domestic expenditures. In other words, the United States would have to learn to live within its means.9 As a leading expert on international economic affairs observed just before the Great Recession kicked in, the dollar’s vulnerability ‘‘presents potentially significant and underappreciated restraints upon contemporary American political and military predominance’’ (Kirshner 2008).

### Unsustainable: Multiple Factors

#### Hegemony not sustainable- hard and soft power and economic/political constraints will all undermine it

Layne 9

[Christopher, Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, International Security, “The Waning of US Hegemony—Myth or Reality?”, 2009, p. asp]

According to the NIC, in addition to relative decline, the United States will confront other constraints on its international role. U.S. military supremacy will no longer be as dominant as it has been since the Cold War’s end (p. 93). The United States’ soft power may diminish as its liberal model of political and economic development is challenged by authoritarian/statist alternatives (pp. 3, 8–9, 13–14). At home, economic and political constraints may undermine U.S. hegemony.

#### A collapse of US hegemony is inevitable due to rising challengers, decline in US power as proved by Afghanistan and Iraq, and how IR works

Liu et al 12

(Debin Liu, security analyst and researcher. Rizwan Naseer, security analyst and researcher. Musrat Amin, security analyst and researcher. “Withering Hegemony of US and Evolving De-centered Globalism: A Theoretical account” Winter 2012 Proquest//wyoccd)

Hegemonic stability theory served the idea very well in post world war II scenario when United States had assumed insurmountable might in economic and military affairs and designed liberal economic policies, established international regimes e.g. World Bank and IMF to reconstruct war-torn Europe and regulated world economy. Despite cold war obstruction United States had been playing the role of a Hegemon for liberal economies till the end of cold war. After the demise of Soviet Union United States rose to the status of a hyperpower. That was the time when no other actors were sufficiently powerful to balance or challenge American might. Europe was making headway but being American ally had no designs of balancing American power. China received miraculous up-thrust and rose to the status of great power but with no clear aspiration of ruling the world. Russia started recovering and returning to mainstream international politics once again as the upcoming era is described by Barry Buzan as De-centered Globalism with no Superpowers but great powers (Buzan, 201 1).¶ The nature of power is so strange that in international system it cannot be monopolized , states rise to the status of super power in international system and then after the decay sets in or the other mighty actors rise so fast that the existing powers are superseded by some other rising powerful actors. This struggle for supremacy is both perennial and universal in international politics. United States proclaimed as a supreme power after the demise of Soviet Union. Unipolar World all revolved around American ideals and hegemonic policies to spread the notion of free market and democracy across globe. United States' unilateralism got debilitated after Afghan war (2001) and Iraq invasion (2003).United States with active support of NATO allies failed to accomplish desired goals in these troubled areas. Failure to bring peace and order in these countries put a big question mark on the validity of 'Hegemonic Stability Theory' on one hand and American might to rule the world unilaterally on the other hand. According to Niall Ferguson the "'unipolarity' identified by some commentators following the Soviet collapse cannot last much longer, for the simple reason that history hates a 'hyper power'. Sooner or later, challengers will emerge, and back we must go to a multipolar or multi-power world" (Ferguson, 2004).¶ Power works according to the law of nature that vacuum is quickly filled by a powerful state or group of states. History is the witness that in world politics there has always been a hegemon or in a struggle to become. If we take stock of world hegemons in historical times we find that centuries ago Spain, France and Britain practiced their supremacy in world affairs and today United States is the Hegemon. The celebrated nineteenth-century German historian Leopold von Ranke in his work depicted modern European history as a perpetual struggle for domination, in that system the balance of power was possible only through recurrent conflict. The prognostication about American and Soviet superiority in world politics made by Yale University historian Paul Kennedy in his best-selling 1987 work, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, is that like all past empires, the U.S. and Russian superpowers would inevitably succumb to overstretch. But they could not stay longer in their supreme positions and eventually would be taken over; Kennedy argued about China and Japan that both the rising powers are still burden-free from the deadweight of imperial military commitments (Ferguson, 2004).

#### Hegemony is empirically unstable due to a narrowing of gap in terms of military superiority, technology, and economic power, all culminated with the balancing of rising powers. Prefer our evidence because it comes from the most renown and supported political scholarship

Liu et al 12

(Debin Liu, security analyst and researcher. Rizwan Naseer, security analyst and researcher. Musrat Amin, security analyst and researcher. “Withering Hegemony of US and Evolving De-centered Globalism: A Theoretical account” Winter 2012 Proquest//wyoccd)

The concept of balance of power is considered as one of the oldest and fundamental concept in the field of international relations. International relations theorists had been defining balance of power differently to highlight its significance and relevance in international politics, as David Hume declared balance of power as scientific law due to its significance in international politics. Glenn Snyder highlighted balance of power as a core theoretical concept in international relations. Hans Morgenthau called balance of power as "iron law of politics" and Henry Kissinger, regarded balance of power as more an art than a science (Paul, Writz & Fortman, 2004). Significance and relevance of balance of power even in contemporary times cannot be ignored where states are actively pursuing balance of power policies to check the rise of other rival states, though it was a fashionable trend among states in historical times.¶ "The concept of balance of power ideally ensures that power is distributed in such a way that no single state or entity is able to dominate the remaining states or entities. Objective characteristics such as relative military power and economic resources determine the distribution of capabilities and hence play a central role in establishing which states occupy the positions of major powers. Major Powers keep strategy of balancing as topmost priority in security realm because a successful balancing strategy ensures peace and it is a precondition of the preservation of the state system"(Odgaard,2007:25).¶ Cold war presents precise example of balance of power between United States and Soviet Union. Both the states had developed Weapons of Mass Destruction (WTvlDs) and made alliances with other states to extend their influence across globe. United States formed security alliance of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Soviet Union counterbalanced by concluding WARSA Pact. There was a condition of quasi balance of power between them that shunned them from engaging into any direct clash that could escalate into nuclear catastrophe. Scholars adjudge the reason of about balance between both powers as a major reason of de-escalation.¶ Balancing strategy is exercised by the big powers and small states alike. According to realist paradigm when leading states in the anarchic structure of international relations use their resources to pursue their security objectives, other major powers struggle to keep a check upon rising power of other states who may pose a serious threat to their interest in future. Realist's argument is that "Power is checked most effectively by counterbalancing strategy." Even major powers don't feel secure from other major or rising powers; they feel threat from other major or rising powers to their security. They think that other powers may endanger their security when they gain relatively more power. The basic axiom of balance-of-power theory is that great powers will develop and mobilize military capabilities sufficient to constrain the most powerful among them. Though the theory has been formulated in many ways over the centuries, the "key proffer" of almost all versions of the theory is that "states tend to balance against threats of hegemony over the system." Therefore, the theory posits that once a state reaches at or near the top of the international heap in resources of power, its relative enhancement of power invites more and more counterbalancing from other competitive actors.¶ Balance of Power Theory also propounds that states try to prevent the rise of a 'hegemon'. A handful of the scholars, who disapprove 'Balance of Power Theory', sound out that contemporary world structure is unipolar, with United States as the strongest power (economically, politically, and militarily) and there is no counterbalancing taking place to United States' hegemony. The remarkable change in alliances since the demise of the Soviet Union has been the expansion of NATO, and the other thing is Pentagon's drastic increase in defense budget to make US army insurmountable, has not invited any grand alliance from other great power and even no such an alliance is in the offing(Brooks and Wohlforth,2008:22). The scenario presented by the group of scholars seems to be vague. It's been very short time that United States started enjoying status of unipolarity but it does not mean that no power would dare to counterbalance US hegemony in the upcoming decades. Because of US declined power and popularity, rise of other great powers like China, Russia and European Union, reflects that in the coming decades US may face counterbalance by other major powers, as history is the witness that even vast and mighty empires declined and were overtaken by other rising powers.¶ This does not necessarily mean that the US is in systemic decline, but US is gradually losing that smart power that differentiates it from other major power players. Although the US still possesses incomparable military prowess, superior technology and its economy remains the world's largest but alarming for US is that the gap of asymmetric power with others is narrowing. It is therefore being anticipated that due to the global distribution of power shiftthere are grave chances that the peace, prosperity and liberal ideals would get a severe blow as a consequence of serious conflict. Another analysis is presented about US contemporary hegemony that over the last two decades no major power has posed any serious challenge to US hegemonic designs in world affairs rather some powerful actors most notably Canada, Western European states, lndia, South Korea, Australia, Singapore and Philippines have joined US that has helped minimizing the conflict among these powers. However, as the hegemonic might that motivated these powers to banwagon US withers away then this international order will be transformed into another kind of international order with more decentralized power. In that scenario with more diffused power structure United States policies and interests may face more challenges by dissident powers and in that case American interests and policies can be challenged by dissenter powers (Zhang, 201 1).

### Unsustainable: Prefer our Evidence

#### Also, prefer our evidence—global power trajectories have most closely followed our balance of power predictions and scholarship—unipolar optimists are wrong and risk a myopia that locks us into a violent multipolarity

Layne 12

[Chris, Professor of IR and Political Science at Texas A&M, “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana”, p. online //wyo-tjc]

The Cold War’s end stifled the burgeoning late 1980s’ debate about America’s relative decline while triggering a new debate about unipolarity. In the Great Recession’s aftermath, a verdict on those debates now can be rendered. First, it turns out the declinists were right after all. The United States’ power has declined relatively. By 2014, the US share of global GDP will shrink to 18%, which is well below the ‘‘normal’’ post–World War II share of 22% to 25% (Nye 1991, 2011). Just as the 1980s declinists predicted, chronic budget and current account deficits, overconsumption, undersaving, and deindustrialization have exacted their toll on the American economy. Judgment also now can be rendered on the debate between balance of power realists and unipolar stability theorists. As balance of power realists predicted, one new great power already has emerged to act as a counterweight to American power, with others waiting in the wings. In contrast to unipolar stability theorists who said unipolarity would extend well into the twenty-first century, balance of power realists predicted that unipolarity would come to an end around 2010. Instead of looking at the trend lines fueling China’s rise and America’s decline, unipolar stability theorists were wrong because they relied on static measures of national power and failed to grasp the velocity of China’s rise. If, indeed, it has not already done so, sometime this decade—- perhaps as early as 2016—China’s GDP will surpass the United States’. No longer is China an emerging great power; it is a ‘‘risen’’ one. The debate about unipolarity is over. The balance of power realists have won. The distribution of power in international political system is shifting dramatically. The US grand strategy must respond to the emerging constellation of power. Yet, US policymakers and many security studies scholars are in thrall to a peculiar form of denialism. First, they believe the world still is unipolar even in the face of overwhelming evidence that it is not. Second, they believe that even if unipolarity were to end, there would be no real consequences for the United States because it will still be the ‘‘pivotal’’ power in international politics, and the essential features of the ‘‘liberal order’’—the Pax Americana—will remain in place even though no longer buttressed by the US economic and military power that have undergirded it since its inception after World War II. This is myopic. Hegemonic decline always has consequences. As the twenty-first century’s second decade begins, history and multipolarity are staging a comeback. The world figures to become a much more turbulent place geopolitically than it was during the era of the Pax Americana. Accepting the reality of the Unipolar Exit—coming to grips with its own decline and the end of unipolarity symbolized by China’s rise—will be the United States’ central grand strategic preoccupation during the next ten to fifteen years.

### A2 Heg Inevitable

#### US voluntarily surrendering hegemony now and it’s popular with policy makers

Wolfworth 12

(Prof. William C. Wohlforth, political scientist and Daniel Webster Professor of Government at the Department of Government of the Dartmouth College. “US Decline? (No.2): William Wohlforth: The United States Lost Some Ground over the Past Decade” 12-23-12 http://www.iranreview.org/content/Documents/US-Decline-No-2-William-Wohlforth-The-United-States-Lost-Some-Ground-over-the-Past-Decade.htm//wyoccd)

It seems that the United States is voluntarily retreating from its position as a global hegemon, as a result of a remarkable increase in the costs of the unipolar and hegemonic order and the considerable decrease in its utilities. What’s your viewpoint in this regard?¶ A: This is far more likely, as the U.S. confronts mounting budget pressures—which stem mainly from domestic programs for an aging population rather than military commitments. But the sorure of the budget pressure is not the issue: the effect may well be to place major pressure on Washington to come up with a cheaper foreign policy approach. That said, at 4.5% of GDP and shrinking, the cost of US military primacy is low by historical standards. And it is set to sink further as Washington winds down the costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Defense spending is projected to hit 3% of GDP by 2017. If the country can avoid getting itself into major counterinsurgency wars like Iraq and Afghanistan, the costs of leadership would appear to be sustainable. And, indeed, this is what President Obama and the overwhelming majority of the U.S. political establishment wants to do.¶ There is a precedent for this—after Vietnam, the United States carried on for the rest of the Cold War without undertaking a major war on that scale even though it maintained its basic grand strategy of containing Soviet power globally. If the United States can repeat that feat of sustaining a global presence while avoiding “wars of choice” like Afghanistan and Iraq, the costs of its current approach should be sustainable.¶ But the United States might not be able to keep itself out of another costly war. And even if it does, it still could choose to “come home” and disengage from the world. Because it is a powerful country that is geographically removed from the world’s power centers, the United States has a choice. And even though most politicians continue to speak in favor of the current approach, and even though the public for the most part, remains willing to go along, a growing cadre of experts and opinion leaders is arguing evermore insistently that the current grand strategy makes no sense for America. They argue that the world takes advantage of the U.S., which is spilling blood and treasure for other peoples’ problems. They claim that the current strategy of global engagement just creates more and more enemies, and threat the country would be much safer if it pull back from the world. Their argument gains plausibility as the budget problems of the U.S. get worse. If their argument wins the day, the U.S. could pull back. And that would be transformational.

### A2 Plan Boosts Cred & Solves Sustainablity

#### Multilateral institutions and soft power cannot reverse the sustainability trend—the magnitude of structural collapses of hard power outweigh and are irreversible

Layne 12

[Chris, Professor of IR and Political Science at Texas A&M, “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana”, p. online //wyo-tjc]

Unipolarity’s demise marks the end of era of the post-World War II Pax Americana. When World War II ended, the United States, by virtue of its overwhelming military and economic supremacy, was incontestably the most powerful actor in the international system. Indeed, 1945 was the United States’ first unipolar moment. The United States used its commanding, hegemonic position to construct the postwar international order—the Pax Americana— which endured for more than six decades. During the Cold War, the Pax Americana reflected the fact that outside the Soviet sphere, the United States was the preponderant power in the three regions of the world it cared most about: Western Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf. The Pax Americana rested on the foundational pillars of US military dominance and economic leadership and was buttressed by two supporting pillars: America’s ideological appeal (‘‘soft power’’) and the framework of international institutions that the United States built after 1945. Following the Cold War’s end, the United States used its second unipolar moment to consolidate the Pax Americana by expanding both its geopolitical and ideological ambitions. In the Great Recession’s aftermath, however, the economic foundation of the Pax Americana has crumbled, and its ideational and institutional pillars have been weakened. Although the United States remains preeminent militarily, the rise of new great powers like China, coupled with US fiscal and economic constraints, means that over the next decade or two the United States’ military dominance will be challenged. The decline of American power means the end of US dominance in world politics and a transition to a new constellation of world power. Without the ‘‘hard’’ power (military and economic) upon which it was built, the Pax Americana is doomed to wither in the early twenty-first century. Indeed, because of China’s great-power emergence, and the United States’ own domestic economic weaknesses, it already is withering.

#### And new sustainability dynamics override their multilat/soft-power/balance of threat internals—collapse inevitable regardless of the character of American power

Layne 12

[Chris, Professor of IR and Political Science at Texas A&M, “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana”, p. online //wyo-tjc]

Unipolar optimists have maintained, and still do, that the United States will buck the historical trend of hegemonic failure for two reasons. First, they say, the magnitude of US power precludes other states from balancing against its hegemony. Simply put, unipolar optimists assert that the military and economic power gap between the United States and its nearest rivals is insurmountable, so wide that no state can hope to close it (Wohlforth 1999, 2002). Second, they argue that because US hegemony is ‘‘benevolent,’’ there is no reason why other states would want to balance against the United States. The argument for US benevolence has three prongs. One is that other states have strong incentives to align with American power because they derive important security and economic benefits from US hegemony (Brooks and Wohlforth 2002, 2008). The second, essentially a balance-of-threat argument, is that by practicing self-restraint, demonstrating sensitivity for others’ interests, and acting through multilateral institutions, the United States can allay others’ fears that it will use its hegemonic power for self-aggrandizing purposes (Mastanduno 1997; Walt 1997, 2005). The third prong is that the United States’ ‘‘soft power’’—the attractiveness of its ideology and culture—draws others into its orbit (Nye 2002). From the Unipolar Moment to the Unipolar Exit Some twenty years after the Cold War’s end, it now is evident that both the 1980s declinists and the unipolar pessimists were right after all. The Unipolar Era has ended and the Unipolar Exit has begun. The Great Recession has underscored the reality of US decline, and only ‘‘denialists’’ can now bury their heads in the sand and maintain otherwise. To be sure, the Great Recession itself is not the cause either of American decline or the shift in global power, both of which are the culmination of decades-long processes driven by the big, impersonal forces of history. However, it is fair to say the Great Recession has both accelerated the causal forces driving these trends and magnified their impact.

### China

#### The US should punt its overseas commitments—it preserves American power, eliminates counter-balancing and solves for our flashpoint war scenarios\*\*

Parent & Mac Donald 11

[Joseph and Paul, Assistant Professors of Political Science at the University of Miami and at Wellesley College, “The Wisdom of Retrenchment”, Foreign Affairs, Nov/Dec, p. asp//wyo-tjc]

In fact, far from auguring chaos abroad and division at home, a policy of prudent retrenchment would not only reduce the costs of U.S. foreign policy but also result in a more coherent and sustainable strategy. In the past, great powers that scaled back their goals in the face of their diminishing means were able to navigate the shoals of power politics better than those that clung to expensive and overly ambitious commitments. Today, a reduction in U.S. forward deployments could mollify U.S. adversaries, eliminate potential flashpoints, and encourage U.S. allies to contribute more to collective defense--all while easing the burden on the United States of maintaining geopolitical dominance. A policy of retrenchment need not invite international instability or fuel partisan rancor in Washington. If anything, it could help provide breathing room for reforms and recovery, increase strategic flexibility, and renew the legitimacy of U.S. leadership.

#### Conflict with China is inevitable unless we accept retrenchment—no amount of accommodation or good relations can avoid a hegemonic clash

Layne 12

[Chris, Professor of IR and Political Science at Texas A&M, “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana”, p. online //wyo-tjc]

Revealingly, Ikenberry makes clear this expectation when he says that the deal the United States should propose to China is for Washington ‘‘to accommodate a rising China by offering it status and position within the regional order in return for Beijing’s acceptance and accommodation of Washington’s core interests, which include remaining a dominant security provider within East Asia’’ (Ikenberry 2011:356). It is easy to see why the United States would want to cut such a deal but it is hard to see what’s in it for China. American hegemony is waning and China is ascending, and there is zero reason for China to accept this bargain because it aims to be the hegemon in its own region. The unfolding Sino- American rivalry in East Asia can be seen as an example of Dodge City syndrome (in American Western movies, one gunslinger says to the other: ‘‘This town ain’t big enough for both of us’’) or as a geopolitical example of Newtonian physics (two hegemons cannot occupy the same region at the same time). From either perspective, the dangers should be obvious: unless the United States is willing to accept China’s ascendancy in East (and Southeast) Asia, Washington and Beijing are on a collision course.

#### EXTENDED DETERRENCE GUARANTEES WAR WITH CHINA WITHIN 10 YEARS—TAIWAN DISPUTE

Layne in ‘7

[Christopher, Professor of Political Science @ Texas A&M, American Empire: A Debate , P. 75 //wyo-tjc]

Finally, Taiwan is a powder-keg issue in Sino-American relations. China remains committed to national reunification, yet Taiwan is moving percepti- bly toward independence. Almost certainly, Beijing would regard a Taiwanese declaration of independence as a casus belli. It is unclear how the United States would respond to a China-Taiwan conflict, although President George \V Bush created a stir in 2001 when he declared that the United States would intervene militarily in the event of a Chinese attack on Taiwan. For sure, how- ever, it is safe to predict that there would be strong domestic political pressure in favor of American intervention. Beyond the arguments that Chinese mili- tary action against Taiwan would undermine U.S. interests in a stable world order and constitute "aggression," ideological antipathy toward China and support for a democratizing Taiwan would be powerful incentives for Ameri- can intervention. On Taiwan, in other words, the arguments of U.S. primacists have come close to locking-in Washington to a potentially dangerous policy The primacists' claim that the United States must be prepared to defend Taiwan from Chinese invasion overlooks three points. First, for nearly a quar- ter century, the United States has recognized that Taiwan is a Chinese prov- ince, not an independent state. Second, America's European and Asian allies have no interest in picking a quarrel with China over Taiwan's fate. If Wash- ington goes to the mat with Beijing over Taiwan, it almost certainly will do so alone. (Given their unilateralist bent, however, the prospect of fighting China without allies might not be much concern to American primacists.) Third, by defending Taiwan, the United States runs the risk of armed confronta- tion with China-probably not in the immediate future, but almost certainly within the next decade or so.

#### SECOND, WAR WITH CHINA LEADS TO DETERRENCE BREAKDOWNS AND NUCLEAR HOLOCAUST

Johnson in 1

[Chalmers, “Time to Bring the Troops Home”, The Nation, May 14, p. lexis // wyo-tjc]

China is another matter. No sane figure in the Pentagon wants a war with China, and all serious US militarists know that China's minuscule nuclear capacity is not offensive but a deterrent against the overwhelming US power arrayed against it (twenty archaic Chinese warheads versus more than 7,000 US warheads). Taiwan, whose status constitutes the still incomplete last act of the Chinese civil war, remains the most dangerous place on earth. Much as the 1914 assassination of the Austrian crown prince in Sarajevo led to a war that no one wanted, a misstep in Taiwan by any side could bring the United States and China into a conflict that neither wants. Such a war would bankrupt the United States, deeply divide Japan and probably end in a Chinese victory, given that China is the world's most populous country and would be defending itself against a foreign aggressor. More seriously, it could easily escalate into a nuclear holocaust. However, given the nationalistic challenge to China's sovereignty of any Taiwanese attempt to declare its independence formally, forward-deployed US forces on China's borders have virtually no deterrent effect.

### OSB Good

#### The US should punt its overseas commitments—it preserves American power, eliminates counter-balancing and solves for our flashpoint war scenarios\*\*

Parent & Mac Donald 11

[Joseph and Paul, Assistant Professors of Political Science at the University of Miami and at Wellesley College, “The Wisdom of Retrenchment”, Foreign Affairs, Nov/Dec, p. asp//wyo-tjc]

In fact, far from auguring chaos abroad and division at home, a policy of prudent retrenchment would not only reduce the costs of U.S. foreign policy but also result in a more coherent and sustainable strategy. In the past, great powers that scaled back their goals in the face of their diminishing means were able to navigate the shoals of power politics better than those that clung to expensive and overly ambitious commitments. Today, a reduction in U.S. forward deployments could mollify U.S. adversaries, eliminate potential flashpoints, and encourage U.S. allies to contribute more to collective defense--all while easing the burden on the United States of maintaining geopolitical dominance. A policy of retrenchment need not invite international instability or fuel partisan rancor in Washington. If anything, it could help provide breathing room for reforms and recovery, increase strategic flexibility, and renew the legitimacy of U.S. leadership.

## Credibility

**No spillover — lack of credibility in one commitment doesn’t affect others at all**

Paul K. **MacDonald 11**, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, and Joseph M. Parent, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, Spring 2011, “Graceful Decline?: The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4, p. 7-44

Second, **pessimists** **overstate** **the extent to which a policy of retrenchment can** **damage a great power's capabilities or prestige**. Gilpin, in particular, assumes that a great power's commitments are on equal footing and interdependent. **In practice**, however, **great powers make commitments of varying degrees that are** **functionally independent** of one another. **Concession in one area need not be seen as** **influencing a commitment in another area**.25 **Far from being perceived as interdependent**, **great power commitments are often** **seen as** being **rivalrous**, **so that** **abandoning commitments in one area may actually** **bolster the strength of a commitment in another area**. During the Korean War, for instance, President Harry Truman's administration explicitly backed away from total victory on the peninsula to strengthen deterrence in Europe.26 **Retreat in an area of lesser importance** **freed up resources** **and** **signaled a strong commitment to an area of greater significance**.

**Credibility theory wrong**

**Drezner 9/16**/13 (Daniel, Swing and a Miss The Sabermetric spat about whether it's important for a president to appear "credible." http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/09/16/swing\_and\_a\_miss\_credibility\_syria?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full)

If nothing else, Barack **Obama's Syria policy has succeeded in exposing the widening fissures in America's foreign policy community**. Even with what looks to be a brokered deal that, if implemented, would remove Syria's chemical weapons stockpile, the administration's gyrations over Syria have generated significant consternation in the foreign policy community. **The most intriguing divide,** however**, is over** the question of whether President Obama must respond forcefully to Syria's use of chemical weapons because of concerns about **credibility**. Administration officials have repeatedly argued that if the president fails to follow through on his "red line" comment about chemical weapons by keeping military options at the ready, other actors in the world like Iran and Russia will view the United States as a paper tiger. Earlier this month, Secretary of State John Kerry pleaded with Congress to authorize the use of force in order to preserve the "core to American credibility in foreign policy." Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel explicitly argued that acting on Syria was necessary to ensure U.S. credibility vis-à-vis Iran. And both Kerry and Hagel suggested in congressional testimony that a failure to act would embolden North Korea to use its chemical weapons stockpile. After rhetoric like this, it's not shocking that GOP Sen. Bob **Corker took to CNN to blast the president for not caring more about U.S. credibility in the region after Obama reversed course.**¶ Influential **pundits have made similar points**. The Council on Foreign Relations's Richard Haass tweeted the importance of making the military option a credible one. Ross Douthat at the New York Times warned that there would be, "unknowable consequences for the credibility of American foreign policy" if Obama failed to rally congressional support for military action, while Roger Cohen reported that, "In Berlin ... the change has been noted. It has also been noted in Tehran, Moscow, Beijing and Jerusalem." Here at Foreign Policy, David Rothkopf argued that action in Syria was essential: "we must also consider what the 'too little, too late' message sends to others in the region who might consider violating the most important norms of international behavior." **It is not hard to find other former policymakers or even straight news stories that articulate this thesis.**¶ **The odd thing about all of this emphasis on "credibility" is that the trend in international relations scholarship has moved in the opposite direction**. **The notion that a country or its leader has a single reputation for resolve or credibility has been pretty much dismissed.** As one recent literature review by University of Alabama political scientist Douglas **Gibler noted, "empirical support for the effects of reputation has been lacking."** Dartmouth professor **Daryl Press**'s Calculating Credibility **argues that the balance of forces on the ground matter far more in how leaders assess each other's intentions than past reputation**. To be sure, reputation and credibility do matter in some well-defined circumstances. Countries that perpetually default on their foreign debts face higher interest rates because of bad prior reputation. Nevertheless, **credibility doesn't matter nearly as much as policymakers claim.**

#### Legitimacy fails—institutions suck and divergent interests prevent broader cooperation

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Just before Christmas, the U.N. Security Council adopted an arms embargo on Eritrea, which has been supplying weapons to Islamic insurgents in nearby Somalia. In one sense, the strictly worded measure is a symbol of the international community’s determination to stop tragic conflicts in the Horn of Africa. The resolution, however, is years late and could end up having little effect. A similar U.N. embargo on Somalia has not prevented weapons from being freely traded in Mogadishu. The concept of global collective security, unfortunately, has not worked well, either last century or this one. It is no surprise that the United Nations is not meeting important challenges, but even once-successful global institutions are losing effectiveness. The International Monetary Fund, for instance, completely failed to handle—or even anticipate—the global economic downturn. The G-7 and G-8 are now thought to be irrelevant, and the G-20, considered a replacement for these two groupings, has little to show for three grand gatherings in 2008 and 2009. The World Trade Organization has been unable to prevent a resurgence of protectionism, and its Doha Round negotiations, now more than eight years old, have stalled. These negotiations could be the first major trade talks to fail since the 1930s. Last month’s Copenhagen climate change summit, the 15th installment of the once-productive Conference of the Parties talks, flopped even though it was hailed as “the most important meeting in the history of the world.” Weak nuclear rogues like Syria are now getting the better of the once-mighty International Atomic Energy Agency. North Korea has already outsmarted the watchdog organization by covertly building plutonium-core weapons, and Iran is developing an atomic warhead with impunity.  President Obama says the United States cannot solve the world’s problems alone. Maybe that’s true, but sooner or later he has to realize he’s not going to get the help of the world’s other powers. The “international community” is not coming together to solve common problems. This is not how we thought things would work out two decades ago. In the early 1990s, optimistic Western analysts predicted that, with the Soviet Union gone, the world would enter a generally harmonious era. As Francis Fukuyama famously argued, events would continue to occur, but “the evolution of human societies through different forms of government had culminated in modern liberal democracy and market-oriented capitalism.” Because democracies did not fight one another, the reasoning went, the international system would become more manageable. Nations would generally tend to agree with one another on the big issues—or at least manage to get along. In this type of world, multilateralism was not only considered possible, it was thought to be necessary and even desirable. Multilateralism, by its emphasis on consensual action, implicitly delegitimized America’s leading role in defending core Western values. So did the concept of globalization. Trade, the theory went, would lead to open -economies, open economies to prosperity, prosperity to representative governance, and representative governance to peace. In this extraordinarily benign environment, the impersonal forces of history, relentlessly grinding forward, would finish off Communists, autocrats, and bad actors of all stripes. As we now know, the opposite occurred. When the political barriers to trade fell, globalization indeed kicked into high gear, creating unprecedented amounts of wealth and liquidity. But global prosperity also strengthened hardline states, notably China and Russia, giving them the means to resist democratization, pursue aggressive foreign policies, and even bend the international system more to their liking. The Chinese, in particular, are displaying a newfound “sense of triumphalism” (as a senior U.S. official put it to the Washington Post last week) and are acting as if their economic success means they don’t have to listen to anybody. Developing democracies, such as India and Brazil, also gained prominence and a platform to pursue policies that differed from those of the more advanced nations.  The result is a world with many different voices, one where consensus, or even agreement, on important issues is not possible. Simply put, among the 195 nations of the world there is no common view of the troubling events of the day and no accepted approach to handling them. Even though the conditions that gave rise to multilateralism no longer exist, the concept has not only survived but attained the status almost of a geopolitical religion. In this environment, solutions are legitimate only if they are multilateral. Yet because multilateral solutions are becoming increasingly difficult to reach, problems fester. Most of the time, the best the international community can manage are lowest common denominator fixes on matters marginal to global security. It was thus utterly predictable that the Security Council chose last month to deal with Eritrea instead of, say, the Islamic Republic of Iran.

# 1NR

#### The timeframe for econ decline wars is fast

Turpin 8 (Craig, Executive editor of New Jersey newspapers, 10/14, “Critical Mass: Economic leadership or dictatorship,” http://www.nj.com/cranford/index.ssf/2008/10/critical\_mass\_economic\_leaders.html)

A global economic collapse will also increase the chance of global conflict. As economic systems shut down, so will the distribution systems for resources like petroleum and food. It is certainly within the realm of possibility that nations perceiving themselves in peril will, if they have the military capability, use force, just as Japan and Nazi Germany did in the mid-to-late 1930s. Every nation in the world needs access to food and water. Industrial nations -- the world powers of North America, Europe, and Asia -- need access to energy. When the world economy runs smoothly, reciprocal trade meets these needs. If the world economy collapses, the use of military force becomes a more likely alternative. And given the increasingly rapid rate at which world affairs move; the world could devolve to that point very quickly.

**Probability: Statistical analysis proves global economic crisis makes conflict likely---small conflicts escalate to global war**

Michael T **Klare 9**, Professor of Peace and World Security Studies at Hampshire College in Amherst, Massachusetts, The Morung Express, 2-28-09, http://www.morungexpress.com/express\_review/15698.html

For the most part, such upheavals, even when violent, are likely to remain localized in nature, and disorganized enough that government forces will be able to bring them under control within days or weeks, even if - as with Athens for six days last December - urban paralysis sets in due to rioting, tear gas, and police cordons. That, at least, has been the case so far. It is entirely possible, however, that, **as the economic crisis worsens, some of these incidents will metastasize into far more intense and long-lasting events: armed rebellions, military takeovers, civil conflicts, even economically fueled wars between states.**

Every outbreak of violence has its own distinctive origins and characteristics. All, however, are driven by a similar combination of anxiety about the future and lack of confidence in the ability of established institutions to deal with the problems at hand. And just **as the economic crisis has proven global in ways not seen before, so local incidents** - especially given the almost instantaneous nature of modern communications - **have a potential to spark others in far-off places**, linked only in a virtual sense.

[continues…24 paragraphs later]

Some sense of this new reality appears to have percolated up to the highest reaches of the US intelligence community. In testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on February 12th, Admiral Dennis C Blair, the new Director of National Intelligence, declared, “The **primary near-term security concern** of the United States is the global economic crisis and its **geopolitical implications** ... **Statistical modeling** shows that economic crises increase the risk of **regime-threatening instability** if they persist over a one to two year period” - certain to be the case in the present situation.

Blair did not specify which countries he had in mind when he spoke of “regime-threatening instability” - a new term in the American intelligence lexicon, at least when associated with economic crises - but it is clear from his testimony that US officials are **closely** **watching dozens of shaky nations in Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, and Central Asia.** Now go back to that map on your wall with all those red and orange pins in it and proceed to color in appropriate countries in various shades of red and orange to indicate recent striking declines in gross national product and rises in unemployment rates. Without 16 intelligence agencies under you, you’ll still have a pretty good idea of the places that Blair and his associates are eyeing **in terms of instability as the future darkens on a planet at the brink.**

#### Turns Credibility Advantage- Economic leadership is the lynchpin to global cooperation – solves all existential threats

Haas 13 – President of the CFR, former director of policy planning at the Department of State (Richard N, “The World Without America”, April 2013, <http://www.cfr.org/us-strategy-and-politics/world-without-america/p30599>, )

But, like most temptations, the urge to gloat at America's imperfections and struggles ought to be resisted. People around the globe should be careful what they wish for. America's failure to deal with its internal challenges would come at a steep price. Indeed, the rest of the world's stake in American success is nearly as large as that of the US itself.¶ Part of the reason is economic. The US economy still accounts for about one-quarter of global output. If US growth accelerates, America's capacity to consume other countries' goods and services will increase, thereby boosting growth around the world. At a time when Europe is drifting and Asia is slowing, only the US (or, more broadly, North America) has the potential to drive global economic recovery.¶ The US remains a unique source of innovation. Most of the world's citizens communicate with mobile devices based on technology developed in Silicon Valley; likewise, the Internet was made in America. More recently, new technologies developed in the US greatly increase the ability to extract oil and natural gas from underground formations. This technology is now making its way around the globe, allowing other societies to increase their energy production and decrease both their reliance on costly imports and their carbon emissions.¶ The US is also an invaluable source of ideas. Its world-class universities educate a significant percentage of future world leaders. More fundamentally, the US has long been a leading example of what market economies and democratic politics can accomplish. People and governments around the world are far more likely to become more open if the American model is perceived to be succeeding.¶ Finally, the world faces many serious challenges, ranging from the need to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction, fight climate change, and maintain a functioning world economic order that promotes trade and investment to regulating practices in cyberspace, improving global health, and preventing armed conflicts. These problems will not simply go away or sort themselves out.¶ While Adam Smith's "invisible hand" may ensure the success of free markets, it is powerless in the world of geopolitics. Order requires the visible hand of leadership to formulate and realize global responses to global challenges.¶ Don't get me wrong: None of this is meant to suggest that the US can deal effectively with the world's problems on its own. Unilateralism rarely works. It is not just that the US lacks the means; the very nature of contemporary global problems suggests that only collective responses stand a good chance of succeeding.¶ But multilateralism is much easier to advocate than to design and implement. Right now there is only one candidate for this role: the US. No other country has the necessary combination of capability and outlook.¶ This brings me back to the argument that the US must put its house in order – economically, physically, socially, and politically – if it is to have the resources needed to promote order in the world. Everyone should hope that it does: The alternative to a world led by the US is not a world led by China, Europe, Russia, Japan, India, or any other country, but rather a world that is not led at all. Such a world would almost certainly be characterized by chronic crisis and conflict. That would be bad not just for Americans, but for the vast majority of the planet's inhabitants.

#### CIR is key to bolster labor and competitiveness for the ag industry

Pressnell 10-29

(Dr. Claude Pressnell, Jr. holds a doctorate in higher education administration/educational leadership from Vanderbilt University and has served as the Director of Financial Assistance and Assistant Professor of Religion at Belmont University. “Immigration reform boost to economy” 10-29-13 http://www.tennessean.com/article/20131029/OPINION03/310290050//wyoccd)

Immigrants also are critically important to our agricultural industry. We must have a stable, legal workforce to ensure farmers have the ability and resources needed to continue producing an abundant, safe and affordable food supply.¶ According to the American Farm Bureau, labor shortages in agriculture cost the American economy between $5 billion and $9 billion annually — as our farmers here and in other states cannot find the help they need here at home. Yet, by using temporary workers from other countries, they can create an additional two to three jobs for American-born workers in several related sectors of our economy, including packaging, shipping and farming supplies.¶ If we fail to act, foreign producers will take advantage of our labor shortage to gain market share, and America will export not only our food production, but also thousands of farm-dependent jobs.

#### Collapse of the ag industry leads to extinction

Lugar 2k

(Richard, a US Senator from Indiana, is Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and a member and former chairman of the Senate Agriculture Committee. “calls for a new green revolution to combat global warming and reduce world instability,” pg online @ <http://www.unep.org/OurPlanet/imgversn/143/lugar.html>)

In a world confronted by global terrorism, turmoil in the Middle East, burgeoning nuclear threats and other crises, it is easy to lose sight of the long-range challenges. **But we do so at our peril.** One of the most daunting of them is meeting the world’s need for food and energy in this century. At stake is not only preventing starvation and saving the environment, but also world peace and security. History tells us that states may go to war over access to resources, and that poverty and famine have often bred fanaticism and terrorism. Working to feed the world will minimize factors that contribute to global instability and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. With the world population expected to grow from 6 billion people today to 9 billion by mid-century, the demand for affordable food will increase well beyond current international production levels. People in rapidly developing nations will have the means greatly to improve their standard of living and caloric intake. Inevitably, that means eating more meat. This will raise demand for feed grain at the same time that the growing world population will need vastly more basic food to eat. Complicating a solution to this problem is a dynamic that must be better understood in the West: developing countries often use limited arable land to expand cities to house their growing populations. As good land disappears, people destroy timber resources and even rainforests as they try to create more arable land to feed themselves. The long-term environmental consequences could be disastrous for the entire globe. Productivity revolution To meet the expected demand for food over the next 50 years, we in the United States will have to grow roughly three times more food on the land we have. That’s a tall order. My farm in Marion County, Indiana, for example, yields on average 8.3 to 8.6 tonnes of corn per hectare – typical for a farm in central Indiana. To triple our production by 2050, we will have to produce an annual average of 25 tonnes per hectare. Can we possibly boost output that much? Well, it’s been done before. Advances in the use of fertilizer and water, improved machinery and better tilling techniques combined to generate a threefold increase in yields since 1935 – on our farm back then, my dad produced 2.8 to 3 tonnes per hectare. Much US agriculture has seen similar increases. But of course there is no guarantee that we can achieve those results again. Given the urgency of expanding food production to meet world demand, we must invest much more in scientific research and target that money toward projects that promise to have significant national and global impact. For the United States, that will mean a major shift in the way we conduct and fund agricultural science. Fundamental research will generate the innovations that will be necessary to feed the world. The United States can take a leading position in a productivity revolution. And our success at increasing food production may **play a decisive** humanitarian **role in the survival of** billions of people and the health of **our planet.**

#### Will pass now-PC key

Garrett 1-7

(Major, reporter for CBS News. “"Unfinished business" on Obama's pre-State of the Union agenda” 1-7-14 http://www.cbsnews.com/news/unfinished-business-on-obamas-pre-state-of-the-union-agenda//wyoccd)

The new business before the State of the Union address will be a major address on reforms to National Security Agency counter-terrorism surveillance tactics. The date of Mr. Obama’s speech was not revealed, but no action will occur this week. Aides said Mr. Obama met extensively with members of his NSA review panel before leaving for his Hawaiian vacation. While in Hawaii, Mr. Obama studied the panel’s 352-page report and has since contacted top counter-terrorism officials, privacy advocates and top lawmakers.¶ Mr. Obama will meet Thursday with Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, Sen. Dianne Feinstein, chair of the Intelligence Committee, as well as lawmakers critical of current NSA practices – among them Sen. Ron Wyden, D-Oregon.¶ The officials also said Mr. Obama has been pleased with current enrollment numbers for the Affordable Care Act, though no one would say the administration had turned the corner on the Obamacare story. Implementation challenges remain and officials said they still don’t have data on the demographic mix of health insurance enrollees.¶ As for the State of Union address, Mr. Obama intends to repeat his push for immigration reform, a higher federal minimum wage and announce additional efforts to boost manufacturing jobs and economic growth. The officials said Mr. Obama remains optimistic House Republicans will pass immigration reform that eventually leads to a path to citizenship for the nation’s estimated 11 million undocumented workers. Mr. Obama’s priority is not to hector the GOP, but to give them quiet encouragement to move immigration legislation in pieces through the House with the goal of merging those bills with a comprehensive Senate-passed reform bill.¶ The officials also predicted no difficulties in winning GOP approval of an increase in the current debt ceiling of $17.2 trillion. The Treasury Department has said the nation will reach its debt ceiling in late February or early March. ¶ Lastly, the officials said Mr. Obama will not measure success strictly on the basis of what bills Congress sends to his desk for signature. Mr. Obama will step up the use of executive action to battle climate change and job creation, bypassing Congress when it refuses to act.

**Obama is pushing immigration as top priority moving into 2014**

**Epstein 12-20**

(Reid, congressional reporter for the Politico. “Obama renews call for Senate immigration bill” 12-20-13 <http://www.politico.com/story/2013/12/barack-obama-senate-comprehensive-immigration-reform-bill-101401.html//wyoccd>)

When President Barack Obama had hopes the House might pass an immigration reform package, he said he was supportive of a piecemeal series of bills.¶ That support may have been short-live dObama on Friday urged the House to back the Senate’s comprehensive immigration reform bill, describing it as a settled matter that the legislation would benefit the country and is politically popular — without mentioning the option of slicing the measure into a series of smaller provisions.¶ (CARTOONS: Matt Wuerker on immigration)¶ While the question of piecemeal bills wasn’t directly raised Friday, Obama praised the Senate bill — as Vice President Joe Biden did last week — and said the House should pass it.¶ “**There are a few differences here and there, but the truth of the matter is that the Senate bill has the main components of comprehensive immigration reform that would boost our economy, give us an opportunity to attract more investment and high-skilled workers who are doing great things** in places like Silicon Valley and around the country,” Obama said. **“So let’s go ahead and get that done**.”¶ Speaking of his goals for 2014, Obama said he hoped the House would pick up the baton from the Senate.¶ “**We can get immigration reform done**,” Obama said. “**We’ve got a concept that has bipartisan support. Let’s see if we can break through the politics on this**.”

#### Schilirio solves ACA drama—he’s been connecting with congress and smoothing problems over

Miller and Rogers 1-5

[ Zeke Miller and Alex Rogers, “White House Point Man Mends Obamacare Politics,” Time Magazine, January 5, 2013, <http://swampland.time.com/2014/01/05/white-house-point-man-mends-obamacare-politics/> //uwyo-baj]

Just days after his return to the White House last month, Phil Schiliro sat down in the Capitol with a group of vulnerable Senate Democrats seething over the disastrous rollout of Obamacare. Weeks before they’d been riding high following the disastrous GOP-led government shutdown. Now they were fighting for their political lives and had openly considered breaking with the President on his signature issue. For Schiliro, the meeting was an important test. The legislative tactician who spearheaded President Barack Obama’s most significant legislative achievements in the first term was less than two weeks into a temporary job in the West Wing with a singular mission: fix the disastrous politics of Obamacare for panicking congressional Democrats. Under nonstop fire from Republicans and facing a potential revolt on its Democratic flank, the White House needed to get things back on track. According to some Democrats on the Hill, it’s working. “Phil is very accessible, very responsive” says Democratic Congressman Rob Andrews of New Jersey. “It’s clear he has the ear of decisionmakers on substance, and that matters to the members,” he adds. The Dec. 18 meeting, together with a host of other interactions, has helped mend the sometimes dysfunctional relationship between the two ends of Pennsylvania Avenue. The Senators, who had long complained of White House neglect of their political plight, gathered with Schiliro to discuss additional fixes and improvements to Obamacare, messaging efforts around positive stories, and granting members credit for fixes they suggest that the White House implements, according to a Senate Democratic aide familiar with the meeting. The same week, Schiliro met with congressional staff, inviting around 30 health care policy wonks for a two-hour session at the White House, House Democratic aides tell TIME. It was one part meet and greet, and one part ego stroking — a rare event in the often distant Obama White House — designed to clear the air of concerns before the health care exchanges officially opened Jan. 1. Following a year in which every presidential priority from immigration to the budget was stymied by congressional gridlock and Democratic infighting clouded foreign policy debates, the White House turned to a familiar face. Obama’s first director of legislative affairs and a former top aide to Democratic Congressman Henry Waxman of California, Schiliro rose to be one of Obama’s “special advisers,” before opening a consulting firm focusing on nonprofits in New Mexico. Schiliro’s hiring was a tacit acknowledgement by the White House that congressional Democrats needed more from the Administration than the technical fixes to Obamacare — as the Affordable Care Act (ACA) is popularly known — like extensions, delays and exemptions, that the Administration had been offering. They needed a politically savvy friend, Democratic aides say, someone they knew and could trust who would listen to their concerns and, most important, help resolve them. At the White House, Schiliro’s surprise, albeit temporary, return from New Mexico presaged a larger West Wing shake-up, which saw changes in the legislative-affairs team and the officials overseeing the implementation of the health care law in an effort to salvage the second term. In December, Katie Beirne Fallon, White House deputy communications director who was an aide to Senator Chuck Schumer, earned the role of top congressional liaison, replacing Miguel Rodriguez, a longtime Obama aide who had trouble working with Hill Democrats. Fallon oversees the health care “strike team” that has organized Democratic messaging in defense of the law, including daily phone conversations with a couple of dozen White House and congressional staffers first thing in the morning, according to aides. The discussions focus on the message of the day and potential responses to Republican attacks. Andrews, who spoke with Schiliro on New Year’s Day to mark the first day of coverage in the exchanges, says that Schiliro will orchestrate small group meetings to hear from members and resolve specific implementation problems in various districts, such as insurance companies removing doctors and hospitals from their networks, confusing Medicaid enrollment processes and the lack of Spanish materials. “I’m a big fan of Phil,” says Andrews. “I hope he stays a long time.” Congressional aides point to other, subtler shifts in White House practices that they say indicate an attempt at bridging gaps with Congress. In December, the White House and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) reversed course and granted temporary exemptions to the ACA’s individual mandate in response to a letter sent by six Democratic and independent Senators. A Senate Democratic aide complained that when the Administration announced in mid-November that insurers could continue to offer canceled plans for an additional year, a proposal similar to the one offered by Senator Mary Landrieu, a Democrat of Louisiana, there was “no mention” that it was an idea derived from Congress. “Whereas later, improvements and communications have been made, the White House and HHS are properly crediting the folks who came up with this idea in their announcement,” said the aide, who cited a new “culture of outreach.” Obama has been criticized for failing to cultivate a connection with congressional lawmakers since before he even took office. White House Chief of Staff Denis McDonough, a driving force in bringing Schiliro back into the Administration, made rebuilding ties, or in many cases building them for the first time, a priority. The new staff changes more closely align the West Wing toward McDonough’s vision for how the Obama White House should operate, Administration aides say. “The Obama Administration has always had a hard time with this — they’ve rarely done a really good job at managing members of Congress and staff,” says a House Democratic aide. “What happens often is when there is a crisis, they quickly try to ramp up their coordination. Whether it’s Syria, the IRS, or whether it’s the ACA. And then, during noncrisis times, when we’re just trying to get regular information, the modes of communication are so much worse.” “My sense is, I think they’ve finally gotten that, and they are trying to make this a more permanent thing instead of it just trying to be a patch job. Phil Schiliro fits that mold. And frankly Miguel Rodriguez — nobody knew who he was,” says the aide. Even Republicans have noticed a difference. While far from keeping an open line to the GOP, Republican aides say they’ve seen an improvement in the Administration’s openness in recent weeks.

#### Obama has sufficient momentum now to pass immigration reform --- it is the top priority

Taylor, 1/5 (David, 1/5/2014, thetimes.co.uk, “Fun in sun over as Obama gets serious about second term,” Factiva))

With Mr Obama’s personal approval ratings at their lowest point following the accident-prone launch of his healthcare reforms, his Administration nontheless enters 2014 marked by cautious optimism. The President’s inner circle is buoyed by the end-of-year budget deal struck with senior Republicans, believing that it may herald sufficient cross-party momentum to push through comprehensive immigration reform, the top priority of hissecond term.And the arrival of Bill Clinton’s former chief of staff, John Podesta, as a senior counsellor is intended to give some impetus to his agenda on tackling climate change. Mr Podesta, a veteran of dealing with a hostile Congress, will also be part of a new team working with lawmakers on Capitol Hill. Jay Carney, White House spokesman, said yesterday: “We have some modest momentum after the budget deal. We come into 2014 with some optimism — guarded, cautious, but hopeful that we can make further progress and looking to see if we can work together in the interests of the American people." The White House has indicated that plans to increase the minimum wage would be a central theme of the President’s State of the Union address later this month, where the focus will be on help for hard-working Americans to get the economy moving. The President landed with his daughters in the Marine One helicopter yesterday morning on the south lawn of the White House, after a family break in Hawaii which, unlike recent years, was not cut short by terror plots or financial crises. He managed nine games of golf in 15 days, snorkelled in Hanauma Bay, and repeat visits to Morimoto Waikiki, the Hawaiian restaurant of television’s Iron Chef star Masaharu Morimoto. Michelle Obama stayed behind in Hawaii with girlfriends for a few extra days — a gift from her husband as part of her 50th birthday celebrations later this month. As well as planning for the State of the Union, Mr Obama will this month make a major speech in response to the wave of revelations about America’s online surveillance machinery. Speaker Boehner is emerging as an unlikely ally on immigration reform. The Republican leader of the House is now in open warfare with the Tea Party after blaming the conservative Right for dragging the party into a damaging government shutdown in their failed strategy to defund Obamacare. He has appointed Senator John McCain’s former chief of staff, Rebecca Tallent,as an adviser on the issue. She helped draw up amnesty bills for illegal immigrants in the mid-2000s and published a landmark report ten weeks ago showing how, over 20 years, immigration reform would help the US economy grow by 4.8 per cent, boost housing construction by $68 billion, and cut the US deficit by $1.2 trillion, while off-setting the cost of an ageing population.

#### Reducing war powers will end Obama’s credibility with Congress – it causes stronger GOP pushback

Seeking Alpha, 9/10/13(“Syria Could Upend Debt Ceiling Fight”, <http://seekingalpha.com/article/1684082-syria-could-upend-debt-ceiling-fight>)

Unless President Obama can totally change a reluctant public's perception of another Middle-Eastern conflict, it seems unlikely that he can get 218 votes in the House, though he can probably still squeak out 60 votes in the Senate. This defeat would be totally unprecedented as a President has never lost a military authorization vote in American history. To forbid the Commander-in-Chief of his primary power renders him all but impotent. At this point, a rebuff from the House is a 67%-75% probability.¶ I reach this probability by looking within the whip count. I assume the 164 declared "no" votes will stay in the "no" column. To get to 218, Obama needs to win over 193 of the 244 undecided, a gargantuan task. Within the "no" column, there are 137 Republicans. Under a best case scenario, Boehner could corral 50 "yes" votes, which would require Obama to pick up 168 of the 200 Democrats, 84%. Many of these Democrats rode to power because of their opposition to Iraq, which makes it difficult for them to support military conflict. The only way to generate near unanimity among the undecided Democrats is if they choose to support the President (recognizing the political ramifications of a defeat) despite personal misgivings. The idea that all undecided Democrats can be convinced of this argument is relatively slim, especially as there are few votes to lose. In the best case scenario, the House could reach 223-225 votes, barely enough to get it through. Under the worst case, there are only 150 votes. Given the lopsided nature of the breakdown, the chance of House passage is about one in four.¶ While a failure in the House would put action against Syria in limbo, I have felt that the market has overstated the impact of a strike there, which would be limited in nature. Rather, investors should focus on the profound ripple through the power structure in Washington, which would greatly impact impending battles over spending and the debt ceiling.¶ Currently, the government loses spending authority on September 30 while it hits the debt ceiling by the middle of October. Markets have generally felt that Washington will once again strike a last-minute deal and avert total catastrophe. Failure in the Syrian vote could change this. For the Republicans to beat Obama on a President's strength (foreign military action), they will likely be emboldened that they can beat him on domestic spending issues.¶ Until now, consensus has been that the two sides would compromise to fund the government at sequester levels while passing a $1 trillion stand-alone debt ceiling increase. However, the right wing of Boehner's caucus has been pushing for more, including another $1 trillion in spending cuts, defunding of Obamacare, and a one year delay of the individual mandate. Already, Conservative PACs have begun airing advertisements, urging a debt ceiling fight over Obamacare. With the President rendered hapless on Syria, they will become even more vocal about their hardline resolution, setting us up for a showdown that will rival 2011's debt ceiling fight.¶ I currently believe the two sides will pass a short-term continuing resolution to keep the government open, and then the GOP will wage a massive fight over the debt ceiling. While Obama will be weakened, he will be unwilling to undermine his major achievement, his healthcare law. In all likelihood, both sides will dig in their respective trenches, unwilling to strike a deal, essentially in a game of chicken. If the House blocks Syrian action, it will take America as close to a default as it did in 2011. Based on the market action then, we can expect massive volatility in the final days of the showdown with the Dow falling 500 points in one session in 2011.¶ As markets panicked over the potential for a U.S. default, we saw a massive risk-off trade, moving from equities into Treasuries. I think there is a significant chance we see something similar this late September into October. The Syrian vote has major implications on the power of Obama and the far-right when it comes to their willingness to fight over the debt ceiling. If the Syrian resolution fails, the debt ceiling fight will be even worse, which will send equities lower by upwards of 10%. Investors must be prepared for this "black swan" event.¶ Looking back to August 2011, stocks that performed the best were dividend paying, less-cyclical companies like Verizon (VZ), Wal-Mart (WMT), Coca-Cola (KO) and McDonald's (MCD) while high beta names like Netflix (NFLX) and Boeing (BA) were crushed. Investors also flocked into treasuries despite default risk while dumping lower quality bonds as spreads widened. The flight to safety helped treasuries despite U.S. government issues. I think we are likely to see a similar move this time.¶ Assuming there is a Syrian "no" vote, I would begin to roll back my long exposure in the stock market and reallocate funds into treasuries as I believe yields could drop back towards 2.50%. Within the stock market, I think the less-cyclical names should outperform, making utilities and consumer staples more attractive. For more tactical traders, I would consider buying puts against the S&P 500 and look toward shorting higher-beta and defense stocks like Boeing and Lockheed Martin (LMT). I also think lower quality bonds would suffer as spreads widen, making funds like JNK vulnerable. Conversely, gold (GLD) should benefit from the fear trade.¶ I would also like to address the potential that Congress does not vote down the Syrian resolution. First, news has broken that Russia has proposed Syria turn over its chemical stockpile. If Syria were to agree (Syria said it was willing to consider), the U.S. would not have to strike, canceling the congressional vote. The proposal can be found here. I strongly believe this is a delaying tactic rather than a serious effort. In 2005, Libya began to turn over chemical weapons; it has yet to complete the hand-off. Removing and destroying chemical weapons is an exceptionally challenging and dangerous task that would take years, not weeks, making this deal seem unrealistic, especially because a cease-fire would be required around all chemical facilities. The idea that a cease-fire could be maintained for months, essentially allowing Assad to stay in office, is hard to take seriously. I believe this is a delaying tactic, and Congress will have to vote within the next two weeks.¶ The final possibility is that Democrats back their President and barely ram the Syria resolution through. I think the extreme risk of a full-blown debt stand-off to dissipate. However, Boehner has promised a strong fight over the debt limit that the market has largely ignored. I do believe the fight would still be worse than the market anticipates but not outright disastrous. As such, I would not initiate short positions, but I would trim some longs and move into less cyclical stocks as the risk would still be the debt ceiling fight leading to some drama not no drama.¶ Remember, in politics everything is connected. Syria is not a stand-alone issue. Its resolution will impact the power structure in Washington. A failed vote in Congress is likely to make the debt ceiling fight even worse, spooking markets, and threatening default on U.S. obligations unless another last minute deal can be struck.