# 1NC

**1**

**Observation One: Interp**

**First, our interpretation: debate is an agonistic field of play where participants must accept the constraints of agreeing to switch-sides on the topic by reading a topical affirmative when they are aff and negating the topic when they are negative.**

**Second, are our link arguments. The aff team fails to engage in this process in three ways:**

1. **Advocating a definitive course of action as indicated by the words ‘resolved’ and ‘should’[[1]](#footnote-1), rather they have you endorse a fluid system of constant criticism.**

**RESOLVED” EXPRESSES INTENT TO IMPLEMENT THE PLAN**

American Heritage Dictionary 2K

[www.dictionary.com/cgi-bin/dict.pl?term=resolved](http://www.dictionary.com/cgi-bin/dict.pl?term=resolved)

To find a solution to; solve …

To bring to a usually successful conclusion

**“SHOULD” DENOTES AN EXPECTATION OF ENACTING A PLAN**

American Heritage Dictionary **–** 2K

[www.dictionary.com]

3 Used to express probability or expectation

1. **Not defending the agent of the resolution, which is the government of the United States based in D.C.[[2]](#footnote-2)**

**THE TOPIC IS DEFINED BY THE PHRASE FOLLOWING THE COLON – THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS THE AGENT OF THE RESOLUTION, NOT THE INDIVIDUAL DEBATERS**

Webster’s Guide to Grammar and Writing **2K**

<http://ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/marks/colon.htm>

Use of a colon before a list or an explanation that is preceded by a clause that can stand by itself. Think of the colon as a gate, inviting one to go on… If the introductory phrase preceding the colon is very brief and the clause following the colon represents the real business of the sentence, begin the clause after the colon with a capital letter.

**THE U.S.F.G. is three branches of government**

Microsoft Encarta Online Encyclopedia **2K** [http://encarta.msn.com]

Supreme Court of the United States, highest court in the United States and the chief authority in the judicial branch, one of three branches of the United States federal government.

**OUR DEFINITION EXCLUDES ACTION BY SMALLER POLITICAL GROUPS OR INDIVIDUALS.**

Black’s Law DictionarySeventh Edition Ed. Bryan A. Garner (chief) **‘**99

Federal government **1.** A national government that exercises some degree of control over smaller political units that have surrendered some degree of power in exchange for the right to participate in national political matters.

1. **Not defending an increasing statutory or judicial restrictions on the Presidential war power authority of the President of the United States**

**Observation Two: The impacts**

**There are three net benefits to this interpretation of debate:**

**First, MORAL disagreement: Effective moral deliberation requires that all parties be willing to submit to a RECIPROCAL process of agonistic disagreement. Without switch-side debate, there can be no method of dealing with the practical constraints that surround any persuasive context. EVEN IF the affirmative wins there is merit to considering their case, their abandonment of of switch-side debate leaves us unable to speak to problems of power, violence and inequality**

**Gutmann & Thompson 96**

[Amy & Dennis, President of Penn State and Professor of Political Philosophy at Harvard, Democracy and Disagreement, p. 1//wyo-tjc]

OF THE **CHALLENGES** that American **democracy faces today**, none **is** more formidable than the problem of **moral disagreement**. Neither the theory nor the practice of democratic politics has so far found an adequate way to cope with conflicts about fundamental values. We address the challenge of moral disagreement here by developing a conception of democracy that secures a central place for moral discussion in political life. Along with a growing number of other political theorists, we call this conception deliberative democracy. The core idea is simple: **when citizens** or their representatives **disagree morally, they should continue to reason together to reach mutually acceptable decisions.** But the meaning and implications of the idea are complex. Although the idea has a long history, it is still in search of a theory. We do not claim that this book provides a comprehensive theory of deliberative democracy, but we do hope that it contributes toward its future development by showing the kind of delib-eration that is possible and desirable in the face of moral disagreement in democracies. Some scholars have criticized liberal political theory for neglecting moral deliberation. Others have analyzed the philosophical foundations of deliberative democracy, and still others have begun to explore institutional reforms that would promote deliberation. Yet nearly all of them stop at the point where deliberation itself begins. None has systematically examined the substance of deliberation—the theoretical principles that should guide moral argument and their implications for actual moral disagreements about public policy. That is our subject, and it takes us into the everyday forums of democratic politics, where moral argument regularly appears but where theoretical analysis too rarely goes. **Deliberative democracy involves reasoning about politics**, and nothing has been more controversial in political philosophy than the nature of reason in politics. **We do not believe that these controversies have to be settled before deliberative principles can guide the practice of democracy**. Since on occasion citizens and their representatives already engage in the kind of reasoning that those principles recommend, deliberative democracy simply asks that they do so more consistently and comprehensively. The best way to prove the value of this kind of reasoning is to show its role in arguments about specific principles and policies, and its contribu¬tion to actual political debates. That is also ultimately the best justification for our conception of deliberative democracy itself. But to forestall pos¬sible misunderstandings of our conception of deliberative democracy, we offer some preliminary remarks about the scope and method of this book. The aim of the **moral reasoning that our deliberative democracy pre-scribes** falls between impartiality, which **requires** something like altruism, and prudence, which demands no more than enlightened self-interest. Its first principle is **reciprocity**, the subject of Chapter 2, but no less essential are the other principles developed in later chapters. **When citizens reason reciprocally, they seek fair terms** **of social cooperation** for their own sake; they try to **find mutually acceptable ways of resolving moral disagreements**. The precise content of **reciprocity** is difficult to determine in theory, but its general countenance is familiar enough in practice. It **can be seen in** the **difference** between **acting in one's self-interest** (say, taking advantage of a legal loophole or a lucky break) **and** **acting fairly** (following rules in the spirit that one expects others to adopt). In many of the controversies dis-cussed later in the book, the possibility of any morally acceptable resolution depends on citizens' reasoning beyond their narrow self-interest and considering what can be justified to people who reasonably disagree with them. Even though the quality of deliberation and the conditions under which it is conducted are far from ideal in the controversies we consider, the fact that in each case some citizens and some officials make arguments consistent with reciprocity suggests that a deliberative perspective is not Utopian. To clarify what **reciprocity might demand** under non-ideal conditions, we develop a **distinction between** **deliberative and nondeliberative disa-greement.** Citizens who reason reciprocally can **recognize** that **a position** **is** **worthy** **of moral respect** **even** **when they think it morally wrong.** They can believe that a moderate pro-life position on abortion, for example, is morally respectable even though they think it morally mistaken. (The abortion example—to which we often return in the book—is meant to be illustrative. For readers who deny that there is any room for deliberative disagreement on abortion, other political controversies can make the same point.) The presence of deliberative disagreement has important implications for how citizens treat one another and for what policies they should adopt. When a **disagreement is not deliberative** (for example, about a policy to legalize discrimination against blacks and women), citizens do not have any obligations of mutual respect toward their opponents. In deliberative disagreement (for example, about legalizing abortion), **citizens** **should try to accommodate the moral convictions** of their opponents to the greatest extent possible, without compromising their own moral convictions. We call this kind of accommodation an economy of moral disagreement, and believe that, though neglected in theory and practice, it is essential to a morally robust democratic life. Although both of us have devoted some of our professional life to urging these ideas on public officials and our fellow citizens in forums of practical politics, this book is primarily the product of scholarly rather than political deliberation. Insofar as it reaches beyond the academic community, it is addressed to citizens and officials in their more reflective frame of mind. Given its academic origins, some readers may be inclined to complain that only professors could be so unrealistic as to believe that moral reasoning can help solve political problems. But such a complaint would misrepresent our aims. To begin with, we do not think that academic discussion (whether in scholarly journals or college classrooms) is a model for moral deliberation in politics. **Academic discussion need not aim at justifying a practical decision, as deliberation must**. Partly for this reason, **academic discussion is likely to be insensitive to the contexts of ordinary politics**: the pressures of power, the problems of inequality, the demands of diversity, the exigencies of persuasion. Some critics **of deliberative democracy show a similar insensitivity when they judge actual** political **deliberations** by the standards of ideal philosophical reflection. Actual deliberation is inevitably defective, but so is philosophical reflection practiced in politics. The appropriate comparison is between the ideals of democratic deliberation and philosophical reflection, or between the application of each in the non-ideal circumstances of politics. We do not assume that politics should be a realm where the logical syllogism rules. Nor do we expect even the more appropriate standard of mutual respect always to prevail in politics. A deliberative perspective sometimes justifies bargaining, negotiation, force, and even violence. It is partly **because moral argument has so much unrealized potential in dem-ocratic politics** that we believe it **deserves more attention**. Because its place in politics is so precarious, the need to find it a more secure home and to nourish its development is all the more pressing. Yet because it is also already part of our common experience, we have reason to hope that it can survive and even prosper if philosophers along with citizens and public officials better appreciate its value in politics. Some readers may still wonder why deliberation should have such a prominent place in democracy. Surely, they may say, citizens should care more about the justice of public policies than the process by which they are adopted, at least so long as the process is basically fair and at least minimally democratic. **One of our main aims** in this book **is to cast doubt on the dichotomy between policies and process** that this concern assumes. Having good reason as individuals to believe that a policy is just does not mean that collectively as citizens we have sufficient justification to legislate on the basis of those reasons. The **moral authority of collective judgments about policy depends in part on the moral quality of the process by which citizens collectively reach those judgments**. Deliberation is the most appropriate way for citizens collectively to resolve their moral disagreements not only about policies but also about the process by which policies should be adopted. **Deliberation is not only a means to an end, but also a means for deciding what means are morally required to pursue our common ends**.

**SWITCH-SIDE DEBATE: The net-benefits are epistemic because prepared, competitive discourse and listening to both sides of an argument is a prerequisite for critical reasoning, and ontological because it affirms a method of living that is the only antidote to the violence of the affirmative’s universalist dogma, which is root of violence and genocide**

**Roberts-Miller 3**

[Patricia, Associate Professor of Rhetoric at UT Austin, “Fighting Without Hatred: Hannah Arendt ' s Agonistic Rhetoric”, p. asp//wyo-tjc]

Totalitarianism and the Competitive Space of Agonism Arendt is probably most famous for her analysis of totalitarianism (especially her The Origins of Totalitarianism and Eichmann in Jerusalem), but the recent attention has been on her criticism of mass culture (The Human Condition). Arendt's main criticism of the current human condition is that **the common world** of deliberate and joint action **is fragmented into** **solipsistic and unreflective behavior**. In an especially lovely passage, she says that in mass society **people are** all **imprisoned** **in the subjectivity of their own singular experience**, which does not cease to be singular if the same experience is multiplied innumerable times. **The end of the common world has come when it is seen only under one aspect and is permitted to present itself in only one perspective**. (Human 58) What Arendt so beautifully describes is that isolation and individualism are not corollaries, and may even be antithetical because **obsession with one's own self** and the particularities of one's life **prevents** one from engaging in conscious, deliberate, **collective action**. Individuality, unlike isolation, depends upon a collective with whom one argues in order to direct the common life. **Self-obsession**, even (especially?) **when coupled with isolation** **from** one' s **community** is **far** **from apolitical**; **it has** political **consequences**. Perhaps a better way to put it is that it is political **precisely because it aspires to be apolitical**. This fragmented world in which many people live simultaneously and even similarly but not exactly together is what Arendt calls the "social." Arendt does not mean that group behavior is impossible in the realm of the social, but that social behavior consists "in some way of isolated individuals, incapable of solidarity or mutuality, who abdicate their human capacities and responsibilities to a projected 'they' or 'it,' with disastrous consequences, both for other people and eventually for themselves" (Pitkin 79). One can behave, but not act. For someone like Arendt, a German-assimilated Jew, one of the most frightening aspects of the Holocaust was the ease with which a people who had not been extraordinarily anti-Semitic could be put to work industriously and efficiently on the genocide of the Jews. And what was striking about the perpetrators of the genocide, ranging from minor functionaries who facilitated the murder transports up to major figures on trial at Nuremberg, was their constant and apparently sincere insistence that they were not responsible. For Arendt, this was not a peculiarity of the German people, but of the current human and heavily bureaucratic condition of twentieth-century culture: we do not consciously choose to engage in life's activities; we drift into them, or we do them out of a desire to conform. Even while we do them, we do not acknowledge an active, willed choice to do them; instead, we attribute our behavior to necessity, and we perceive ourselves as determined—determined by circumstance, by accident, by what "they" tell us to do. We do something from within the anonymity of a mob that we would never do as an individual; we do things for which we will not take responsibility. Yet, whether or not people acknowledge responsibility for the consequences of their actions, those consequences exist. Refusing to accept responsibility can even make those consequences worse, in that the people who enact the actions in question, because they do not admit their own agency, cannot be persuaded to stop those actions. They are simply doing their jobs. In a totalitarian system, however, everyone is simply doing his or her job; there never seems to be anyone who can explain, defend, and change the policies. Thus, it is, as Arendt says, rule by nobody. It is illustrative to contrast Arendt's attitude toward discourse to Habermas'. While both are critical of modern bureaucratic and totalitarian systems, Arendt's **solution is** the **playful and competitive space of agonism**; it is not the rational-critical public sphere. The "actual content of political life" is "the joy and the gratification that arise out of being in company with our peers, out of acting together and appearing in public, out of inserting ourselves into the world by word and deed, thus acquiring and sustaining our personal identity and beginning something entirely new" ("Truth" 263). According to Seyla Benhabib, Arendt's public realm emphasizes the assumption of competition, and it "represents that space of appearances in which moral and political greatness, heroism, and preeminence are revealed, displayed, shared with others. This is a **competitive space** in which one **competes for recognition, precedence, and acclaim**" (78). These qualities are displayed, but not entirely for purposes of acclamation; they are not displays of one's self, but of ideas and arguments, of one's thought. When Arendt discusses Socrates' thinking in public, she emphasizes his performance: "He performed in the marketplace the way the flute-player performed at a banquet. It is sheer performance, sheer activity"; nevertheless, it was thinking: "What he actually did was to make public, in discourse, the thinking process" {Lectures 37). Pitkin summarizes this point: "Arendt says that the heroism associated with politics is not the mythical machismo of ancient Greece but something more like the existential leap into action and public exposure" (175-76). Just as it is not machismo, although it does have considerable ego involved, so it is not instrumental rationality; Arendt's discussion of the kinds of discourse involved in public action include myths, stories, and personal narratives. Furthermore, the **competition is not ruthless;** it **does not imply a willingness to triumph at all costs. Instead**, it **involves** something like **having** such **a passion for ideas and politics that one is willing to take risks**. One tries to articulate the best argument, propose the best policy, design the best laws, make the best response. **This is a risk in that one might lose;** advancing an argument means that one must be open to the criticisms others will make of it. The situation is **agonistic not because the participants** manufacture or **seek conflict, but because conflict is a necessary consequence of difference** This attitude is reminiscent of Kenneth Burke, who did not try to find a language free of domination but who instead theorized a way that the very tendency toward hierarchy in language might be used against itself (for more on this argument, see Kastely). Similarly, Arendt does not propose a public realm of neutral, rational beings who escape differences to live in the discourse of universals; she envisions one of different people who argue with passion, vehemence, and integrity. Eichmann perfectly exemplified what Arendt famously called the "banality of evil" but that might be better thought of as the bureaucratization of evil (or, as a friend once aptly put it, the evil of banality). That is, he was able to engage in mass murder because he was able not to think about it, especially not from the perspective of the victims, and he was able to exempt himself from personal responsibility by telling himself (and anyone else who would listen) that he was just following orders. It was the bureaucratic system that enabled him to do both. He was not exactly passive; he was, on the contrary, very aggressive in trying to do his duty. He behaved with the "ruthless, competitive exploitation" and "inauthen-tic, self-disparaging conformism" that characterizes those who people totalitarian systems (Pitkin 87). Arendt's theorizing of totalitarianism has been justly noted as one of her strongest contributions to philosophy. She saw that a situation like Nazi Germany is different from the conventional understanding of a tyranny. Pitkin writes, Totalitarianism cannot be understood, like earlier forms of domination, as the ruthless exploitation of some people by others, whether the motive be selfish calculation, irrational passion, or devotion to some cause. Understanding totalitarianism's essential nature requires solving the central mystery of the holocaust—the objectively useless and indeed dysfunctional, fanatical pursuit of a purely ideological policy, a pointless process to which the people enacting it have fallen captive. (87) Totalitarianism is closely connected to bureaucracy; it is oppression by rules, rather than by people who have willfully chosen to establish certain rules. It is the triumph of the social. Critics (both friendly and hostile) have paid considerable attention to Arendt's category of the "social," largely because, despite spending so much time on the notion, Arendt remains vague on certain aspects of it. Pitkin appropriately compares Arendt's concept of the social to the Blob, the type of monster that figured in so many post-war horror movies. That Blob was "an evil monster from outer space, entirely external to and separate from us [that] had fallen upon us intent on debilitating, absorb¬ing, and ultimately destroying us, gobbling up our distinct individuality and turning us into robots that mechanically serve its purposes" (4). Pitkin is critical of this version of the "social" and suggests that Arendt meant (or perhaps should have meant) something much more complicated. The simplistic version of the social-as-Blob can itself be an instance of Blob thinking; Pitkin's criticism is that Arendt talks at times as though the social comes from outside of us and has fallen upon us, turning us into robots. Yet, Arendt's major criticism of the social is that it involves seeing ourselves as victimized by something that comes from outside our own behavior. I agree with Pitkin that Arendt's most powerful descriptions of the social (and the other concepts similar to it, such as her discussion of totalitarianism, imperialism, Eichmann, and parvenus) emphasize that these processes are not entirely out of our control but that they happen to us when, and because, we keep refusing to make active choices. We create the social through negligence. It is not the sort of force in a Sorcerer's Apprentice, which once let loose cannot be stopped; on the contrary, it continues to exist because we structure our world to reward social behavior. Pitkin writes, "From childhood on, in virtually all our institutions, we reward euphemism, salesmanship, slo¬gans, and we punish and suppress truth-telling, originality, thoughtful-ness. So we continually cultivate ways of (not) thinking that induce the social" (274). I want to emphasize this point, as it is important for thinking about criticisms of some forms of the social construction of knowledge: denying our own agency is what enables the social to thrive. To put it another way, theories of powerlessness are self-fulfilling prophecies. Arendt grants that there are people who willed the Holocaust, but she insists that **totalitarian systems** **result not** so much **from** the **Hitlers** or Stalins **as from the bureaucrats who may or may not agree with** the established **ideology but** who **enforce** the **rules** **for no stronger motive than a desire to avoid trouble** with their superiors (see Eichmann and Life). **They do not think about what they do. One might prevent such occurrences**—or, at least, resist the modern tendency toward totalitarian¬ism—by thought: "critical thought is in principle anti-authoritarian" (Lectures 38). By "thought" Arendt does not mean eremitic contemplation; in fact, she has great contempt for what she calls "professional thinkers," refusing herself to become a philosopher or to call her work philosophy. Young-Bruehl, Benhabib, and Pitkin have each said that **Heidegger represented** just such a professional thinker for Arendt, and his **embrace of Nazism** **epitomized** the **genuine dangers such "thinking" can pose** (see Arendt's "Heidegger"). "**Thinking" is not typified by** the **isolated** **con¬templation** of philosophers; it requires the arguments of others and close attention to the truth. It is easy to overstate either part of that harmony. One must consider carefully the arguments and viewpoints of others: **Political thought is representative**. I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; that is, I represent them. This process of representation does not blindly adopt the actual views of those who stand somewhere else, and hence look upon the world from a different perspective; this is a question neither of empathy, as though I tried to be or to feel like somebody else, nor of counting noses and joining a majority but of being and thinking in my own identity where actually I am not. **The more** people's **standpoints** I have **present** in my mind while I am pondering a given issue, and the **better I can imagine how I would feel and think if I were in their place,** the stronger will be my capacity for represen¬tative thinking and the more valid my final conclusions, my opinion. ("Truth" 241) **There are two points to emphasize** in this wonderful passage. First, **one does not get these standpoints in one's mind through imagining them, but through listening to them;** thus, **good thinking requires that one hear the arguments of other people.** Hence, as Arendt says, "critical thinking, while still a solitary business, does not cut itself off from' all others.'" Thinking is, in this view, necessarily public discourse: critical thinking is possible "only where the standpoints of all others are open to inspection" (Lectures 43). Yet, it is not a discourse in which one simply announces one's stance; participants are interlocutors and not just speakers; they must listen. Unlike many current versions of public discourse, **this view presumes that speech matters**. It is not asymmetric manipulation of others, nor merely an economic exchange; it must be a world into which one enters and by which one might be changed. Second, passages like the above make some readers think that Arendt puts too much faith in discourse and too little in truth (see Habermas). But Arendt is no crude relativist; she believes in truth, and she believes that there are facts that can be more or less distorted. She does not believe that reality is constructed by discourse, or that truth is indistinguishable from falsehood. She insists tha^ the truth has a different pull on us and, consequently, that it has a difficult place in the world of the political. Facts are different from falsehood because, while they can be distorted or denied, especially when they are inconvenient for the powerful, they also have a certain positive force that falsehood lacks: "Truth, though powerless and always defe ated in a head-on clash with the powers that be, possesses a strength of its own: whatever those in power may contrive, they are unable to discover or invent a viable substitute for it. Persuasion and violence can destroy truth, but they cannot replace it" ("Truth" 259). Facts have a strangely resilient quality partially because a lie "tears, as it were, a hole in the fabric of factuality. As every historian knows, one can spot a lie by noticing incongruities, holes, or the j unctures of patched-up places" ("Truth" 253). While she is sometimes discouraging about our ability to see the tears in the fabric, citing the capacity of totalitarian governments to create the whole cloth (see "Truth" 252-54), she is also sometimes optimistic. In Eichmann in Jerusalem, she repeats the story of Anton Schmidt—a man who saved the lives of Jews—and concludes that such stories cannot be silenced (230-32). For facts to exert power in the common world, however, these stories must be told. Rational truth (such as principles of mathematics) might be perceptible and demonstrable through individual contemplation, but "factual truth, on the contrary, is always related to other people: it concerns events and circumstances in which many are involved; it is established by witnesses and depends upon testimony; it exists only to the extent that it is spoken about, even if it occurs in the domain of privacy. It is political by nature" (23 8). Arendt is neither a positivist who posits an autonomous individual who can correctly perceive truth, nor a relativist who positively asserts the inherent relativism of all perception. Her description of how **truth** functions **does not fall anywhere in the three-part expeditio so prevalent in both rhetoric and philosophy: it is not expressivist, positivist, or social constructivist. Good thinking depends upon good public argument, and good public argument depends upon access to facts**: "Freedom of opinion is a farce unless factual information is guaranteed" (238). The sort of thinking that Arendt propounds takes the form of action only when it is public argument, and, as such, it is particularly precious: "For if no other test but the experience of being active, no other measure but the extent of sheer activity were to be applied to the various activities within the vita activa, it might well be that thinking as such would surpass them all" (Human 325). Arendt insists that it is "the same general rule— Do not contradict yourself (not your self but your thinking ego)—that determines both thinking and acting" (Lectures 3 7). In place of the mildly resentful conformism that fuels totalitarianism, Arendt proposes what Pitkin calls "a tough-minded, open-eyed readiness to perceive and judge reality for oneself, in terms of concrete experience and independent, critical theorizing" (274). The paradoxical nature of agonism (that it must involve both individuality and commonality) makes it difficult to maintain, as the temptation is great either to think one's own thoughts without reference to anyone else or to let others do one's thinking.

**Third, Engaging the state is critical to the ability of citizens to break into the project of solving global challenges: It relies on an existing internationalist state and refocuses its energies through citizen participation in national institutions that solve for war as well as environmental and social challenges**

**Sassen 2009**

[ColumbiaUniversity, istheauthorof TheGlobalCity (2ndedn, Princeton, 2001), Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages (Princeton, 2008) and A Sociology of Globalisation (Norton,2007), among others, 2009, The Potential for a Progressive State?, uwyo//amp]

Using state power for a new global politics These post-1980s trends towards **a greater interaction of national andglobal dynamics are not part of some unidirectional historical progres-sion**. There have been times in the past when they may have been as strong in certain aspects as they are today (Sassen, 2008a: chapter 3). But **the current positioning of national states is distinctive precisely because** 270 Saskia Sassen **the national state has become the most powerful complex organizational entity in the world, and because it is a resource that citizens, confined largely to the national, can aim at governing and using to develop novel political agendas. It is this mix of the national and the global that is so full of potential. The national state is one particular form of state: at the other end of this variable the state can be conceived of as a technical administrative capability that could escape the historic bounds of narrow nationalisms that have marked the state historically**, or colonialism as the only form of internationalism that states have enacted**. Stripping the state of the particularity of this historical legacy gives me more analytic freedom in conceptualising these processes and opens up the possibility of the denationalised state**.As particular components of national states become the institutional home for the operation of some of the dynamics that are central to glob-alisation they undergo change that is difficult to register or name. In my own work I have found useful the notion of an incipient denation-alising of specific components of national states, i.e. components that function as such institutional homes. **The question for research then becomes what is actually ‘national’ in some of the institutional compo-nents of states linked to the implementation and regulation of economic globalisation. The hypothesis here would be that some components of national institutions, even though formally national, are not national in the sense in which we have constructed the meaning of that term overthe last hundred years.This partial**, often highly specialised or at least particularised**, dena-tionalisation can also take place in domains other than that of economic globalisation, notably the more recent developments in the humanrights regime which allow national courts to sue foreign firms and dictators, or which grant undocumented immigrants certain rights. Denationalisation is, thus, multivalent: it endogenises global agendas of many different types of actors, not only corporate firms and financial markets, but also human rights and environmental objectives. Those confined to the national can use national state institutions as a bridge into global politics. This is one kind of radical politics**, and only one kind, **that would use the capacities of hopefully increasingly denationalized states. The existence and the strengthening of global civil society organ-isations becomes strategic in this context. In all of this lie the possibilities of moving towards new types of joint global action by denationalized states–coalitions of the willing focused not on war but on environmental and social justice projects.**

**Observation Three: Voting Issue**

**Vote negative to reject the affirmative’s dogmatic refusal to subject themselves to the constraints of switch-side debate.**

**First, BOUNDED CREATIVITY outweighs: You should embrace a model of debate that strikes a balance between predictability and creativity— preparing to debate within a common framework enhances education because it maximizes testing of ideas. That’s also a reason to SEVERLY DISCOUNT their impact claims because those claims have not been submitted to rigorous testing.**

**Goodin 03**

[Robert E. Goodin and Simon J. Niemeyer- Australian National University- 2003, When Does Deliberation Begin? Internal Reflection versus Public Discussion in Deliberative Democracy, POLITICAL STUDIES: 2003 VOL 51, 627–649, uwyo//amp]

Suppose that instead of highly polarized symbolic attitudes, what we have at the outset is mass ignorance or mass apathy or non-attitudes. There again, people's engaging with the issue – focusing on it, acquiring information about it, thinking hard about it – would be something that is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the deliberative process. And more to our point, it is something that is most likely to occur within individuals themselves or in informal interactions, well in advance of any formal, organized group discussion. There is much in the large literature on attitudes and the mechanisms by which they change to support that speculation.31 Consider, for example, the literature on ‘central’ versus ‘peripheral’ routes to the formation of attitudes. Before deliberation, individuals may not have given the issue much thought or bothered to engage in an extensive process of reflection.32 In such cases, positions may be arrived at via peripheral routes, taking cognitive shortcuts or arriving at ‘top of the head’ conclusions or even simply following the lead of others believed to hold similar attitudes or values (Lupia, 1994). These shorthand approaches involve the use of available cues such as ‘expertness’ or ‘attractiveness’ (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) – not deliberation in the internal-reflective sense we have described. Where peripheral shortcuts are employed, there may be inconsistencies in logic and the formation of positions, based on partial information or incomplete information processing. In contrast, ‘central’ routes to the development of attitudes involve the application of more deliberate effort to the matter at hand, in a way that is more akin to the internal-reflective deliberative ideal. Importantly for our thesis, there is nothing intrinsic to the ‘central’ route that requires group deliberation. Research in this area stresses instead the importance simply of ‘sufficient impetus’ for engaging in deliberation, such as when an individual is stimulated by personal involvement in the issue.33 The same is true of ‘on-line’ versus ‘memory-based’ processes of attitude change.34 The suggestion here is that we lead our ordinary lives largely on autopilot, doing routine things in routine ways without much thought or reflection. When we come across something ‘new’, we update our routines – our ‘running’ beliefs and procedures, attitudes and evaluations – accordingly. But having updated, we then drop the impetus for the update into deep-stored ‘memory’. A consequence of this procedure is that, when asked in the ordinary course of events ‘what we believe’ or ‘what attitude we take’ toward something, we easily retrieve what we think but we cannot so easily retrieve the reasons why. That more fully reasoned assessment – the sort of thing we have been calling internal-reflective deliberation – requires us to call up reasons from stored memory rather than just consulting our running on-line ‘summary judgments’. Crucially for our present discussion, once again, what prompts that shift from on-line to more deeply reflective deliberation is not necessarily interpersonal discussion. The impetus for fixing one's attention on a topic, and retrieving reasons from stored memory, might come from any of a number sources: group discussion is only one. And again, even in the context of a group discussion, this shift from ‘on-line’ to ‘memory-based’ processing is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the process, often before the formal discussion ever begins. All this is simply to say that, on a great many models and in a great many different sorts of settings, it seems likely that elements of the pre-discursive process are likely to prove crucial to the shaping and reshaping of people's attitudes in a citizens’ jury-style process. The initial processes of focusing attention on a topic, providing information about it and inviting people to think hard about it is likely to provide a strong impetus to internal-reflective deliberation, altering not just the information people have about the issue but also the way people process that information and hence (perhaps) what they think about the issue. What happens once people have shifted into this more internal-reflective mode is, obviously, an open question. Maybe people would then come to an easy consensus, as they did in their attitudes toward the Daintree rainforest.35 Or maybe people would come to divergent conclusions; and they then may (or may not) be open to argument and counter-argument, with talk actually changing minds. Our claim is not that group discussion will always matter as little as it did in our citizens’ jury.36 Our claim is instead merely that the earliest steps in the jury process – the sheer focusing of attention on the issue at hand and acquiring more information about it, and the internal-reflective deliberation that that prompts – will invariably matter more than deliberative democrats of a more discursive stripe would have us believe. However much or little difference formal group discussions might make, on any given occasion, the pre-discursive phases of the jury process will invariably have a considerable impact on changing the way jurors approach an issue.

**2**

**The silence of the aff on the question of how colonialism was produced condemns their project to reifying colonialism- the call to come before decolonization bases the aff’s moral system on the continued benefit of genocidal occupation AND it’s a sequencing question- feminism must FIRST be informed by the historical, material, and fixed realities of the Native subject**

**Morgensen 2010**

[Morgensen, Scott, 2k10, GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies, Volume 16, Number 1-2, “Settler Homonationalism: Theorizing Settler Colonialism within Queer Modernities, 2010.]

Denaturalizing settler colonialism will mark it as not a fait accompli but a process open to change. While settlement suggests the appropriation of land, that history was never fixed: even the violence of allotment failed to erase collective Native land claims, just as land expropriation is being countered by tribal governments reacquiring sovereign land. In turn, as Thomas King and Paul Carter suggest, settlement narrates the land, and, as storytelling, it remains open to debate, End Page 122 such as in Native activisms that sustain Indigenous narratives of land or tell new stories to denaturalize settler landscapes. **The processes of settler colonialism produce contradictions, as settlers try to contain or erase Native difference in order that they may inhabit Native land as if it were their own**. Doing so produces the contortions described by Deloria, as **settler subjects argue that Native people or their land claims never existed, no longer exist, or if they do are trumped by the priority of settler claims. Yet at the same time settler subjects study Native history so that they may absorb it as their own and legitimate their place on stolen land. These contradictions are informed by the knowledge, constantly displaced, of the genocidal histories of occupation. Working to stabilize settler subjectivity produces the bizarre result of people admitting to histories of terrorizing violence while basing their moral systems on continuing to benefit from them. The difference between conservative and liberal positions on settlement often breaks between whether non-Natives feel morally justified or conscionably implicated in a society based on violence. But while the first position embraces the status quo, the second does nothing necessarily to change it**. As Smith pointedly argues, "**It is a consistent practice among progressives to bemoan the genocide of Native peoples, but in the interest of political expediency, implicitly sanction it by refusing to question the illegitimacy of the settler nation responsible for this genocide."** In writing with Kehaulani Kauanui, Smith argues that this complicity continues, as progressives have critiqued the seeming erosion of civil liberties and democracy under the Bush regime. How is this critique affected if we understand the Bush regime not as the erosion of U.S. democracy but as its fulfillment? If we understand American democracy as predicated on the genocide of indigenous people? . . . Even scholars critical of the nation-state often tend to presume that the United States will always exist, and thus they overlook indigenous feminist articulations of alternative forms of governance beyond the United States in particular and the nation-state in general. Smith and Kauanui remind us here that Indigenous feminists crucially theorize life beyond settler colonialism, including by fostering terms for national community that exceed the heteropatriarchal nation-state form. **Non-Natives who seek accountable alliance with Native people may align themselves with these stakes if they wish to commit to denaturalizing settler colonialism.** But as noted, **their more frequent effort to stabilize their identities follows less from a belief that settlement is natural than from a compulsion to foreclose the Pandora's box of contradictions** End Page 123 **they know will open by calling it into question. In U.S. queer politics**, this includes the implications of my essay: **queers will invoke and repeat the terrorizing histories of settler colonialism if these remain obscured behind normatively white and national desires for Native roots and settler citizenship.** A first step for non-Native queers thus can be to examine critically and challenge how settler colonialism conditions their lives, as a step toward imagining new and decolonial sexual subjectivities, cultures, and politics. This work can be inspired by historical coalition politics formed by queers of color in accountable relationship to Native queer activists. Yet this work invites even more forms, particularly when Native queers choose to organize apart. White queers challenging racism and colonialism can join queers of color to create new queer politics marked explicitly as non-Native, in that they will form by answering Native queer critiques. As part of that work, non-Native queers can study the colonial histories they differently yet mutually inherit, and can trouble the colonial institutions in which they have sought their freedom, as steps toward shifting non-Native queer politics in decolonizing directions.

**Feminist strategies fail in the context of native women, misunderstand racism and its impact on the erasure of native women’s identity, we need a starting point from a indigenous perspective**

**Maracle ‘02**

[Lee, Women Studies at University of Windsor, Leader in personal and cultural reclamation and international expert on Canadian First Nations culture and history, I AM WOMEN, Raincoast Books, 5.31.2002. //wyo-hdm]

I USED TO consider myself a liberated woman. I woke up at the bottom of the mine shaft one morning, darkness above me, screaming, "I'm not like the rest. . . I'm not an alcoholic ... a skid row bum ... a stupid Native," ad nauseum. **Each time I confronted white colonial society I had to convince them of my validity as a human being. It was the attempt to convince them that made me realize that I was still a slave.** It was this enslavement which moved me to retrace my own desertion. In these pages I recount the colour of traitorousness and my decision to reconnect myself to all of us struggling to remove the burden of a recent colonial history. Striving I drank heartily of the settler's wine learned his language well; gazed with awe at his success no pretty woman was I, nor clever wit did possess « My striving went to naught it was the trying that shames me now. Until March 1982, feminism, indeed womanhood itself, was meaningless to me. **Racist ideology** had **define**d **womanhood for the Native woman as nonexistent, therefore neither the woman question nor the European rebel's response held any meaning** for me. Ignorance is no crime. But **when you trot your ignorance before the world as though it were part of some profound truth, that is a crime.** I apologize to Robert Mendoza's wife and all the Native women who watched the video that I made in San Francisco for International Women's Day in 1978. You must have been personally offended by my denial of my own womanhood. I will forever remember Robert's sensitive reply to my remark that it was irrelevant that I was a woman. In a phone call in which he praised my understanding of the colonial process, he added: 'Couldn't you see that perhaps it was because you were Native and a woman that your insight was so powerful?" His modest indignation sharpens the deep remorse I now feel tor those women who had to watch, red-faced, while this traitor blurted into a microphone, in front of a multitude of non-Native women, that it mattered not that I was a Native woman. 'C Was such a great video, a great presentation . . . Don't you that you could have taken responsibility for being a woman and inspired our sisters, just a little, with the fact that Clsive understanding that you have acquired was due, at ln Part> to the fact that you were a Native woman?" Robert And^ Pleaded into the Phone from Pasmaquoddy, Maine. rem Words °f my granny echoed in my ears . . . "You will"m 6r what YOU need to know when the time comes." (Ah, Robert, don't you see, I could not have done that, not then.) Before 1961, **we were "wards of the government," children in the eyes of the law. We objected and became, henceforth, people. Born of this objection was the Native question—the forerunner of Native self-government, the Native land question**, etc. **The woman question still did not exist for us.** Not then.I responded, like so many other women, as a person without sexuality. **Native women do not** even **like the words "women's liberation" and even now it burns** my back. **How could I resist the reduction of women to sex objects when I had not been considered sexually desirable, even as an object? We have been the object of sexual release for white males whose appetites are too gross for their own delicate women.** I woke up**. I AM WOMAN! Not the woman on the billboard for whom physical work is damning, for whom nothingness, physical oblivion is idyllic. But a woman for whom mobility, muscular movement, physical prowess are equal to the sensuous pleasure of being alive. The dead alone do nothing. Paraplegics move. I want to move.** I want to look across the table in my own kitchen and see, in the brown eyes of the man who shares my life, the beauty of my own reflection. More. **I want to look across my kitchen table at the women of colour who share my life and see the genius of their minds, uncluttered by white opinion**. I want to sit with my grown daughters and experience the wonderment of our mutual affection. I want us to set the standard for judging our brilliance, our beauty and our passions. **Whereas Native men have been victims of the age-old racist remark "lazy drunken Indian," about Native women white folks ask, "Do they have feelings?**" How many times do you hear from our own brothers, "Indian women don't whine and cry around, nag or complain." At least not "real" or "true" Indian women**. Embodied in that kind of language is the negation of our femininity—the denial of our womanhood. And, let us admit it, beneath such a remark isn't there just a little coercion to behave and take without complaint whatever our brothers think "we have it coming** "? I used to believe such attempts at enforcing docility in women. Worse, I was convinced that love, passion/compassion were inventions of white folks. I believed that we never loved, Wept, laughed or fought with each other. Divorce was unheard id we then merely accept our wifely obligations to men ' C Way a horse or an ox accepts yoke and bridle? I think not. •-'- denial of Native womanhood is the reduction of the dic° C Pe°ple to a sub-human level. Animals beget animals. The 8 °f PatrUrchy demand that beneath the Native male e Natlve female. **The dictates of racism are that Native men are beneath white women and Native females are not fit to be referred to as women.** No one makes the mistake of referring to us as ordinary women. **White women invite us to speak if the issue of racism or Native people**. We are there to teach, to sensitize them or to serve them in some way. **We are expected to retain our position well below them, as their servants. We are not, as a matter of course, invited as an integral part of "their movement"—the women's movement. I am not now, nor am I likely to be, considered an authority on women in general by the white women's movement in this country. If I am asked to write, my topic as Native** whatever, and like as not**, the request comes replete with an outline and the do's and don'ts of what I may or may not say. Should I venture out on my own and deal with women as a whole and not in segregated Native fashion, the invitations stop coming. I am not interested in gaining entry to the doors of the "white women's movement.**" I would look just a little ridiculous sitting in their living rooms saying "we this and we that." Besides, it is such a small movement. I say this for those Native women who think that they may find equal relations among white women and who think that there may be some solace to be found in those relations. **We are slaves with our own consent.** As women, we do not support each other. We look at males when they speak and stare off into space when a woman steps assertively into the breach of leadership. Men who stand up and passionately articulate our aspirations about sovereignty are revered as powerful leaders; women who do so are "intimidating." We mock the liberation of women. I too am guilty of acceding to the erasure of our womanhood. I actually wrote articles with just the kind of strictures that today sicken me. No more. I used to be uncomfortable being with women. I can remember saying to a close friend of mine that I had more men friends than women. She nodded, yes, unoffended, but neither of us could think of a single male to whom we could say the converse without offending his manhood. We both had become complicit in the erasure of ourselves as women, as Natives. We have done enough to help Europeans wipe us off the face of the earth. Every day we trade our treasured women friends for the men in our lives. We even trade our sisters. **Let Wounded Knee be the last time that they erased us from the world of the living. Let us all blossom beautiful and productive.** 3. Isn't Love a Given?

**Lack of native methodology results in ongoing genocide, assimilation and annihilation of indigenous peoples and culture- k2 solve environmental degradation, heterosexism, classism, racism, sexism and militarism**

**Churchill 96** (Ward, Prof. of Ethnic Studies @ U. of Colorado, Boulder BA and MA in Communications from Sangamon State, “From a Native Son”,mb)

I’ll debunk some of this nonsense in a moment, but first I want to take up the posture of self-proclaimed leftist radicals in the same connection. And I’ll do so on the basis of principle, because justice is supposed to matter more to progressives than to rightwing hacks. Let me say that the pervasive and near-total silence of the Left in this connection has been quite illuminating. **Non-Indian activists**, with only a handful of exceptions, persistently plead that they can’t really take a coherent position on the matter of Indian land rights because “unfortunately,” they’re “not really conversant with the issues” ( as if these were tremendously complex ). Meanwhile, they **do** virtually **nothing**, generation after generation, **to inform themselves on the topic of who actually owns the ground they’re standing on**. The record can be played only so many times before it wears out and becomes just another variation of “hear no evil, see no evil.” At this point, it doesn’t take Albert Einstein to figure out that **the Left doesn’t know much about such things because it’s never wanted to know, or that this is so because it’s always had its own plans for utilizing land it has no more right to than does the status quo it claims to oppose**. The usual technique for explaining this away has always been a sort of pro forma acknowledgement that Indian land rights are of course “really important stuff” (yawn), but that one” really doesn’t have a lot of time to get into it ( I’ll buy your book, though, and keep it on my shelf, even if I never read it ). Reason? Well, one is just “overwhelmingly preoccupied” with working on “other important issues” (meaning, what they consider to be more important issues). **Typically enumerated are sexism, racism, homophobia, class inequities, militarism, the environment**, or some combination of these. It’s a pretty good evasion, all in all. Certainly, there’s no denying any of these issues their due; they are all important, obviously so. But more important than the question of land rights? There are some serious problems of primacy and priority imbedded in the orthodox script. To frame things clearly in this regard**, lets hypothesize for a moment that all of the various non-Indian movements concentrating on each of these issues were suddenly successful in accomplishing their objectives** . Lets imagine that the United States as a whole were somehow transformed into an entity defined by the parity of its race, class, and gender relations, its embrace of unrestricted sexual preference, its rejection of militarism in all forms, and its abiding concern with environmental protection (I know, I know, this is a sheer impossibility, but that’s my point). When all is said and done, **the society resulting** from this scenario **is still**, first and foremost, **a colonialist** **society**, an imperialist society in the most fundamental sense possible with all that this implies. **This** is true because **the scenario does nothing** at all **to address the fact that whatever is happening happens on someone else’s land**, not only **without their consent**, but **through an adamant disregard for their rights to the land**. Hence, all it means is that **the immigrant or invading population has rearranged its affairs in such a way as to make itself more comfortable at the continuing expense of indigenous people. The colonial equation remains intact and may even be reinforced by a greater degree** of participation, and vested interest in maintenance of the colonial order among the settler population at large. The dynamic here is not very different from that evident in the American Revolution of the late 18th century, is it? And we all know very well where that led, don’t we**? Should we therefore begin to refer to socialist imperialism**, feminist imperialism, **gay and lesbian imperialism**, environmental imperialism, African American, and la Raza imperialism? I would hope not. I would hope this is all just a matter of confusion, of muddled priorities among people who really do mean well and who’d like to do better. If so, then all that is necessary to correct the situation is a basic rethinking of what must be done., and in what order. Here, I’d advance the straightforward premise that the **land rights of “First Americans” should serve as a first priority for everyone seriously committed to accomplishing positive change** in North America. But before I suggest everyone jump off and adopt this priority, I suppose it’s only fair that I interrogate the converse of the proposition: if making things like class inequity and sexism the preeminent focus of progressive action in North America inevitably perpetuates the internal colonial structure of the United States, does the reverse hold true? I’ll state unequivocally that it does not. There is no indication whatsoever that a restoration of indigenous sovereignty in Indian Country would foster class stratification anywhere, least of all in Indian Country. In fact, all indications are that when left to their own devices, indigenous peoples have consistently organized their societies in the most class-free manners. Look to the example of the Haudenosaunee (Six Nations Iroquois Confederacy). Look to the Muscogee (Creek) Confederacy. Look to the confederations of the Yaqui and the Lakota, and those pursued and nearly perfected by Pontiac and Tecumseh. They represent the very essence of enlightened egalitarianism and democracy. Every imagined example to the contrary brought forth by even the most arcane anthropologist can be readily offset by a couple of dozen other illustrations along the lines of those I just mentioned. Would sexism be perpetuated? Ask one of the Haudenosaunee clan mothers, who continue to assert political leadership in their societies through the present day. Ask Wilma Mankiller, current head of the Cherokee nation , a people that traditionally led by what were called “Beloved Women.” Ask a Lakota woman—or man, for that matter—about who it was that owned all real property in traditional society, and what that meant in terms of parity in gender relations. Ask a traditional Navajo grandmother about her social and political role among her people. Women in most traditional native societies not only enjoyed political, social, and economic parity with men, they often held a preponderance of power in one or more of these spheres. **Homophobia? Homosexuals of both genders were** (and in many settings still are) **deeply revered** as special or extraordinary, and therefore spiritually significant, **within most indigenous North American cultures. The extent to which these realities do not now pertain in native societies is exactly the extent to which Indians have been subordinated to the mores of the invading, dominating culture. Insofar as restoration of Indian land rights is tied directly to the reconstitution of traditional indigenous social, political, and economic modes, you can see where this leads: the relations of sex and sexuality accord rather well with the aspirations of feminist and gay rights activism.** How about a restoration of native land rights precipitating some sort of “environmental holocaust”? Let’s get at least a little bit real here. If you’re not addicted to the fabrications of Smithsonian anthropologists about how Indians lived, or George Weurthner’s Eurosupremacist Earth First! Fantasies about how we beat all the wooly mammoths and mastodons and saber-toothed cats to death with sticks, then this question isn’t even on the board. I know it’s become fashionable among Washington Post editorialists to make snide references to native people “strewing refuse in their wake” as they “wandered nomadically about the “prehistoric” North American landscape. What is that supposed to imply? That we, who were mostly “sedentary agriculturalists” in any event. Were dropping plastic and aluminum cans as we went? Like I said, lets get real. Read the accounts of early European arrival, despite the fact that it had been occupied by 15 or 20 million people enjoying a remarkably high standard of living for nobody knows how long: 40,000 years? 50,000 years? Longer? Now contrast that reality to what’s been done to this continent over the past couple of hundred years by the culture Weurthner, the Smithsonian, and the Post represent, and you tell me about environmental devastation. That leaves militarism and racism. Taking the last first, there really is no indication of racism in traditional Indian societies. To the contrary, the record reveals that Indians habitually intermarried between groups, and frequently adopted both children and adults from other groups. This occurred in precontact times between Indians, and the practice was broadened to include those of both African and European origin—and ultimately Asian origin as well—once contact occurred. Those who were naturalized by marriage or adoption were considered members of the group, pure and simple. This was always the Indian view. The Europeans and subsequent Euroamerican settlers viewed things rather differently, however, and foisted off the notion that Indian identity should be determined primarily by “blood quantum,” an outright eugenics code similar to those developed in places like Nazi Germany and apartheid South Africa. Now that’s a racist construction if there ever was one. Unfortunately, a lot of Indians have been conned into buying into this anti- Indian absurdity, and that’s something to be overcome. But there’s also solid indication that quite a number of native people continue to strongly resist such things as the quantum system. As to militarism, no one will deny that Indians fought wars among themselves both before and after the European invasion began. Probably half of all indigenous peoples in North America maintained permanent warrior societies. This could perhaps be reasonably construed as “militarism,” but not, I think, with the sense the term conveys within the European/Euro-American tradition. **There were never**, so far as anyone can demonstrate,, **wars of annihilation fought in this hemisphere prior to the Columbian arrival**, none. In fact, it seems **that it was a more or less firm principle of indigenous warfare not to kill, the object being to demonstrate personal bravery, something that could be done only against a live opponent.** There’s no honor to be had in killing another person, because a dead person can’t hurt you. There’s no risk. This is not to say that nobody ever died or was seriously injured in the fighting. They were, just as they are in full contact contemporary sports like football and boxing. Actually, these kinds of Euro- American games are what I would take to be the closest modern parallels to traditional inter-Indian warfare. For Indians, it was a way of burning excess testosterone out of young males, and not much more. So, **militarism in the way the term is used today is as alien to native tradition as smallpox and atomic bombs. Not only is it perfectly reasonable to assert that a restoration of Indian control over unceded lands within the United States would do nothing to perpetuate such problems as sexism and classism, but the reconstitution of indigenous societies this would entail stands to free the affected portions of North America from such maladies altogether**. Moreover, it can be said that the process should have a tangible impact in terms of diminishing such oppressions elsewhere. The principle is this: sexism, racism, and all the rest arose here as a concomitant to the emergence and consolidation of the Eurocentric nation-state form of sociopolitical and economic organization. **Everything the state does**, everything it can do**, is** **entirely contingent on its ongoing domination of Indian country**. Given this, it seems obvious that **the literal dismemberment of the nation-state inherent to Indian land recovery correspondingly reduces the ability of the state to sustain the imposition of objectionable relation within itself**. It follows that the realization of indigenous land rights serves to undermine or destroy the ability of the status quo to continue imposing a racist, sexist, classist, homophobic, militaristic order on non-Indians.

**3**

**Feminism is compatible with realism, the modern nation-state is less gendered than past feudal regimes, its universal norms have been the basis of women’s liberation**

**Lind 05**

[Michael Lind – editor of the National Interest – 2005 Of Arms and the Woman, review of the Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War by Cynthia Enloe

http://feminism.eserver.org/of-arms-and-the-woman.txt accessed 11-20-07]

Then there is "**the state**." Here, too, **there is nothing in realism that cannot accommodate many feminine observations** about the particular patriarchal features of particular historic states**. The realist definition of "the state" as a sovereign entity with an existence and a strategy distinct from that of individuals is very broad,** **including medieval duchies** and ancient e**mpires-- and, perhaps, female biker gangs. Realist theory holds no preference for the modern nation-state,** though a word might be spoken in its defense. Again and again **in feminist writings one encounters the claim that the modern nation- state is inherently "gendered," as though its predecessors--**feudal dynastic regimes, theocratic empires, city-states, tribal amphictyonies--**were not even more rigidly patriarchal.**

**Completely missing from such an analysis is any acknowledgement that the successes of feminism have been largely based on appeals to the universal norms governing citizens of the impersonal,** bureaucratic **nation-state. Those appeals would have made no sense in any previous political system.** Notwithstanding this, feminist scholars tend to join free marketeers, multiculturalists and Wilsonians in their approval of the (mostly imaginary) dissolution of the nation-state in a new world order. **If the nation-state is "gendered,**" Enloe reasons, **then perhaps the post-national nonstate need not be:** "Perhaps effective u.n. soldiering will call for a new kind of masculinity, one less reliant on misogyny, less insecure about heterosexual credentials." (**If the recent "peacekeeping" of u.n. forces in Bosnia** and Somalia **shows anything**, however, **it is that a little more of the old masculinity may be necessary to prevent mass slaughter--and mass rape, too.**)

**Working from within but against the state is key to success of feminist struggles- the state is multifaceted and we reform aspects of the state to fight against dominant discourses and masculinist policies**

**Rai 02**

[Shirin M. Rai - professor in the department of Politics and International Studies at Warwick – 2002 Gender and the Political Economy of Development p. 204-206]

As we saw in chapter 5, **for feminists**, the nation-state has always j presented serious intellectual and strategic challenges. For some, **any engagement with the state has been questionable on the grounds that 'the state ... produces** state **subjects** inter alia, bureaucratized, dependent, disciplined and gendered...' (Brown, 1992: 9; also see Allen, 1990). There has been an ongoing debate within the feminist movement about the expropriatory power of institutions (see Ehrenreich and Piven, 1983; Brown, 1992; Pringle and Watson, 1992;' Rai, 1995). The various positions have covered the entire spectrum from rejecting 'dealing' with state institutions entirely, to suggest­ing an 'in and against' the state approach, to examining the benefits of working with/through state institutions. I have argued elsewhere that **for women,** as for other marginalized groups, **the state and civil society are both complex terrains - f**ractured, oppressive, **threatening and also providing spaces for struggles** and negotiations. **These struggles and negotiations are grounded in the positionings of various groups of women articulating their short- and long-term interests in the context of the multiplicity of power relations that form the state in any country**. In its turn, t**he state and its institutions are also 'shaped' by the forms and outcomes of these struggles.** While deny­ing any intentionality to the state, or a necessary coherence to the alliances formed and engaged in struggles against states, there are, however, particular characteristics of Third World states that need to be examined to form a judgement about the various possible spaces for mobilization by women in their interests**. My study of women's struggles against and engagement with the state in India, for example, showed that while state institutions and dominant political parties have taken up the cause of women's representation as part of the generalized discourse of modernity to which they subscribe, this discourse is not unified.** As such**, it allows sections of the state to take initiatives to respond to the struggles of women for equality as well as empowerment. This results in contradiction between different fractions of the state, which allows further possibilities for negotiation and struggle by and in the interests of women.** Further, **the capacity of the state to implement its policies and enforce its laws is undermined by the weakness of the economy and of the political infrastructure, and by widespread corruption which leads to the delegitimization of government and the political system. This lack of capacity further enhances intra-state conflict** (Rai, 1995). **The state thus cannot be regarded as and engaged with As a unified entity. It remains a fractured terra in that women's groups and struggles need to respond to in complex way**s. Thus, in my earlier work (1995, 1996b, 1999) 1 have suggested that **women's movements need to work 'in and against' the state.** An engagement with the state should not be considered simply as one option to be weighed against others; **it is a necessity.** I have argued **that a recognition of the particular splintered complexity of the state and of the multiplicity of the strategies of struggle is needed by women to confront and/or use state fractions in their own interests. An understanding of a relative autonomy of state fractions from the existing social relations and infrastructural capacity, on the one hand, and of state embeddedness in social relations and the consequences of such embeddedness for women, on the other, is necessary for engaging with institutions of power** in a critical and thoughtful way**. Such an approach**, derived from analysis of particular struggles, also **points to the potential for a strategy that holds in tension the engagement with, and the mobilization against, structures of power**, be they at the local, national or global level. In the context of 'the neoliberal frame' under globalization (Runyan, 1999), I would suggest that strategizing for change in this way has become far more critical. As the global reach of social and political movements increases through technological and information networks, and as the pressures of international trade and markets begin to impinge significantly on national economies, leading to a fragmentation and repositioning of nation-states, the relationship between IocaI struggles, social movements and the national state is being constantly reshaped (Cohen and Rai, 2000a; Stienstra, 2000). I would suggest further that **for a critical engagement with structures of power, the terms of engagement need to be clearly thought out.** As we saw in chapter 5, not all, or even most, of these terms be determined by the women's movements, but a sensitivity to the issues at stake is still important if we are realistically to assess the extent to which agendas of institutions and structures of power be shifted. Finally, I would argue that **an engagement with power structures need** not rule out - indeed, **needs to build upon a strong movement of opposition to these structures. Without such double move, early feminist concerns about co-optation within dominant discourses and by structural regimes of power become real. Such an analysis of 'in and against' organized power structures needs to reflect upon 'the shifting distinctions between representation within the state and political economy,** on the one hand, **and within the theory of the Subjec**t, on the other...' (Spivak, 1988) In doing so, we can begin to address the tension between feasible

# 2NC

**O/V**

**Injecting personal politics into the conversation is MONOLOGISM which is a violent form of communication ethics because it closes arguments off to refutation—that specifically turns their advocacy**

**Farber 99**

(Professor of Law and Associate Dean of Faculty, University of Minnesota, “Beyond All Criticism”, 83 Minn. L. Rev. 1735, June//wyoccd)

The difficulty of extracting any workable conception of social equality from radical multiculturalism is a sign of a larger set of problems. We argued in Beyond All Reason that radical multiculturalism is inherently destructive of dialogue and community. **Among the problems are its tendency to reduce argument to the exchange and criticism of personal stories; its inability to separate disagreement with a speaker's message from attacks on the speaker as a person; and its divisive entanglement in identity politics**. **Because radical multiculturalism replaces a belief in objective truth with a focus on power relations, it faces the temptation to slide away from democratic interchange toward nihilism or authoritarianism.** Anne **Coughlin summarizes** (and partially endorses) **our argument** in the following passage: Throughout the book, Farber and Sherry repeatedly **fault the radicals for politicizing scholarship, for confusing politics with truth, and for rejecting universal values in favor of an intellectual totalitarianism that privileges the subjective preferences of whoever happens to be in power**. Indeed, as Farber and Sherry notice, **some of the more extreme statements by the radical multiculturalists amount to an endorsement of the ugliest kind of fascism**... These criticisms are obvious, devastating, and, from the perspective of traditional liberal scholars, largely unanswerable. n102 In their contributions to this symposium, Matthew Finkin and Steven Gey expand upon the potentially antidemocratic implications of radical multiculturalism. Finkin draws a detailed and rather worrisome comparison between radical multiculturalism and the jurisprudential principles accepted in certain European fascist regimes. Indeed, he goes farther. He offers the hypothesis "that **radical multiculturalism has more than an "affinity' with Fascism; that it is Fascist to the bone**." n103 Gey argues that **radical multiculturalism leads to an essentially conservative politics**: "**since the social constructionists refuse to recognize the legitimacy of liberal institutional limits on political power, they implicitly give every group that obtains ultimate power the authority to impose that group's "truth' on everyone else**." n104 In various ways, and sometimes in language much more pointed than our own, Finkin, Gey, and Coughlin all raise the question of whether the hard-won virtues of a liberal society are compatible with a serious adherence to radical multiculturalism. As Coughlin points out, **much of the attention of the radical multiculturalists is focused on the academic world in which they live and work. We might begin, then, by asking whether their viewpoint is consistent with the values of intellectual and academic freedom that are central to the classical liberal vision of the university. The traditional arguments for academic freedom are based on the notion of searching for truth**, a concept that is made problematic by post-modernism. n105 Some criticisms of Beyond All Reason also suggest an intolerance for academic debate. The most obvious concern is raised by the intemperate response of radicals such as Calmore and Culp to any criticism of their school of thought. Such views, if held either by individuals with influence within universities or by administrators of speech codes, would pose a direct threat to free debate. Charges of racism, when issuing from those who advocate legal penalties against racist speakers, are not just empty rhetoric. In addition to the openly vituperative replies, some of the responses illustrate the attitude we criticized in Derrick Bell as a "knowing and dismissive sneer." n106 Calmore, for example, [\*1762] suggests that our book "should really be buried" n107 rather than discussed. Culp says that "the philosophical ideas expressed in this book... are to philosophy what lite is to beer." n108 Continuing Bell's reference to Louis Armstrong - if you don't know jazz, "don't mess with it" n109 - Calmore engages in an extended discussion of jazz and his ambivalence about its appeal to a broad audience, concluding that "it really is okay that Farber and Sherry are not happily within [the] audience" for radical multiculturalism. n110 **These shrugs of disdain do not exactly invite dialogue**. But the more significant point is not the defensive tone of the radicals, but their distorted picture of intellectual discourse. For instance, Abrams calls for a "truce" in which traditional scholars and radical multiculturalists will learn to live side by side. n111 This turns out to be a rather one-sided truce, however**. Traditional scholars**, according to Abrams, **should not "challenge" multiculturalists by asking about the truth or normative implications of their narratives**, n112 **but radical multiculturalists are free to accuse traditionalists of racism and sexism whenever they think it appropriate**. n113 For Delgado, scholarship is equivalent to a lawsuit (or political warfare), where each side is trying to win: thus it is unfair to write a favorable review of a scholar in the "same camp" or on your "side" unless you disclose your common affiliation. n114 This is a somewhat peculiar vision of academic discussion.

## Limits Good

#### Bounded knowledge is good – debate should be maintained as a disciplinary space- key to unlocking critically pedagogies potential for social justice

McArthur 10

(Department of Higher & Community Education, University of Edinburgh, Paterson’s Land,

Holyrood Road, Edinburgh EH8 8AQ, UK Studies in Higher Education Vol. 35, No. 3, May 2010 ebsco DA: 5-24-13//wyoccd)

Giroux’s critical pedagogy rests upon a commitment to public spaces for learning, where diverse forms of knowledge can be exchanged and developed; where students and teachers engage critically with those knowledges, and with one another; and through which genuine democratic ideals can be pursued. Disciplines are regarded as antithetical to these aims, because they are considered closed, elitist and to perpetuate conservative forms of relationships and types of knowledge. Thus, critical pedagogy seeks, instead, to escape disciplinary boundaries and build interdisciplinary spaces in which such public and political realms can exist and prosper. Looking anew at disciplines I suggest that there is an alternative view of disciplines to that outlined above. In this view disciplines are complex, contested and permeable spaces. I further propose that, if critical pedagogues such as Giroux can, in Proust’s term, look with new eyes at disciplines, they will hopefully see dynamic and safe structures that could provide real and robust allies in the fight to protect higher education from narrow, largely economic, interpretations of its role, and instead promote higher education as a democratic space which supports greater social justice. In this section I seek to encourage this new look at disciplines by first outlining my conception of them as complex, contested and permeable structures, in contrast to Giroux’s perspective of disciplines as static, elitist and limiting. Secondly, I argue that interdisciplinarity and disciplinarity should be thought of as complementary spaces, rather than alternatives. Finally, I discuss how the act of looking anew at disciplines may help critical pedagogy strengthen its own theoretical and practical stances.

## SS Debate Good

**Switch side debate is good-direct engagement, not abstract relation, with identities we do not identify with is critical to us to overcome the existential resentment we feel towards those with whom we disagree. Lack of switch-side facilitates a refusal to accept that our position is within question**

**Glover 10**

[Robert, Professor of Political Science at University of Connecticut, Philosophy and Social Criticism, “Games without Frontiers?: Democratic Engagement, Agonistic Pluralism, and the Question of Exclusion”, Vol. 36, p. asp uwyo//amp]

In this vein, **Connolly sees the goal of political engagement as securing a positive ‘ethosof engagement’ in relation to popular movements which alter existing assumption**s, that is, a **positive attitude towards attempts at pluralization. Connolly suggests we do so through** thecultivation of two essential virtues**: agonistic respect and critical responsiveness. 88 Agonisticrespect is defined as a situation whereby each political actor arrives at an appreciation for the factthat their own self-definition is bound with that of others, as well as recognition of the degree towhich each of these projections is profoundly contestable**. 89 While Connolly notes that **agonistic respect is a ‘kissing cousin’ of liberal tolerance, he distinguishes it by saying that the latter typically carries ‘the onus of being at the mercy of a putative majority that often construes itsown position to be beyond question**.’ 90 Thus, **agonistic respect is a reciprocal democratic virtue meant to operate across relations of difference, and Connolly deploys it as a regulative ideal forthe creation agonistic democratic spaces**. 91 In a somewhat related way, the virtue of ‘**critical responsiveness’** also attempts to move beyond liberal tolerance. 92 Critical responsiveness **entails ‘ careful listening and presumptive generosity to constituencies struggling to move from an obscure or degraded subsistence below the field of recognition**, justice, obligation, rights, or legitimacy to a place on one or more of those registers.’ 93 C**ritical responsiveness is not pity, charity, or paternalism but implies anenhanced degree of concern for others, driven by the cultivation of reciprocal empathic concern 21 for that which you are not. 94 This attitude cannot be developed in an abstract relation to thesenew and existing forms of** radical cultural, political, religious, and philosophical **difference.Critical responsiveness above all requires that one ‘get[s] a whiff of experiences heretofore aliento [us]’, recognizing that while this may be unsettling or cause discomfort, direct engagement isthe means by which you, ‘work tactically on yourself and others to overcome existential resentment of this persistent condition of human being.’**

# 1NR

### OV

#### Ow/s the aff- violence committed against Native people must be understood as qualitatively different than the marginalizations that occur to other minority groups- key to recognizing the colonialist privilege these groups seek to attain on stolen land

Sandy Grande. “American Indian Geographies of Power: At the Crossroads of Indigena and Mestizaje.” Harvard Educational Review, 70:4. Winter 2000.

In this article, Sandy Marie Anglas Grande outlines the tensions between American Indian epistemology and critical pedagogy. She asserts that the deep structures of critical pedagogy fail to consider an Indigenous perspective. In arguing that American Indian scholars should reshape and reimagine critical pedagogy, Grande also calls for critical theorists to reexamine their epistemological foundations. Looking through these two lenses of critical theory and Indigenous scholarship, Grande begins to redefine concepts of democracy, identity, and social justice. Until Indians resolve for themselves a comfortable modern identity that can be used to energize reservation institutions, radical changes will not be of much assistance. (Deloria & Lytle, 1984, p. 266) Our struggle at the moment is to continue to survive and work toward a time when we can replace the need for being preoccupied with survival with a more responsible and peaceful way of living within communities and with the everchanging landscape that will ever be our only home. (Warrior, 1995, p. 126) Broadly speaking, this article focuses on the intersection between dominant modes of critical pedagogy' and American Indian intellectualism.2 At present, critical theories are often indiscriminately employed to explain the sociopolitical conditions of all marginalized peoples. As a result, many Indigenous scholars view the current liberatory project as simply the latest in a long line of political endeavors that fails to consider American Indians as a unique populations Thus, while critical pedagogy may have propelled mainstream educational theory and practice along the path of social justice, I argue that it has muted and thus marginalized the distinctive concerns of American Indian intellectualism and education. As such, I argue further that the particular history of imperialism enacted upon Indigenous peoples requires a reevaluation of dominant views of democracy and social justice, and of the universal validity of such emancipatory projects - including critical pedagogy. It is not that critical pedagogy is irrelevant to Indigenous peoples, as they clearly experience oppression, but rather that the deep structures of the "pedagogy of oppression" fail to consider American Indians as a categorically different population, virtually incomparable to other minority groups. To assert this is not to advocate any kind of hierarchy of oppression but merely to call attention to the fundamental difference of what it means to be a sovereign and tribal people within the geopolitical confines of the United States.

#### The alternative sparks global decolonization movements that are critical to averting environmental collapse and extinction

Tinker ‘96

[George E. Tinker, Iliff School of Technology, 1996, Defending Mother Earth: Native American Perspectives on Environmental Justice, ed. Jace Weaver, p. 171-72//wyo-hdm]

My suggestion that we take the recognition of indigenous sovereignty as a priority is an overreaching one that involves more than simply justice for indigenous communities around the world. Indeed, such a political move will necessitate a rethinking of consumption patterns in the North, and a shift in the economics of the North will cause a concomitant shift also in the Two-thirds World of the South. The relatively simple act of recognizing the sovereignty of the Sioux Nation and returning to it all state-held lands in the Black Hills (for example, National Forest and National Park lands) would generate immediate international interest in the rights of the indigenous, tribal peoples in all state territories. In the United States alone it is estimated that Indian nations still have legitimate (moral and legal) claim to some two-thirds of the U.S. land mass. Ultimately, such an act as return of Native lands to Native control would have a significant ripple effect on other states around the world where indigenous peoples still have aboriginal land claims and suffer the ongoing results of conquest and displacement in their own territories. American Indian cultures and values have much to contribute in the comprehensive reimagining of the Western value system that has resulted in our contemporary ecojustice crisis. The main point that must be made is that there were and are cultures that take their natural environment seriously and attempt to live in balance with the created whole around them in ways that help them not overstep environmental limits. Unlike the West’s consistent experience of alienation from the natural world, these cultures of indigenous peoples consistently experienced themselves as part of the that created whole, in relationship with everything else in the world. They saw and continue to see themselves as having responsibilities, just as every other creature has a particular role to play in maintaining the balance of creation as an ongoing process. This is ultimately the spiritual rationale for annual ceremonies like the Sun Dance or Green Corn Dance. As another example, Lakota peoples planted cottonwoods and willows at their campsites as they broke camp to move on, thus beginning the process of reclaiming the land humans had necessarily trampled through habitation and encampment. We now know that indigenous rainforest peoples in what is today called the state of Brazil had a unique relationship to the forest in which they lived, moving away from a cleared area after farming it to a point of reduced return and allowing the clearing to be reclaimed as jungle. The group would then clear a new area and begin a new cycle of production. The whole process was relatively sophisticated and functioned in harmony with the jungle itself. So extensive was their movement that some scholars are now suggesting that there is actually very little of what might rightly be called virgin forest in what had been considered the “untamed” wilds of the rainforest. What I have described here is more than just a coincidence or, worse, some romanticized falsification of Native memory. Rather, I am insisting that there are peoples in the world who live with an acute and cultivated sense of their intimate participation in the natural world as part of an intricate whole. For indigenous peoples, this means that when they are presented with the concept of development, it is sense-less. Most significantly, one must realize that this awareness is the result of self-conscious effort on the part of the traditional American Indian national communities and is rooted in the first instance in the mythology and theology of the people. At its simplest, the worldview of American Indians can be expressed as Ward Churchill describes it: Human beings are free (indeed, encouraged) to develop their innate capabilities, but only in ways that do not infringe upon other elements – called “relations,” in the fullest dialectical sense of the word – of nature. Any activity going beyond this is considered as “imbalanced,” a transgression, and is strictly prohibited. For example, engineering was and is permissible, but only insofar as it does not permanently alter the earth itself. Similarly, agriculture was widespread, but only within norms that did not supplant natural vegetation. Like the varieties of species in the world, each culture has contributed to make for the sustainability of the whole. Given the reality of eco-devastation threatening all of life today, the survival of American Indian cultures and cultural values may make the difference for the survival and sustainability for all the earth as we know it. What I have suggested implicitly is that the American Indian peoples may have something of values – something corrective to Western values and the modern world system – to offer to the world. The loss of these gifts, the loss of the particularity of these peoples, today threatens the survivability of us all. What I am most passionately arguing is that we must commit to the struggle for the just and moral survival of Indian peoples as peoples of the earth, and that this struggle is for the sake of the earth and for the sustaining of all life. It is now imperative that we change the modern value of acquisitiveness and the political systems and economics that consumption has generated. The key to making this massive value shift in the world system may lie in the international recognition of indigenous political sovereignty and self-determination. Returning Native lands to the sovereign control of Native peoples around the world, beginning in the United States, is not simply just; the survival of all may depend on it.

#### Policy Debate is skewed towards Western ways of knowing—The idea that negs can “kick” arguments at any point in the debate is mired in an idea of neutral consensus building that crowds out an indigenization of the debate space

Walker 4 (Polly O, is of Cherokee and Anglo descent and holds a PhD in conflict transformation from the University of Queensland in Australia. “Decolonizing conflict resolution: addressing the ontological violence of westernization,” The American Indian Quarterly 28.3&4 (2004) 527-549//)

The atomistic conceptualizations on which these Western models are based also depict relationships as being separable from conflict processing. [End Page 535]Although problem-solving methods are considered to be more beneficial to relationships than the more adversarial court-based processes of adjudication and arbitration, reaching an agreement is prioritized over healing relationships. Furthermore, Western problem-solving approaches reflect a worldview based on "a man-over-nature conceptualisation of relations to nature," separating humans from the natural world (Galtung 1990, 319). As such, Western conflict resolution contrasts sharply with Indigenous approaches, which honor interconnections within the natural world, acknowledging animals, plants, and the animate natural world as an integral part of the process (Huber 1993; Bluehouse and Zion 1993, 332–33). The role of facilitator as an impartial, unbiased observer in Western problem-solving models also reflects an atomistic paradigm in which the participants are considered as discrete units rather than in relation to their interconnections. For example, the role of third-party facilitator is not that of a well-known and respected community leader as is the case in many Indigenous methods. In Western problem-solving models facilitators are selected based on beliefs about their ability to separate themselves from the conflict. Facilitators are expected to stand apart from the conflict, and facilitators with little knowledge about the conflict are generally considered to be more desirable than ones with extensive knowledge of the conflict (Burton 1996, 60–61).

#### That’s especially true in college debate

Spanos 4 (William, Prof of English @ Binghamton U, in Joe Millers’ Book Cross-ex, pg. 467)

Dear Joe Miller, Yes, the statement about the American debate circuit you refer to was made by me, though some years ago. I strongly believed then –and still do, even though a certain uneasiness about “objectivity” has crept into the “philosophy of debate” — that debate in both the high schools and colleges in this country is assumed to take place nowhere, even though the issues that are debated are profoundly historical, which means that positions are always represented from the perspective of power, and a matter of life and death. I find it grotesque that in the debate world, it doesn’t matter which position you take on an issue — say, the United States’ unilateral wars of preemption — as long as you “score points”. The world we live in is a world entirely dominated by an “exceptionalist” America which has perennially claimed that it has been chosen by God or History to fulfill his/its “errand in the wilderness.” That claim is powerful because American economic and military power lies behind it. And any alternative position in such a world is virtually powerless. Given this inexorable historical reality, to assume, as the protocols of debate do, that all positions are equal is to efface the imbalances of power that are the fundamental condition of history and to annul the Moral authority inhering in the position of the oppressed. This is why I have said that the appropriation of my interested work on education and empire to this transcendental debate world constitute a travesty of my intentions. My scholarship is not “disinterested.” It is militant and intended to ameliorate as much as possible the pain and suffering of those who have been oppressed by the “democratic” institutions that have power precisely by way of showing that their language if “truth,” far from being “disinterested” or “objective” as it is always claimed, is informed by the will to power over all manner of “others.” This is also why I told my interlocutor that he and those in the debate world who felt like him should call into question the traditional “objective” debate protocols and the instrumentalist language they privilege in favor of a concept of debate and of language in which life and death mattered. I am very much aware that the arrogant neocons who now saturate the government of the Bush administration — judges, pentagon planners, state department officials, etc. learned their “disinterested” argumentative skills in the high school and college debate societies and that, accordingly, they have become masters at disarming the just causes of the oppressed. This kind leadership will reproduce itself (along with the invisible oppression it perpetrates) as long as the training ground and the debate protocols from which it emerges remains in tact. A revolution in the debate world must occur. It must force that unworldly world down into the historical arena where positions make a difference. To invoke the late Edward Said, only such a revolution will be capable of “deterring democracy” (in Noam Chomsky’s ironic phrase), of instigating the secular critical consciousness that is, in my mind, the sine qua non for avoiding the immanent global disaster towards which the blind arrogance of Bush Administration and his neocon policy makers is leading.

### Link

#### Second, Deconstruction erases the objective truth of sovereignty and Native histories – perm can’t solve because it denies the possibility of objective truth in the name of radical sexual politics, thereby erasing the facticity of the genocide of the Native American

Gorelova, 2009 (Olena, “Postmodernism, native American literature, and Issues of sovereignty.” http://etd.lib.montana.edu/etd/2009/gorelova/GorelovaO0509.pdf, online, MB)

Postmodernism is all about bringing margins into the play and rejecting grand narratives. Michael Dear and Gregg Wassmansdorf point out in *Postmodern Consequences* that postmodernists learn to contextualize and reject meta-theories in favor of undecidability and microexplanations and renounce the universal truth. Nevertheless, Craig Womack’s statement that there is Native American truth and it is worth looking for (Womack 4) seems to be more convincing, especially in terms of quest for sovereignty and re-establishment of Native histories and their validity. It is way too premature for Native scholars to deconstruct history when we haven’t yet constructed it. We need, for example, to recover the nineteenth century, especially in terms of understanding what Native writers were up to during that time and how their struggles have evolved toward what Indian writers can say in print today, as well as foundational principles they provide for an indigenous criticism. (Womack 3) Deconstructing history and identity would negate the whole purpose of American Indian literature, which, by many scholars, is identified as a support of sovereignty. Postmodernism deconstructs identity and gets rid of Native American points of view, thus putting Native perspective as well as Native narrative and story out of existence. Womack points out that postmodernism has a “tendency to decenter everything, including the legitimacy of a Native perspective” (Womack 6). Therefore, on the one hand, it undermines the ideology of the dominant mainstream society by ridding it of the notion of “alien other” and introducing it into the positive world of differences. On the other hand, the loss of center leads to the loss of meaning and history, therefore devaluing Native perspective as well as five hundred years of colonization that is still ongoing.

#### Sixth, feminism, even when diversified, sustains colonialism and white supremacy

Grande 4 (Sandy, Associate Professor of Education at Connecticut College, Ph.D., “Red Pedagogy”, pg. 124-126)

I feel compelled to begin by stating: I am not a feminist. Rather, I am indigena}¶ While, like other indigenous women, I recognize the invaluable contributions¶ that feminists have made to both critical theory and praxis in education,¶ I also believe the well-documented failure of whitestream feminists to¶ engage race and acknowledge the complicity of white women in the history¶ of domination positions it alongside other colonialist discourses. Indeed the¶ colonialist project could not have flourished without the active participation¶ of white women; therefore, as Annette M. Jaimes notes (1992, 311-344),¶ some American Indian women continue to hold white women in disdain as¶ they are first and foremost perceived as constituents of the same white¶ supremacy and colonialism that oppresses all Indians. Thus, in contrast to¶ dominant modes of feminist critique that locate women's oppression in the¶ structures of patriarchy, this analysis is premised on the understanding that¶ the collective oppression of indigenous women is primarily an effect of¶ colonialism—a multidimensional force underwritten by Western Christianity,¶ defined by white supremacy, and fueled by global capitalism.¶ To begin, it is necessary to map the complex and contradictory terrain of¶ both feminist theory and indigenous women. Just as the political space of¶ feminism is multifarious, so is the sociocultural space occupied by women¶ who identify as "American Indian." As Devon Mihesuah (1998) notes, American¶ Indian women differ in everything from blood-quantum to skin color,¶ and from religious affiliation to "opinions about what it means to be Indian."¶ Interfaced with such diversity, however, Indian women share commonalities¶ that extend beyond their gender—most significantly, the struggles against¶ genocide, cultural imperialism, and assimilation.¶ While these common experiences do not constitute a shared American Indian¶ history or contemporary reality, nor does the heterogeneity of experience¶ preclude the power and existence of grand narratives (e.g., colonization, capitalism,¶ the Enlightenment). Critical scholar Henry Giroux (1997) maintains¶ that "grand narratives" interface with the heterogeneity of experience, providing¶ for the historical and relational placement of different groups within¶ some "common project." In other words, while indigenous women may indeed¶ differ in everything "from blood-quantum to skin color," their shared experience¶ as "conquered peoples" historically and relationally places them¶ within the "common project" of colonization (Mihesuah 1998, 38). Furthermore,¶ it is this placement that connects the lives and experiences of indigenous¶ women (the colonized) to each other while it distinguishes them from¶ white women (the colonizers).¶ Generally speaking, such "binaries" (colonizer/colonized) are anathema to¶ "mainstream" feminism, dismissed as everything from essentialist and universalizing¶ to masculinist and coercive (Lather 1998). Insofar as this dismissal erases their lived experience, indigenous women view it as a rhetorical¶ device that not only relativizes difference but also conveniently allows¶ white women to deny their complicity in the colonialist project. Indeed,¶ "mainstream" feminists have been widely critiqued for failing to acknowledge¶ their privilege and the historical significance of racial and class differences¶ among women. Women of color, in particular, have taken issue with¶ their presumptions of a universal "sisterhood" and unproblematized patriarchy.¶ On this point, bell hooks (1989, 19-20) is worth quoting at length:¶ Ideologically, thinking in this direction enables Western women, especially privileged¶ white women, to suggest that racism and class exploitation are merely an¶ offspring of the parent system: patriarchy. Within the feminist movement in the¶ West, this has led to the assumption of resisting patriarchal domination as a¶ more legitimate feminist action than resisting racism and other forms of domination.¶ Such thinking prevails despite radical critiques made by black women¶ and women of color who question this proposition. To speculate that an oppositional¶ division between men and women existed in early human communities is¶ to impose on the past, on these non-white groups, a worldview that fits all too¶ neatly within contemporary feminist paradigms that name man as the enemy and¶ woman as the victim.¶ hooks's critique resonates deeply for indigenous women who continue to assert¶ the historical-material "difference" of their experiences. Indeed, this¶ analysis joins the voices of indigenous with African-American and other "labeled¶ women" working to create awareness of the interlocking systems of¶ domination, particularly those forces that have empowered white women "to¶ act as exploiters and oppressors" (hooks 1989, 603).¶ The historical divide between white and subaltern women suggests that¶ what has long passed as "mainstream" feminism is actually whitestream¶ feminism,2 that is, a feminist discourse that is not only dominated by white¶ women but also principally structured on the basis of white, middle-class¶ experience, serving their ethnopolitical interests and capital investments.¶ Currently, however, the critique of feminism as a whitestream discourse is¶ viewed as "passe," a "well-rehearsed argument" that no longer holds validity.¶ 3 While women of color and other marginalized women have long critiqued¶ the racist underpinnings of whitestream feminism, I am not convinced¶ that the discourse has fundamentally changed. Thus, on some level,¶ this analysis serves as a test of my own doubts about this supposed transformation.¶ There is no mistaking that the contemporary terrain of feminism is broadly¶ diverse." Even a cursory examination of the field reveals a multiplicity of contemporary¶ feminisms: liberal, postmodern, post-structural, Marxist, critical race, socialist, lesbian, womanist, and transnational feminisms. Upon closer examination,¶ however, it becomes apparent that there is little if any intersection¶ among these feminisms. In other words, women of color tend be the ones writing¶ about race and feminism, lesbi-bi-transgendered women about sexuality¶ and feminism, working-class women about class and feminism, and middleclass¶ heterosexual women about a depoliticized feminism. Thus, it isn't that the¶ feminist discourse has intrinsically diversified, but rather has simply evolved to¶ be more pluralistic, "inviting" different voices at the same time the existing¶ axes of power are retained. More pointedly, contemporary feminism is a ghettoized¶ terrain, marked by an uneven playing field wherein whitestream feminists¶ commandeer "the center," and subaltern women, the margins. This reality¶ calls into question the self-proclaimed death of whitestream feminism,¶ (re)inviting examinations of the field from a variety of perspectives.

#### We outweigh their discourse claims- colonialist discourse is the main cause of imperialist aggression resulting in violence and terrorism on those who have been colonized and those who are the colonizers

Rouwane ‘01

[M’barek, Hassan II University, Ain Chok, Casablanca, Morocco, “Colonialist Discourse: "Postcolonial" Violent Realities and Practices” 5.7.2001. <http://www.postcolonialweb.org/poldiscourse/casablanca/rouwane1.html>//wyo-hdm]

Colonialist discourse (in the colonial as well as the so-called postcolonial situation), as it is disseminated in many European modes of thought and knowledge about the Other, has been functioning within intricate, violent structures and acts of domination, whose psychological effects-the negative aspects of so-called hybridity- such as shocks, traumas, and scars are left in and felt by today's (ex)colonisers and (ex)colonised. There are ample instances and examples of this kind of violent contact. The problem has been and is still being made more complex with the continuing perpetuation of imperialist aggression, which is justified by a more complex ideological system of what I call imperialist culture, rather than cultural imperialism. The ideological role of imperialist culture has been the lumping together of the Other's different ways of life with underdevelopment, violence, and terrorism, just as in the past non-European modes of life and violent barbarism were lumped together. As long as the Other is still denied the right to belong to the same time, as long as there is a denial of coevaleness, as Fabian terms it, of the Other, domination will [continue](http://www.postcolonialweb.org/poldiscourse/casablanca/rouwane1.html) and will always find alibis and subterfuges. As long as the relationship between the powerful (ex)colonisers and the powerless (ex)colonised is maintained through the perpetuation of all structures and forms of inequality: economic, technological, political, military, etc., the debate on colonialism with all its posts will continue and the dismantling process of colonialist discourse, which is based on two psychological elements: the superiority complex and the inferiority complex will take longer time, more violence and counter-violence to eradicate, erase, and eventually obliterate from memory.

### AT: Perm

#### Third, There is no permutation- Women are constructed as subjects of life within the biopolitical regime of colonialism whereas Natives are subjects of death- this understanding conditioned and informs politics, we are the only prerequisite

Smith 10 (Andrea “Queer Theory and Native Studies: The Heteronormativity of Settler Colonialism” GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies, Volume 16, Number 1-2, 2010, pp. 42-68 (Article) //)

Thus normative futurity depends on an “origin story.” The future is legitimated as a continuation of the past. Here I am reminded of how I have often heard Native activists say, “Let us not work on domestic or other forms of gender violence now, we must work on survival issues ﬁrst.”25 Of course, since Native women are the women most likely to be killed by acts of gender violence in the United States, they are clearly not surviving. The many works on Native women and feminism that say that we are “American Indian women in that order,” that position gender justice as something to be addressed after decolonization, all speak to how this politics of futurity sacriﬁces the lives of women and those who are not gender nor-mative for the indeﬁnitely postponed postcolonial future. As Denetdale notes, the Native nationhood that becomes articulated under this strategy of futurity is one that supports heteropatriarchy, U.S. imperialism, antiblack racism, and capital- ism. As Edelman states: “Political programs are programmed to reify difference and thus to secure in the form of the future, the order of the same.”26 Edelman calls us to queer “social organization as such” to show how our efforts to secure a better future for our children lead us to excuse injustice in the present.27 At the same time, however, this subjectless critique has its limits with regard to decolonization. For instance, Edelman’s analysis lapses into a vulgar construc- tionism by creating a fantasy that there can actually be a politics without a political program that does not always reinstantiate what it deconstructs, that does not always also in some way reafﬁrm the order of the same. Edelman’s “anti-oppositional” politics in the context of multinational capitalism and empire ensures the continu- ation of that status quo by disabling collective struggle designed to dismantle these systems. That is, it seems difﬁcult to dismantle multinational capitalism, settler colonialism, white supremacy, and heteropatriarchy without some kind of politi- cal program, however provisional it may be. Here, Native studies can temper this subjectless critique by engaging queer of color critique in particular. José Esteban Muñoz notes, for example, that an anti-oppositional politic ultimately opts out of relationality and politics. “Relationality is not pretty, but the option of simply opting out of it . . . is imaginable only if one can frame queerness as a singular abstraction that can be subtracted and isolated from a larger social matrix.”28 Furthermore, an anti-oppositional politic can quickly lapse into a leftist cynicism, in which all politics are dismissed as “reproductive” with no disruptive potential. This cynicism then becomes an apology for maintaining the status quo. As Muñoz argues: “The here and now is simply not enough. Queerness should and could be about a desire for another way of being in both the world and time, a desire that resists mandates to accept that which is not enough.”29 A politics of “opting out” clearly privileges those who are relatively more comfortable under the current situation. For indigenous peoples, however, who face genocide, as well as all peoples subjected to conditions of starvation, violence, and war, opting out is simply not an option. The question then arises, who will be left when we opt out of a struggle against white supremacy, settler colonialism, and capitalism? Those most imme- diately sacriﬁced in this “anti-oppositional” politic are indigenous peoples, poor peoples, and all those whose lives are under immediate attack. Thus, while Edel- man contends that the Child can be analytically separated from actual children, Muñoz demonstrates that Edelman’s Child is nonetheless a disavowed white Child. “The future is the stuff of some kids. Racialized kids, queer kids, are not the sovereign princes of futurity. [Edelman’s] framing nonetheless accepts and repro- duces this monolithic future of the child that is indeed always already white.”30 An indigenous critique must question the value of “no future” in the con-text of genocide, where Native peoples have already been determined by settler colonialism to have no future. If the goal of queerness is to challenge the repro- duction of the social order, then the Native child may already be queered. For instance, Colonel John Chivington, the leader of the famous massacre at Sand Creek, charged his followers to not only kill Native adults but to mutilate their reproductive organs and to kill their children because “nits make lice.”31 In this context, the Native Child is not the guarantor of the reproductive future of white supremacy; it is the nit that undoes it. In addition, while both “tradition” and “the future” must be critically engaged, it does not follow that they can be dismissed. As with identity, the notion of a tradition-free subject simply reinstantiates the notion of a liberal subject who is free from past encumbrances. As Elizabeth Povinelli’s work suggests, the liberal subject articulates itself as an autological subject that is completely self- determining over and against the “genealogical” subject (i.e., the indigenous sub- ject) trapped within tradition, determined by the past and the future.32 Essentially then, this call for “no future” relies on a primitivizing discourse that positions the [white] queer subject in relation to a premodern subject who is locked in history. The “Native” serves as the origin story that generates the autonomous present for the white queer subject.

#### Fifth, the permutation is the colonialist status quo, stripping the alternative of its intellectualism and adding the native identity as just another marginalized voice

Sandy Grande. “American Indian Geographies of Power: At the Crossroads of Indigena and Mestizaje.” Harvard Educational Review, 70:4. Winter 2000.

Corporate Commodification

The forces of both ethnic fraud and cultural encroachment operate to create a climate ripe for the corporate commodification of American Indianness. While this commodification takes many forms, it is perhaps most visible in the marketing of Indian narratives, particularly publishing, in which literary/cultural forms of Indian intellectualism have been historically favored over critical forms. For instance, Indigenous scholar Elizabeth Cook-Lynn (1998) questions why the same editors and agents who solicit her "life story" also routinely reject her scholarly work. She writes, "While I may have a reasonable understanding why a state-run university press would not want to publish research that has little good to say about America's relationship to tribes.... I am at a loss to explain why anyone would be more interested in my life story (which for one thing is quite unremarkable)" (p. 121). The explanation, of course, is that the marketable narrative is that which subscribes to the Whitestream notion of Indian as romantic figure, and not Indian as scholar and social critic. Such a predisposition works to favor not only cultural/literary forms of American Indian intellectualism over critical forms, but also the work of "fraudulent" Indians over that of "legitimate" American Indian scholars. Cook-Lynn (1998) argues that, just as the rights to our land remain in the hands of the Whitestream government, the rights to our stories remain in non-Indian enclaves. Deloria (1998) similarly contends that what passes in the academic world as legitimate scholarship on American Indians is often the product of average scholars (often White) advocating a predetermined anti-Indian agenda2 and "fraudulent" Indians. That such work has been allowed to corner the market raises the question of who controls access to the intellectual property of American Indian peoples. Deloria himself asks, "Who is it that has made such people as Adolph Hungry Wolf, Jamake Highwater, Joseph Epes Brown, Su Bear, Rolling Thunder, Wallace Black Elk, John Redtail Freesoul, Lynn Andrews, and Dhyani Ywahoo the spokespeople of American Indians?" (p. 79). He responds by naming Whitestream America as both patron and peddler of the Hollywood Indian. He writes, "They [the fraudulent Indians] represent the intense desire of Whites to create in their own minds an Indian they want to believe in" (p. 79). As such, the market is flooded with tragic stories of lost cultures, intimate narratives of "frontier life," and quasi-historic accounts of the Native Americans' plight. Such stories are told and retold as part of America's dark and distant past, a bygone era of misguided faith where cultural genocide is depicted as an egregious but perhaps unavoidable consequence of the country's manifest destiny toward democracy. While I would never argue that stories depicting the truth of Native peoples' tragic experiences (e.g., Indian boarding schools, the Trail of Tears) do not deserve a central place in the telling of American history, such accounts become problematic in the wider context of Whitestream consumption of Indian history. Why are these stories the ones most often presented as the prime-time programs in the commodified literary network of Indian history? What is gained by focusing on these particular aspects of White domination and Indian subjugation? I argue that such stories serve several purposes, none of which contributes to the emancipatory project of American Indians. First, by propagating the romantic image of American Indians and concomitantly marginalizing the work of Indigenous intellectuals and social critics, Whitestream publishers maintain control over the epistemic frames that define Indians, and thus over the fund of available knowledge on American Indians. Second, such control is underwritten by the understanding that American Indian intellectualism exists as a threat to the myth of the everevolving democratization of Indian-White relations, and to the notion that cultural genocide is a remnant of America's dark and distant past. Third, the often oversimplified accounts of Indian history, framed in good-v.-badguy terms, allow the consumer to fault rogue groups of dogmatic missionaries and wayward military officers for the slow but steady erosion of Indigenous life, thereby distancing themselves and mainstream government from the ongoing project of cultural genocide. Finally, the focus on Indian history allows the Whitestream to avoid issues facing American Indians in the twenty-first century. As a result, Indians as a modern people remain invisible, allowing a wide array of distorted myths to flourish as contemporary reality - for example, that all the "real" Indians are extinct, that the surviving Indians are all alcoholic-drug addicts who have forsaken traditional ways to become budding capitalists, gaming entrepreneurs, and casino owners - and find their way into public discourse. At the same time these images are circulated, the intensive, ongoing court battles over land, natural resources, and federal recognition are ignored, fueling the great lie of twenty-first century democracy - that America's "Indian problem" has long been solved. Discussion. The forces of identity appropriation, cultural encroachment, and corporate commodification pressure American Indian communities to employ essentialist tactics and construct relatively fixed notions of identity, and to render the concepts of fluidity and transgression highly problematic. It is evident from the examples above that the notion of fluid boundaries has never worked to the advantage of Indigenous peoples: federal agencies have invoked the language of fluid or unstable identities as the rationale for dismantling the structures of tribal life and creating greater dependency on the U.S. government; Whitestream America has seized its message to declare open season on Indians, thereby appropriating Native lands, culture, spiritual practices, history, and literature; and Whitestream academics have now employed the language of postmodern fluidity to unwittingly transmute centuries of war between Indigenous peoples and their respective nation-states into a "genetic and cultural dialogue" (Valle & Torres, 1995, p. 141). Thus, in spite of its aspirations to social justice, the notion of a new cultural democracy based on the ideal of mestizaje represents a rather ominous threat to American Indian communities.

1. ### “Resolved” implies a policy or legislative decision

   Jeff Parcher, former debate coach at Georgetown, Feb 2001 http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html

   Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constiutent parts See Syns at \*analyze\* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at \*Solve\* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Firmness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision. (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statement of a decision, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconceivable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desirablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the preliminary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my view. One affirms a resolution. Affirmative and negative are the equivalents of 'yes' or 'no' - which, of course, are answers to a question.

   And Should denotes an expectation of enacting a plan  
   American Heritage Dictionary 2000 (Dictionary.com)  
   should. The will to do something or have something take place: I shall go out if I feel like it [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Federal government is the central government in Washington DC  
   Encarta Online 2005,   
     
   United States (Government), the combination of federal, state, and local laws, bodies, and agencies that is responsible for carrying out the operations of the United States. The federal government of the United

   States is centered in Washington, D.C. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)