# 1NC

### First

#### A. OUR INTERPRETATION: THE AFFIRMATIVE SHOULD PRESENT A TOPICAL PLAN OF ACTION AND DEFEND THAT THEIR POLICY SHOULD BE ADOPTED BY THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

#### B. DEFINITIONS:

#### 1. THE TOPIC IS DEFINED BY THE PHRASE FOLLOWING THE COLON – THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS THE AGENT OF THE RESOLUTION, NOT THE INDIVIDUAL DEBATERS

Webster’s 2K

Guide to Grammar and Writing 2K; <http://ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/marks/colon.htm>

Use of a colon before a list or an explanation that is preceded by a clause that can stand by itself. Think of the colon as a gate, inviting one to go on… If the introductory phrase preceding the colon is very brief and the clause following the colon represents the real business of the sentence, begin the clause after the colon with a capital letter.

#### 2. “RESOLVED” EXPRESSES INTENT TO IMPLEMENT THE PLAN

American Heritage Dictionary 2K

[www.dictionary.com/cgi-bin/dict.pl?term=resolved](http://www.dictionary.com/cgi-bin/dict.pl?term=resolved)

To find a solution to; solve …

To bring to a usually successful conclusion

#### 3. “SHOULD” DENOTES AN EXPECTATION OF ENACTING A PLAN

American Heritage Dictionary – 2K

[www.dictionary.com]

3 Used to express probability or expectation

#### 4. THE U.S.F.G. is three branches of government

Encarta 2K

Microsoft Encarta Online Encyclopedia 2K [http://encarta.msn.com]

Supreme Court of the United States, highest court in the United States and the chief authority in the judicial branch, one of three branches of the United States federal government.

#### 5. OUR DEFINITION EXCLUDES ACTION BY SMALLER POLITICAL GROUPS OR INDIVIDUALS.

Black’s Law 99

Black’s Law Dictionary Seventh Edition Ed. Bryan A. Garner (chief) ‘99

Federal government 1. A national government that exercises some degree of control over smaller political units that have surrendered some degree of power in exchange for the right to participate in national political matters.

#### C. VIOLATION – THE AFFIRMATIVE IS NOT AN INSTRUMENTAL AFFIRMATION OF THE RESOLUTION –

#### D. REASONS TO PREFER –

#### PREDICTABILITY: the resolution sets the limits for the debate. Affirmatives would always win if there wasn’t predictable negative ground.

#### Constraints are more conducive to creative thinking—following the rules is key to innovation

Gibbert et al. 07

(Michael Gibbert, Assistant Professor of Management at Bocconi University (Italy), et al., with Martin Hoeglis, Professor of Leadership and Human Resource Management at WHU—Otto Beisheim School of Management (Germany), and Lifsa Valikangas, Professor of Innovation Management at the Helsinki School of Economics (Finland) and Director of the Woodside Institute, 2007 (“In Praise of Resource Constraints,” MIT Sloan Management Review, Spring, https://umdrive.memphis.edu/gdeitz/public/The%20Moneyball%20Hypothesis/Gibbert%20et%20al.%20-%20SMR%20(2007)%20Praise%20Resource%20Constraints.pdf, Accessed 04-08-2012, p. 15-16//wyoccd)

Resource constraints can also fuel innovative team performance directly. In the spirit of the proverb "necessity is the mother of invention," [end page 15] teams may produce better results because of resource constraints. Cognitive psychology provides experimental support for the "less is more" hypothesis. For example, scholars in creative cognition find in laboratory tests that subjects are most innovative when given fewer rather than more resources for solving a problem.¶ The reason seems to be that the human mind is most productive when restricted. Limited—or better focused—by specific rules and constraints, we are more likely to recognize an unexpected idea. Suppose, for example, that we need to put dinner on the table for unexpected guests arriving later that day. The main constraints here are the ingredients available and how much time is left. One way to solve this problem is to think of a familiar recipe and then head off to the supermarket for the extra ingredients. Alternatively, we may start by looking in the refrigerator and cupboard to see what is already there, then allowing ourselves to devise innovative ways of combining subsets of these ingredients. Many cooks attest that the latter option, while riskier, often leads to more creative and better appreciated dinners. In fact, it is the option invariably preferred by professional chefs.¶ The heightened innovativeness of such "constraints-driven" solutions comes from team members' tendencies, under the circumstances, to look for alternatives beyond "how things are normally done," write C. Page Moreau and Darren W. Dahl in a 2005 Journal of Consumer Research article. Would-be innovators facing constraints are more likely to find creative analogies and combinations that would otherwise be hidden under a glut of resources.

#### Bounded knowledge is good – debate should be maintained as a disciplinary space- key to unlocking critically pedagogies potential for social justice

McArthur 10

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Holyrood Road, Edinburgh EH8 8AQ, UK Studies in Higher Education Vol. 35, No. 3, May 2010 ebsco DA: 5-24-13//wyoccd)

Giroux’s critical pedagogy rests upon a commitment to public spaces for learning, where diverse forms of knowledge can be exchanged and developed; where students and teachers engage critically with those knowledges, and with one another; and through which genuine democratic ideals can be pursued. Disciplines are regarded as antithetical to these aims, because they are considered closed, elitist and to perpetuate conservative forms of relationships and types of knowledge. Thus, critical pedagogy seeks, instead, to escape disciplinary boundaries and build interdisciplinary spaces in which such public and political realms can exist and prosper. Looking anew at disciplines I suggest that there is an alternative view of disciplines to that outlined above. In this view disciplines are complex, contested and permeable spaces. I further propose that, if critical pedagogues such as Giroux can, in Proust’s term, look with new eyes at disciplines, they will hopefully see dynamic and safe structures that could provide real and robust allies in the fight to protect higher education from narrow, largely economic, interpretations of its role, and instead promote higher education as a democratic space which supports greater social justice. In this section I seek to encourage this new look at disciplines by first outlining my conception of them as complex, contested and permeable structures, in contrast to Giroux’s perspective of disciplines as static, elitist and limiting. Secondly, I argue that interdisciplinarity and disciplinarity should be thought of as complementary spaces, rather than alternatives. Finally, I discuss how the act of looking anew at disciplines may help critical pedagogy strengthen its own theoretical and practical stances. If critical pedagogy is to challenge narrow commercial and commodified conceptualisations of higher education, it needs to refocus on its commitment to action, rather than pure theory, and looking anew at disciplines as potential allies may be a first step in doing this. Disciplines: complex, contested and permeable I am not arguing that disciplines have not at various times acted conservatively or have not valued stasis over change. Certainly, at different times, disciplinary structures have proven effective homes for forces resistant to change – both epistemologically and politically. Many of us can no doubt relate to the description of ‘the food-fights that go on within disciplines’, and ‘the most absurd yet intense and devastating attempts to expel from the center and marginalize people whose perspectives are different’ (Bérubé and Nelson 1995, 192). My argument, instead, is that these examples or snapshots of experience do not tell the whole story about the dynamic nature of disciplinarity. Those who take a long-term historical view of the development of disciplines, such as the authors of the essays within Anderson and Valente’s (2002) volume on Disciplinarity at the fin de siècle, reveal the degree of change, debate and contestation – of evolution, fracturing and succession – within such disciplinary structures. Thus, the editors state: ‘what has often been lacking in our current disciplinary debates is a longer perspective that would enable us to understand better their historical conditions and developments’ (1). Taking this long view is, I suggest, essential to looking anew at disciplines. It is also rather paradoxical that critical pedagogues accuse disciplines of privileging certain forms of knowledge; critical pedagogy does this too. Such privileging is indeed, surely part of the inherently political nature of pedagogy? What is crucial are the choices made between different forms of knowledge, the awareness of such choices, and the motivations for and outcomes of these choices. If Giroux’s critical pedagogy could take a sufficiently long-term view of the development of disciplines, this would afford a better understanding of their intrinsically dynamic nature. Without this long view, there is the danger of falling into the trap of what Plotnitsky (2002, 75) describes as ‘extreme epistemological conservatism’ in one’s analysis of disciplines. In his illuminating account of the development of quantum physics, Plotnitsky explores the link between disciplinarity and radicality. He argues that non-classical epistemology, ways of knowing that differ from that upon which the discipline has previously been based, form part of the ongoing development of a discipline such as physics. Indeed, ‘Radicality becomes the condition of disciplinarity rather than, as it may appear at first sight and as it is often argued by the proponents of classical theories, being in conflict with it’ (2002, 49). In contrast, Giroux appears to suggest that only in interdisciplinary fields such as cultural studies can non-classical or alternative forms of knowledge be brought together with more traditional epistemologies (Aronowitz and Giroux 1991; Giroux 1992). Giroux’s position is based upon his strong association of disciplines with canonical forms of knowledge and a rigid adherence to textual authority. The alternative is to see disciplines as Davidson (2004) does; as spaces with boundaries that are ‘flexible, culturally determined, interdependent and relative to time’ (302). Parker’s (2002) concept of ‘new disciplinarity’, encompassing a distinction between subjects and disciplines, helps illuminate the emancipatory potential of disciplinary spaces. She describes subjects as groupings which ‘can be reduced to common transferable and equivalent subject-specific skills’ (375), with an emphasis on ‘the end product, and skills and competencies’ that aggregate over set periods (375). It is true that subjects are inclusive, in the sense that nearly anyone can take part in studying them, but, as Parker argues, they are also passive – ‘they are taught, learned, delivered’ (374). In contrast, Parker views a discipline as something that is ‘practiced and engaged with’ (375). Disciplines are ongoing, evolving communities. Subjects permit only transmissive or bankable knowledge, while disciplines allow for transgressive and creative approaches. Disciplines offer spaces for students and teachers to interact critically. Disciplines can encompass diverse and shifting knowledge communities. Giroux’s fear that disciplines impose particular forms of knowledge, discourse and learning on students is not without foundation. However, I argue it is based on examples of poor practice, rather than anything inherent to the nature of academic disciplines. Disciplines are, and should be, sites of contestation and challenge; of competing and conflicting ‘takes’ on knowledge. What disciplines have internally in common is a shared discourse in which to undertake such conflict, and to do so with rigour. In her discussion of attitudes to disciplinarity among French academics, Donahue (2004) observes that: ‘They accounted for its contestatory nature, describing their own research groups as negotiated, arguing back-and-forth, and suggesting that this contested nature is part of what students must learn to navigate’ (68).

#### SWITCH-SIDE DEBATE SOLVES: topics are meaningless if we don’t debate both sides: topic-specific education outweighs general education.

#### Switch-side debate good—direct engagement with identities we don’t identify with is critical to overcome the existential resentment we feel towards the Other

Glover 10

[Robert, Professor of Political Science at University of Connecticut, Philosophy and Social Criticism, “Games without Frontiers?: Democratic Engagement, Agonistic Pluralism, and the Question of Exclusion”, Vol. 36, p. asp uwyo//amp]

In this vein, Connolly sees the goal of political engagement as securing a positive ‘ethos of engagement’ in relation to popular movements which alter existing assumptions, that is, a positive attitude towards attempts at pluralization. Connolly suggests we do so through thecultivation of two essential virtues: agonistic respect and critical responsiveness. 88 Agonistic respect is defined as a situation whereby each political actor arrives at an appreciation for the fact that their own self-definition is bound with that of others, as well as recognition of the degree to which each of these projections is profoundly contestable. 89 While Connolly notes that agonistic respect is a ‘kissing cousin’ of liberal tolerance, he distinguishes it by saying that the latter typically carries ‘the onus of being at the mercy of a putative majority that often construes its own position to be beyond question.’ 90 Thus, agonistic respect is a reciprocal democratic virtue meant to operate across relations of difference, and Connolly deploys it as a regulative ideal for the creation agonistic democratic spaces. 91 In a somewhat related way, the virtue of ‘critical responsiveness’ also attempts to move beyond liberal tolerance. 92 Critical responsiveness entails ‘ careful listening and presumptive generosity to constituencies struggling to move from an obscure or degraded subsistence below the field of recognition, justice, obligation, rights, or legitimacy to a place on one or more of those registers.’ 93 Critical responsiveness is not pity, charity, or paternalism but implies an enhanced degree of concern for others, driven by the cultivation of reciprocal empathic concern 21 for that which you are not. 94 This attitude cannot be developed in an abstract relation to these new and existing forms of radical cultural, political, religious, and philosophical difference. Critical responsiveness above all requires that one ‘get[s] a whiff of experiences heretofore alien to [us]’, recognizing that while this may be unsettling or cause discomfort, direct engagement is the means by which you, ‘work tactically on yourself and others to overcome existential resentment of this persistent condition of human being.’

#### E. VOTING ISSUE FOR GROUND, COMPETITIVE EQUITY AND JURISDICTION.

#### THIS ARGUMENT PROVIDES A-PRIORI REASONS TO VOTE NEGATIVE. YOU MUST USE YOUR BALLOT TO RATIFY CONSTRAINTS ON DISCOURSE TO PRESERVE A POLITICALLY-ENABLING DISCUSSION

Shively 2K

Ruth Lessl Shively, Associate Professor, Political Science, Texas A&M University, POLITICAL THEORY AND PARTISAN POLITICS, 2K, p. 179.

To put this point another way, it turns out that to be open to all things is, in effect, to be open to nothing. While the ambiguists have commendable reasons for wanting to avoid closure—to avoid specify­ing what is not allowed or celebrated in their political vision—they need to say "no" to some things in order to be open to things in general. They need to say "no" to certain forms of contest, if only to protect contest in general. For if one is to be open to the principles of democracy, for example, one must be dogmatically closed to the prin­ciples of fascism. If one would embrace tolerance, one must rigidly reject intolerance. If one would support openness in political speech and action, one must ban the acts of political intimidation, violence or recrimination that squelch that openness. If one would expand delib­eration and disruption, one must set up strict legal protections around such activities. And if one would ensure that citizens have reason to engage in political contest—that it has practical meaning and import for them—one must establish and maintain the rules and regulations and laws that protect democracy. In short, openness requires certain clear limits, rules, closure. And to make matters more complex, these structures of openness cannot simply be put into place and forgotten. They need to be taught to new generations of citizens, to be retaught and reenforced among the old, and as the political world changes, to be shored up, rethought, adapted, and applied to new problems and new situations. It will not do, then, to simply assume that these structures are permanently viable and secure without significant work or justification on our part; nor will it do to talk about resisting or subverting them. Indeed, they are such valuable and yet vulnerable goods that they require the most unflag­ging and firm support that we can give them.

#### THE DELIBERATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF THEIR ADVOCACY ARE A PRIOR QUESTION – PRE-CONDITIONS OF AGREEMENT ARE NECESSARY FOR YOUR DECISION TO HAVE ANY POLITICAL VALUE

Gunderson 2K

Adolf G. Gundersen, Associate Professor, Political Science, Texas A&M University, POLITICAL THEORY AND PARTISAN POLITICS, 2K p. 104-105.

Indirect political engagement is perhaps the single most important element of the strategy I am recommending here. It is also the most emblematic, as it results from a fusion of confrontation and separa­tion. But what kind of political engagement might conceivably qualify as being both confrontational and separated from actual political deci­sion-making? There is only one type, so far as I can see, and that is deliberation. Political deliberation is by definition a form of engage­ment with the collectivity of which one is a member. This is all the more true when two or more citizens deliberate together. Yet delibera­tion is also a form of political action that precedes the actual taking and implementation of decisions. It is thus simultaneously connected and disconnected, confrontational and separate. It is, in other words, a form of indirect political engagement. This conclusion, namely, that we ought to call upon deliberation to counter partisanship and thus clear the way for deliberation, looks rather circular at first glance. And, semantically at least, it certainly is. Yet this ought not to concern us very much. Politics, after all, is not a matter of avoiding semantic inconveniences, but of doing the right thing and getting desirable results. In political theory, therefore, the real concern is always whether a circular argument translates into a self-defeating prescription. And here that is plainly not the case, for what I am suggesting is that deliberation can diminish partisanship, which will in turn contribute to conditions amenable to continued or extended deliberation. That "deliberation promotes deliberation" is surely a circular claim, but it is just as surely an accurate description of the real world of lived politics, as observers as far back as Thucydides have documented. It may well be that deliberation rests on certain preconditions. I am not arguing that there is no such thing as a deliberative "first cause." Indeed, it seems obvious to me both that deliberators require something to deliberate about and that deliberation presumes certain institutional structures and shared values. Clearly something must get the deliberative ball rolling and, to keep it rolling, the cultural terrain must be free of deep chasms and sinkholes. Nevertheless, however extensive and demanding deliberation's preconditions might be, we ought not to lose sight of the fact that, once begun, deliberation tends to be self-sustaining. Just as partisanship begets partisanship, deliberation begets deliberation. If that is so, the question of limiting par­tisanship and stimulating deliberation are to an important extent the same question.

### Second

#### First, the Will to power is a part of life, it makes violence and suffering inevitable, --we should embrace it, this is key to affirm the will to life

Nietzsche, 1886 (Friedrich, Philosopher with a hammer, “Beyond Good and Evil” The Nietzsche Channel, online, MB)

257. EVERY elevation of the type "man," has hitherto been the work of an aristocratic society and so it will always be--a society believing in a long scale of gradations of rank and differences of worth among human beings, and requiring slavery in some form or other. Without the PATHOS OF DISTANCE, such as grows out of the incarnated difference of classes, out of the constant out-looking and down-looking of the ruling caste on subordinates and instruments, and out of their equally constant practice of obeying and commanding, of keeping down and keeping at a distance--that other more mysterious pathos could never have arisen, the longing for an ever new widening of distance within the soul itself, the formation of ever higher, rarer, further, more extended, more comprehensive states, in short, just the elevation of the type "man," the continued "self-surmounting of man," to use a moral formula in a supermoral sense. (that is to say, of the preliminary condition for the elevation of the type "man"): the truth is hard. Let us acknowledge unprejudicedly how every higher civilization hitherto has ORIGINATED! Men with a still natural nature, barbarians in every terrible sense of the word, men of prey, still in possession of unbroken strength of will and desire for power, threw themselves upon weaker, more moral, more peaceful races (perhaps trading or cattle-rearing communities), or upon old mellow civilizations in which the final vital force was flickering out in brilliant fireworks of wit and depravity. At the commencement, the noble caste was always the barbarian caste: their superiority did not consist first of all in their physical, but in their psychical power--they were more COMPLETE men (which at every point also implies the same as "more complete beasts"). 258. Corruption--as the indication that anarchy threatens to break out among the instincts, and that the foundation of the emotions, called "life," is convulsed--is something radically different according to the organization in which it manifests itself. When, for instance, an aristocracy like that of France at the beginning of the Revolution, flung away its privileges with sublime disgust and sacrificed itself to an excess of its moral sentiments, it was corruption:--it was really only the closing act of the corruption which had existed for centuries, by virtue of which that aristocracy had abdicated step by step its lordly prerogatives and lowered itself to a FUNCTION of royalty (in the end even to its decoration and parade-dress). The essential thing, however, in a good and healthy aristocracy is that it should not regard itself as a function either of the kingship or the commonwealth, but as the SIGNIFICANCE and highest justification thereof--that it should therefore accept with a good conscience the sacrifice of a legion of individuals, who, FOR ITS SAKE, must be suppressed and reduced to imperfect men, to slaves and instruments. Its fundamental belief must be precisely that society is NOT allowed to exist for its own sake, but only as a foundation and scaffolding, by means of which a select class of beings may be able to elevate themselves to their higher duties, and in general to a higher EXISTENCE: like those sun- seeking climbing plants in Java--they are called Sipo Matador,-- which encircle an oak so long and so often with their arms, until at last, high above it, but supported by it, they can unfold their tops in the open light, and exhibit their happiness. 259. To refrain mutually from injury, from violence, from exploitation, and put one's will on a par with that of others: this may result in a certain rough sense in good conduct among individuals when the necessary conditions are given (namely, the actual similarity of the individuals in amount of force and degree of worth, and their co-relation within one organization). As soon, however, as one wished to take this principle more generally, and if possible even as the FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF SOCIETY, it would immediately disclose what it really is--namely, a Will to the DENIAL of life, a principle of dissolution and decay. Here one must think profoundly to the very basis and resist all sentimental weakness: life itself is ESSENTIALLY appropriation, injury, conquest of the strange and weak, suppression, severity, obtrusion of peculiar forms, incorporation, and at the least, putting it mildest, exploitation;--but why should one for ever use precisely these words on which for ages a disparaging purpose has been stamped? Even the organization within which, as was previously supposed, the individuals treat each other as equal--it takes place in every healthy aristocracy--must itself, if it be a living and not a dying organization, do all that towards other bodies, which the individuals within it refrain from doing to each other it will have to be the incarnated Will to Power, it will endeavour to grow, to gain ground, attract to itself and acquire ascendancy-- not owing to any morality or immorality, but because it LIVES, and because life IS precisely Will to Power. On no point, however, is the ordinary consciousness of Europeans more unwilling to be corrected than on this matter, people now rave everywhere, even under the guise of science, about coming conditions of society in which "the exploiting character" is to be absent--that sounds to my ears as if they promised to invent a mode of life which should refrain from all organic functions. "Exploitation" does not belong to a depraved, or imperfect and primitive society it belongs to the nature of the living being as a primary organic function, it is a consequence of the intrinsic Will to Power, which is precisely the Will to Life--Granting that as a theory this is a novelty--as a reality it is the FUNDAMENTAL FACT of all history let us be so far honest towards ourselves!

And, embracing the tension of being marginalized, the tension and suffering of marginalization are prerequisites to greatness

HIGGINS '06

(Kathleen Marie, professor of philosophy at UT-Austin, CRITICAL AFFINITIES: NIETZSCHE AND AFRICAN-AMERICAN THOUGHT, p. 67)

While this conflict itself may be unavoidable, Nietzsche urges the individual tormented in this way to resist the temptation to use this as a basis for self-flagellation. Zarathustra proclaims, "I say unto you: One must still have chaos in oneself to be able to give birth to a dancing star" (Z P 5). He cautions against too much caution, and he indicates that the solution to this inner tension is self-transformation along the lines that DuBois also suggests. But the worst enemy you can encounter will always be you, yourself; you lie in wait for yourself in caves and woods. Lonely, you are going the way to yourself. And your way leads past yourself and your seven devils. You must wish to consume yourself in your own flame: how could you wish to become new unless you had first become ashes! (Z: 1 "The Creator") Instead of viewing tension as a sign that one is doing something wrong, those suffering from marginalization and the inner strife that it occasions should reassess their situation, Nietzsche contends. As he comments in Beyond Good and Evil, "The great epochs of our life come when we gain the courage to rechristen our evil as what is best in us" (BGE 116). Instead of viewing oneself as deficient for not fitting in, one can view oneself as occupying a particularly valuable role. One might see oneself as a pioneer, an adventurer, or a legislator of new values. The last of these is particularly relevant to African Americans who seek a transformation of society's values. Seeing oneself in this manner, one is in a position to heal the self-doubt that typically arises in those who are exceptions to the communal norm. Nietzsche points out that the innovator is necessarily marginalized. Thus one's sense of being outside the mainstream, even of being cast outside it, may be an unavoidable feature of being a cultural pioneer. One also can attempt to interpret one's own position as central to the unfolding development of humanity, even if this centrality is not recognized by those comfortable with their positions within the status quo. Nietzsche argues that each individual's perceptions are limited by virtue of being perspectival but are simultaneously real contributions to human understanding for exactly the same reason. This suggests that individual and minority outlooks represent an enhancement to society generally, the more so because they are not viewpoints taken for granted by the majority. Marginalization, on this view, is a precondition for assuming a particularly significant cultural role.

#### And, their imagination of a better world is a continuation of the ascetic ideal. This association of all that is good at not of this world expresses a hatred for the only one we’ve got—turns case. Fantasizing about a world without suffering produces creative impotence only our relationship to life can escape this paradox of resentment

Turlani in 2003

(Aydan, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences Faculty of Letters and Sciences   
Istanbul Technical University, “Nietzsche and the Later Wittgenstein: An Offense to the Quest for Another World”, The Journal of Nietzsche Studies, 26 (2003), 55-63)

The craving for absolutely general specifications results in doing metaphysics. Unlike Wittgenstein, Nietzsche provides an account of how this craving arises. The creation of the two worlds such as apparent and real world, conditioned and unconditioned world, being and becoming is the creation of the *ressentiment* of metaphysicians. Nietzsche says, "to imagine another, more valuable world is an expression of hatred for a world that makes one suffer: the ressentiment of metaphysicians against actuality is here creative" (*WP* III 579). Escaping from this world because there is grief in it results in asceticism. **[End Page 61]** Paying respect to the ascetic ideal is longing for the world that is pure and denaturalized. Craving for frictionless surfaces, for a transcendental, pure, true, ideal, perfect world, is the result of the ressentiment of metaphysicans who suffer in this world. Metaphysicians do not affirm this world as it is, and this paves the way for many explanatory theories in philosophy. In criticizing a philosopher who pays homage to the ascetic ideal, Nietzsche says, "he wants *to escape from torture*" (*GM* III 6). The traditional philosopher or the ascetic priest continues to repeat, "'My kingdom is not of *this* world'" (*GM* III 10). This is a longing for another world in which one does not suffer. It is to escape from this world; to create another illusory, fictitious, false world. This longing for "the truth" of a world in which one does not suffer is the desire for a world of constancy. It is supposed that contradiction, change, and deception are the causes of suffering; in other words, the senses deceive; it is from the senses that all misfortunes come; reason corrects the errors; therefore reason is the road to the constant. In sum, this world is an error; the world as it ought to be exists. This will to truth, this quest for another world, this desire for the world as it ought to be, is the result of unproductive thinking. It is unproductive because it is the result of avoiding the creation of the world as it ought to be. According to Nietzsche, the will to truth is "the impotence of the will to create" (*WP* III 585). Metaphysicians end up with the creation of the "true" world in contrast to the actual, changeable, deceptive, self-contradictory world. They try to discover the true, transcendental world that is already there rather than creating a world for themselves. For Nietzsche, on the other hand, the transcendental world is the "denaturalized world" (*WP* III 586). The way out of the circle created by the *ressentiment* of metaphysicians is the will to life rather than the will to truth. The will to truth can be overcome only through a Dionysian relationship to existence. This is the way to a new philosophy, which in Wittgenstein's terms aims "to show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle" (*PI* §309).

#### And, the 1ac’s vision of a perfect world causes us to hate the one we have, leads to denial of life of this life for a more perfect one

Nietzsche, 1872 (Friedrich, philosopher, “The Birth of Tragedy” Online, MB)

Already in the preface addressed to Richard Wagner, art, and *not* morality, is presented as the truly *metaphysical* activity of man. In the book itself the suggestive sentence is repeated several times, that the existence of the world is *justified* only as an aesthetic phenomenon. Indeed, the whole book knows only an artistic meaning and crypto-meaning behind all events—a "god," if you please, but certainly only an entirely reckless and amoral artist-god who wants to experience, whether he is building or destroying, in the good and in the bad, his own joy and glory—one who, creating worlds, frees himself from the *distress* of fullness and *overfullness* and from the *affliction* of the contradictions compressed in his soul. The world—at every moment the *attained* salvation of God, as the eternally changing, eternally new vision of the most deeply afflicted, discordant, and contradictory being who can find salvation only in *appearance*: you can call this whole artists' metaphysics arbitrary, idle, fantastic; what matters is that it betrays a spirit who will one day fight at any risk whatever the *moral* interpretation and significance of existence. Here, perhaps for the first time, a pessimism "beyond good and evil" is suggested. Here that "perversity of mind" gains speech and formulation against which Schopenhauer never wearied of hurling in advance his most irate curses and thunderbolts [*Parerga and Paralipomena* (1851), II.5, 69]: a philosophy that dares to move, to demote, morality into the realm of appearance—and not merely among "appearances" or phenomena (in the sense of the idealistic **terminus technicus** [technical term]), but among "deceptions," as semblance, delusion, error, interpretation, contrivance, art. Perhaps the depth of this *antimoral* propensity is best inferred from the careful and hostile silence with which Christianity is treated throughout the whole book—Christianity as the most prodigal elaboration of the moral theme to which humanity has ever been subjected. In truth, nothing could be more opposed to the purely aesthetic interpretation and justification of the world which are taught in this book than the Christian teaching, which is, and wants to be, *only* moral and which relegates art, every art, to the realm of lies; with its absolute standards, beginning with the truthfulness of God, it negates, judges, and damns art. Behind this mode of thought and valuation, which must be hostile to art if it is at all genuine, I never failed to sense a hostility to life—a furious, vengeful antipathy to life itself: for all of life is based on semblance, art, deception, points of view [Optik], and the necessity of perspectives and error. Christianity was from the beginning, essentially and fundamentally, life's nausea and disgust with life, merely concealed behind, masked by, dressed up as, faith in "another: or "better" life. Hatred of "the world," condemnations of the passions [Affekte], fear of beauty and sensuality, a beyond invented the better to slander this life, at bottom a craving for the nothing, for the end, for respite, for "the sabbath of sabbaths"—all this always struck me, no less than the unconditional will of Christianity to recognize *only* moral values, as the most dangerous and uncanny form of all possible forms of a "will to decline"—at the very least a sign of abysmal sickness, weariness, discouragement, exhaustion, and the impoverishment of life. For, confronted with morality (especially Christian, or unconditional, morality), life must continually and inevitably be in the wrong, because life is something essentially amoral—and eventually, crushed by the weight of contempt and the eternal No, life must then be felt to be unworthy of desire and altogether worthless. Morality itself—how now? might not morality be "a will to negate life," a secret instinct of annihilation, a principle of decay, diminution, and slander—the beginning of the end? Hence, the danger of dangers? ... It was *against* morality that my instinct turned with this questionable book, long ago; it was an instinct that aligned itself with life and that discovered for itself a fundamentally opposite doctrine and valuation of life—purely artistic and *anti-Christian*. What to call it? As a philologist and man of words I baptized it, not without taking some liberty—for who could claim to know the rightful name of the Antichrist?—in the name of a Greek god: I called it *Dionysian*. —

#### Thus the alternative:

#### We should forget the 1ac in order to affirm life

Zupancic, 2003 (Alenka, Philosopher, “The Shortest Shadow: Nietzche’s philosophy of the two” Online, MB)

It is true that there is also a rather different notion present in Christianity, a notion much closer to Nietzsche’s own position—namely, the notion of mercy as situated “beyond law” (Jenseits des Rechts). Nietzsche links to this notion nothing less than the possibility of an escape from the vicious circle of punishment and guilt. But his notion of mercy is not simply that of an act of forgiveness; it can spring only from a surplus of “power” and “richness.” Illustrating this with the example of actual wealth, Nietzsche writes that the creditor becomes more human to the extent that he has grown richer: so that, finally, how much injury he can endure without suffering from it becomes the actual measure of his wealth.24 Such a creditor can now allow himself the noblest luxury possible: letting those who harm him go unpunished. In this way, the justice which began with “everything is dischargeable, everything must be discharged” ends by winking, and letting those who are incapable of discharging their debt go free. This “self-overcoming of justice” is called mercy, and remains the privilege of the most “powerful.”25 We should be careful here not to believe that the terms “rich” and “powerful” refer simply to those who have a lot of money, and hold this or that position of power.As Nietzsche points out, it is the capacity not to be injured, and not to suffer because of an injustice, that constitutes the measure of one’s richness and power—not the capacity to endure suffering and injury, to bear pain, but the capacity not to let this suffering as suffering enter the constitution of one’s subjectivity (which also means the capacity not to let oneself be subjectivized in the figure of the “subject of injury,” the figure of the victim). Those who can manage this are “rich” and “powerful” because they can manage it, not the other way around. There is also an important difference between forgiving and (what Nietzsche calls) forgetting. Forgiveness has a perverse way of involving us even further in debt. To forgive somehow always implies to pay for the other, and thus to use the very occurrence of injury and its forgiveness as a new “engagement ring.” Nietzsche makes this very point in relation to Christianity: the way God has forgiven our sins has been to pay for them, to pay for them with His own “flesh.” This is the fundamental perversity of Christianity: while forgiving, it simultaneously brandishes at us the cross, the instrument of torture, the memory of the one who suffered and died so that we could be forgiven, the memory of the one who paid for us. Christianity forgives, but does not forget. One could say that, with the eyes of the sinner fixed on the cross, forgiving creates a new debt in the very process of this act. It forgives what was done, but it does not forgive the act of forgiving itself. On the contrary, the latter establishes a new bond and a new debt. It is now infinite mercy (as the capacity of forgiving) that sustains the infinite debt, the debt as infinite. The debt is no longer brought about by our actions; it is brought about by the act of forgiving us these actions.We are indebted for forgiveness. The infinite capacity to forgive might well become the infernal flame in which we “temper” our debt and guilt. This is why Nietzsche counters the concept of forgiving with the concept of forgetting (“a good example of this in modern times is Mirabeau, who had no memory for insults and vile actions done to him and was unable to forgive simply because he—forgot”).26 This is perhaps the moment to examine in more detail what Nietzschean “forgetting” is actually about. What is the capacity of forgetting as the basis of “great health”? Nietzsche claims that memory entertains some essential relationship with pain. This is what he describes as the principle used in human “mnemotechnics”: “If something is to stay in the memory it must be burned in: only that which never ceases to hurt stays in the memory.”27 Thus, if memory is essentially related to pain (here it seems that Nietzsche claims the opposite of what psychoanalysis is claiming: that traumatic events are the privileged objects of repression; yet pain is not the same thing as trauma, just as “forgetting” is not the same thing as repressing), then forgetting refers above all to the capacity not to nurture pain. This also means the capacity not to make pain the determining ground of our actions and choices. What exactly is pain (not so much physical pain, but, rather, the “mental pain” that can haunt our lives)? It is a way in which the subject internalizes and appropriates some traumatic experience as her own bitter treasure. In other words, in relation to the traumatic event, pain is not exactly a part of this event, but already its memory (the “memory of the body”). And Nietzschean oblivion is not so much an effacement of the traumatic encounter as a preservation of its external character, of its foreignness, of its otherness. In Unfashionable Observations, Second Piece (“On the Utility and Liability of History for Life”), Nietzsche links the question of forgetting (which he employs as a synonym for the ahistorical) to the question of the act. Forgetting, oblivion, is the very condition of possibility for an act in the strong sense of the word. Memory (the “historical”) is eternal sleeplessness and alert insomnia, a state in which no great thing can happen, and which could even be said to serve this very purpose. Considering the common conception according to which memory is something monumental that “fixes” certain events, and closes us within their horizon, Nietzsche proposes a significantly different notion. It is precisely as an eternal openness, an unceasing stream, that memory can immobilize us, mortify us, make us incapable of action. Nietzsche invites us to imagine the extreme example of a human being who does not possess the power to forget. Such a human being would be condemned to see becoming everywhere: he would no longer believe in his own being, would see everything flow apart in turbulent particles, and would lose himself in this stream of becoming. He would be like the true student of Heraclitus. A human being who wanted to experience things in a thoroughly historical manner would be like someone forced to go without sleep.28 Memory holds us in eternal motion—it keeps opening numerous horizons, and this is precisely how it immobilizes us, forcing us into frenetic activity. Hence, Nietzsche advances a thesis that is as out of tune with our time as it was with his own: “every living thing can become healthy, strong and fruitful only within a defined horizon; if it is incapable of drawing a horizon around itself and too selfish, in turn, to enclose its own perspective within an alien horizon, then it will feebly waste away or hasten to its timely end.”29 Of course, Nietzsche’s aim here is not to preach narrow-mindedness and pettiness, nor is it simply to affirm the ahistorical against history and memory. On the contrary, he clearly states that it is only by thinking, reflecting, comparing, analyzing, and synthesizing (i.e. only by means of the power to utilize the past for life, and to reshape past events into history) that the human being becomes properly human.Yet, in the excess of history, the human being ceases to be human once again, no longer able to create or invent. This is why Nietzsche insists that “every great historical event” is born in the “ahistorical atmosphere,” that is to say, in conditions of oblivion and closure: Imagine a man seized and carried away by a vehement passion for a woman or for a great idea; how his world changes! Looking backward he feels he is blind, listening around he hears what is unfamiliar as a dull, insignificant sound; and those things that he perceives at all he never before perceived in this way; so palpable and near, colorful, resonant, illuminated, as though he were apprehending it with all his senses at once. All his valuations are changed and devalued; . . . It is the most unjust condition in the world, narrow, ungrateful to the past, blind to dangers, deaf to warnings; a tiny whirlpool of life in a dead sea of night and oblivion; and yet this condition—ahistorical, antihistorical through and through— is not only womb of the unjust deed, but of every just deed as well; and no artist will create a picture, no general win a victory, and no people gain its freedom without their having previously desired and striven to accomplish these deeds in just such an ahistorical condition. . . . Thus, everyone who acts loves his action infinitely more than it deserves to be loved, and the best deeds occur in such an exuberance of love that, no matter what, they must be unworthy of this love, even if their worth were otherwise incalculably great.30 If we read this passage carefully,we note that the point is not simply that the capacity to forget, or the “ahistorical condition,” is the condition of “great deeds” or “events.” On the contrary: it is the pure surplus of passion or love (for something) that brings about this closure of memory, this “ahistorical condition.” In other words, it is not that we have first to close ourselves within a defined horizon in order then to be able to accomplish something. The closure takes place with the very (“passionate”) opening toward something (“a woman or a great idea”). Nietzsche’s point is that if this surplus passion engages us “in the midst of life,” instead of mortifying us, it does so via its inducement of forgetting. Indeed, I could mention a quite common experience here: whenever something important happens to us and incites our passion,we tend to forget and dismiss the grudges and resentments we might have been nurturing before. Instead of “forgiving” those who might have injured us in the past, we forget and dismiss these injuries. If we do not, if we “work on our memory” and strive to keep these grudges alive, they will most probably affect and mortify our (new) passion.

#### There are no moral facts, only profound depths of unconscious and irrational forces which drive us and determine our destiny. We should allow full reign of these forces and rejoice in the ecstatic affirmation of the total character of life, declaring even the most terrible qualities of life as good

Carty in 2003

(Anthony, Professor of law, University of Westminster, London, SYMPOSIUM: NIETZSCHE AND LEGAL THEORY (PART I): NIETZSCHE AND SOCRATES / OR THE SPIRIT OF THE DEVIL AND THE LAW, Cardozo Law Review, January 2003, l/n)

The difference between Nietzsche and Socrates may well be more superficial and even pathetic - one of temperament. We have the gloomy Teutonic and the sanguine Mediterranean. Again, to refer to Nietzsche's perspectivism, it is a question of interpretation rather than fact. There are no moral facts, as it were. Nietzsche claims that there are profound depths: unconscious, irrational forces which drive us, making a mockery of the rhetoric of free will and devastating any social and personal restraints. Perhaps inconsistently he suggests that we should welcome this and allow full reign to these forces. They represent fate. In some sense, such drives may have to be sublimated, but they are still determining our destiny. In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche says:   Only as much of that foundation of all existence, that Dionysiac underground of the world, can be permitted to enter an individual's consciousness as can be overcome, in its turn, by the Apolline power of transfiguration, so that both of these artistic drives are required to unfold their energies in strict, reciprocal proportion, according to the law of eternal justice. [n40](http://www.lexisnexis.com:80/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.535935.9543583037&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1219266062225&returnToKey=20_T4396533563&parent=docview" \l "n40)   The will to power is never anything more precise than an  [\*633]  expansion of the force of life itself. Intoxication to the point of the extinction of subjectivity appears to be recommended, even if Nietzsche himself may only have meant listening to a Wagner opera. The mature Nietzsche, by 1888, clearly prefers the Dionysian, the amor fati. [n41](http://www.lexisnexis.com:80/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.535935.9543583037&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1219266062225&returnToKey=20_T4396533563&parent=docview" \l "n41) The world Apollinian means: "the urge to perfect self-sufficiency, to the typical individual, to all that simplifies, distinguishes, makes strong, clear, unambiguous, typical: freedom under the law." [n42](http://www.lexisnexis.com:80/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.535935.9543583037&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1219266062225&returnToKey=20_T4396533563&parent=docview" \l "n42) The word Dionysian means a reaching beyond personality, the everyday, reality, across the abyss of transitoriness:   a passionate-painful overflowing into darker, fuller, more floating states; an ecstatic affirmation of the total character of life as that which remains the same ... the great pantheistic sharing of joy and sorrow that sanctifies and calls good even the most terrible and questionable qualities of life ... the feeling of the necessary unity of creation and destruction. [n43](http://www.lexisnexis.com:80/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.535935.9543583037&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1219266062225&returnToKey=20_T4396533563&parent=docview" \l "n43)

### Third

#### Al Qaeda is weak now but could recover if the US allows them the opportunity

McLaughlin 13

(John McLaughlin was a CIA officer for 32 years and served as deputy director and acting director from 2000-2004. He currently teaches at the Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies and is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, ¶ 06:00 AM ET¶ Terrorism at a moment of transition7/12, http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2013/07/12/terrorism-at-a-moment-of-transition/)

A third major trend has to do with the debate underway among terrorists over tactics, targets, and ways to correct past errors.¶ On targets, jihadists are now pulled in many directions. Many experts contend they are less capable of a major attack on the U.S. homeland. But given the steady stream of surprises they’ve sprung – ranging from the 2009 “underwear bomber” to the more recent idea of a surgically implanted explosive – it is hard to believe they’ve given up trying to surprise us with innovations designed to penetrate our defenses.¶ We especially should remain alert that some of the smaller groups could surprise us by pointing an attacker toward the United States, as Pakistan’s Tehrik e Taliban did in preparing Faizal Shazad for his attempted bombing of Times Square in 2010.¶ At the same time, many of the groups are becoming intrigued by the possibility of scoring gains against regional governments that are now struggling to gain or keep their balance – opportunities that did not exist at the time of the 9/11 attacks.¶ Equally important, jihadists are now learning from their mistakes, especially the reasons for their past rejection by populations where they temporarily gained sway.¶ Documents from al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, discovered after French forces chased them from Mali, reveal awareness that they were too harsh on local inhabitants, especially women. They also recognized that they need to move more gradually and provide tangible services to populations – a practice that has contributed to the success of Hezbollah in Lebanon.¶ We are now seeing a similar awareness among jihadists in Syria, Tunisia, Libya, and Yemen. If these “lessons learned” take hold and spread, it will become harder to separate terrorists from populations and root them out.¶ Taken together, these three trends are a cautionary tale for those seeking to gauge the future of the terrorist threat.¶ Al Qaeda today may be weakened, but its wounds are far from fatal. It is at a moment of transition, immersed in circumstances that could sow confusion and division in the movement or, more likely, extend its life and impart new momentum.¶ So if we are ever tempted to lower our guard in debating whether and when this war might end, we should take heed of these trends and of the wisdom J. R. R. Tolkien has Eowyn speak in “Lord of the Rings”: "It needs but one foe to breed a war, not two ..."

#### Squo securitization of terrorism is key to the war on terror

Vultee 2010

[Fred Vultee, PhD in Journalism, Associate Professor at Wayne State, 2010, Securitization: A new approach to framing and media portrayals of the "war on terror", <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/0/3/8/8/pages203884/p203884-2.php>, uwyo//amp]

What is happening when news accounts portray the effort to contain and prevent political violence as the formal War on Terror or the dubious “war on terror”? A promising explanation lies in securitization theory, a recent outgrowth of security studies. Securitization can be thought of as a particular form of framing. When an issue has been securitized, a political actor has been able to cast it as an existential threat – an imminent peril to the physical, cultural, or social health of the community – and has gained a degree of public assent to use extraordinary measures to combat that threat. The role of the news media in such a process is essential. Media frames are the lens through which the public sees an issue like terrorism or immigration as a matter best dealt with through the normal workings of law enforcement and politics or as a crisis that requires extreme measures.

#### Discourse at the academic level uniquely key—leftist critique creates US inaction and appeases enemies

Hanson 3

– Professor Emeritus of Classics, California State (Victor, The Fruits of Appeasement, http://city-journal.org/html/14\_2\_the\_fruits.html, AG)

Rather than springing from realpolitik, sloth, or fear of oil cutoffs, much of our appeasement of Middle Eastern terrorists derived from a new sort of anti-Americanism that thrived in the growing therapeutic society of the 1980s and 1990s. Though the abrupt collapse of communism was a dilemma for the Left, it opened as many doors as it shut. To be sure, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, few Marxists could argue for a state-controlled economy or mouth the old romance about a workers’ paradise—not with scenes of East German families crammed into smoking clunkers lumbering over potholed roads, like American pioneers of old on their way west. But if the creed of the socialist republics was impossible to take seriously in either economic or political terms, such a collapse of doctrinaire statism did not discredit the gospel of forced egalitarianism and resentment against prosperous capitalists. Far from it. If Marx receded from economics departments, his spirit reemerged among our intelligentsia in the novel guises of post-structuralism, new historicism, multiculturalism, and all the other dogmas whose fundamental tenet was that white male capitalists had systematically oppressed women, minorities, and Third World people in countless insidious ways. The font of that collective oppression, both at home and abroad, was the rich, corporate, Republican, and white United States. The fall of the Soviet Union enhanced these newer post-colonial and liberation fields of study by immunizing their promulgators from charges of fellow-traveling or being dupes of Russian expansionism. Communism’s demise likewise freed these trendy ideologies from having to offer some wooden, unworkable Marxist alternative to the West; thus they could happily remain entirely critical, sarcastic, and cynical without any obligation to suggest something better, as witness the nihilist signs at recent protest marches proclaiming: “I Love Iraq, Bomb Texas.” From writers like Arundhati Roy and Michel Foucault (who anointed Khomeini “a kind of mystic saint” who would usher in a new “political spirituality” that would “transfigure” the world) and from old standbys like Frantz Fanon and Jean-Paul Sartre (“to shoot down a European is to kill two birds with one stone, to destroy an oppressor and the man he oppresses at the same time”), there filtered down a vague notion that the United States and the West in general were responsible for Third World misery in ways that transcended the dull old class struggle. Endemic racism and the legacy of colonialism, the oppressive multinational corporation and the humiliation and erosion of indigenous culture brought on by globalization and a smug, self-important cultural condescension—all this and more explained poverty and despair, whether in Damascus, Teheran, or Beirut. [continues] This nonjudgmentalism—essentially a form of nihilism—deemed everything from Sudanese female circumcision to honor killings on the West Bank merely “different” rather than odious. Anyone who has taught freshmen at a state university can sense the fuzzy thinking of our undergraduates: most come to us prepped in high schools not to make “value judgments” about “other” peoples who are often “victims” of American “oppression.” Thus, before female-hating psychopath Mohamed Atta piloted a jet into the World Trade Center, neither Western intellectuals nor their students would have taken him to task for what he said or condemned him as hypocritical for his parasitical existence on Western society. Instead, without logic but with plenty of romance, they would more likely have excused him as a victim of globalization or of the biases of American foreign policy. They would have deconstructed Atta’s promotion of anti-Semitic, misogynist, Western-hating thought, as well as his conspiracies with Third World criminals, as anything but a danger and a pathology to be remedied by deportation or incarceration.

#### Constrained executive makes it impossible to respond to the rapid and existential nature of the threat posed by terrorism-strong, flexible executive key to check nuclear, chemical, and biological attacks

Royal 2011

[John Paul, Fellow of the Institute for World Politics, 2011, War Powers and the Age of Terrorism, <http://www.thepresidency.org/storage/Fellows2011/Royal-_Final_Paper.pdf>, uwyo//amp]

The international system itself and national security challenges to the United States in particular, underwent rapid and significant change in the first decade of the twenty-first century. War can no longer be thought about strictly in the terms of the system and tradition created by the Treaty of Westphalia over three and a half centuries ago. Non-state actors now possess a level of destructiveness formerly enjoyed only by nation states. Global terrorism, coupled with the threat of weapons of mass destruction developed organically or obtained from rogue regimes, presents new challenges to U.S. national security and place innovative demands on the Constitution’s system of making war. In the past, as summarized in the 9/11 Commission Report, threats emerged due to hostile actions taken by enemy states and their ability to muster large enough forces to wage war: “Threats emerged slowly, often visibly, as weapons were forged, armies conscripted, and units trained and moved into place. Because large states were more powerful, they also had more to lose. They could be deterred" (National Commission 2004, 362). This mindset assumed that peace was the default state for American national security. Today however, we know that threats can emerge quickly. Terrorist organizations half-way around the world are able to wield weapons of unparalleled destructive power. These attacks are more difficult to detect and deter due to their unconventional and asymmetrical nature. In light of these new asymmetric threats and the resultant changes to the international system, peace can no longer be considered the default state of American national security. Many have argued that the Constitution permits the president to use unilateral action only in response to an imminent direct attack on the United States. In the emerging security environment described above, pre-emptive action taken by the executive branch may be needed more often than when nation-states were the principal threat to American national interests. Here again, the 9/11 Commission Report is instructive as it considers the possibility of pre-emptive force utilized over large geographic areas due to the diffuse nature of terrorist networks: In this sense, 9/11 has taught us that terrorism against American interests “over there” should be regarded just as we regard terrorism against America “over here.” In this sense, the American homeland is the planet (National Commission 2004, 362). Furthermore, the report explicitly describes the global nature of the threat and the global mission that must take place to address it. Its first strategic policy recommendation against terrorism states that the: U.S. government must identify and prioritize actual or potential terrorist sanctuaries. For each, it should have a realistic strategy to keep possible terrorists insecure and on the run, using all elements of national power (National Commission 2004, 367). Thus, fighting continues against terrorists in Afghanistan, Yemen, Iraq, Pakistan, the Philippines, and beyond, as we approach the tenth anniversary of the September 11, 2001 attacks. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially nuclear weapons, into the hands of these terrorists is the most dangerous threat to the United States. We know from the 9/11 Commission Report that Al Qaeda has attempted to make and obtain nuclear weapons for at least the past fifteen years. Al Qaeda considers the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction to be a religious obligation while “more than two dozen other terrorist groups are pursing CBRN [chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear] materials” (National Commission 2004, 397). Considering these statements, rogue regimes that are openly hostile to the United States and have or seek to develop nuclear weapons capability such as North Korea and Iran, or extremely unstable nuclear countries such as Pakistan, pose a special threat to American national security interests. These nations were not necessarily a direct threat to the United States in the past. Now, however, due to proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile technology, they can inflict damage at considerably higher levels and magnitudes than in the past. In addition, these regimes may pursue proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile technology to other nations and to allied terrorist organizations. The United States must pursue condign punishment and appropriate, rapid action against hostile terrorist organizations, rogue nation states, and nuclear weapons proliferation threats in order to protect American interests both at home and abroad. Combating these threats are the “top national security priority for the United States…with the full support of Congress, both major political parties, the media, and the American people” (National Commission 2004, 361). Operations may take the form of pre-emptive and sustained action against those who have expressed hostility or declared war on the United States. Only the executive branch can effectively execute this mission, authorized by the 2001 AUMF. If the national consensus or the nature of the threat changes, Congress possesses the intrinsic power to rescind and limit these powers.

#### Terrorist retaliation causes nuclear war – draws in Russia and China

Ayson, 10

Robert Ayson, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, 2010 (“After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld)

A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. t may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response.

### Case

#### Drones are a critical alliance tool

Jacqueline L. Hazelton, international security specialist, “Drones: What Are they Good For?,” Strategic Studies Institute, 2013.

There are several other possible strategic effects of drone strikes. Swaggering, here displaying US military power and its seemingly effortless global reach, arguably demonstrates resolve, a quality that has been underlined as an element of US counterterrorism policy.14 Drone strikes can also be seen as the straightforward use of brute force to destroy those who would threaten the United States or its allies.15 In addition, they are an alliance tool supporting other states, such as Yemen and Pakistan.

#### Drone strikes are down all across the board—we have the resources, but Obama made a policy decision to limit them

Ackerman 12-31 [Spencer Ackerman, national security reporter at the guardian, “Fewer deaths from drone strikes in 2013 after Obama policy change,” 12-31-13, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/31/deaths-drone-strikes-obama-policy-change>, wyo-sc]

While specific figures are difficult to narrow down and even harder to verify, the number of strikes, almost exclusively by drones, declined in 2013, as did the casualties they caused. Between the three countries, there were around 55 strikes this year, a substantial drop from the roughly 92 in 2012. In 2013 the strikes killed up to 271 people, down from an estimate of between 505 and 532 in 2012. Approximately one in every nine to 10 deaths is a civilian. The data comes from estimates compiled by the New America Foundation, the Long War Journal and the Bureau of Investigative Journalism.¶ Yet attempts to correlate the decline in strikes to a decline in specific threats are blocked by secrecy, diplomatic contingency and political convenience, Zenko said. ¶ With the drawdown of the US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Zenko said, “there has never been more available, both dedicated US and leased, satellite bandwidth; never been more strike drones available; and there’s more people who can watch full-motion video [for targeting]. There has never been more assets available to kill people and strikes are going down. There’s been a policy decision, and I think they’ve been correct to emphasize that.”¶

#### Af-Pak drone strikes decreasing now – no high value targets left, public pressure is causing caution

Farshori 8/27/13 (Kokab, Voice of America News, "Are US Drone Strikes in Pakistan Winding Down?," http://www.voanews.com/content/drone-strikes/1737799.html)

WASHINGTON — For more than a decade, the United States has been using unmanned drones to strike at al-Qaida and Taliban militants in western parts of Pakistan that border on Afghanistan. The drone strikes, begun under President George W. Bush, dramatically increased after President Obama took office.¶ ¶ But now, more than four years later, the number of drone strikes is way down. ¶ ¶ According to the New America Foundation, which tracks the strikes, there have only been 17 drone strikes this year so far. In the first eight months of last year, there were 36 strikes, while the number of drone strikes in the first eight months of 2011 and 2010 there were 56 and 57 respectively. ¶ ¶ Under the Bush administration, there were 46 strikes in Pakistan from 2004 to 2008. The total number of strikes carried out by the Obama administration from 2009 to 2012 was 297. ¶ ¶ Experts in Washington offer a variety of reasons for the shrinking number of drone strikes in recent months. Stephen Tankel, a counter-terrorism expert and an assistant professor at American University in Washington D.C., says one of the reasons is that there aren’t many high-value targets left to be hit in the Pakistan and Afghanistan region. ¶ ¶ Tankel also says the pressure from Pakistan and international human rights organizations may be at play as well. ¶ ¶ “I think there is certainly pressure from Pakistan, from human rights organizations, and quite frankly from elements within the U.S. that the drone strikes should be reduced, if not ended entirely,” he said.

#### There exists an intrinsic antagonism in debate – on one side, debate is always shaped by strategy, winning, and debate theory. The other side is the desire to influence a larger public. The aff’s desire to change the debate community is always shaped by the norms of debate. Your aff will never be receptive to the larger public. We should view outside of the academy as more important than our debate spaces

Welsh 12 Scott Department of Communication Appalachian State University (“Coming to Terms with the Antagonism between Rhetorical Reflection and Political Agency”, *Philosophy and Rhetoric,* Vol. 45, No. 1, 2012, Jstor)

Giroux’s concluding words, in which scholars reclaim the promises of a truly global democratic future, echo Ono and Sloop’s construction of scholarship as the politically embedded pursuit of utopia, McKerrow’s academic emancipation of the oppressed, McGee’s social surgery, Hartnett’s social justice scholar, and Fuller’s agent of justice. Each aims to unify the competing elements within the scholarly subject position—scholarly reflection and political agency—by reducing the former to the latter. Žižek’s advice is to consider how such attempts are always doomed to frustration, not because ideals are hard to live up to but because of the impossibility of resolving the antagonism central to the scholarly subject position. The titles “public intellectual” and “critical rhetorician” attest to the fundamental tension. “Public” and “rhetorician” both represent the aspiration to political engagement, while “critical” and “intellectual” set the scholar apart from noncritical, nonintellectual public rhetoric. However, rather than allowing the contingently articulated terms to exist in a state of paradoxical tension, these authors imagine an organic, unavoidable, necessary unity. The scholar is, in one moment, wholly public and wholly intellectual, wholly critical and wholly rhetorical, wholly scholar and wholly citizen—an impossible unity, characteristic of the sublime, in which the antagonism vanishes (2005, 147). Yet, as Žižek predicts, the sublime is the impossible. The frustration producing gap between the unity of the ideological sublime and conflicted experience quickly begins to put pressure on the ideology. This is born out in the shift from the exhilarated tone accompanying the birth of critical rhetoric (and its liberation of rhetoric scholarship from the incoherent and untenable demands of scientific objectivity) to a dispirited accounting for the difficulty of actually embodying the imagined unity of scholarly reflection and political agency. Simonson, for example, draws attention to the gap, noting how, twenty years later, it is hard to resist the feeling that “the bulk of our academic publishing is utterly inconsequential.” His hope is that a true connection between scholarly reflection and political agency may be possible outside of academia (2010, 95). Fuller approaches this conclusion when he says that the preferred path to filling universities with agents of justice is through “scaling back the qualifications needed for tenure-stream posts from the doctorate to the master’s degree,” a way of addressing the antagonism that amounts to setting half of it afloat (2006, 154). Hartnett is especially interesting because while he also insists on the existence of the gap, dismissing “many” of his “colleagues” as merely dispensing “politically vacuous truisms” or, worse, as serving as “tools of the state” and “humanities-based journals” as “impenetrably dense” and filled with “jargon-riddled nonsense,” he evinces a considerable impatience with the audiences he must engage as a social justice scholar (2010, 69, 74–75). In addition to reducing those populating the mass media to a cabal of “rotten corporate hucksters,” Hartnett rejects vernacular criticisms of his activism as “ranting and raving by fools,” and chafes at becoming “a target for yahoos of all stripes” (87, 84). In other words, the gap is not only recognized on the academic side of the ledger but appears on the public side as well; the public (in the vernacular sense of the word) does not yield to the desire of the social justice scholar. Or, as Žižek puts it, referencing Lacan, “You never look at me from the place in which I see you” (1991, 126). More telling still, Hartnett’s main examples of social justice scholars are either retired or located outside of academia (2010, 86). As Simonson suggests, and Hartnett implicitly concedes, it may well be that it really is only outside the academy that there can be immediate, material, political consequences.

#### No public backlash in Pakistan or Yemen---just as many people love them as hate them

Max Boot 13, the Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow in National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, 2/6/13, “Obama Drone Memo is a Careful, Responsible Document,” http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2013/02/06/obama-drone-memo-is-a-careful-responsible-document/

Drone strikes are by no means risk free, the biggest risk being that by killing innocent civilians they will cause a backlash and thereby create more enemies for the U.S. than they eliminate. There is no doubt that some of these strikes have killed the wrong people–as the New York Times account highlights in one incident in Yemen. There is also little doubt, moreover, that drone strikes are no substitute for a comprehensive counterinsurgency and state-building policy designed to permanently safeguard vulnerable countries such as Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, Libya, and Mali from the incursions of radical jihadists. But drone strikes have been effective in disrupting al-Qaeda operations and they have been conducted with less collateral damage and more precision than in the past.

It is hard to assess what impact they have had on public opinion in countries such as Yemen and Pakistan, but there is at least as much evidence that these strikes are applauded by locals who are terrorized by al-Qaeda thugs as there is evidence that the strikes are reviled for killing fellow clansmen. As the Times notes: “Although most Yemenis are reluctant to admit it publicly, there does appear to be widespread support for the American drone strikes that hit substantial Qaeda figures like Mr. Shihri, a Saudi and the affiliate’s deputy leader, who died in January of wounds received in a drone strike late last year.”

# 2NC

#### Destruction, violence war and suffering are essential to life and existence, we should embrace them not fear them

Nietzsche, 1882 (Friedrich, philosopher, the Gay Science” Online, MB)

*Preparatory human beings*.— I welcome all signs that a more virile, warlike age is about to begin, which will restore honor to courage above all! For this age shall prepare the way for one yet higher, and it shall gather the strength that this higher age will require some day—the age that will carry heroism into the search for knowledge and that will wage wars for the sake of ideas and their consequences. To this end we now need many preparatory courageous human beings who cannot very well leap out of nothing—any more than out of the sand and slime of present-day civilization and metropolitanism: human beings who know how to be silent, lonely, resolute, and content and constant in invisible activities; human beings who are bent on seeking in all things for what in them must be *overcome*; human beings distinguished as much by cheerfulness, patience, unpretentiousness, and contempt for all great vanities as by magnanimity in victory and forbearance regarding the small vanities of the vanquished; human beings whose judgment concerning all victors and the share of chance in every victory and fame is sharp and free; human beings with their own festivals, their own working days, and their own periods of mourning, accustomed to command with assurance but instantly ready to obey when that is called for, equally proud, equally serving their own cause in both cases; more endangered human beings, more fruitful human beings, happier beings! For believe me!—the secret for harvesting from existence the greatest fruitfulness and the greatest enjoyment is: to live dangerously! Build your cities on the slopes of Vesuvius! Send your ships into uncharted seas! Live at war with your peers and yourselves! Be robbers and conquerors as long as you cannot be rulers and possessors, you seekers of knowledge! Soon the age will be past when you could be content to live hidden in forests like shy deer! At long last the search for knowledge will reach out for its due:—it will want to *rule* and *possess*, and you with it!

The ability to overcome suffering can give us brutal satisfaction – alternative action results in a distrust and hate of life.

Cioran 34 (E.M, Romanian Philosopher, Prof of Philosophy at Andrei Saguna, 1934, On the Heights of Despair, p. 6-7, AD: 7/7/09) jl

Among the many forms of the grotesque, I find the one whose roots are steeped in despair more unusual and complex. The other forms have less intensity. It is important to note that the grotesque is inconceivable without intensity of feeling. And what intensity is deeper and more organic than despair? The grotesque appears only in very negative states, when great anxiety arises from a lack of life; the grotesque is exaltation in negativity. there is a mad launch toward negativity in that bestial, agonizing grimace when the shape and lines of the face are contorted into strangely expressive forms, when the look in one's eyes changes with distant light and shadow, and one's thoughts follow the curve of similar distortions. Truly intense and irrevocable despair cannot be objectified except in grotesque expressions, because the grotesque is the absolute negation of serenity, that state of purity, transparence, and lucidity so different from the chaos and nothingness of despair. Have you ever had the brutal and amazing satisfaction of looking at yourself in the mirror after countless sleepless nights? Have you suffered the torment of insomnia, when you count the minutes for nights on end, when you feel alone in this world, when your drama seems to be the most important in history and history ceases to have meaning, ceases to exist? When the most terrifying flames grow in you and your existence appears unique and isolated in a world made only for the consummation of your agony? You must have felt those moments, as countless and infinite as suffering, in order to have a clear picture of the grotesque when you look at yourself in the mirror. It is a picture of total strain, a tense grimace to which is added the demonically seductive pallor of a man who has struggled along horrible, dark precipices. Isn’t this grotesque expression of despair similar to a precipice? It has something of the abysmal maelstrom of great depths, the seduction of the all-encompassing infinite to which we bow as we bow to fatality. How good it would be if one could die by throwing oneself into an infinite void! The complexity of the grotesque born out of despair resides in its capacity to indicate an inner infinity and to produce a paroxysm of the highest tension. How could this intense agony manifest itself in pleasant linear curves and formal purity? The grotesque essentially negates the classic, as well as any idea of style, harmony, and perfection. It is evident to anyone who understands the multiple forms of inner drama that the grotesque hides secret tragedies, indirectly expressed. Whoever has seen his face grotesquely disfigured can never forget it, because he will always be afraid of himself. Despair is followed by painful anxiety. What else does the grotesque do if it does not actualize fear and anxiety?

The morality of the affirmative depends on an external enemy to call itself good in opposition to itself – this means the affirmatives harms will always exist as they require them for their moral project turning the case

Newman 0 (Saul, Senior Lecturer in Politics @ U of London, “Anarchism and the Politics of Ressentiment,” Theory & Event - Volume 4, Issue 3, Muse, AD: 7/8/09) jl

Slave morality is characterized by the attitude of ressentiment -- the resentment and hatred of the powerless for the powerful. Nietzsche sees ressentiment as an entirely negative sentiment -- the attitude of denying what is life-affirming, saying 'no' to what is different, what is 'outside' or 'other'. Ressentiment is characterized by an orientation to the outside, rather than the focus of noble morality, which is on the self.[[7]](http://muse.jhu.edu.ts.isil.westga.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v004/4.3newman.html" \l "fn7) While the master says 'I am good' and adds as an afterthought, 'therefore he is bad'; the slave says the opposite -- 'He (the master) is bad, therefore I am good'. Thus the invention of values comes from a comparison or opposition to that which is outside, other, different. Nietzsche says: "... in order to come about, slave morality first has to have an opposing, external world, it needs, psychologically speaking, external stimuli in order to act all, -- its action is basically a reaction."[[8]](http://muse.jhu.edu.ts.isil.westga.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v004/4.3newman.html" \l "fn8) This reactive stance, this inability to define anything except in opposition to something else, is the attitude of ressentiment. It is the reactive stance of the weak who define themselves in opposition to the strong. The weak need the existence of this external enemy to identify themselves as 'good'. Thus the slave takes 'imaginary revenge' upon the master, as he cannot act without the existence of the master to oppose. The man of ressentiment hates the noble with an intense spite, a deep-seated, seething hatred and jealousy. It is this ressentiment, according to Nietzsche, that has poisoned the modern consciousness, and finds its expression in ideas of equality and democracy, and in radical political philosophies, like anarchism, that advocate it.

**They deny human vitality – we need to embrace strength**

**Porter 1** (Burton, prof of Philosophy at Amherst, “The Good Life,” Page 245, google books) Zanezor

  Nietzsche singled out democracy. socialism, and Christianity as oppressive forces, lie regarded democracy and socialism as enemies of the vital spirit of humanity because they maintain that all people are equal and should have the same proportion of the worlds goods and an equal voice in government; the idea of someone being Superior and entitled to greater consideration is anathema to their values. Everything must he decided by majority rule, which means that bourgeois morality will carry the day ‘We do not take a vote in order to decide the merits of a work of art or a scientific theory, but oddly enough we allow the masses to decide the social morality under which we live daily; the norms of mediocrity arc allowed to rule our social existence. Nietzsche criticized Christianity on similar grounds, for it seems in league with everything that is common and timid. To Nietzsche’s mind, Christianity favors humility and self-denial, pacifism, conservatism, and mutual helpfulness. This is a manifestation of herd morality which Christianity reflects and supports, and it is founded on weakness rather than strength. Christians are merely extolling their own inadequacies and transforming them into virtues because they do not have the courage to assert themselves. They believe the meek shall inherit the earth because they lack the strength of will to master the earth. Christianity is the religion of pity,” Nietzsche wrote, and pity stands opposed to the tonic emotions which heighten our vitality; it has a depressing effect (and) makes suffering contagious. .. . In Christianity the instincts of the subjugated and oppressed come to the fore: here the lowest classes seek their salvation. Christian too is mortal enmity against the lords of the earth, against the “noble”—along with a sly, secret rivalry (one leaves them the body, one wants only the “soul”). Christian, finally, is the hatred of the spirit, of pride, courage, freedom, liberty of the spirit; Christian is the hatred of the senses, of by in the senses, of joy itself. Nietzsche thought Christianity not only antivital hut distracting in that it draws people’s attention away from real issues of human progress and personal growth. Like Marx. he did not want to understand the world so much as to change it, and Christianity stood in the way as a conservative force that persuades people to pin their hopes on the life to come and to control their earthly longings.

# 1NR

### Our experts good

**Experts are critical—they have extensive knowledge of primary and secondary works in their field, and the capacity to correctly apply that information to new situations**

**Goldman, 2001**

[Alvin, University of Arizona, “Experts: Which ones should you trust?” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 63.1, 85-110, Online, <http://fas-philosophy.rutgers.edu/goldman/SeminarFall2007/October%2031st/Goldman%20-%20Experts%20Which%20Ones%20Should%20You%20Trust.pdf>] /Wyo-MB

Before addressing this question, we should say more about the nature of expertise and the sorts of experts we are concerned with here. Some kinds of experts a r e unusually accomplished at certain skills, including violinists, billiards players, textile designers, and s o forth. These are not the kinds of experts with which epistemology is most naturally concerned. For epistemological purposes we shall mainly focus on **cognitive or intellectual experts**: people who have (or claim to **have) a superior quantity or level of knowledge in s ome domain and an ability to generate new knowledge in answer to questions within the domain.** Admittedly, there are elements of skill or know-how in intellectual matters too, so the boundary between skill expertise and cognitive expertise is not a sharp one. Nonetheless, I shall try to work on only one side of this rough divide, the intellectual side. How shall we define expertise in the cognitive sense? **What distinguishes an expert from a layperson**, in a given cognitive domain? I'll begin by specifying an objective sense of expertise, what it is to be an expert, not what it is to have a reputation for expertise. Once the objective sense is specified, the reputational sense readily follows: a reputational expert is someone widely believed to be an expert (in the objective sense), whether or not he really is one. Turning to objective expertise, then, I first propose that cognitive expertise be defined in "veritistic" (truth-linked) terms. As a first pass, **experts in a given domain** (the E-domain) **have more beliefs** (or high degrees of belief) **in true propositions and/or fewer beliefs in false propositions within that domain than most people do** (or better: than the vast majority of people do). According to this proposal, **expertise is largely a comparative matter.** However, I do not think it is wholly comparative. If the vast majority of people are full of false beliefs in a domain and Jones exceeds them slightly by not succumbing t o a few falsehoods that a r e widely shared, that still d o e s not ma k e him an "expert" (from a God's-eye point of view). **To qualify as a cognitive expert, a person must possess a substantial body of truths in the target domain**. Being an expert is not simply a matter of veritistic superiority to most of the community. Some non-comparative threshold of veritistic attainment must be reached, though there is great vagueness in setting this threshold. **Expertise** is not all a matter of possessing accurate information. It **includes a capacity or disposition to deploy or exploit this fund of information to form beliefs in true answers to new questions that may be posed in the domain.** This arises from some set of skills or techniques that constitute part of what it is to be an expert. **An expert has the (cognitive) know-how, when presented with a new question in the domain, to go to the right sectors of his information-bank and perform appropriate operations on this information; or to deploy some external apparatus or data-banks to disclose relevant material. So expertise features a propensity element** as well as an element of actual attainment. A third possible feature of expertise may require a little modification in what we said earlier. To discuss this feature, let us distinguish the primary and secondary questions in a domain. Primary questions are the principal questions of interest to the researchers or students of the subject-matter. Secondary questions concern the existing evidence or arguments that bear on the primary questions, and the assessments of the evidence made by prominent researchers. In general, **an expert in a field is someone who has** (comparatively) **extensive knowledge** (in the weak sense of knowledge, i.e., true belief) **of the state of the evidence, and knowledge of the opinions and reactions to that evidence by prominent workers in the field**. In the central sense of "expert" (a strong sense), **an expert is someone with an unusually extensive body of knowledge on both primary and secondary questions in the domain**. However, there may also be a weak sense of "expert", in which it includes someone who merely has extensive knowledge on the secondary questions in the domain. Consider two people with strongly divergent views on the primary questions in the domain, so that one of them is largely right and the other is largely wrong. By the original, strong criterion, the one who is largely wrong would not qualify as an expert. People might disagree with this as the final word on the matter. They might hold that anyone with a thorough knowledge of the existing evidence and the differing views held by the workers in the field deserves to be called an expert. I concede this by acknowledging the weak sense of "expert". Applying what has been said above, we can say that **an expert** (in the strong sense) in domain D **is someone who possesses an extensive fund of knowledge (true belief) and a set of skills or methods for apt and successful deployment of this knowledge to new questions in the domain**. Anyone purporting to be a (cognitive) expert in a given domain will claim to have such a fund and set of methods, and will claim to have true answers to the question ( ~ ) under dispute because he has applied his fund and his methods to the question(s). **The task for** the layperson who is **consulting putative experts**, and who hopes thereby to learn a true answer to the target question, **is to decide who has superior expertise, or who has better deployed** his **expertise to the question at hand.** T h e novicet2-experts problem is whether a layperson can justifiably choose one putative expert as more credible or trustworthy than the other with respect to the

### UQ

#### They say no AlQ in Pakistan, but Taliban has empirically been linked to AlQ. And fine, here. Taliban still a threat.

#### Threat of terrorist attack is receding but the global war against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associate forces will last for 20 more years – AUMF is key to the authority to conduct the global campaign

Sheehan, 13

Michael A. Sheehan, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict Department of Defense, “Hearing To Receive Testimony On The ¶ Law Of Armed Conflict, The Use Of ¶ Military Force, And The 2001 Authorization For Use Of Military Force”, May 16, 2013.

Senator Graham. ¶ Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. ¶ From the President’s point of view, does the Authorization to Use ¶ Military Force in any way restrict his ability to go after terrorist ¶ organizations that represent a national security threat to this country in places outside of Afghanistan that are not within the hierarchy of al Qaeda that existed on September 11, 2001? ¶ Mr. SHEEHAN. Senator, it would not. ¶ Senator GRAHAM. So do we need to change it to give the President—is there anything the President would like us to do differently than exists today? ¶ Mr. SHEEHAN. Senator, I think the AUMF provides very clear ¶ guidance for al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces. He has ¶ many other authorities that you are aware of that he could use ¶ that he used prior to AUMF to deal with any other threats to our ¶ National security. ¶ Senator GRAHAM. Do you agree with me the war against radical ¶ Islam or terror, whatever description you would like to provide, will ¶ go on after the second term of President Obama? ¶ Mr. SHEEHAN. Senator, in my judgment, this is going to go on for ¶ quite a while and, yes, beyond the second term of the President. ¶ Senator GRAHAM. And beyond this term of Congress. ¶ Mr. SHEEHAN. Yes, sir. I think it is at least 10 to 20 years. ¶ Senator GRAHAM. I think you are absolutely right. I think we are ¶ involved in a generational struggle. So the lessons of September 11 ¶ are always learned the hard way. ¶ So your advice to the committee is to do nothing? ¶ Mr. SHEEHAN. Senator, I think it is appropriate to review a law ¶ that was written 12 years ago. ¶ Senator GRAHAM. And doing nothing is an exceptional—you ¶ know, for Congress could be at the right answer more often than ¶ not. ¶ Mr. SHEEHAN. Yes, sir. I think it is an appropriate time to review ¶ this, and we are taking this very seriously to review it. But at this ¶ time, we do not find that it would improve our ability to conduct ¶ our global campaign against these organizations. ¶ Senator GRAHAM. Well, General, do you agree with that? ¶ General GROSS. Senator, I agree that the current AUMF is adequate for us. In the time I have had in Central Command, down ¶ at ISAF in Afghanistan, and also here on the Joint Staff, we have ¶ been able to go after the enemy that fits within the AUMF. ¶ Senator GRAHAM. Do you agree with me, Mr. Secretary, that the ¶ inherent authority of the President as commander in chief would ¶ give him or her great latitude in terms of pursuing terrorist organizations¶ that represent a threat against the United States apart ¶ from Congress? ¶ Mr. SHEEHAN. Yes, sir, I do agree. ¶ Senator GRAHAM. But you also would agree that when the Congress and the President and our courts are all aligned, we are ¶ stronger as a nation, when we are all on the same sheet of music. ¶ Mr. SHEEHAN. Yes, sir. ¶ Senator GRAHAM. So the one thing I do believe would be helpful ¶ is if the Congress does more than just criticize, that we find ways ¶ to empower the commander in chief and also in some ways control ¶ the power of the executive branch. But I tend to agree that what ¶ we have today is working. But we all agree that the enemy of today ¶ is different than it was on September 11. Do you agree with that? ¶ Mr. SHEEHAN. Sir, they have changed a bit, but in many ways ¶ they have not changed very much at all. They are operating in a ¶ very similar way that they were in 1998 out of traditional strongholds in Yemen and east Africa. They have expanded in north Africa and some other areas, but quite frankly, this has been a global ¶ organization since day one. ¶ Senator GRAHAM. But would you agree with me because of the ¶ pressure we have placed on the enemy in Afghanistan and Iraq, ¶ they are moving? ¶ Mr. SHEEHAN. Yes, sir. They have always moved. Even in 2002, ¶ they were very active in north Africa and in parts of the Levant. ¶ Senator GRAHAM. I could not agree with you more. So from your ¶ point of view, you have all the authorization and legal authorities ¶ necessary to conduct a drone strike against terrorist organizations ¶ in Yemen without changing the AUMF. ¶ Mr. SHEEHAN. Yes, sir, I do believe that. ¶ Senator GRAHAM. Do you agree with that, General? ¶ General GROSS. I do, sir. ¶ Senator GRAHAM. General, do you agree with that? ¶ General NAGATA. I do, sir. ¶ Senator GRAHAM. Could we send military members into Yemen ¶ to strike against one of these organizations? Does the President ¶ have that authority to put boots on the ground in Yemen? ¶ Mr. TAYLOR. As I mentioned before, there is domestic authority ¶ and international law authority. At the moment, the basis for putting boots on the ground in Yemen—we respect the sovereignty of ¶ Yemen and it would—— ¶ Senator GRAHAM. I am not talking about that. I am talking about ¶ does he have the legal authority under our law to do that. ¶ Mr. TAYLOR. Under domestic authority, he would have that authority. ¶ Senator GRAHAM. I hope the Congress is okay with that. I am ¶ okay with that. ¶ Does he have authority to put boots on the ground in the Congo? ¶ Mr. SHEEHAN. Yes, sir, he does. ¶ Senator GRAHAM. Do you agree with me that when it comes to ¶ international terrorism, we are talking about a worldwide struggle? ¶ Mr. SHEEHAN. Absolutely, sir. ¶ Senator GRAHAM. Would you agree with me the battlefield is ¶ wherever the enemy chooses to make it? ¶ Mr. SHEEHAN. Yes, sir. From Boston to the FATA. ¶ Senator GRAHAM. I could not agree with you more. ¶ Do you agree with that, General? ¶ General GROSS. Yes, sir. I agree that the enemy decides where ¶ the battlefield is. ¶ Senator GRAHAM. And it could be anyplace on the planet and we ¶ have to be aware and able to act. Do you have the ability to act ¶ and you are aware of the threats? ¶ Mr. SHEEHAN. Yes, sir. We do have the ability to react and we ¶ are tracking the threats globally. ¶ Senator GRAHAM. From my point of view, I think your analysis ¶ is correct, and I appreciate all of your service to our country. ¶ Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Graham.

### Link

#### I don’t have a n/l arg on my flow but framing of the war on terror as an existential threat is key to gaining popular support for the government to resolve terrorism threats, the aff tries to recenter our discussion.

#### And now that the aff has committed to STOPPING drone strikes

**Pakistani drones are key to solve nuclear terror**

Curtis, 13

member of the professional staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for three years

[Lisa, former White House-appointed senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for South Asian affairs, tracking India-Pakistan relations, she worked as an analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency in the late 1990s, "Pakistan Makes Drones Necessary," National Interest, 7-15-14, nationalinterest.org/commentary/pakistan-makes-drones-necessary-8725?page=1, accessed 8-26-13, mss]

But until Islamabad cracks down more aggressively on groups attacking U.S. interests in the region and beyond, drones will remain an essential tool for fighting global terrorism. Numbering over three hundred and fifty since 2004, drone strikes in Pakistan have killed more than two dozen Al Qaeda operatives and hundreds of militants targeting U.S. and coalition forces. President Obama made clear in his May 23 speech at the National Defense University that Washington would continue to use drones in Pakistan’s tribal border areas to support stabilization efforts in neighboring Afghanistan, even as it seeks to increase transparency and tighten targeting of the drone program in the future. Obama also defended the use of drones from a legal and moral standpoint, noting that by preemptively striking at terrorists, many innocent lives had been saved. The most compelling evidence of the efficacy of the drone program came from Osama bin Laden himself, who shortly before his death contemplated moving Al Qaeda operatives from Pakistan into forested areas of Afghanistan in an attempt to escape the drones’ reach, according to Peter Bergen, renowned author of Manhunt: The Ten-Year Search for Bin Laden from 9/11 to Abbottabad. How to Reduce the Need for Drones The continuation of drone strikes signals U.S. frustration with Pakistan’s unwillingness to crack down consistently and comprehensively on groups that find sanctuary in Pakistan’s tribal areas. There continue to be close ties between the Pakistan military and the Taliban-allied Haqqani Network, which attacks U.S. forces in Afghanistan and undermines the overall U.S. and NATO strategy there. The most recent U.S. drone attack inside Pakistani territory occurred last week against militants from the Haqqani Network located in North Waziristan, along the border with Afghanistan. In early June, drone missiles also targeted a group of fighters in Pakistan that were preparing to cross over into Afghanistan. On both occasions, the Pakistani Foreign Ministry condemned the attacks as counterproductive and said they raised serious questions about human rights. No doubt a better alternative to the drones would be Pakistani action against terrorist sanctuaries. But Pakistan has stonewalled repeated U.S. requests for operations against the Haqqani network. In addition to continuing drone strikes as necessary, the U.S. should further condition military aid to Pakistan based on its willingness to crack down on the Haqqani Network. In early June, the House of Representatives approved language in the FY 2014 National Defense Authorization Act that conditions reimbursement of Coalition Support Funds (CSF) pending Pakistani actions against the Haqqani network. Hopefully, the language will be retained in the final bill. The United States provides CSF funds to reimburse Pakistan for the costs associated with stationing some one hundred thousand Pakistani troops along the border with Afghanistan. Pakistan has received over $10 billion in CSF funding over the last decade. One must question the worth of having troops stationed in this region if they refuse to go after one of the most dangerous terrorist groups. Details of the relationship between the Pakistan military and the Haqqani Network are laid out in a recent book, Fountainhead of Jihad: The Haqqani Nexus, 1973–2012 by Vahid Brown and Don Rassler. The book highlights that Pakistan is actively assisting the Haqqani network the same way it has over the last twenty years, through training, tactical field advice, financing and material support. The assistance, the authors note, helps to sustain the Haqqani group and enhance its effectiveness on the battlefield. Drones Help Pakistan It is no secret that the drone strikes often benefit the Pakistani state. On May 29, for example, a drone missile strike killed the number two leader of the Pakistani Taliban (also referred to as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan or TTP), Waliur Rehman. The TTP has killed hundreds of Pakistani security forces and civilians in terrorist attacks throughout the country since its formation in 2007. Furthermore, the group conducted a string of suicide attacks and targeted assassinations against Pakistani election workers, candidates, and party activists in the run-up to the May elections, declaring a goal of killing democracy. Complicating the picture even further is the fact that Pakistan’s support for the Haqqani network indirectly benefits the Pakistani Taliban. The Haqqanis play a pivotal role in the region by simultaneously maintaining ties with Al Qaeda, Pakistani intelligence and anti-Pakistan groups like the TTP. With such a confused and self-defeating Pakistani strategy, Washington has no choice but to rely on the judicious use of drone strikes. The U.S. will need to keep a close eye on the tribal border areas, where there is a nexus of terrorist groups that threaten not only U.S. interests but also the stability of the Pakistani state. Given that Pakistan is home to more international terrorists than almost any other country and, at the same time, has one of the fastest growing nuclear arsenals, the country will remain of vital strategic interest for Washington for many years to come. Though the drone issue will continue to be a source of tension in the relationship, it is doubtful that it alone would derail ties. The extent to which the United States will continue to rely on drone strikes ultimately depends on Islamabad’s willingness to develop more decisive and comprehensive counterterrorism policies that include targeting groups like the Haqqani Network.

### Impact

#### Asymmetrical, unconventional, and evolving nature of terrorist threats and high need for preemptive action necessitates a flexible executive branch - that’s Royal ‘11

#### Extend Ayson

#### Preventing extinction is the highest ethical priority – we should take action to prevent the Other from dying FIRST, only THEN can we consider questions of value to life

Paul Wapner, associate professor and director of the Global Environmental Policy Program at American University, Winter 2003, Dissent, online: http://www.dissentmagazine.org/menutest/archives/2003/wi03/wapner.htm

All attempts to listen to nature are social constructions-except one. Even the most radical postmodernist must acknowledge the distinction between physical existence and non-existence. As I have said, postmodernists accept that there is a physical substratum to the phenomenal world even if they argue about the different meanings we ascribe to it. This acknowledgment of physical existence is crucial. We can't ascribe meaning to that which doesn't appear. What doesn't exist can manifest no character. Put differently, yes, the postmodernist should rightly worry about interpreting nature's expressions. And all of us should be wary of those who claim to speak on nature's behalf (including environmentalists who do that). But we need not doubt the simple idea that a prerequisite of expression is existence. This in turn suggests that preserving the nonhuman world-in all its diverse embodiments-must be seen by eco-critics as a fundamental good. Eco-critics must be supporters, in some fashion, of environmental preservation. Postmodernists reject the idea of a universal good. They rightly acknowledge the difficulty of identifying a common value given the multiple contexts of our value-producing activity. In fact, if there is one thing they vehemently scorn, it is the idea that there can be a value that stands above the individual contexts of human experience. Such a value would present itself as a metanarrative and, as Jean-François Lyotard has explained, postmodernism is characterized fundamentally by its "incredulity toward meta-narratives." Nonetheless, I can't see how postmodern critics can do otherwise than accept the value of preserving the nonhuman world. The nonhuman is the extreme "other"; it stands in contradistinction to humans as a species. In understanding the constructed quality of human experience and the dangers of reification, postmodernism inherently advances an ethic of respecting the "other." At the very least, respect must involve ensuring that the "other" actually continues to exist. In our day and age, this requires us to take responsibility for protecting the actuality of the nonhuman. Instead, however, we are running roughshod over the earth's diversity of plants, animals, and ecosystems. Postmodern critics should find this particularly disturbing. If they don't, they deny their own intellectual insights and compromise their fundamental moral commitment.

#### [2.] Outweighs-

#### [A] Probability: Two dozen terrorist organizations are openly in pursuit of CBRN weapons for the purpose of attacking the United States

#### And, studies flow neg

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(Rahim, Founder and Editor-in-Chief of World Affairs Commentary, "New al-Qaeda Chief Zawahiri Has Strong Nuclear Intent," Forbes, June 29, www.forbes.com/sites/rahimkanani/2011/06/29/new-al-qaeda-chief-zawahiri-has-strong-nuclear-intent/)

We should be especially worried about the threat of nuclear terrorism under Zawahiri’s leadership. In a recent report titled “Islam and the Bomb: Religious Justification For and Against Nuclear Weapons”, which I researched for and contributed to, lead author Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, former director of intelligence and counterintelligence at the U.S. Department of Energy, argues that al-Qaeda’s WMD ambitions are stronger than ever. And that “this intent no longer feels theoretical, but operational.” “I believe al-Qaeda is laying the groundwork for a large scale attack on the United States, possibly in the next year or two,” continues Mowatt-Larssen in the opening of the report issued earlier this year by the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard Kennedy School. “The attack may or may not involve the use of WMD, but there are signs that al-Qaeda is working on an event on a larger scale than the 9/11 attack.” Most will readily dismiss such claims as implausible and unlikely, and we hope they are right, but after spending months with Mowatt-Larssen, who also served as the former head of the Central Intelligence Agency’s WMD and terrorism efforts, scrutinizing and cross-referencing Zawahiri’s 268-page treatise published in 2008 titled “Exoneration”, the analytics steered us towards something far more remarkable than expected. “As I read the text closely, in the broader context of al-Qaeda’s past, my concerns grew that Zawahiri has written this treatise to play a part in the ritualistic process of preparing for an impending attack,” states Mowatt-Larssen. “As Osama bin Laden’s fatwa in 1998 foreshadowed the 9/11 attack, Ayman Zawahiri’s fatwa in 2008 may have started the clock ticking for al-Qaeda’s next large scale strike on America. If the pattern of al-Qaeda’s modus operandi holds true, we are in the middle of an attack cycle.” Among several important findings, Zawahiri sophisticatedly weaves identical passages, sources and religious justifications for a nuclear terrorist attack against the United States previously penned by radical Saudi cleric Nasir al Fahd. Indeed, the language used, research cited, and arguments put forth are nothing short of detailed and deliberate. Reading as both a religious duty to kill millions of Americans and a lengthy suicide note together, this piece of literature is something we must take seriously with Zawahiri now at the helm of al-Qaeda. The time may have come for al-Qaeda’s new CEO to leave a legacy of his own. Concluding the author’s note, Mowatt-Larssen states, “Even if this theory proves to be wrong, it is better to overestimate the enemy than to under­estimate him. Conventional wisdom holds that al-Qaeda is spent—that they are incapable of carrying out another 9/11. Leaving aside whether this view is correct, for which I harbor grave doubts, we will surely miss the signs of the next attack if we continue to overestimate our own successes, and dismiss what terrorists remain capable of accomplishing when they put their minds to it.”

#### [B] Magnitude: Attack stokes geopolitical rivalries and popular pressure will mandate blind retaliation-guarantees maximum escalation

#### [C] Timeframe: Happens quickly-nations will be forced to respond in kind ASAP

#### And, Al Qaeda fast tracked

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(Frank, Director of the George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute, "After bin Laden the Threat Remains: Drones, CIA, and SOF Still the Only Game in Town," HSPI Commentary 22, May 2, [www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/commentary022\_after\_bin\_laden.cfm](http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/commentary022_after_bin_laden.cfm))

Would-be successors to bin Laden wait (and likely not for long) in the wings. Ayman al Zawahiri, Ilyas Kashmiri, Anwar al Awlaki, and others continue to pose a grave threat to the United States. We should expect them to fast-track any and all plots that have the chance to produce high-visibility mass-casualty attacks against US targets overseas or on the homeland. Zawahiri, Kashmiri, Awlaki and others (known and perhaps unknown) will be motivated to prove they are relevant, that they can continue to pose a threat, and most of all that they deserve to be the heir apparent to bin Laden. It is this last potential outcome, an internal power struggle, that might spawn the greatest uptick in the terror threat.

#### The K Can’t solve no root cause – only intelligence can address terrorism

Stein ‘7 [Zachary R. Stern, “The Face of Terrorism: Toward a Terrorist Profile” a study self-described here: This study focuses on a more important and substantial question than the definition of terrorism. It seeks to understand the root causes of terrorism or, at the very least, to dispel popular misconceptions about those causes. If optimists like President Bush are to be believed, reducing global poverty and increasing education levels will result in a decrease in global terrorism. This approach is based on the assumption that economic disadvantage and the inaccessibility or the denial of proper schooling creates fertile breeding grounds for terrorism. Equally unsatisfactory as an explanation, is the opposite hypothesis, exemplified by the work of Alan Krueger, that education and financial well-being actually help explain how and why terrorism is engendered. The assumptions of both sides are not borne out by the facts. They belie the complexity of the individuals and the collective histories that produce terrorists. Terrorists are deeply committed individuals, willing to risk imprisonment and death for their cause. This characteristic would indicate that ideology, and not demographic background, is the leading cause of terrorism. Since ideology and one’s commitment to it are by not easily quantifiable (nor has anyone attempted to quantify them, to date), this study will seek to disprove the demographic background argument by reviewing the relevant literature, and to further establish the point by analyzing individual terrorists’ backgrounds from a wide cross-section. It will also seek to provide some tentative answers to the question that captivates counter-terrorism experts, psychologists, and just about everyone who worries about terrorism: why does someone become a terrorist? This paper is organized as follows: first, a literature review of relevant subject material; second, a description of the methods used in this study; third, a description of the various data sources used in this study; fourth, regressional analysis of the data sources; fifth, non-regressional analysis and anecdotal cases from this study; sixth, and finally, conclusions of this study, Spring 2007]

With **no root cause of terrorism readily identifiable**, terrorism **cannot be extinguished at its source**, and **individuals cannot be deterred from pursuing its means in the hope of securing their desired ends**. This leaves **strong intelligence** as the **best tool available** to **counterterrorism**. While continuing with research into terrorist demographics and profiling, the majority of resources must be directed for the most effective counterterrorism strategy, and thus in many ways we must move away from a terrorist profile. Instead, terrorist organizations **must be infiltrated, their leaders rounded up, and their cells broken**.

#### Default to our specific internal links – empiricism is good and true in the context of terrorism

Horgan and Boyle ‘8 [John Horgan and Michael J. Boyle\*\*” (1 International Center for the Study of Terrorism, Department of Psychology, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA, USA; "School of International Relations, University of St Andrews, S! Andrews, UK), Critical Studies on Terrorism, Vol. 1, No. l, April 2008, “A case against ‘Critical Terrorism Studies’”)

Furthermore, we also realize the **inherent challenge** in attempting to be a disinterested observer of social phenomena (problems with this, as shall be shown, lie at the heart of some of the raison d 'étre for CTS) particularly in a ﬁeld **as contested as terrorism** studies. Terrorism is a **widely disputed social and political phenomenon** and the very act of data collection — which includes, for example, discerning what events count and do not count as terrorism — cannot **be considered entirely value free**. The terrorism scholar can try to be as independently minded as possible and test for the robustness of ﬁndings based on different deﬁnition of the data, but the basic problem — that terrorism studies is **ineluctably political** — remains. In our view, this does not lead to an abandonment of empirical approaches to social and political inquiry. Instead, we believe that **the empirical approach is a powerful and useful way to study terrorism**, and that a key contribution of CTS can be to make empirical scholarship more self-aware and reﬂective in its practice.2 We do not believe that concepts without tight analytic boundaries - for example, the ‘state’ or ‘power’ — cannot be used in research, though they must be used with **some care and self-awareness**. As a matter of policy, neither of us believes that any form of intellectual enterprise should be discarded if it happens to run contrary to our interests or to challenge what we do. We welcome the contribution of CTS only if it helps to improve the analytic rigor of terrorism or open new avenues of research. We believe that — as Mao put it — that in academia it is always a good idea to let ‘a hundred ﬂowers bloom; let a hundred schools of thought contend’. We say this as a prelude to qualifying the criticisms below, levelled at CTS (or at least its current incamation) as a way of stimulating debate, not silencing it.

#### There is no root cause of terrorism – that theory is a fallacy

Weiner ’88 [Justus R. Weiner, Director of the Division of American Law and former Assistant Professor of International Relations and Law at Boston University School of Law, “Terrorism: Israel’s Legal Responses”, 14 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 184, 1988]

Political scientists, sociologists, psychologists and others theorize **why terrorist acts are committed** against Israeli targets. One **popular theory is the “root cause**.” This thesis claims that were not for the frustration, deprivation, and misery of the Palestinian people, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) would not commit acts of terrorism. A typical intellectual argument excusing PLO terror reasons: “Shying away from analyzing the motives for terror, or the political, economic and historical environments that breed it, overlooks the often symbiotic relationship between a terrorist and the governments and policies he fights against.” Others go one step further and turn an explanation into a justification. Yassir Arafat, the Chairman of the PLO Executive Committtee, argued: “The use of the pro-Israeli media of the word ‘terrorism’ does not intimidate us, especially when it is used by forces that have colonialized peoples for hundreds of years, and accused freedom fighters of being ‘terrorists’ when they fought against occupation, terrorism and racial discrimination until they won their independence….” Regrettably, this justification has gained considerable support at the United Nations. Benzion Netanyahu, the Israeli Ambassador to the United Nations, has written in response: The typical stratagem at the United Nations, for example, has been to justify terrorism by calling it a struggle for national liberation. This is perverse enough in itself, because terrorism is always unjustifiable, regardless of professed or real goals. But it is perverse in another way. For the real goals of terrorists are in practice related to their methods. History has repeatedly given us advance warning. Those who deliberately butcher women and children do not have liberation in mind. It is not only that the ends of terrorists do not justify the means that they chose. It is that the choice of means indicates what the true ends are. Far from being fighters for freedom, the terrorists are the forerunners of a new tyranny. It is instructive to note that the French Resistance did not resort to the systematic killing of German women and children, well within reach in occupied France. A few years later, in Algeria, the FLN showed no such restraint against French occupation. France, of course, is today a democracy. Algeria is mearly another of the despotisms where terrorists have come to power. Realistically, the “root cause” theory **should be recognized as the “root cause fallacy**.” This is because, on a global basis, there **is scant evidence** to **support any direct correlation** between those who have suffered and those who commit acts of terrorism. Indeed on both an individual and group level, many of those who have suffered **most scrupulously avoid such acts**. The PLO, by contrast, purports to represent the Palestinian people, a group with options for non-violent political action and resources including wealth and education. Yet the PLO deliberately engages in terrorist acts while eschewing all other means of political redress. Any Arab leader showing the slightest inclination towards accommodation with Israel has risked assassination. Thus, PLO terror should be recognized as a cause for, not the result of, Palestinian frustration, desperation, and misery.