### T

**Interpretation “restriction” is a method of prohibiting authority**

Mohammed, 97

P.A. Mohammed, J. Sri Chithira Aero And Adventure ... vs The Director General Of Civil ... on 24 January, 1997¶ Equivalent citations: AIR 1997 Ker 121¶ Sri Chithira Aero And Adventure ... vs The Director General Of Civil ... on 24 January, 1997. http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/255504/?type=print

10. Microlight aircrafts or hang gliders shall not be flown over an assembly of persons or over congested areas or restricted areas including cantonment areas, defence installations etc. unless prior permission in writing is obtained from appropriate authorities. These provisions do not create any restrictions. There is no **total prohibition** of operation of microlight aircraft or hang gliders. The distinction between 'regulation' and 'restriction' **must be clearly perceived. The 'regulation' is a process which aids main function within the legal precinct whereas 'restriction' is a process which prevents the function without legal sanction**. Regulation is allowable but restriction is objectionable. What is contained in the impugned clauses is, only **regulations and not restrictions**, complete or partial. They **are issued with authority conferred on the first respondent**, under Rule 133A of the Aircraft Rules consistent with the provisions contained in the Aircraft Act 1934 relating to the operation, use etc. of aircrafts flying in India. Microlight aircrafts, hang gliders and powered hang gliders are all coming within the definition of 'aircraft' contained in Section 2( 1) of the Act. Section 5 of **the Act authorises** the Central Government to make rules regulating among other things use and operation of aircraft and lor securing the safety of aircraft operation. Rule 133A authorises the first respondent to issue directions relating to the operation and use of the aircraft. Thus the analysis of the above provisions would sufficiently indicate that **the** impugned **clauses** contained in Exts. P4 and P5 **are** purely **measures regulating** the use and **operation** of aircrafts.

**Increase means to become greater**

Increase:

in·crease verb \in-ˈkrēs, ˈin-ˌ\

intransitive verb

**1: to become progressively greater (as in size, amount, number, or intensity)**

2: to multiply by the production of young

**That’s Merriam-Webster 12**, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/increase?show=0&t=1348112715

**Executive authority stems from the constitution or statutory delegation.**

**Gaziano**, **2001**

(Todd, senior fellow in Legal Studies and Director of the Center for Legal Judicial Studies at the Heritage Foundation, 5 Texas Review of Law & Politics 267, Spring, lexis)

Although President Washington's Thanksgiving Proclamation was hortatory, other proclamations or orders that communicate presidential decisions may be legally binding. n31 Ultimately **the authority for all presidential orders or directives must come from either the Constitution or from statutory delegations**. **The source of authority (constitutional versus statutory) carries important implications for the extent to which that authority may be legitimately exercised or circumscribed**. Regardless of the source of substantive power, however, the authority to use written directives in the exercise of that power need not be set forth in express terms in the Constitution or federal statutes. As is explained further below, the authority to issue directives may be express, implied, or inherent in the substantive power granted to the President. The Constitution expressly mentions certain functions that are to be performed by the President. Congress has augmented the President's power by delegating additional authority within these areas of responsibility. The following are among the more important grants of authority under which the President may issue at least some directives in the exercise of his constitutional and statutorily delegated powers: Commander in Chief, Head of State, Chief Law Enforcement Officer, and Head of the Executive Branch.

**Violation – The Aff increases presidents war powers authority – It doesn’t prohibit the president from doing anything**

**Coronogue 12** – **1AC Author** (Graham, JD at duke, “A NEW AUMF: DEFINING COMBATANTS IN THE WAR ON TERROR”, http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1294&context=djcil, zzx)

This congressional authorization gave the president the authority to use force against those involved in the 9/11 attacks **and their allies**, but the war on terror has moved beyond this mandate. **In 2001, al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Osama bin Laden were clearly the “enemy.**”3 **The AUMF addressed this threat by providing domestic authorization for the use of force against all entities closely tied to 9/11.** However, ten years after the attacks, bin Laden is dead and the Taliban is a shadow of its former self.4 Yet the United States still uses the AUMF to justify the use of force against new terrorist and extremist groups, many of which were not closely involved in 9/11 and may not have even existed in 2001. Given this disconnect, politicians have advocated amending, scrapping, or reaffirming the AUMF to have it reflect the present reality of the conflict. The Obama administration argues that the AUMF should remain the same and has taken pains to expand the authorization to cover new terrorist threats from organizations unrelated to al-Qaeda.5 However, this ten-year-old authorization must be revised. **The United States is facing a new and still evolving enemy; our law on conflict must evolve with it.** We should not expect the President to simply reinterpret or stretch statutory language when considering such fundamentally important issues as national security, deadly force, and indefinite detention. This "stretching" out of the statute will create significant questions of legality and authorization in times when we cannot afford to hesitate or second-guess. **The President and the armed forces need an updated, clear, and explicit authorization to execute this war effectively** and know the limits of their power. In short. Congress must amend or update the AUMF to reflect the current reality of conflict and guide the President's prosecution of this war.

**Vote Neg**

**Limits – Their aff justifies any aff that has the judiciary or Congress clarify in ways that expand war powers - 1000s of ways to do that**

**Ground – Increasing restrictions is key to stable neg link and cp ground – clarifications to authority make all DA links non-unique – bidirectional affs are especially bad because they are reading neg ground on the aff**

**The aff is extra-topical – AUMF applies to things outside the resolution -**

Justice.gov 2006

(January 27, “THE NSA PROGRAM TO DETECT AND PREVENT TERRORIST ATTACKS

MYTH V. REALITY” <http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/nsa_myth_v_reality.pdf>)

**Myth: The NSA program is illegal. Reality: The President’s authority** to authorize the terrorist surveillance program is **firmly based both in** his constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief, and in **the** Authorization for Use of Military Force (**AUMF**) passed by Congress after the September 11 attacks. • As Commander-in-Chief and Chief Executive, the President has legal authority under the Constitution to authorize the NSA terrorist surveillance program. ¾ The Constitution makes protecting our Nation from foreign attack the President’s most solemn duty and provides him with the legal authority to keep America safe. ¾ It has long been recognized that the President has inherent authority to conduct warrantless surveillance to gather foreign intelligence even in peacetime. Every federal appellate court to rule on the question has concluded that the President has this authority and that it is consistent with the Constitution. ¾ Since the Civil War, wiretaps aimed at collecting foreign intelligence have been authorized by Presidents, and the authority to conduct warrantless surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes has been consistently cited and used when necessary. • **Congress confirmed and supplemented the President's constitutional authority to authorize this program when it passed the AUMF**. ¾ **The AUMF authorized the President to use “all necessary and appropriate military force against those** nations, **organizations**, or persons **he determines planned**, authorized, committed, or aided in the terrorist attacks that occurred on **September 11**, 2001.” **¾ In its Hamdi decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the AUMF also authorizes the “fundamental incident[s] of waging war.”** **The history of warfare makes clear that electronic surveillance** of the enemy **is** a **fundamental** incident to the use of military force.

**Extra T is a voter for limits – surveillance was rejected from the topic and is a whole new set of advantage ground and disads – it has to be a voting issue or it becomes a no risk issue for the Aff**

### 1NC

#### [A.] Text: United States congress should enact a statute that:

#### -authorizes the use of military force against organizations with sufficient capability and planning that it presents an immanent threat to the United States expressly in accordance with international self-defense law

#### -authorizes the president to use force consistent with power under Article II of the constitution.

#### -requires executive branch identification of groups covered by authorization of force modeled on the State Department’s Foreign Terrorist Organization designation process and detailed reports to Congress about the implementation of the authorization. Listings are to be subject to review and default sunset every two years.

#### [B.] Solvency: Solves the flexibility and accountability necessary to address extra-AUMF threats – it would be constitutionally approved, reassure international allies of legal justification for continuing conflict, and render the process more transparent and accountable.

Chesney et al., 13

Robert Chesney, Jack Goldsmith, Matthew Waxman, Benjamin Wittes, prof @ UT School of Law and fellow at Brookings Institution, Prof of Law at Harvard Law School and member of Hoover Institution, prof of Law at Columbia Law and senior fellow at Council on Foreign Relations, and senior fellow at Brookings, “A Statutory Framework for Next-Generation Terrorist Threats,” Jean Perkins Task Force on National Security and Law at Hoover Institute, February 25, 2013.

3. General Criteria Plus Listing¶ Based on current trends and the lessons from the past decade, we recommend ¶ a third approach: Congress sets forth general statutory criteria for presidential ¶ uses of force against new terrorist threats but requires the executive branch, ¶ through a robust administrative process, to identify particular groups that are ¶ covered by that authorization of force. One model to draw on, with modifications, ¶ is the State Department’s Foreign Terrorist Organization designation process. ¶ Under this process, the Secretary of State—pursuant to specific statutory ¶ standards, in consultation with other departments, and following a notification ¶ period to Congress—designates particular groups as terrorist organizations ¶ and thereby triggers statutory consequences for those groups and their members. ¶ We believe that a listing system modeled on this approach best cabins ¶ presidential power while at the same time giving the president the flexibility he ¶ needs to address emerging threats. Such a listing scheme will also render more ¶ transparent and regularized the now very murky process by which organizations ¶ and their members are deemed to fall within the September 2001 AUMF.¶ The listing approach is not without significant challenges, however. Some will ¶ claim that such a delegation to the president to identify the entities against ¶ whom force can be deployed would be unconstitutional. However, Congress has ¶ often authorized the president to use force in ways that leave the president ¶ significant discretion in determining the precise enemy.9¶ In light of this history, ¶ the waning of the non-delegation doctrine in other contexts, the congressional ¶ specification of the general criteria for the use of force, and the administrative, ¶ reporting, and timing limitations on the listing process described below, the ¶ constitutional objections can be overcome.¶ A more serious challenge is that the listing approach will appear to codify ¶ permanent war, and to diminish the degree of congressional involvement and ¶ inter-branch deliberation compared to the second approach. These concerns ¶ can be mitigated in several ways. First, the substantive statutory criteria ¶ governing this listing process should be as specific as possible. For example, ¶ a new AUMF might authorize force against “an organization with sufficient ¶ capability and planning that it presents an imminent threat to the United ¶ States.” Or it might authorize force against “any group or person that has ¶ committed a belligerent act against the U.S. or imminently threatens to do so.” ¶ In setting out such criteria, Congress could make clear precisely what it means ¶ by key terms such as “imminent” and “belligerent act.” The criteria should, ¶ moreover, be expressly linked to international self-defense law. Compliance ¶ with that law is an obligation of the United States. And from a diplomatic and ¶ international legal-policy standpoint it is important that the United States ¶ government as a whole make clear that this is not an open-ended “global war ¶ on terror” but a cabined application of traditional self-defense to the new ¶ realities of non-state threats.¶ Second, at the front end of the listing process, the administrative, consultative, ¶ and notification procedures should be sufficiently robust to ensure careful ¶ deliberation and strong accountability. At the same time, the statute should ¶ provide for emergency exercises of Article II power (which the Constitution ¶ arguably compels in any event), followed by a process for retroactive listing, ¶ to deal with rapidly moving crises while providing strong incentive for the ¶ president to fold his actions into the statutory scheme.¶ Finally, a listing scheme should include thorough ex post reporting and ¶ auditing as well. At a minimum the president should have a duty to report to ¶ Congress in detail on the intelligence and other factual bases that led to the ¶ inclusion of particular groups on the list. The president should also have a duty ¶ to file detailed reports with Congress—in a more robust form than the usually ¶ conclusory War Powers Resolution reports—about how the statutory ¶ authorization of force is being implemented. As has become typical in the ¶ exercise of its oversight of modern national security delegations, Congress ¶ would also likely deploy inspectors general to perform audits on elements ¶ of the listing process. Finally, once a group is listed, there will be tremendous ¶ political incentive not to de-list it. So to ensure continual reassessment of ¶ the need for authorized force against particular groups, all listing should be ¶ subject to a review and renewal process (say, every two years) with an ¶ automatic sunset if not affirmatively renewed. (We discuss the role of sunset ¶ provisions as a general feature of all three proposed authorizations in the ¶ next Part.)

### 1NC

#### Al Qaeda is weak now but could recover if the US allows them the opportunity

McLaughlin 13

(John McLaughlin was a CIA officer for 32 years and served as deputy director and acting director from 2000-2004. He currently teaches at the Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies and is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, ¶ 06:00 AM ET¶ Terrorism at a moment of transition7/12, http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2013/07/12/terrorism-at-a-moment-of-transition/)

A third major trend has to do with the debate underway among terrorists over tactics, targets, and ways to correct past errors.¶ On targets, jihadists are now pulled in many directions. Many experts contend they are less capable of a major attack on the U.S. homeland. But given the steady stream of surprises they’ve sprung – ranging from the 2009 “underwear bomber” to the more recent idea of a surgically implanted explosive – it is hard to believe they’ve given up trying to surprise us with innovations designed to penetrate our defenses.¶ We especially should remain alert that some of the smaller groups could surprise us by pointing an attacker toward the United States, as Pakistan’s Tehrik e Taliban did in preparing Faizal Shazad for his attempted bombing of Times Square in 2010.¶ At the same time, many of the groups are becoming intrigued by the possibility of scoring gains against regional governments that are now struggling to gain or keep their balance – opportunities that did not exist at the time of the 9/11 attacks.¶ Equally important, jihadists are now learning from their mistakes, especially the reasons for their past rejection by populations where they temporarily gained sway.¶ Documents from al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, discovered after French forces chased them from Mali, reveal awareness that they were too harsh on local inhabitants, especially women. They also recognized that they need to move more gradually and provide tangible services to populations – a practice that has contributed to the success of Hezbollah in Lebanon.¶ We are now seeing a similar awareness among jihadists in Syria, Tunisia, Libya, and Yemen. If these “lessons learned” take hold and spread, it will become harder to separate terrorists from populations and root them out.¶ Taken together, these three trends are a cautionary tale for those seeking to gauge the future of the terrorist threat.¶ Al Qaeda today may be weakened, but its wounds are far from fatal. It is at a moment of transition, immersed in circumstances that could sow confusion and division in the movement or, more likely, extend its life and impart new momentum.¶ So if we are ever tempted to lower our guard in debating whether and when this war might end, we should take heed of these trends and of the wisdom J. R. R. Tolkien has Eowyn speak in “Lord of the Rings”: "It needs but one foe to breed a war, not two ..."

#### Specifying terrorist groups hampers presidential flexibility

Chesney, et al., 13

[Robert Chesney, Jack Goldsmith (Senior Fellow and Member of the Task Force on National Security and Law), Matthew Waxman (member of the Task Force on National Security and Law), and Benjamin Wittes (member of the Task Force on National Security and Law), February 15th, 2013, Is the "War on Terror" Lawful?, <http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining-ideas/article/141091>, uwyo//amp]

Congress could instead authorize the President to use force against specified terrorist groups and/or in specified countries or geographic areas. This would resemble the more traditional approach by which Congress authorizes force against state adversaries or for particular operations within foreign countries. Recent news reports have suggested that some in the administration and the military are deliberating about whether to ask Congress for just such a statute to address Islamist terrorist threats in some North African countries. This “retail” approach – in contrast to the “wholesale” approach laid out in the previous section – is the one that, among our three options, most restricts presidential discretion.¶ In theory, the retail approach is advantageous because Congress would specifically define the enemy (recognizing, however, the difficulties associated with the AUMF in drawing clear boundaries around transnational terrorism groups). Congress must under this approach stay engaged politically and legally as threats evolve and emerge; it must debate and approve any significant expansions of the conflict.¶ A downside of the retail approach is that Congress probably cannot or will not, on a continuing basis, authorize force quickly or robustly enough to meet the threat, which is ever-morphing in terms of group identity and in terms of geographic locale. The emerging array of terrorist groups across North Africa, with varying types and degrees of links, and posing potentially different (and again, changing) threats to the United States, illustrates the difficulties of crafting force authorizations that are neither too narrow nor too broad.

#### Terrorist retaliation causes nuclear war – draws in Russia and China

Ayson, 10

Robert Ayson, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, 2010 (“After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld)

A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. t may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response.

### 1NC

#### Restricting Obama’s war powers fits perfectly with his presidential narrative of oscillations between hard power and soft rhetoric – it does nothing to rupture the narrative of expansionist masculinity which encodes the American Presidency

Landreau 2011

– John C, Ph.D. from Princeton University. Current Professor at TCNJ in Women’s and Gender Studies. *Obamas My Dad: Mixed Race Suspects, Political Anxiety and the New Imperialism,* The Third Space – a journal in feminist theory & culture, Vol 10. No. 1<http://www.thirdspace.ca/journal/article/viewArticle/landreau/408>

More than a few scholars have emphasized the democratic and dialogic character of President Barack Obama's rhetoric, especially in contrast to that of his main rivals in the 2008 presidential campaign (Ivie and Giner, Murphy, Rowland and Jones). While this characterization has merit in some areas, Obama's rhetoric is neither dialogic nor democratizing when he speaks about national security. On issues of national security, both during the campaign and after becoming president, Obama favours the standard-issue idiom of militarism and American exceptionalism that has characterized the rhetoric of presidents from both parties since World War II.[[1]](http://www.thirdspace.ca/journal/article/viewArticle/landreau/408#1) Indeed, his December 2009 decision to escalate military violence in Afghanistan is testimony to the power of the dominant paradigms of national security thinking in his rhetoric and his policies. Bonnie Mann argues that the suasive force of national security common sense in the United States is substantially provided by "the style of national manhood" (180). By style, Mann refers to the "aesthetic" of masculinity that is "[...]carried by stories and images more than by argument or reason" and that functions to orient our sense of what is legitimate, normal and right (and their opposites). The style of national manhood is hinged to broader political styles so that, for example, support for war becomes "[...]an intentional posture lived viscerally, a matter of who we are as a nation rather than a thoughtful commitment to the justice of a cause" (180). In a similar vein, this paper argues that Obama's national security rhetoric is based upon, and oriented by, the logic of American masculinity, and more specifically by the forms of presidential masculinity that are imbricated with national security thinking in our political culture. To make this argument, I begin with an analysis of the apparent differences between the national security rhetoric and policies of George W. Bush and those of Barack Obama. This is important because much of Obama's success in the 2008 electoral campaign was due to his promise of a new beginning in our approach to terrorism and security (Bostdorff). Also, many pundits and critics have praised his rhetoric in this arena in terms of a dramatic contrast between the two presidents, referring to Obama's appeals to soft rather than hard power, and to his performance of a more democratic, less authoritarian leadership style in the global community (Bostdorff, Ivie and Giner, Landreau). My argument swims against this current in that I characterize both Obama's national security policies, and his performance of presidential masculinity, in a line of continuity with Bush. I substantiate this conclusion with a close analysis of three of Obama's speeches. First, I look at Obama's speech in acceptance of the Democratic Nomination in August, 2008. This speech is important because it reveals a great deal about the gravitational force of masculinity in national security rhetoric as Obama shifts his attention from the Democratic primary against a female candidate who was too militaristic for Democratic voters, to the general election campaign against a male candidate with especially strong national security credentials. Then, I turn to the two major speeches in December 2009 in which Obama justifies and explains the aggressive use of U.S. military violence in the Middle East: these are the speech announcing the escalation of the war in Afghanistan at West Point, and the speech in acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize. Obama as the anti-Bush: the Rhetoric of a New Beginning Both during his campaign, and in his presidential inauguration speech, Barack Obama promised a "new beginning" in American foreign and national security policy (especially in relation to the Middle East) that would both keep us safe from enemies and "restore our moral standing" (Obama, Acceptance). In particular, this new beginning promised to distance U.S. foreign policy from the grim (and largely illegal) features of the Bush administration's "war on terror" such as the executive sanctioning of the torture of prisoners, the maintenance of a gulag of foreign detention centres where prisoners could be treated outside the guidelines of U.S. and international law, and illegal secret initiatives such as the program to assassinate Al-Qaeda operatives directed by Vice President Cheney (Mazzetti and Shane). In his first day in the White House, on January 22, 2009, Obama issued three executive orders that followed through on this promise.[[2]](http://www.thirdspace.ca/journal/article/viewArticle/landreau/408#2) In addition to these early executive orders, in the days and months following his election Obama showed great rhetorical sensitivity to the wide-spread negative perception in the Middle East of U.S. imperial behavior and designs, its uncritical support of Israel, and its disregard for civilian casualties and for the civil rights of prisoners. In an effort to reverse the tide of anti-American feeling, Obama's first post-inaugural interview was given to Hisham Melhem of Al Arabiya TV news (Interview). This was followed in April and May by major addresses in Ankara and Cairo whose primary intended audience was Middle Eastern and, more broadly, Islamic. Both of these speeches articulate a new rhetoric of hope for U.S.-Middle Eastern relations. In the speech to the Turkish parliament, for example, Obama declares: I [...] want to be clear that America's relationship with the Muslim community, the Muslim world, cannot, and will not, just be based upon opposition to terrorism. We seek broader engagement based on mutual interest and mutual respect. We will listen carefully, we will bridge misunderstandings, and we will seek common ground. We will be respectful, even when we do not agree [...]. (para. 38) Hope for a new era of U.S Middle East relations is here embodied by an attitude of respect, by a willingness to negotiate differences and find areas of mutual interest, and by an explicit criticism of the unilateral and monologic focus of the Bush administration on the 'war on terror'. This apparent change in direction in national security and foreign policy seems to be characterized by an alternate version of presidential masculinity and by an alternate telling of the myth of American exceptionalism. Many have commented on the muscular character of George W. Bush's rhetoric of war and national security. Indeed, his policies in what he called the 'war on terror' depended almost exclusively on what Joseph Nye famously called "hard power", and were justified rhetorically by a conspicuously militarist and masculinist narrative about America's role in world history and politics.[[3]](http://www.thirdspace.ca/journal/article/viewArticle/landreau/408#3) In contrast to the "[...] stern projection of a tough national persona" (Ivie and Giner 288) in Bush's rhetoric and policies, Obama seems to articulate a gentler, more reasoned approach to national security and terrorism that includes the use of 'hard' military power but also depends importantly on 'soft' power in the form of diplomacy, international cooperation, and an emphasis on human rights, economic stability and political freedom. Ivie and Giner argue that the success of Obama's rhetorical appeal to 'soft' power during the 2008 presidential campaign was due to his ability to harness and resignify the deeply-resonant myth of American exceptionalism for a more democratic and community-minded projection of America's role in world affairs. In Obama's version of national security, they write: A less tragic sense of order mandated a reduced sense of guilt and thereby decreased the need for redemption via the cult of killing. This expression of national mission in more democratic and practical terms indicated, at least "logologically," the possibility of aligning public culture with a more global and constructive perspective on matters of national security. It revealed the possibility of a founding myth reformed to relax the lethal grip of the Evil One on the conscience of a nation that might do more good in the world if it were burdened less by tragic guilt.[[4]](http://www.thirdspace.ca/journal/article/viewArticle/landreau/408#4) (296) This conclusion requires a retrospective reassessment in the light of Obama's decision to escalate the war in Afghanistan. How do we reconcile Obama's seemingly dramatic shift from progressive presidential candidate who was proud to have opposed the war in Iraq from the beginning, and who abolished the use of torture and illegal detention in his first day in office, to the president who in December 2009 made the decision to pursue and significantly escalate military violence in Afghanistan? How do we reconcile Obama's seemingly contradictory use of both the soft rhetoric of hope and diplomacy and the hard rhetoric of fear and military violence in his national security statements and speeches? In the analysis that follows I argue that while Obama at times articulates a softer version of foreign policy, and seems to perform a softer, more inclusive presidential masculinity in the area of global politics and terrorism, this does not fundamentally signify a different orientation to national security as some have argued. I emphasize how Obama's rhetoric and policies fall within the standard rhetorical oscillations that constitute the myth of American exceptionalism and presidential masculinity, and that those oscillations are principally and most significantly oriented by the more militarist and conventionally masculinist versions of the myth. Obama's speech at the Democratic National Convention in August 2008 marks the formal shift of his campaign focus from Democratic Party voters towards a national audience, and from his rivalry with Hillary Clinton to a campaign against John McCain. In terms of Obama's national security rhetoric, this is a fascinating moment because, in this new broader context, he makes an attitudinal shift to a more militarized and masculinized mode of speech. In fact, Obama's performance of soft masculinity on issues of national security during the primary campaign was an opportune product of the moment that did not reflect the principal orientation of his thinking.[[5]](http://www.thirdspace.ca/journal/article/viewArticle/landreau/408#5) This is quite clear in the nomination speech as he shifts his campaign towards a more conservative national audience, and directs his attention from a female rival to a male rival with military credentials. Obama's first sentence about foreign policy in the nomination speech concerns his own stature and ability to lead American troops into battle, and to battle John McCain for the position of commander in chief. "If John McCain wants to have a debate about who has the temperament and judgment to serve as the next commander-in-chief, that's a debate I'm ready to have." (para. 79) What is most interesting about this lead-in to the topic of national security, terrorism, and foreign policy is that its main rhetorical function is to emphasize Obama's masculine capability. It does this by declaring his presidential mettle, but also through the performance of an 'I dare you' challenge to his political adversary. It seems to say, 'if you want to fight, then let's fight. Bring it on!' Why does Obama begin this section of the speech with a flexing of muscle? In part, it has to do with the histrionics of presidential campaigns, and in this particular campaign with the anticipated challenge to Obama's military masculinity from John McCain, a candidate with a powerful story of military bravery and heroism to his credit. At the same time, the foregrounding of presidential masculinity in terms of the resolve and capacity to lead the armed forces into battle is nothing unusual. The most significant human protagonist in the narrative of American exceptionalism is almost always the figure of the president. This is especially true in times of danger, crisis or war. He is the commander in chief of the armed forces. To him goes the job of protecting the national family from outside threats and danger. To do this effectively, he must be brave, decisive and rational. He cannot afford to be feminized by being overly emotional or sympathetic to others; he cannot succumb to doubts, or become scared to act (Cohn, Cuordileone, Hopper, Lakoff, Sylvester, Tickner, Young). It is to this mythos that Obama's beginning performance of masculinity in the speech belongs. In the new context of a national audience, it stands out as a deeply-felt and vigorously articulated orientation towards national security. After this initial show of male plumage, Obama continues the foreign policy section of the nomination speech by contrasting his youthful masculinity to McCain's elderly, bumbling masculinity. For -- while Senator McCain was turning his sights to Iraq just days after 9/11, I stood up and opposed this war, knowing that it would distract us from the real threats that we face. When John McCain said we could just muddle through in Afghanistan, I argued for more resources and more troops to finish the fight against the terrorists who actually attacked us on 9/11, and made clear that we must take out Osama bin Laden and his lieutenants if we have them in our sights. (para. 80-81) While McCain turns his sights away from the target, Obama stands up. While McCain muddles, Obama works to finish the fight and "take out" bin Laden if he's "in our sights." In the subtly crafted metaphor of aiming a gun at an enemy that organizes the passage, McCain appears as a distracted old soldier who aims at the wrong target and is generally confused. In contrast, vigorous and youthful, Obama stands up purposely, aims at the target, and fires. These metaphors all work to highlight the differences between McCain and Obama in terms of their embodiment of a properly militarized masculinity: which candidate can stand up, correctly identify the enemy, and fire the necessary shots to kill him. Obama criticizes McCain for standing alone in "stubborn refusal" to recognize the realities of the conflict (that it is with al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, not in Iraq), and therefore for lacking judgment. This lack of judgment is also narrated in terms of a contrast between a youthful and an aging masculinity: "We need a president who can face the threats of the future, not keep grasping at the ideas of the past." (para. 84) Obama declares. The contrast between a man who grasps at the past and one who "faces" the future is coded with messages about age and masculinity: youthful, confident stepping forward into the future versus old, unsteady back-stepping towards the past. At stake in this contrast is which strategy will "defeat" the enemy. "You don't defeat -- you don't defeat a terrorist network that operates in 80 countries by occupying Iraq", (para. 85) Obama argues. These are enemies who must be killed in order to protect the nation. To do this requires a commander-in-chief with masculine resolve and courage who can lead us into battle. This is not work for touchy-feely idealists who want to understand, communicate, and negotiate. And Republicans, Obama points out proudly, are not the only ones with the proper testicular size to lead the army into battle: "We are the party of Roosevelt. We are the party of Kennedy. So don't tell me that Democrats won't defend this country. Don't tell me that Democrats won't keep us safe." (para. 87) As in his opening statement, part of the effectiveness of these lines is their performance of a kind of "I'm up to the challenge masculinity" that talks tough, is aggressive with challengers ("don't tell me"), and does not back down. The rhetoric of American exceptionalism and presidential masculinity foregrounded here in the nomination clearly constitutes the dominant note of continuity in Obama's national security thinking. This is most evident in his two speeches from December 2009 in which he justifies his decision to escalate the war in Afghanistan as the following discussion will show. Obama's December 2009 speech at West Point argues for the strategic necessity and ethical correctness of increased war effort in Afghanistan on the basis of history. The history begins with the 19 Al Qaeda operatives who committed the terrorist atrocities on 9/11 and moves quickly to focus on the Taliban who provided them with a secure base from which to operate. After 9/11, as Obama tells the story, we made great military inroads against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, but then mistakenly turned our attention to Iraq. This provided an opening for the Taliban, and for Al Qaeda, who are now coming back into Afghanistan from Pakistan. The Afghan government cannot fight them off and therefore, he says, summing it all up: "In short, the status quo is not sustainable" (para. 12). How does a rudimentary history like this serve as an explanation or justification for war? What is the mediating logic? The over-simplification of contemporary U.S and Afghan history entailed in this schematic narrative is head-spinning.[[6]](http://www.thirdspace.ca/journal/article/viewArticle/landreau/408#6) But, even putting that aside, if one accepts the history at face value, it is still the case that our commitment to war is left unexplained and unjustified by the narrative. The history begins with 19 terrorists, and ends with the large-scale military action on the part of the United States. Should it not take a lot more than saying, 'well, the Taliban are gaining momentum and, remember, they are best friends with Al Qaeda' to justify the deployment of 100,000 U.S. troops, predator drones strikes all over northern Pakistan and eastern Afghanistan, full involvement of the CIA, major flows of capital and materiel, and huge contracts with private military contractors like XE Services (aka Blackwater)? Obama's historical narrative simply does not add up to a political argument for this kind of war, and for this kind of outlay of capital. As a justification for war, it seems, rather, to be structured like a myth in the sense that Roland Barthes gave the word. Myth, according to Barthes, is paradoxically effective because, formally, it works like an alibi. It is an explanation based on an absence of evidence and meaning rather than its presence. In an alibi (the accused was absent not present at the scene) the meaning and the evidence are always elsewhere (121-127). Obama's narrative amounts to a mythological explanation for war in the sense that its significance lies not in the history itself but in the formal seriousness of a president telling a story to justify war. That is, its significance lies in the rhetorical gesture that serves to remind the audience of the president's authority as commander in chief and of his role to defend the nation from harm. By telling this story the president in effect quotes an array of motives, intentions, plot sequences and characters that are formally full even if their content in this instance is misleading or empty. To paraphrase Hayden White, in this case the content is the form. Here, the details of the story of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan are significant to the extent that they play a role in a larger narrative already familiar to the American audience: the Unites States stands for peace and prosperity, freedom and democracy but sometimes it is attacked by evil enemies whose irrational desire is to destroy all that is good. In that circumstance, the president must protect the national family through the use of military violence. War is the best and, in fact, the only way to make ourselves secure. Following this schematic historical narrative with which he begins the West Point speech, Obama reassures the audience that his final decision to escalate the war was taken only after a serious and difficult deliberative process. This process, he says, "has allowed me to ask the hard questions, and to explore all the different options, along with my national security team, our military and civilian leadership in Afghanistan, and our key partners. And given the stakes involved, I owed the American people -- and our troops -- no less." (para. 13) The image of the president very seriously asking questions, exploring options, and consulting experts is one intended to produce a sense of citizen confidence both in the decision and in the decider (as George W. Bush famously called himself) again without revealing any of the details or particulars that constitute the decision. The rhetorical appeal here is essentially charismatic and depends on thick cultural associations with the president as benevolent paternal authority, and as rational but determined protector of the nation. The tone of the passage is that of a father reassuring his family that the big decision he has made today was made with great care, and with their communal welfare in mind. Obama's stress on his careful deliberation process but not on the content of the deliberation is reminiscent of Iris Marion Young's emphasis on the "logic of masculinist protection" in national security thinking. This is a logic that connects the protective role of the father in the patriarchal family with the role of commander in chief. In both cases, she argues that one of the prices exacted by benevolent masculinist protection is that the protected woman/feminized citizen must concede "critical distance from decision-making autonomy." (120). In other words, if the fatherly president's allegiance to citizens and soldiers is expressed in the mindfulness with which he makes communal decisions of this magnitude, then it is equally true that our allegiance to the father-president is expressed in our acceptance of his authority and judgment to do what is best for us in these circumstances. The allegiance to the father quickly becomes the measure of our patriotism. As a rhetorical strategy, then, Obama's description of the seriousness of his decision-making process serves to legitimate his decision to escalate war through an appeal to an image of protective presidential masculinity. This appeal interpellates the audience in the role of a complicit, feminized citizenry that needs such fatherly protection.[[7]](http://www.thirdspace.ca/journal/article/viewArticle/landreau/408#7) After the scant historical review, and a summary of where we are and why we are obliged to go to war, Obama devotes a good portion of the West Point speech to making a series of sequential points, statements of fact, and reasoned arguments. For example, he gives three specific goals for the Afghan intervention, and outlines how those goals will be achieved and how it will all be paid for. He also identifies three possible objections to the escalation and gives reasoned arguments for why these criticisms are incorrect. In sum, he says "As President, I refuse to set goals that go beyond our responsibility, our means, or our interests." (para. 37).As feminist International Relations scholars have argued, to talk about war in rationalist terms as Obama does here tends to divert attention from the cruelties of war, and to imagine the truth of war "abstracted from bodies" (Ruddick 132). It becomes difficult, in this context, to focus on, or give weight to, the terrible details of war, and in particular to the death and destruction that modern wars exact mostly from civilians not soldiers.[[8]](http://www.thirdspace.ca/journal/article/viewArticle/landreau/408#8) As a rhetorical performance, the description of war in terms of rational sequences and formulas also tends to give authority to the rhetorician himself by distancing him from feminized forms of emotionality or care work (Cohn). Obama ends his speech with the conclusion that presidential war speeches commonly have: an eloquent and solemn call to unity and patriotism. "Now, let me be clear: None of this will be easy. The struggle against violent extremism will not be finished quickly, and it extends well beyond Afghanistan and Pakistan. It will be an enduring test of our free society, and our leadership in the world." (para. 41) The logic of a bond between our free society and our leadership in the world is presupposed rather than described or explained. Like all heroes, the hero of the exceptionalist narrative faces a test. In this instance, he is us, and our essential quality of being a free society is linked to our dominance in the world. Since the days of Franklin Roosevelt, and the service and sacrifice of our grandparents and great-grandparents, our country has borne a special burden in global affairs. We have spilled American blood in many countries on multiple continents.We have spent our revenue to help others rebuild from rubble and develop their own economies. We have joined with others to develop an architecture of institutions -- from the United Nations to NATO to the World Bank -- that provide for the common security and prosperity of human beings. We have not always been thanked for these efforts, and we have at times made mistakes. But more than any other nation, the United States of America has underwritten global security for over six decades -- a time that, for all its problems, has seen walls come down, and markets open, and billions lifted from poverty, unparalleled scientific progress and advancing frontiers of human liberty. For unlike the great powers of old, we have not sought world domination.Our union was founded in resistance to oppression. We do not seek to occupy other nations. We will not claim another nation's resources or target other peoples because their faith or ethnicity is different from ours. What we have fought for -- what we continue to fight for -- is a better future for our children and grandchildren. And we believe that their lives will be better if other peoples' children and grandchildren can live in freedom and access opportunity (para. 47-49). Unlike other world powers, we are benevolent, seeking only that which will make the world a better place. We are, that is to say, a world power but not a world empire. Our history shows this: our military violence and our leadership have underwritten global security for over sixty years. Strangely, though, our fatherly sacrifice to protect the world from harm is sometimes misunderstood, and "we have not always been thanked for our efforts." Who are the unthankful and what is their story? In the standard-issue exceptionalist narrative, they are the enemies of freedom, the sowers of chaos, and the ideologically possessed. Obama certainly believes this. At the same time, the statement that "we have not always been thanked for our efforts" also expresses a deep anxiety about the details and the stories that are erased by the great father's version of history. The Nobel Prize acceptance speech, given just nine days after Obama's announcement of the escalation of the war in Afghanistan, provides a fascinating expansion of the plot of "American as good vs. foreign as evil" that informs the narrative justification for war in the West Point speech. In this speech, Obama contextualizes both American exceptionalism in general, and his specific decision to expand the war in Afghanistan, in a sweeping historical narrative of global progress. "At the dawn of history," Obama declares, "war was routinely pursued between tribes and peoples quite simply as a way of 'seeking power and settling disputes." (para. 6) Later, as "man" progressed, legal and diplomatic efforts were made in an attempt to regulate war and the way it was pursued. Obama invokes just war theory citing it as one of the principle ways in which humans have tried to regulate and civilize war. In Obama's narrative, the United States is located at the upper end of this historical progression because it is the United States that has provided the leadership to produce the global "architecture" of peace in the form of the United Nations, support for human rights, nuclear arms reductions, and so on. Elaborating on the schematic history of the United States that appeared in the West Point speech, Obama says The United States of America has helped underwrite global security for more than six decades with the blood of our citizens and the strength of our arms. The service and sacrifice of our men and women in uniform has promoted peace and prosperity from Germany to Korea, and enabled democracy to take hold in places like the Balkans. We have borne this burden not because we seek to impose our will. We have done so out of enlightened self-interest -- because we seek a better future for our children and grandchildren, and we believe that their lives will be better if others' children and grandchildren can live in freedom and prosperity (para. 18). J. Ann Tickner argues that the idea of enlightened self interest corresponds to a masculinist model of international relations in which states are systematic and instrumental they are competitive "profit maximizers that pursue power and autonomy in an anarchic world system

."(52) In this context, if international cooperation exists, it is explained not in terms of community or an interdependent notion of security and welfare, but rather in terms of rational choice and enlightened self-interest. Here, in Obama's version, we shoulder the burden of world peace and prosperity both heroically (with American blood and military power) but also as rational actors. We act not as an imperial power, but as a benign power exercising rational choices in a dangerous world in order to protect our interests. By virtue of the incantatory power of the exceptionalist narrative, our interests are identical with democratic values and the cause of economic justice. The awkward context of the Nobel Prize speech both clarifies and complicates Obama's justification of war. While acknowledging the "moral force" of the theory of non-violence, he also argues that "evil does exist in the world" and that a realist assessment of the world "as it is" sometimes requires violence. This part of the speech is quite subtle, shuttling back and forth between the recognition that war is terrible and the insistence that it is sometimes necessary. The notion that war is sometimes just and sometimes necessary for building peace is modified throughout with an appeal to "responsibility" and to the rational, measured use of military violence. Obama argues that "all responsible nations must embrace the role that militaries with a clear mandate can play to keep the peace." (para. 26) The rationalist tone of responsibility and militaries with clear mandates is matched by Obama's framing of the philosophical question of war and peace as a matter of human imperfection. The ideals of peace are beautiful, but in the world as it is human beings are not perfect. They sometimes act unaccountably and irresponsibly. And sometimes they must be stopped from perpetrating evil. At the end of the speech, Obama signals what for him is the chief human imperfection that is at the root of so much of the world's violence. He says, As the world grows smaller, you might think it would be easier for human beings to recognize how similar we are; to understand that we're all basically seeking the same things; that we all hope for the chance to live out our lives with some measure of happiness and fulfillment for ourselves and our families. And yet somehow, given the dizzying pace of globalization, the cultural leveling of modernity, it perhaps comes as no surprise that people fear the loss of what they cherish in their particular identities -- their race, their tribe, and perhaps most powerfully their religion. In some places, this fear has led to conflict. At times, it even feels like we're moving backwards. We see it in the Middle East, as the conflict between Arabs and Jews seems to harden. We see it in nations that are torn asunder by tribal lines. And most dangerously, we see it in the way that religion is used to justify the murder of innocents by those who have distorted and defiled the great religion of Islam, and who attacked my country from Afghanistan. These extremists are not the first to kill in the name of God; the cruelties of the Crusades are amply recorded. But they remind us that no Holy War can ever be a just war (para. 47-49). In the context of globalization, what jams the machine is fear of loss of identity. This fear also gets in the way of our universal human aspirations for peace and prosperity. The most notable example of this kind of fear is, of course, the terrorism practiced by al Qaeda. This is a fear underwritten by megalomania: the idea that violence is mandated by God. What is striking about this passage is that it plots opposition to globalization as fear of change, almost as a kind of primitive or childish clinging to identity in a world whose universal characteristics are evident. But can this be the whole story? Can one explain the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, as Obama appears to do here, as irrational fear of loss of identity? Is opposition to capitalist globalization American-style, and under the paternal arm of American power, always and everywhere a form of childishness or partial vision? In his concluding comments, Obama quotes Martin Luther King's 1964 Nobel Prize acceptance speech in which he talks about the moral necessity of striving for what ought to be rather than accepting things as they are. This is an eloquent but highly impertinent frame for the speech. In his Nobel address, King soundly rejects those versions of history organized around notions of necessary violence. Accepting the prize on behalf of the entire civil rights movement, King says: After contemplation, I conclude that this award which I receive on behalf of that movement is a profound recognition that nonviolence is the answer to the crucial political and moral question of our time - the need for man to overcome oppression and violence without resorting to violence and oppression. Civilization and violence are antithetical concepts. Negroes of the United States, following the people of India, have demonstrated that nonviolence is not sterile passivity, but a powerful moral force which makes for social transformation. Sooner or later all the people of the world will have to discover a way to live together in peace, and thereby transform this pending cosmic elegy into a creative psalm of brotherhood. If this is to be achieved, man must evolve for all human conflict a method which rejects revenge, aggression and retaliation. The foundation of such a method is love (para. 4). King clearly rejects the idea that civilization sometimes requires violence, or that violence can sometimes be just or moral. Love, in King's terms, is antithetical to the discourse of innocence, guilt, power and violence that constitutes the narrative of American exceptionalism. Instead, King's ethic of love is consonant with Judith Butler's critique of violence: The violent response is the one that does not ask, and does not seek to know. It wants to shore up what it knows, to expunge what threatens it with not-knowing, what forces it to reconsider the presuppositions of its world, their contingency, their malleability. The nonviolent response lives with its unknowingness about the Other in the face of the Other, since sustaining the bond that the question opens is finally more valuable than knowing in advance what holds us in common, as if we already have all the resources we need to know what defines the human, what its future life might be (35). This is precisely what is wrong with the narrative of American exceptionalism, and with Obama's obligation to it. A story whose plot is organized entirely around the character of its hero does not seek to know. It is narcissistic. It shores up what it knows in fear of the Other, and in this gesture reconfirms that its view of the world is the truth. Obama seems oblivious to the contradictions in his assertion of American power as he struggles here to articulate the oxymoron of peace through war. In the end, what "makes sense" in his justification for war is the cultural and political sense that adheres to the image of embodied presidential masculinity, and to his military leadership performed in patriotic service to America's heroic global mission.

#### The splitting of the atom is a symptom of man’s persistence in his refusal to reunite with and affirm his body and the female body-only through this affirmation does the destruction of humynkind become unthinkable

Irigaray 85

[Luce Irigaray, 1985, “An Ethics of Sexual Difference”, uwyo//amp]

To forget being is to forget the air, this first fluid given us gratis and free of interest in the mother's blood, given us again when we are born, like a natural profusion that raises a cry of pain: the pain of a being who comes into the world and is abandoned, forced henceforth to live without the immediate assistance of another body. Unmitigated mourning for the intrauterine nest, elemental homesickness that man will seek to assuage through his work as builder of worlds, and notably of the dwelling which seems to form the essence of his maleness: language. In all his creations, all his works, man always seems to neglect thinking of himself as flesh, as one who has received his body as that primary home (that Gestell, as Heidegger would say, when, in "Logos," the seminar on Heraclitus, he recognizes that what metaphysics has not begun to address is the issue of the body) which determines the possibility of his coming into the world and the potential opening of a horizon of thought, of poetry, of celebration, that also includes the god or gods. The fundamental dereliction in our time may be interpreted as our failure to remember or prize the element that is indispensable to life in all its manifestations: from the lowliest plant and animal forms to the highest. Science and technology are reminding men of their careless neglect by forcing them to consider the most frightening question possible, the question of a radical polemic: the destruction of the universe and of the human race through the splitting of the atom and its exploitation to achieve goals that are beyond our capacities as mortals.

#### The alternative is to reject the aff and reinterpret the 1AC harms through the lens of sexual difference

Irigaray 85

[Luce Irigaray, 1985, “An Ethics of Sexual Difference”, uwyo//amp]

Sexual difference is one of the major philosophical issues, if not the issue, of our age. According to Heidegger, each age has one issue to think through, and one only. Sexual difference is prQbably the issue in our time which could be our "salvation" if we thought it through. But, whether I turn to philosophy, to science, or to religion, I find this underlying issue still cries out in vain for our attention. Think of it as an approach that would allow us to check the many forms that destruction takes in our world, to counteract a nihilism that merely affirms the reversal or the repetitive proliferation of status quo values-whether you call them the consumer society, the circularity of discourse, the more or less cancerous diseases of our age, the unreliability of words, the end of philosophy, religious despair or regression to religiosity, scientis tic or technical imperialism that fails to consider the living subject. Sexual difference would constitute the horizon of worlds more fecund than any known to date-at least in the West-and without reducing fecundity to the reproduction of bodies and flesh. For loving partners this would be a fecundity of birth and regeneration, but also the production of a new age of thought, art, poetry, and language: the creation of a new poetics. Both in theory and in practice, everything resists the discovery and affirmation of such an advent or event. In theory, philosophy wants to be literature or rhetoric, wishing either to break with ontology or to regress to the ontological. Using the same ground and the same framework as "first philosophy," working toward its disintegration but without proposing any other goals that might assure new foundations and new works. In politics, some overtures have been made to the world of women. But these overtures remain partial and local: some concessions have been made by those in power, but no new values have been established. Rarely have these measures been thought through and affirmed by women themselves, who consequently remain at the level of critical demands. Has a worldwide erosion of the gains won in women's struggles occurred because of the failure to lay foundations different from those on which the world of men is constructed? Psychoanalytic theory and therapy, the scenes of sexuality as such, are a long way from having effected their revolution. And with a few exceptions, sexual practice today is often divided between two parallel worlds: the world of men and the world of women. A nontraditional, fecund encounter between the sexes barely exists. It does not voice its demands publicly, except through certain kinds of silence and polemics. A revolution in thought and ethics is needed if the work of sexual difference is to take place. We need to reinterpret everything concerning the relations between the subject and discourse, the subject and the world, the subject and the cosmic,' the microcosmic and the macrocosmic. Everything, beginning with the way in which the subject has always been written in the masculine form, as man, even when it claimed to be universal or neutral. Despite the fact that man-at least in French-rather than being neutral, is sexed.

### 1NC

#### The Israeli Supreme Court should rule the authority for self-defense targeted killings is limited to instances outside of a conflict.

#### Israel is comparatively more influential in the area of targeted killing.

Fisher, 7

[Jason, Judicial Clerk to the Honorable James O. Browning, United States District Court for the District of New Mexico; J.D./M.A. University of California, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 45 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 711]

Norms also may and frequently do attain greater prominence due to the efforts of norm entrepreneurs. A State, community, organization, or individual setting out to change the normative understandings and behavior of others may be considered a norm entrepreneur. n162 States possess advantages over other types of actors if they wish to act as norm entrepreneurs attempting to usher developing norms through the norm life cycle. Most States interact across a "wide range of fora and situations with ... other states" and, as such, "have many opportunities ... to persuade other states of the rightness of their views." n163 Powerful States, moreover, tend to have more communication resources and to have more opportunities to interact with more States more often than less powerful States and, thus, hold an entrepreneurial advantage. n164 The relative power positions of the United States and Israel in the system of States would appear to provide both of them with the capabilities and opportunities to engage in actively persuading other States to adopt their norms. However, given the sensitive nature and limited application of a norm permitting the use of targeted killing as a counter-terrorism tactic, it seems likely that both the United States and Israel would be wary of being seen as too actively engaged in promoting such a norm. That said, Israel's willingness and, to a lesser extent, the United States' willingness to acknowledge and defend their use of targeted killing, thereby communicating, underscoring, and justifying [\*739] their behavior, may be viewed as a limited, restrained form of norm entrepreneurship. n165 Israel regularly announces the circumstances and results of its targeted killing operations. n166 For example, on November 9, 2000, following the targeted killing of Tanzim member Hussein Abayat, an Israeli Defense Force (IDF) spokesperson announced that: During an IDF-initiated action in the area of the village of Beit-Sahur, missiles were launched by IDF helicopters at the vehicle of a senior Fatah/Tanzim activist. The pilot reported an accurate hit. The activist was killed, and his aide, who accompanied him, was wounded ... . Abayat is suspected of having initiated and executed numerous shooting attacks in Beit-Sahur, Gilo, and al-Khder during which three IDF soldiers were killed ... . The action this morning is a long-term activity undertaken by the Israeli Security Forces, targeted at the groups responsible for the escalation of violence. n167 Israel's readiness to acknowledge its use of targeted killing suggests that Israel believes and is willing to communicate its beliefs that targeted killing is a justifiable and permissible counter-terrorism tactic. Further implying that it believes targeted killing ought to be recognized as a permitted tactic, Israel has publicly declared that it will continue to employ targeted killing: the Israeli Deputy Defense Minister, Ephraim Sneh, announced in March 2001, "We will hit all those who are involved in terrorist operations, attacks, or preparations for attacks." n168 Additionally, Israel has publicly defended and justified its use of targeted killing. Deputy Defense Minister Sneh, for example, has also stated, "I can tell you unequivocally what the policy is. If anyone has committed or is planning to carry out terrorist attacks, he has to be hit ... . It is effective, precise and just." n169 Shaul Mofaz, the Israeli Defense Minister, has also justified targeted killing by proclaiming its effectiveness: "There is no question about its efficacy. Look what happened to Hamas in the years it conducted an untrammeled suicide bombing war against us. When we started [\*740] the targeted killings, the situation changed." n170

# 2NC

### Impact overview

#### Flight from the body constructs everything as bare life- the dematerialization of the body supports a politics of mass extermination that reifes Foucault’s underside of power- leads to mass genocide of marginalized bodies

#### Patriarchy is not inevitable—failure to solve guarantees extinction

**Clark 04**[Mary E., PhD and professor of biological studies @ Berkeley, "RHETORIC, PATRIARCHY & WAR: EXPLAINING THE DANGERS OF "LEADERSHIP" IN MASS CULTURE", http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi\_0199-4005307/Rhetoric-patriarchy-war-explaining-the.html]

**I begin by questioning the notion that patriarchy is a "natural" or "inevitable" form of human society.** By "patriarchy" I do not mean a community or society where males hold political positions as spokespersons for the whole and often are adjudicators of local disputes. This "male function" is common in tribal and indigenous societies. But men's power over others is severely limited and generally held only at the pleasure of the entire group, especially the elder women. (4) **Patriarchies, rather, are those much larger societies where not only is there gender dominance; they also are highly class-structured, with a small, powerful elite controlling the rest of society,**A short history of these entities is necessary to understand today's dilemma. **Rigidly controlled patriarchies have evolved and disintegrated at many times and in many places in the past few millennia of human existence-which**, being the era of written history**, is the condition of humankind most familiar to us.** But, as I have argued elsewhere (5) **this was an unknown political condition throughout earlier human existence, when small, egalitarian, highly dialogic communities prevailed. Even today, small remnants of such societies still exist in comers of the planet that escaped the socially destructive impact of Western colonization. Modern Western "democracies" are, in fact, patriarchal in structure**, evolving out of the old, male-dominated aristocracies of late-Medieval Europe. Those historic class/caste hierarchies were legitimized by embedded religious dogma and inherited royal authority. Together, church and monarch held a monopoly of physical and economic power, creating politically stable, albeit unjust, societies. During the gradual development of the religious Reformation, coupled with the Enlightenment's concept of the "individual citizen," emerging egalitarian ideas threatened to destabilize the social coherence of patriarchal regimes. At the same time, principalities and dukedoms were fusing into kingdoms; kingdoms, in turn, were joining together as giant nation states. The United Kingdom was formed of England, Wales and Scotland-each a fusion of local earlier dukedoms. City States of Italy fused rather later. Bismarck created the "Second Reich" out of diverse German-speaking princedoms in the 1870s. And, adding to this growth in the sheer size of patriarchies there was a doubling of populations every couple of generations. **Nation-states emerged as "mass cultures," with literally millions of persons under the control of a single, powerful government.**The centralized physical power possessed by most of these several industrializing European nations matched or exceeded that of ancient Rome**. To achieve coherence of such societies demanded a new legitimating force to create a broad base of support among giant, diverse populations.** The erosion of the belief that classes were a god-given, "natural" state of affairs was hastened by the introduction of low-cost printing and rapidly growing levels of literacy (both necessary to underpin the new Industrial Age). These politically equalizing forces unleashed a host of social discontents that had to be controlled. The old religious threats of damnation or excommunication were fast losing their force, and new legal systems circumscribed the absolute powers of monarchs to control social behavior. This very cacaphony of **voices threatened the stability of the new giant states. The "solution," of course, was to take control of the public dialogue, to define the legitimate "topics of conversation."** This is the primary role of political "leadership" in today's mass societies, and that leadership uses two major tools to wield its influence: rhetoric and the mass media. I suggest, then, that **the high potential for internal instability in giant patriarchal states is a primary factor in setting the stage for today's global insecurity and the extreme militaristic rhetoric that exists both within and between nations.**Before continuing this discussion of patriarchy's dangers, I would note that, although in modern Western patriarchies the domination of women by men is less evident as women have gained increasing political and economic status, women with such status tend to assume the "shoulder pads" and "language" of men when it comes to political and economic institutions. Women like Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India, Golda Melt, Israeli Prime Minister; Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick, Reagan's Ambassador to the United Nations; Madeleine Albright, Clinton's Secretary of State; Margaret Thatcher, Britain's Prime Minister; and Condoleezza Rice, George W. Bush's Security Advisor, come readily to mind. (Thatcher cites the following terms the media applied to her: Iron Lady, Battling Maggie, and Attila the Hen. (6)) The glass ceiling in the corporate world has proved harder to crack, however, so fewer well-known examples exist there of powerful females. (Katherine Graham, who became publisher of the Washington Post after the death of her husband, was one of the few powerful women who to her credit, did not adopt the patriarchal mode.) Hence, **I regard the Western nations' politico-economic world view as very much in accordance with that of historical patriarchies**, with perhaps one or two Scandinavian exceptions. I thus conclude that **the language of international politics today is "gendered" by the political insecurity experienced by leaders of earlier patriarchies**, and that the presence of women in such governments has little effect on the framework of public dialogue. (I recall hearing Geraldine Ferraro, when running for Vice-President in 1984, assure an interviewer that she would not hesitate to push the "nuclear button" if necessary.) Hence, **it is not our X and Y chromosomes that are at issue here; it is the gendered world view that underpins our institutions and frames our behaviors. As long as those in power "think" in this patriarchal box, we will live in a globally-armed camp, where war-leading even to the annihilation of our species-is a constant, real possibility.**

#### Ts the aff- Patriarchy runs deeper than legal reforms—the 1AC focus on legal practices serves to perpetuate the overarching system

**Tickner 92**[Ann, Professor @ the School of International Relations USC, B.A. in History, U London, M.A. in IR, Yale, PhD in pol science, “GENDER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS—FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON ACHIEVING GLOBAL SECURITY”, pg. 12]

Most contemporary feminist perspectives define themselves in terms of reacting to traditional liberal feminism that, since its classic formulation in the works of Mary Wollstonecraft and John Stuart Mill, has sought to draw attention to and eliminate the legal restraints barring women's access to full participation in the public world. Most **contemporary feminist scholars**, other than liberals, **claim that the sources of discrimination against women run much deeper than legal restraints: they are enmeshed in the economic, cultural, and social structures of society and thus do not end when legal restraints are removed**. Almost **all feminist perspectives have been motivated by the common goal of attempting to describe and explain the sources of gender inequality, and hence women's oppression, and to seek strategies to end them. Feminists claim that women are oppressed in a multiplicity of ways that depend on culture, class, and race as well as on gender**.Rosemary Tong suggests that we can categorize various contemporary feminist theories according to the ways in which they view the causes of women's oppression. While Marxist feminists believe that capitalism is the source of women's oppression, **radical feminists claim that women are oppressed by the system of patriarchy that has existed under almost all modes of production. Patriarchy is institutionalized through legal and economic, as well as social and cultural institutions. Some radical feminists argue that the low value assigned to the feminine characteristics described above also contributes to women's oppression.** Feminists in the psychoanalytic tradition look for the source of women's oppression deep in the psyche, in gender relationships into which we are socialized from birth.

#### The rhetoric of war masks the ongoing violence committed against women’s bodies- we must redefine “war” versus “peace”

**Ray 1997**

[E. Ray “The Shame of it: gender-based terrorism in the former Yugoslavia and the failureof international human rights law to comprehend the injuries.” The American University Law Review. Vol 46. ]

In order to reach all of the violence perpetrated against the women of the former Yugoslavia that is not committed by soldiers or other officials of the state, human rights law must move beyond its artificially constructed barriers between "public" and "private" actions: **A feminist perspective on human rights would require a rethinking of the notions of imputability and state responsibility**and in this sense would challenge the most basic assumptions of international law. **If violence against women were** **considered**by the international legal system **to be as shocking as violence against people for their political ideas, women would have considerable support in their struggle.... The assumption that underlies all law,** including international human rights law**, is that the public/private distinction is real: human society**, human lives **can be separated into two distinct spheres. This divisio**n, however**, is an ideological construct rationalizing the exclusion of women from the sources of power**. 2 6 The international community must recognize that **violence against women is always political**, regardless of where it occurs, **because it affects the way women view themselves and their role in the world, as well as the lives they lead in the** so-called **public sphere**. 2 6 ' **When women are silenced within the family, their silence** is not restricted to the private realm, but rather **affects their voice in the public realm** as well, often assuring their silence in any environment. 262 For women in the former Yugoslavia, as well as for all women, e**xtension beyond the various public/private barriers is imperative if human rights law "is to have meaning for women brutalized in less-known theaters of war or** in the by-ways of **daily life."** 63 Because, as currently constructed, human rights laws can reach only individual perpetrators during times of war, **one alternative is to reconsider our understanding of what constitutes "war" and what constitutes "peace. " " When it is universally true that no matter where in the world a woman lives or with what culture she identifies, she is at grave risk of being beaten, imprisoned, enslaved, raped, prostituted, physically tortured, and murdered** simply **because she is a woman, the term "peace" does not describe her existence.**2 5 In addition to being persecuted for being a woman, **many women also are persecuted on ethnic, racial, religious, sexual orientation, or other grounds. Therefore, it is crucial that our re-conceptualization of human rights is not limited to violations based on gender."**Rather,**our definitions of "war" and "peace"**in the context of all of the world's persecuted groups **should be questioned**. Nevertheless, **in every culture a common risk factor is being a woman, and to describe the conditions of our lives as "peace" is to deny the effect of sexual terrorism on all women**. 6 7 **Because we are socialized to think of times of "war" as limited to groups of men fighting over physical territory** or land, **we do not immediately consider the possibility of "war" outside this narrow definition**except in a metaphorical sense, such as in the expression "the war against poverty." However, **the physical violence and sex discrimination perpetrated against women because we are women is hardly metaphorical. Despite the fact that its prevalence makes the violence seem natural or inevitable, it is profoundly political** in both its purpose and its effect. Further, **its exclusion from international human rights law is no accident, but rather part of a system politically constructed to exclude and silence women**. 2 6 The appropriation of women's sexuality and women's bodies as representative of men's ownership over women has been central to this "politically constructed reality. 2 6 9 **Women's bodies have become the objects through which dominance and even ownership are communicated, as well as the objects through which men's honor is attained or taken away in many cultures.Y Thus, when a man wants to communicate that he is more powerful than a woman, he may beat her. When a man wants to communicate that a woman is his to use as he pleases, he may rape her** or prostitute her. The objectification of women is so universal that when one country ruled by men (Serbia) wants to communicate to another country ruled by men (Bosnia-Herzegovina or Croatia) that it is superior and more powerful, it rapes, tortures, and prostitutes the "inferior" country's women. 2 71**The use of the possessive is intentional, for communication among men through the abuse of women is effective only to the extent that the group of men to whom the message is sent believes they have some right of possession over the bodies of the women used.** Unless they have some claim of right to what is taken, no injury is experienced. Of course, regardless of whether a group of men sexually terrorizing a group of women is trying to communicate a message to another group of men**, the universal sexual victimization of women clearly communicates to all women a message of dominance and ownership over women.** As Charlotte Bunch explains, **"The physical territory of [the] political struggle [over female subordination] is women's bodies." 7 2**

### Alt Overview: Irigaray

#### Reinterpret everything through a lens of sexual difference- that reinterpretation is a clearing out of masculine forms of thought and a way to

#### Give birth to new thought, art, and politics that are outside of masculinity

#### -our link args in the 1NC is that clearing of space and reinterpretation, includes a gendered perspective

# AT Butler

### AT: You’re Essentialist

#### affirmation of embodiment of the subject is critical to define the body as multifunctional and complex, material and symbolic

**Braidotti 2011**

[Braidotti, Rosi. Nomadic Subjects : Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist Theory (2nd Edition). New York, NY, USA: Columbia University Press, 2011. p 5.

<http://site.ebrary.com/lib/uofw/Doc?id=10464453&ppg=16> Copyright © 2011. Columbia University Press. All rights reserved. Uwyo//amp]

These figurations are evidence of the many heterogeneous ways in which feminists today are exploring alternative forms of subjectivity and of their struggle with language to produce affirmative representations. The array of terms available to describe this new female feminist subjectivity is telling: Monique Wittig (1991) chooses to represent it through the figuration of the “lesbian,” echoed by Judith Butler with her “queer parodic politics of the masquerade” (1991); others, quoting Nancy Miller (Miller 1986b) prefer to describe the process as “becoming women,” in the sense of the female feminist subjects of another story. De Lauretis calls it the “eccentric” subject (1990a:115– 150); alternative feminist subjectivities have also been described as “fellow-commuters” in an in-transit state (Boscaglia 1991:122– 135) or as “inappropriated others” (Minh-ha 1989) or as “postcolonial” (Mohanty 1984:333– 358; Spivak 1989b, c) subjects. These last analyze gender in relation to other geopolitical concerns in terms of transnational feminist links. **The starting point for most feminist redefinitions of subjectivity is a new form of materialism that develops the notion of the corporeal by emphasizing the embodied and therefore sexually differentiated structure of the speaking subject.** Consequently, **rethinking the bodily roots of subjectivity is the starting point for the epistemological project of nomadism. The** body or the e**mbodimentof the subject is to be understood as neither a biological nor a sociological category, but rather as a point of overlapping between the physical, the symbolic, and the sociological. I stress the issue of embodiment so as to make a plea for different ways of thinking about the body. The body refers to the materialist but also vitalist groundings of human subjectivity and to the** specifically**human capacity to be** both **grounded and** to flow and thus to **transcend the very variables**— class, race, sex, gender, age, disability— **that structure us. A nomadic vision of the body defines it as multifunctional and complex,** as a transformer of flows and energies, affects, desires, and imaginings. From psychoanalysis I have learned to appreciate the advantages of the nonunitary structure of the subject and the joyful implication of the unconscious foundations of the subject.**Complexity is the key to understanding the multiple affective layers,**complex temporal variables, **and internally contradictory time and memory lines that frame our embodied existence. In contrast to the oppositions created by a dualistic mode of social constructivism, a nomadic body is a threshold of transformations. It is the complex interplay of the highly constructed social and symbolic forces**. The body is a surface of intensities and an affective field in interaction with others. In other words, **feminist emphasis on embodiment goes hand in hand with a radical rejection of essentialism. In feminist theory one speaks as a woman, although the subject “woman” is not a monolithic essence**, defined once and for all, but **rather the site of multiple, complex, and potentially contradictory sets of experiences,determined by overlapping variables such as class, race, age, lifestyle, and sexual preference. One speaks as a woman in order to empower women, to activate sociosymbolic changes in their condition: this is a radically antiessentialist position.**

# Links

#### Egalitarian politics is not real and not possible within the confines of the nation state- the state demands that woman give up her sexual difference to become a citizen, to become “neuter”, and to become incorporated into the masculine universal- women cannot participate in the law or judicial circuits because they have no language

**Fermon 98**

[Nicole Ferman, 1998, Women on the Global Market: Irigaray and the Democratic State, Diacritics, Vol. 28, No. 1, Irigaray and the Political Future of Sexual Difference¶ (Spring, 1998), pp. 120-137¶ uwyo//amp]

Best known for her subtle interrogation of philosophy and psychoanalysis, Luce **Irigaray** ¶ clearly also **conducts a dialogue with the political, proposing that women's erasure from ¶ culture and society invalidates all economies**, sexual or political. **Because woman has ¶ disappeared** both figuratively and literally from society [see Sen, "More Than 100 Million ¶ Women Are Missing"], **Irigaray conceives the contemporary ethical project as a recall to ¶ difference rather than equality**, to difference between women and men-that is, **sexual ¶ difference. She characterizes relations between men and women as market relations in ¶ which women are commodities**, objects, **but never subjects** **of exchange**, objects to men ¶ but not to themselves: women do not belong to themselves but exist "to keep relationships ¶ among men running smoothly" [TS 192]. Women under these conditions require imagi- ¶ native ways to reconfigure the self, to subvert the melancholy and regression of ¶ masculinist economies and envisage a future in which women would not be ashamed of ¶ the feminine, would experience it as a positivity worth emulating. ¶ Irigaray contends that**after the gains of egalitarian politics are** carefully e**xamined, ¶ the inclusion of women in the political arena has failed to take into account women's ¶ distinct** and different **position from men,and from each other**, as well as *perpetuating the ¶ fiction of the "neutral" citizen*, *the ahistorical individual citizen of the nation-state. It is ¶ that fiction Irigaray dispels in her critique of liberal democratic politics* and its creation, ¶ "*citizens who are neuter in regard to familial singularity, its laws, and necessary sexual ¶ difference"* [SG 112] *in order to benefit the State* and its laws.**The subject is male; the ¶ citizen is neuter**. Who is the female citizen in contemporary society? What is the ethical ¶ elaboration of the contractual relations between women and men, and between sexed ¶ individuals and the community? How do women imagine a distinct set of rights and ¶ responsibilities based on self-definition and autonomy, given the particular strictures of ¶ contemporary politics-that is, the market-driven, antidemocratic nature of the current ¶ economic national and global forces? Irigaray suggests that "**the return of women to ¶ collective work,** to public places, to social relations**, demands linguistic mutations" and ¶ profound transformations, an embodied imagination with** force and **agency in civil life** ¶ [TD 65**]. ¶ Irigaray warns that if civil and political participation**is construed**in** overly narrow ¶ terms, if focus is on *economic or judicial "circuits"*alone, *we overlook the symbolic ¶ organization of power-women risk losing "everything* without even being acknowl- ¶ edged" [TD 56]. Instead an interval of recognition can expand the political to include the ¶ concerns and activities of real women, lest silence imply consent to sexual neutrality, or¶ more likely, to women's obliteration under men's interests and concerns. Women's ¶ insistence on self-definition and wage labor, on love and justly remunerated work, ¶ testifies to the obduracy of women's difference, one that is not likely to disappear. **The ¶ patriarchal family is still the legal norm**, even when certain exceptions are made, while ¶ enduring questions regarding women's health and children's physical welfare as priori- ¶ ties beyond market considerations are consigned to legislative obfuscation, still a political ¶ afterthought. Instead, **in the US the liberal state removes the slender welfare net specific ¶ to women and children**, Aid to Families with Dependent Children, **and fails to provide ¶ medical coverage to those who are among the most vulnerable** of its citizens.**Women ¶ without access to the legal protection of sex-neutral citizenship**, poor working women **¶ without language (the money for an effective "mouthpiece" to represent their distress in ¶ a court of law), are further disempowered by liberal politics' insistence on sexual ¶ neutrality**-that is, **on repression** or amnesia **regarding the lived experiences of women. ¶ Sexual difference is key to any project of self-definition** by women. Irigaray insists ¶ on the sexual nature of this self-definition, not solely for its obvious procreative necessity, ¶ but because the natural world is a source of renewal and fecundity which requires attentive ¶ interrogation and respect [SG 15]. **This rebirth seems alien to the structure of male politics, ¶ which instead seem to provoke disasters (Bhopal, Chernobyl, or the current runaway ¶ jungle fires** of Indonesia, courtesy of commercial logging, spreading **thick pollution** to ¶ neighboring countries) and untimely **death.' We talk about social justice and forget its ¶ origins in nature and not merely as an engagement between men in abstraction**. *Irigaray ¶ believes that recognition and respect of difference between the sexes is prior to productive ¶ and generative relations between women*, between men, and between men and women. ¶ *Sexual difference is universal* and allows us to participate in "an immediate natural given,¶ and it is a real and irreducible component of the universal" [ILTY 47]. *It is this prior ¶ recognition of two*, rather than the One that has dominated world politics and thought, ¶ *which must be acknowledged, along with the possibility of a political economy of ¶ abundance,*not only that of man-made scarcity then attributed to nature. This melancholic ¶ (male) script pays romantic tribute to motherhood in the abstract without due recognition ¶ of the relations between real mothers and children, thus failing to properly acknowledge ¶ and protect mother or child. Our ability to address the specifics of race, ethnicity, and ¶ religious and other differences with respect hinges on our ability to acknowledge and ¶ respect the feminine, to see it as a source of invention and possibilities. To do so would ¶ of course affect relations between the sexes, "men and women perhaps... communicat[ing] ¶ for the first time if two different genders are affirmed," it would allow a new configuration ¶rather than continuing the present regime: "the globalization and universalization of ¶ culture ... ungovernable and beyond our control" [SG 120; ILTY 129].

### AT: Perm F/L

#### First, Oppression D/A-The permutation is not an act of love-it rejects woman’s attempt to stand outside of the masculine universal, undifferentiated, and demands her oppression

**Irigaray 85**

[Luce Irigaray, 1985, “An Ethics of Sexual Difference”, uwyo//amp]

**One configuration remains in latency**, in abeyance: that of l**ove among women. A configuration that constitutes a substrate that is**sometimes **mute, sometimes a disturbing force** in our culture. A very live substrate whose outlines, shapes, are yet blurred, chaotic, or confused. **Traditionally**, therefore, **this love among women has been a matter of rivalry with**: - **the real mother**, **- an** all-powerful **prototype of maternity,** - **the desire of man**: of father, son, brother. **This involves** **quantitative estimates of love that** ceaselessly **interrupt love's** attraction and dev**elopment. When we hear women talking to each other, we** tend to **hear** expressions like the following: -**like you; - me too; - me more** (or me less). **Such nagging calculations** (which may be unconscious or preconscious)**paralyze the fluidity of affect. We harden, borrow, situate ourselves on the edges of the other in order to "exist."** As proofs of love, these *comparatives eliminate the possibility of a place among women. We prize one another by standards that are not our own and which occupy***,** without inhabiting, *the potential place of our identity. These statements* bear witness to affects which are still childish or which *fail to survive the death struggle of a narcissism that is always put off: to infinity or else to the hands of a third party as judge.*One of the remarks you often hear one woman say to another woman who is a little better situated in her identity is: just like everyone else. **Here we have no proof of love, but a judgmental statement that prevents the woman from standing out from an undifferentiated grouping, from a sort of primitive community of women, unconscious utopias or atopias that some women exploit** at times **to prevent one of their number from affirming her identity**. **Without realizing it, or willing it,** in most cases, **women constitute** **the** most terrible **instrument of their own oppression: they destroy anything that emerges from their undifferentiated condition and thus become agents of their own annihilation, their reduction to a sameness that is not their own**. A kind of magma, of "night in which all the cats are gray," from which man, or humanity, extracts for free what he needs for food, lodging, and survival. These like you J me too J me more (or less) J just like everyone else kinds of remarks have little to do with a loving ethics. They are trace-symptoms of the polemos7 among women**. There is no with you in this economy. But there may be a fusional state out of which nothing emerges or should emerge, or else a blind competition to occupy a place or space that is ill-defined but which arouses attraction, envy, passion. It is still not another woman who is loved but merely the place she occupies**, that she creates, and that must be taken away from her, rather than respected. This tends to be the way with passions among women. **We have to move against the current of history for things to be any different.** Which does happen. And constitutes one of the most essential places for an ethics of the passions: no love oj other without love oj same.

#### Our role of the ballot is to vote for the team with the best strategy to solve violence and oppression-

#### Our scholarship is good and ethical-An ethics of sexual difference is a prerequisite to all questions of subjectivity- sexual difference constitutes the first and ever-forgotten symbol that is deployed to systematically exclude women from access to the symbolic and thus, their own subjectivity

**Irigaray 85**

[Luce Irigaray, 1985, “An Ethics of Sexual Difference”, uwyo//amp]

Nietzsche used to say that we would continue to believe in God as long as we believed in grammar. Yet even, or perhaps particularly af**ter the fall of a certain God, discourse still defends its untouchable status. To say that discourse has a sex,** especially **in its syntax, is to question the last bastion of semantic order. It amounts to taking issue with the God of men in his most tradi-tional form***. Even if language is emptied of meaning-*orperhaps the more it is emptied of meaning?-*respect for its technical architecture must remain intact*. Discourse would be the erection of the totem and the taboo of the world of man. And **the more man strives to analyze the world**, the universe, **himself, the more he seems to resist upsetting the foundations of discourse. His analysis would serve only to confirm and double discourse's immutability. From the start, discourse would be for man that other of nature,** that mother, that nature-womb, within which he lived, survived, and risked being lost. The discourse that had been intended as his tool for breaking ground and cultivating the world changed into an intangible, sacred horizon for him. That which is most his own and yet most alien to him? His home within the universe. And, **inside that tentacular technical machine that man has made**, a machine **that threatens him today,** not only in stark reality but**also by assimilation** to his fantasies and the nightmares he has of a devouring mother, **man seems to cling ever tighter** to that semblance of familiarity he finds in both his everyday and his scientific discourse. *As if that technical universe and that language were not his creation, which, because of its failure to preserve the other, fails to preserve him too***. The work of his hand, in which he cannot** even **recognize himself**, in which he **has drowned the other**, **now threatens to drown him**in turn. He has all the animist fears of a child in the face of nature. He is afraid to touch his machine in case it is activated by his approach, as if it were a mechanism owed respect because of its transcendence. Language, in all its shapes and sizes, would dimly represent for man the allpowerful and ever-unknown mother as well as the transcendent God. Both. Man cannot or will not recognize or reinterpret in his symbols this duality in his technical productions **The most obvious symbol**, that closest to hand and also most easily forgotten, **is the living symbol of sexual difference**. But **theory would claim that this symbolizes only itself. And women would serve only as a potentialsymbol to be exchanged by men**, by peoples, **and would never achieve symbolism** or be able to use symbols. 11 Does the symbol constituted by sexual difference implacably split into two? **The female would fall into the category of fallow land, matter to be made into a product, or currency symbol, mother or virgin without any identity as a woman. The masculine would no longer enter into. the body** or the flesh **of the symbol but fashion it or pass it from hand to hand from the outside. The bond between or the function shared by the pieces would be achieved secretly thanks to the female; the exchange of symbols would be assured by the masculine. By serving in this way as mediation** from within the symbol, **the feminine would have no access t**o sharing, exchanging, or coining **symbols.** In particular, **the mother-daughter relationship**, the attraction between mother and daughter, **would be hidden in the symbol. Daughters**, wives, and indeed**mothers would not hav**e, or would no longer have, **signs available for their own relationships**, **or the means of designating a reality transcendent to themselves-their Other,** their God or divine being. **No articulated language would help women escape from the sameness of man or from an uninhabitable sameness of their own**, lacking a passage from the inside to the outside of themselves, among themselves. Because they are used in mediation, as mediators, women can have within themselves and among themselves a same, an Other only if they move out of the existing systems of exchange. Their only recourse is flight, explosion, implosion, into an immediate relationship to nature or to God.

#### Don’t weigh their impacts—the aff uses an ethical approach that creates crisis-based politics that means that we will be infinitely entrenched in the system

**Cuomo 96**

Professor of Philosophy, 1996 Chris, Hypatia 11.4, proquest //Wyo-BF

**Ethical approaches that do not attend to the ways in which warfare and military practices are woven into the very fabric of life in twenty-first century technological states lead to crisis-based politics and analyses.**For any feminism that aims to resist oppression and create alternative social and political options, **crisis-based ethics and politics are problematic because they distract attention from the need for sustained resistance to the enmeshed, omnipresent systems of domination and oppression that so often function as givens in most people's lives. Neglecting the omnipresence of militarism allows the false belief that the absence of declared armed conflicts is peace**, the polar opposite of war. It is particularly easy for those whose lives are shaped by the safety of privilege, and who do not regularly encounter the realities of militarism, to maintain this false belief. **The belief that militarism is an ethical, political concern only regarding armed conflict, creates forms of resistance to militarism that are merely exercises in crisis control**. **Antiwar resistance is then mobilized when the “real” violence finally occurs, or when the stability of privilege is directly threatened, and at that point it is difficult not to respond in ways that make resisters drop all other political priorities**. Crisis-driven attention to declarations of war might actually keep resisters complacent about and complicitous in the general presence of global militarism. Seeing war as necessarily embedded in constant military presence draws attention to the fact that horrific, state-sponsored violence is happening nearly all over, all of the time, and that it is perpetrated by military institutions and other militaristic agents of the state.