### 1NC

#### Capitalist exploitation structures all aspects of ableism and is a better explanation for the exploitation and deployment of the medical model of disability—the alternative is key to challenge the root cause of oppression

Grossman, 2004

[Brian, Ph.D. Student, Program in Medical Sociology, Department of Social and Behavioral Sciences, University of California, San Francisco, Political economy perspectives on disability and aging: Competing or complementary frameworks?, This paper will be presented as part of the panel on Issues in Disability and Aging at the conference, Social Policy As if People Matter, to be held at Adelphi University in Garden City, NY on November 11-12, 2004, http://www.adelphi.edu/peoplematter/pdfs/Grossman.pdf] /Wyo-MB

Russell (1998, 2001) takes a different approach to the political economy of disability,¶ situating her analysis within the tradition of critical Marxism. She traces the effects of the¶ interactions between the economic structures and the political system as they influence the lives¶ of disabled people through state-supported eugenics, the systematic exclusion of people with¶ disabilities from the labor force, and both the both corporate and charity-based privatization of¶ the public responsibilities of providing services and equipment for people with disabilities. ¶ In her book, Beyond Ramps: Disability at the End of the Social Contract, Russell (1998)¶ begins her political economic analysis with a critique of the medical model of disability, that¶ which seeks to cure the impairments of people with disabilities, thereby situating disability as an¶ individual crisis or personal tragedy to be overcome or fixed. She argues that it as a result of this¶ model that political and financial efforts focus on correcting the bodies and minds of individuals¶ rather than on removing barriers to social participation for people with disabilities. Additionally,¶ she indicates that the individualization of disability that accompanies the medical model has¶ historically been employed to differentiate people with disabilities from the general population,¶ to cast them as abnormal, as less than human.¶ Next, Russell (1998) traces the shameful histories of eugenics in the United States,¶ England and Germany from the turn of the 20th century through World War II. She highlights¶ the economic rationalization of forced sterilization programs in the United States and England¶ and the mass extermination of first children, and then adults, with disabilities in Hitler’s¶ Germany. In particular, she describes how people with disabilities were characterized by the¶ Nazi government as drains on the social welfare system (due to their inability to produce in a¶ capitalist economic system while at the same time requiring the state to spend money on their¶ behalf). This economic justification combined with the Social Darwinism of the time,¶ contributed to the creation of a state-supported program of eugenics of people with disabilities¶ that was not only sanctioned by but also enforced by the medical establishment of the time.¶ From the political economy of Nazi era eugenics, Russell (1998) moves to the current¶ debate over euthanasia and “the right to die” for people with disabilities. Citing a study from the¶ New England Journal of Medicine that surveyed physicians in Oregon (the first state to legalize¶ euthanasia), she demonstrates the connections between financial considerations and policies Grossman, 2004¶¶ around physician-assisted suicide by recounting that in addition to the 60% of physicians who¶ reported supporting assisted suicide, 80% indicated that economics might influence patient¶ decisions. Moreover, she offers the example of Larry McAfee, a quadriplegic in Georgia¶ who, facing forced institutionalization as a consequence of insufficient state-supported programs¶ that allow for independent living, petitioned the courts for and was granted the right to suicide, as¶ a further example of the political bias toward the extermination of people with disabilities over¶ the provision of services. As a result, Russell (1998) is left asking the haunting questions: “But¶ are patients who face destitution really choosing death? Or are they victims of Social Darwinist¶ euthanasia policy under which the rich can buy all the care they need while the poor must do¶ without?” (40).¶ Continuing her exploration of the political economy of disability, Russell (1998) provides¶ a history of the opposition to the passage of Social Security in the United States, detailing the¶ roles played by the private insurance industry and the American Medical Association. In¶ addition, she highlights the difficulties that eligibility requirement for programs like Medicaid¶ and Social Security which require restricted incomes and/or limited assets present for people¶ with disabilities who want to work. Moreover, she is extremely critical of the emphasis on¶ private sector charities over a public safety net. In particular, she blasts Jerry Lewis and his¶ Muscular Dystrophy Association (MDA) for their portrayal of people with disabilities as pitiable¶ and in need of cures, as well as the profit-making tactics that govern the distribution of funds¶ raised by the organization. She provides evidence that two-thirds of the money raised by MDA¶ in 1991 was spent on overhead, with only the remaining one-third of funds to be split between¶ direct patient services and research grants.Grossman, 2004¶ Furthermore, Russell (1998) discusses the effect of the ideology of capitalism in¶ attracting the interest of then President George H.W. Bush to support the Americans with¶ Disabilities Act (what has since been touted as the most sweeping piece of legislation for people¶ with disabilities in the history of the United States) as a low-cost way to reduce the number of¶ people on government assistance under the disguise of civil rights for people with disabilities. In¶ addition, she identifies economics as the primary motivation for the political actions that initiated¶ continuing disability reviews (CDRs) and the multiple changes to federal definitions of¶ disability, both of which were intended to reduce access to state systems of support.¶ In a later article, Russell (2001) continues to elaborate on the relationships between¶ political and economic spheres as evidenced by her redefinition of disabled people as “persons¶ deemed less exploitable or not exploitable by the owning class who control the means of¶ production in a capitalist economy” (87). She identifies the role of (the capitalist) class interests¶ in determining the level of participation in social life afforded to people with disabilities through¶ economically rationalized decisions about both the exclusion and inclusion of people with¶ disabilities in the labor force at different times in America’s history (i.e., sheltered workshops;¶ unwillingness of employers to offer accommodations, despite the ADA). Again, she highlights¶ the interplay between capitalist interests and the medicalization of disability that result in a focus¶ on curing the individual, avoiding the institution of policies that remove barriers to social and¶ economic participation.¶ In “Mainfesto of an Uppity Crip”, the penultimate chapter of Beyond Ramps, Russell¶ (1998) outlines a plan for change, offering more than twenty-five suggestion for anti-capitalist¶ reform that include actions like ensuring greater corporate accountability, instituting campaign¶ finance reform, returning the media to the public, adopting the principles of universal design to ¶ public and private spaces, mandating a living wage, and replacing the current mode of¶ “institutional profiteering” (222) through the provision of Personal Assistance Services that¶ support people with disabilities living in the community. She concludes the book by arguing for¶ a renaissance of social solidarity across identity groups against the capitalist class, a movement¶ that would bring differences together and revive public discourse.

#### Their focus on the social model of disability is wrong—masks capitalist exploitation as the root cause of the exploitation and exclusion of people with disabilities—the critique is key

Russell and Malhotra, 2002

[Marta, and Ravi, CAPITALISM AND DISABILITY, SOCIALIST REGISTER 2002, http://socialistregister.com/index.php/srv/article/viewFile/5784/2680] /Wyo-MB

Having a disability is conventionally regarded as a personal tragedy which the individual must overcome, or as a medical problem to which the individual must become adjusted. In 1976, however, the Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation in Britain made a significant advance when it pointed out that ‘disability is something imposed on top of our impairments by the way we are unnecessarily isolated and excluded from full participation in society’.1 Among those concerned with disability it soon became common ground that ‘it is society which disables persons with impairments’.¶ This social model of disability2 necessitates a rethinking of prevalent defini- tions. Leaving aside biological or physical-anthropological definitions of disability which make it appear that impaired persons are ‘naturally’ and, therefore, justi- fiably, excluded from the ‘labour force’, even mainstream definitions have serious shortcomings. The World Health Organization, for instance, defines impairment (the condition of being deaf or blind, or having impaired mobility or being other- wise impaired) as the physiological ‘problem’; disability as restricted functions or activities resulting from an impairment; and handicap as the ‘disadvantage resulting from the impairment or disability, that limits or prevents the fulfillment of a role’.3 This terminology has been criticized by social model theorists of disability because it relies primarily on medical definitions and uses a bio-physi- ological definition of normality. Further, ‘the environment’ within which this ‘disadvantage’ is located, ‘is represented as “neutral”, and any negative conse- quences of this approach for the person with an impairment are regarded as inevitable or acceptable rather than as disabling barriers’.4¶ Reconceptualizing disability as an outcome of the political economy, however, also requires acknowledging the limitations of the ‘minority’ model of disability, which views it as the product of a disabling social and architectural environment. In this view the fundamental source of the problems encountered by disabled persons is prejudicial or discriminatory attitudes, implying that by erasing mistaken attitudes society will accept ‘difference’ and equality will flourish.5 This approach diverts attention from the mode of production and the concrete social relations that produce the disabling barriers, exclusion and inequalities facing disabled persons.¶ In contrast, we take the view that disability is a socially-created category derived from labour relations, a product of the exploitative economic structure of capitalist society: one which creates (and then oppresses) the so-called ‘dis- abled’ body as one of the conditions that allow the capitalist class to accumulate wealth. Seen in this light, disability is an aspect of the central contradiction of capitalism, and disability politics that do not accept this are, at best, fundamen- tally flawed strategies of reform or, worse, forms of bourgeois ideology that prevent this from being seen.

#### The political economy is what influences social interpretation and the meanings of disability. In industrial societies, rehabilitation, like all other goods and services is transformed into a commodity. The affirmative offers no explanation of why disabled people are oppressed in capitalist societies and no strategy for liberating us from the chains of that oppression.

Oliver 99

(Professor Michael J. Oliver - Professor of Disability Studies University of Greenwich, London, England “Capitalism, Disability and Ideology: A Materialist Critique of the Normalization Principle” – Book: A quarter-century of normalization and social role valorization: evolution and impact (p163-173) 1999 http://www.leeds.ac.uk/disability-studies/archiveuk/Oliver/cap%20dis%20ideol.pdf KB)

The production of disability therefore is nothing more or less than a set of activities specifically geared towards producing a good - the category disability - supported by a range of political actions which create the conditions to allow these productive activities to take place and underpinned by a discourse which gives legitimacy to the whole enterprise. As to the specifics of the terminology used in this discourse, I use the term disabled people generically and refuse to divide the group in terms of medical conditions, functional limitation or severity of impairment. For me disabled people are defined in terms of three criteria; (i) they have an impairment; (ii) they experience oppression as a consequence; and (c) they identify themselves as a disabled person. Using the generic term does not mean that I do not recognise differences in experience within the group but that in exploring this we should start from the ways oppression differentially impacts on different groups of people rather than with differences in experience among individuals with different impairments. I agree that my own initial outlining of a materialist theory of disability (Oliver 1990) did not specifically include an examination of the oppression that people with learning difficulties face (and I use this particular term throughout my paper because it is the one democratic and accountable organisations of people with learning difficulties insist on). Nevertheless I agree that "For a rigorous theory of disability to emerge which begins to examine all disability in a materialist account, an analysis of normalization must be included". (Chappell 1992.38) Attempting to incorporate normalization in a materialist account however, does not mean that I believe that, beyond the descriptive, it is of much use. Based as it is upon functionalist and interactionist sociology, whose defects are well known (Gouldner1970), it offers no satisfactory explanation of why disabled people are oppressed in capitalist societies and no strategy for liberating us from the chains of that oppression. Political economy, on the other hand, suggests that all phenomena (including social categories) are produced by the economic and social forces of capitalism itself. The forms in which they are produced are ultimately dependent upon their relationship to the economy (Marx 1913) .Hence, the category disability is produced in the particular form it appears by these very economic and social forces. Further, it is produced as an economic problem because of changes in the nature of work and the needs of the labour market within capitalism. "The speed of factory work, the enforced discipline, the time-keeping and production norms -all these were a highly unfavourable change from the slower, more self-determined methods of work into which many handicapped people had been integrated" . (Ryan and Thomas 1980.101) The economy, through both the operation of the labour market and the social organisation of work, plays a key role in producing the category disability and in determining societal responses to disabled people. In order to explain this further, it is necessary to return to the crucial question of what is meant by political economy. The following is a generally agreed definition of political economy, "The study of the interrelationships between the polity, economy and society, or more specifically, the reciprocal influences among government the economy, social classes, state and, status groups. The central problem of the political economy perspective is the manner in which the economy and polity interact in a relationship of reciprocal causation affecting the distribution of social goods". (Estes et al 1982) The central problem with such an agreed definition is that it is an explanation which can be incorporated into pluralist visions of society as a consensus emerging out of the interests of various groups and social forces and indeed, this explanation has been encapsulated in a recent book on disability "A person's position in society affects the type and severity of physical disability one is likely to experience and more importantly the likelihood that he or she is likely to receive rehabilitation services. Indeed, the political economy of a community dictates what debilitating health conditions will be produced, how and under what circumstances they will be defined, and ultimately who will receive the services". (Albrecht (1992.14) This quote lays out the way in which Albrecht pursues his argument in three parts. The first part shows how the kind of society people live in influences the kinds of disability that are produced, notably how the mode of production creates particular kinds of impairments. Further, he traces the ways in which the mode of production influences social interpretation and the meanings of disability and he also demonstrates how, in industrial societies, rehabilitation, like all other goods and services is transformed into a commodity.

#### Capitalism produced disability and exclusion through the creation of industrial society and the demand that the body labor like a perfect machine—the result was the creation and exclusion of disabled bodies from the workforce

Russell and Malhotra, 2002

[Marta, and Ravi, CAPITALISM AND DISABILITY, SOCIALIST REGISTER 2002, http://socialistregister.com/index.php/srv/article/viewFile/5784/2680] /Wyo-MB

The primary oppression of disabled persons (i.e. of people who could work, in a workplace that was accommodated to their needs) is their exclusion from exploitation as wage labourers.6 Studies show that disabled persons experience lower labour-force participation rates, higher unemployment rates and higher part-time employment rates than non-disabled persons.7 In the US, 79% of working-age disabled adults say they would prefer to work,8 yet in 2000 only 30.5% of those with a work disability between ages sixteen and sixty-four were in the labour force and only 27.6% were employed; while 82.1% of non-disabled persons in this age group were either employed (78.6%) or actively seeking work for pay.9 Though having a job does not always translate into an above-poverty- level existence, disabled persons’ historical exclusion from the labour force has undoubtedly contributed to their poverty. Disabled persons are nearly three times as likely to live below the current poverty line — 29% live in poverty, compared to 10% of non-disabled people.10 In the USA fully one third of disabled adults live in a household with an annual income of less than $15,000,11 while the 300 to 400 million living in developing countries have even less chance of employ- ment and exist in abject poverty, usually with no social safety nets at all.12¶ Historical materialism provides a theoretical base from which to explain these conditions and outcomes. Under feudalism, economic exploitation was direct and political, made possible by the feudal concentration of land ownership. While a few owners reaped the surplus, many living on their estates worked for subsis- tence and disabled people were able to participate in this economy to varying degrees.13 Notwithstanding religious superstition about disabled people during the Middle Ages, and significant persecution of them, the rural production process that predominated prior to the Industrial Revolution permitted many disabled people to make a genuine contribution to daily economic life.14¶ With the advent of capitalism, people were no longer tied to the land, but they¶ were forced to find work that would pay a wage — or starve; and as production became industrialized people’s bodies were increasingly valued for their ability to function like machines. Bosses could push non-disabled workers to produce at ever increasing rates of speed. Factory discipline, time-keeping and production norms broke with the slower, more self-determined and flexible work pattern into which many disabled people had been integrated.15 As work became more rationalized, requiring precise mechanical movements of the body, repeated in quicker succession, impaired persons — the deaf or blind, and those with mobility difficulties — were seen as — and, without job accommodations to meet their impairments, were — less ‘fit’ to do the tasks required of factory workers, and were increasingly excluded from paid employment.16 And so ‘the operation of the labour market in the nineteenth century effectively depressed handicapped people of all kinds to the bottom of the market’.17¶ Industrial capitalism thus created not only a class of proletarians but also a new class of ‘disabled’ who did not conform to the standard worker’s body and whose labour-power was effectively erased, excluded from paid work.18 As a result, disabled persons came to be regarded as a social problem and a justification emerged for segregating them out of mainstream life and into a variety of insti- tutions, including workhouses, asylums, prisons, colonies and special schools.19 Exclusion was further rationalized by Social Darwinists, who used biology to argue that heredity — race and genes — prevailed over the class and economic issues raised by Marx and others. Just as the ‘inferior’ weren’t meant to survive in nature, they were not meant to survive in a competitive society. Legislation, influenced by Social Darwinism and eugenics theory, was enacted in a number of jurisdictions for the involuntary sterilization of disabled people.20 Advocates of eugenics such as Galton, Dugdale and Goddard propagated the myth that there was an inevitable genetic link between physical and mental impairments and crime and unemployment.21 This was also linked to influential theories of racial superiority, according to which the birth of disabled children should be regarded as a threat to racial purity.22 In the notorious Buck v. Bell decision of 1927, the US Supreme Court upheld the legality of the forced sterilization of disabled people. At the extreme, Nazi Germany determined that disabled individuals were an economic burden and exterminated tens of thousands of them.23 But even in ‘democratic’ America bean-counting logic prevailed: by 1938, thirty-three American states had sterilization laws and between 1921 and 1964 over 63,000 disabled people were involuntarily sterilized in a pseudo-scientific effort to prevent the births of disabled offspring and save on social costs.24 Whether or not codified into law, the sterilization of disabled people was common in a number of countries in the first half of the twentieth century, including Britain, Denmark, Switzerland, Sweden, and Canada.25

#### NEXT, THE DETERMINISM OF CAPITAL IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE INSTRUMENTALIZATION OF ALL LIFE—THIS LOGIC MOBILIZES AND ALLOWS FOR THE 1AC’S SCENARIOS IN THE FIRST PLACE

DYER-WITHERFORD (professor of Library and Info. Sciences at the U of Western Ontario) 1999   
[Nick. Cyber Marx: Cycles and Circuits of Struggle in High Technology Capitalism.]

For capitalism, the use of machines as organs of “will over nature” is an imperative. The great insight of the Frankfurt School—an insight subsequently improved and amplified by feminists and ecologists—was that capital’s dual project of dominating both humanity and nature was intimately tied to the cultivation of “instrumental reason” that systematically objectifies, reduces, quantifies and fragments the world for the purposes of technological control. Business’s systemic need to cheapen labor, cut the costs of raw materials, and expand consumer markets gives it an inherent bias toward the piling-up of technological power. This priority—enshrined in phrases such as “progress,” “efficiency,” “productivity,” “modernization,” and “growth”—assumes an automatism that is used to override any objection or alternative, regardless of the environmental and social consequences. Today, we witness global vistas of toxification, deforestation, desertification, dying oceans, disappearing ozone layers, and disintegrating immune systems, all interacting in ways that perhaps threaten the very existence of humanity and are undeniably inflicting social collapse, disease, and immiseration across the planet. The degree to which this project of mastery has backfired is all too obvious.

#### Vote Negative to validate and adopt the method of structural/historical criticism that is the 1NC.

#### METHOD IS THE FOREMOST POLITICAL QUESTION BECAUSE ONE MUST UNDERSTAND EXISTING SOCIAL TOTALITY BEFORE ONE CAN HOW TO ACT—GROUNDING THE SITES OF POLITICAL CONTESTATION OUTSIDE OF LABOR MERELY SERVE TO HUMANIZE CAPITAL AND PREVENT A TRANSITION BEYOND OPPRESSION

TUMINO (Prof. English @ Pitt) 2001

[Stephen, “What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever”, Red Critique, p. online //wyo-tjc]

Any effective political theory will have to do at least two things: it will have to offer an integrated understanding of social practices and, based on such an interrelated knowledge, offer a guideline for praxis. My main argument here is that among all contesting social theories now, only Orthodox Marxism has been able to produce an integrated knowledge of the existing social totality and provide lines of praxis that will lead to building a society free from necessity. But first I must clarify what I mean by Orthodox Marxism. Like all other modes and forms of political theory, the very theoretical identity of Orthodox Marxism is itself contested—not just from non-and anti-Marxists who question the very "real" (by which they mean the "practical" as under free-market criteria) existence of any kind of Marxism now but, perhaps more tellingly, from within the Marxist tradition itself. I will, therefore, first say what I regard to be the distinguishing marks of Orthodox Marxism and then outline a short polemical map of contestation over Orthodox Marxism within the Marxist theories now. I will end by arguing for its effectivity in bringing about a new society based not on human rights but on freedom from necessity. I will argue that to know contemporary society—and to be able to act on such knowledge—one has to first of all know what makes the existing social totality. I will argue that the dominant social totality is based on inequality—not just inequality of power but inequality of economic access (which then determines access to health care, education, housing, diet, transportation, . . . ). This systematic inequality cannot be explained by gender, race, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, or nationality. These are all secondary contradictions and are all determined by the fundamental contradiction of capitalism which is inscribed in the relation of capital and labor. All modes of Marxism now explain social inequalities primarily on the basis of these secondary contradictions and in doing so—and this is my main argument—legitimate capitalism. Why? Because such arguments authorize capitalism without gender, race, discrimination and thus accept economic inequality as an integral part of human societies. They accept a sunny capitalism—a capitalism beyond capitalism. Such a society, based on cultural equality but economic inequality, has always been the not-so-hidden agenda of the bourgeois left—whether it has been called "new left," "postmarxism," or "radical democracy." This is, by the way, the main reason for its popularity in the culture industry—from the academy (Jameson, Harvey, Haraway, Butler,. . . ) to daily politics (Michael Harrington, Ralph Nader, Jesse Jackson,. . . ) to. . . . For all, capitalism is here to stay and the best that can be done is to make its cruelties more tolerable, more humane. This humanization (not eradication) of capitalism is the sole goal of ALL contemporary lefts (marxism, feminism, anti-racism, queeries, . . . ). Such an understanding of social inequality is based on the fundamental understanding that the source of wealth is human knowledge and not human labor. That is, wealth is produced by the human mind and is thus free from the actual objective conditions that shape the historical relations of labor and capital. Only Orthodox Marxism recognizes the historicity of labor and its primacy as the source of all human wealth. In this paper I argue that any emancipatory theory has to be founded on recognition of the priority of Marx's labor theory of value and not repeat the technological determinism of corporate theory ("knowledge work") that masquerades as social theory.

### 1NC

#### Narratives of disability fantasize normality by reentrenching their politics in past pain as they share their experience of oppression—their identity rearranges the debate space to focus on identity round by round, story by story, endlessly repeating, but offers no praxis of how to resolve the ills of ableism. Their politics are at odds with other identities which decimates their potential for change

Davis 98 [Lennard J. Davis, Internationally known American specialist in disability studies, Distinguished Professor of English at the University of Illinois at Chicago, School of Arts and Sciences, and also Professor of Disability and Human Development in the School of Applied Health Sciences and Professor of Medical Education in the University of Illinois College of Medicine., “Who Put the ‘The’ in ‘the Novel’?: Identity Politics and Disability in Novel Studies” NOVEL: A Forum on Fiction, Vol. 31, No. 3, (Summer, 1998), pp. 317-334, jstor, wyo-sc]

But the desire for a cure is also the desire for a quick fix. The alterity pre- ¶ sented by disability is shocking to the liberal, ableist sensibility, and so narra- ¶ tives involving disability always yearn for the cure, the neutralizing of the ¶ disability. This desire to neutralize is ironic since in a dialectic sense the fan- ¶ tasy of normality needs the abjection of disability to maintain a homeostatic ¶ system of binaries. But, since this desire is premised on the denigration of dis- ¶ ability, it will of course be invisible to the normate16 readers who prefer the ¶ kindly notion of cure to the more dramatice notion of eradication. Likewise, the ¶ quick fix presented by issues concerning race, class, and gender are equally char- ¶ acteristic of the bourgeois imagination. Class conflict can be nicely reconciled by ¶ novels like North and South, where a kind of utopian factory emerges that by- ¶ passes unions and is achieved by rerouting surplus value through the benevo- ¶ lence of a female captain of industry in the form of Margaret Hale, or Hard ¶ Times, where the working class struggle is seen as a "muddle" only soluble by ¶ Christian charity toward the poor who "will always be with you." ¶ All of these cures are placebos for the basic problem presented to capitalism ¶ and its ideological productions in the form of modern subjectivity, which dons ¶ the form of the normal, average, citizen protagonist-that bell-curve-gener- ¶ ated, fantastic being who reconciles the promise of equal rights with the real- ¶ ity of unequal distribution of wealth. But the quick fix, the cure, has to be re- ¶ peated endlessly, like a patent medicine, because it actually cures nothing. ¶ Novels have to tell this story over and over again, as do films and television, ¶ since the patient never stays cured and the disabled, cured individually, refuse ¶ to stop reappearing as a group. Indeed, modern subjectivity is a wounded iden- ¶ tity that cannot cure itself without recourse to cure narratives, which means ¶ that it cannot cure itself at all, since the disability of modern subjectivity is in-herent in the environment not in the subject. ¶ The problem with the notion of wounded identities, as Brown postulates, is ¶ that the ontology of their coming into being is best characterized by ¶ Nietzsche's notion of ressentiment, an "effect of domination that reiterates impotence, a substitute for action, for power, for self-affirmation that reinscribes ¶ incapacity, powerlessness, and rejection" (Brown 69). Thus, identity is depen-dent for its motivation and existence on remembering and reinvoking the pain ¶ caused by oppression. Politicized identity "installs its pain ... in the very foun- ¶ dation of its political claim, in its demand for recognition as identity ... by en- ¶ trenching, restating, dramatizing, and inscribing its pain in politics" (74). Like ¶ the novel, identity is rooted in its wounds, and plot is a form of pain control. ¶ Thus, its solution must be to heal the wound, end the pain. However, just as the ¶ cure offered in novels spells closure for the text, the cure offered to wounded ¶ identity spells the end of identity, since identity is created by the initializing ¶ wound. The answer to novels is only more novels, not a cure offered for the actual ills of society. Likewise, the proliferation of politicized identities is ¶ symptomatic of the problem, and the inclusion of more identities in our norm ¶ will no more solve the problem of oppression than the proliferation of novels ¶ will. ¶ I have tried to make the case briefly that disability, as an identity, can le- ¶ gitimately be seen as the foundational model that situates the origin of the ¶ novel in eighteenth-century England and France. If disability is such an origin, ¶ I can then argue that all other identities-class, race, gender, sexual prefer- ¶ ence-should be subsumed under the hegemonic identity category of disability. ¶ In other words, I contend that the "the" in the novel belongs to a history of ¶ ableist domination. If I do that, I place myself in the line of critics who have ¶ argued for the centrality of their identities as foundational for the creation of ¶ modern subjectivity. By doing so, I can now make two observations. First, I ¶ clearly have not solved the problem of identity politics. By adding my identity ¶ to the roster, and even by claiming foundational status for my identity (which ¶ can be seen as including and therefore superseding other identities), I have re- ¶ arranged the chessboard without creating a strategy for winning the battle. ¶ Second, my writing of this piece, its subsequent publication in Novel, and even a ¶ chorus of supporting voices from other scholars involved in disability studies ¶ who may read this work, will not propel disability into the forefront of iden- ¶ tity politics for the simple reason that the other identity groups will not cede ¶ their place of priority. The reason for this reluctance is also relatively sim- ¶ ple-to acknowledge truly the existence of another identity dilutes the general ¶ category of identity and to prioritize identities places some identities further ¶ down the line of significance. Disability will have difficulty being seen as ¶ having a primary place in identity politics because most academics are deeply ¶ implicated in ableism without, of course, realizing it. Disability is still rou- ¶ tinely ignored, marginalized, or patronized by the very people most active in identity politics.

#### Performance is not a mode of resistance – it gives too much power to the audience because the performer is structurally blocked from controlling the (re)presentation of their representations. Appealing to the ballot is a way of turning over one’s identity to the same reproductive economy that underwrites liberalism

Peggy Phelan 96, chair of New York University's Department of Performance Studies, Unmarked: the politics of performance, 146-9

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Performance’s only life is in the present. Performance cannot be saved, recorded, documented, or otherwise participate in the circulation of representations of representations: once it does so, it becomes something other than performance. To the degree that performance attempts to enter the economy of reproduction it betrays and lessens the promise of its own ontology. Performance’s being, like the ontology of subjectivityproposed here, becomes itself through disappearance.¶ The pressures brought to bear on performance to succumb to thelaws of the reproductive economy are enormous. For only rarely in this culture is the “now” to which performance addresses its deepest questions valued. (This is why the now is supplemented and buttressedby the documenting camera, the video archive.) Performance occursover a time which will not be repeated. It can be performed again, butthis repetition itself marks it as “different.” The document of a performance then is only a spur to memory, an encouragement of memory to become present.¶ The other arts, especially painting and photography, are drawnincreasingly toward performance. The French-born artist Sophie Calle,for example, has photographed the galleries of the Isabella StewartGardner Museum in Boston. Several valuable paintings were stolen fromthe museum in 1990. Calle interviewed various visitors and membersof the muse um staff, asking them to describe the stolen paintings. She then transcribed these texts and placed them next to the photographs of the galleries. Her work suggests that the descriptions and memories of the paintings constitute their continuing “presence,” despite the absence of the paintings themselves. Calle gestures toward a notion of the interactive exchange between the art object and the viewer. While such exchanges are often recorded as the stated goals of museums and galleries, the institutional effect of the gallery often seems to put the masterpiece under house arrest, controlling all conflicting and unprofessional commentary about it. The speech act of memory and description (Austin’s constative utterance) becomes a performative expression when Calle places these commentaries within the¶ 147¶ representation of the museum. The descriptions fill in, and thus supplement (add to, defer, and displace) the stolen paintings. The factthat these descriptions vary considerably—even at times wildly—onlylends credence to the fact that the interaction between the art objectand the spectator is, essentially, performative—and therefore resistantto the claims of validity and accuracy endemic to the discourse of reproduction. While the art historian of painting must ask if thereproduction is accurate and clear, Calle asks where seeing and memoryforget the object itself and enter the subject’s own set of personalmeanings and associations. Further her work suggests that the forgetting(or stealing) of the object is a fundamental energy of its descriptiverecovering. The description itself does not reproduce the object, it ratherhelps us to restage and restate the effort to remember what is lost. Thedescriptions remind us how loss acquires meaning and generatesrecovery—not only of and for the object, but for the one who remembers.The disappearance of the object is fundamental to performance; itrehearses and repeats the disappearance of the subject who longs alwaysto be remembered.¶ For her contribution to the Dislocations show at the Museum of Modern Art in New York in 1991, Calle used the same idea but this time she asked curators, guards, and restorers to describe paintings that were on loan from the permanent collection. She also asked them to draw small pictures of their memories of the paintings. She then arranged the texts and pictures according to the exact dimensions of the circulating paintings and placed them on the wall where the actual paintings usually hang. Calle calls her piece Ghosts, and as the visitor discovers Calle’s work spread throughout the museum, it is as if Calle’s own eye is following and tracking the viewer as she makes her way through the museum.1 Moreover, Calle’s work seems to disappear because it is dispersed throughout the “permanent collection”—a collection which circulates despite its “permanence.” Calle’s artistic contribution is a kind of self-concealment in which she offers the words of others about other works of art under her own artistic signature. By making visible her attempt to offer what she does not have, what cannot be seen, Calle subverts the goal of museum display. She exposes what the museum does not have and cannot offer and uses that absence to generate her own work. By placing memories in the place of paintings, Calle asks that the ghosts of memory be seen as equivalent to “the permanent collection” of “great works.” One senses that if she asked the same people over and over about the same paintings, each time they would describe a slightly different painting. In this sense, Calle demonstrates the performative quality of all seeing.¶ 148¶ I Performance in a strict ontological sense is nonreproductive. It is this quality which makes performance the runt of the litter of contemporary art. Performance clogs the smooth machinery of reproductive representation necessary to the circulation of capital. Perhaps nowhere was the affinity between the ideology of capitalism and art made more manifest than in the debates about the funding policies for the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA).2 Targeting both photography and performance art, conservative politicians sought to prevent endorsing the “real” bodies implicated and made visible by these art forms. Performance implicates the real through the presence of living bodies. In performance art spectatorship there is an element of consumption: there are no left-overs, the gazing spectator must try to take everything in. Without a copy, live performance plunges into visibility—in a maniacally charged present—and disappears into memory, into the realm of invisibility and the unconscious where it eludes regulation and control. Performance resists the balanced circulations of finance. It saves nothing; it only spends. While photography is vulnerable to charges of counterfeiting and copying, performance art is vulnerable to charges of valuelessness and emptiness. Performance indicates the possibility of revaluing that emptiness; this potential revaluation gives performance art its distinctive oppositional edge.3 To attempt to write about the undocumentable event of performance is to invoke the rules of the written document and thereby alter the event itself. Just as quantum physics discovered that macro-instruments cannot measure microscopic particles without transforming those particles, so too must performance critics realize that the labor to write about performance (and thus to “preserve” it) is also a labor that fundamentally alters the event. It does no good, however, to simply refuse to write about performance because of this inescapable transformation. The challenge raised by the ontological claims of performance for writing is to re-mark again the performative possibilities of writing itself. The act of writing toward disappearance, rather than the act of writing toward preservation, must remember that the after-effect of disappearance is the experience of subjectivity itself. This is the project of Roland Barthes in both Camera Lucida and Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes. It is also his project in Empire of Signs, but in this book he takes the memory of a city in which he no longer is, a city from which he disappears, as the motivation for the search for a disappearing performative writing. The trace left by that script is the meeting-point of a mutual disappearance; shared subjectivity is possible for Barthes because two people can recognize the same Impossible. To live for a love whose goal is to share the Impossible is both a humbling project and an exceedingly ambitious one, for it seeks to find connection only in that which is no longer there. Memory. Sight. Love. It must involve a full seeing of the Other’s absence (the ambitious part), a seeing which also entails the acknowledgment of the Other’s presence (the humbling part). For to acknowledge the Other’s (always partial) presence is to acknowledge one’s own (always partial) absence. In the field of linguistics, the performative speech act shares with the ontology of performance the inability to be reproduced or repeated. “Being an individual and historical act, a performative utterance cannot be repeated. Each reproduction is a new act performed by someone who is qualified. Otherwise, the reproduction of the performative utterance by someone else necessarily transforms it into a constative utterance.”4 ¶ 149¶ Writing, an activity which relies on the reproduction of the Same(the three letters cat will repeatedly signify the four-legged furry animalwith whiskers) for the production of meaning, can broach the frame of performance but cannot mimic an art that is nonreproductive. Themimicry of speech and writing, the strange process by which we put words in each other’s mouths and others’ words in our own, relies on a substitutional economy in which equivalencies are assumed and re-established. Performance refuses this system of exchange and resists the circulatory economy fundamental to it. Performance honors the idea that a limited number of people in a specific time/space frame can have an experience of value which leaves no visible trace afterward. Writing about it necessarily cancels the “tracelessness” inaugurated within this performative promise. Performance’s independence from mass reproduction, technologically, economically, and linguistically, is its greatest strength. But buffeted by the encroaching ideologies of capitaland reproduction, it frequently devalues this strength. Writing aboutperformance often, unwittingly, encourages this weakness and falls inbehind the drive of the document/ary. Performance’s challenge to writingis to discover a way for repeated words to become performative utterances, rather than, as Benveniste warned, constative utterances.

#### Affirmation of the self through revenge is no longer an act of affirmation but rather a product of resentment in which the person seeks to cause the same suffering upon the other in an unending cycle of violence, for the revenge is never complete

Brown 95

[Wendy Brown, Badass, Professor of Political Science at the University of California, “States of Injury Power and Freedom in Late Modernity”, pg 65-69, 1995, Book, \\wyo-bb]

Premising itself on the natural equality of human beings, liberalism makes a political promise of universal individual freedom in order to arrive at social equality, or achieve a civilized retrieval of the equality postulated in the state of nature. It is the tension between the promises of individualistic liberty and the requisites of equality that yields ressentiment in one of two directions, depending on the way in which the paradox is brokered. A strong commitment to freedom vitiates the fulfillment of the equality promise and breeds ressentiment as welfare state liberalism— attenuations of the unmitigated license of the rich and powerful on behalf of the "disadvantaged." Conversely, a strong commitment to equality, requiring heavy state interventionism and economic redistribution, attenuates the commitment to freedom and breeds ressentiment expressed as neoconservative anti-statism, racism, charges of reverse racism, and so forth. However, it is not only the tension between freedom and equality but the prior presumption of the self-reliant and self-made capacities of liberal subjects, conjoined with their unavowed dependence on and construction by a variety of social relations and forces, that makes all liberal subjects, and not only markedly disenfranchised ones, vulnerable to ressentiment: it is their situatedness within power, their production by power, and liberal discourse's denial of this situatedness and production that cast the liberal subject into failure, the failure to make itself in the context of a discourse in which its self-making is assumed, indeed, is its assumed nature. This failure, which Nietzsche calls suffering, must either find a reason within itself (which redoubles the failure) or a site of external blame upon which to avenge its hurt and redistribute its pain. Here is Nietzsche's account of this moment in the production of ressentiment: For every sufferer instinctively seeks a cause for his suffering, more exactly, an agent; still more specifically, a. guilty agent who is susceptible to suffering—in short, some living thing upon which he can, on some pretext or other, vent his affects, actually or in effigy. . . . This . . . constitutes the actual physiological cause of ressentiment, vengefulness, and the like: a desire to deaden pain by means of affects, . . . to deaden, by means of a more violent emotion of any kind, a tormenting, secret pain that is becoming unendurable, and to drive it out of consciousness at least for the moment: for that one requires an affect, as savage an affect as possible, and, in order to excite that, any pretext at all.23 Ressentiment in this context is a triple achievement: it produces an affect (rage, righteousness) that overwhelms the hurt; it produces a culprit responsible for the hurt; and it produces a site of revenge to displace the hurt (a place to inflict hurt as the sufferer has been hurt). Together these operations both ameliorate (in Nietzsche's term, "anaesthetize") and externalize what is otherwise "unendurable." In a culture already streaked with the pathos of ressentiment for the reasons just discussed, there are several distinctive characteristics of late modern postindustrial societies that accelerate and expand the conditions of its production. My listing will necessarily be highly schematic: First, the phenomenon William Connolly names "increased global contingency" combines with the expanding pervasiveness and complexity of domination by capital and bureaucratic state and social networks to create an unparalleled individual powerlessness over the fate and direction of one's own life, intensifying the experiences of impotence, dependence, and gratitude inherent in liberal capitalist orders and constitutive of ressentiment.24 Second, the steady desacralization of all regions of life— what Weber called disenchantment, what Nietzsche called the death of god—would seem to add yet another reversal to Nietzsche's genealogy of ressentiment as perpetually available to "alternation of direction." In Nietzsche's account, the ascetic priest deployed notions of "guilt, sin, sinfulness, depravity, damnation" to "direct the ressentiment of the less severely afflicted sternly back upon themselves . . . and in this way exploit[ ed] the bad instincts of all sufferers for the purpose of self-discipline, self-surveillance, and self-overcoming. "25 However, the desacralizing tendencies of late modernity undermine the efficacy of this deployment and turn suffering's need for exculpation back toward a site of external agency.26 Third, the increased fragmentation, if not disintegration, of all forms of association not organized until recently by the commodities market—communities, churches, families—and the ubiquitousness of the classificatory, individuating schemes of disciplinary society, combine to produce an utterly unrelieved individual, one without insulation from the inevitable failure entailed in liberalism's individualistic construction. 27 In short, the characteristics of late modern secular society, in which individuals are buffeted and controlled by global configurations of disciplinary and capitalist power of extraordinary proportions, and are at the same time nakedly individuated, stripped of reprieve from relentless exposure and accountability for themselves, together add up to an incitement to ressentiment that might have stunned even the finest philosopher of its occasions and logics. Starkly accountable yet dramatically impotent, the late modern liberal subject quite literally seethes with ressentiment. Enter politicized identity, now conceivable in part as both product of and reaction to this condition, where "reaction" acquires the meaning Nietzsche ascribed to it: namely, an effect of domination that reiterates impotence, a substitute for action, for power, for self-affirmation that reinscribes incapacity, powerlessness, and rejection. For Nietzsche, ressentiment itself is rooted in reaction—the substitution of reasons, norms, and ethics for deeds—and he suggests that not only moral systems but identities themselves take their bearings in this reaction. As Tracy Strong reads this element of Nietzsche's thought: Identity . . . does not consist of an active component, but is reaction to something outside; action in itself, with its inevitable self-assertive qualities, must then become something evil, since it is identified with that against which one is reacting. The will to power of slave morality must constantly reassert that which gives definition to the slave: the pain he suffers by being in the world Hence any attempt to escape that pain will merely result in the reaffirmation of painful structures.28 If the "cause" of ressentiment is suffering, its "creative deed" is the reworking of this pain into a negative form of action, the "imaginary revenge" of what Nietzsche terms "natures denied the true reaction, that of deeds."29 This revenge is achieved through the imposition of suffering "on whatever does not feel wrath and displeasure as he does"30 (accomplished especially through the production of guilt), through the establishment of suffering as the measure of social virtue, and through casting strength and good fortune ("privilege," as we say today) as self recriminating, as its own indictment in a culture of suffering: "it is disgraceful to be fortunate, there is too much misery. "31 But in its attempt to displace its suffering, identity structured by ressentiment at the same time becomes invested in its own subjection. This investment lies not only in its discovery of a site of blame for its hurt will, not only in its acquisition of recognition through its history of subjection (a recognition predicated on injury, now righteously revalued), but also in the satisfactions of revenge, which ceaselessly reenact even as they redistribute the injuries of marginalization and subordination in a liberal discursive order that alternately denies the very possibility of these things and blames those who experience them for their own condition. Identity politics structured by ressentiment reverse without subverting this blaming structure: they do not subject to critique the sovereign subject of accountability that liberal individualism presupposes, nor the economy of inclusion and exclusion that liberal universalism establishes. Thus, politicized identity that presents itself as a self-affirmation now appears as the opposite, as predicated on and requiring its sustained rejection by a "hostile external world."32

#### Our alternative is to recognize debate as a site of contingent commonality in which we can forge bonds of argumentation beyond identity---the affirmative’s focus on subjectivity abdicates the flux of politics and debate for the incontestable truth of identity

Brown 95—prof at UC Berkeley (Wendy, States of Injury, 47-51)

The postmodern exposure of the imposed and created rather than dis- covered character of all knowledges—of the power-surtuscd, struggle-¶48¶produced quality of all truths, including reigning political and scientific ones—simultaneously exposes the groundlessness of discovered norms or visions. It also reveals the exclusionary and regulatory function of these norms: white women who cannot locate themselves in Nancy Hartsock’s account of women’s experience or women s desires, African American women who do not identify with Patricia Hill Collinss account of black women’s ways of knowing, are once again excluded from the Party of Humanism—this time in its feminist variant. ¶Our alternative to reliance upon such normative claims would seem to be engagement in political struggles in which there are no trump cards such as “morality” or “truth."Our alternative, in other words, is to struggle within an amoral political habitat for temporally bound and fully contestable visions of who we are and how we ought to live. Put still another way, postmodernity unnerves feminist theory not merely because it deprives us of uncomplicated subject standing, as Christine Di Stefano suggests, or of settled ground for knowledge and norms, as Nancy Hartsock argues, or of "centered selves and “emancipatory knowledge," as Seyla Bcnhabib avers. Postmodernity unsettles feminism because it erodes the moral ground that the subject, truth, and nor- mativity coproduce in modernity. When contemporary feminist political theorists or analysts complain about the antipolitical or unpolitical nature of postmodern thought—thought that apprehends and responds to this erosion—they arc protesting, inter' aha, a Nictzschcan analysis of truth and morality as fully implicated in and by power, and thereby dplegiti- mated qua Truth and Morality Politics, including politics with passion- ate purpose and vision, can thrive without a strong theory of the subject, without Truth, and without scientifically derived norms—one only need reread Machiavelli, Gramsci, or Emma Goldman to see such a politics flourish without these things. The question is whether fnninist politics can prosper without a moral apparatus, whether feminist theorists and activists will give up substituting Truth and Morality for politics. Are we willing to engage in struggle rather than recrimination, to develop our faculties rather than avenge our subordination with moral and epistemological gestures, to fight for a world rather than conduct process on the existing one? Nictzschc insisted that extraordinary strengths of character and mind would be necessary to operate in thce domain of epistemological and religious nakedness he heralded. But in this heexcessively individualized a challenge that more importantly requires the deliberate development of postmoral and antirelativist political spaces, practices of deliberation, and modes of adjudication.¶49¶The only way through a crisis of space is to invent a new space —Fredric Jameson. “Postmodernism"¶Precisely because of its incessant revelation of settled practices and identi- ties as contingent, its acceleration of the tendency to melt all that is solid into air. what is called postmodernity poses the opportunity to radically sever the problem of the good from the problem of the true, to decide “what we want” rather than derive it from assumptions or arguments about “who we are.”Our capacity to exploit this opportunity positively will be hinged to our success in developing new modes and criteria for political judgment. It will also depend upon our willingness to break certain modernist radical attachments, particularly to Marxism’s promise (however failed) of meticulously articulated connections betwreen a com- prehensive critique of the present and norms for a transformed future—a science of revolution rather than a politics of oneResistance, the practice most widely associated with postmodern polit- ical discourse, responds to without fully meeting the normativity chal- lenge of postmodernity. A vital tactic in much political w’ork as wrcll as for mere survival, resistance by itself does not contain a critique, a vision, or grounds for organized collective efforts to enact either. Contemporary affection for the politics of resistance issues from postmodern criticism’s perennial authority problem: our heightened consciousncss of the will to power in all political “positions” and our wrariness about totalizing an- alyses and visions. Insofar as it eschew’s rather than revisesthese problematic practices, resistance-as-politics does not raise the dilemmas of responsibility and justification entailed in “affirming” political projects and norms. In this respect, like identity politics, and indeed sharing with identity politics an excessively local viewpoint and tendency toward positioning without mapping, the contemporary vogue of resistance is more a symptom of postmodernity’s crisis of political space than a coherent response to it.Resistance goes nowhere in particular, has no inherent attachments, and hails no particular vision; as Foucault makes clear, resistance is an effect of and reaction to power, not an arrogation of it.¶What postmodernity disperses and postmodern feminist politics requires are cultivated political spaces for posing and questioning feminist political norms, for discussing the nature of “the good” for women. Democratic political space is quite undcrtheonzed in contemporary femi- nist thinking, as it is everywhere in latc-twentieth-ccntury political the- ory, primarily bccausc it is so little in evidence. Dissipated by the increasing tcchnologizing of would-be political conversations and pro- cesses, by the erosion of boundaries around specifically political domains¶50¶and activities, and by the decline of movement politics, political spaces are scarcer and thinner today than even in most immediately prior epochs of Western history. In this regard, their condition mirrors the splayed and centrifuged characteristics of postmodern political power. Yet precisely because of postmodernity’s disarming tendencies toward political disori- entation, fragmentation, and technologizing, the creation of spaces where political analyses and norms can be proffered and contested is su- premely important.¶Political space is an old theme in Western political theory, incarnated by the polis practices of Socrates, harshly opposed by Plato in the Repub- lic, redeemed and elaborated as metaphysics by Aristotle, resuscitated as salvation for modernity by Hannah Arendt. jnd given contemporary spin in Jurgen Habermas's theories of ideal speech situations and com- municative rationality. The project of developing feminist postmodern political spaces, while enriched by pieces of this tradition, necessarily also departs from it. In contrast with Aristotle’s formulation, feminist politi- cal spaces cannot define themselves against the private sphere, bodies, reproduction and production, mortality, and all the populations and is- sues implicated in these categories. Unlike Arendt’s, these spaces cannot be pristine, ratified, and policed at their boundaries but are necessarily cluttered, attuned to earthly concerns and visions, incessantly disrupted, invaded, and reconfigured. Unlike Habermas, wc can harbor no dreams of nondistorted communication unsullied by power, or even of a ‘com- mon language,’\* but wc recognize as a permanent political condition par- tiality of understanding and expression, cultural chasms whose nature may be vigilantly identified but rarely “resolved,” and the powers of words and images that evoke, suggest, and connote rather than transmit meanings.42 Our spaces, while requiring some definition and protection, cannot be clean, sharply bounded, disembodied, or permanent: to engage postmodern modes of power and honor specifically feminist knowledges, they must be heterogenous, roving, relatively noninstitutionalized, and democratic to the point of exhaustion.¶Such spaces are crucial for developing the skills and practices of post- modern judgment, addressing the problem of “how to produce a discourse on justicc . . . when one no longer relies on ontology or epistemology.”43 Postmodemity’s dismantling of metaphysical foundations for justice renders us quite vulnerable to domination by technical reason ¶51¶unless we seize the opportunity this erosion also creates to develop democratic processes for formulating postepistemelogical and postontological judgments. Such judgements require learning how to have public conversations with each other, arguing from a vision about the common (“what I want for us") rather than from identity (“who I am”),and from explicitly postulated norms and potential common values rather than false essentialism or unreconstructed private interest.44 Paradoxically, such public and comparatively impersonal arguments carry potential for greater accountability than arguments from identity or interest. While the former may be interrogated to the ground by others, the latter are insulated from such inquiry with the mantle of truth worn by identity-based speech. Moreover, postidentitypolitical positions and conversations potentially replace a politics of difference with a politics of diversity—differences grasped from a perspective larger than simply one point in an ensemble.Postidentity public positioning requires an outlook that discerns structures of dominance within diffused and disorienting orders of power, thereby stretching toward a more politically potent analysis than that which our individuated and fragmented existences can generate. In contrast to Di Stefano's claim that 'shared identity” may constitute a more psychologically and politically reliable basis for “attachment and motivation on the part of potential activists,” I am suggesting that political conversation oriented toward diversity and the common, toward world rather than self, and involving a conversion of ones knowledge of the world from a situated (subject) position into a public idiom,offers us the greatest possibility of countering postmodern social fragmentations and political disintegrations.¶Feminists have learned well to identify and articulate our "subject positions —we have become experts at politicizing the “I”that is produced through multiple sites ofpower and subordination. But the very practice so crucial to making these elements of power visible and subjectivity political may be partly at odds with the requisites for developing political conversation among a complex and diverse “we.” We may need to learn public speaking and the pleasures of public argument not to overcome our situatedness, but in order to assume responsibility for our situations and to mobilize a collective discourse that will expand them. For the political making of a feminist future that does not reproach the history on which it is borne, we may need to loosen our attachments to subjectivity, identity, and morality and to redress our underdeveloped taste for political argument.

# Case

#### The medical model should not be completely rejected; medical discourse is useful in raising awareness and recovering from loss like those at sites of war

Barker & Murray, 10

English Professors University of Birmingham, University of Leeds 10

[Clare Barker, Stuart Murray, Journal of Literary & Cultural Disability Studies Volume 4, Number 3, 2010 “Disabling Postcolonialism: Global Disability Cultures and Democratic Criticism,” accessed 7-13-12 BC]

Given that the history of colonialism (and its post/neocolonial aftermath) is indeed a history of mass disablement, and that the acquisition of disability may be tied into wider patterns of dispossession—the loss of family, home, land, community, employment—there is a pressing need, as we see it, to resist the too-easy censure of narratives that construct disability as loss. We would caution especially against the blanket rejection and/or critique of medical discourse and medicalized terminology, which may be strategically important when campaigning for resources and raising awareness of (neo)colonial abuses. What individuals in such circumstances experience as loss should not be rendered an invalid response by arguments that fail to recognize the wider contexts and material environments in which disablement occurs.

#### Rejection of the medical model causes community backlash—the social model is perceived as offensive, unethical, and unrealistic—turns the aff

Autism and Oughtisms 11

December 16, 2011 Note: Autism and Oughtisms is the name of the blogger who posted this entry, she has a minor in sociology and is a mother of an autistic child (“Concern over the use of the Social Model of Disability, in the Autism Community,” Accessed online at <http://autismandoughtisms.wordpress.com/2011/12/16/concern-over-the-use-of-the-social-model-of-disability-in-the-autism-community/>, Accessed on 7/19/12)

I’m increasingly encountering reference to the Social Model of [Disability](http://autismandoughtisms.wordpress.com/2011/12/16/concern-over-the-use-of-the-social-model-of-disability-in-the-autism-community/), in autism rhetoric. It is most strongly associated with the Neurodiversity movement, and related groups (like ASAN). Without fail, every time I have seen the Social Model of Disability being used to discuss autism, I have seen quick and concerned responses from others who are outraged that something as serious and real (as opposed to mild or entirely socially constructed) as autism, could be referenced and re-framed in this way. In this post I am going to try to make sense of those concerns, where they come from, and whether they are well-placed. First some introductory points about the Model itself. The [Social Model of Disability](http://autismandoughtisms.wordpress.com/2011/12/16/concern-over-the-use-of-the-social-model-of-disability-in-the-autism-community/) can be seen as a response to the more individualised and “normative” Medical Model of Disability. The Social Model shifts the focus from reshaping the impaired individual, to reshaping society (in terms of things like society’s response, attitudes and accommodation of those impaired persons). It defines disability in reference to how much society is accommodating the affected individuals, rather than as something defined by the condition the person has. It does not necessarily come hand-in-hand with a [complete](http://autismandoughtisms.wordpress.com/2011/12/16/concern-over-the-use-of-the-social-model-of-disability-in-the-autism-community/) reframing of the impairment carried by the individual, by which I mean, you can still identify an objective and serious impairment held by the individual, yet use a Social Model approach to what to do about it and how to talk about it. It may do though; various movements will and do deny existing definitions – and even existence – of the [impairments](http://autismandoughtisms.wordpress.com/2011/12/16/concern-over-the-use-of-the-social-model-of-disability-in-the-autism-community/) that lead to disability, completely denying current terms and groupings and diagnostic criteria used to identify the conditions affecting people in the first place. This line of thinking will also challenge uses of the terms like “impairment” at all, choosing instead to completely redefine the condition as one only created by societal attitudes towards these people as “other” and unwanted. Similarly, the Social Model of Disability doesn’t necessarily come hand-in-hand with saying the only correct response to a challenged person is to alter society and everyone else rather than the individual themself (for example, they may say society must be more accommodating but also there must be [medical](http://autismandoughtisms.wordpress.com/2011/12/16/concern-over-the-use-of-the-social-model-of-disability-in-the-autism-community/) and therapy interventions for the best of the affected individual). Again though, some do take that more extreme approach, saying that the affected individual should not have to change or be forced to change at all; that it is only society (everyone else) who must be expected to change, in attitudes and accommodation towards those seemingly affected by a disability. Basically, the Social Model of Disability then can be seen either as a guiding consideration that enhances our appreciation of the role society plays in the definition and actuality of disability, or it can be taken as a more extreme version that attacks the very definition of impairments (per se) and completely counters existing expectations that afflicted individuals do something to better fit into the world they exist in. In that first guise – as an enhanced consideration of the role society plays in making disability worse – there will not be much controversy, since it would be fair to say that most people understand that accommodation and better attitudes towards conditions like autism, can and do make a very real impact on how debilitating something like autism can be. But in this softer guise of the model, it doesn’t tell us much we didn’t already know, and isn’t really a “game-changer.” It is the more extreme version and uses of the model that raise hackles (and I will soon get to why that may be, particularly for autism). I think it is important though to recognise that not everyone who refers to the Social Model of Disability is conforming to this more extreme version, and are often using it to rather suggest a gentle paradigm shift along-side continuing medical definitions and interventions at the individual level. In order to understand why many in the autism community – most especially the daily carers of those § Marked 10:58 § with more severe forms of autism – take such exception to the more extreme Social Model of Disability, I think it is important to understand the rather common histories and daily struggles faced by these carers; pre-diagnosis, at the point of diagnosis and post-diagnosis. It is a common experience for parents of autistic children to go through months or years of being told there is nothing “wrong with their child”; that what they’re worried about in their child is just a little slow development in their interests, abilities and speech. That better parenting or more socializing would fix the child right up. Eventually the child receives the diagnosis (which may take more than one professional, particularly if they see the wrong sort of professionals), and then those parents have to face family, friends and strangers sharing their wisdom that autism is not a real condition; it’s just a fad diagnosis tailored to bad parents or poorly performing children. After diagnosis comes the eternal fight for services and funding that you’re supposedly entitled to, so your child can get the help they need as soon as possible, to make the biggest difference possible for the brightest future possible. So when someone comes along after or during all these struggles and adds one more voice to the “your child’s condition isn’t really a disability” barrage, it is completely understandable and predictable that there is going to be a backlash. When you fight to have your child’s condition acknowledged in the first place by professionals and those around you, then fight to access services, to then have someone tell you “it would all be OK if society just acted a bit differently towards your child” or “there is nothing wrong with your child, just something wrong with society”, it comes off like a threat to the very diagnosis and to the hard-won services. And in its more extreme form, that is exactly what the Social Model of Disability is; a threat. It tells you to get rid of the diagnosis category (in particular forms and places anyway), and to stop providing therapies to these people; to turn all funding and attention instead to the problems in society instead. More than a threat though, it also comes across as (a) a complete and astounding denial of reality, and (b), an entirely unrealistic and arguably immoral response to impairment and disability. It comes across as a denial of reality because being around the most severely autistic (and disabled more generally) makes it impossible to say “there is nothing really wrong here.” When basic self-care skills are missing to the extent that the person is dependent on others to change nappies well into their school years, or language is non-existent to the point that completely artificial modes of communication need to be intentionally (and often expensively) introduced in order to even figure out the simplest request, the notion that just changing society would make it all be fine, can appear ignorant and be quite upsetting. This would be a reaction to a more extreme form of the Social Model of Disability of course; not the form that accepts real and serious impairment (beyond the socially defined) and the need for interventions at the individual level. It can be seen as an unrealistic and immoral response too. Unrealistic, because making everyone else in society change when the alternative is working to help that individual find a way to function within society as it currently exists, is the far more mammoth task, and unlikely to help that individual here and now (though it may improve their life years or decades from now; there is arguably no reason social awareness can’t be improved along-side an individual approach). The focus needs to be on helping the person now, in the world they find themselves in. Yes, lets work to make that a better world, but not at the expense of helping the person find their way in society as it currently works. The “immoral” aspect of this approach comes in because the Social Model of Disability does not sit intuitively with highly valuing independence, which is a question of not just economics but a deeper set of (particular) moral beliefs. The moral concern here is that dependence on others – particularly on society at large (in terms of financial support, accommodation, positive discrimination etc) – is neither neutral nor something to be encouraged and celebrated. Rather, anything which encourages adults towards personal independence (self-care, financial independence, the ability to live one’s own life the way one chooses, etc), is a positive value. However, it must be noted that the “outcome” (which is arguably unrealistic or impossible) of the ultimate implementation and realisation of the Social Model of Disability, wouldactually be heightened independence of those currently deemed disabled, since they would be more empowered to gain employment, and to move freely through society (both mentally and physically). Also, one could arguably question the meaning of independence in a society that taxes heavily already, where interdependence and dependence is already an oft-forgotten aspect of today’s modern societies; that the Social Disability Model just seeks to extend that aspect. Again though, the increased independence arguably afforded by a Social Disability Model approach, can come along-side rather than instead of, an individualised approach to disability (where therapies and other interventions are also used to equip the affected individual). It is the “instead of” approach – where some argue that therapies, definitions, and interventions at the individual level should be abandoned altogether – that upsets carers the most. From my own thoughts and understanding of these conflicts, a lot of confusion comes from inconsistent or unclear uses of the Social Model of Disability. At its extremes, the Model looks distorting, offensive, and dangerous to the wellbeing of the disabled. In its milder form it is a sort of paradigm shift – bringing attention to a different or rather additional way to view, understand and approach disability – and yet because it is milder, this form isn’t as important or “powerful” as its more extreme version (and is arguably redundant as a model per se, since it is downgraded to a “consideration” or “heightened awareness”, that can sit (merely) along-side the existing supposed “Medical Model”). I do not have particular training or special insights (beyond Sociology being the Minor of my BA and my own experiences as a mother of an autistic child), that I brought into this post. This post is rather the result of thinking about others’ reactions, and indeed my own reactions, to encountering the Social Model of Disability rhetoric, particularly in regards to the autism community. And so, as ever, I do openly encourage you to correct me if I’ve got something wrong or misrepresented or misunderstood some aspect. But if I am incorrect, it is worth noting that those errors are made not just by me, and are symptoms of an oft poorly communicated rhetoric rather than ill-intent or lack of consideration on my behalf.

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### 2NC

# 2NC alt solvency

### 2NC – Impact Calc

#### FELLOW-FEELING OR COMPASSION ARE IMPOSSIBLE UNDER A CAPITALIST LOGIC -IT MONETIZES ALL LIFE, ENABLING THE WORST ATROCITIES IMAGINABLE

Kovel 02

Joel Kovel, Alger Hiss Professor, Social Studies, Bard College, THE ENEMY OF NATURE: THE END OF CAPITALISM OR THE END OF THE WORLD, 2002, p. 141.

Capital produces egoic relations, which reproduce capital. The isolated selves of the capitalist order can choose to become personifications of capital, or may have the role thrust upon them. In either case, they embark upon a pattern of non-recognition mandated by the fact that the almighty dollar interposes itself between all elements of experience: all things in the world, all other persons, and between the self and its world: nothing really exists except in and through monetization. This set-up provides an ideal culture medium for the bacillus of competition and ruthless self-maximization. Because money is all that ‘counts’, a peculiar heartlessness characterizes capitalists, a tough-minded and cold abstraction that will sacrifice species, whole continents (viz. Africa) or inconvenient sub-sets of the population (viz. black urban males) who add too little to the great march of surplus value or may be seen as standing in its way The presence of value screens out genuine fellow-feeling or compassion, replacing it with the calculus of profit-expansion. Never has a holocaust been carried out so impersonally When the Nazis killed their victims, the crimes were accom­panied by a racist drumbeat; for global capital, the losses are regrettable necessities.

#### And, the impact to the K is fast—the aff’s impact is slow exclusion and violence that happens overtime—avoid the fast impact of capitalism now to live to stop other forms of exclusion later—COLLAPSE IS ASSURED NOW DO TO CAPITALISM’S UNSUSTAINABLE USE OF RESOURCES LEADING TO ENVIRONMENTAL COLLAPSE AND HUMAN EXTINCTION. NOW IS THE OPPORTUNE TIME TO BREAK AWAY FROM CAPITALISM DURING THIS CRISIS.

Knight 09

[Alex Knight, Masters in Political Science, Organizer, teacher and writer in Philadelphia. Began organizing students in college on anti-war and environmental issues. A real time Activist. “Is it the end of capitalism”, May 4th, 2009, <http://endofcapitalism.com/about/1-is-this-the-end-of-capitalism/>, Access Date 6/11/13, \\wyo-bb]

Capitalism requires growth. A system that requires growth cannot last forever on a planet that is defined by ecological and social limits. Capitalism is therefore fundamentally unsustainable – sooner or later it will run up against those limits and the system will stop functioning. At this moment we are in the midst of a crisis which is calling into question the future of this system. Now is a perfect opportunity to envision a new way of living in the world that can meet human needs while also respecting the needs of the planet. It is time to build this new world. The current economic crisis which began in 2007 is unlike any previous crisis faced by global capitalism. In earlier downturns there remained a way to grow out of it by expanding production – there were new resources and energy supplies, new markets, and new pools of labor to exploit. The system just needed to expand its reach, because there was plenty of money to make outside its existing grasp. If we study what lies at the root of today’s crisis, we will discover very real limits to growth blocking that path this time. From extreme poverty alongside excessive consumption to exhaustion of resources and ecosystems, the system’s capacity for growth has reached a breaking point. The present economic recession might not be recorded in the history books as the final chapter of capitalism. But the ongoing crisis illustrates that like Humpty-Dumpty, the capitalist system is broken and there’s no sense continuing to use all the King’s horses and all the King’s men to try to put it back together again. It would be wiser to spend those resources developing an economy that works better for our communities and our planet. Contrary to what may be reported in the news, this is not merely a financial crisis. Professor Richard Wolff in his excellent video Capitalism Hits the Fan explains that this crisis did not begin in the financial markets and it hasn’t ended there. When the corporate media cast blame for the recession on abstractions like “toxic assets,” “collateralized debt obligations,” “credit default swaps,” or focus discussion of the problem on the crimes and errors of individual investors and firms, they obscure the true depth of the crisis. This is a crisis of the system itself, meaning the only solution is a total change in the structure of the economy. Capitalism cannot be “fixed,” it must be replaced. Despite unprecedented efforts on the part of the King’s men, who have spared no expense on his recovery, Humpty remains in critical condition today and his long-term prospects are not looking good. Journalist and former Goldman Sachs executive Nomi Prins has been tracking the extent of the Wall St. bailout, and reported in December ’09 that the US government has in the past year committed over $14 trillion to buy up worthless debt from troubled banks. (Putting this in perspective, the entire yearly economy of the United States is also $14 trillion.) Despite these unprecedented giveaways, businesses continue to close their doors or downsize their workforces, pushing the official US unemployment rate over 10% as of November ’09. But this number only includes those jobless workers who are currently looking for full-time employment. A more accurate figure, including the underemployed and those discouraged from actively seeking employment would be 17.5%, or nearly 1 of every 5 American workers out of a job. While the US Congress quickly gave out trillions of dollars to banks and corporations facing hardship, it has thus far created no new job training or unemployment programs to ease the suffering of the millions of workers losing their incomes. Nor does it appear willing to create a public health care program for the nearly 50 million Americans now without access to a doctor. At the same time the US government continues to drag its feet on the issue of climate change, recently joining with China to “wreck” the Copenhagen climate summit (in Bill McKibben’s words) that was attempting to curb global greenhouse gas emissions. Such favoritism towards banks and corporations while neglecting the basic well-being of the public and the planet reflects the sickness of capitalist priorities. In this system, profit is valued more highly than human and non-human life. Capitalism requires growth, and according to an article published in New Scientist, growth is “killing the Earth.” The article included the below graph, showing the size of the global economy (GDP) skyrocketing over the last fifty years. [GRAPH OMITTED] But this tremendous growth in economic output corresponds to an equally rapid growth in damage done to the global environment. Forest loss, fisheries depleted, ozone destruction, species extinctions, carbon dioxide emissions, and the rise of global temperatures all race towards the top of the page, suggesting that if capitalism were able to recover from its current fall and continue on a path of endless growth, there soon might not be any planet left to live on. Luckily for Earth and all those who call it home, there are limits constraining capitalism from further growth. These limits are both ecological and social because they originate both from the planet and communities of people. The ecological limits include shrinking supplies of water, soil, uranium, and fossil fuels like oil, natural gas, and coal. The most important limiting factor is oil, which fuels much of the capitalist economy, including 95% of current transportation. Global capitalism today could not exist without oil, but worldwide oil production appears to be near its ultimate maximum, or “peak.” Peak oil doesn’t mean that there is no more oil, just that the oil remaining underground is deeper, heavier, more remote, and more expensive – so it cannot continue to be pumped at the same rate as before. As demand for oil continues to grow, this supply limit is creating a shortage that cannot be overcome by existing alternative fuels, which has sent oil prices soaring. And without the cheap and plentiful fuel it needs to grow, capitalism as a way of organizing society will become obsolete.

### 2NC – Root Cause

#### Cap is totally the cause of all oppression including ableism

Oliver 99

(Professor Michael J. Oliver - Professor of Disability Studies University of Greenwich, London, England “Capitalism, Disability and Ideology: A Materialist Critique of the Normalization Principle” – Book: A quarter-century of normalization and social role valorization: evolution and impact (p163-173) 1999 http://www.leeds.ac.uk/disability-studies/archiveuk/Oliver/cap%20dis%20ideol.pdf KB)

The second part of the argument shows how intermediate social institutions in America, such as the legal, the political and welfare systems contribute to the specific way in which disability is produced and their role in the transformation of rehabilitation into a commodity. The final part considers what this may mean in terms of future developments in social policy and what effects it may have on the lives of disabled people. It is difficult to disagree with this formulation at the descriptive level but the problem with this pluralist version of political economy is that the structure of capitalist America itself goes unexamined as does the crucial role that the capitalist economy plays in. shaping the experience of groups and individuals. Exactly the same criticism can be levelled at normalization theory. Devaluation according to normalization theory is a universal cognitive process and economic and social conditions are only relevant to who gets devalued. Political economy, as it is used here, takes a particular theoretical view of society; one which sees the economy as the crucial, and ultimately determining factor, in structuring the lives of groups and individuals. Further, while the relationship between various groups and the economy may differ in qualitative ways, the underlying structural relationship remains. "The convergence and interaction of liberating forces at work in society against racism, sexism, ageism and economic imperialism are all oppressive 'isms' and built-in responses of a society that considers certain groups inferior. All are rooted in the social-economic structures of society. All deprive certain groups of status, the right to control their own lives and destinies with the end result of powerlessness. All have resulted in economic and social discrimination. All rob (American) society of the energies and involvement of creative persons who are needed to make our society just and humane. All have brought on individual alienation, despair, hostility, and anomie". (Walton 1979.9) Hence the oppression that disabled people face is rooted in the economic and social structures of capitalism. And this oppression is structured by racism, sexism, homophobia, ageism and disablism which is endemic to all capitalist societies and cannot be explained away as a universal cognitive process. To explain this further it is necessary to go back to the roots of capitalism itself.

### 2NC – Alt Solves

#### Political economic critique is necessary to understand the way that capitalist exploitation frames and control medical industrial complex that dominates people with disabilities—the analysis of the alternative is a perquisite to the aff—prevents the fracturing of identity based strategies

Grossman, 2004

[Brian, Ph.D. Student, Program in Medical Sociology, Department of Social and Behavioral Sciences, University of California, San Francisco, Political economy perspectives on disability and aging: Competing or complementary frameworks?, This paper will be presented as part of the panel on Issues in Disability and Aging at the conference, Social Policy As if People Matter, to be held at Adelphi University in Garden City, NY on November 11-12, 2004, http://www.adelphi.edu/peoplematter/pdfs/Grossman.pdf] /Wyo-MB

Political economy is an analytic framework that attempts to unearth the links between¶ corporate and/or bureaucratic interests and the products of political infrastructure, such as¶ political appointments and policy decisions. The focus of the inquiry depends on the analytic¶ tradition of the research, with the market focus arising from a Marxist tradition and the¶ bureaucratic focus stemming from a Weberian one. Both traditions of political economy view¶ the products of political infrastructure as worthy of sociological inquiry as a consequence of their¶ socially constructed (as opposed to positivist or essentialist) natures. Marxist political economy¶ asserts that policy is not decided through a democratic process, but rather reflects (and is in fact,¶ controlled by) financial interests of the dominant social/economic class. This perspective has¶ proven to be a useful tool in a number of areas of sociologic interest: the environment, economic¶ imperialism and globalization, civil rights, and especially health and illness. It is in this last¶ arena, in which the discussion that follows will continue to explore the utility of Marxist political¶ economy as a tool for the critical analysis of social inequality and the identification of¶ opportunities for action.¶ Within the subfield of the sociology of health and illness (also called the sociology of¶ medicine), Marxist political economy has been offered as an explanatory framework through¶ which to understand and analyze the rise of HMOs, the historical and continued role of medical¶ professionals in the creation of markets for medical goods and services, as well as the consistent¶ failures to enact a national health system in the U.S. (Navarro, 1995; McKinlay, 1977; Waitzkin,¶ 1989). Employing a political economy perspective, Ehrenreich & Ehrenreich (1971) introduced¶ the term “medical industrial complex” to describe the collective presence of capitalist interests¶ within the healthcare sector, identifying the accumulation of profit as one of the primary¶ functions of the U.S. health care system. Additionally, the political economy framework was¶ employed by McKinlay (1977) to illustrate six reasons why medicine (or health, more broadly)¶ was a profitable market for capitalist exploitation: 1) the market for healthcare is large and¶ captive (i.e., people will always need to seek care); 2) people place the fulfillment of health¶ needs above other commodity needs; 3) the delivery of healthcare services affords control over¶ the consuming public; 4) the high demand for technology in the healthcare sector supports a high¶ degree of competition; 5) the government guarantees profit for those delivering healthcare¶ services (as evidenced by the medical misuses/abuses of the 1970s); and 6) healthcare provides a¶ cloak of benevolence to the (inherently) exploitative nature of capitalism. More recently,¶ Navarro (1995, 2001) employed a political economic analytic to attribute the failure of the¶ Clinton Healthcare Plan to the influence of the medical industrial complex on the policy process.¶ Furthermore, political economy has been offered as a way to understand the increasing¶ consolidation of healthcare capital into fewer firms and more concentrated markets not just in the¶ U.S., but around the globe as well (Estes, Harrington, & Pellow, 2000; Navarro, 1999).¶ Moreover, political economy has been a useful framework for researchers of and¶ advocates for certain groups defined by health status or demographic characteristics to identify¶ and analyze how economic interests influence and are sustained by political processes. Two¶ such groups whose experiences of capitalist exploitation in healthcare have been explored¶ through Marxist political economy are elderly people and people with disabilities. Although¶ these two demographic groups are not necessarily mutually exclusive (and as the Baby Boomers¶ age will increasingly overlap), they are often represented by disparate social and political¶ advocacy organizations, competing against one another for both philanthropic and governmental¶ financial support. Both existing legislation and the legislative process act to splinter these¶ groups into fighting for scarce resources, while the corporate interests are consolidated in the¶ production and distribution of goods and services accessed by both communities, further¶ multiplying opportunities for exploitation. Additionally, the research on both of these¶ populations is separated across a number of disciplinary boundaries (i.e., geriatrics and¶ gerontology, rehabilitation sciences and disability studies), government funding sources (i.e.,¶ National Institute for Disability Rehabilitation Research in the Department of Education,¶ National Institute on Aging in the National Institutes of Health), journals, and communities of¶ researchers. Consequently, although both sets of researchers have explored the political¶ economy framework in relation to their respective populations, there seems to be little evidence¶ of, and perhaps little interest in, combining these two bodies of research under a broader¶ theoretical model of political economy. After exploring both of these sets of literatures, this¶ paper will conclude by highlighting the opportunities for analysis and action that a united¶ political economy approach has to offer.

### 2NC – Negative is Key Starting Pint

#### The alternative is the only starting point to explain oppression against the disabled

Saczkowski 11

[Thomas Saczkowski, “NARRATIVES OF VIOLENCE: THE RELATIONSHIP OF MASCULINITY AND

ABLEISM,” 35-37, University of Toronto, <https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/30054/1/Narratives_of_Violence_tspace.pdf> //uwyo-baj]

Gleeson (1997) provides a historical materialist account of disability in capitalism. In this analysis, he posits that the market has been organized in such a way that it excludes people with disabilities. In using Engels (2007) and Eisenstein’s (1979) account of the gendering of labour in a capitalist political economy, we can see disability is treated in similar ways. Capitalist structures are organized to create profit, and to accomplish this they have made labour revolve around efficiency, enforced discipline, time keeping, and physical and mental requirements that require meeting the speed of production. Albrecht (2001) details the consequences of this organization and suggests that it results in the majority of people with disabilities being rejected from high-income and high responsibility employment, and subordinates them to menial labour jobs. This then has consequences for how people with disabilities incur ableist perceptions and treatment because of this organization and also because of their class status. Gleeson (1997) describes how people with disabilities have been oppressed because of ableist perceptions, but also because of how capitalism has exploited the lower class. The foundation of capitalism is based on the exploitation and control of the poor and working class so they produce the greatest amount of capital for the ruling class. Therefore, by 36 forcing people with disabilities into the lower class, capitalism takes away the social responsibility of state structures to support people with disabilities in the labour market and their home life, and also allows those individuals to be exploited in inflexible and poorly paid positions. Sheldon (2005) reminds us that disability and ableism cannot be dematerialised and explained only as a product of discriminatory beliefs. She maintains that it is essential to address how disablement relates to the capitalist mode of production. I briefly mentioned before how demands of efficiency by capitalism have been adopted by oppressive patriarchal forms of masculinity so as to maintain male dominance within the market and the social sphere (Connell, 2005). Some of the characteristics of the masculine identity include being strong, assertive, and individualistic. These are characteristics typically used to describe not only a good capitalist but also an oppressive masculinity. This allows for male dominance to exist within the economy, while maintaining that dominance through the subjugation of women and people with disabilities. The patriarchal foundations of the economy create a system where higher positions within the social and economic hierarchy are reserved for only able-bodies. The organization of capitalism rejects the body that is not conducive to maximizing production and/or will incur costs for a corporation; therefore the disabled body is rejected from this space (Albrecht, 2001). This economic structural organization dominates and controls people with disabilities (Sheldon, 2005). The organization of a masculine identity seeks to control the body and its norms and gestures so it can be commodified. All bodies within the economy are commodified, and such bodies are valued differently based on their exploitability and expendability (Fine & Asch, 1988). 37 The disabled body is seen as being deviant from the productive oppressive masculine identity. The disabled body is labelled as inferior to the able-bodied norm because it is viewed as less productive and may require accommodation (Albrecht, 2001). Patriarchalcapitalism and ableism engenders a society where people with disabilities have lower incomes and participate less in the work force (Fraser et al.; 2003). Disabled people struggle in a society that has been designed for male dominance and as if disability does not exist (Shakespeare, 2005; Fine & Asch, 1988). Peterson (2005) argues that in a capitalist economic system, the dominance of the patriarchal capitalist male is held as the ideal with the intention of preserving the productivity of industrial capitalism. The body of a disabled person marks both a rejection of this masculine identity and an inadequacy in preserving the values and production of capitalism. This unproductive disabled body is then marginalized and forced to take up lower paying jobs that are characteristically occupied by working class peoples (Serlin, 2003). Within these positions, there is less access to benefits and support systems and, in most cases, disabled people must seek supplementary income from welfare (Barnes et al., 1999). Subsequently, the disabled body is made invisible within capitalist society because of its incapacity to embody the valued qualities of the productive patriarchal male. In addition, Albrecht (2001) details how the disabled body becomes hyper-visible to create a disability marketplace in capitalist society. Certain images of the disabled body become visible when they are used for capital gains for large corporations and to create an economic sphere where accommodation becomes attainable by consumption. In turn, the creation of this market creates capital for capitalists and exacerbates an understanding of disability through the medical model (Albrecht, 2001). 38

#### **Turns the case—the aff will never create change unless capitalism is placed at the forefront—their resistance will be rendered underground**

Saczkowski 11

[Thomas Saczkowski, “NARRATIVES OF VIOLENCE: THE RELATIONSHIP OF MASCULINITY AND

ABLEISM,” 35-37, University of Toronto, <https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/30054/1/Narratives_of_Violence_tspace.pdf> //uwyo-baj]

Foucault (2003) describes the process of commodification through his concept of the docile body. The concept of docile bodies focuses on how external institutions regulate and dominate the body into the ideal productive body for capitalism, to be productive, obedient, and to maximize the interests of the ruling class (Foucault, 2003). Those who take up the characteristics of the docile body for capitalist interests maintain economic power structures and fulfill the necessary roles for the proper functioning of an exploitative economic system. A docile body is one whose appearance and corporeality is shaped to fit the desired and ideal image that is most beneficial to capitalist growth. An example is a male solider whose existence revolves around conforming to the obedient, strong, courageous prototype (Foucault, 2003). Foucault states that the docile body “may be subjected, used, transformed and improved” (2003). The purpose of the docile body is to reveal no impairments and to reject and violently respond to the existence of disabilities that contradict the dominant identity. A necessary prerequisite to being a good and productive worker within a capitalist society is to be docile, and to shape and contort ones body and identity to meet labour expectations. Foucault (2003) argues that when a person fails to become docile within society, their priorities and expectations become invisible and they no longer fit the role of the ideal capitalist worker. People that do not fit this role are not considered productive and ultimately are rejected from the economic sphere. Consequently, the ableist image that is created by a patriarchal capitalist system then becomes adopted by social structures and policies. An ableist perception of viewing disabled people as unproductive and ineffective then has implications on their social standing and how they are generally perceived in society. People with disabilities are 39 then viewed with pity rather than respect and an ableist gaze is created. Earlier, I used Bannerji’s (1995) experiences to describe systemic violence; the violence of ableism operates in similar ways against people with disabilities. This then pushes many people with disabilities into poverty, lower classes, and precarious employment (Gleeson, 1997; Vosko, 2002). Albrecht (2001) argues that the political economy of disability determines that it is more cost effective for the state to keep people with disabilities in a state of poverty under poorly funded social assistance programs and low-wage precarious jobs. This then does not require the state to change its operations as an ableist entity and renegotiate the ableist systemic violence against people with disabilities (Crow, 1996). This enforcement by the state against people with disabilities is most clearly seen through the organization of social assistance in Ontario, and primarily the Ontario Disability Support Program and the Special Diet Allowance. The Ontario government recently cancelled the Special Diet Allowance, which provided extra funding to people with disabilities to purchase nutritious food (Clarke, 1997). The cancellation of this program was part of a package of austerity measures—measures that were influenced by a growing neoliberal ideology in the Ontario government. The cancellation of this program is not only an attack on poor people throughout Ontario, but it is also a direct attack on people with disabilities (Clarke, 1997). As described before with Albrecht’s (2001) analysis, the cancelling of these services takes away the responsibility of the state to support people with disabilities and creates a larger private market that people with disabilities are then dependent on for support and subsistence. Furthermore, it then maintains and empowers the ableist ideology of viewing people with disabilities as unproductive, inefficient, and ultimately useless in terms of providing for themselves and 40 contributing to the capitalist economy. This is done by the discourse that is accompanied with the attacks on the poor and people with disabilities. The state and conservative structures argue that people on social assistance are lazy and chose not to work. This discourse often has a profound effect on the political knowledge and affiliation of the masses (Clarke, 1997). This is an attempt to erase the experiences and bodies of people with disabilities from a patriarchal capitalist and ableist social and political economy (Crow, 1996; Ostrander, 2008; Razack, 1998).

#### Political economy is key to provide a framework for understanding disability and to guide future action

Grossman, 2004

[Brian, Ph.D. Student, Program in Medical Sociology, Department of Social and Behavioral Sciences, University of California, San Francisco, Political economy perspectives on disability and aging: Competing or complementary frameworks?, This paper will be presented as part of the panel on Issues in Disability and Aging at the conference, Social Policy As if People Matter, to be held at Adelphi University in Garden City, NY on November 11-12, 2004, http://www.adelphi.edu/peoplematter/pdfs/Grossman.pdf] /Wyo-MB

The political economy of disability described by Albrecht & Bury (2001) offer the¶ notions of risk and accountability as ideologies that shape experience, policy, and activism;¶ provide an explicit recognition of the heterogeneity of actors within and across social groups in¶ the political economy; and prominently situate war and its connections to the transnational¶ military industrial complex as central to the control of the flows of capital and the increases in¶ the number of disabled people in a global context.¶ Russell (1998, 2001) focuses on the power of capitalist economic rationalization in the¶ support of both historic and current policies of eugenics and euthanasia as desired alternatives to¶ the provision of services. Additionally, she is critical of the role of charities that has been¶ fostered by capitalist influence over the state, as well as the opportunities for profit at the¶ expense of direct services that have been realized in multiple charitable organizations, like Jerry¶ Lewis’s Muscular Dystrophy Association.¶ Moreover, both Albrecht & Bury, and Russell illustrate the historically contingent nature¶ of disability and the manipulations of the boundaries of these definitions to suit the capitalist¶ interest of the times. Lastly, these theorists situate the political economic framework as an¶ analysis imbued with the potential for action, as is particularly evident in Russell’s “Manifesto of¶ an Uppity Crip”.¶ To conclude, a unified political economy model that addresses both disability and aging¶ is possible. Using the Estes (2001) model as a foundation, the issues of disability implicit in the¶ current iteration of the model need to be made explicit, while those issues addressed by authors¶ working in the political economy of disability must be recognized and integrated in order to¶ achieve a stronger model for both analysis and action.

# 2NC Link

### 2NC – Link Wall

#### The aff gets taken up by big business as another product to sell—turns case

Russell and Malhotra, 2002

[Marta, and Ravi, CAPITALISM AND DISABILITY, SOCIALIST REGISTER 2002, http://socialistregister.com/index.php/srv/article/viewFile/5784/2680] /Wyo-MB

Disabled persons who do not offer a body which will enhance profit-making as labourers are used to shore up US capitalism by other means. Entrepreneurs and rehabilitation specialists have made impaired bodies of use to the economic order by shaping disablement into big business40 and turning the disabled body into a commodity around which social policies get created or rejected according to their market value.41 The corporate solution to disablement — institutional- ization in a nursing home, for instance — evolved from the realization that disabled people could be made to serve profit because public financing guaran- teed the revenue (in the USA, Medicaid funds 60% of the cost, Medicare 15%, private insurance 25%). Disabled people are worth more to the Gross Domestic Product when occupying a ‘bed’ than a home. When a single impaired body can generate $30,000 — $82,000 in annual revenues Wall Street counts it as an asset that contributes to companies’ net worth. Despite the efforts of the disability rights movement to de-institutionalize disabled populations and shift policy towards the provision of in-home services, the logic of capital reasserts itself via the recommodification of the disabled body in the home (insofar as public funding permits — with the advent of ‘managed care’, trying to limit costs, there is an increased financial motive to underserve). Corporations have taken an interest in the money-making potential of the in-home services field, and indeed promote the in-home services model as they build their new ‘home-care’ empires. As Jim Charlton puts it, ‘the transformation of people into commodi- ties hides their dehumanization and exploitation by other human beings: it becomes simply an economic fact of life’.42

### 1nr

#### Disability projects like the aff devolve into acceptance of the free market and rights based approaches that collapse on themselves and cause worse oppression for the disabled

Russell and Malhotra, 2002

[Marta, and Ravi, CAPITALISM AND DISABILITY, SOCIALIST REGISTER 2002, http://socialistregister.com/index.php/srv/article/viewFile/5784/2680] /Wyo-MB

Nevertheless, there were and are serious contradictions in the IL philosophy. On the one hand, it seeks to promote autonomy and self-determination for disabled people. On the other, it implicitly accepts the foundations of free market ideology by framing the debate in terms of the right of disabled people as consumers to receive equal treatment from the marketplace. The ability to access the marketplace is cold comfort to the huge proportion of disabled people living in poverty or near-poverty conditions. In a capitalist society, after all, access to the marketplace is predicated on having the purchasing power to buy the services in question. A strategy of disability liberation politics entirely dependent on that purchasing power is so impoverished as to be of assistance to only a tiny fraction of the most privileged disabled people. It also tends to marginalize the concerns of women and minorities. By accepting free market principles as a given the IL movement undermined its radical potential to truly empower disabled people. In the worst cases, some IL centres, afraid of rocking the boat and losing state funding, have become little more than venues for peer counselling and organizing picnics. Only by questioning the very basis of the rules of the market can there be liberation for disabled people.

#### The aff collapses into identity politics that undermines resistance to capitalism

Russell and Malhotra, 2002

[Marta, and Ravi, CAPITALISM AND DISABILITY, SOCIALIST REGISTER 2002, http://socialistregister.com/index.php/srv/article/viewFile/5784/2680] /Wyo-MB

Yet, ultimately, even the most grassroots disability organizations in both the USA and Britain appear theoretically ambiguous in their ideological formulations. They have yet to adopt an anti-capitalist agenda that sees disablement as a product of the class system. Moreover, in both the USA and Britain the passage of disability rights legislation, which is individualistic at base, removes an element of coherence from the political praxis of even the most militant disability rights organizations. A failure to see their common links with other marginalized members of society, including the reserve army of the unemployed, welfare recipients, the increasingly large segment of society working in part-time jobs or in jobs that do not pay a living wage, and others, may result in the squandering of the promise of the various disability rights movements on the shoals of iden- tity politics — or, worse, on postmodern discourse whose theorists refuse to name capitalism as a cause for their oppression. A turn to class politics and historical materialism, fully cognizant of its risks and limitations, is what the disability rights movements need most.

#### Neolib link—the aff ends up coinciding with neoliberal demands to take responsibility for individuals labor and employment

Russell and Malhotra, 2002

[Marta, and Ravi, CAPITALISM AND DISABILITY, SOCIALIST REGISTER 2002, http://socialistregister.com/index.php/srv/article/viewFile/5784/2680] /Wyo-MB

Though it might seem contradictory that a US Republican President (repre- senting the GOP which is, after all, the reactionary voice of capital) signed the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) into law,57 the goals of the ADA are completely in line with neoliberal and Third Way politics which emphasize ending dependency and increasing productivity. There has been a convergence of neoliberal and Third Way discourses, resulting in the mantra that ‘rights entail responsibilities’. Both discourses adopt the supply-side theory that the economy is burdened by rigid labour markets and overly-generous welfare provisions. In this spirit former President Clinton declared that the ‘era of big government is over’ and called for ‘more empowerment, less entitlement’. There is keen government interest in policies that will shift the long-term unemployed and disadvantaged into employment.¶ These politics are underscored in the ADA legislation itself. Congress speci- fied three major goals when it enacted the ADA: eliminating arbitrary barriers faced by disabled persons, ending inequality of opportunity, and reducing unnec- essary dependency and unrealized productivity. The ADA promotes the inclusion of disabled persons in the majority workforce through the establishment of consti- tutional law and regulations which are geared to creating ‘equal opportunity’ in the labour market for disabled job applicants by ‘leveling the playing field’ and requiring employers to accommodate impairments on the job, unless to do so would cause an ‘undue hardship’ for the business58 — which makes the ‘entitle- ment’ to accommodation no entitlement at all. In other words, disabled people’s quasi-civil rights would be tolerated by the anti-government and anti-regulatory GOP as long as the ADA cost the federal government next to nothing, was largely voluntary for business (no quotas, no affirmative action), and promised to get people off state-funded entitlements.59¶ Though disability civil rights are relatively new in Britain, Prime Minister Tony Blair has gone even further. ‘New policies to offer unemployed people jobs and training are a social democratic priority — but we also expect everyone to take up the opportunity offered’, says Blair. These remarks were soon followed by a notice from officials telling disabled persons to seek work or lose benefits. The Independent reported that ‘[s]ick and disabled people who refuse to look for work will face the withdrawal of their state benefits under a tough new govern- ment drive to slash “welfare dependency.”’60 The disability unemployment issue is increasingly defined in both the USA and in Britain as one of dependency which the faulty individual on welfare must overcome, not as the structural outcome of an exclusionary market.

#### **Turns the case—the aff will never create change unless capitalism is placed at the forefront—their resistance will be rendered underground**

Saczkowski 11

[Thomas Saczkowski, “NARRATIVES OF VIOLENCE: THE RELATIONSHIP OF MASCULINITY AND

ABLEISM,” 35-37, University of Toronto, <https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/30054/1/Narratives_of_Violence_tspace.pdf> //uwyo-baj]

Foucault (2003) describes the process of commodification through his concept of the docile body. The concept of docile bodies focuses on how external institutions regulate and dominate the body into the ideal productive body for capitalism, to be productive, obedient, and to maximize the interests of the ruling class (Foucault, 2003). Those who take up the characteristics of the docile body for capitalist interests maintain economic power structures and fulfill the necessary roles for the proper functioning of an exploitative economic system. A docile body is one whose appearance and corporeality is shaped to fit the desired and ideal image that is most beneficial to capitalist growth. An example is a male solider whose existence revolves around conforming to the obedient, strong, courageous prototype (Foucault, 2003). Foucault states that the docile body “may be subjected, used, transformed and improved” (2003). The purpose of the docile body is to reveal no impairments and to reject and violently respond to the existence of disabilities that contradict the dominant identity. A necessary prerequisite to being a good and productive worker within a capitalist society is to be docile, and to shape and contort ones body and identity to meet labour expectations. Foucault (2003) argues that when a person fails to become docile within society, their priorities and expectations become invisible and they no longer fit the role of the ideal capitalist worker. People that do not fit this role are not considered productive and ultimately are rejected from the economic sphere. Consequently, the ableist image that is created by a patriarchal capitalist system then becomes adopted by social structures and policies. An ableist perception of viewing disabled people as unproductive and ineffective then has implications on their social standing and how they are generally perceived in society. People with disabilities are 39 then viewed with pity rather than respect and an ableist gaze is created. Earlier, I used Bannerji’s (1995) experiences to describe systemic violence; the violence of ableism operates in similar ways against people with disabilities. This then pushes many people with disabilities into poverty, lower classes, and precarious employment (Gleeson, 1997; Vosko, 2002). Albrecht (2001) argues that the political economy of disability determines that it is more cost effective for the state to keep people with disabilities in a state of poverty under poorly funded social assistance programs and low-wage precarious jobs. This then does not require the state to change its operations as an ableist entity and renegotiate the ableist systemic violence against people with disabilities (Crow, 1996). This enforcement by the state against people with disabilities is most clearly seen through the organization of social assistance in Ontario, and primarily the Ontario Disability Support Program and the Special Diet Allowance. The Ontario government recently cancelled the Special Diet Allowance, which provided extra funding to people with disabilities to purchase nutritious food (Clarke, 1997). The cancellation of this program was part of a package of austerity measures—measures that were influenced by a growing neoliberal ideology in the Ontario government. The cancellation of this program is not only an attack on poor people throughout Ontario, but it is also a direct attack on people with disabilities (Clarke, 1997). As described before with Albrecht’s (2001) analysis, the cancelling of these services takes away the responsibility of the state to support people with disabilities and creates a larger private market that people with disabilities are then dependent on for support and subsistence. Furthermore, it then maintains and empowers the ableist ideology of viewing people with disabilities as unproductive, inefficient, and ultimately useless in terms of providing for themselves and 40 contributing to the capitalist economy. This is done by the discourse that is accompanied with the attacks on the poor and people with disabilities. The state and conservative structures argue that people on social assistance are lazy and chose not to work. This discourse often has a profound effect on the political knowledge and affiliation of the masses (Clarke, 1997). This is an attempt to erase the experiences and bodies of people with disabilities from a patriarchal capitalist and ableist social and political economy (Crow, 1996; Ostrander, 2008; Razack, 1998).

#### THIRD, Perm could never function, the two visions of society could never be compromised. Materialist theory is the only one that allows people to transform their own lives, and by doing so transform society—star this evidence is comparative the permutation fails

Oliver 99

(Professor Michael J. Oliver - Professor of Disability Studies University of Greenwich, London, England “Capitalism, Disability and Ideology: A Materialist Critique of the Normalization Principle” – Book: A quarter-century of normalization and social role valorization: evolution and impact (p163-173) 1999 http://www.leeds.ac.uk/disability-studies/archiveuk/Oliver/cap%20dis%20ideol.pdf KB)

Conclusion In this paper I have argued that normalization as a social theory is inadequate in that it does not describe experience satisfactorily, its explanation of why disabled have the kinds of experiences they do is wholly inadequate, and its potential for transforming those experiences to something better is limited. It is not only those unsympathetic to normalization who question its future, however. "What does normalization now have to do in order to be a positive force for change in the 1990's. The answer may lie in going back to its roots and realigning itself in relation to other sociological theories". (Brown and smith 1992.176) Whether such a realignment, even with materialist theory, is likely to resuscitate normalization is itself doubtful, because what is at stake is a vision of the kind of society we would like to live in. Normalization theory offers disabled people the opportunity to be given valued social roles in an unequal society which values some roles more than others. Materialist social theory offers disabled people the opportunity to transform their own lives and in so doing to transform the society in which they live into one in which all roles are valued. As a disabled person I know which of those choices I prefer and I also know which most of the disabled people I meet prefer.

#### THE PERM IS MERELY AN ATTEMPT TO DISARM MARXISM OF ITS RADICAL POTENTIAL. THE PERMUTATION OF THE METHOD STRIPS OUT ALL OF THE CONCEPTUAL THEORY THAT ALLOWS US TO UNDERSTAND THE WORLD AND CREATE A PRAXIS TO END OPPRESSION.

TUMINO (Prof. English @ Pitt) 2001

[Stephen, “What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever”, Red Critique, p. online //wyo-tjc]

Orthodox Marxism has become a test-case of the "radical" today. Yet, what passes for orthodoxy on the left—whether like Smith and Zizek they claim to support it, or, like Butler and Rorty they want to "achieve our country" by excluding it from "U.S. Intellectual life" ("On Left Conservatism"), is a parody of orthodoxy which hybridizes its central concepts and renders them into flexodox simulations. Yet, even in its very textuality, however, the orthodox is a resistance to the flexodox. Contrary to the common-sensical view of "orthodox" as "traditional" or "conformist" "opinions," is its other meaning: ortho-doxy not as flexodox "hybridity," but as "original" "ideas." "Original," not in the sense of epistemic "event," "authorial" originality and so forth, but, as in chemistry, in its opposition to "para," "meta," "post" and other ludic hybridities: thus "ortho" as resistance to the annotations that mystify the original ideas of Marxism and hybridize it for the "special interests" of various groups. The "original" ideas of Marxism are inseparable from their effect as "demystification" of ideology—for example the deployment of "class" that allows a demystification of daily life from the haze of consumption. Class is thus an "original idea" of Marxism in the sense that it cuts through the hype of cultural agency under capitalism and reveals how culture and consumption are tied to labor, the everyday determined by the workday: how the amount of time workers spend engaging in surplus-labor determines the amount of time they get for reproducing and cultivating their needs. Without changing this division of labor social change is impossible. Orthodoxy is a rejection of the ideological annotations: hence, on the one hand, the resistance to orthodoxy as "rigid" and "dogmatic" "determinism," and, on the other, its hybridization by the flexodox as the result of which it has become almost impossible today to read the original ideas of Marxism, such as "exploitation"; "surplus-value"; "class"; "class antagonism"; "class struggle"; "revolution"; "science" (i.e., objective knowledge); "ideology" (as "false consciousness"). Yet, it is these ideas alone that clarify the elemental truths through which theory ceases to be a gray activism of tropes, desire and affect, and becomes, instead, a red, revolutionary guide to praxis for a new society freed from exploitation and injustice. Marx's original scientific discovery was his labor theory of value. Marx's labor theory of value is an elemental truth of Orthodox Marxism that is rejected by the flexodox left as the central dogmatism of a "totalitarian" Marxism. It is only Marx's labor theory of value, however, that exposes the mystification of the wages system that disguises exploitation as a "fair exchange" between capital and labor and reveals the truth about this relation as one of exploitation. Only Orthodox Marxism explains how what the workers sell to the capitalist is not labor, a commodity like any other whose price is determined by fluctuations in supply and demand, but their labor-power—their ability to labor in a system which has systematically "freed" them from the means of production so they are forced to work or starve—whose value is determined by the amount of time socially necessary to reproduce it daily. The value of labor-power is equivalent to the value of wages workers consume daily in the form of commodities that keep them alive to be exploited tomorrow. Given the technical composition of production today this amount of time is a slight fraction of the workday the majority of which workers spend producing surplus-value over and above their needs. The surplus-value is what is pocketed by the capitalists in the form of profit when the commodities are sold. Class is the antagonistic division thus established between the exploited and their exploiters. Without Marx's labor theory of value one could only contest the after effects of this outright theft of social labor-power rather than its cause lying in the private ownership of production. The flexodox rejection of the labor theory of value as the "dogmatic" core of a totalitarian Marxism therefore is a not so subtle rejection of the principled defense of the (scientific) knowledge workers need for their emancipation from exploitation because only the labor theory of value exposes the opportunism of knowledges (ideology) that occult this exploitation. Without the labor theory of value socialism would only be a moral dogma that appeals to the sentiments of "fairness" and "equality" for a "just" distribution of the social wealth that does the work of capital by naturalizing the exploitation of labor under capitalism giving it an acceptable "human face."

#### The permutation just delays collective action—asks the powerful to change their opinion of disability first—this is a passive and failing strategy

Oliver 99

(Professor Michael J. Oliver - Professor of Disability Studies University of Greenwich, London, England “Capitalism, Disability and Ideology: A Materialist Critique of the Normalization Principle” – Book: A quarter-century of normalization and social role valorization: evolution and impact (p163-173) 1999 http://www.leeds.ac.uk/disability-studies/archiveuk/Oliver/cap%20dis%20ideol.pdf KB)

In looking at the issue of political change, within normalization theory it is difficult to find anything beyond descriptions of the kinds of things devalued people should be entitled to. How to achieve these entitlements at the political level is not really discussed although Wolfensberger confidently asserts that if we want to valorize someone's social roles "...we know from social science what the overarching strategies are through which this can be accomplished if that is what one wants to pursue". (Wolfensberger 1994.96) I don't know what social science he is referring to but I have to say that I know very few social scientists who are, any longer, convinced that the concept of social roles has very much value to the development of social theory let alone for the promotion of political action. Not only are Talcott Parsons and Erving Goffman dead in a material sense but so are their products; the macro and micro versions of role theory. One can only assume from normalization writings that political change will be a gift from the powerful to powerless once they have come to a true understanding of disability through exposure to the teachings of normalization and social role valorization. Nowhere does normalization acknowledge that "...the conviction that one's group is worth fighting for has to come at least partly from within. The alternative is to wait passively for the advantaged group to confer limited equality which does not essentially alter the status quo, and which it may be motivated to avoid". (Dalley 1992.128) Again, materialist theory is much more upfront about political change. It will only be achieved through struggle, and that struggles will be by oppressed groups themselves against the forces that oppress them. In order to do this it is necessary for oppressed groups to organise collectively to confront this oppression. That inevitably means confrontation and conflict with powerful groups, interests and structures for there are few examples in human history of people willingly giving up power to others. As far as disabled people are concerned, we have seen over the past fifteen years disabled people coming together to organise themselves as a movement at local, national and international levels. In Britain, for example, in order to harness this growing consciousness of disabled people, to provide a platform to articulate the re-definition of the problem of disability and to give a focus to the campaigns for independent living and against discrimination, the British Council of Organisations of Disabled People (BCODP) was formed in 1981 and its success in the subsequent decade is entirely an achievement of disabled people themselves (Hasler 1993). Its conception and subsequent development have been achieved without extensive financial support from Government or from traditional organisations for disabled people. On the contrary, the BCODP was criticised from the start as being elitist, isolationist, unrepresentative, and Marxist by a collection of unrepresentative people with abilities, right and left wing academics, isolated and elitist staff and management of traditional organisations and many professionals whose very careers were bound up with keeping disabled people dependent. Yet despite these attacks, BCODP has gone from strength to strength, now representing over 90 organisations of disabled people and 300,000 disabled individuals. These initiatives not only established BCODP as the only representative voice of disabled people in Britain but by its very success it stimulated an ever growing number of disabled people to adopt a disabled identity. Similar stories of the rise of the disability movement could be told from other parts of both the developing and the developed world. With this growing sense of a collective, political identity has developed the self-confidence not simply to ask for the necessary changes but to demand them and to use a whole range of tactics including direct action and civil disobedience. What's more, this movement is democratic arid accountable to disabled people themselves (Dreidger 1988 Oliver 1990 Davis 1993) and its collective voice is demanding that we be included in our societies everywhere by ending the oppression that confronts us, not by offering us and our oppressors normalization or social role valorization programmes.

#### A theory of just normalization cannot truly understand disability in a way that allows for transformative politics – we need a material based approach that looks at the whole equation

Oliver 99

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(Cohen 1985.152) In the world of late capitalism, the same people, albeit with different jobs titles and perhaps in plusher buildings, are doing the same things to disabled people although they may now be calling them 'doing a needs led assessment' or 'producing a care plan' in Britain. Elsewhere it may be called individual programme planning, social brokerage, change agentry and the like. But the material fact remains, it is still professionals doing it, whatever 'it' is called, to disabled people. The ideology of normalization All social changes require an ideology to support the economic rationality underpinning them. So the ideology underpinning the rise of the institution was ultimately a medical and a therapeutic one; accordingly placing people in institutions was not only good for the health of individuals, it was also good for the health of society. Normalization, it could be argued, is the ideology (or one of the ideologies) that allowed people to be returned to the community in that they can be 'normalized' or in its later variant, be allocated normal (valued) social roles. After all, we don't want the different, the deviant or even the dangerous returned to our communities. I fully realise that here I am stepping on dangerous ground and that both Wolfensberger (1994) and Nirje (1993) would probably argue that I am confusing normal with normalization. There is not the space to demonstrate that I realise that this is not the case nor to draw attention to their own published ambiguities on this issue. Instead I wish to point out that normalization is part of a discourse which is predicated on the normal/abnormal distinction and it is certainly clear that Wolfensberger thinks this distinction is real rather than socially constructed (p95). A materialist approach to this would suggest, as does the French philosopher Foucault (1973) , that the way we talk about the world and the way we experience it are inextricably linked -the names we give to things shapes our experience of them and our experience of things in the world influences the names we give to them. Hence our practices of normalizing people and normalizing services both constructs and maintains the normal/abnormal dichotomy. It is becoming clear that the social structures of late capitalist societies cannot be discussed in a discourse of normality/abnormality, because what characterises them is difference; differences based on gender, ethnic backgrounds, sexual orientation, abilities, religious beliefs, wealth, age, access or non-access to work and so on. And in societies founded on oppression, these differences cross cut and intersect each other in ways they we haven't even begun to properly understand, let alone try to resolve (Zarb and Oliver 1993). The concept of simultaneous oppression (Stuart 1993) may offer a more adequate way of understanding differences within the generic category of disability. Certainly people are beginning to talk about their experience in this way. "As a black disabled women, I cannot compartmentalise or separate aspects of my identity in this way. The collective experience of my race, disability and gender are what shape and inform my life". (Hill1994.7) Kirsten Hearn provides a poignant account of how disabled lesbians and gay men are excluded from all their potential communities. Firstly, "The severely able-bodied community and straight disabled community virtually ignored our campaign". (Hearn 1991.30) and, "Issues of equality are not fashionable for the majority of the severely able-bodied, white, middle-class lesbian and gay communities. (Hearn 1991.33) The point that I am making is that the discourse of normalization (whatever the intent of its major proponents and however badly they feel it has been misused by its disciples} can never adequately describe or explain societies characterised by difference because of its reductionist views of both humanity and society. Individual and group differences cannot be described solely in terms of the normality/abnormality dichotomy and inegalitarian social structures cannot be explained by reference only to valued and devalued social roles. Normalization can also never serve to transform peoples lives; a point to which I shall return.

#### PARTICULARISM-- SINGLE ISSUE RESISTANCE IS EASILY CO-OPTED AND MARGINALIZED

MESZAROS (Prof. Emeritus @ Univ. Sussex) 1995

[Istavan, Beyond Capital: Towards a Theory of Transition, 40// wyo]

However, historically/epochally defined non-integrability, no matter how important for the future, cannot guarantee success on its own. Switching the allegiance of disappointed socialists from the working class to so-called ‘new social movements’ (praised now in opposition to, and by discarding altogether the emancipatory potential of, labour) must be considered, therefore, far too premature and naive. Single issue movements, even if they fight for non-integrable causes, can be picked off and marginalized one by one, because they cannot lay claim to representing a coherent and comprehensive alternative to the given order as a mode of social metabolic control and system of societal reproduction. This is what makes focusing on the socialist emancipatory potential of labour more important today than ever before. For labour is not only non-integrable (in contrast to some historically specific political manifestations of labour, like reformist social democracy, which may be rightly characterized as integrable and indeed in the last few decades also completely integrated), but — precisely as the only feasible structural alternative to capital — can provide the comprehensive strategic framework within which all ‘single issue’ emancipatory movements can successfully make their common cause for the survival of humanity.

#### Post-al Marxist approach undermines Marxist radicals and prioritize authenticity and experience that undermines the possibly for critique and development of class consciousness

Mas'ud Zavarzadeh, Department of English, Syracuse University, "The stupidity that consumption is just as productive as production": in the shopping mall of the post-al left.” *College Literature,* October 01, 1994

Rehearsing Sprinker's cynical pragmatism, [Williams] announces that "Like it not, the discourses of poststructuralism set the terms of current conversation" and advocates a "coalition" of the left (on [his] map) with poststructuralism. [He] does not seem to realize that to have a dialogue with poststructuralism requires that one have at least a modicum of knowledge of poststructuralism: poststructuralism does not "totalize" the domain of investigation into a map with an inside (post-al left) and an "outside" (Syracuse Left); poststructuralism does not construct simplistic binaries between a "seminal" essay and its "other." Essays, for a poststructuralist, are all part of a chain of significations. They are "texts." [Williams'] "master" plan (map) of the left is quite telling about the assumptions informing what [he] calls the "new new left" and providing the key to the salvation of what [he] (like [Hill]) playfully names "What's Left?" In the interview with The Chronicle of Higher Education, [Williams] said that the goal of the minnesota review under [his] editorship will be to move towards a "Generation X articulation of Marxism." (It is a mark of the level of comfort [Williams] provides for the bourgeois knowledge industry that the media repeatedly seeks [him] out and solicits [his] views on issues of the day.) In other words, the function of the current populism of the post-al left is to make a "Generation X Marxism" available to "radicals," and in doing so, reduce the anxiety of the post-al leftist "me-in-crisis" by providing "bite-size" radicalism that will make it possible for the postal activist left to affirm that now it is a "cool thing" to be anti-theoretical and acquire one's authenticity through an experiential "me-in-crisis." Conceptuality, however, is the condition of possibility for critique, for the development of class consciousness and for understanding the contradictions of the everyday in terms of the logic of accumulation of capital. Marx in the "Preface" to the first German edition of Capital argues for the necessity of "abstraction" in order to go beyond the "appearance" and reach the "essence" of social practices. The function of revolutionary pedagogy is to produce conceptual knowledges and to train people as "socialist theoreticians" who can go beyond their immediate "experiences" and organize themselves in a new revolutionary vanguard party to transform the world! To produce a world organized according to the principle: from each according to her or his ability, to each according to his or her needs....

#### They undermine the notion of truth—protects the ruling class and destroys class struggle

Mas'ud Zavarzadeh, Department of English, Syracuse University, "The stupidity that consumption is just as productive as production": in the shopping mall of the post-al left.” *College Literature,* October 01, 1994

This distributionist/consumptionist theory that underwrites the economic interests of the (upper)middle classes is the foundation for all the texts in this exchange and their pedagogies. A good pedagogy in these texts therefore is one in which power is distributed evenly in the classroom: a pedagogy that constructs a classroom of consensus not antagonism (thus opposition to "politicizing the classroom" in OR-1 [Hogan]) and in which knowledge (concept) is turned--through the process that OR-3 [McCormick] calls "translation"--into "consumable" EXPERIENCES. The more "intense" the experience, as the anecdotes of [McCormick] show, the more successful the pedagogy. In short, it is a pedagogy that removes the student from his/her position in the social relations of production and places her/him in the personal relation of consumption: specifically, EXPERIENCE of/as the consumption of pleasure. The post-al logic obscures the laws of motion of capital by very specific assumptions and moves--many of which are rehearsed in the texts here. I will discuss some of these, mention others in passing, and hint at several more. (I have provided a full account of all these moves in my "Post-ality" in Transformation 1.) I begin by outlining the post-al assumptions that "democracy" is a never-ending, open "dialogue" and "conversation" among multicultural citizens; that the source of social inequities is "power"; that a post-class hegemonic "coalition," as OR-5 [Williams] calls it--and not class struggle--is the dynamics of social change; that truth (as R-1 [Hill] writes) is an "epistemological gulag"-- a construct of power--and thus any form of "ideology critique" that raises questions of "falsehood" and "truth" ("false consciousness") does so through a violent exclusion of the "other" truths by, in [Williams'] words, "staking sole legitimate claim" to the truth in question. Given the injunction of the post-al logic against binaries (truth/falsehood), the project of "epistemology" is displaced in the ludic academy by "rhetoric." The question, consequently, becomes not so much what is the "truth" of a practice but whether it "works." (Rhetoric has always served as an alibi for pragmatism.) Therefore, [France] is not interested in whether my practices are truthful but in what effects they might have: if College Literature publishes my texts would such an act (regardless of the "truth" of my texts) end up "cutting our funding?" [he] asks. A post-al leftist like [France], in short, "resists" the state only in so far as the state does not cut [his] "funding." Similarly, it is enough for a cynical pragmatist like [Williams] to conclude that my argument "has little prospect of effectual force" in order to disregard its truthfulness. The post-al dismantling of "epistemology" and the erasure of the question of "truth," it must be pointed out, is undertaken to protect the economic interests of the ruling class. If the "truth question" is made to seem outdated and an example of an orthodox binarism ([Hill]), any conclusions about the truth of ruling class practices are excluded from the scene of social contestation as a violent logocentric (positivistic) totalization that disregards the "difference" of the ruling class. This is why a defender of the ruling class such as [Hill] sees an ideology critique aimed at unveiling false consciousness and the production of class consciousness as a form of "epistemological spanking." It is this structure of assumptions that enables [France] to answer my question, "What is wrong with being dogmatic?" not in terms of its truth but by reference to its pragmatics (rhetoric): what is "wrong" with dogmatism, [he] says, is that it is violent rhetoric ("textual Chernobyl") and thus Stalinist. If I ask what is wrong with Stalinism, again (in terms of the logic of [his] text) I will not get a political or philosophical argument but a tropological description.[6] The post-al left is a New Age Left: the "new new left" privileged by [Hill] and [Williams]--the laid-back, "sensitive," listening, and dialogic left of coalitions, voluntary work, and neighborhood activism (more on these later). It is, as I will show, anti-intellectual and populist; its theory is "bite size" (mystifying, of course, who determines the "size" of the "bite"), and its model of social change is anti-conceptual "spontaneity": May 68, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and, in [Hill's] text, Chiapas. In the classroom, the New Age post-al pedagogy inhibits any critique of the truth of students' statements and instead offers, as [McCormick] makes clear, a "counseling," through anecdotes, concerning feelings. The rejection of "truth" (as "epistemological gulag"--[Hill]), is accompanied by the rejection of what the post-al left calls "economism." Furthermore, the post-al logic relativizes subjectivities, critiques functionalist explanation, opposes "determinism," and instead of closural readings, offers supplementary ones. It also celebrates eclecticism; puts great emphasis on the social as discourse and on discourse as always inexhaustible by any single interpretation--discourse (the social) always "outruns" and "exceeds" its explanation. Post-al logic is, in fact, opposed to any form of "explanation" and in favor of mimetic description: it regards "explanation" to be the intrusion of a violent outside and "description" to be a respectful, caring attention to the immanent laws of signification (inside). This notion of description--which has by now become a new dogma in ludic feminist theory under the concept of "mimesis" (D. Cornell, Beyond Accommodation)--regards politics to be always immanent to practices: thus the banalities about not politicizing the classroom in [Hogan's] "anarchist" response to my text[7] and the repeated opposition to binaries in all nine texts. The opposition to binaries is, in fact, an ideological alibi for erasing class struggle, as is quite clear in [France's] rejection of the model of a society "divided by two antagonistic classes" (see my Theory and its Other).

#### The aff collapses into identity politics that undermines resistance to capitalism

Russell and Malhotra, 2002

[Marta, and Ravi, CAPITALISM AND DISABILITY, SOCIALIST REGISTER 2002, http://socialistregister.com/index.php/srv/article/viewFile/5784/2680] /Wyo-MB

Yet, ultimately, even the most grassroots disability organizations in both the USA and Britain appear theoretically ambiguous in their ideological formulations. They have yet to adopt an anti-capitalist agenda that sees disablement as a product of the class system. Moreover, in both the USA and Britain the passage of disability rights legislation, which is individualistic at base, removes an element of coherence from the political praxis of even the most militant disability rights organizations. A failure to see their common links with other marginalized members of society, including the reserve army of the unemployed, welfare recipients, the increasingly large segment of society working in part-time jobs or in jobs that do not pay a living wage, and others, may result in the squandering of the promise of the various disability rights movements on the shoals of iden- tity politics — or, worse, on postmodern discourse whose theorists refuse to name capitalism as a cause for their oppression. A turn to class politics and historical materialism, fully cognizant of its risks and limitations, is what the disability rights movements need most.