### 1st Off

#### Text: The Executive Branch of the United States should limit his or her targeted killing and indefinite detention war powers authority granted to the President of the United States by Public Law 107-40 and modified by the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act by limiting the targets of those authorities to al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or those nations, organizations, or persons who enjoy close and well-establish collaboration with al-Qaeda or the Taliban. The President of the United States should publicly announce and adhere to this policy.

#### De Facto and De Jure self-binding create accountability from the courts and risk political alienation for going back on promises

Posner and Vermeule 2010 [Eric A. , Professor of Law at the University of Chicago Law School and Editor of The Journal of Legal Studies; Adrian , Harvard Law Professor, The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic, Oxford Press, p. 138-139//wyo-sc]

Many of our mechanisms are unproblematic from a legal perspective, as they involve presidential actions that are clearly lawful. But a few raise legal questions; in particular, those that involve self-binding.59 Can a president bind himself to respect particular first-order policies? With qualifications, the answer is "yes, at least to the same extent that a legislature can." Formally, a duly promulgated executive rule or order binds even the executive unless and until it is validly abrogated, thereby establishing a new legal status quo.60 The legal authority to establish a new status quo allows a president to create inertia or political constraints that will affect his own future choices. In a practical sense, presidents, like legislatures, have great de facto power to adopt policies that shape the legal landscape for the future. A president might commit himself to a long-term project of defense procurement or infrastructure or foreign policy, narrowing his own future choices and generating new political coalitions that will act to defend the new rules or policies. More schematically, we may speak of formal and informal means of selfbinding: 1. The president might use formal means to bind himself. This is possible in the sense that an executive order, if otherwise valid, legally binds the president while it is in effect and may be enforced by the courts. It is not possible in the sense that the president can always repeal the executive order if he can bear the political and reputational costs of doing so. 2. The president might use informal means to bind himself. This is not only possible but frequent and important. Issuing an executive rule providing for the appointment of special prosecutors, as Nixon did, is not a formal self-binding.61 However, there may be political costs to repealing the order. This effect does not depend on the courts' willingness to enforce the order, even against Nixon himself. Court enforcement makes the order legally binding while it is in place, but only political and reputational enforcement can protect it from repeal. Just as a dessert addict might announce to his friends that he is going on a no-dessert diet in order to raise the reputational costs of backsliding and thus commit himself, so too the repeal of an executive order may be seen as a breach of faith even if no other institution ever enforces it. In what follows, we will invoke both formal and informal mechanisms. For our purposes, the distinction between the authority to engage in de jure self-binding (legally limited and well-defined) and the power to engage in de facto self-binding (broad and amorphous) is secondary. So long as policies are deliberately chosen with a view to generating credibility, and do so by constraining the president’s own future choices in ways that impose greater costs on ill-motivated presidents than on well-motivated ones, it does not matter whether the constraint is formal or informal.

### 2nd Off

#### Executive war power primacy now—the plan flips that

Posner 13

[Eric Posner, 9/3/13, Obama Is Only Making His War Powers Mightier, www.slate.com/articles/news\_and\_politics/view\_from\_chicago/2013/09/obama\_going\_to\_congress\_on\_syria\_he\_s\_actually\_strengthening\_the\_war\_powers.html]

President Obama’s surprise announcement that he will ask Congress for approval of a military attack on Syria is being hailed as a vindication of the rule of law and a revival of the central role of Congress in war-making, even by critics. But all of this is wrong. Far from breaking new legal ground, President **Obama has reaffirmed the primacy of the executive** in matters of war and peace. **The war powers of the presidency remain as mighty as ever**.

It would have been different if the president had announced that **only Congress can authorize** the use of military force, as dictated by the Constitution, which gives Congress alone the power to declare war. **That would have been** worthy of notice, **a reversal of the ascendance of executive power over Congress**. **But the president said no such thing**. He said: “I believe I have the authority to carry out this military action without specific congressional authorization.” Secretary of State John Kerry confirmed that the president “has the right to do that”—launch a military strike—“no matter what Congress does.”

Thus, the president believes that the law gives him the option to seek a congressional yes or to act on his own. He does not believe that he is bound to do the first. He has merely stated the law as countless other presidents and their lawyers have described it before him.

The president’s announcement should be understood as a political move, not a legal one. His motive is both self-serving and easy to understand, and it has been all but acknowledged by the administration. If Congress now approves the war, it must share blame with the president if what happens next in Syria goes badly. If Congress rejects the war, it must share blame with the president if Bashar al-Assad gases more Syrian children. The big problem for Obama arises if Congress says no and he decides he must go ahead anyway, and then the war goes badly. He won’t have broken the law as he understands it, but he will look bad. He would be the first president ever to ask Congress for the power to make war and then to go to war after Congress said no. (In the past, presidents who expected dissent did not ask Congress for permission.)

People who celebrate the president for humbly begging Congress for approval also apparently don’t realize that his understanding of the law—that it gives him the option to go to Congress—maximizes executive power vis-à-vis Congress. If the president were required to act alone, without Congress, then he would have to take the blame for failing to use force when he should and using force when he shouldn’t. If he were required to obtain congressional authorization, then Congress would be able to block him. But if he can have it either way, he can force Congress to share responsibility when he wants to and avoid it when he knows that it will stand in his way.

#### Congressional restraints spill over to destabilize all presidential war powers.

Heder ’10

(Adam, J.D., magna cum laude , J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, “THE POWER TO END WAR: THE EXTENT AND LIMITS OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER,” St. Mary’s Law Journal Vol. 41 No. 3, <http://www.stmaryslawjournal.org/pdfs/Hederreadytogo.pdf>)

This constitutional silence invokes Justice Rehnquist’s oftquoted language from the landmark “political question” case, Goldwater v. Carter . 121 In Goldwater , a group of senators challenged President Carter’s termination, without Senate approval, of the United States ’ Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan. 122 A plurality of the Court held, 123 in an opinion authored by Justice Rehnquist, that this was a nonjusticiable political question. 124 He wrote: “In light of the absence of any constitutional provision governing the termination of a treaty, . . . the instant case in my view also ‘must surely be controlled by political standards.’” 125 Notably, Justice Rehnquist relied on the fact that there was no constitutional provision on point. Likewise, there is **no constitutional provision** on whether Congress has the legislative power to **limit, end, or otherwise redefine the scope of a war**. Though Justice Powell argues in Goldwater that the Treaty Clause and Article VI of the Constitution “add support to the view that the text of the Constitution does not unquestionably commit the power to terminate treaties to the President alone,” 126 **the same cannot be said about Congress’s legislative authority** to terminate or **limit a war** in a way that goes beyond its explicitly enumerated powers. There are no such similar provisions that would suggest Congress may decline to exercise its appropriation power but nonetheless legally order the President to cease all military operations. Thus, the case for deference to the political branches on this issue is even greater than it was in the Goldwater context. Finally, the Constitution does not imply any additional powers for Congress to end, limit, or redefine a war. The textual and historical evidence suggests the Framers purposefully **declined to grant Congress such powers**. And as this Article argues, granting Congress this power would be **inconsistent with the general war powers structure of the Constitution.** Such a reading of the Constitution would **unnecessarily empower Congress** and **tilt the scales heavily in its favor**. More over, it **would strip the President of his Commander in Chief authority** to direct the movement of troops at a time **when the Executive’s expertise is needed.** 127 And fears that the President will grow too powerful are unfounded, given the reasons noted above. 128 In short, the Constitution does not impliedly afford Congress any authority to prematurely terminate a war above what it explicitly grants. 129 Declaring these issues nonjusticiable political questions would be the most practical means of balancing the textual and historical demands, the structural demands, and the practical demands that complex modern warfare brings . Adjudicating these matters would only lead the courts to engage in impermissible line drawing — lines that would both confus e the issue and add layers to the text of the Constitution in an area where the Framers themselves declined to give such guidance.

#### That goes nuclear

Li ‘9

[Zheyao, J.D. candidate, Georgetown University Law Center, 2009; B.A., political science and history, Yale University, 2006. This paper is the culmination of work begun in the "Constitutional Interpretation in the Legislative and Executive Branches" seminar, led by Judge Brett Kavanaugh, “War Powers for the Fourth Generation: Constitutional Interpretation in the Age of Asymmetric Warfare,” 7 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 373 2009 WAR POWERS IN THE FOURTH GENERATION OF WARFARE

1. The Emergence of Non-State Actors]

Even as the quantity of nation-states in the world has increased dramatically since the end of World War II, the **institution** of the nation-state has been in decline over the past few decades. Much of this decline is the direct result of the waning of major interstate war, which primarily resulted from the introduction of nuclear weapons.122 The proliferation of nuclear weapons, and their immense capacity for absolute destruction, has ensured that **conventional wars** remain limited in scope and duration. Hence, "both the size of the armed forces and the quantity of weapons at their disposal has declined quite sharply" since 1945.123 At the same time, concurrent with the decline of the nation-state in the second half of the twentieth century, non-state actors have increasingly been willing and able to use force to advance their causes. In contrast to nation-states, who adhere to the Clausewitzian distinction between the ends of policy and the means of war to achieve those ends, non-state actors do not necessarily fight as a mere means of advancing any coherent policy. Rather, they see their fight **as a life-and-death struggle**, wherein the ordinary terminology of war as an instrument of policy breaks down because of this blending of means and ends.124 It is the existential nature of this struggle and the disappearance of the Clausewitzian distinction between war and policy that has given rise to a new generation of warfare. The concept of fourth-generational warfare was first articulated in an influential article in the Marine Corps Gazette in 1989, which has proven highly prescient. In describing what they saw as the modem trend toward a new phase of warfighting, the authors argued that: In broad terms, fourth generation warfare seems likely to be widely dispersed and largely undefined; the distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point. It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definable battlefields or fronts. The distinction between "civilian" and "military" may disappear. Actions will occur concurrently throughout all participants' depth, including their society as a cultural, not just a physical, entity. Major military facilities, such as airfields, fixed communications sites, and large headquarters will become rarities because of their vulnerability; the same may be true of civilian equivalents, such as seats of government, power plants, and industrial sites (including knowledge as well as manufacturing industries). 125 It is precisely this blurring of peace and war and the demise of traditionally definable battlefields that provides the impetus for the formulation of a new theory of war powers. As evidenced by Part M, supra, the constitutional allocation of war powers, and the Framers' commitment of the war power to two co-equal branches, **was not designed** to cope with the current international system, one that is characterized by the persistent machinations of international terrorist organizations, the rise of multilateral alliances, the emergence of **rogue states**, and the potentially wide proliferation of easily deployable **w**eapons of **m**ass **d**estruction, **nuclear and otherwise.** B. The Framers' World vs. Today's World The Framers crafted the Constitution, and the people ratified it, in a time when everyone understood that the state controlled both the raising of armies and their use. Today, however, the threat of terrorism is bringing an end to the era of the nation-state's legal monopoly on violence, and the kind of war that existed before-based on a clear division between government, armed forces, and the people-is on the decline. 126 As states are caught between their decreasing ability to fight each other due to the existence of nuclear weapons and the increasing threat from non-state actors, it is clear that the Westphalian system of nation-states that informed the Framers' allocation of war powers is no longer the order of the day. 127 As seen in Part III, supra, the rise of the modem nation-state occurred as a result of its military effectiveness and ability to defend its citizens. If nation-states such as the United States are unable to adapt to the changing circumstances of fourth-generational warfare-that is, if they are unable to adequately defend against low-intensity conflict conducted by non-state actors-"**then clearly [the modem state] does not have a future in front of it**.' 128 The challenge in formulating a new theory of war powers for fourthgenerational warfare that remains legally justifiable lies in the difficulty of adapting to changed circumstances while remaining faithful to the constitutional text and the original meaning. 29 To that end, it is crucial to remember that the Framers crafted the Constitution in the context of the Westphalian system of nation-states. The three centuries following the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 witnessed an international system characterized by wars, which, "through the efforts of governments, assumed a more regular, interconnected character."' 130 That period saw the rise of an independent military class and the stabilization of military institutions. Consequently, "warfare became more regular, better organized, and more attuned to the purpose of war-that is, to its political objective."' 1 3' **That era is now over**. Today, the stability of the long-existing Westphalian international order has been greatly eroded in recent years with the advent of international terrorist organizations, which care nothing for the traditional norms of the laws of war. This new global environment exposes the limitations inherent in the interpretational methods of originalism and textualism and necessitates the adoption of a new method of constitutional interpretation. While one must always be aware of the text of the Constitution and the original understanding of that text, that very awareness identifies the extent to which fourth-generational warfare epitomizes a phenomenon unforeseen by the Framers, a problem the constitutional resolution of which must rely on the good judgment of the present generation. 13 Now, to adapt the constitutional warmarking scheme to the new international order characterized by fourth-generational warfare, one must understand the threat it is being adapted to confront. C. The Jihadist Threat The erosion of the Westphalian and Clausewitzian model of warfare and the blurring of the distinction between the means of warfare and the ends of policy, which is one characteristic of fourth-generational warfare, apply to al-Qaeda and other adherents of jihadist ideology who view the United States as an enemy. An excellent analysis of jihadist ideology and its implications for the rest of the world are presented by Professor Mary Habeck. 133 Professor Habeck identifies the centrality of the Qur'an, specifically a particular reading of the Qur'an and hadith (traditions about the life of Muhammad), to the jihadist terrorists. 134 The jihadis believe that the scope of the Qur'an is universal, and "that their interpretation of Islam is also intended for the entire world, which must be brought to recognize this fact peacefully if possible and through violence if not."' 135 Along these lines, the jihadis view the United States and her allies as among the greatest enemies of Islam: they believe "that every element of modern Western liberalism is flawed, wrong, and evil" because the basis of liberalism is secularism. 136 The jihadis emphasize the superiority of Islam to all other religions, and they believe that "God does not want differing belief systems to coexist."' 37 For this reason, jihadist groups such as al-Qaeda "recognize that the West will not submit without a fight and believe in fact that the Christians, Jews, and liberals have united against Islam in a war that will end in the complete destruction of the unbelievers.' 138 Thus, the adherents of this jihadist ideology, be it al-Qaeda or other groups, will continue to target the United States until she is destroyed. Their ideology demands it. 139 To effectively combat terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda, it is necessary to understand not only how they think, but also how they operate. Al-Qaeda is a transnational organization capable of simultaneously managing multiple operations all over the world."14 It is both centralized and decentralized: al-Qaeda is centralized in the sense that Osama bin Laden is the unquestioned leader, but it is decentralized in that its operations are carried out locally, by distinct cells."4 AI-Qaeda benefits immensely from this arrangement because it can exercise direct control over high-probability operations, while maintaining a distance from low-probability attacks, only taking the credit for those that succeed. The local terrorist cells benefit by gaining access to al-Qaeda's "worldwide network of assets, people, and expertise."' 42 Post-September 11 events have highlighted al-Qaeda's resilience. Even as the United States and her allies fought back, inflicting heavy casualties on al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and destroying dozens of cells worldwide, "al-Qaeda's networked nature allowed it to absorb the damage and remain a threat." 14 3 This is a far cry from earlier generations of warfare, where the decimation of the enemy's military forces would generally bring an end to the conflict. D. The Need for Rapid Reaction and Expanded Presidential War Power By now it should be clear just how different this conflict against the extremist terrorists is from the type of warfare that occupied the minds of the Framers at the time of the Founding. Rather than maintaining the geographical and political isolation desired by the Framers for the new country, today's United States is an international power targeted by individuals and groups that will not rest until seeing her demise. The Global War on Terrorism is not truly a war within the Framers' eighteenth-century conception of the term, and the normal constitutional provisions regulating the division of war powers between Congress and the President do not apply. Instead, this "war" **is a struggle for survival** and dominance against forces that threaten to destroy the United States and her allies, and the fourth-generational nature of the conflict, highlighted by an indiscernible distinction between wartime and peacetime, necessitates an evolution of America's traditional constitutional warmaking scheme. As first illustrated by the military strategist Colonel John Boyd, constitutional decision-making in the realm of war powers in the fourth generation should consider the implications of the OODA Loop: Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act. 44 In the era of fourth-generational warfare, **quick reactions**, proceeding through the OODA Loop rapidly, and disrupting the enemy's OODA loop are the keys to victory. "In order to win," Colonel Boyd suggested, "we should operate at a **faster tempo** or rhythm than our adversaries." 145 In the words of Professor Creveld, "[b]oth organizationally and in terms of the equipment at their disposal, the armed forces of the world will have to adjust themselves to this situation by changing their doctrine, doing away with much of their heavy equipment and becoming more like police."1 46 Unfortunately, the existing constitutional understanding, which diffuses war power between two branches of government, necessarily (by the Framers' design) slows down decision- making. In circumstances where war is undesirable (which is, admittedly, most of the time, especially against other nation-states), the deliberativeness of the existing decision-making process is a positive attribute. In America's current situation, however, in the midst of the conflict with al-Qaeda and other international terrorist organizations, the existing process of constitutional decision-making in warfare may prove a **fatal hindrance** to achieving the initiative **necessary** for victory. As a **slow-acting**, deliberative **body**, Congress does not have the ability to adequately deal with **fast-emerging situations** in fourth-generational warfare. Thus, in order to combat transnational threats such as al-Qaeda, the executive branch **must** have the ability to operate by taking offensive military action even without congressional authorization, because **only the executive branch** is capable of the swift decision-making and action necessary to prevail in fourth-generational conflicts against fourthgenerational opponents.

### 3rd Off

#### Immigration reform will pass – PC is key

Lopez 1/1/14 (Oscar, Latin Times, "New Year 2014: 4 Reasons Immigration Reform Will Pass In 2014," http://www.latintimes.com/new-year-2014-4-reasons-immigration-reform-will-pass-2014-141778)

Immigration reform is set to be the key issue of 2014. Following Mitt Romney's dismal performance among Latino voters in the 2012 election, both sides of the Government woke up to the necessity for comprehensive reform on immigration. Indeed, in his State of the Union address in February, President Obama declared that “the time has come to pass comprehensive immigration reform.” Yet with the House divided over Obamacare and the budget crisis, the Government Shutdown let immigration reform die. 2014 will change that: and here are 4 Reasons Why.¶ 1. Republican Support: A fundamental lack of support from the GOP has always been one of the major obstacles for passing comprehensive reform legislation, and indeed this seemed to be the case this year after the Bill passed by the Senate was struck down by Congress. However, more and more GOP members are realizing the significance of the Latino vote and understanding that passing comprehensive immigration reform is the most significant way of securing support from Latino voters. ¶ A July poll from Latino Decisions found that immigration reform was the most important issue facing the Latino community for 60 percent of those surveyed. The poll also found that 70 percent of those questioned were dissatisfied with the job Republicans were doing on the issue. The survey also found the 39 percent would be more likely to support a Republican congressional candidate if immigration reform was passed with Republican leadership. ¶ Republican candidates have become aware of the significance of immigration reform for the party. Even in traditionally conservative Republican strongholds like Texas, candidates are turning towards immigration reform. According to Republican strategist and CNN en Español commentator Juan Hernandez, "it also wouldn’t surprise me if after the primary, the candidates move to the center and support reform. For Republicans to stay in leadership in Texas, we must properly address immigration.”¶ The March 2014 primaries will be a key moment in determining how reform progresses: Republican Strategist John Feehery suggests, “The timing on this is very important. What was stupid to do becomes smart to do a little bit later in the year.” Once the primaries are over, GOP members will have the chance to implement reform legislation without fear of challenges from the right. ¶ 2. Legalization Over Citizenship: While the Senate’s 2013 immigration reform bill was struck down by Congress, GOP party members have indicated that they will support legislation which favors legalization of undocumented immigrants over a path to citizenship.¶ Meanwhile, a recent survey from Pew Research Hispanic Trends Project demonstrated that 55 percent of Hispanic adults believe that legalizing immigrants and removing the fear of deportation is more important than a pathway to citizenship (although citizenship is still important to 89 percent of Latinos surveyed.)¶ As CBS suggests, “Numbers like these could give leverage to lawmakers who are interested in making some reforms to the legal immigration system, but not necessarily offering any kind of citizenship.”¶ If House Republicans offered legalization legislation for the undocumented community, this could put pressure on the President to compromise. And while this kind of reform would not be as comprehensive as the Senate’s bill, a bipartisan agreement would be a significant achievement towards accomplishing reform.¶ 3. Activism Steps Up: 2013 saw one of the biggest surges in grassroots activism from immigration supporters, and political leaders started to listen. The hunger strike outside the White House was a particularly significant demonstration and drew visits of solidarity from a number of leaders from both sides of Congress, including the President and First Lady.¶ Immigration reform activists have promised "we will be back in 2014." Indeed, 2014 promises to be a year of even greater activism. Activist Eliseo Medina has pledged that immigrant advocacy groups would visit “as many congressional districts as possible” in 2014 to ensure further support.¶ Protests, rallies and marchers are likely to increase in 2014, putting greater pressure on Congress to pass legislation. Such visual, vocal protests will be key in ensuring comprehensive reform.¶ 4. Leadership: As immigration reform comes to the fore, party leaders will step up in 2014 to ensure change is achieved. While President Obama has made clear his support for comprehensive reform, House Speaker John Boehner previously stated that he had “no intention” of negotiating with the Senate on their comprehensive immigration bill. ¶ However, towards the end of 2013, it seemed that Representative Boehner was changing his tune. In November, President Obama revealed that “the good news is, just this past week Speaker Boehner said that he is “hopeful we can make progress” on immigration reform.” As if to prove the point, Boehner has recently hired top aide Rebecca Tallent to work on immigration reform.¶ With bipartisan leadership firmly focused on immigration reform and party members on both sides realizing the political importance of the issue, comprehensive legislation is one thing we can be sure of in 2014.

#### Fighting to defend his war power will sap Obama’s capital, trading off with rest of agenda

**Kriner, 10** --- assistant professor of political science at Boston University

(Douglas L. Kriner, “After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War”, University of Chicago Press, Dec 1, 2010, page 68-69)

**While congressional support leaves the president’s reserve of political capital intact, congressional criticism saps energy from other initiatives on the home front by forcing the president to expend energy and effort defending his international agenda. Political capital spent shoring up support for a president’s foreign policies is capital that is unavailable for his future policy initiatives**. Moreover, any weakening in the president’s political clout may have immediate ramifications for his reelection prospects, as well as indirect consequences for congressional races.59 Indeed, Democratic efforts to tie congressional Republican incumbents to President George W. Bush and his war policies paid immediate political dividends in the 2006 midterms, particularly in states, districts, and counties that had suffered the highest casualty rates in the Iraq War. 60 **In addition to boding ill for the president’s perceived political capital and reputation, such partisan losses in Congress only further imperil his programmatic agenda, both international and domestic.** Scholars have long noted that President Lyndon **Johnson’s dream of a Great Society also perished in the rice paddies of Vietnam. Lacking** the requisite funds in a war-depleted treasury and **the political capital needed to sustain his legislative vision, Johnson gradually let his domestic goals slip away** as he hunkered down in an effort first to win and then to end the Vietnam War. In the same way, **many of** President **Bush’s highest second-term domestic proprieties, such as Social Security and immigration reform, failed perhaps in large part because the administration had to expend so much energy and effort waging a rear-guard action against congressional critics of the war in Iraq.**61 **When making their cost-benefit calculations, presidents surely consider these wider political costs of congressional opposition to their military policies.** If congressional opposition in the military arena stands to derail other elements of his agenda, all else being equal, the president will be more likely to judge the benefits of military action insufficient to its costs than if Congress stood behind him in the international arena.

#### Immigration reform is key to generate jobs and attract high skilled workers that solves for competitiveness and the econ

Johnson 13

(Simon Johnson, former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, is the Ronald A. Kurtz Professor of Entrepreneurship at the M.I.T. Sloan School of Management and co-author of “White House Burning: The Founding Fathers, Our National Debt, and Why It Matters to You.” “How Immigration Reform Would Help the Economy” 6-20-13 http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/20/how-immigration-reform-would-help-the-economy//wyoccd)

The assessment is positive. This precise immigration proposal would improve the budget picture (see this helpful chart) and stimulate economic growth. The immediate effects are good and the more lasting effects even better. If anything, the long-run positive effects are likely to be even larger than the C.B.O. is willing to predict, in my assessment. (I’m a member of the office’s Panel of Economic Advisers but I was not involved in any way in this work.)¶ The debate over immigration is emotionally charged and, judging from recent blog posts, the Heritage Foundation in particular seems primed to dispute every detail in the C.B.O. approach – and to assert that it is underestimating some costs (including what happens when illegal immigrants receive an amnesty and subsequently claim government-provided benefits, a point Heritage has emphasized in its own report).¶ There is good reason for the C.B.O.’s careful wording in its analysis; it operates within narrow guidelines set by Congress, and its staff is wise to stick to very well-documented points. Still, as the legislation gains potential traction, it is worth keeping in mind why there could be an even larger upside for the American economy.¶ In 1776, the population of the United States was around 2.5 million; it is now more than 316 million (you can check the real-time Census Bureau population clock, but of course that is only an estimate).¶ Think about this: What if the original inhabitants had not allowed immigration or imposed very tight restrictions – for example, insisting that immigrants already have a great deal of education? It’s hard to imagine that the United States would have risen as an economy and as a country. How many United States citizens reading this column would be here today? (I’m proud to be an immigrant and a United States citizen.)¶ The long-term strength of the United States economy lies in its ability to create jobs. For more than 200 years as a republic (and 400 years in total) immigrants have not crowded together on a fixed amount of existing resources – land (in the early days) or factories (from the early 1800s) or the service sector (where most modern jobs arise). Rather the availability of resources essential for labor productivity has increased sharply. Land is improved, infrastructure is built and companies develop.¶ Most economic analysis about immigration looks at wages and asks whether natives win or lose when more immigrants show up in particular place or with certain skills. At the low end of wage distribution, there is reason to fear adverse consequences for particular groups because of increased competition for jobs. In fact, the C.B.O. does find that income per capita would decline slightly over the next 10 years before increasing in the subsequent 10 years: “Relative to what would occur under current law, S. 744 would lower per capita G.N.P. by 0.7 percent in 2023 and raise it by 0.2 percent in 2033, according to C.B.O.’s central estimates.”¶ And it is reasonable to ask who will pay how much into our tax system – and who will receive what kind of benefits. This is the terrain that the C.B.O. and the Heritage Foundation are contesting. (See, too, a letter to Senator Marco Rubio, Republican of Florida, from Stephen Gross, the chief actuary of the Social Security Administration. Mr. Gross said immigration reform would be a net positive; of the current 11.5 million illegal immigrants, “many of these individuals already work in the country in the underground economy, not paying taxes, and will begin paying taxes” if the immigration legislation are adopted. New illegal immigration would decline but not be eliminated.)¶ But the longer-run picture is most obviously quite different. The process of creating businesses and investing – what economists like to call capital formation – is much more dynamic than allowed for in many economic models.¶ People will save and they will invest. Companies will be created. The crucial question is who will have the ideas that shape the 21st century. (See, for example, the work of Charles I. Jones of Stanford University on this point and a paper he and Paul Romer wrote for a broader audience.)¶ This is partly about education – and the proposed legislation would tilt new visas more toward skilled workers, particularly those in science, technology, engineering, and math (often referred to as STEM).¶ But it would be a mistake to limited those admitted – or those allowed legal status and eventual citizenship – to people who already have or are in the process of getting a university-level education. To be clear, under the new system there may well be more low-wage immigrants than high-wage immigrants, but the transition to a point system for allocating green cards is designed to increase the share of people with more education and more scientific education, relative to the situation today and relative to what would otherwise occur.¶ Many people have good ideas. The Internet has opened up the process of innovation. I don’t know anyone who can predict where the next big technologies will come from. I also don’t know who will figure out how to organize production – including the provision of services – in a more effective manner.¶ We are competing in a world economy based on human capital, and people’s skills and abilities are the basis for our productivity. What we need more than anything, from an economic point of view, is more people (of any age or background) who want to acquire and apply new skills.¶ Increasing the size of our domestic market over the last 400 years has served us well. Allowing in immigrants in a fiscally responsible manner makes a great deal of sense — and the reports from the Joint Committee on Taxation and C.B.O. are very clear that this is now what is on the table. If the children of immigrants want to get more education, we should welcome the opportunity that this presents. When you cut off the path to higher education, you are depriving people of opportunity – and you are also hurting the economy.¶ The deeper political irony, of course, is that if the Heritage Foundation and its allies succeed in defeating immigration legislation, there are strong indications that this will hurt the Republican Party at the polls over the next decade and beyond. Yet, even so, House Republicans seem inclined to oppose immigration reform. That would be a mistake on both economic and political grounds.¶ We are 316 million people in a world of more than 7 billion – on its way to 10 billion or more (read this United Nations report if you like to worry about the future).¶ We should reform immigration along the lines currently suggested and increase the supply of skilled labor in the world. This will both improve our economy and, at least potentially, help ensure the world stays more prosperous and more stable.

**Nuclear war**

**Harris and Burrows ‘9**

**(**Mathew, PhD European History at Cambridge, counselor in the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer, member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” <http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf>, AM)

Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, **history may be more instructive than ever**. While we continue to believe that **the Great Depression** is not likely to be repeated, the **lessons** to be drawn from that period **include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies** (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) **and** on the **sustainability of multilateral institutions** (think League of Nations in the same period). **There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century.** For that reason, the ways in which **the potential for greater conflict could grow** would seem to be even more apt **in a constantly volatile economic environment** as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. **Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced.** For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. **Terrorist groups** in 2025 **will** likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups\_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks\_and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that **become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would** almost certainly **be the Middle East**. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, **worries** about a nuclear-armed Iran **could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions**. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity **conflict** and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella **could lead to an** unintended escalation **and broader conflict** if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. **The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals** combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also **will produce inherent difficulties** in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, **short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty** of Iranian intentions **may place more focus on preemption** rather than defense, potentially **leading to** escalatingcrises**.** 36 Types of **conflict** that the world continues to experience, such as **over resources, could reemerge**, particularly if **protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions** of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this **could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources,** for example, to be **essential for** maintaining domestic stability and the **survival of their regime**. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. **If** the **fiscal stimulus focus for** these **countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional** naval **capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves**, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. **With water** also **becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.**

### 4th Off

#### Egalitarian politics is not real and not possible within the confines of the nation state- the state demands that woman give up her sexual difference to become a citizen, to become “neuter”, and to become incorporated into the masculine universal- women cannot participate in the law or judicial circuits because they have no language

Fermon 98

[Nicole Ferman, 1998, Women on the Global Market: Irigaray and the Democratic State, Diacritics, Vol. 28, No. 1, Irigaray and the Political Future of Sexual Difference¶ (Spring, 1998), pp. 120-137¶ uwyo//amp]

Best known for her subtle interrogation of philosophy and psychoanalysis, Luce Irigaray ¶ clearly also conducts a dialogue with the political, proposing that women's erasure from ¶ culture and society invalidates all economies, sexual or political. Because woman has ¶ disappeared both figuratively and literally from society [see Sen, "More Than 100 Million ¶ Women Are Missing"], Irigaray conceives the contemporary ethical project as a recall to ¶ difference rather than equality, to difference between women and men-that is, sexual ¶ difference. She characterizes relations between men and women as market relations in ¶ which women are commodities, objects, but never subjects of exchange, objects to men ¶ but not to themselves: women do not belong to themselves but exist "to keep relationships ¶ among men running smoothly" [TS 192]. Women under these conditions require imagi- ¶ native ways to reconfigure the self, to subvert the melancholy and regression of ¶ masculinist economies and envisage a future in which women would not be ashamed of ¶ the feminine, would experience it as a positivity worth emulating. ¶ Irigaray contends that after the gains of egalitarian politics are carefully examined, ¶ the inclusion of women in the political arena has failed to take into account women's ¶ distinct and different position from men, and from each other, as well as perpetuating the ¶ fiction of the "neutral" citizen, the ahistorical individual citizen of the nation-state. It is ¶ that fiction Irigaray dispels in her critique of liberal democratic politics and its creation, ¶ "citizens who are neuter in regard to familial singularity, its laws, and necessary sexual ¶ difference" [SG 112] in order to benefit the State and its laws. The subject is male; the ¶ citizen is neuter. Who is the female citizen in contemporary society? What is the ethical ¶ elaboration of the contractual relations between women and men, and between sexed ¶ individuals and the community? How do women imagine a distinct set of rights and ¶ responsibilities based on self-definition and autonomy, given the particular strictures of ¶ contemporary politics-that is, the market-driven, antidemocratic nature of the current ¶ economic national and global forces? Irigaray suggests that "the return of women to ¶ collective work, to public places, to social relations, demands linguistic mutations" and ¶ profound transformations, an embodied imagination with force and agency in civil life ¶ [TD 65]. ¶ Irigaray warns that if civil and political participation is construed in overly narrow ¶ terms, if focus is on economic or judicial "circuits" alone, we overlook the symbolic ¶ organization of power-women risk losing "everything without even being acknowl- ¶ edged" [TD 56]. Instead an interval of recognition can expand the political to include the ¶ concerns and activities of real women, lest silence imply consent to sexual neutrality, or ¶ more likely, to women's obliteration under men's interests and concerns. Women's ¶ insistence on self-definition and wage labor, on love and justly remunerated work, ¶ testifies to the obduracy of women's difference, one that is not likely to disappear. The ¶ patriarchal family is still the legal norm, even when certain exceptions are made, while ¶ enduring questions regarding women's health and children's physical welfare as priori- ¶ ties beyond market considerations are consigned to legislative obfuscation, still a political ¶ afterthought. Instead, in the US the liberal state removes the slender welfare net specific ¶ to women and children, Aid to Families with Dependent Children, and fails to provide ¶ medical coverage to those who are among the most vulnerable of its citizens. Women ¶ without access to the legal protection of sex-neutral citizenship, poor working women ¶ without language (the money for an effective "mouthpiece" to represent their distress in ¶ a court of law), are further disempowered by liberal politics' insistence on sexual ¶ neutrality-that is, on repression or amnesia regarding the lived experiences of women. ¶ Sexual difference is key to any project of self-definition by women. Irigaray insists ¶ on the sexual nature of this self-definition, not solely for its obvious procreative necessity, ¶ but because the natural world is a source of renewal and fecundity which requires attentive ¶ interrogation and respect [SG 15]. This rebirth seems alien to the structure of male politics, ¶ which instead seem to provoke disasters (Bhopal, Chernobyl, or the current runaway ¶ jungle fires of Indonesia, courtesy of commercial logging, spreading thick pollution to ¶ neighboring countries) and untimely death.' We talk about social justice and forget its ¶ origins in nature and not merely as an engagement between men in abstraction. Irigaray ¶ believes that recognition and respect of difference between the sexes is prior to productive ¶ and generative relations between women, between men, and between men and women. ¶ Sexual difference is universal and allows us to participate in "an immediate natural given, ¶ and it is a real and irreducible component of the universal" [ILTY 47]. It is this prior ¶ recognition of two, rather than the One that has dominated world politics and thought, ¶ which must be acknowledged, along with the possibility of a political economy of ¶ abundance, not only that of man-made scarcity then attributed to nature. This melancholic ¶ (male) script pays romantic tribute to motherhood in the abstract without due recognition ¶ of the relations between real mothers and children, thus failing to properly acknowledge ¶ and protect mother or child. Our ability to address the specifics of race, ethnicity, and ¶ religious and other differences with respect hinges on our ability to acknowledge and ¶ respect the feminine, to see it as a source of invention and possibilities. To do so would ¶ of course affect relations between the sexes, "men and women perhaps... communicat[ing] ¶ for the first time if two different genders are affirmed," it would allow a new configuration ¶ rather than continuing the present regime: "the globalization and universalization of ¶ culture ... ungovernable and beyond our control" [SG 120; ILTY 129].

#### Splitting of the atom is a symptom of man’s persistence in his refusal to reunite with and affirm his body and the female body-only through this affirmation does the destruction of humynkind become unthinkable

Irigaray 85

[Luce Irigaray, 1985, “An Ethics of Sexual Difference”, uwyo//amp]

To forget being is to forget the air, this first fluid given us gratis and free of interest in the mother's blood, given us again when we are born, like a natural profusion that raises a cry of pain: the pain of a being who comes into the world and is abandoned, forced henceforth to live without the immediate assistance of another body. Unmitigated mourning for the intrauterine nest, elemental homesickness that man will seek to assuage through his work as builder of worlds, and notably of the dwelling which seems to form the essence of his maleness: language. In all his creations, all his works, man always seems to neglect thinking of himself as flesh, as one who has received his body as that primary home (that Gestell, as Heidegger would say, when, in "Logos," the seminar on Heraclitus, he recognizes that what metaphysics has not begun to address is the issue of the body) which determines the possibility of his coming into the world and the potential opening of a horizon of thought, of poetry, of celebration, that also includes the god or gods. The fundamental dereliction in our time may be interpreted as our failure to remember or prize the element that is indispensable to life in all its manifestations: from the lowliest plant and animal forms to the highest. Science and technology are reminding men of their careless neglect by forcing them to consider the most frightening question possible, the question of a radical polemic: the destruction of the universe and of the human race through the splitting of the atom and its exploitation to achieve goals that are beyond our capacities as mortals.

#### The alternative is to reject the affirmative’s masculine, universal silence and instead affirm a radical ethics of sexual difference that comes to grips with the sexual violence of the 1AC.

Irigaray 85

[Luce Irigaray, 1985, “An Ethics of Sexual Difference”, uwyo//amp]

Sexual difference is one of the major philosophical issues, if not the issue, of our age. According to Heidegger, each age has one issue to think through, and one only. Sexual difference is prQbably the issue in our time which could be our "salvation" if we thought it through. But, whether I turn to philosophy, to science, or to religion, I find this underlying issue still cries out in vain for our attention. Think of it as an approach that would allow us to check the many forms that destruction takes in our world, to counteract a nihilism that merely affirms the reversal or the repetitive proliferation of status quo values-whether you call them the consumer society, the circularity of discourse, the more or less cancerous diseases of our age, the unreliability of words, the end of philosophy, religious despair or regression to religiosity, scientis tic or technical imperialism that fails to consider the living subject. Sexual difference would constitute the horizon of worlds more fecund than any known to date-at least in the West-and without reducing fecundity to the reproduction of bodies and flesh. For loving partners this would be a fecundity of birth and regeneration, but also the production of a new age of thought, art, poetry, and language: the creation of a new poetics. Both in theory and in practice, everything resists the discovery and affirmation of such an advent or event. In theory, philosophy wants to be literature or rhetoric, wishing either to break with ontology or to regress to the ontological. Using the same ground and the same framework as "first philosophy," working toward its disintegration but without proposing any other goals that might assure new foundations and new works. In politics, some overtures have been made to the world of women. But these overtures remain partial and local: some concessions have been made by those in power, but no new values have been established. Rarely have these measures been thought through and affirmed by women themselves, who consequently remain at the level of critical demands. Has a worldwide erosion of the gains won in women's struggles occurred because of the failure to lay foundations different from those on which the world of men is constructed? Psychoanalytic theory and therapy, the scenes of sexuality as such, are a long way from having effected their revolution. And with a few exceptions, sexual practice today is often divided between two parallel worlds: the world of men and the world of women. A nontraditional, fecund encounter between the sexes barely exists. It does not voice its demands publicly, except through certain kinds of silence and polemics. A revolution in thought and ethics is needed if the work of sexual difference is to take place. We need to reinterpret everything concerning the relations between the subject and discourse, the subject and the world, the subject and the cosmic,' the microcosmic and the macrocosmic. Everything, beginning with the way in which the subject has always been written in the masculine form, as man, even when it claimed to be universal or neutral. Despite the fact that man-at least in French-rather than being neutral, is sexed.

### 1NC Solvency

#### We’ll continue the war on terror without the AUMF—President will justify with article 2 powers

Wittes 13 (Benjamin, editor in chief of Lawfare and a Senior Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution, member of the Hoover Institution’s Task Force on National Security and Law, “

Coming at the AUMF Debate from a Different Angle,” March 19, 2013, <http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/03/coming-at-the-aumf-debate-from-a-different-angle/>)

In his last post, Jack made the point that the fundamental difference seemed to be that Jen and Steve believed that peacetime authorities were adequate to the terrorist threat while we harbored doubts on that point. I agree that this is a fundamental division, but there’s another one—one I suspect is equally, if not, more important: Steve and Jen seem to believe that **not reauthorizing the AUMF** will, in fact, trigger a **cessation or diminution** **of the use of lethal force** in counterterrorism activities. In other words, they argue that **without a new AUMF, lethal counterterrorism activities would be**, if not eliminated, **severely constricted** and limited to, for example, an immediate response to a new major attack. They contend further that while Congress might act piecemeal to authorize particular uses of force in certain extreme cases, the basic framework would be one of peace and law enforcement—in other words, an absence of military force. On the other hand, they argue, a new AUMF would allow for the continuation of lethal counterterrorism activities, and even the expansion of them—as presidents add ever more groups to a list from which removal would be nearly impossible. In other words, the stakes are high because this is a choice between war and peace.¶ The spirit that animates our paper, by contrast, is the suspicion that this belief is a bit less than realistic. In my view, to sketch the alternative, whoever is president is going to **continue our current counterterrorism policies** for the foreseeable future. Barring a Rand Paul presidency (and it will be interesting to see if either Jen or Steve endorses that prospect in the name of peace), any president is going to feel **obliged to maintain counterterrorism on offense**, and Congress—whining, carping, complaining all the way both that the president is being too aggressive and that he is not being aggressive enough—**will go along with it**, indeed, will insist upon it. That’s just the political reality. And it’s the political reality for a very simple reason that is, at its core, not about a point of law: Americans overwhelmingly prefer killing terrorists overseas to allowing them operating wiggle-room with which to attack Americans.¶ This counterterrorism on offense will be justified, as it has been so far, by aggressive interpretation of the AUMF as covering associated forces in geographic locales far from hot battlefields. Or it will be justified by an **expansive view of Article II powers**. Or it will be justified by **whatever other legal means may be available.** The critical point, however, is that the core strategy is simply not going to be walked back, unless there is some dramatic political shift, and most fundamentally, it’s not going to be walked back because a group of lawyers think the AUMF is no longer a vital instrument—any more than the absence of a congressional action precluded the Libya operation.

#### The executive branch is currently operating on unrestrained authority

Waxman et al 13  
(Matthew, Robert Chesney, Jack Goldsmith, Benjamin Wittes, All Members of the Task Force on National Security and Law for the hoover institute, “Is the War on Terror Lawful?” Hoover Institute, February 25, 2013, [http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining-ideas/article/141091 accessed 8/16/13](http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining-ideas/article/141091%20accessed%208/16/13)) ZLH

Since September 18, 2001, a joint resolution of Congress known as the Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF) has served as the primary legal foundation for the “war on terror.” In this essay we explain why the AUMF is increasingly obsolete, why the nation will probably need a new legal foundation for next-generation terrorist threats, what the options are for this new legal foundation, and which option we think is best. The AUMF authorizes the president to “use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, . . . .” The authorization of “force” in the AUMF is the main legal basis for the president’s power to detain and target members of al Qaeda and The Taliban. In addition, since September 11, Congress, two presidential administrations, and the lower federal courts have interpreted the “force” authorized by the AUMF to extend to members or substantial supporters of the Taliban and al Qaeda, and associated forces. The main reason the AUMF is becoming obsolete is that the conflict it describes – which on its face is one against the perpetrators of the September 11 attacks and those who harbor them – is growing less salient as U.S. and allied actions degrade the core of Al Qaeda and the U.S. military draws down its forces fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan. At the same time that the original objects of the AUMF are dying off, newer terrorist groups that threaten the United States and its interests are emerging around the globe. Some of the terrorist groups have substantial ties to al Qaeda and thus can be brought within the AUMF by interpretation. For example, the President has been able to use force against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (“AQAP”), a terrorist organization in Yemen, because it is a supporter or associated force of al Qaeda. But this interpretive move is increasingly difficult as newer threatening groups emerge with dimmer ties, if any, to al Qaeda. As a result, we are reaching the end point of statutory authority for the President to meet terrorist threats.

### 1NC AT: Terrorism

#### Strikes low—we need intel and few high value targets left

Taylor and Wong 10-9 [Guy Taylor, State Dept. Correspondent at the Washington Times and former editor of the World Politics Review and Kristina Wong, national security reporter for The Washington Times, “Drone strikes plummet as U.S. seeks more human intelligence,” October 9, 2013, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/oct/9/drone-strikes-drop-as-us-craves-more-human-intelli/#ixzz2hp6pBp9h, wyo-sc]

The number of drone strikes approved by the Obama administration on suspected terrorists has fallen dramatically this year, as the war with al Qaeda increasingly shifts to Africa and U.S. intelligence craves more captures and interrogations of high-value targets.¶ U.S. officials told The Washington Times on Wednesday that the reasons for a shift in tactics are many — including that al Qaeda’s senior ranks were thinned out so much in 2011 and 2012 by an intense flurry of drone strikes, and that the terrorist network has adapted to try to evade some of Washington’s use of the strikes or to make them less politically palatable.¶ But the sources acknowledged that a growing desire to close a recent gap in actionable human intelligence on al Qaeda’s evolving operations also has renewed the administration’s interest in more clandestine commando raids like the one that netted a high-value terrorist suspect in Libya last weekend.

#### AUMF revisions crush counter-terror- crushes flexibility, announces our vulnerabilities, and snowballs

Corn, 13 Geoffrey, Professor of Law and Presidential Research Professor, Testimony at the Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee Subject: "The Law of Armed Conflict, the Use of Military Force, and the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force" May 16th, Federal News Service, Nexis

Because I do not believe there is inconsistency between the nature of U.S. operations to date and these inherent limitations, I do not believe it is necessary at this point in time to modify the AUMF. Instead, I believe that Congress should continue to engage in oversight to remain fully apprised of the strategic, operational, and at times tactical decisionmaking processes that result in the employment of U.S. combat power pursuant to the statute, enabling Congress to ensure that such use falls within the scope of an authorization targeted at al Qaeda, intended to protect the Nation from future terrorist attacks, and that these operations reflect unquestioned commitment to the principles of international law that regulate the use of military force during any armed conflict. I believe the AUMF effectively addresses the belligerent threat against the United States posed by terrorist groups. I emphasize the term ‘‘belligerent’’ for an important reason. It is obvious that the AUMF has granted authority to use the Nation’s military power against threats falling within its scope. Therefore, only those organizations that pose a risk of sufficient magnitude to justify invoking the authority associated with armed conflict should be included within that scope as a result of their affiliation with al Qaeda. Determining what groups properly fall within this scope is, therefore, both critical and challenging. The AUMF provides the President with the necessary flexibility to tailor U.S. operations to the evolving nature of this unconventional enemy, maximizing the efficacy of U.S. efforts to deny al Qaeda the freedom of action they possessed in Afghanistan prior to Operation Enduring Freedom. In reaction to this evolution, the United States has employed combat power against what the prior panel referred to as associated forces or co-belligerents of al Qaeda, belligerent groups assessed to adhere to the overall terrorist objectives of the organization and engage in hostilities alongside al Qaeda directed against the United States or its interests. The focused on shared ideology, tactics, and indicia of connection between high-level group leaders seems both logical and legitimate for including these offshoots of al Qaeda within the scope of the AUMF as co-belligerents, a determination that, based on publicly available information, has to date been limited to groups seeking the sanctuary of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas, Yemen, or Somalia. If Congress does, however, choose to revise the AUMF, I do not believe that the revision should incorporatean exclusive list of defined co-belligerent groups, a geographic scope limitation, or some external oversight of targeting decisions**,** all of which would undermine the efficacy of U.S. operations by signaling to the enemy limits on U.S. operational and tactical reach**.** It is an operational and tactical axiom that insurgent and non- state threats rarely seek the proverbial toe-to-toe confrontation with clearly superior military forces. Al Qaeda is no different. Indeed, their attempts to engage in such tactics in the initial phases of Operation Enduring Freedom proved disastrous. Incorporating such limitations into the AUMF would, therefore, be inconsistent with the operational objective of seizing and retaining the initiative against this unconventional enemy and the strategic objective of preventing future terrorist attacks against the United States. Finally, I believe to target decisionmaking during armed conflict is a quintessential command function and that the President, acting in his own capacity or through subordinate officers, should make these decisions. He and his subordinates bear an obligation to ensure compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict and other principles of international law when employing U.S. combat power. Every subordinate officer in the chain of command is sworn to uphold and defend the constitution which, by implication, also requires compliance with this law. I believe the level of commitment to ensuring such compliance in structure, process, education, training, and internal oversight is more significant today than at any time in our Nation’s history. As one familiar with all these aspects of the compliance process, I am discouraged by the common assertion that there is insufficient oversight for targeting decisions. Furthermore, I believe few people better understand the immense moral burden associated with a decision to order lethal attack than experienced military leaders who never take these decisions lightly. If our confidence in these leaders to make sound military decisions is sufficient to entrust to them the lives of our sons and daughters—and on this point, again I must admit my self-interest as my son is a second-year cadet in the U.S. Air Force Academy and my brother is a serving colonel in the United States Army—I believe it must be sufficient to judge when and how to employ lethal combat power against an enemy. These leaders spend their entire professional careers immersed in the operational, moral, ethical, and legal aspects of employing combat power. I just do not believe some external oversight mechanism or a Federal judge is more competent to make these extremely difficult and weighty judgments as the people that this Nation entrusts for that responsibility. Finally, I would like to make one comment on the very hotly discussed issue of associated forces and the scope of the AUMF. In my view, when the administration refers to an associated or affiliated force, it is referring to a process of mutation that this organization undergoes. Obviously, we are dealing with an enemy that is going to seek every asymmetrical tactic to avoid the capability of the United States to disrupt or disable its operations. Part of that tactic, I think is to recruit and grow affiliated organizations. I certainly understand the logic of wanting to include those organizations within the scope of a revised AUMF. My concern echoes that of Senator Inhofe, which is the risk is if you open that Pandora’s box, what other changes to this authority might be included in the statute which I believe could denigrate or limit the effectiveness of U.S. military operations. And so while I believe Congress absolutely has an important function to ensure that the use of force under the statute is consistent with the underlying principles that frame the enactment of the AUMF, which is to defeat al Qaeda as an entity in the corporate sense and protect the United States from future terrorist attacks, I do not believe at this point in time it is necessary to modify the statute

#### Drones can continue outside the AUMF-

**Pearlstein 4-11**-13 [Deborah, served in the White House from 1993-1995 as a Senior Editor and Speechwriter for President Clinton. A magna cum laude graduate of Harvard Law School, Pearlstein clerked for Judge Michael Boudin of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, then for Justice John Paul Stevens of the U.S. Supreme Court, assistant professor of law at Cardozo School of Law for Yeshiva University, “Keeping up with the Drones’,” <http://opiniojuris.org/2013/04/11/keeping-up-with-the-drones/>]

The McClatchy piece contends that such statistics are necessarily at odds with Administration statements that its targeting operations were limited to senior leaders of Al Qaeda and allied groups. This seems wrong; I haven’t understood the Administration’s position to be that it would only target senior leadership. Indeed, that was part of the problem with the White Paper. It argued that targeting senior leaders was within the President’s authority, but it didn’t foreclose the possibility that others could also be targeted. The Paper spent a great deal of time gesturing at, if not quite committing to, legal theories that would support much broader targeting authority. In this respect, the leaked news, if accurate, confirms what should by now be the unsurprising conclusion that the White Paper did not describe the full scope of asserted U.S. targeting authority.¶ That said, the official details here are new and therefore important to untangle. We might fairly assume some of these strikes are the deeply problematic signature strikes we’ve known about – against ‘militants’ who may or may not pose a threat to the United States. But what about the named groups? Does the United States have the authority to target the groups it targeted in the Pakistan/Afghan border region – including the Haqqanis, the Pakistani Taliban, and Lashkar i Jhangvi? Start with domestic law. The Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), giving the President the power to use force against those groups responsible for the attacks of 9/11, is an authorization for the use of military force. It’s not clear the AUMF empowers the CIA to do anything. In any case, as the article points out, there’s no suggestion that the groups named above were in fact responsible for the attacks of 9/11. So odds are slim that the AUMF is the relevant source of domestic authority. That leaves CIA’s authority under Title 50 of the U.S. Code to conduct covert operations, operations for which a presidential finding is required and which the U.S. wishes to be able publicly to deny. So perhaps there is a presidential finding (of course classified) that authorizes the use of force against a far broader range of groups than is covered by the AUMF. That would be news. One may well not think this a good idea (itself worth several separate posts), but provided the Administration is complying with

#### Drones decapitate key leadership responsible for AQAP’s soft power strat. Yemen supports the strikes and they outweigh blowback.

**Emker, Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations, 2013**

(Stacey, “Analyzing the US Counterterrorism Strategy in Yemen”, 1-14, <http://blogs.shu.edu/diplomacy/2013/01/analyzing-the-us-counterterrorism-strategy-in-yemen/>)

Three distinct forms of blowback are heavily cited as the cost of U.S. drones strikes in Yemen. Foremost, it has been asserted that U.S. drones cause purposeful retaliation by AQAP against the government of Yemen. Purposeful retaliation is most often demonstrated through public statements made by AQAP after an attack. Hours after a U.S. drone strike killed five suspected Al-Qaeda militants in southern Yemen in March 2012, militants blew up a liquid-natural gas pipeline in Shabwah which transports gas to a facility whose leading stakeholder is the French oil company, Total. The second form of blowback centers on collateral damage, the unintended death or injury of Yemen civilians, unrelated to AQAP targets. Al-Qaeda exploits U.S. errors in drone strikes, giving it ample material for propaganda. In effect, AQAP has a higher likelihood of recruiting new members and can increase sympathy for Al-Qaeda linked militants. Anger over collateral damage in this type of scenario has been demonstrated quite a few times since the U.S. began its drone campaign against AQAP. In 2010, AQAP’s sharpest gains domestically began with the botched Yemeni counterterrorism raid on ‘A’yd al-Shabwani and a U.S. drone strike that killed Marib’s deputy governor, Jabir al-Shabwani who was also known as a prominent sheik. Since al-Shabwani was a pro-government leader and had been asked to negotiate with tribes purportedly hiding Al-Qaeda militants on behalf of Sana’a, the news of the drone strike sparked outrage throughout Marib and resulted in a series of retaliatory attacks against military bases, oil pipelines, and electrical grids by Al Shabwan tribesmen. The collateral damage involved with this strike was a gift to the Al-Qaeda narrative, which cited the casualties as evidence of the incompetency of President Saleh and U.S. callousness. The third form of blowback typically identified asserts that drones strikes help to further destabilize Yemen instead of providing more security. When state power is essentially exercised from above through both strikes and surveillance, it undermines the weak central government and leaves a security vacuum to be filled on the ground. Given the central government’s limited state capacity, the ground is more easily controlled by insurgent groups. From this standpoint, drone strikes in Yemen indirectly caused the Ansar-Al Sharia movement to take control of the Southern Provinces. Partially due to the Arab Spring, the central government under President Saleh was unable to deliver any form of governance, law enforcement, or social services in the Shabwah and Abyan provinces throughout 2011. Conversely, the Southern provinces experienced a sharp increase in the number of U.S. drone strikes. Although the purpose was to provide security, the strikes intensified anti-regime sentiment and helped create a movement focused on the near enemy, the Saleh regime. Ansar al-Sharia represented itself as the means for expressing grievances with the government, and by providing rule of law and social services as a functioning state apparatus. As a result, Ansar al-Sharia was able to fill the void and win supporters within society while providing AQAP a safe-haven. On the other hand, drone strikes in Yemen have been beneficial in the fight against AQAP. As previously stated, AQAP is plotting terrorist attacks against U.S. targets and maintains the capability to attack within U.S. borders. Compared to other military objectives in the “war on terror,” there are no troops on the ground in Yemen, reducing the cost of military intervention and anti-American resentment through occupation. In addition, military pressure on AQAP through occupation would likely inflict far more civilian casualties on the Yemeni population than collateral damage from drone strikes. From this standpoint, drones are seen as an efficient tool to gather intelligence and target AQAP members. When direct action is taken, drone strikes are conducted in concert with the Yemeni government to avoid civilian casualty. President Hadi publicly endorsed U.S. drone strikes in September 2012, making Yemen a reliable counterterrorism partner. This factor is crucial when assessing the effectiveness of drones in Yemen under former President Saleh compared to President Hadi. While former President Saleh pledged Yemen’s support to the U.S. in the “war on terror,” U.S. officials and Yemeni experts questioned Saleh’s commitment and saw him as an unreliable partner and source of intelligence. John Brennan, President Obama’s chief counterterrorism advisor, has made frequent public visits to Yemen over the past year. When speaking of President Hadi’s counterterrorism efforts, Brennan has stated that “the cooperation has been more consistent, more reliable and with a more committed and determined focus.” With this, the information provided by the Yemeni government under President Hadi has greatly improved the efficacy of the drone campaign, and helped in avoiding catastrophic mistakes. The conventional understanding of drones and collateral damage is not a sufficient or systematic explanation of recruitment within the domestic context of Yemen. Christopher Swifts’ interviews with tribal leaders, Islamic Politicians, Salafist clerics, and other sources all revealed that AQAP recruitment is not motivated solely by U.S. drone strikes, but driven by economic desperation. AQAP insurgents lure young Yemeni men with the promise of a rifle, a car, and a salary of four-hundred dollars a month, which is a fortune when half the population is living on less than two dollars a day. AQAP has employed a soft power approach by fulfilling social needs in order to build networks of mutual dependency. Despite the general antipathy for drone strikes, a majority of the Yemeni’s interviewed expressed that AQAP posed a serious threat to their country and had a pragmatic view of the U.S. drone campaign. As long as drones target legitimate terrorists, Yemenis grudgingly acknowledge their utility. With this, it is important to note Yemen’s religious majority and nationalism. The population of Yemen is almost entirely Muslim, made up of Zaydis and Shaf’is. Zaydis are found mostly in North and Northwest Yemen and belong to a branch of Shi’a Islam. Zaydis form the the Huthi insurgent movement, and AQAP statements in Inspire have connected the movement to threats posed by Shi’a in eastern Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq. Since AQAP has attacked two Huthi processions in 2010 and threatened supporters, Zaydi Yemenis do not represent practical recruitment options for AQAP. On the hand, the majority of Yemenis are Shafi’is making up the South and East. The Shafi’is school follows one of the four Sunni schools of Islamic jurisprudence and is considered a relatively moderate form of Islam. While Islamic radicalism is prevalent within the country, Shafi’is is culturally very different and is not exactly fertile breeding grounds for extremist ideology. As a result, the Al-Qaeda ideology does not go hand-in-hand with the majority of the Yemeni people. Analysis of AQAP’s history suggests that the group’s resiliency within Yemen is due to a group of local Yemeni leaders who understand the local language, tribal customs, and developed relationships with prominent sheiks. Unlike predecessor jihadist groups in Yemen, AQAP has exercised strategic discipline in creating coherent, but nuanced propaganda. The group assimilates broadly popular grievances into a single narrative proposing international jihad as the only solution. The group exploits common malcontent with the Yemeni government over injustices including corruption, the absence of public services and political reform, and unequal distribution of profits from oil. In addition, AQAP has not explicitly called for the outright dissolution of tribal identity like AQAM in Afghanistan Somalia, Iraq, and Pakistan. Within Yemen, AQAP targets Western interests, Yemeni security officials, and economic sectors such as oil and tourism. The group has specifically avoided Yemeni civilian casualties in bombings and suicide attacks. Also, AQAP has avoided potentially divisive American and European targets, such as the many Western-language students, foreign aid, and medical workers who remained in Yemen until 2010. With this, AQAP leaders recognized the importance of managing perceptions in order to sustain legitimacy and have even denied responsibility for terrorist attacks that did not fit with its narrative. The most direct way to reduce AQAP’s viability in Yemen, while simultaneously limiting its capacity to attack the US, requires the removal of its local leadership through drone strikes who are responsible for the group’s strategic guidance. With this, it important to note that drone strikes represent only one tool in the U.S.’s comprehensive policy towards Yemen. The costs of U.S. drone strikes correspond with three distinct forms of blowback that have helped to strengthen AQAP’s narrative and increased recruitment and sympathy for Al-Qaeda linked militants. However, the costs do not outweigh the utility of drone strikes against AQAP within the domestic context. While the U.S. acted more unilaterally in Yemen under President Saleh, the Obama Administration is now working in concert with the transitional government of President Hadi. With this, the relationship between the U.S. and Yemen has transformed into a working partnership in the fight against AQAP. As a partnership, this counterterrorism policy is beneficial for both Yemeni and international support.

**The worst case scenario happened – no extinction**

**Dove 12** [Alan Dove, PhD in Microbiology, science journalist and former Adjunct Professor at New York University, “Who’s Afraid of the Big, Bad Bioterrorist?” Jan 24 2012, http://alandove.com/content/2012/01/whos-afraid-of-the-big-bad-bioterrorist/]

The second problem is much more serious. Eliminating the toxins, we’re left with a list of infectious bacteria and viruses. With a single exception, these organisms are probably near-useless as weapons, and history proves it.¶ There have been at least three well-documented military-style deployments of infectious agents from the list, plus one deployment of an agent that’s not on the list. I’m focusing entirely on the modern era, by the way. There are historical reports of armies catapulting plague-ridden corpses over city walls and conquistadors trying to inoculate blankets with Variola (smallpox), but it’s not clear those “attacks” were effective. Those diseases tended to spread like, well, plagues, so there’s no telling whether the targets really caught the diseases from the bodies and blankets, or simply picked them up through casual contact with their enemies.¶Of the four modern biowarfare incidents, two have been fatal. The first was the 1979 Sverdlovsk anthrax incident, which killed an estimated 100 people. In that case, a Soviet-built biological weapons lab accidentally released a large plume of weaponized Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) over a major city. Soviet authorities tried to blame the resulting fatalities on “bad meat,” but in the 1990s Western investigators were finally able to piece together the real story. The second fatal incident also involved anthrax from a government-run lab: the 2001 “Amerithrax” attacks. That time, a rogue employee (or perhaps employees) of the government’s main bioweapons lab sent weaponized, powdered anthrax through the US postal service. Five people died.¶ That gives us a grand total of around 105 deaths, entirely from agents that were grown and weaponized in officially-sanctioned and funded bioweapons research labs. Remember that.¶Terrorist groups have also deployed biological weapons twice, and these cases are very instructive. The first was the 1984 Rajneeshee bioterror attack, in which members of acult in Oregon inoculated restaurant salad bars with Salmonella bacteria (an agent that’s not on the “select” list). 751 people got sick, but nobody died. Public health authorities handled it as a conventional foodborne Salmonella outbreak, identified the sources and contained them. Nobody even would have known it was a deliberate attack if a member of the cult hadn’t come forward afterward with a confession. Lesson: our existing public health infrastructure was entirely adequate to respond to a major bioterrorist attack.¶ The second genuine bioterrorist attack took place in 1993. Members of the Aum Shinrikyo cult successfully isolated and grew a large stock of anthrax bacteria, then sprayed it as an aerosol from the roof of a building in downtown Tokyo. The cult was well-financed,and had many highly educated members, so **this** release over the world’s largest city really **represented a worst-case scenario**.¶ **Nobody got sick** or died. From the cult’s perspective, it was a complete and utter failure. Again, the only reason we even found out about it was a post-hoc confession. Aum members later demonstrated their lab skills by producing Sarin nerve gas, with far deadlier results. Lesson: one of the top “select agents” is extremely hard to grow and deploy even for relatively skilled non-state groups. It’s a really crappy bioterrorist weapon.¶ Taken together, these events point to an uncomfortable but inevitable conclusion: our biodefense industry is a far greater threat to us than any actual bioterrorists.

#### No scenario for nuclear terror---consensus of experts

Matt Fay ‘13, PhD student in the history department at Temple University, has a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from St. Xavier University and a Master’s in International Relations and Conflict Resolution with a minor in Transnational Security Studies from American Military University, 7/18/13, “The Ever-Shrinking Odds of Nuclear Terrorism”, webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:HoItCUNhbgUJ:hegemonicobsessions.com/%3Fp%3D902+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=firefox-a

For over a decade now, one of the most oft-repeated threats raised by policymakers—the one that in many ways justified the invasion of Iraq—has been that of nuclear terrorism. Officials in both the Bush and Obama administrations, including the presidents themselves, have raised the specter of the atomic terrorist. But beyond mere rhetoric, how likely is a nuclear terrorist attack really?¶ While pessimistic estimates about America’s ability to avoid a nuclear terrorist attack became something of a cottage industry following the September 11th attacks, a number of scholars in recent years have pushed back against this trend. Frank Gavin has put post-9/11 fears of nuclear terrorism into historical context (pdf) and argued against the prevailing alarmism. Anne Stenersen of the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment has challenged the idea that al Qaeda was ever bound and determined to acquire a nuclear weapon. John Mueller ridiculed the notion of nuclear terrorism in his book Atomic Obsessions and highlighted the numerous steps a terrorist group would need to take—all of which would have to be successful—in order to procure, deliver, and detonate an atomic weapon. And in his excellent, and exceedingly even-handed, treatment of the subject, On Nuclear Terrorism, Michael Levi outlined the difficulties terrorists would face building their own nuclear weapon and discussed how a “system of systems” could be developed to interdict potential materials smuggled into the United States—citing a “Murphy’s law of nuclear terrorism” that could possibly dissuade terrorists from even trying in the first place.¶ But what about the possibility that a rogue state could transfer a nuclear weapon to a terrorist group? That was ostensibly why the United States deposed Saddam Hussein’s regime: fear he would turnover one of his hypothetical nuclear weapons for al Qaeda to use.¶ Enter into this discussion Keir Lieber and Daryl Press and their article in the most recent edition of International Security, “Why States Won’t Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists.” Lieber and Press have been writing on nuclear issues for just shy of a decade—doing innovative, if controversial work on American nuclear strategy. However, I believe this is their first venture into the debate over nuclear terrorism. And while others, such as Mueller, have argued that states are unlikely to transfer nuclear weapons to terrorists, this article is the first to tackle the subject with an empirical analysis.¶ The title of their article nicely sums up their argument: states will not turn over nuclear weapons terrorists. To back up this claim, Lieber and Press attack the idea that states will transfer nuclear weapons to terrorists because terrorists operate of absent a “return address.” Based on an examination of attribution following conventional terrorist attacks, the authors conclude:¶ [N]either a terror group nor a state sponsor would remain anonymous after a nuclear attack. We draw this conclusion on the basis of four main findings. First, data on a decade of terrorist incidents reveal a strong positive relationship between the number of fatalities caused in a terror attack and the likelihood of attribution. Roughly three-quarters of the attacks that kill 100 people or more are traced back to the perpetrators. Second, attribution rates are far higher for attacks on the U.S. homeland or the territory of a major U.S. ally—97 percent (thirty-six of thirty-seven) for incidents that killed ten or more people. Third, tracing culpability from a guilty terrorist group back to its state sponsor is not likely to be difficult: few countries sponsor terrorism; few terrorist groups have state sponsors; each sponsor terrorist group has few sponsors (typically one); and only one country that sponsors terrorism, has nuclear weapons or enough fissile material to manufacture a weapon. In sum, attribution of nuclear terror incidents would be easier than is typically suggested, and passing weapons to terrorists would not offer countries escape from the constraints of deterrence.¶ From this analysis, Lieber and Press draw two major implications for U.S. foreign policy: claims that it is impossible to attribute nuclear terrorism to particular groups or potential states sponsors undermines deterrence; and fear of states transferring nuclear weapons to terrorist groups, by itself, does not justify extreme measures to prevent nuclear proliferation.¶ This is a key point. While there are other reasons nuclear proliferation is undesirable, fears of nuclear terrorism have been used to justify a wide-range of policies—up to, and including, military action. Put in its proper perspective however—given the difficulty in constructing and transporting a nuclear device and the improbability of state transfer—nuclear terrorism hardly warrants the type of exertions many alarmist assessments indicate it should.

### Firebreaks

#### No US precedent---not causal

Kenneth Anderson 11, Professor of International Law at American University, 10/9/11, “What Kind of Drones Arms Race Is Coming?,” <http://www.volokh.com/2011/10/09/what-kind-of-drones-arms-race-is-coming/#more-51516>

New York Times national security correspondent Scott Shane has an opinion piece in today’s Sunday Times predicting an “arms race” in military drones. The methodology essentially looks at the US as the leader, followed by Israel – countries that have built, deployed and used drones in both surveillance and as weapons platforms. It then looks at the list of other countries that are following fast in US footsteps to both build and deploy, as well as purchase or sell the technology – noting, correctly, that the list is a long one, starting with China. The predicament is put this way:

Eventually, the United States will face a military adversary or terrorist group armed with drones, military analysts say. But what the short-run hazard experts foresee is not an attack on the United States, which faces no enemies with significant combat drone capabilities, but the political and legal challenges posed when another country follows the American example. The Bush administration, and even more aggressively the Obama administration, embraced an extraordinary principle: that the United States can send this robotic weapon over borders to kill perceived enemies, even American citizens, who are viewed as a threat.

“Is this the world we want to live in?” asks Micah Zenko, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. “Because we’re creating it.”

By asserting that “we’re” creating it, this is a claim that there is an arms race among states over military drones, and that it is a consequence of the US creating the technology and deploying it – and then, beyond the technology, changing the normative legal and moral rules in the international community about using it across borders. In effect, the combination of those two, technological and normative, forces other countries in strategic competition with the US to follow suit. (The other unstated premise underlying the whole opinion piece is a studiously neutral moral relativism signaled by that otherwise unexamined phrase “perceived enemies.” Does it matter if they are not merely our “perceived” but are our actual enemies? Irrespective of what one might be entitled to do to them, is it so very difficult to conclude, even in the New York Times, that Anwar al-Awlaki was, in objective terms, our enemy?)

It sounds like it must be true. But is it? There are a number of reasons to doubt that moves by other countries are an arms race in the sense that the US “created” it or could have stopped it, or that something different would have happened had the US not pursued the technology or not used it in the ways it has against non-state terrorist actors. Here are a couple of quick reasons why I don’t find this thesis very persuasive, and what I think the real “arms race” surrounding drones will be.

Unmanned aerial vehicles have clearly got a big push from the US military in the way of research, development, and deployment. But the reality today is that the technology will transform civil aviation, in many of the same ways and for the same reasons that another robotic technology, driverless cars (which Google is busily plying up and down the streets of San Francisco, but which started as a DARPA project). UAVs will eventually move into many roles in ordinary aviation, because it is cheaper, relatively safer, more reliable – and it will eventually include cargo planes, crop dusting, border patrol, forest fire patrols, and many other tasks. There is a reason for this – the avionics involved are simply not so complicated as to be beyond the abilities of many, many states. Military applications will carry drones many different directions, from next-generation unmanned fighter aircraft able to operate against other craft at much higher G stresses to tiny surveillance drones. But the flying-around technology for aircraft that are generally sizes flown today is not that difficult, and any substantial state that feels like developing them will be able to do so.

But the point is that this was happening anyway, and the technology was already available. The US might have been first, but it hasn’t sparked an arms race in any sense that absent the US push, no one would have done this. That’s just a fantasy reading of where the technology in general aviation was already going; Zenko’s ‘original sin’ attribution of this to the US opening Pandora’s box is not a credible understanding of the development and applications of the technology. Had the US not moved on this, the result would have been a US playing catch-up to someone else. For that matter, the off-the-shelf technology for small, hobbyist UAVs is simple enough and available enough that terrorists will eventually try to do their own amateur version, putting some kind of bomb on it.

Moving on from the avionics, weaponizing the craft is also not difficult. § Marked 14:23 § The US stuck an anti-tank missile on a Predator; this is also not rocket science. Many states can build drones, many states can operate them, and crudely weaponizing them is also not rocket science. The US didn’t spark an arms race; this would occur to any state with a drone. To the extent that there is real development here, it lies in the development of specialized weapons that enable vastly more discriminating targeting. The details are sketchy, but there are indications from DangerRoom and other observers (including some comments from military officials off the record) that US military budgets include amounts for much smaller missiles designed not as anti-tank weapons, but to penetrate and kill persons inside a car without blowing it to bits, for example. This is genuinely harder to do – but still not all that difficult for a major state, whether leading NATO states, China, Russia, or India. The question is whether it would be a bad thing to have states competing to come up with weapons technologies that are … more discriminating.

#### Zero chance that U.S. self-restraint causes any other country to give up their plans for drones

Max Boot 11, the Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow in National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, 10/9/11, “We Cannot Afford to Stop Drone Strikes,” Commentary Magazine, <http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2011/10/09/drone-arms-race/>

The New York Times engages in some scare-mongering today about a drone ams race. Scott Shane notes correctly other nations such as China are building their own drones and in the future U.S. forces could be attacked by them–our forces will not have a monopoly on their use forever. Fair enough, but he goes further, suggesting our current use of drones to target terrorists will backfire:

If China, for instance, sends killer drones into Kazakhstan to hunt minority Uighur Muslims it accuses of plotting terrorism, what will the United States say? What if India uses remotely controlled craft to hit terrorism suspects in Kashmir, or Russia sends drones after militants in the Caucasus? American officials who protest will likely find their own example thrown back at them.

“The problem is that we’re creating an international norm” — asserting the right to strike preemptively against those we suspect of planning attacks, argues Dennis M. Gormley, a senior research fellow at the University of Pittsburgh and author of Missile Contagion, who has called for tougher export controls on American drone technology. “The copycatting is what I worry about most.”

This is a familiar trope of liberal critics who are always claiming we should forego “X” weapons system or capability, otherwise our enemies will adopt it too. We have heard this with regard to ballistic missile defense, ballistic missiles, nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons, land mines, exploding bullets, and other fearsome weapons. Some have even suggested the U.S. should abjure the first use of nuclear weapons–and cut down our own arsenal–to encourage similar restraint from Iran.

The argument falls apart rather quickly because it is founded on a false premise: that other nations will follow our example. In point of fact, Iran is hell-bent on getting nuclear weapons no matter what we do; China is hell-bent on getting drones; and so forth. Whether and under what circumstances they will use those weapons remains an open question–but there is little reason to think self-restraint on our part will be matched by equal self-restraint on theirs. Is Pakistan avoiding nuking India because we haven’t used nuclear weapons since 1945? Hardly. The reason is that India has a powerful nuclear deterrent to use against Pakistan. If there is one lesson of history it is a strong deterrent is a better upholder of peace than is unilateral disarmament–which is what the New York Times implicitly suggests.

Imagine if we did refrain from drone strikes against al-Qaeda–what would be the consequence? If we were to stop the strikes, would China really decide to take a softer line on Uighurs or Russia on Chechen separatists? That seems unlikely given the viciousness those states already employ in their battles against ethnic separatists–which at least in Russia’s case already includes the suspected assassination of Chechen leaders abroad. What’s the difference between sending a hit team and sending a drone?

While a decision on our part to stop drone strikes would be unlikely to alter Russian or Chinese thinking, it would have one immediate consequence: al-Qaeda would be strengthened and could regenerate the ability to attack our homeland. Drone strikes are the only effective weapon we have to combat terrorist groups in places like Pakistan or Yemen where we don’t have a lot of boots on the ground or a lot of cooperation from local authorities. We cannot afford to give them up in the vain hope it will encourage disarmament on the part of dictatorial states.

#### No new detainees-it’s administrative policy

Gerstein 2011

[Josh Gerstein, 2011, John Brennan: No new prisoners to Guantanamo Bay¶ Read more: <http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0911/62990.html#ixzz2kP8K1sO8>, uwyo//amp]

The Obama administration has ruled out sending any new war-on-terror prisoners to Guantanamo Bay, President Barack Obama’s top counterterrorism adviser said Thursday.¶ “We’re not going to bring people to Guantanamo,” Deputy National Security Adviser John Brennan told reporters. “It’s this administration’s policy to close Guantanamo and, despite some congressional hurdles that have been put in our path, we’re going to continue to pursue that.”

#### China-Taiwan war unlikely – economic ties and improving relations

Weede, Former Professor of Sociology at the University of Bonn, 2010

(Erich, retired in 2004, current member of the Mont Pelerin Society, “The Capitalist Peace and the Rise of China: Establishing Global Harmony by Economic Interdependence”, International Interactions 36:2, 206-213, 5/18/10, accessed 6/20/11) JDB

From an international trade perspective, all of East Asia has recently become a Chinese sphere of influence. China is the most important destination of Japanese, South Korean, and Taiwanese exports—ahead of the United States. Although Taiwanese politicians around the turn of the millennium rejected the idea of reunification on the Mainland’s terms, and although some of them were attracted to the idea of declaring the legal independence of Taiwan, economic and social ties across the Taiwan Strait grew vigorously at the same time. Taiwanese companies employ millions of people on the mainland. About a million people from Taiwan live on the Chinese mainland. Mainland China has been the preferred destination of Taiwan’s foreign investment. Since the lateral escalation of a military conflict between the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan constitutes the most plausible scenario whereby the U.S. and China might get into a war, economic interdependence between China and Taiwan contributes to the preservation of peace. Recently, political relations between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China on Taiwan have improved fast. Given the record of Sino-Japanese wars in the past and the power of these neighboring states, the extent of Sino-Japanese economic cooperation provides another reason for optimism. The capitalist peace stands a chance to apply between China and its neighbors and competitors.

#### No war – deterrence checks escalation

Ganguly, 8

[Sumit Ganguly is a professor of political science and holds the Rabindranath Tagore Chair at Indiana University, Bloomington. “Nuclear Stability in South Asia,” International Security, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Fall 2008), pp. 45–70]

As the outcomes of the 1999 and 2001–02 crises show, nuclear deterrence is robust in South Asia. Both crises were contained at levels considerably short of full-scale war. That said, as Paul Kapur has argued, Pakistan’s acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability may well have emboldened its leadership, secure in the belief that India had no good options to respond. India, in turn, has been grappling with an effort to forge a new military doctrine and strategy to enable it to respond to Pakistani needling while containing the possibilities of conflict escalation, especially to the nuclear level.78 Whether Indian military planners can fashion such a calibrated strategy to cope with Pakistani probes remains an open question. This article’s analysis of the 1999 and 2001–02 crises does suggest, however, that nuclear deterrence in South Asia is far from parlous, contrary to what the critics have suggested. Three specific forms of evidence can be adduced to argue the case for the strength of nuclear deterrence. First, there is a serious problem of conflation in the arguments of both Hoyt and Kapur. Undeniably, Pakistan’s willingness to provoke India has increased commensurate with its steady acquisition of a nuclear arsenal. This period from the late 1980s to the late 1990s, however, also coincided with two parallel developments that equipped Pakistan with the motives, opportunities, and means to meddle in India’s internal affairs—particularly in Jammu and Kashmir. The most important change that occurred was the end of the conflict with the Soviet Union, which freed up military resources for use in a new jihad in Kashmir. This jihad, in turn, was made possible by the emergence of an indigenous uprising within the state as a result of Indian political malfeasance.79 Once the jihadis were organized, trained, armed, and unleashed, it is far from clear whether Pakistan could control the behavior and actions of every resulting jihadist organization.80 Consequently, although the number of attacks on India did multiply during the 1990s, it is difficult to establish a firm causal connection between the growth of Pakistani boldness and its gradual acquisition of a full-fledged nuclear weapons capability. Second, India did respond with considerable force once its military planners realized the full scope and extent of the intrusions across the Line of Control. Despite the vigor of this response, India did exhibit restraint. For example, Indian pilots were under strict instructions not to cross the Line of Control in pursuit of their bombing objectives.81 They adhered to these guidelines even though they left them more vulnerable to Pakistani ground ªre.82 The Indian military exercised such restraint to avoid provoking Pakistani fears of a wider attack into Pakistan-controlled Kashmir and then into Pakistan itself. Indian restraint was also evident at another level. During the last war in Kashmir in 1965, within a week of its onset, the Indian Army horizontally escalated with an attack into Pakistani Punjab. In fact, in the Punjab, Indian forces successfully breached the international border and reached the outskirts of the regional capital, Lahore. The Indian military resorted to this strategy under conditions that were not especially propitious for the country. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first prime minister, had died in late 1964. His successor, Lal Bahadur Shastri, was a relatively unknown politician of uncertain stature and standing, and the Indian military was still recovering from the trauma of the 1962 border war with the People’s Republic of China.83 Finally, because of its role in the Cold War, the Pakistani military was armed with more sophisticated, U.S.-supplied weaponry, including the F-86 Sabre and the F-104 Starfighter aircraft. India, on the other hand, had few supersonic aircraft in its inventory, barring a small number of Soviet-supplied MiG-21s and the indigenously built HF-24.84 Furthermore, the Indian military remained concerned that China might open a second front along the Himalayan border. Such concerns were not entirely chimerical, because a Sino-Pakistani entente was under way. Despite these limitations, the Indian political leadership responded to Pakistani aggression with vigor and granted the Indian military the necessary authority to expand the scope of the war. In marked contrast to the politico-military context of 1965, in 1999 India had a self-confident (if belligerent) political leadership and a substantially more powerful military apparatus. Moreover, the country had overcome most of its Nehruvian inhibitions about the use of force to resolve disputes.85 Furthermore, unlike in 1965, India had at least two reserve strike corps in the Punjab in a state of military readiness and poised to attack across the border if given the political nod.86 Despite these significant differences and advantages, the Indian political leadership chose to scrupulously limit the scope of the conflict to the Kargil region. As K. Subrahmanyam, a prominent Indian defense analyst and political commentator, wrote in 1993:. The awareness on both sides of a nuclear capability that can enable either country to assemble nuclear weapons at short notice induces mutual caution. This caution is already evident on the part of India. In 1965, when Pakistan carried out its “Operation Gibraltar” and sent in infiltrators, India sent its army across the cease-fire line to destroy the assembly points of the infiltrators. That escalated into a full-scale war. In 1990, when Pakistan once again carried out a massive infiltration of terrorists trained in Pakistan, India tried to deal with the problem on Indian territory and did not send its army into Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.87

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### Impact overview

#### Flight from the body constructs everything as bare life- the dematerialization of the body supports a politics of mass extermination that reifes Foucault’s underside of power- leads to mass genocide of marginalized bodies

#### AND the Phallogocentrism of the aff inflects irreparable loss on all female subjectivity

Braidotti 2011

[Braidotti, Rosi. Nomadic Subjects : Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist Theory (2nd Edition). New York, NY, USA: Columbia University Press, 2011. p 5.

<http://site.ebrary.com/lib/uofw/Doc?id=10464453&ppg=16> Copyright © 2011. Columbia University Press. All rights reserved. Uwyo//amp]

Irigaray is one of the few thinkers who places full emphasis on radical heterosexuality and the need to reconstruct a heterosexual social-symbolic contract that does not rest on feminophobia, hence not on a patriarchal social unconscious. A fully trained psychoanalyst, Irigaray denounces the delusional nature of identities postulated on the phallogocentric signifier and digs deeper than the sociological expressions of everyday sexism and culturally enforced discrimination. Her critique touches upon the in-depth roots of misogyny in a subject whose foundations rest on the rejection of the feminine from the material maternal body that constitutes our site of origin and inflicts a wound on each and every subject. At the beginning of the self, there is a separation from the totality one enjoyed as part of the mater or matrix. This causes an irreparable loss and hence an inexpressible grief. This structure of “unrepresentability” is a crucial part of psychoanalytic theories of subject formation. It rests on two key ideas: first, that the original loss of (the illusion of) totality, which translates into a wound, becomes a constitutive element of our subjectivity. One incorporates the loss, so to speak, and folds over it by deploying all possible cognitive and emotional forms of compensation. The pain of it never goes away— it just gets formatted into mourning and melancholia (Freud) or gratitude and reciprocity (Melanie Klein). Irigaray argues that the sense of originary loss has to be replaced by self-love and love for the Woman one could become.

#### Treating war as an event that only happens when people are being shot or fighting is fundamentally flawed – it ignores multiple forms of war due like womyn’s oppression and ecological violence.

Cuomo 96[Chris, Professor of Philosophy and Women's Studies, and Director of the Institute for Women's Studies at the University of Georgia, “War Is Not Just an Event: Reflections on the Significance of Everyday Violence” Published in *Hypatia* 11.4, p. 30-46]

Although my position is in agreement with the notion that war and militarism are feminist issues, I argue that approaches to the **ethics of war and peace which do not consider “peacetime” military violence are inadequate for feminist and environmentalist concerns**. Because **much of the military violence done to women and ecosystems happens outside the boundaries of declared wars, feminist and environmental philosophers ought to emphasize the significance of everyday military violence**. Philosophical attention to war has typically appeared in the form of justifi­cations for entering into war, and over appropriate activities within war. The spatial metaphors used to refer to war as a separate, bounded sphere indicate assumptions that war is a realm of human activity vastly removed from normal life, or a sort of happening that is appropriately conceived apart from everyday events in peaceful times. Not surprisingly, **most discussions of the political and ethical dimensions of war discuss war solely as an event**—an occurrence, or collection of occurrences, having clear beginnings and endings that are typi­cally marked by formal, institutional declarations. As happenings, **wars and military activities can be seen as motivated by identifiable, if complex, intentions, and directly enacted by individual and collective decision-makers and agents of states.** But **many of the questions about war that are of interest to feminists including how large-scale, state-sponsored violence affects women and members of other oppressed groups; how military violence shapes gen­dered, raced, and nationalistic political realities and moral imaginations; what such violence consists of and why it persists;** **how** **it is related to other oppressive and violent institutions and hegemonies—cannot be adequately pursued by focusing on events**. These issues are not merely a matter of good or bad intentions and identifiable decisions. In "Gender and 'Postmodern' War," Robin Schott introduces some of the ways in which war is currently best seen not as an event but as a presence (Schott 1995). Schott argues that postmodern understandings of persons, states, and politics, as well as the high-tech nature of much contemporary warfare and the preponderance of civil and nationalist wars, render an event-based conception of war inadequate, especially insofar as gender is taken into account. In this essay, I will expand upon her argument by showing that accounts of war that only focus on events are impoverished in a number of ways, and therefore feminist consideration of the political, ethical, and onto­logical dimensions of war and the possibilities for resistance demand a much more complicated approach. I take Schott's characterization of war as presence as a point of departure, though I am not committed to the idea that the constancy of militarism, the fact of its omnipresence in human experience, and the paucity of an event-based account of war are exclusive to contemporary postmodern or postcolonial circumstances) Theory that does not investigate or even notice the omnipresence of militarism cannot represent or address the depth and specificity of the every­day effects of militarism on women, on people living in occupied territories, on members of military institutions, and on the environment. **These effects are relevant to feminists in a number of ways because military practices and institutions help construct gendered and national identity, and because they justify the destruction of natural nonhuman entities and communities during peacetime. Lack of attention to these aspects** of the business of making or preventing military violence in an extremely technologized world **results in** theory that cannot accommodate the connections among the constant pres­ence of militarism, declared wars, and other closely related social phenomena, such as nationalistic glorifications of motherhood, media violence, and **current ideological gravitations to military solutions for social problems.**

### Alt Overview: Irigaray

#### Reinterpret everything through a lens of sexual difference- that reinterpretation is a clearing out of masculine forms of thought and a way to

#### Give birth to new thought, art, and politics that are outside of masculinity

#### -our link args in the 1NC is that clearing of space and reinterpretation, includes a gendered perspective

### AT: “Policy” Framework F/L

#### Our role of the ballot is to vote for the team with the best strategy to solve violence and oppression-

#### Our scholarship is good and ethical-An ethics of sexual difference is a prerequisite to all questions of subjectivity- sexual difference constitutes the first and ever-forgotten symbol that is deployed to systematically exclude women from access to the symbolic and thus, their own subjectivity

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[Luce Irigaray, 1985, “An Ethics of Sexual Difference”, uwyo//amp]

Nietzsche used to say that we would continue to believe in God as long as we believed in grammar. Yet even, or perhaps particularly after the fall of a certain God, discourse still defends its untouchable status. To say that discourse has a sex, especially in its syntax, is to question the last bastion of semantic order. It amounts to taking issue with the God of men in his most tradi-tional form. Even if language is emptied of meaning-or perhaps the more it is emptied of meaning?-respect for its technical architecture must remain intact. Discourse would be the erection of the totem and the taboo of the world of man. And the more man strives to analyze the world, the universe, himself, the more he seems to resist upsetting the foundations of discourse. His analysis would serve only to confirm and double discourse's immutability. From the start, discourse would be for man that other of nature, that mother, that nature-womb, within which he lived, survived, and risked being lost. The discourse that had been intended as his tool for breaking ground and cultivating the world changed into an intangible, sacred horizon for him. That which is most his own and yet most alien to him? His home within the universe. And, inside that tentacular technical machine that man has made, a machine that threatens him today, not only in stark reality but also by assimilation to his fantasies and the nightmares he has of a devouring mother, man seems to cling ever tighter to that semblance of familiarity he finds in both his everyday and his scientific discourse. As if that technical universe and that language were not his creation, which, because of its failure to preserve the other, fails to preserve him too. The work of his hand, in which he cannot even recognize himself, in which he has drowned the other, now threatens to drown him in turn. He has all the animist fears of a child in the face of nature. He is afraid to touch his machine in case it is activated by his approach, as if it were a mechanism owed respect because of its transcendence. Language, in all its shapes and sizes, would dimly represent for man the allpowerful and ever-unknown mother as well as the transcendent God. Both. Man cannot or will not recognize or reinterpret in his symbols this duality in his technical productions The most obvious symbol, that closest to hand and also most easily forgotten, is the living symbol of sexual difference. But theory would claim that this symbolizes only itself. And women would serve only as a potential symbol to be exchanged by men, by peoples, and would never achieve symbolism or be able to use symbols. 11 Does the symbol constituted by sexual difference implacably split into two? The female would fall into the category of fallow land, matter to be made into a product, or currency symbol, mother or virgin without any identity as a woman. The masculine would no longer enter into. the body or the flesh of the symbol but fashion it or pass it from hand to hand from the outside. The bond between or the function shared by the pieces would be achieved secretly thanks to the female; the exchange of symbols would be assured by the masculine. By serving in this way as mediation from within the symbol, the feminine would have no access to sharing, exchanging, or coining symbols. In particular, the mother-daughter relationship, the attraction between mother and daughter, would be hidden in the symbol. Daughters, wives, and indeed mothers would not have, or would no longer have, signs available for their own relationships, or the means of designating a reality transcendent to themselves-their Other, their God or divine being. No articulated language would help women escape from the sameness of man or from an uninhabitable sameness of their own, lacking a passage from the inside to the outside of themselves, among themselves. Because they are used in mediation, as mediators, women can have within themselves and among themselves a same, an Other only if they move out of the existing systems of exchange. Their only recourse is flight, explosion, implosion, into an immediate relationship to nature or to God.

#### Second, Limits D/A-Framework is the redeployment of the masculine attempt to contain the feminine threshold- as envelop and threshold the masculine attempts to contain woman and obsesses over the possibility of feminine destruction of these limits- culminates in a master-slave dialectic that circumvents all female potential

Irigaray 85

[Luce Irigaray, 1985, “An Ethics of Sexual Difference”, uwyo//amp]

If traditionally, and as a mother, woman represents place for man, such a limit means that she becomes a thing, with some possibility of change from one historical period to another. She finds herself delineated as a thing. Moreover, the maternalfeminine also serves as an envelope, a container, the starting point from which man limits his things. The relationship between envelope and things constitutes one of the aporias, or the aporia, of Aristotelianism and of the philosophical systems derived from it. In our terminologies, which derive from this economy of thought but are impregnated with a psychologism unaware of its sources, it is said, for example, that the woman-mother is castrating. Which means that, since her status as envelope and as thing(s) has not been interpreted, she remains inseparable from the work or act of man, notably insofar as he defines her and creates his identity with her as his starting point or, correlatively, with this determination of her being. If after all this, she is still alive, she continuously undoes his work-distinguishing herself from both the envelope and the thing, ceaselessly creating there some interval, play, something in motion and un-limited which disturbs his perspective, his world, and his/its limits. But, because he fails to leave her a subjective life, and to be on occasion her place and her thing in an intersubjective dynamic, man remains within a master-slave dialectic. The slave, ultimately, of a God on whom he bestows the characteristics of an absolute master. Secretly or obscurely, a slave to the power of the maternal-feminine which he diminishes or destroys. The maternal-feminine remains the place separated from "its" own place, deprived of "its" place. She is or ceaselessly becomes the place of the other who cannot separate himself from it. Without her knowing or willing it, she is then threatening because of what she lacks: a "proper" place. She would have to re-envelop herself with herself, and do so at least twice: as a woman and as a mother. Which would presuppose a change in the whole economy of space-time. In the meantime, this ethical question comes into play in matters of nudity and perversity. Woman must be nude because she is not situated, does not situate herself in her place. Her clothes, her makeup, and her jewels are the things with which she tries to create her container(s), her envelope(s). She cannot make use of the envelope that she is, and must create artificial ones. Freud's statement that woman is identified with orality is meaningful, but it still exiles her from her most archaic and constituent site. No doubt orality is an especially significant measure for her: morphologically, she has two mouths and two pairs of lips. But she can act on this morphology or make something of it only if she preserves her relation to spatiality and to the fetal. Although she needs these dimensions to create a space for herself (as well as to maintain a receptive place for the other), they are traditionally taken from her to constitute man's nostalgia and everything that he constructs in memory of this first and ultimate dwelling place. An obscure commemoration .... Centuries will perhaps have been needed for man to interpret the meaning of his work(s): the endless construction of a number of substitutes for his prenatal home. From the depths of the earth to the highest skies? Again and again, taking from the feminine the tissue or texture of spatiality. In exchange-but it isn't a real one-he buys her a house, even shuts her up in it, places limits on her that are the opposite of the unlimited site in which he unwittingly situates her. He contains or envelops her with walls while enveloping himself and his things with her flesh. The nature of these envelopes is not the same: on the one hand, invisibly alive, but with barely perceivable limits; on the other, visibly limiting or sheltering, but at the risk of being prison-like or murderous if the threshold is not left open. We must, therefore, reconsider the whole question of our conception of place, both in order to move on to another age of difference (each age of thought corresponds to a particular time of meditation on difference), and in order to construct an ethics of the passions. We need to change the relations between form, matter, interval, and limit, an issue that has never been considered in a way that allows for a relationship between two loving subjects of different sexes. Once there was the enveloping body and the enveloped body, the latter being the more mobile through what Aristotle termed locomotion (since maternity does not look much like "motion"). The one who offers or allows desire moves and envelops, engulfing the other. It is moreover a danger if no third term exists. Not only to serve as a limitation. This third term can occur within the one who contains as a relation of the latter to his or her own limit(s): relation to the divine, to death, to the social, to the cosmic. If a third term does not exist within and for the container, he or she becomes all-powerful. Therefore, to deprive one pole of sexual difference, women, of a third term also amounts to putting them in the position of omnipotence: this is a danger for men, especially in that it suppresses an interval that is both entrance and space between.3 A place for both to enter and exit the envelope (and on the same side, so as not to perforate the envelope or assimilate it into the digestive process); for both, a possibility of unhindered movement, of peaceful immobility without the risk of imprisonment.

#### Third, Masculine State D/A-Your state is the state of man- women cannot construct their own laws, symbols, and states until they are affirmed as full subjects that have vertical and horizontal relationships with other women, unencumbered by men

Irigaray 85

[Luce Irigaray, 1985, “An Ethics of Sexual Difference”, uwyo//amp]

If we are not to relive Antigone's fate, the world of women must successfully create an ethical order and establish the conditions necessary for women's action. This world of female ethics would continue to have two vertical and horizontal dimensions: - daughter-to-mother, mother-to-daughter; - among women, or among "sisters." In some way, the vertical dimension is always being taken away from female becoming. The bond between mother and daughter, daughter and mother, has to be broken for the daughter to become a woman. Female genealogy has to be suppressed, on behalf of the son-Father relationship, and the idealization of the father and husband as patriarchs. But without a vertical dimension (since verticality has always been confused with erection), a loving ethical order cannot take place among women. Within themselves, among themselves, women need both of these dimensions (even squared ... ) if they are to act ethically, either to achieve an in-itself for-itself, a move out of the plant life [108] 1into the animal, or to organize their "animal" territoriality into a "state" or people with its own symbols, laws, and gods. Because this horizon has still to be built, women cannot remain merely a horizontality, ground for the male erection. Women must construct a world in all its and their dimensions. A universe, not merely for the other, as they have been asked to do in the past: as keepers of home and children, mothers, in the name of the property, the laws, the rights, and obligations of the other's State. A world for women. Something that at the same time has never existed and which is already present, although repressed, latent, potential. Eternal mediators for the incarnation of the body and the world of man, women seem never to have produced the singularity of their own body and world. The originality of a sameness that would relate to incarnation. Before and after the advent into the light of day. Before and after the movement outward into the brightness of the outside of the body, of the inside of a world. This sameness, quite apart from everything that can be said about it from the outside, has a way of relating to its appearance which cannot be equated with that of the masculine world, as a result of the way it lives in mucous.

#### Fourth, We must construct new languages as women- it is a prerequisite to reconstituting the destructive norms that perpetuate in society

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[Luce Irigaray, 1985, “An Ethics of Sexual Difference”, uwyo//amp]

In other words, in this division between the two sides of sexual difference, one part of the world would be searching for a way to find and speak its meaning, its side of signification, while the other would be questioning whether meaning is still to be found in language, values, and life. This desperately important question of our time is linked to an injustice, an ethical mistake, a debt still owing to "natural law" and to its gods. If this question is apparent in the dereliction of the feminine, it is also raised on the male side, in quest for its meaning. Humanity and humanism have proved that their ethos is difficult to apply outside certain limits of tolerance. Given that the world is not undifferentiated, not neuter, particularly insofar as the sexes are concerned. The meaning that can be found on the male side is perhaps that of a debt contracted toward the one who gave and still gives man life, in language as well. Language, however formal it may be, feeds on blood, on flesh, on material elements. Who and what has nourished language? How is thjs debt to be repaid? Must we produce more and more formal mechanisms and techniques which redound on man, like the inverted outcome of that mother who gave him a living body? And whom he fears in direct ratio to the unpaid debt that lies between them. To remember that we must go on living and creating worlds is our task. But it can be accomplished only through the combined efforts of the two halves of the world: the masculine and the feminine.

### AT: Perm F/L

#### First, Oppression D/A-The permutation is not an act of love-it rejects woman’s attempt to stand outside of the masculine universal, undifferentiated, and demands her oppression

Irigaray 85

[Luce Irigaray, 1985, “An Ethics of Sexual Difference”, uwyo//amp]

One configuration remains in latency, in abeyance: that of love among women. A configuration that constitutes a substrate that is sometimes mute, sometimes a disturbing force in our culture. A very live substrate whose outlines, shapes, are yet blurred, chaotic, or confused. Traditionally, therefore, this love among women has been a matter of rivalry with: - the real mother, - an all-powerful prototype of maternity, - the desire of man: of father, son, brother. This involves quantitative estimates of love that ceaselessly interrupt love's attraction and development. When we hear women talking to each other, we tend to hear expressions like the following: -like you; - me too; - me more (or me less). Such nagging calculations (which may be unconscious or preconscious) paralyze the fluidity of affect. We harden, borrow, situate ourselves on the edges of the other in order to "exist." As proofs of love, these comparatives eliminate the possibility of a place among women. We prize one another by standards that are not our own and which occupy, without inhabiting, the potential place of our identity. These statements bear witness to affects which are still childish or which fail to survive the death struggle of a narcissism that is always put off: to infinity or else to the hands of a third party as judge. One of the remarks you often hear one woman say to another woman who is a little better situated in her identity is: just like everyone else. Here we have no proof of love, but a judgmental statement that prevents the woman from standing out from an undifferentiated grouping, from a sort of primitive community of women, unconscious utopias or atopias that some women exploit at times to prevent one of their number from affirming her identity. Without realizing it, or willing it, in most cases, women constitute the most terrible instrument of their own oppression: they destroy anything that emerges from their undifferentiated condition and thus become agents of their own annihilation, their reduction to a sameness that is not their own. A kind of magma, of "night in which all the cats are gray," from which man, or humanity, extracts for free what he needs for food, lodging, and survival. These like you J me too J me more (or less) J just like everyone else kinds of remarks have little to do with a loving ethics. They are trace-symptoms of the polemos7 among women. There is no with you in this economy. But there may be a fusional state out of which nothing emerges or should emerge, or else a blind competition to occupy a place or space that is ill-defined but which arouses attraction, envy, passion. It is still not another woman who is loved but merely the place she occupies, that she creates, and that must be taken away from her, rather than respected. This tends to be the way with passions among women. We have to move against the current of history for things to be any different. Which does happen. And constitutes one of the most essential places for an ethics of the passions: no love oj other without love oj same.

#### Second, As woman announced the Pentecost woman must share equally in the divine- the permutation is an attempt at assimilation that denies equal partnership

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[Luce Irigaray, 1985, “An Ethics of Sexual Difference”, uwyo//amp]

The spirit is not to be imprisoned only in the Father-son duality. The spirit eludes this "couple." This event is announced in the Gospel itself: the female, the women partake not in the Last Supper but in the Pentecost, and it is they who discover and announce the resurrection. This seems to say that the body of man can return to life when woman no longer forgets that she has a share in the spirit. In·this way her transfiguration would take place. The moment of her glorification, finally without masochism. Without the infliction of wounds. Without the need for her body to be opened over and again to pleasure, to jouissance, or to conception. The body would be enveloped in her flesh. Inside-outside. Even for conception, the cradle would in some sense be ready. The nest for the child would be possible if the female had its own nest. If woman had her own territory: her birth, her genesis, her growth. With the female becoming in self and for self as Hegel would say. An in self and a for self that are not closed off in the self-sufficiency of a consciousness or a mind. An in self and a for self that always also remain for the other and in a world and a universe that are partway open. For woman to affirm that her desire proceeds or wills thus, woman must be born into desire. She must be longed for, loved, valued as a daughter. An other morning, a new parousia that necessarily accompanies the coming of an ethical God. He respects the difference between him and her, in cosmic and aesthetic generation and creation. Sharing the heaven and the earth in all their elements, potencies, acts.

#### Third, Incrementalism D/A-doesn’t solve-language and subjectivity is fundamentally disparately sexuate- a radical affirmation of difference is a prerequisite

Irigaray 85

[Luce Irigaray, 1985, “An Ethics of Sexual Difference”, uwyo//amp]

Up to this point, my reading and my interpretation of the history of philosophy agree with Merleau-Ponty: we must go back to a moment of prediscursive experience, recommence ev~ rything, all the categories by which we understand things, the world, subject-object divisions, recommence everything and pause at the "mystery, as familiar as it is unexplained, of a light which, illuminating the rest, remains at its source in obscurity. ""If we could rediscover within the exercise of seeing and speaking some of the living references that assign themselves such a destiny in a language, perhaps they would teach us how to form our new instruments, and first of all to understand our research, our interrogation themselves." (P. 130). This operation is absolutely necessary in order to bring the maternal-feminine into language: at the level of theme, motif, subject, articulation, syntax, and so on. Which requires passage through the night, a light that remains in obscurity.

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#### Links act as disads to the perm-

#### The perm is severance and demands the rejection of Roger- Men in feminism, even queer activists and theorists, cannot participate in feminism because they have not experienced the historical oppression on the basis of sex-results in metaphysical cannibalism in which men become subversive at the expense of the subjectivity of woman

Braidotti 2011

[Braidotti, Rosi. Nomadic Subjects : Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist Theory (2nd Edition). New York, NY, USA: Columbia University Press, 2011. p 5.

<http://site.ebrary.com/lib/uofw/Doc?id=10464453&ppg=16> Copyright © 2011. Columbia University Press. All rights reserved. Uwyo//amp]

In spite of my commitment to joyful, positive affirmation of alternative values, according to the Dionysian spirit of nomadic philosophy, there are times when a dose of resentful criticism appears as irresistible as it is necessary. Such is the case whenever I cast an ironic glance at “male-stream” poststructuralist philosophy. The question I will start of with is what is the position of men in feminism. How does the nomadic feminist look upon this issue? There is something both appealing and suspect in the notion of “men in feminism,” like many of the other contributors, my gaze lingers on the preposition “IN” wondering about the spatial dimension it throws open. Is it the battleground for the eternal war of the sexes? Is the space where bodily sexed subjectivities come to a head-on collision? I can only envisage this topic as a knot of interconnected tensions, an area of intense turmoil, a set of contradictions. Somewhere along the line, I am viscerally opposed to the whole idea: men aren’t and shouldn’t be IN feminism: the feminist space is not theirs and not for them to see. Thus the discursive game we are trying to play is either profoundly precarious or perversely provocative— or both at once. A sort of impatience awakens in me at the thought of a whole class/caste of men who are fascinated, puzzled, and intimidated by the sight of a penhandling female intelligentsia of the feminist kind. I do not know what is at stake in this for them and thus, to let my irony shine through between the lines, I am tempted to de/reform a sign and write, instead of phallic subtexts, “men in Pheminism.” Why insist on a letter, for instance? Contextual Constraints Of all Foucault ever taught me, the notion of the “materiality of ideas” has had the deepest impact. One cannot make an abstraction of the network of truth and power formations that govern the practice of one’s enunciation; ideas are sharp-edged discursive events that cannot be analyzed simply in terms of their propositional content. There is something incongruous for me to be sitting here in ethnocentric messed up Europe, thinking about “men in Pheminism.” I cannot say this is a major problem in my mind or in the context within which I am trying to live. There is something very American, in a positive sense, about this issue. The interest that American men display in feminism reflects a specific historical and cultural context: one in which feminist scholarship has made it to the cutting edge of the academic scene. This is not the case in Europe yet. As a European feminist I feel both resistant to and disenchanted with the reduction of feminism to “feminist theory” and the confining of both within academic discourse. This attitude points out a danger that the pioneers of women’s studies courses emphasized from the start: that our male “allies” may not be able to learn how to respect the material foundations, experiential bases, and hence the complexity of the issues raised by feminism. Following a century-old mental habit that Adrienne Rich (1977) analyzes so lucidly, men-in-feminism, however, cannot resist the temptation of short-circuiting this complexity. In a drive to straighten out feminist theory and practice, they streamline the feminist project in a mold. Blinded by what they have learned to recognize as “theory,” they bulldoze their way through feminism as if it were not qualitatively different from any other academic discipline. They are walking all over us. “They” are those white, middle-class male intellectuals who have “got it right” in that they have sensed where the subversive edge of feminist theory is. “They” are a very special generation of postbeat, preneoconfortyto-fifty-year-old men who have “been through” the upheavals of the 1960s and have inherited the values and the neuroses of that period. “They” are the “new men” in the “postfeminist” context of the politically reactionary 1990s. “They” are the best male friends we’ve got, and “they” are not really what we had hoped for. “They” can circle round women’s studies departments in crisis-struck arts faculties, knowing that here’s one of the few areas of the academy tht is still expanding financially with student enrollment at both undergraduate and graduate levels. “They” play the academic career game with great finesse, knowing the rule about feminist politics of locations and yet ignoring it. “They” know that feminist theory is the last bastion of constructive radical thought amidst the ruins of the postmodern gloom. “They” are conscious of the fact that the debate about modernity and beyond is coextensive with the woman question. Some of them are gay theorists and activists whose political sensibility may be the closest to feminist concerns. Next are heterosexual “ladies men,” whose preoccupation with the feminine shines for its ambiguity. What the heterosexual men are lacking intellectually— the peculiar blindness to sexual difference for which the term sexism is an inadequate assessment— is a reflection on their position in history. The politics of location is just not part of their genealogical legacy. They have not inherited a world of oppression and exclusion based on their sexed corporal being; they do not have the lived experience of oppression because of their sex. Thus most of them fail to grasp the specificity of feminism in terms of its articulation of theory and practice, of thought and life. Maybe they have no alternative. It must be very uncomfortable to be a male, white, middle-class, heterosexual intellectual at a time in history when so many minorities and oppressed groups are speaking up for themselves; a time when the hegemony of the white knowing subject is crumbling. Lacking the historical experience of oppression on the basis of sex, they paradoxically lack a minus. Lacking the lack, they cannot participate in the great ferment of ideas that is shaking up Western culture: it must be very painful, indeed, to have no option other than being the empirical referent of the historical oppressor of women, asked to account for his atrocities. The problem, in my perspective, is that the exclusion of women and the denigration of the feminine— or of blackness— are not just a small omission that can be fixed with a little good will. Rather, they point to the underlying theme in the textual and historical continuity of masculine self-legitimation and ideal self-projection (Lloyd 1985; Benjamin 1980). It’s on the woman’s body— on her absence, her silence, her disqualification— that phallocentric discourse rests. This sort of “metaphysical cannibalism,” which Ti-Grace Atkinson (1974) analyzed in terms of uterus envy, positions the woman as the silent groundwork of male subjectivity— the condition of possibility for his story. Psychoanalytic theory, of the Freudian or the Lacanian brand, circles around the question of origins— the mother’s body— by elucidating the psychic mechanisms that make the paternal presence, the father’s body, necessary as a figure of authority over her. Following Luce Irigaray, I see psychoanalysis as a patriarchal discourse that apologizes for and provides a political anatomy of metaphysical canni­ balism: the silencing of the powerfulness of the feminine (potentia). Refusing to dissociate the discourse about the feminine, the maternal, from the historical realities of the condition and status of women in Western culture, Irigaray equates the metaphorization of women (the feminine, the maternal) with their victimization or historical oppression. One does not become a member of the dark continent, one is born into it. The question is how to transform this century-old silence into a presence of women as subjects in every aspect of existence. I am sure “they” know this, don’t “they”?

#### Drone operators feminize their targets to justify their execution-

Allinson 12. (Jamie, Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, University of Westminster, International Relations PhD, University of Edinburgh, “Necropolitics of the Cyborg Empire: Rethinking the Drone War,” Millennium Conference, http://millenniumjournal.files.wordpress.

com/2012/10/allinsonmillenium2012necropoliticscyborg-empire.docx)

The particular interlude prompted by the demand for weapons to be seen at 5:18 leads to a highly revealing exchange between the Predator team and the screeners, which is worth quoting at length: ¶ At 0529D the Predator pilot states to the crew ‘does it look like he is ho'n something across his chest. It's what they've been doing here lately, they wrap their \*expletive\* in their man dresses so you can't PID it.’ Then on the radio to [redacted] he says "looks like the dismounted pax on the hilux pickup on the east side is carrying something, but we cannot PID what it is at this time but he is carrying something’. After the Predator crew prompted the twice in mIRC, the screeners call out a possible weapon and then ask the crew to go white hot to get a better look. The response from the sensor operator is ‘white hot is not going to give us anything better, that truck would make a beautiful target’. The Predator pilot then at 0534D made this radio call "All players, all Players from [redacted] from our DGS, the MAM that just mounted the back of the hilux had a possible weapon, read back possible rifle.' During their post strike review, the screeners determined that this was not a weapon. At 0624D the screeners called out a weapon, this the only time that the Screeners called out a weapon without being prompted by the Predator crew. At 0655D, the Predator pilot called [redacted] and told him that the Screeners called out two weapons. The Screeners had not made any call outs of weapons. At 0741 the Predator pilot calls [redacted] and says ‘there's about 6 guys riding in the back of the highlux, so they don't have a lot of room. Potentially could carry a personal weapon on themselves.’¶ A great deal is to be understood about the necropolitical logic at work in the occupation of Afghanistan through this passage. As an indicator of the role of Orientalist fantasy in the tendency of Western militaries to ‘effeminise the men of the [occupied] population through both symbolic and practical emasculation’ the Predator pilot’s characterization of the Afghan man’s clothing is quite stark: ‘their mandresses’. Nor does this phrase refer solely to the Predator pilot’s notion of what men ought to wear (presumably trousers), and the implied denigration of those whose clothing does not meet this norm. It also reveals the drawing of a caesura, a mental and political cordon around those whose actions inherently render them part of the population it is acceptable to put to death.¶ We can consider this act of delineation at the basic level of pronouns. The Predator pilot describes how ‘what *they’ve* [my emphasis] been doing round here lately’ is to ‘wrap their \*expletive\* in their man dresses so you can't PID it’. Before this he asks for confirmation that the man on the screen does indeed look like he is holding something across his chest. Now, it may be objected that ‘they’ is simply a pronoun here⎯which it is, but this usage is in no sense simple. The pilot could have said ‘that’s what the Taliban have been doing round here lately’, or ‘the enemy’ or ‘the insurgents’ or a similar noun. By using ‘they’ the pilot shows that he already considers the man he is looking at to be one of ‘them’, and this ‘they’ have very definite characteristics, culled from the imaginary of what Patrick Porter calls ‘military orientalism’. ‘They’ are effete, exotic, and treacherous in transgression of the gender boundaries by, for example, their wearing ‘mandresses’. Nor is the mandress, however comfortable or stylish it may sound by comparison to US military uniform, a simple piece of clothing. It is itself weaponized, a tool of the MAM’s underhand concealment of the arms he is assumed to bear, and which the action of carrying something across the chest inadvertently reveals.¶ The unspoken frustration behind the Predator pilot’s ascription of a motive to the Afghan man’s concealment of a (non-existent) weapon is doubly instructive. Why do MAMs hold things across their chests and inside their clothes? They do so ‘so you can’t PID it.’ This implies that the pilot believes that the Taliban are manipulating US rules of engagement to the degree that they know what constitutes a positive identification of a weapon for a drone pilot and that they are deliberately preventing this identification, and therefore hampering the use of lethal force against them. The pilot therefore inverts the rules of engagement by evoking the tactical wrapping-up of objects in the ‘mandress’: an Afghan male without a visible weapon thereby becomes grounds for threat.

# 1NR

**The laws of the state are bad – they ignore the individual, conceal pain and suffering and because they give rights they can revoke rights**

**Fellmeth 2k** (Aaron, Int. Rel. @ Yale, Human Rights Quarterly 22(3), p. 666)

The second feminist analytical method is known as "feminist practical reasoning." According to one proponent, such reasoning values individualized fact-finding over bright-line rules, reasoning from context, and accounting for the perspectives of the powerless. 24 Feminist jurisprudence teaches respect for diverse perspectives because feminism itself is an "other" perspective, and it focuses on real-world experiences of women because the abstract theories characteristic of male-dominated economics, sociology, or political science often generalize about social conditions or effects, ignoring gender-based disparities. Most feminists share this inductive, contextual methodology focusing on women's perspectives and experiences. The uniquely "feminist" aspect of feminist practical reasoning is its focus on the excluded "other," not its methodology. 25 Rules are abhorrent per se because they operate deductively and gloss over individual pain**. 26** For example, Katharine Bartlett objects to bright-line laws requir**ing** minors to obtain parental consent before seeking an abortion because of the "actual accounts of the wrenching circumstances" of a minor. 27 Bartlett recognizes the value of rulesas "necessities because we are not always good judges," that is, because sometimes the collective judgment of society is superior to that of many individuals. 28 However, she deplores their unnecessary uniformity, which prevents society from dealing with individual circumstances that may cause needless suffering**.** If nothing is a "given," nothing can be taken away**.**

**No impact to terrorism – too hard to pull off post 9/11, not enough personnel to carry out an attack, too much pressure because of security restrictions**

**Schneier 10**

(Bruce, a security technologist and author of "Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World.", “Opinion: Where Are All the Terrorist Attacks?”, March 2010, <http://www.aolnews.com/opinion/article/opinion-why-arent-there-more-times-square-style-terrorist-attacks/19463843>)

Hard to Pull Off **Terrorism sounds easy**, but the actual attack is the easiest part. **Putting together the people, the plot and the materials is hard. It's hard to sneak terrorists into the U.S. It's hard to grow your own inside the U.S. It's hard to operate; the general population, even the Muslim population, is against you.** Movies and television make terrorist plots look easier than they are. It's hard to hold conspiracies together. It's easy to make a mistake. **Even 9/11, which was planned before the climate of fear that event engendered, just barely succeeded. Today, it's much harder to pull something like that off without slipping up and getting arrested.** Few Terrorists **But even more important than the difficulty of executing a terrorist attack, there aren't a lot of terrorists out there. Al-Qaida isn't a well-organized global organization** with movie-plot-villain capabilities; it's a loose collection of people using the same name. **Despite the post-9/11 rhetoric, there isn't a terrorist cell in every major city. If you think about the major terrorist plots we've foiled in the U.S. -- the JFK bombers, the Fort Dix plotters -- they were mostly** [**amateur terrorist wannabes**](http://www.schneier.com/essay-174.html) **with no connection to any sort of al-Qaida central command, and mostly no ability to effectively carry out the attacks they planned. The successful terrorist attacks** -- the Fort Hood shooter, the guy who flew his plane into the Austin IRS office, the anthrax mailer -- **were largely nut cases operating alone**. Even the unsuccessful shoe bomber, and the equally unsuccessful Christmas Day underwear bomber, had minimal organized help -- and that help originated outside the U.S. **Terrorism doesn't occur without terrorists, and they are far rarer than popular opinion would have it.**

### No Impact ext.

**[1] Zero risk of a terrorist attack, post 9/11 success is impossible; terrorists lack the organization, and U.S. infrastructure and security will mitigate the impact. –That’s Schneier**

#### [2] Best statistical analysis proves the risk of terrorism is low

#### Zenko ‘12

[Micah, Fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the [Council on Foreign Relations](http://www.cfr.org/?cid=oth_partner_site-atlantic-primer_on_airpower-071811%20), and author of Between Threats and War: U.S. Discrete Military Operations in the Post-Cold War World, “Americans Are as Likely to Be Killed by Their Own Furniture as by Terrorism,” http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/06/americans-are-as-likely-to-be-killed-by-their-own-furniture-as-by-terrorism/258156/]

Today, the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) released its 2011 Report on Terrorism. The report offers the U.S. government's best statistical analysis of terrorism trends through its Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS), which compiles and vets open-source information about terrorism--defined by U.S. law as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents." Although I invite you to read the entire thirty-one page report, there are a few points worth highlighting that notably contrast with the conventional narrative of the terrorist threat: "The total number of worldwide attacks in 2011, however, dropped by almost 12 percent from 2010 and nearly 29 percent from 2007." (9) "Attacks by AQ and its affiliates increased by 8 percent from 2010 to 2011. A significant increase in attacks by al-Shabaab, from 401 in 2010 to 544 in 2011, offset a sharp decline in attacks by al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI) and a smaller decline in attacks by al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)." (11) "In cases where the religious affiliation of terrorism casualties could be determined, Muslims suffered between 82 and 97 percent of terrorism-related fatalities over the past five years." (14) Of 978 terrorism-related kidnapping last year, only three hostages were private U.S. citizens, or .003 percent. A private citizen is defined as 'any U.S. citizen not acting in an official capacity on behalf of the U.S. government.' (13, 17) Of the 13,288 people killed by terrorist attacks last year, seventeen were private U.S. citizens, or .001 percent. (17) According to the report, the number of U.S. citizens who died in terrorist attacks increased by two between 2010 and 2011; overall, a comparable number of Americans are crushed to death by their televisions or furniture each year. This is not to diminish the real--albeit shrinking--threat of terrorism, or to minimize the loss and suffering of the 13,000 killed and over 45,000 injured around the world. For Americans, however, it should emphasize that an irrational fear of terrorism is both unwarranted and a poor basis for public policy decisions.

#### The fight against terrorism is a fight against the uncivilized, irrational danger—this justifies endless war and intervention to protect the masculine order

Wilcox 03 [Lauren, PhD in IR @ University of Minnesota, BA @ Macalester College, MA @ London School of Economics, “Security Masculinity: The Gender-Security Nexus”]

These statements give several clues as to the implications of ”barbaric‘ behavior. Terrorists are barbaric and uncivilized, and opposed to democracy. Those who commit evil acts commit attacks against civilization, therefore, being uncivilized is equivalent to being evil. Finally, terrorists fight without rules, they kill innocents and women, and they are cowards, therefore they are barbaric and uncivilized. Overall, the message is clearly that of a dichotomous world, in which there are only two choices; civilization or barbarism, us or them.

In order to understand the significance of the use of the discourse of civilization versus barbarism in the war on terror, a brief history of this discourse is helpful. Applying the label ”barbaric‘ to people from the Middle East, or any non-white peoples is hardly a new historical development. In his book Orientalism˙ Edward Said critiques the discipline of Oriental Studies in the European and American academies for reproducing stereotypes and using their privileged status to create knowledge about people in the Middle East that served to justify and increase their control and domination over these people. 63 Said describes the relationship between West and the Middle East, as seen from the West, —to be one between a strong and a weak partner,“ and adds that, —many terms were used to express the relations…The Oriental is irrational, depraved (fallen), childlike, ”different‘; thus the European is rational, virtuous, mature, ”normal.‘ “64 This relationship is gendered in that ”Orientals‘ are assigned traits associated with femininity and inferiority. This dichotomous relationship is replicated in political discourses as well as in academic and literary circles.

The discourse of civilization/barbarism was used in order to justify colonialism of non-white peoples throughout the world, and has a long history in US foreign history. A people labeled ”uncivilized‘ is considered to be unable to rule themselves, and is need of guidance from more civilized people. The use of force against ”barbarians‘ is also justified.65 Furthermore, the rules of humane and civilized warfare do not apply to wars against ”barbaric‘ peoples. Against this background, the use of the discourse of barbarism can be seen as an attempt to foretell the coming war and to persuade people of the necessity of using force against al-Qaeda and their hosts in Afghanistan. The additional measures of control, surveillance, and detention of Middle Eastern and North African men in the process of securitizing immigration served to harass, demean and subordinate this ”inferior‘ masculinity, contributing to the constructing of the hegemonic masculinity of American men. The ”special‘ registration requirements for the National Security Entry-Exit System is evidence of the gendered inside/outside, us/them distinction in regards to national identity. This program, instituted as part of the securitization of immigration, serves to support the construction and maintenance of the current articulation of hegemonic masculinity, which differentiates American men as superior to men in the Middle East. The special registration requires that men and boys over the age of fifteen with non-immigrant visas from countries in the Middle East, Northern Africa, countries with large Muslim populations such as Indonesia and Pakistan, and an outlier, North Korea, be interviewed and have their whereabouts tracked by the INS.66 These persons will be finger printed and photographed, with their fingerprints matched against fingerprints of known or suspected terrorists and used by law enforcement. They are also required to submit personal contact information, and are required to notify the Attorney General when the change addresses. These measures are in addition to the detention and questioning of thousands of men of Arab or Muslim background after the September 11 that tacks, some allegedly detained without access to attorneys or proper food.67 The INS has also recently changed its policy on asylum, as people seeking asylum from thirty-three countries, mostly in the Middle East, are now being detained pending the processing of their applications, where previously they have been released.68 By concentrating on men as the ”outsiders‘ Middle Eastern men specifically service not only as the ”other‘ that American identity is contrasted again, but a feminized ”other‘ that American masculinity is defined against.

#### The state uses the public and private spheres as promotions for masculine IR

Peterson 04 [V. Spike: associate professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Arizona (Feminist Theories Within, Invisible To, and Beyond IR, Winter/Spring 2004) http://www.watsoninstitute.org/bjwa/archive/10.2/Feminist%20Theory/Peterson.pdf]

Given the assumption (since Aristotle) that public and private are internal to states, and the assumption that IR is about relations among, not within, states, what relevance does the dichotomy have to IR? On the one hand, as a foundational dichotomy in Western thought, public and private shape our discourse generally, and IR is no exception. And insofar as states are central to the discourse of IR, reference to them incorporates, implicitly and explicitly, constructions of public and private. On the other hand, I make two related points regarding the dichotomy as ideological. First, one powerful effect of foundational dichotomies is that they are typically deployed as abstractions (disembedded from context) even as they carry ideological force by valorizing one term at the expense of the other. Second, feminists argue that the dichotomy of public and private is historically and conceptually gendered; it privileges the public sphere as masculine. Abstract references to public and private then serve to privilege and legitimize that which is associated with the masculine over that which is associated with the feminine, and this has material effects. With these brief points in mind, I offer a reading of two variants of public and private in relation to conventional IR discourse. In both variants, the state/government constitutes the public and is associated with masculine characteristics of politics, reason, order, and autonomy. The first variant takes the territorial state as given and looks inward. This version resembles Aristotle’s dichotomy, with the state/politics as the public distinguished from private sphere activities and relationships, cast as domestic.

**Status quo measures already neutralized the threat**

Stratfor 8, (“Busting the Anthrax Myth,” July 30, <http://www.stratfor.com/print/120756>)

Aum Shinrikyo’s team of highly trained scientists worked under ideal conditions in a first-world country with a virtually unlimited budget. They were able to travel the world in search of deadly organisms and even received technical advice from former Soviet scientists. The team worked in large, modern laboratory facilities to produce substantial quantities of biological weapons. They were able to operate these facilities inside industrial parks and openly order the large quantities of laboratory equipment they required. Yet, in spite of the millions of dollars the group spent on its biological weapons program — and the lack of any meaningful interference from the Japanese government — Aum still experienced problems in creating virulent biological agents and also found it difficult to dispense those agents effectively. Today, al Qaeda finds itself operating in a very different environment than that experienced by Aum Shinrikyo in 1993. At that time, nobody was looking for Aum or its biological and chemical weapons program. By contrast, since the Sept. 11 attacks, the United States and its allies have actively pursued al Qaeda leaders and sought to dismantle and defang the organization. The United States and its allies have focused a considerable amount of resources in tracking and disassembling al Qaeda’s chemical and biological warfare efforts. The al Qaeda network has had millions of dollars of its assets seized in a number of countries, and it no longer has the safe haven of Afghanistan from which to operate. The chemical and biological facilities the group established in the 1990s in Afghanistan — such as the Deronta training camp, where cyanide and other toxins were used to kill dogs, and a crude anthrax production facility in Kandahar — have been found and destroyed by U.S. troops. Operating in the badlands along the Pakistani-Afghan border, al Qaeda cannot easily build large modern factories capable of producing large quantities of agents or toxins. Such fixed facilities are expensive and consume a lot of resources. Even if al Qaeda had the spare capacity to invest in such facilities, the fixed nature of them means that they could be compromised and quickly destroyed by the United States. If al Qaeda could somehow create and hide a fixed biological weapons facility in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas or North-West Frontier Province, it would still face the daunting task of transporting large quantities of biological agents from the Pakistani badlands to targets in the United States or Europe. Al Qaeda operatives certainly can create and transport small quantities of these compounds, but not enough to wreak the kind of massive damage it desires. Al Qaeda’s lead chemical and biological weapons expert, Midhat Mursi al-Sayid Umar, also known as Abu Khabab al-Masri, was reportedly killed on July 28, 2008, by a U.S. missile strike on his home in Pakistan. Al-Sayid, who had a $5 million dollar bounty on his head, was initially reported to have been one of those killed in the January 2006 strike in Damadola [9]. If he was indeed killed, his death should be another significant blow to the group’s biological warfare efforts. Of course, we must recognize that the jihadist threat goes just beyond the al Qaeda core. As we have been writing for several years now, al Qaeda has undergone a metamorphosis [10] from a smaller core group of professional operatives into an operational model that encourages independent grassroots jihadists to conduct attacks. The core al Qaeda group, through men like al-Sayid, has published manuals in hard copy and on the Internet that provide instructions on how to manufacture rudimentary biological weapons. It is our belief that independent jihadist cells and lone-wolf jihadists will almost certainly attempt to brew up some of the recipes from the al Qaeda cookbook. There also exists a very real threat that a jihadist sympathizer could obtain a small quantity of deadly biological organisms by infiltrating a research facility. This means that we likely will see some limited attempts at employing biological weapons. That does not mean, however, that such attacks will be large-scale or create mass casualties.

**No one will use bioweapons**

**Palmquist 2008** (Matt, “How and why the threat of bioterrorism has been so greatly exaggerated.” 5-19-08. http://www.miller-mccune.com/politics/bioterror-in-context-355)

Clark: The more I looked into it, I thought, "Jeez, what are these guys talking about?" What are the odds that a terrorist group, no matter how well financed, would be able to create a bioterror weapon? I began looking into what it takes to really make a successful bioterrorism agent, and I just became very skeptical of this whole thing. The (United States ) military gave up bioweapons 30 years ago. They're too undependable; they're too hard to use; they're too hard to make. Then I started checking around, and I found there's a whole literature out there of people who've been screaming for years that this whole bioterrorism thing is really overblown; it's not practical; it's never going to work. Aum Shinrikyo couldn't get it to work; those guys put millions and millions of dollars into it. So you think of a bunch of guys sitting in a cave in Afghanistan — they're sure as hell not going to do it. Is any government going to do it? No. So that made me very skeptical, and I went back to Oxford and said, "This whole thing's a crock." And they said, "But that's even more interesting!" M-M: Thus the question mark at the end of the title, Bracing for Armageddon? Clark: Yeah, exactly. Scientifically, it is a crock. And this really verges into the political, but we've spent $50 billion on it. So Oxford paid for me to take a trip back East and talk to a bunch of these voices that haven't been heard and interview them. M-M: How much research was involved? Clark: A couple of years. The science is pretty straightforward on paper. The kind of an organization you'd have to put together, with the varying expertise that is required to make one of these things and deploy it, takes a whole group of people with all kinds of different skills, from engineers to meteorologists. That's just not going to happen. You can run an airplane into an office tower, and you get instant everything you could ever possibly hope for. So why would anybody sit around for years and years? The Aum Shinrikyo guys tried for six, seven years and couldn't get it to work. And a lot of them had Ph.D.s.

### FireBreaks

#### Restricting Obama’s war powers fits perfectly with his presidential narrative of oscillations between hard power and soft rhetoric – it does nothing to rupture the narrative of expansionist masculinity which encodes the American Presidency

Landreau 2011 – John C, Ph.D. from Princeton University. Current Professor at TCNJ in Women’s and Gender Studies. *Obamas My Dad: Mixed Race Suspects, Political Anxiety and the New Imperialism,* The Third Space – a journal in feminist theory & culture, Vol 10. No. 1<http://www.thirdspace.ca/journal/article/viewArticle/landreau/408>

More than a few scholars have emphasized the democratic and dialogic character of President Barack Obama's rhetoric, especially in contrast to that of his main rivals in the 2008 presidential campaign (Ivie and Giner, Murphy, Rowland and Jones). While this characterization has merit in some areas, Obama's rhetoric is neither dialogic nor democratizing when he speaks about national security. On issues of national security, both during the campaign and after becoming president, Obama favours the standard-issue idiom of militarism and American exceptionalism that has characterized the rhetoric of presidents from both parties since World War II.[[1]](http://www.thirdspace.ca/journal/article/viewArticle/landreau/408#1) Indeed, his December 2009 decision to escalate military violence in Afghanistan is testimony to the power of the dominant paradigms of national security thinking in his rhetoric and his policies. Bonnie Mann argues that the suasive force of national security common sense in the United States is substantially provided by "the style of national manhood" (180). By style, Mann refers to the "aesthetic" of masculinity that is "[...]carried by stories and images more than by argument or reason" and that functions to orient our sense of what is legitimate, normal and right (and their opposites). The style of national manhood is hinged to broader political styles so that, for example, support for war becomes "[...]an intentional posture lived viscerally, a matter of who we are as a nation rather than a thoughtful commitment to the justice of a cause" (180). In a similar vein, this paper argues that Obama's national security rhetoric is based upon, and oriented by, the logic of American masculinity, and more specifically by the forms of presidential masculinity that are imbricated with national security thinking in our political culture. To make this argument, I begin with an analysis of the apparent differences between the national security rhetoric and policies of George W. Bush and those of Barack Obama. This is important because much of Obama's success in the 2008 electoral campaign was due to his promise of a new beginning in our approach to terrorism and security (Bostdorff). Also, many pundits and critics have praised his rhetoric in this arena in terms of a dramatic contrast between the two presidents, referring to Obama's appeals to soft rather than hard power, and to his performance of a more democratic, less authoritarian leadership style in the global community (Bostdorff, Ivie and Giner, Landreau). My argument swims against this current in that I characterize both Obama's national security policies, and his performance of presidential masculinity, in a line of continuity with Bush. I substantiate this conclusion with a close analysis of three of Obama's speeches. First, I look at Obama's speech in acceptance of the Democratic Nomination in August, 2008. This speech is important because it reveals a great deal about the gravitational force of masculinity in national security rhetoric as Obama shifts his attention from the Democratic primary against a female candidate who was too militaristic for Democratic voters, to the general election campaign against a male candidate with especially strong national security credentials. Then, I turn to the two major speeches in December 2009 in which Obama justifies and explains the aggressive use of U.S. military violence in the Middle East: these are the speech announcing the escalation of the war in Afghanistan at West Point, and the speech in acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize. Obama as the anti-Bush: the Rhetoric of a New Beginning Both during his campaign, and in his presidential inauguration speech, Barack Obama promised a "new beginning" in American foreign and national security policy (especially in relation to the Middle East) that would both keep us safe from enemies and "restore our moral standing" (Obama, Acceptance). In particular, this new beginning promised to distance U.S. foreign policy from the grim (and largely illegal) features of the Bush administration's "war on terror" such as the executive sanctioning of the torture of prisoners, the maintenance of a gulag of foreign detention centres where prisoners could be treated outside the guidelines of U.S. and international law, and illegal secret initiatives such as the program to assassinate Al-Qaeda operatives directed by Vice President Cheney (Mazzetti and Shane). In his first day in the White House, on January 22, 2009, Obama issued three executive orders that followed through on this promise.[[2]](http://www.thirdspace.ca/journal/article/viewArticle/landreau/408#2) In addition to these early executive orders, in the days and months following his election Obama showed great rhetorical sensitivity to the wide-spread negative perception in the Middle East of U.S. imperial behavior and designs, its uncritical support of Israel, and its disregard for civilian casualties and for the civil rights of prisoners. In an effort to reverse the tide of anti-American feeling, Obama's first post-inaugural interview was given to Hisham Melhem of Al Arabiya TV news (Interview). This was followed in April and May by major addresses in Ankara and Cairo whose primary intended audience was Middle Eastern and, more broadly, Islamic. Both of these speeches articulate a new rhetoric of hope for U.S.-Middle Eastern relations. In the speech to the Turkish parliament, for example, Obama declares: I [...] want to be clear that America's relationship with the Muslim community, the Muslim world, cannot, and will not, just be based upon opposition to terrorism. We seek broader engagement based on mutual interest and mutual respect. We will listen carefully, we will bridge misunderstandings, and we will seek common ground. We will be respectful, even when we do not agree [...]. (para. 38) Hope for a new era of U.S Middle East relations is here embodied by an attitude of respect, by a willingness to negotiate differences and find areas of mutual interest, and by an explicit criticism of the unilateral and monologic focus of the Bush administration on the 'war on terror'. This apparent change in direction in national security and foreign policy seems to be characterized by an alternate version of presidential masculinity and by an alternate telling of the myth of American exceptionalism. Many have commented on the muscular character of George W. Bush's rhetoric of war and national security. Indeed, his policies in what he called the 'war on terror' depended almost exclusively on what Joseph Nye famously called "hard power", and were justified rhetorically by a conspicuously militarist and masculinist narrative about America's role in world history and politics.[[3]](http://www.thirdspace.ca/journal/article/viewArticle/landreau/408#3) In contrast to the "[...] stern projection of a tough national persona" (Ivie and Giner 288) in Bush's rhetoric and policies, Obama seems to articulate a gentler, more reasoned approach to national security and terrorism that includes the use of 'hard' military power but also depends importantly on 'soft' power in the form of diplomacy, international cooperation, and an emphasis on human rights, economic stability and political freedom. Ivie and Giner argue that the success of Obama's rhetorical appeal to 'soft' power during the 2008 presidential campaign was due to his ability to harness and resignify the deeply-resonant myth of American exceptionalism for a more democratic and community-minded projection of America's role in world affairs. In Obama's version of national security, they write: A less tragic sense of order mandated a reduced sense of guilt and thereby decreased the need for redemption via the cult of killing. This expression of national mission in more democratic and practical terms indicated, at least "logologically," the possibility of aligning public culture with a more global and constructive perspective on matters of national security. It revealed the possibility of a founding myth reformed to relax the lethal grip of the Evil One on the conscience of a nation that might do more good in the world if it were burdened less by tragic guilt.[[4]](http://www.thirdspace.ca/journal/article/viewArticle/landreau/408#4) (296) This conclusion requires a retrospective reassessment in the light of Obama's decision to escalate the war in Afghanistan. How do we reconcile Obama's seemingly dramatic shift from progressive presidential candidate who was proud to have opposed the war in Iraq from the beginning, and who abolished the use of torture and illegal detention in his first day in office, to the president who in December 2009 made the decision to pursue and significantly escalate military violence in Afghanistan? How do we reconcile Obama's seemingly contradictory use of both the soft rhetoric of hope and diplomacy and the hard rhetoric of fear and military violence in his national security statements and speeches? In the analysis that follows I argue that while Obama at times articulates a softer version of foreign policy, and seems to perform a softer, more inclusive presidential masculinity in the area of global politics and terrorism, this does not fundamentally signify a different orientation to national security as some have argued. I emphasize how Obama's rhetoric and policies fall within the standard rhetorical oscillations that constitute the myth of American exceptionalism and presidential masculinity, and that those oscillations are principally and most significantly oriented by the more militarist and conventionally masculinist versions of the myth. Obama's speech at the Democratic National Convention in August 2008 marks the formal shift of his campaign focus from Democratic Party voters towards a national audience, and from his rivalry with Hillary Clinton to a campaign against John McCain. In terms of Obama's national security rhetoric, this is a fascinating moment because, in this new broader context, he makes an attitudinal shift to a more militarized and masculinized mode of speech. In fact, Obama's performance of soft masculinity on issues of national security during the primary campaign was an opportune product of the moment that did not reflect the principal orientation of his thinking.[[5]](http://www.thirdspace.ca/journal/article/viewArticle/landreau/408#5) This is quite clear in the nomination speech as he shifts his campaign towards a more conservative national audience, and directs his attention from a female rival to a male rival with military credentials. Obama's first sentence about foreign policy in the nomination speech concerns his own stature and ability to lead American troops into battle, and to battle John McCain for the position of commander in chief. "If John McCain wants to have a debate about who has the temperament and judgment to serve as the next commander-in-chief, that's a debate I'm ready to have." (para. 79) What is most interesting about this lead-in to the topic of national security, terrorism, and foreign policy is that its main rhetorical function is to emphasize Obama's masculine capability. It does this by declaring his presidential mettle, but also through the performance of an 'I dare you' challenge to his political adversary. It seems to say, 'if you want to fight, then let's fight. Bring it on!' Why does Obama begin this section of the speech with a flexing of muscle? In part, it has to do with the histrionics of presidential campaigns, and in this particular campaign with the anticipated challenge to Obama's military masculinity from John McCain, a candidate with a powerful story of military bravery and heroism to his credit. At the same time, the foregrounding of presidential masculinity in terms of the resolve and capacity to lead the armed forces into battle is nothing unusual. The most significant human protagonist in the narrative of American exceptionalism is almost always the figure of the president. This is especially true in times of danger, crisis or war. He is the commander in chief of the armed forces. To him goes the job of protecting the national family from outside threats and danger. To do this effectively, he must be brave, decisive and rational. He cannot afford to be feminized by being overly emotional or sympathetic to others; he cannot succumb to doubts, or become scared to act (Cohn, Cuordileone, Hopper, Lakoff, Sylvester, Tickner, Young). It is to this mythos that Obama's beginning performance of masculinity in the speech belongs. In the new context of a national audience, it stands out as a deeply-felt and vigorously articulated orientation towards national security. After this initial show of male plumage, Obama continues the foreign policy section of the nomination speech by contrasting his youthful masculinity to McCain's elderly, bumbling masculinity. For -- while Senator McCain was turning his sights to Iraq just days after 9/11, I stood up and opposed this war, knowing that it would distract us from the real threats that we face. When John McCain said we could just muddle through in Afghanistan, I argued for more resources and more troops to finish the fight against the terrorists who actually attacked us on 9/11, and made clear that we must take out Osama bin Laden and his lieutenants if we have them in our sights. (para. 80-81) While McCain turns his sights away from the target, Obama stands up. While McCain muddles, Obama works to finish the fight and "take out" bin Laden if he's "in our sights." In the subtly crafted metaphor of aiming a gun at an enemy that organizes the passage, McCain appears as a distracted old soldier who aims at the wrong target and is generally confused. In contrast, vigorous and youthful, Obama stands up purposely, aims at the target, and fires. These metaphors all work to highlight the differences between McCain and Obama in terms of their embodiment of a properly militarized masculinity: which candidate can stand up, correctly identify the enemy, and fire the necessary shots to kill him. Obama criticizes McCain for standing alone in "stubborn refusal" to recognize the realities of the conflict (that it is with al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, not in Iraq), and therefore for lacking judgment. This lack of judgment is also narrated in terms of a contrast between a youthful and an aging masculinity: "We need a president who can face the threats of the future, not keep grasping at the ideas of the past." (para. 84) Obama declares. The contrast between a man who grasps at the past and one who "faces" the future is coded with messages about age and masculinity: youthful, confident stepping forward into the future versus old, unsteady back-stepping towards the past. At stake in this contrast is which strategy will "defeat" the enemy. "You don't defeat -- you don't defeat a terrorist network that operates in 80 countries by occupying Iraq", (para. 85) Obama argues. These are enemies who must be killed in order to protect the nation. To do this requires a commander-in-chief with masculine resolve and courage who can lead us into battle. This is not work for touchy-feely idealists who want to understand, communicate, and negotiate. And Republicans, Obama points out proudly, are not the only ones with the proper testicular size to lead the army into battle: "We are the party of Roosevelt. We are the party of Kennedy. So don't tell me that Democrats won't defend this country. Don't tell me that Democrats won't keep us safe." (para. 87) As in his opening statement, part of the effectiveness of these lines is their performance of a kind of "I'm up to the challenge masculinity" that talks tough, is aggressive with challengers ("don't tell me"), and does not back down. The rhetoric of American exceptionalism and presidential masculinity foregrounded here in the nomination clearly constitutes the dominant note of continuity in Obama's national security thinking. This is most evident in his two speeches from December 2009 in which he justifies his decision to escalate the war in Afghanistan as the following discussion will show. Obama's December 2009 speech at West Point argues for the strategic necessity and ethical correctness of increased war effort in Afghanistan on the basis of history. The history begins with the 19 Al Qaeda operatives who committed the terrorist atrocities on 9/11 and moves quickly to focus on the Taliban who provided them with a secure base from which to operate. After 9/11, as Obama tells the story, we made great military inroads against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, but then mistakenly turned our attention to Iraq. This provided an opening for the Taliban, and for Al Qaeda, who are now coming back into Afghanistan from Pakistan. The Afghan government cannot fight them off and therefore, he says, summing it all up: "In short, the status quo is not sustainable" (para. 12). How does a rudimentary history like this serve as an explanation or justification for war? What is the mediating logic? The over-simplification of contemporary U.S and Afghan history entailed in this schematic narrative is head-spinning.[[6]](http://www.thirdspace.ca/journal/article/viewArticle/landreau/408#6) But, even putting that aside, if one accepts the history at face value, it is still the case that our commitment to war is left unexplained and unjustified by the narrative. The history begins with 19 terrorists, and ends with the large-scale military action on the part of the United States. Should it not take a lot more than saying, 'well, the Taliban are gaining momentum and, remember, they are best friends with Al Qaeda' to justify the deployment of 100,000 U.S. troops, predator drones strikes all over northern Pakistan and eastern Afghanistan, full involvement of the CIA, major flows of capital and materiel, and huge contracts with private military contractors like XE Services (aka Blackwater)? Obama's historical narrative simply does not add up to a political argument for this kind of war, and for this kind of outlay of capital. As a justification for war, it seems, rather, to be structured like a myth in the sense that Roland Barthes gave the word. Myth, according to Barthes, is paradoxically effective because, formally, it works like an alibi. It is an explanation based on an absence of evidence and meaning rather than its presence. In an alibi (the accused was absent not present at the scene) the meaning and the evidence are always elsewhere (121-127). Obama's narrative amounts to a mythological explanation for war in the sense that its significance lies not in the history itself but in the formal seriousness of a president telling a story to justify war. That is, its significance lies in the rhetorical gesture that serves to remind the audience of the president's authority as commander in chief and of his role to defend the nation from harm. By telling this story the president in effect quotes an array of motives, intentions, plot sequences and characters that are formally full even if their content in this instance is misleading or empty. To paraphrase Hayden White, in this case the content is the form. Here, the details of the story of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan are significant to the extent that they play a role in a larger narrative already familiar to the American audience: the Unites States stands for peace and prosperity, freedom and democracy but sometimes it is attacked by evil enemies whose irrational desire is to destroy all that is good. In that circumstance, the president must protect the national family through the use of military violence. War is the best and, in fact, the only way to make ourselves secure. Following this schematic historical narrative with which he begins the West Point speech, Obama reassures the audience that his final decision to escalate the war was taken only after a serious and difficult deliberative process. This process, he says, "has allowed me to ask the hard questions, and to explore all the different options, along with my national security team, our military and civilian leadership in Afghanistan, and our key partners. And given the stakes involved, I owed the American people -- and our troops -- no less." (para. 13) The image of the president very seriously asking questions, exploring options, and consulting experts is one intended to produce a sense of citizen confidence both in the decision and in the decider (as George W. Bush famously called himself) again without revealing any of the details or particulars that constitute the decision. The rhetorical appeal here is essentially charismatic and depends on thick cultural associations with the president as benevolent paternal authority, and as rational but determined protector of the nation. The tone of the passage is that of a father reassuring his family that the big decision he has made today was made with great care, and with their communal welfare in mind. Obama's stress on his careful deliberation process but not on the content of the deliberation is reminiscent of Iris Marion Young's emphasis on the "logic of masculinist protection" in national security thinking. This is a logic that connects the protective role of the father in the patriarchal family with the role of commander in chief. In both cases, she argues that one of the prices exacted by benevolent masculinist protection is that the protected woman/feminized citizen must concede "critical distance from decision-making autonomy." (120). In other words, if the fatherly president's allegiance to citizens and soldiers is expressed in the mindfulness with which he makes communal decisions of this magnitude, then it is equally true that our allegiance to the father-president is expressed in our acceptance of his authority and judgment to do what is best for us in these circumstances. The allegiance to the father quickly becomes the measure of our patriotism. As a rhetorical strategy, then, Obama's description of the seriousness of his decision-making process serves to legitimate his decision to escalate war through an appeal to an image of protective presidential masculinity. This appeal interpellates the audience in the role of a complicit, feminized citizenry that needs such fatherly protection.[[7]](http://www.thirdspace.ca/journal/article/viewArticle/landreau/408#7) After the scant historical review, and a summary of where we are and why we are obliged to go to war, Obama devotes a good portion of the West Point speech to making a series of sequential points, statements of fact, and reasoned arguments. For example, he gives three specific goals for the Afghan intervention, and outlines how those goals will be achieved and how it will all be paid for. He also identifies three possible objections to the escalation and gives reasoned arguments for why these criticisms are incorrect. In sum, he says "As President, I refuse to set goals that go beyond our responsibility, our means, or our interests." (para. 37).As feminist International Relations scholars have argued, to talk about war in rationalist terms as Obama does here tends to divert attention from the cruelties of war, and to imagine the truth of war "abstracted from bodies" (Ruddick 132). It becomes difficult, in this context, to focus on, or give weight to, the terrible details of war, and in particular to the death and destruction that modern wars exact mostly from civilians not soldiers.[[8]](http://www.thirdspace.ca/journal/article/viewArticle/landreau/408#8) As a rhetorical performance, the description of war in terms of rational sequences and formulas also tends to give authority to the rhetorician himself by distancing him from feminized forms of emotionality or care work (Cohn). Obama ends his speech with the conclusion that presidential war speeches commonly have: an eloquent and solemn call to unity and patriotism. "Now, let me be clear: None of this will be easy. The struggle against violent extremism will not be finished quickly, and it extends well beyond Afghanistan and Pakistan. It will be an enduring test of our free society, and our leadership in the world." (para. 41) The logic of a bond between our free society and our leadership in the world is presupposed rather than described or explained. Like all heroes, the hero of the exceptionalist narrative faces a test. In this instance, he is us, and our essential quality of being a free society is linked to our dominance in the world. Since the days of Franklin Roosevelt, and the service and sacrifice of our grandparents and great-grandparents, our country has borne a special burden in global affairs. We have spilled American blood in many countries on multiple continents.We have spent our revenue to help others rebuild from rubble and develop their own economies. We have joined with others to develop an architecture of institutions -- from the United Nations to NATO to the World Bank -- that provide for the common security and prosperity of human beings. We have not always been thanked for these efforts, and we have at times made mistakes. But more than any other nation, the United States of America has underwritten global security for over six decades -- a time that, for all its problems, has seen walls come down, and markets open, and billions lifted from poverty, unparalleled scientific progress and advancing frontiers of human liberty. For unlike the great powers of old, we have not sought world domination.Our union was founded in resistance to oppression. We do not seek to occupy other nations. We will not claim another nation's resources or target other peoples because their faith or ethnicity is different from ours. What we have fought for -- what we continue to fight for -- is a better future for our children and grandchildren. And we believe that their lives will be better if other peoples' children and grandchildren can live in freedom and access opportunity (para. 47-49). Unlike other world powers, we are benevolent, seeking only that which will make the world a better place. We are, that is to say, a world power but not a world empire. Our history shows this: our military violence and our leadership have underwritten global security for over sixty years. Strangely, though, our fatherly sacrifice to protect the world from harm is sometimes misunderstood, and "we have not always been thanked for our efforts." Who are the unthankful and what is their story? In the standard-issue exceptionalist narrative, they are the enemies of freedom, the sowers of chaos, and the ideologically possessed. Obama certainly believes this. At the same time, the statement that "we have not always been thanked for our efforts" also expresses a deep anxiety about the details and the stories that are erased by the great father's version of history. The Nobel Prize acceptance speech, given just nine days after Obama's announcement of the escalation of the war in Afghanistan, provides a fascinating expansion of the plot of "American as good vs. foreign as evil" that informs the narrative justification for war in the West Point speech. In this speech, Obama contextualizes both American exceptionalism in general, and his specific decision to expand the war in Afghanistan, in a sweeping historical narrative of global progress. "At the dawn of history," Obama declares, "war was routinely pursued between tribes and peoples quite simply as a way of 'seeking power and settling disputes." (para. 6) Later, as "man" progressed, legal and diplomatic efforts were made in an attempt to regulate war and the way it was pursued. Obama invokes just war theory citing it as one of the principle ways in which humans have tried to regulate and civilize war. In Obama's narrative, the United States is located at the upper end of this historical progression because it is the United States that has provided the leadership to produce the global "architecture" of peace in the form of the United Nations, support for human rights, nuclear arms reductions, and so on. Elaborating on the schematic history of the United States that appeared in the West Point speech, Obama says The United States of America has helped underwrite global security for more than six decades with the blood of our citizens and the strength of our arms. The service and sacrifice of our men and women in uniform has promoted peace and prosperity from Germany to Korea, and enabled democracy to take hold in places like the Balkans. We have borne this burden not because we seek to impose our will. We have done so out of enlightened self-interest -- because we seek a better future for our children and grandchildren, and we believe that their lives will be better if others' children and grandchildren can live in freedom and prosperity (para. 18). J. Ann Tickner argues that the idea of enlightened self interest corresponds to a masculinist model of international relations in which states are systematic and instrumental they are competitive "profit maximizers that pursue power and autonomy in an anarchic world system

."(52) In this context, if international cooperation exists, it is explained not in terms of community or an interdependent notion of security and welfare, but rather in terms of rational choice and enlightened self-interest. Here, in Obama's version, we shoulder the burden of world peace and prosperity both heroically (with American blood and military power) but also as rational actors. We act not as an imperial power, but as a benign power exercising rational choices in a dangerous world in order to protect our interests. By virtue of the incantatory power of the exceptionalist narrative, our interests are identical with democratic values and the cause of economic justice. The awkward context of the Nobel Prize speech both clarifies and complicates Obama's justification of war. While acknowledging the "moral force" of the theory of non-violence, he also argues that "evil does exist in the world" and that a realist assessment of the world "as it is" sometimes requires violence. This part of the speech is quite subtle, shuttling back and forth between the recognition that war is terrible and the insistence that it is sometimes necessary. The notion that war is sometimes just and sometimes necessary for building peace is modified throughout with an appeal to "responsibility" and to the rational, measured use of military violence. Obama argues that "all responsible nations must embrace the role that militaries with a clear mandate can play to keep the peace." (para. 26) The rationalist tone of responsibility and militaries with clear mandates is matched by Obama's framing of the philosophical question of war and peace as a matter of human imperfection. The ideals of peace are beautiful, but in the world as it is human beings are not perfect. They sometimes act unaccountably and irresponsibly. And sometimes they must be stopped from perpetrating evil. At the end of the speech, Obama signals what for him is the chief human imperfection that is at the root of so much of the world's violence. He says, As the world grows smaller, you might think it would be easier for human beings to recognize how similar we are; to understand that we're all basically seeking the same things; that we all hope for the chance to live out our lives with some measure of happiness and fulfillment for ourselves and our families. And yet somehow, given the dizzying pace of globalization, the cultural leveling of modernity, it perhaps comes as no surprise that people fear the loss of what they cherish in their particular identities -- their race, their tribe, and perhaps most powerfully their religion. In some places, this fear has led to conflict. At times, it even feels like we're moving backwards. We see it in the Middle East, as the conflict between Arabs and Jews seems to harden. We see it in nations that are torn asunder by tribal lines. And most dangerously, we see it in the way that religion is used to justify the murder of innocents by those who have distorted and defiled the great religion of Islam, and who attacked my country from Afghanistan. These extremists are not the first to kill in the name of God; the cruelties of the Crusades are amply recorded. But they remind us that no Holy War can ever be a just war (para. 47-49). In the context of globalization, what jams the machine is fear of loss of identity. This fear also gets in the way of our universal human aspirations for peace and prosperity. The most notable example of this kind of fear is, of course, the terrorism practiced by al Qaeda. This is a fear underwritten by megalomania: the idea that violence is mandated by God. What is striking about this passage is that it plots opposition to globalization as fear of change, almost as a kind of primitive or childish clinging to identity in a world whose universal characteristics are evident. But can this be the whole story? Can one explain the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, as Obama appears to do here, as irrational fear of loss of identity? Is opposition to capitalist globalization American-style, and under the paternal arm of American power, always and everywhere a form of childishness or partial vision? In his concluding comments, Obama quotes Martin Luther King's 1964 Nobel Prize acceptance speech in which he talks about the moral necessity of striving for what ought to be rather than accepting things as they are. This is an eloquent but highly impertinent frame for the speech. In his Nobel address, King soundly rejects those versions of history organized around notions of necessary violence. Accepting the prize on behalf of the entire civil rights movement, King says: After contemplation, I conclude that this award which I receive on behalf of that movement is a profound recognition that nonviolence is the answer to the crucial political and moral question of our time - the need for man to overcome oppression and violence without resorting to violence and oppression. Civilization and violence are antithetical concepts. Negroes of the United States, following the people of India, have demonstrated that nonviolence is not sterile passivity, but a powerful moral force which makes for social transformation. Sooner or later all the people of the world will have to discover a way to live together in peace, and thereby transform this pending cosmic elegy into a creative psalm of brotherhood. If this is to be achieved, man must evolve for all human conflict a method which rejects revenge, aggression and retaliation. The foundation of such a method is love (para. 4). King clearly rejects the idea that civilization sometimes requires violence, or that violence can sometimes be just or moral. Love, in King's terms, is antithetical to the discourse of innocence, guilt, power and violence that constitutes the narrative of American exceptionalism. Instead, King's ethic of love is consonant with Judith Butler's critique of violence: The violent response is the one that does not ask, and does not seek to know. It wants to shore up what it knows, to expunge what threatens it with not-knowing, what forces it to reconsider the presuppositions of its world, their contingency, their malleability. The nonviolent response lives with its unknowingness about the Other in the face of the Other, since sustaining the bond that the question opens is finally more valuable than knowing in advance what holds us in common, as if we already have all the resources we need to know what defines the human, what its future life might be (35). This is precisely what is wrong with the narrative of American exceptionalism, and with Obama's obligation to it. A story whose plot is organized entirely around the character of its hero does not seek to know. It is narcissistic. It shores up what it knows in fear of the Other, and in this gesture reconfirms that its view of the world is the truth. Obama seems oblivious to the contradictions in his assertion of American power as he struggles here to articulate the oxymoron of peace through war. In the end, what "makes sense" in his justification for war is the cultural and political sense that adheres to the image of embodied presidential masculinity, and to his military leadership performed in patriotic service to America's heroic global mission.

#### The rhetoric of war masks the ongoing violence committed against women’s bodies- we must redefine “war” versus “peace”

Ray 1997

[E. Ray “The Shame of it: gender-based terrorism in the former Yugoslavia and the failureof international human rights law to comprehend the injuries.” The American University Law Review. Vol 46. ]

In order to reach all of the violence perpetrated against the women of the former Yugoslavia that is not committed by soldiers or other officials of the state, human rights law must move beyond its artificially constructed barriers between "public" and "private" actions: A feminist perspective on human rights would require a rethinking of the notions of imputability and state responsibility and in this sense would challenge the most basic assumptions of international law. If violence against women were considered by the international legal system to be as shocking as violence against people for their political ideas, women would have considerable support in their struggle.... The assumption that underlies all law, including international human rights law, is that the public/private distinction is real: human society, human lives can be separated into two distinct spheres. This division, however, is an ideological construct rationalizing the exclusion of women from the sources of power. 2 6 The international community must recognize that violence against women is always political, regardless of where it occurs, because it affects the way women view themselves and their role in the world, as well as the lives they lead in the so-called public sphere. 2 6 ' When women are silenced within the family, their silence is not restricted to the private realm, but rather affects their voice in the public realm as well, often assuring their silence in any environment. 262 For women in the former Yugoslavia, as well as for all women, extension beyond the various public/private barriers is imperative if human rights law "is to have meaning for women brutalized in less-known theaters of war or in the by-ways of daily life." 63 Because, as currently constructed, human rights laws can reach only individual perpetrators during times of war, one alternative is to reconsider our understanding of what constitutes "war" and what constitutes "peace. " " When it is universally true that no matter where in the world a woman lives or with what culture she identifies, she is at grave risk of being beaten, imprisoned, enslaved, raped, prostituted, physically tortured, and murdered simply because she is a woman, the term "peace" does not describe her existence. 2 5 In addition to being persecuted for being a woman, many women also are persecuted on ethnic, racial, religious, sexual orientation, or other grounds. Therefore, it is crucial that our re-conceptualization of human rights is not limited to violations based on gender." Rather, our definitions of "war" and "peace" in the context of all of the world's persecuted groups should be questioned. Nevertheless, in every culture a common risk factor is being a woman, and to describe the conditions of our lives as "peace" is to deny the effect of sexual terrorism on all women. 6 7 Because we are socialized to think of times of "war" as limited to groups of men fighting over physical territory or land, we do not immediately consider the possibility of "war" outside this narrow definition except in a metaphorical sense, such as in the expression "the war against poverty." However, the physical violence and sex discrimination perpetrated against women because we are women is hardly metaphorical. Despite the fact that its prevalence makes the violence seem natural or inevitable, it is profoundly political in both its purpose and its effect. Further, its exclusion from international human rights law is no accident, but rather part of a system politically constructed to exclude and silence women. 2 6 The appropriation of women's sexuality and women's bodies as representative of men's ownership over women has been central to this "politically constructed reality. 2 6 9 Women's bodies have become the objects through which dominance and even ownership are communicated, as well as the objects through which men's honor is attained or taken away in many cultures.Y Thus, when a man wants to communicate that he is more powerful than a woman, he may beat her. When a man wants to communicate that a woman is his to use as he pleases, he may rape her or prostitute her. The objectification of women is so universal that when one country ruled by men (Serbia) wants to communicate to another country ruled by men (Bosnia-Herzegovina or Croatia) that it is superior and more powerful, it rapes, tortures, and prostitutes the "inferior" country's women. 2 71 The use of the possessive is intentional, for communication among men through the abuse of women is effective only to the extent that the group of men to whom the message is sent believes they have some right of possession over the bodies of the women used. Unless they have some claim of right to what is taken, no injury is experienced. Of course, regardless of whether a group of men sexually terrorizing a group of women is trying to communicate a message to another group of men, the universal sexual victimization of women clearly communicates to all women a message of dominance and ownership over women. As Charlotte Bunch explains, "The physical territory of [the] political struggle [over female subordination] is women's bodies." 7 2

#### Indo-Pak relations resilient

Krepon 09

[Michael, Founding President of the Henry L. Stimson Foundation, Nuclear Arms and the Future of South Asia, BNET, April 2009, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_m0KNN/is\_53/ai\_n31464292/pg\_3/?tag=content;col1//UWYO TDA]

The first such dominant trend is that **Pakistan and India will probably keep viewing economic growth as essential to national well-being, domestic cohesion, and national security.** **Trade between the countries** presumably **will** continue to **grow.** While the perceived primacy of economic growth does not ensure peaceful relations between Pakistan and India, **the pursuit of this goal is likely to further ameliorate animosity**. Pakistan's future growth is limited in part by constrained trading partnerships with India and states in Central Asia. As long as Pakistan's ties to neighboring India and Afghanistan remain conflicted, these natural trade routes will generate far less than optimal results. **This** dominant **trend is conducive to improved bilateral relationships on the subcontinent**. Second, in view of the primacy of economics **in** the national security calculations of **Pakistan and India**, **it is probable that the leadership in both countries will seek to avoid major crises and border skirmishes in the years ahead.** **Pakistan's interest in nonhostile relations with India is likely to be reinforced** by continued difficulties along its border with Afghanistan. The leadership goal of peaceful borders between Pakistan and India could, however, be challenged by significant acts of terrorism perpetrated by extremists with quite different agendas. Nonetheless**, there are greater buffers against escalation arising from significant acts of terrorism than in previous years. This dominant trend also points in the direction of improved bilateral relations on the subcontinent. It is hard to envision another standoff** like that of the "Twin Peaks" crisis in 2001-2002. (1) This does not, however, exclude lesser cases in which extremist acts trigger retaliatory measures.

#### [3] Won’t escalate globally

The Hamilton Spectator, 2002

For those who do not live in the subcontinent, the most important fact is that the damage would be largely confined to the region. The Cold War is over, the strategic understandings that once tied India and Pakistan to the rival alliance systems have all been cancelled, and no outside powers would be drawn into the fighting. The detonation of a hundred or so relatively small nuclear weapons over India and Pakistan would not cause grave harm to the wider world from fallout. People over 40 have already lived through a period when the great powers conducted hundreds of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, and they are mostly still here.

#### The nation-state is fundamentally predicated on the exclusion of women- the social contract and the public/private division of civil society necessitates this condition because the public and state are always about relations between men

Fermon 98

[Nicole Ferman, 1998, Women on the Global Market: Irigaray and the Democratic State, Diacritics, Vol. 28, No. 1, Irigaray and the Political Future of Sexual Difference¶ (Spring, 1998), pp. 120-137¶ uwyo//amp]

It is not accidental that liberal politics, the modern notion of a social contract between ¶ newly declared equals, was imagined for the specific purpose of dismantling the paternal ¶ and patriarchal rule of male "subjects" by kings. This task required a sustained assault on ¶ the still powerful ideal of divine right monarchy, and on certain hierarchical relations ¶ among men. By shifting the focus of legitimation to nature and the natural, social contract ¶ theorists like Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau hoped to produce the basis for different social ¶ relations between individual men, as well as between nations, which Rousseau likened to ¶ individuals in their propensity for dissolution, decrepitude, and death [Rousseau, OC 3: ¶ 604-05]. However, the social contract which binds men to equality and liberty categori- ¶ cally excludes women from relations of conventional justice. Instead women are rel- ¶ egated to the private sphere, the family, while modern political life becomes the work of ¶ man and men. The moral law that creates equality between men does not extend to women. ¶ Feminist theorists from Wollstonecraft to Pateman perceive a more fundamental prob- ¶ lem: political thought does not deal with the very condition of human existence, the power ¶ men exercise over women in every arena of social and political life [see Pateman]. Irigaray ¶ challenges the strictures of complementarity encouraged by liberalism, the notion that ¶ woman's destiny and trajectory are to prop up a narrowly conceived universal, a notion ¶ of the good life hostile not only to women but to human survival more generally. Although ¶ traditions of every political type place women in the home and the family, Irigaray identifies that family as man's dwelling, one where woman is in "internal exile". [SG 66]. ¶ She conducts a critique of the patriarchal family, of existing relations between men and ¶ women, and presents a radical solution to women's subordinate status: the civil recogni- ¶ tion of women's lived experiences vis-h-vis men and the nation-state. Irigaray asserts the ¶ strategic challenge of sexual difference as the basis of sexuate rights, or rights of ¶ equivalence, as a supplement to the democratic program of the liberal state. This will ¶ allow women space and time to generate an economy open to women's interactions with ¶ each other, to reach beyond sex-neutral citizenship to an open future.

#### The alt is a prereq to solve for war- only possible in a world of sexual difference because the death drive is instigated because of the male subject’s loss of the maternal feminine- drives him to master everything which culminates in nuclear destruction

Weedon 1999

[Chris, the Chair of the Centre for Critical and Cultural Theory at Cardiff University, Feminism, theory, and the politics of difference, p. 90-93]

In the order of reason which has governed Western thought since the rise of Ancient Greek philosophy, feminine otherness is denied and reconstituted as a male-defined otherness. This results in the denial of subjectivity to potentially non-male-defined women. A maternal feminine subjectivity, were it to be realized, would enable women to step outside of patriarchal definitions of the feminine and become subjects in their own right. Whereas the unconscious in Freud and Lacan lays claim to fixed universal status, for Irigaray its actual form and content is a product of history. Thus, however patriarchal the symbolic order may be in Lacan, it is open to change. The question is how this change might be brought about. For Irigaray, the key to change is the development of a female imaginary. This can only be achieved under patriarchy in a fragmented way, as what she terms the excess that is realized in margins of the dominant culture. The move towards a female imaginary would also entail the transformation of the symbolic, since the relationship between the two is one of mutual shaping. This would enable women to assume subjectivity in their own right. Although, for Irigaray, the imaginary and the symbolic are both historical and changeable, this does not mean that, after thousands of years of repression and exclusion, change is easy. In a move not unlike that of ecofeminists, Irigaray suggests that the symbolic order, men and masculinity are shaped by patriarchy in ways which are immensely problematic not just for women but also for the future of the planet. The apparently objective, gender-neutral discourses of science and philosophy — the discourses of a male subject — have led to the threat of global nuclear destruction. In An Ethics of Sexual Difference (1993; original 1984), Irigaray suggests that the patriarchal male subject is himself shaped by the loss of the maternal feminine which motivates a desire for mastery: Man's self-affect depends on the woman who has given him being and birth, who has born/e him, enveloped him, warmed him, fed him. Love of self would seemingly take the form of a long return to and through the other. A unique female other, who is forever lost and must be sought in many others, an infinite number of others. The distance for this return can be conquered by the transcendence of God. The (female) other who is sought and cherished may be assimilated to the unique god. The (female) other is mingled or confused with God or the gods. (Irigaray 1993: 60-1; original 1984) Irigaray takes this theme further in Thinking the Difference: For a Peaceful Revolution (1994; original 1989) when she suggests that the desire for godlike mastery and transcendence has dire consequences for the world: Huge amounts of capital are allocated to the development of death machines in order to ensure peace, we are told. This warlike method of organising society is not self-evident. It has its m origin in patriarchy. It has a sex. But the age of technology has given weapons of war a power that exceeds the conflicts and risks taken among patriarchs. Women, children, all living things, including elemental matter, are drawn into the maelstrom. And death and destruction cannot be associated solely with war. They are part of the physical and mental aggression to which we are constantly subjected. What we need is an overall cultural transformation. Mankind [le peuple des homines] wages war everywhere all the time with a perfectly clear conscience. Mankind is traditionally carnivorous, sometimes cannibalistic. So men must eat to kill, must increase their domination of nature in order to live or to survive, must seek on the most distant stars what no longer exists here, must defend by any means the small patch of land they are exploiting here or over there. Men always go further, exploit further, seize more, without really knowing where they are going. Men seek what they think they need without considering who they are and how their identity is defined by what they do. To overcome this ignorance, I think that mankind needs those who are persons in their own right to help them understand and find their limits. Only women can play this role. Women are not genuinely responsible subjects in the patriarchal community. That is why it may be possible for them to interpret this culture in which they have less involvement and fewer interests than do men, and of which they are not themselves products to the point where they have been blinded by it. Given their relative exclusion from society, women may, from their outside perspective, reflect back a more objective image of society than can men. (Irigaray 1994: 4—5; original 1989) The destructive force of the patriarchal symbolic order makes all the more pressing Irigaray's project of creating a female imaginary and symbolic, specific to women, which might in its turn transform the male-defined symbolic order in the West, in which women figure only as lesser men. In this process, separatism becomes a strategy in the struggle for a nonpatriarchal society in which sexual difference is both voiced and valued: Let women tacitly go on strike, avoid men long enough to learn to defend their desire notably by their speech, let them discover the love of other women protected from that imperious choice of men which puts them in a position of rival goods, let them forge a social status which demands recognition, let them earn their living in order to leave behind their condition of prostitute — these are certainly indispensable steps in their effort to escape their proletarianization on the trade market. But if their goal is to reverse the existing order - even if that were possible - history would simply repeat itself and return to phallocratism, where neither women's sex, their imaginary, nor their language can exist. (1994: 106; original 1989)A