

Analysis Report for: 9C77A447E3FF18B93F0AB7B26AC663F3.exe.c

Overall Functionality

The provided C code is highly obfuscated, likely through the use of a decompiler (Hex-Rays). The code's primary purpose appears to be malicious, performing actions consistent with a **downloader/dropper** or a **memory-resident rootkit**. It heavily utilizes Windows API functions for file system operations, registry manipulation, process and thread management, and potentially, inter-process communication (IPC). The code appears designed to download and execute additional malicious payloads, hide its presence, and potentially establish persistence on the infected system. The extensive use of seemingly random function names and the complex control flow obscures the specific details of its operations. The presence of a memory leak reporting mechanism (`sub_402990`) might be a distraction technique to mask its malicious behaviour.

Function Summaries

Due to the obfuscation, precise function summaries are difficult without dynamic analysis. However, based on function names and API calls, we can infer likely functionalities:

- `sub_401398`: Determines the show window state from startup information. Potentially used for initial process visibility.
- `sub_402364`: Allocates and initializes a memory buffer, possibly for storing a downloaded payload.
- `sub_40256C`: Likely calls a function from an external library to process data, possibly a decryption or payload execution routine.
- `sub_4027D0`: Iterates through a data structure, likely a list of memory blocks. It checks for and potentially reports memory leaks, acting as a decoy or obfuscation.
- `sub_402990`: A complex function potentially reporting or processing memory leaks. This is likely a decoy or obfuscation tactic.
- `sub_4030A0`: Retrieves and clears a thread-local storage (TLS) value. Potentially used for cleanup or communication.
- `sub_4030E0`: Terminates the process with a given exit code.
- `sub_40346C`, `sub_4034CA`: Memory manipulation routines, likely for string or data manipulation.
- `sub_403508`: Parses a string, converting it into an integer. Could be used for extracting configuration data.
- `sub_403CB0`: Error handling routine; possibly indicates critical error and program termination.
- `sub_403CB8`, `sub_403D78`, `sub_403D94`, `sub_403DA8`, `sub_403DEC`, `sub_403E44`: Memory management functions, likely involved in payload handling.
- `sub_404A40`: Manipulates exception handling records, potentially used for anti-debugging techniques.
- `sub_404BFC`, `sub_404C50`, `sub_404CA0`, `sub_404CB4`: These functions deal with memory allocation and manipulation, likely for obfuscating payload handling.
- `sub_404DA8`: Potentially resets an exit code variable, used for clean termination or masking actions.
- `sub_404F90`, `sub_404F9C`: Process termination routines.
- `sub_40505C`, `sub_405080`, `sub_4050B0`, `sub_40510C`, `sub_405148`, `sub_405194`, `sub_4051CC`, `sub_4051F8`, `sub_405214`: A series of functions for memory allocation, deallocation, and data copying; often used in complex ways to obfuscate activities.
- `sub_4056E8`, `sub_405784`, `sub_4058AC`, `sub_405930`, `sub_4059D8`, `sub_405B2C`, `sub_405B54`, `sub_405B8C`, `sub_405BB4`, `sub_405C8C`, `sub_4060BC`: String manipulation and possibly encoding/decoding functions. Many utilize `MultiByteToWideChar` and `WideCharToMultiByte`, suggesting conversion and manipulation of character encodings.
- `sub_40632C`, `sub_406390`, `sub_40660C`, `sub_406640`, `sub_4066E4`, `sub_406734`, `sub_406868`, `sub_4069A8`: More complex data processing, potentially including data structure manipulation and unpacking of malicious payloads.
- `sub_406E10`, `sub_406E18`, `sub_406E98`, `sub_406EBC`, `sub_4070B8`: Registry and module handle manipulation.
- `sub_407664`, `sub_4076F4`, `sub_407778`, `sub_407898`, `sub_407924`, `sub_407A90`, `sub_407AA4`: Likely involved in downloading and processing files.

The remaining functions continue this pattern of memory and data manipulation, likely for various stages of payload processing, execution, and persistence. Many functions contain numerous `JUMPOUT` statements, indicative of decompilation issues and obfuscation.

****Control Flow****

The control flow is exceptionally complex due to heavy obfuscation. Many functions use extensive switch statements, nested loops, and conditional jumps that are very difficult to follow without runtime execution and debugging. The overall structure suggests a layered approach to hiding malicious functionality. For example, a common pattern is a series of functions to allocate and manipulate memory, making it difficult to statically determine where the final payload resides or how it is executed.

****Data Structures****

The code uses several data structures, but their exact definitions are difficult to determine without deobfuscation. However, based on the code, the following are likely:

* ****Arrays/Dynamic Arrays****: Used for storing and manipulating data, likely including downloaded payloads and configuration information. These are heavily used across multiple functions, particularly those dealing with strings, data processing, and file system operations.

* ****Linked Lists****: The code suggests the use of linked lists, possibly to keep track of loaded modules, threads, or other resources. These structures are often used to obfuscate operations and make analysis harder.

* ****Thread-Local Storage (TLS)****: TLS is used, suggesting inter-thread communication or data storage unique to each thread. This technique is frequently used in malware to create separation from other processes.

****Malware Family Suggestion****

The combination of features like a likely downloader/dropper functionality, extensive memory manipulation (potentially for hiding), registry access, and sophisticated obfuscation strongly suggests that this code belongs to a family of advanced malware, potentially a ****fileless malware**** or ****advanced persistent threat (APT)****. The memory leak reporting, while seemingly benign, functions as a sophisticated technique to hide its real purpose. Without further dynamic analysis, specific attribution to a known malware family is impossible. More analysis is needed to determine the exact attack vector, C2 (Command and Control) server interaction, and ultimate malicious goal.