# Analysis Report for: AFCA77888B30A169C7BA30BB0D21C0DD.exe.c

#### \*\*Overall Functionality\*\*

This C code is a heavily obfuscated program, likely malware, designed to perform several malicious actions. The code's structure suggests it's a self-extracting installer or a dropper, unpacking and executing further malicious payload. It appears to install itself persistently by modifying the registry (adding a RunOnce key), and potentially deleting files or directories. The extensive use of Windows API calls related to file manipulation, registry access, and process creation points toward a multifaceted threat. The numerous weak functions suggest the malware may use different techniques to evade detection based on the system environment.

#### \*\*Function Summaries\*\*

The code contains numerous functions, many with names like `sub\_14000XXX`, indicating they were likely generated by a decompiler. Here's a summary of some key functions:

- \* `sub\_140001008`: Copies a null-terminated string from one location to another, handling potential buffer overflows. Returns an error code.
- \*`sub\_1400010BC`: Uses `vsnprintf` to format a string using variable arguments, similar to `printf`. Handles potential buffer overflows. Returns an error code.
- \* `sub\_140001130`: Checks if the current user is a member of the Administrators group using the `CheckTokenMembership` function from `advapi32.dll`. Returns 1 if successful. 0 otherwise.
- \*`sub\_140001258`: Determines user privilege level (Administrator or not). It uses `GetTokenInformation` to check group memberships, potentially to modify its behavior based on the user's privileges. Returns a numerical code representing privilege level.
- \*`sub\_140001470`: Dialog box procedure. Handles different message types, showing error messages or closing dialogs.
- \* `sub\_140001558`: Parses a string, extracting substrings delimited by a specified character. Returns a pointer to the next part of the string.
- \*`sub\_1400015F4`: Parses an installer-like command line argument string. It extracts file paths, section names, and other parameters. It handles the execution of commands (.INF, .BAT). Returns error codes or indicates successful processing.
- \*`sub\_140001D10`: Performs registry manipulation, adding a value to the `RunOnce` registry key. This ensures the malware runs on the next system boot.
- \* `sub\_140002034`: Recursively deletes files and directories.
- \*`sub\_140002EDC`: The main initialization function. Calls various other functions to perform actions like extracting resources, checking the operating system version, checking for the presence of a Mutex (to prevent multiple instances), and finally launching the GUI interface.
- \* `pfnopen`, `pfnread`, `pfnrdid`, `pfnseek`, `pfnfdin`: These functions seem to implement a custom file I/O system, possibly for extracting embedded resources. The names suggest they are emulating the standard file handling functions.
- \* `sub\_140004838`: Creates a new process using `CreateProcessA`.
- \* `sub\_140004B70`: Opens a folder browser dialog box using `SHBrowseForFolder` and `SHGetPathFromIDList`.
- \* `sub\_1400051F8`: Loads a resource from the executable. Returns the size of the loaded resource.
- \*`sub\_1400053B8`: Deletes a file. Checks for specific files to remove.
- \* `StartAddress`: Thread function that likely performs the main installation/execution actions.
- \* `TopLevelExceptionFilter`: Custom exception handler.

### \*\*Control Flow\*\*

The control flow is complex and highly intertwined. Key functions like `sub\_140002EDC` and `StartAddress` manage the main execution flow, involving many nested loops and conditional branches:

- \*`sub\_140002EDC`: This function checks various system parameters and resources before proceeding. It demonstrates a complex decision-making process, performing different actions (e.g., installing via registry, showing GUI, extracting other payloads) based on the system configuration and user permissions.
- \*`StartAddress`: This is a thread procedure. It uses `FDICopy` (along with the custom file I/O functions) to extract a cabinet file, indicating that additional malware components might be embedded within the main executable.

## \*\*Data Structures\*\*

- \* `struct \_EXCEPTION\_POINTERS`: This standard Windows structure is used for exception handling.
- \* `struct \_CONTEXT`: Another standard Windows structure used to save the CPU context.
- \* `struct \_STARTUPINFOA`: Standard Windows structure for process creation.
- \* `FDICABINETINFO`: This structure holds data related to the cabinet file.
- \* `ERF`: Custom error reporting structure likely used to communicate between functions.

# \*\*Malware Family Suggestion\*\*

The combination of self-extraction, registry modification for persistence, file deletion, process creation, and dialog box interaction makes this sample malware look like an \*\*installer-based malware\*\* or \*\*dropper\*\*. The complex unpacking, custom file system, and error handling strongly suggest an attempt at obfuscation and anti-analysis techniques. It could potentially be categorized as a \*\*downloader\*\* if it fetches additional payloads from remote servers (this aspect is not evident in this snippet, but is consistent with the observed functionality).

## \*\*Further Analysis\*\*

The code requires extensive reverse engineering to completely understand its behaviour. A deeper analysis should focus on:

- \* \*\*Network communication:\*\* Check for any network connections the malware attempts to establish.
- \* \*\*Strings:\*\* Analyze the string constants, particularly file paths, registry keys, and URLs.
- \* \*\*External function calls:\*\* Examine API calls to understand the actions the malware is performing.
- \* \*\*Dynamic analysis:\*\* Running the code in a sandbox environment will provide insights into the malware's behavior and effects on the system.

Without dynamic analysis and a thorough examination of any embedded files, it is impossible to say with certainty what all payloads this malware eventually executes. The code provided only shows the unpacking and install stage.