




Interdisciplinary Centre for Cyber Security and Cyber Defence of Critical Infrastructures

Advanced Malware and their Detection Technique

By
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Text Book

- Practical Malware Analysis by Michael Sikorski and Andrew Honig
 - ISBN 978-1593272906



Overview

- **Introduction**
- **Basic Analysis**
- **Malware Static Analysis**
- **Malware Dynamic Analysis**

Introduction: Background

- Malicious software which enters the computer system without users authorization and takes undesirable actions.
 - The development of computer security has a military origin, and since 1950 it is a major concern.
 - US government was a major force behind security research and technology.
 - In 1970 first malware was born.
 - In 1980s PC came into existence which were small enough to fit on the desk.
 - In 1990s, Internet has made a revolutionary impact on the PC users.

Why do people write malware?

- In the 90s
 - For the fun or skill showing
 - Spread to other machines & display a message



Why do people write malware?

- Today
 - \$\$\$

Organizations buy malware

- Steal passwords,
- credit cards,
- bank info,
- ransoms,
- intellectual property,
- trade secrets

They can use these info or sell it

Types of Malware

- 1st Generation/Static Malware:
 - Backdoor, Trojan horse, Rootkit, Scareware, Adware, Virus, Worm, etc.
- 2nd Generation/Dynamic Malware:
 - Encrypted, Oligormorphic, Polymorphic and Metamorphic Malware.

Malware Structure

Three Parts

- **Attack Vector:** The means by which a malware spreads, enabling it to replicate, also referred as Infection Vector.
- **Trigger:** The event or condition that determines when the payload is activated or delivered.
- **Malicious Activities:** The payload may involve damage or may involve benign but NOTICEABLE activity.

Virus Structure

```
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <dirent.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
struct stat sbuf;

search(char *dir_name)
{
    DIR *dirp;
    struct dirent *dp;

    dirp = opendir(dir_name);
    if (dirp == NULL) return;
    while (TRUE) {
        dp = readdir(dirp);
        if (dp == NULL) {
            chdir ("..");
            break;
        }
        if (dp->d_name[0] == '.') continue; /* skip the . and .. directories */
        lstat(dp->d_name, &sbuf);           /* is entry a symbolic link? */
        if (S_ISLNK(sbuf.st_mode)) continue; /* skip symbolic links */
        if (chdir(dp->d_name) == 0) {
            search(".");
        } else {
            if (access(dp->d_name,X_OK) == 0) /* if executable, infect it */
                infect(dp->d_name);
        }
        closedir(dirp);
    }
}

/* standard POSIX headers */

/* for lstat call to see if file is sym link */

/* recursively search for executables */
/* pointer to an open directory stream */
/* pointer to a directory entry */

/* open this directory */
/* dir could not be opened; forget it */


/* read next directory entry */
/* NULL means we are done */
/* go back to parent directory */
/* exit loop */

/* skip the . and .. directories */
/* is entry a symbolic link? */
/* skip symbolic links */
/* if chdir succeeds, it must be a dir */
/* yes, enter and search it */
/* no (file), infect it */

/* if executable, infect it */

/* dir processed; close and return */
```


Antivirus Defense System




Types of Malware

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2nd Generation: Encrypted Malware




2nd Generation: Oligomorphic Malware



2nd Generation: Polymorphic Malware

Mutation Engine: to generate almost unlimited number of decrptors by using obfuscation techniques.



Obfuscation Techniques

- Register usage exchange
- This method was used by the Win95/RegSwap virus, which was created by the virus writer Vecna and released in 1998.
- **Different generations of the virus will use the same code but with different registers**

a)


5A	pop edx
BF04000000	mov edi, 0004h
8BF5	mov esi, ebp
B80C000000	mov eax, 000Ch
81C288000000	add edx, 0088h
8B1A	mov ebx, [edx]
899C8618110000	mov [esi+eax*4+00001118], ebx

b)

58	pop eax
BB04000000	mov ebx, 0004h
8BD5	mov edx, ebp
BF0C000000	mov edi, 000Ch
81C088000000	add eax, 0088h
8B30	mov esi, [eax]
89B4BA18110000	mov [edx+edi*4+00001118], esi


Obfuscation Techniques

- Permutation Techniques



Obfuscation Techniques

- Insertion of Jump Instructions



Obfuscation Techniques

- Subroutine Inlining and Outlining
 - In this technique, calls of the subroutines are replaced by its codes or vice versa

```
/* some instructions */  
call Function 1  
call Function 2  
/* some instructions */  
Function 1:  
    mov eax, ebx  
    add eax, 12h  
    push eax  
    ret
```

Function 2:

```
    mul ecx  
    mov edx, eax  
    ret
```

(a) Code variant A

```
/* some instructions */  
        mov eax, ebx  
        add eax, 12h  
        push eax  
        mul ecx  
        mov edx, eax  
/* some instructions */
```

(b) Code variant B


Obfuscation Techniques

- Insertion of dead codes


00401005	8BF0	MOV ESI,ERX
00401007	3E:8A00	MOU AL,BYTE PTR DS:[ERX]
00401008	84C0	TEST AL,AL
0040100C	v 74 49	JE SHORT Test.00401057
0040100E	53	PUSH EBX
0040100F	3F·8F05 74F940	POP DWORD PTR DS:[40F974]
00401016	90	NOP
00401017	090B	RCR EBX,CL
00401019	0FCB	BSWAP EBX
0040101B	68 59104000	PUSH Test.00401059
00401020	5B	POP EBX
00401021	3F·8903	MOU DWORD PTR DS:[EBX],EAX
00401024	90	NOP
00401025	43	INC EBX
00401026	0FB0C2	BSR EAX,EDX
00401029	A9 46A978DC	TEST EAX,DC78A946
0040102E	8BC2	MOU EAX,EDX
00401030	52	PUSH EDX
00401031	90	NOP
00401032	B6 86	MOU DH,86
00401034	B3 27	MOU BL,27
00401036	88 7CFAA17F	MOU EAX,7FA1FA7C
0040103B	v EB 01	JMP SHORT Test.0040103E
0040103D	90	NOP
0040103E	0FBCC2	BSF EAX,EDX
00401041	3E:C705 FC8841	MOU DWORD PTR DS:[4188FC],0
0040104C	2D 210DE8B9	SUB EAX,B9E80D21
00401051	690A E577D49D	IMUL EBX,EDX,9DD477E5

2nd Generation: Polymorphic Malware

Mutation Engine: to generate almost unlimited number of decrptors by using obfuscation techniques.



2nd Generation: Metamorphic Malware



Tools to Create Metamorphic Malwares

- GenVir.
- VCL (Virus Creation Laboratory),
- PS-MPC (Phalcon-Skism Mass-Produced Code Generator),
- NGVCK (Next Generation Virus Creation Kit),
- G2 (generation second virus kit),
- VCS (Virus Construction Set)

Links :

<http://83.133.184.251/virensimulation.org/vxcd5b.html?id=tidx&page=4>

For Manual obfuscation: online tool

<https://www.pelock.com/obfuscator/>

Threat & Challenges in Malware detection

- An exponential increase in the number of malware.
- Non recoverable computer infection
- The attacks/threats are not only limited to individual level, but there are state sponsored highly skilled hackers developing customized malware e.g. Stuxnet, duqu, etc.
- Advanced Malware are capable to bypass traditional detection system.

Basic Analysis: General/Naive Procedure

- Submit the code to a virus program or online scanner such as <http://www.virustotal.com>; signature analysis may help determine the name and functionality of the malware
- Perform additional online research to determine the malware's purpose and capabilities

Where to Get Malware Samples for Analysis?

- <https://github.com/ashubits/samples>
- <https://zeltser.com/malware-sample-sources/>
- <http://www.tekdefense.com/downloads/malware-samples/>
- <http://thezoo.morirt.com/>
It contains close to 100 malware binary and source codes.
- <http://openmalware.org/>
You can search to find the malware binary code you want

Basic Analysis Tools

- File (Unix/Linux command) - Used to determine the file type
 - command: `file <program name>`
 - “/usr/share/file/magic.mgc” file offers approximately 5,000 different file types that Linux will recognize with the file command
- Strings (Windows & Unix) - find the printable strings in an object or other binary file
 - command: `strings -a <program name>`
 - `-a` - this option causes strings to look for strings in all sections of the object file
- BinText (Windows) - Finds ASCII, Unicode and Resource strings in a file,
<http://www.mcafee.com/us/downloads/free-tools/bintext.aspx>

Basic Analysis

- What is the type of the file?
file: PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
- What suspicious imports are used in file?
 - a. ShellExecuteExA - Can be used to run applications
 - b. Socket APIs - Make network connections
 - c. File API - read/modify files
- What are a few strings that stick out to you and why?
 - a. 60.248.52.95 - Potential network signature
 - b. http://www.ueopen.com/test.html - Potential network signature
 - c. cmd.exe - The malware could be trying to run shell commands
 - d. *(SY)# - Potential network signature, possibly used for a remote shell prompt

Basic Analysis: Conclusion

- What happens when you run this malware?


Connects to 60.248.52.95, offers up a remote shell, then deletes itself

- What do you think is the purpose of this malware?
 - To act as a backdoor by offering a remote shell to the attacker

Malware Analysis

- Static Analysis:
- Dynamic Analysis

Program to Process Procedure



Static Malware Analysis

- Analysis of malware performed **without actually executing the untrusted code**
- **Analysis can be performed on any platform** because you are not intending to run the malware which may be platform specific (e. g., a Win32 executable)
- Some questions to be answered include:
 - What type of file is this (batch file, shell script, [Windows executable](#), [Linux ELF](#), [Javascript](#), etc.)
 - What does it do?
 - Does it spread itself via physical media or network resources?
 - Does it steal, alter, or delete information?
- Determine the type of file you are examining, its internal structures (sections and headers) or logics using reverse engineering.

Windows Portable Executable (PE) Analysis Tools

Three PE Analysis Tools Worth Looking At

- <https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2014/05/five-pe-analysis-tools-worth-looking-at/>
- PE Studio (free version available, portable)
 - <https://www.winitor.com/>
- Exeinfo PE - view detailed information about an Windows exe file including packers used
 - <http://exeinfo.atwebpages.com/>
- PEBrowse Professional: static-analysis and disassembler for Win32/Win64 executables
 - <http://www.smidgeonsoft.prohosting.com/pebrowse-pro-file-viewer.html>

Static Malware Analysis

- What Malware writers do against static analysis?
- Stripping: Removes all human-readable symbols from object code.
 - Combats reverse engineering.
- Packing with UPX, etc.
 - upx.sourceforge.net
 - Compresses source code (achieves ratios of 20% - 40%)

Reverse Engineering Tool

- Windows Binary
 - IDA PRO
 - OBJDUMP
- Android apps
 - APKTOOL

BASIC DYNAMIC ANALYSIS

- PRACTICAL STEPS

- Basic dynamic analysis can assist and confirm the findings obtained from basic static analysis.
- Step 1: Baseline
 - Before executing the malware, take a first snapshot of registry using **Regshot**.
- Step 2: System status
 - During the running of malware, start **Process Monitor** and **Process Explorer**. Note any changes occurred.

BASIC DYNAMIC ANALYSIS

- PRACTICAL STEPS

- Step 3: Network traffic
 - Using **Wireshark** to log network traffic generated by the malware.
- Step 4: Comparison
 - Waiting for the malware to finish making any system changes. Take a second snapshot using **Regshot**. Compare the differences between two snapshots.

Virtual Machine

- What is a virtual machine?
 - Simply, a computer in your computer
 - Really, a (usually) segregated virtual environment that emulates real hardware
- Why are we using a virtual machine?
 - Safety, reliability, consistency, it's easy
 - Keep the malware in a contained environment
 - Snapshots: Completely 100% revert the VM to an earlier state, If things go bad, no one cares

Virtual Machine

- Downloads of Windows VM Images
 - link <https://developer.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-edge/tools/vms/>
 - The password to your VM is "Passw0rd!"

Ubuntu , Kali and other linux VM images

- Link <https://www.osboxes.org/virtualbox-images/>

Installation Manual

- Link
https://oalabs.openanalysis.net/2018/07/16/oalabs_malware_analysis_virtual_machine/

DYNAMIC ANALYSIS

- PREPARATION


- Using dedicated physical or virtual machines (VMs) to analyze malware.
- Preventing the malware from spreading, malware can be analyzed on **air-gapped networks**.
 - Isolated networks with machines that are disconnected from the Internet or any other networks.

Disadvantage: Lack of Internet connection as many pieces of malware depend on live Internet connection for functioning.

BASIC DYNAMIC ANALYSIS

- PREPARATION

- When using VMs, make sure all service packs, patches, hot fixes and **any applications needed are installed** before executing the malware.
- Make sure that VM networking is set to **Host-Only** networking. Otherwise, there is a great risk of spreading the malware to any connect networks.



Sandboxing

Malware sandboxing is a practical application of the dynamical analysis approach: instead of statically analyzing the binary file, **it gets executed and monitored in real-time**.

This approach obviously has pros and cons, but it's a valuable technique to obtain additional details on the **malware**, such as its network behaviour.

Therefore it's a good practice to perform both static and **dynamic analysis** while inspecting a malware, in order to gain a deeper understanding of it.

Before using Sandbox

Some questions you should ask yourself:

- What kind of files do I want to analyse?
- What volume of analyses do I want to be able to handle?
- Which platform do I want to use to run my analysis on?
- Which software to install and which versions (particularly important when analysing exploits).
- What kind of information I want about the file?


What Cuckoo can do?

- It can retrieve the following type of results:
 - Files being created, deleted and downloaded by the malware during its execution.
 - Memory dumps of the malware processes.
 - Network traffic trace in PCAP format.
 - Screenshots taken during the execution of the malware.

What is Cuckoo?

- It can be used to analyze:
 - Generic Windows executables
 - DLL files
 - PDF documents
 - Microsoft Office documents
 - URLs and HTML files
 - PHP scripts
 - CPL files
 - Visual Basic (VB) scripts
 - ZIP files
 - Java JAR
 - Python files
 - , etc.


Architecture of Cuckoo



Configuration

- As pointed out by the info messages you will now be able to find your CWD at /home/cuckoo/.cuckoo
 - as it defaults to ~/.cuckoo. All configuration files as you know them can be found in the
 - \$CWD/conf directory.
I.e.,
 - \$CWD/conf/cuckoo.conf,
 - \$CWD/conf/virtualbox.conf, etc.

Case Study: WannaCry



Other online option

- <https://www.hybrid-analysis.com>
- This is a free malware analysis service for the community that detects and analyzes unknown threats using a unique **Hybrid Analysis** technology.

Detection Techniques for Advanced Malware

Machine Learning:

- *The Answer to detect 2nd generation malware*


Information Extracted from Static and Dynamic Analysis

These features can be extracted by

- Static analysis, without executing the executables such as opcode or bytecode n-grams, PE header, etc. or
- Dynamic analysis, during the execution of executable such as API or system calls, network traffic, etc.

Detection: Machine learning

The study of computers algorithms that is improved through past malware analysis and observations.



Building Own Malware detector (Research)

- Opcode frequency: as a dominant feature for malware detection with high accuracy


Tool for analysis WEKA (ML tool)

<https://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka/downloading.html>

Opcodes info

<http://staff.ustc.edu.cn/~bjhua/courses/security/2014/slides/lec-anti-disas.txt>

Research at IITK: A Hybrid Approach to Detect Linux Malware



In this work, we develop a hybrid approach by integrating both static and dynamic analysis, to detect Linux malware effectively. We have performed our analysis on 7717 malware and 2265 benign files and obtained a promising detection accuracy of 99.1%.

Thank you
QUESTION ?

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