

Business Cycle Asymmetry and Input-Output Structure: The Role of Firm-to-Firm Networks*

Jorge Miranda-Pinto[†] Alvaro Silva[‡] Eric R. Young[§]

November 10, 2022

Abstract

We study the network origins of business cycles asymmetries. Using country-level and firm-level data on the structure of input-output networks, we show that countries with a larger number of non-zero intersectoral linkages (denser networks) and firms with a larger number of suppliers and customers (degrees) display a more negatively-skewed distribution of output growth. We then show that at the onset of COVID-19, more interconnected firms suffered larger declines in output growth. We construct a multisector model with input-output linkages and show that the relationship between output skewness and network density naturally arises once we consider non-linearities in production. In an economy with low production flexibility (inputs are gross complements), denser production structures imply that relying on more inputs becomes a risk that further amplifies the effects of negative productivity shocks. The opposite holds if firms display high production flexibility (inputs are gross substitutes), in which having more inputs to choose from becomes an opportunity to diversify the effects of negative productivity shocks. We calibrate the model using our rich firm-to-firm network Chilean data and show that more connected firms experience larger declines in output in response to a COVID-19 shock, consistent with the data. The size of the shock determines the strength of the relationship between degrees and output decline, which highlights the importance of non-linearities and the limitations of local approximations.

*The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the Central Bank of Chile, the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, or the Federal Reserve System. Officials of the Central Bank of Chile processed the disaggregated data from the Chilean tax authority (Servicio de Impuestos Internos, SII). We thank Federico Huneeus, Oscar Landerretche, and seminar participants at the Central Bank of Chile and University of Chile for useful comments and discussions. We also thank Alvaro Castillo for outstanding research assistance.

[†]Central Bank of Chile and University of Queensland. Email: jmirandap@bcentral.cl

[‡]University of Maryland. Email: asilvub@umd.edu

[§]University of Virginia and Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. Email: ey2d@virginia.edu

1 Introduction

It is a general fact that recessions are shorter and more severe than expansions, i.e. they are “sharper”. This asymmetry leads to a negatively-skewed distribution of real GDP growth as documented in, for example, [Ordóñez \(2013\)](#). Figure 1 shows this asymmetry for a sample of 46 countries during 1985-2019. Out of the 46 countries, 43 display negatively-skewed real GDP growth. The primary explanation for this fact in the literature is the existence of financial constraints ([Ordóñez, 2013](#); [Jensen et al., 2020](#)). In this paper, we offer a different explanation for the asymmetry, based on the empirical importance of sectoral shocks and the structure of input-output connections.


We use sectoral input-output data for 46 countries and firm-to-firm network data for the Chilean economy to study the role of production networks in shaping the magnitude of macroeconomic downturns. In the cross-country data, we document strong correlations between countries’ GDP growth skewness—our measure of downturn’s severity—and input-output structure (density of the network). We then use the firm-level network data to investigate to which extent production linkages at the firm-level relate to firm-level output growth skewness and to firm-level output declines during COVID-19.

Using OECD domestic input-output data, we show that — controlling for other important cross-country characteristics — countries in which more input-output connections are active (denser networks) display more negatively-skewed business cycles, as expressed by a more negative skewness of real GDP growth for the period 1985-2019. Our estimates imply that if a country with a network density of 0.69 (the average in the sample) were to increase its active links by 10 percentage points (to 0.79), the skewness of GDP growth would decrease from -0.87 to -1.19 . To put the numbers into perspective, a country with a skewness of -0.87 experiences an average percent decline in real GDP of -2.4 percent, while a country with a skewness of -1.19 displays an average downturn of -2.8 percent.

We then use administrative data on Chilean firm-to-firm transactions to investigate the relationship between firm-level interconnectedness, as described by the total degrees of the firm—defined as the total number of suppliers and customers the firm has—and firm level resilience to negative shocks. In particular, we measure firm level output (sales and employment) growth skewness and show that, controlling for covariates, firms with a larger number of suppliers and customers display a more negatively skewed distribution of output growth.¹ This relationship hides an important asymmetry as the negative relationship is

¹We also studied the relationship between output skewness and the number of clients (indegree) or suppliers (outdegree) separately. The results indicate that each of them display a negative and statistically significant relationship with output skewness. Therefore, for simplicity, we use the total degree as a measure of network interconnectedness. As we will see in the theoretical section, the model we present indeed

Figure 1. Skewness of Annual GDP Growth Cyclical Component (1985 – 2019)



Note: This figure plots the skewness of countries' annual growth of the HP cyclical component of real GDP for the period 1985-2019.

mainly driven by the firms with negative skewness for the period. The group of firms with positive skewness instead displays a positive, albeit smaller, relationship between degrees and output skewness. We then study the performance of more interconnected firms during COVID-19. We show that, controlling for other firm-level covariates, firms that had more connections during COVID-19 experienced larger declines of sales, value-added, and employment in 2020q2. We also find that during the recovery period, more connected firms were able to grow slightly faster than less connected firms.

We explain our evidence and quantify the role of networks in a production network model with N firms connected through intermediate input purchases. Our approach follows [Baqee and Farhi \(2019\)](#) closely, in which non-linearities in production are capable of generating asymmetric business cycles out of symmetric idiosyncratic technology shocks. We start by extending the analysis in [Baqee and Farhi \(2019\)](#) and show the role of network

displays a similar role for both, the indegree and the outdegree, which is why the total degree provides sufficient information.

density—the number of active input-output links—in amplifying or mitigating negative productivity shocks.² To do so, we study two networks that only differ in the number of positive input-output links and show that more connections amplify the adverse effects of negative productivity shocks, creating a more negative skewness of output, if inputs are gross complements; the opposite holds if firms have a higher flexibility in substituting their inputs. The intuition behind our results lies in the strength of sectoral/firm-level price and quantity adjustments. In our model, price adjustments depend only on the network structure to a first-order. Quantity adjustments, also to a first-order, depend on the network structure and on the flexibility in substituting inputs. If inputs are gross complements, a negative productivity shock in the dense network generates a Baumol-cost disease mechanism in which the sector hit by the negative shock becomes larger in the economy, relative to a more sparse network.

We then perform two quantitative exercises to understand the drivers of macroeconomic skewness and firm-level responses to negative productivity shocks. First, we calibrate our model economy to match the the production network of the 46 countries in our sample. As in the data, the model implied skewness of log real GDP is negative in 44 out of 46 countries and displays significant cross-country heterogeneity. Moreover, we show that the model delivers a relationship between network density and skewness that is qualitatively, but not quantitatively, similar to that in the data.

Our second quantitative exercise uses the firm-to-firm network structure of the Chilean economy before COVID-19. We investigate the ability of the model to deliver the non-linear relationship between firm-level (in and out) degrees (the number of customers and suppliers) and output growth before, during, and after COVID-19. We calibrate the decline in firm-level productivity using the annual percent change in revenue labor productivity. The model is able to deliver a relationship between degrees and output growth that is very similar to that in the data. We show that the magnitude of the shock is crucial to deliver these facts, and that conditional on the size of the shock, the relationship between degrees and output growth is stronger for negative productivity shocks than for positive ones. Therefore, the model’s internal propagation is strong enough to deliver a procyclical cross-sectional skewness of output growth even if productivity shocks are symmetric. Finally, the concavity of aggregate output in this economy reconciles two seemingly contradictory facts: at the firm level, about half of the firms display positive skewness of output growth and half negative, while at the aggregate level the economy has negatively-skewed output growth.

Contribution to the literature. The results in our paper highlight the risks of produc-

²In our model, as in [Carvalho et al. \(2020\)](#), productivity shocks propagate upstream and downstream in the network. Therefore, indegrees and outdegrees both determine the exposure of firms to shocks.

tion interconnectedness when the economy is hit by large shocks. Our paper contributes to the literature that underlines the role of financial frictions in generating asymmetric business cycles (e.g., [Ordóñez \(2013\)](#) and [Jensen et al. \(2020\)](#)). We instead propose a mechanism that relies on production non-linearities and the structure of the production network.³

Our paper also contributes to the literature that studies the role of production network density in determining the level of GDP ([Herskovic, 2018](#)), GDP growth ([Acemoglu and Azar, 2020](#)), and the volatility of GDP ([Miranda-Pinto, 2021](#)). Unlike the previous papers, we focus on the non-linear effects of large negative shocks to productivity and the role of firm-to-firm networks. Our paper is more closely related to [Baqae and Farhi \(2019\)](#) and [Dew-Becker \(2022\)](#). Similar to [Dew-Becker \(2022\)](#), we complement [Baqae and Farhi \(2019\)](#) by focusing on a particular network statistic (network density) and on higher order moments of GDP. Compared to these papers our contribution is twofold. First, we provide empirical evidence both at the country level and at the firm level that highlights the role of production networks in driving business cycles asymmetries. Second, our firm-to-firm network data allow us to test the predictions of the model in the cross-section at a more granular level during COVID-19. We show that the size of the shock is crucial to deliver the observed relationship between firm-level degrees and economic resilience during COVID-19, as measured by the firm-level decline in output. Therefore, we highlight the importance of non-linearities and the use of global methods (or higher order approximations) to solve models of intersectoral linkages and CES production technologies.

Our paper also relates to [Salgado et al. \(2019\)](#), who investigate the sources of the asymmetry in the cross-sectional distribution of firm-level output growth. We see our work as complementary to theirs. While they argue that shocks to the skewness of firm-level TFP shocks are important in recessions, we instead emphasize the non-linear role of firm-level network structures in amplifying (large) negative productivity shocks.

2 Cross-country evidence

In this section, we analyze the cross-sectional relationship between countries GDP growth asymmetry, as measured in [Figure 1](#), and countries' input-output structure. We collect data on real GDP (domestic currency) for the period 1985-2019 and real GDP per-capita (at chained PPPs in 2017 US dollars) in 1985 from the Penn World Tables version 9.0. To measure the details of the production network structure across countries, we use the OECD

³Our mechanism is likely to be amplified by the presence of financial frictions. In an environment like the one developed by [Bigio and La'O \(2020\)](#) and [Miranda-Pinto and Zhang \(2020\)](#) show that trade credit linkages can generate asymmetric effects of financial financial shocks along the supply chain.

input-output database. This dataset contains input-output data for about 60 countries at a level of disaggregation of 45 sectors for the period 1995-2018. Our final sample has 46 countries, of which about one half are developed and half emerging countries. We use the input-output data in 1995, as it is the earliest available in the OECD database.

Figure 2 depicts the input-output network for Chile. In this figure, an arrow from sector j to sector i represents intermediate inputs flowing from j to i . The size of the nodes is determined by the size of the sector, in terms of gross-output. The figure highlights the network features we focus in this paper. In particular, the significant heterogeneity in sectoral degrees (number of suppliers and clients) and the implied level of production interconnectedness in the economy. We measure interconnectedness using network density as in, for example, Miranda-Pinto (2021). In particular, our measure of Density is

$$\text{Density} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N \mathbf{1}(\omega_{ij} > 0) - N}{N(N-1)};$$

where the numerator counts the number of non-zero off-diagonal input-output links in the economy and the denominator sums all the possible off-diagonal input-output connections in the economy. Thus, density is a measure of the fraction of feasible connections that are active in an economy. As an example, the Chilean production network displays a density of 69%.⁴


Our focus in this section is the cross-country correlation between production network density and the skewness of real GDP growth. To do so, we control for other possible network moments such as the mean, standard deviation and skewness of the weighted outdegree and indegree.⁵ In addition, we control for other development measures such as the GDP per capita in 1985 and GDP growth volatility during the period.

Figure 3 shows a scatter plot of the residual skewness of real GDP growth and network density, after removing any variation coming from our controls. As it is apparent from this figure, the cross-country correlation between real GDP growth skewness and density is strongly negative, meaning that countries with more connections features on average lower skewness of their real GDP growth. Since, on average, countries exhibit negative skewness of the real GDP growth, this result means that countries with more interconnected production networks tend to exhibit more negatively skewed real GDP growth.

⁴We use a very small threshold to define a non-zero input-output link. In particular, we use a value of 0.1% for the ratio between a specific intermediate input expenditure and total intermediate input expenditure by each sectoral pair.

⁵The weighted outdegree of a sector i can be measured as the sum of the shares of sector i sales to sector j as a fraction of sector j 's total output, for all j . The weighted indegree of a sector i can be measured as the sum of the shares of sector i 's purchases of intermediate inputs from sector j as a fraction of sector i 's total output, for all j .

Figure 2. Input-Output Structure: Chile in 1995




Note: This figure shows the structure of inter-sectoral linkages for the Chilean economy in 1995 using the 45 sectors classification in the OECD input-output data revision 4. A node is a sector and the size of the node depends on sectoral gross-output.

3 Firm-level evidence

In this section, we present evidence that relates firm-level output (sales and employment) growth asymmetry to firm-level network structures. We start by describing our data and then perform two empirical exercises. First, we study the relationship between firm-level networks and firm-level output growth skewness. Second, we investigate the relationship between firm-level networks and output growth during COVID-19.

Figure 3. Cross-Country Production Network Density and Skewness



Note: This figure plots the residualized Skewness of the cyclical component of Real GDP growth between 1985 – 2019 and the residualized network density in 1995. These are residualized using the following controls: GDP per capita in 1985, the volatility of the cyclical component of GDP growth, skewness of the outdegree and indegree distribution in 1995.

3.1 Data Description and Sample construction

We combine four different administrative datasets, collected by the Chilean tax authority (Servicio de Impuestos Internos, SII), that provide detailed firm-level information based on firms tax ID numbers anonymized for research purposes.⁶ ⁷ We use data on firms' total sales from the monthly and annual tax declarations for the period 2005-2020. In particular, the F29 form keeps track of monthly sales, while the form F22 has final information of annual sales for the tax payments. We also use firm-level information on employment from the form DJ1887. Finally, we use data at the firm-to-firm transaction level from the electronic transaction system implemented since 2014.⁸ These data cover the universe of formal firms

⁶This study was developed within the scope of the research agenda conducted by the Central Bank of Chile (CBC) in economic and financial affairs of its competence. The CBC has access to anonymized information from various public and private entities, by virtue of collaboration agreements signed with these institutions.

⁷The information contained in the databases of the Chilean IRS is of a tax nature originating in self-declarations of taxpayers presented to the Service; therefore, the veracity of the data is not the responsibility of the Service

⁸To secure the privacy of workers and firms, the CBC mandates that the development, extraction and publication of the results should not allow the identification, directly or indirectly, of natural or legal persons.

in Chile and it is mandatory for all firms since mid 2018.

We combine the monthly sales data in the F29 form with the annual sales data in the F22 because the high frequency data in the F29 is more likely to suffer from misreporting problems. For example, firms could misreport sales in May but report sales in June as sales from May and June. On the other hand, the F22 annual form, which is the official data for tax purposes, should be less susceptible to misreporting, both because it is also an official document and because it is at a lower frequency. Therefore, we use the high frequency sales data only for firms whose sales reported in the F29 represent between 90 – 110 percent of the sales reported in the F22. In addition, we drop the bottom and top 1 percent of the observations in terms of sales growth. For this group of firms we also obtain their total employment data from the DJ1887 tax declaration form, which requires firms to report their wage bill and number of employees. We then aggregate these monthly data to quarterly for the period 2005q1-2020q4. For firms' sales, we simply add sales across months in a given quarter. For employment, we aggregate it by taking the simple average across months in a given quarter. For the firm-to-firm transaction data, we add up all sales for a given pair of firms (i, j) across all months in a given quarter. As a final filter, we keep firms with five or more employees that are present at least 20 quarters for the period 2005q1-2020q4. To make a sense of how detailed our firm-to-firm data is, Figure 4 plots a random sample of 2000 firms in 2019q4. For visualization purposes we plot the links that represent at least 10% of firms total intermediate input purchases.


From the firm-to-firm transaction data used to construct Figure 4 we measure the unweighted indegree of firm i as the number of firms that supply a positive amount of goods or services to firm i , while we measure the unweighted outdegree of firm i as the number of firms that buy a positive amount of the output produced by firm i . We calculate the total degrees as the sum of indegrees and outdegrees. We also consider different moments of the distribution of firms' weighted indegrees and outdegrees. In particular, we obtain the average indegree as the ratio between firm i 's total expenditure on other firms' output and firm i 's total sales $\Omega_{iM} = \frac{\sum_{j=1}^N P_j M_{ij}}{P_i Q_i}$. We then obtain the input-output shares as $\Omega_{ij} = \frac{P_j M_{ij}}{P_i Q_i}$.⁹

Table 1 presents the main descriptive statistics. We report average sales, average number of employees, degrees, volatility and skewness of output growth. Two main facts stand out. First, network degrees display significant heterogeneity. Second, about half of firms in our

All the analysis was implemented by the authors and did not involve nor compromise the IRS.

⁹We also follow an alternative approach to measure firm-level linkages. In particular, instead of using firm-to-firm linkages, we use disaggregated industry classifications (170 industries) to measure degrees at the firm-to-industry level. The advantage of this approach is that it can better describe different intermediate inputs in the production process (e.g., metal vs glass) rather than different varieties of the same intermediate input (e.g., glass type A and glass type B that differ little and are simply sold by competitor firms). The results are very similar, which is why we prefer to use firm-to-firm linkages throughout the paper.

Figure 4. Chilean Firm-to-Firm Network: Random Sample of 2000 firms



Note: This figure plots the firm-to-firm network in 2019q4, for a random sample of 2000 Chilean firms. A dot represents a firm and each edge is an intermediate input sale that represent at least 10% of the client's total intermediate input purchases.

sample display a negatively skewed distribution of output growth.

3.2 Firm-level networks


Here, we provide more information on the distribution of firm level degrees. Figure 5, panel a, shows that degrees have a thick right tail. A relatively small number of firms are very well connected. Indeed, the average degree is twice as large as the median degree. Similar results hold when we consider the average degree over the period.

Our firm-level network data allows us to study the heterogeneity in linkages within narrowly-defined industries. Panel (b) of Figure 5 shows that there is substantial heterogeneity in degrees across firms, even after removing industry fixed effects. Consider the following two examples: bakery products and hotels. There are 1,509 companies in the bakery prod-

Table 1. Descriptive statistics

	Mean	SD	p25	p50	p75	N
Sales 1st period (millions)	314.290	4,770.680	12.186	34.507	96.921	68,885
Average employees	40.330	189.481	6.486	11.400	24.564	68,885
Degree 1st period	40.654	64.748	10.000	20.000	41.000	68,885
Standard deviation sales growth	0.500	0.282	0.278	0.438	0.676	68,885
Standard deviation employment growth	0.405	0.308	0.192	0.313	0.521	68,875
Skewness sales growth	-0.103	0.966	-0.489	-0.046	0.374	68,885
Skewness employment growth	0.048	1.230	-0.487	0.066	0.629	68,855

Note: This table presents basics descriptive statistics on output, network, volatility of output growth, and skewness of output growth. Sales first period and degree first period correspond to the sales and degrees that firms display either at the beginning of the period in 2005q1 or whenever the firm enters the sample (as long as it meets the requirement of 20 quarters in the sample).

Figure 5. Network degrees distribution

Note: this figure presents the kernel distribution of firm-level degrees the first time these firms report data on linkages. Panel (a) plots the distribution of the raw data, while panel (b) reports the firm degree subtracting the industry average (170 industries classification).

ucts industry with an average first period degree of 26.9 links, a standard deviation of 32.8 and a skewness of 7.2. In the hotels industry there are 1,376 companies with an average first period degree of 43.9 links, a standard deviation and a skewness of 58.7 and 3.7, respectively.

We now study the relationship between firm size and linkages in the cross-section. To do so, we run the following regression

$$(1) \quad \log \text{Degree}_i = \alpha + \alpha_I + \beta_s \log \text{Sales}_i + \gamma' \mathbf{X}_i + \varepsilon_i,$$

where $\log \text{Degree}_i$ is the average number of degrees (number of customers and suppliers) that a given firm i has during our analyzed period. α is a constant term, α_I is an industry fixed-effect, and \mathbf{X}_i contains firm-level controls such as the average intermediate input and

Table 2. Size and interconnectedness

	<i>Dep. Var: log Degree</i>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
log Sales	0.333*** (0.003)	0.338*** (0.003)	0.301*** (0.003)
Observations	64,642	64,642	64,642
R-squared	0.250	0.251	0.386
Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Sector FE	No	No	Yes

Note: This table reports the OLS coefficient of a regression in which the dependent variable is log degrees and the independent variable is log sales. Controls include average intermediate input share and the average export share (as a share of sales). Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

export share (as a share of total sales). ε_i is an error term. Our parameter of interest is β_s , which is the elasticity of degrees to changes in sales.


Unsurprisingly, in Table 2 we find that larger firms have more connections. In the cross-section, the elasticity of indegree with respect to sales is 0.30, meaning that moving up 1 percent in the distribution of firm size is associated with a 0.3 percent increase in the degree. The R^2 of the regression is 0.25. Once we control for other firm-level characteristics and sector fixed effects, the R^2 of the regression only increases to 0.38. The positive relationship between degrees and size is consistent with the implications of multisector models with intersectoral linkages, as in [Acemoglu et al. \(2012\)](#). However, there is a significant portion of the variation in degrees (62 percent) that is not accounted for the cross-sectional variation in firm-level observables that we use. This result leads us to believe that the structure of firm-level linkages provides valuable information beyond firm size and industry fixed-effects that we analyze in the next sections.

3.3 Firm-level output asymmetry and networks

In this subsection, we investigate the connection between firm-level asymmetry and network structure.

Figure 6 provides a first glance at the unconditional relationship between degrees and output growth skewness, measured using either sales (panel (a)) and employment (panel (b)). We observe a clear negative one: more interconnected firms display larger declines in output than less connected firms.

Figure 6. Output asymmetry and firm level networks



Note: These figures plot the binscatter plots, using 50 bins, for log degrees in the x-axis and the skewness of firm-level sales growth (panel a) the skewness of employment growth (panel b).

We now study the relationship between firm-level networks and firms' asymmetry in output growth in more detail. To do so, we take advantage of the cross-sectional heterogeneity in firm-level output growth skewness, for the whole sample, and the average number of linkages (indegree, outdegree, and the sum of both). In particular, we estimate the following equation:

$$(2) \quad Y_i = \alpha + \alpha_I + \beta_d \log \text{Degree}_i + \gamma' \mathbf{X}_i + \varepsilon_i,$$

where Y_i may represent either sales growth skewness or employment growth skewness during the period for a given firm i . Our parameter of interest is β_d that provides the relationship between log degree and the two skewness measures. We measure the degree of a firm using the average number of connections a firm has during the period, including both buyer and seller relationships. The parameter α_I represents industry fixed effects that we include to account for the fact that some industries might be naturally exposed to more skewed shocks. The \mathbf{X}_i represents firm-level characteristics and include size (in terms of sales), export share, and intermediate input share. Finally, ε_i is an error term.

In Tables 3 and 4 we report the results of estimating Equation 2 for both sales growth skewness and employment growth skewness, respectively. Also, we partition the number of firms into those that exhibit either negative or positive skewness and run the regressions for those subsamples. The results show that the negative relationship between degrees and skewness only holds for the group of firms with negative skewness. Columns (1) to (3) in Table 3 show that more interconnected firms display a more negative skewness of output

Table 3. Sales Growth Skewness and Network Degrees

	<i>Dep. Var: Sales Growth Skewness</i>					
	Negative Skewness			Positive Skewness		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Log degree 1st	-0.091*** (0.004)	-0.056*** (0.005)	-0.048*** (0.005)	0.040*** (0.003)	0.040*** (0.004)	0.044*** (0.004)
Observations	36,534	34,216	34,209	32,309	29,841	29,834
R-squared	0.016	0.031	0.129	0.005	0.043	0.072
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Sector FE	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

Note: This table reports the OLS coefficient of a regression in which the dependent variable is the skewness of sales growth and the independent variable is log degree. Controls include log sales, intermediate input share, and export share. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 4. Employment Growth Skewness and Network Degrees

	<i>Dep. Var: Employment Growth Skewness</i>					
	Negative Skewness			Positive Skewness		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Log degree 1st	-0.073*** (0.005)	-0.070*** (0.006)	-0.050*** (0.006)	0.035*** (0.004)	0.069*** (0.005)	0.070*** (0.005)
Observations	31,992	30,329	30,324	36,859	33,709	33,705
R-squared	0.007	0.032	0.094	0.002	0.014	0.036
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Sector FE	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes


Note: This table reports the OLS coefficient of a regression in which the dependent variable is the skewness of employment growth and the independent variable is log degree. Controls include log sales, intermediate input share, and export share. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

(sales and employment) growth, even after controlling for firm-level characteristics and industry fixed effects. In columns (4) to (6), we observe that the opposite holds for the group of positively skewed firms.

3.4 Firm-level resilience and networks during downturns

In this subsection, we follow [Salgado et al. \(2019\)](#) and study the asymmetry in the cross-sectional distribution of output growth, and how the firm-level network structure could

Figure 7. Output growth distribution recessions and expansions



Note: This figure presents the kernel density of sales growth during expansions and recessions. Recessions are defined as the firm-quarter observations in 2009 (GFC) and 2020 (COVID-19), while expansions are all the other firm-quarter observations.

provide insights on this asymmetry. Figure 7 shows that during macroeconomic downturns the distribution of firm-level output growth displays a fatter left tail, consistent with [Salgado et al. \(2019\)](#).¹⁰


We now zoom into the COVID-19 crisis. COVID-19 is the only recession for which we have firm-to-firm network data and COVID-19 represents an ideal event study for at least three reasons. First, COVID-19 is a very large shock, which is therefore more likely to activate non-linear effects. Second, COVID-19 is a sectoral productivity shock that had heterogeneous effects across industries (contact services vs non-contact goods and services) and firms (small vs large firms).¹¹ Third, during COVID-19 in Chile, financial conditions actually improved due to the implementation of several policies aimed at supporting the most-affected firms (see, [Albagli et al., 2021](#), for detailed evidence). Hence, COVID-19 represents a situation where the complementary hypothesis of financial frictions driving business cycle asymmetries may be relatively muted. As we highlight in Section 4, we propose that the large negative productivity shocks implied by COVID-19 were amplified via production interconnectedness.

We show that, consistent with Figure 7, firm-level output growth skewness declined

¹⁰Similar results hold for the size-weighted distribution of output growth.

¹¹There is an important demand component to the COVID-19 shock as well, due to lockdowns and other restrictions on business operations.

Figure 8. Output growth distribution during COVID-19



Note: This figure presents the kernel density of sales and employment growth during before (2019q2) and during COVID-19 (2020q2).


significantly during COVID-19: a significantly larger number of firms experienced declines in sales and employment. In particular, Figure 8 shows a large increase in the mass of firms in the left tail of the distribution of sales growth during 2020q2, compared to 2019q2. But who exactly were these firms? To answer this question, we run the following cross-sectional regression at each quarter t

$$(3) \quad \Delta \log y_i(t) = \alpha(t) + \beta(t) \log \text{degree}_i^{2017q4} + \Gamma(t) \cdot \text{controls}(t) + \epsilon_i(t),$$

where $\beta(t)$ measures the importance of firm-level degrees in shaping their performance at time t compared to other firms. We include controls for industry fixed effects, sales, intermediate input shares, and export shares.

In Figure 9 we plot the OLS estimated coefficient $\beta(t)$ in Equation 3 at different quarters in 2019 and 2020. We can see that the structure of firm-level networks was a relevant predictor of firm performance during COVID-19, even after controlling for intermediate input share, export share, sales, weighted degree measures, and industry fixed effects. A firm with a degree 10% larger (4 extra links compared to the average in Table 1) displayed a decline in output growth that is 0.55 percentage points larger. Interestingly, the coefficient of log sales is positive and equal to 0.04, indicating that a firm with sales 10% larger had 0.4 percentage points of larger (or less negative) sales growth. Hence, larger firms were more resilient to COVID-19 and, conditional on size, those that were more connected were less resilient. In the next section, we construct a production network model that help us understanding the cross-country and firm-level facts we document on the relationship between output skewness

Figure 9. Coefficient of regressing output growth against log degrees



Note: This figure plots the OLS estimated $\beta(t)$ from Equation 3.

and network structure.

4 Theory

We consider a general equilibrium closed economy environment with a representative consumer, N producers, and F factors of production based on [Baqae and Farhi \(2019\)](#). This economy features no distortions or frictions. We describe each block in turn.

Notation. Throughout, we use **bold** to denote vectors and matrices. For any vector/matrix \mathbf{X} , we use \mathbf{X}^T for its transpose.

4.1 Representative Consumer

The representative consumer has preferences over the N different goods according to the utility function

$$(4) \quad U(C_1, C_2, \dots, C_N)$$

where C_i represents consumption of good i . We assume $U(\cdot)$ is homothetic.

The representative consumer owns all F factors of production and supplies them inelastically to producers. Denoting the price of factor f as W_f , the representative consumer budget constraint is then

$$(5) \quad \sum_{i=1}^N P_i C_i \leq \sum_{f=1}^F W_f L_f + \sum_{i=1}^N \Pi_i$$

where Π_i is firm i 's profit.

Consumer's problem. Taking as given good and factor prices (\mathbf{P}, \mathbf{W}) , and factor supplies $\bar{\mathbf{L}}$ the representative consumer chooses a sequence \mathbf{C} of consumption demands to maximize (4) subject to (5). The solution to this problem delivers *Marshallian demands* for each good i as a function of prices and factor supplies i.e. $C_i = C_i(\mathbf{P}, \mathbf{W}, \bar{\mathbf{L}})$ for all $i = 1, 2, \dots, N$. We denote the optimal vector by \mathbf{C}^* and let $Y = U(\mathbf{C}^*)$ to be the maximum utility.

4.2 Producers

There are N producers indexed by $i = 1, 2, \dots, N$. Each producer i produces quantity Q_i using factors $\{L_{if}\}_{f=1}^F$ and intermediate inputs from other producers $\{M_{ij}\}_{j=1}^N$. Here L_{if} represents the demand for factor f by producer i , and M_{ij} represents producer's i demand for good j . Each producer has access to a producer-specific production function that satisfies

$$(6) \quad Q_i = A_i F^i(\{L_{if}\}_{f=1}^F, \{M_{ij}\}_{j=1}^N)$$

where A_i is a Hicks-neutral technology level. We assume that the $F^i(\cdot)$ is constant returns to scale.

Given good and factor prices, the total cost of producer i is

$$(7) \quad TC_i = \sum_{f=1}^F W_f L_{if} + \sum_{j=1}^N P_j M_{ij}.$$

Producer's problem. Taking as given good and factor prices (\mathbf{P}, \mathbf{W}) , each producer i minimizes (7) subject to (6). The solution to this problem delivers conditional demand for all inputs (both factors and intermediate goods), that are functions of prices, technology and quantities i.e. $L_{if} = L_{if}(P, W, Q_i, A_i)$ and $M_{ij} = M_{ij}(P, W, Q_i, A_i)$.

One consequence of our assumptions is that total costs can be written as

$$(8) \quad TC_i = TC_i(\mathbf{W}, \mathbf{P}, A_i, Q_i) = MC_i(\mathbf{W}, \mathbf{P}, A_i) Q_i,$$

so that total costs are linear in the quantity, Q_i . This result is a consequence of the constant returns to scale assumption.

By *Shephard's Lemma*, we can write conditional demands as

$$(9) \quad L_{if} = \frac{\partial TC_i}{\partial W_f} = \frac{\partial MC_i}{\partial W_f} Q_i \quad \text{for all } f = 1, 2, \dots, F$$

$$(10) \quad M_{ij} = \frac{\partial TC_i}{\partial P_j} = \frac{\partial MC_i}{\partial P_j} Q_i \quad \text{for all } j = 1, 2, \dots, N$$

4.3 Equilibrium

To close the model, we need to specify the market clearing conditions for both good and factor markets.

$$(11) \quad Q_i = C_i + \sum_{j=1}^N M_{ji} \quad \text{for all } i = 1, 2, \dots, N$$

$$(12) \quad \bar{L}_f = \sum_{i=1}^N L_{if} \quad \text{for all } f = 1, 2, \dots, F$$

Equation 11 are the goods market clearing conditions, while Equation 12 are the factor market clearing conditions.

4.4 Useful Definitions.

We now define some objects that are going to be key for our analysis.

We let $\mathbf{\Omega}$ to be the *input-output matrix* of this economy, with typical element

$$\mathbf{\Omega} = \{\Omega_{ij}\} = \frac{P_j M_{ij}}{P_i Q_i} \quad \text{for all } i, j = 1, \dots, N$$

Typical element Ω_{ij} measures how much producer i spends on good j , $P_j M_{ij}$, as a fraction of i 's sales, $P_i Q_i$. Here P_i is the price of good i , Q_i is the quantity sold of good i , and M_{ij} is how much producer i buys of the quantity of good j . In other words, it is a measure of the importance of producer j (column, seller) as a *supplier* to producer i (row, buyer).

With some abuse of notation, we also define producer's i expenditure on factor f as a

fraction of its sales

$$\Omega_{if} = \frac{W_f L_{if}}{P_i Q_i}.$$

We define Ψ as the *Leontief-Inverse matrix*, of dimension $N \times N$, as

$$(13) \quad \Psi = (I - \Omega)^{-1} = \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \Omega^s \text{ with typical element } \{\Psi_{ij}\}.$$

Ψ_{ij} denotes how important is producer j as a *direct and indirect* supplier to producer i .

On the consumption side, we define the vector of consumption shares, \mathbf{b} , as

$$\mathbf{b} = \{b_i\} = \frac{P_i C_i}{GDP},$$

where C_i represents the consumption of good i .

Since there are F factors of production, we define their shares of *Nominal Gross Domestic Product* (GDP) as

$$\Lambda_f = \frac{W_f \bar{L}_f}{GDP}; \quad \sum_{f=1}^F \Lambda_f = 1; \quad \sum_{f=1}^F W_f \bar{L}_f = GDP,$$

where W_f is the price of factor f , \bar{L}_f is the equilibrium factor f quantity, which in this model coincides with the factor supply endowment, \bar{L}_f . The second result is a restatement of the first result, and follows from the fact that everything in this economy is produced out of factors, and therefore total value added (GDP) should equal factor payments.

We let λ_i denote the *Domar weight* of producer i in total value added:

$$\lambda_i = \frac{P_i Q_i}{GDP}.$$

In the presence of intermediate goods in production, the Domar weight is the relevant size statistic for each producer's contribution to total value added ([Domar, 1961](#); [Hulten, 1978](#)). These weights also determine the *input-output multiplier* as

$$\xi = \sum_{i=1}^N \lambda_i,$$

that measures the discrepancy between aggregate sales and nominal GDP, a measure of the extent of intermediate inputs in production.

4.5 Aggregate Impact of Sectoral Technology Shocks

We now focus on how the production network structure can affect aggregate output skewness. The following is a re-statement of a previous result in [Baqee and Farhi \(2019\)](#):

Proposition 1 (Macroeconomic Impact of Sectoral Technology Shocks) *To a second-order approximation, the macroeconomic effect of sectoral technology shocks on real GDP, Y , is given by*

$$(14) \quad d \log Y = \lambda_i d \log A_i + \frac{1}{2} \frac{d \lambda_i}{d \log A_i} (d \log A_i)^2$$

The above proposition highlights that sectoral technology shocks can have meaningful second-order effects on real GDP provided that $d \lambda_i$ reacts to changes in $\log A_i$. How much λ_i reacts to the productivity shock depends on two key concepts: the elasticity of substitution of each producer and the production network structure. On the one hand, the elasticity of substitution is key for determining the sign of $d \lambda_i$ (the direction of the response). The production network structure, on the other hand, provides the quantitative bite that makes the direction, given by the elasticity of substitution, stronger or weaker.

To better get the intuition for this result, consider a model with only two sectors and one factor of production that we call labor. We assume labor is the numeraire. Define the Allen-Uzawa elasticity of substitution between any pair of inputs (k, h) by a given producer j (θ_{kh}^j), as

$$(15) \quad \theta_{kh}^j = \frac{\frac{\partial \log M_{jk}}{\partial \log P_h}}{\Omega_{jh}}.$$

This elasticity of substitution is a share-weighted demand elasticity since $\frac{\partial \log M_{jk}}{\partial \log P_h}$ is the *constant-output* response of demand of producer j for good k when we change the price of good h .

Consider now a technology shock to a producer n such that $d \log A_n > 0$. The change in the Domar weight of a producer i change in response to this shock is given by

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{d \lambda_i}{d \log A_n} &= \sum_{j=1}^2 \lambda_j \Phi_j \left(\Psi_{(i)}, \Psi_{(n)} \right) \\ \Phi_j \left(\Psi_{(i)}, \Psi_{(n)} \right) &= - \sum_{k=1}^2 \sum_{h=1}^2 \Omega_{jk} \left(\delta_{kh} + \left(\theta_{kh}^j - 1 \right) \Omega_{jh} \right) \Psi_{ki} \Psi_{hn} \\ \delta_{kh} &= 1 \text{ if } k = h \text{ and } 0 \text{ otherwise} \end{aligned}$$

where we use $\Psi_{(i)}$ to denote the i th column of the Leontief-inverse matrix Ψ . $\Phi_j(\Psi_{(i)}, \Psi_{(n)})$ is what [Baqee and Farhi \(2019\)](#) call the *input-output substitution operator*. This operator is important because it records how each producer j redirects expenditures towards sector i after a change in the productivity of sector n . To fix ideas, take a given producer j . In the presence of intermediate input linkages, an increase in technology of sector n translates into a price change of good h of $-\Psi_{hn}$. Following this decrease in the price of good h , sector j may reallocate its expenditure from other goods k towards good h . How much it does so is measured by $\Omega_{jk}(\delta_{kh} + (\theta_{kh}^j - 1)\Omega_{jh})$ that provides the partial equilibrium change in expenditure share of producer j on good k when we vary the price of good h i.e. $\frac{\partial \Omega_{jk}}{\partial \log P_h}$. This effect is then transmitted *upstream* in the production network (from the buyer to the seller) from producer k , the one that producer j was redirecting expenditure towards/from, to producer i by the element Ψ_{ki} that records how important is producer i as a seller to producer k . This chain of reasoning holds for all producers j that potentially demand good i . The final effect of producer j on producer i is weighted by the size of sector j , i.e $\lambda_j \Phi_j(\Psi_{(i)}, \Psi_{(n)})$.

Simple Quantitative Example. We now conduct a simple quantitative exercise to illustrate how this measure affects aggregate output skewness. Imagine a two sector world where


$$(16) \quad \Omega^{sparse} = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & (1-a) \\ (1-a) & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$(17) \quad \Omega^{dense} = \begin{bmatrix} (1-a)/2 & (1-a)/2 \\ (1-a)/2 & (1-a)/2 \end{bmatrix}.$$

Figure 10 shows the aggregate output response to a technology shock in sector 2, for two different elasticities of substitution $\sigma = 0.2$ and $\sigma = 1.8$, and the two different network structures detailed in Equations (16) and (17) assuming $a = 0.5$. We construct this exercise by changing the distribution of expenditure on intermediate inputs while keeping the aggregate expenditure on intermediates, the consumption shares, and the Domar weights equal in both cases. If inputs are gross complements, as shown by [Baqee and Farhi \(2019\)](#), aggregate output is a concave function of productivity, implying that negative shocks are amplified and positive shocks are attenuated. Our contribution here is to demonstrate that the dense network displays stronger concavity of aggregate output compared to the sparse network. In panel (b), we observe that the opposite holds when inputs are substitutes in production. In that case, negative shocks are mitigated, while positive shocks are amplified. Both effects are stronger in the dense network.

Figure 11 explains the intuition behind the results in Figure 10. When inputs are gross complements, positive productivity shocks to sector 2 shrink the size of sector. The decline

Figure 10. Aggregate Output Response to a Technology Shock in Sector 2



Note: This figure plots aggregate output responses to a technology shock in sector 2 for different elasticities of substitution and different network structures. The blue line shows the aggregate output responses with a dense network structure, while the red line shows the aggregate output responses with a sparse network structure.


in the Domar weight of sector 2 is larger in the dense network, compared to the sparse, which explains the stronger concavity in production observed for the more interconnected network. Exactly the opposite holds when the elasticity $\sigma > 1$. This result is akin to Baumol’s cost disease. Under complementarities, the sector which productivity declines becomes larger in the economy, which further amplifies the negative effect of the initial shock.

Finally, in Figure 12 we show the implications for the skewness of log real GDP in both networks. As we observe, the smaller the elasticity, the more negative is the skewness of output in the dense network compared to the sparse.

5 Quantitative Exercises


In this section, we calibrate a production network model with non-unitary elasticities of substitution between inputs and constant returns to scale in production, as in [Baqae and Farhi \(2019\)](#), [Miranda-Pinto \(2021\)](#), and [Carvalho et al. \(2021\)](#). We perform two quantitative exercises. First, we use the OECD industry-to-industry production network for the 46 countries in our sample from section 2. Our goal is to show how the model can generate the observed relationship between macroeconomic skewness and network density. In our second exercise, we use the firm-to-firm network data for the Chilean economy from section 3 to study the ability of our model to generate the cross-sectional patterns that relate firm-level

Figure 11. Changes in Domar Weight of Sector 2 after a positive technology shock



Note: This figure shows $d\lambda_2/d\log A_2$ for different values of the elasticity of substitution σ .

Figure 12. Simulated Skewness as a Function of the Elasticity



Note: This figure shows the simulated skewness of log real GDP (y-axis), in the dense and sparse networks, and the value of the elasticity of substitution σ in the x-axis. Productivity shocks follow a normal distribution with mean 1.5 and standard deviation of 0.2. The skewness reported is the average skewness of 200 simulations of size 500. This corresponds to the global solution of the model.

networks to firm-level output asymmetry. Here, we also use the firm-to-firm calibration to evaluate the ability of our model in generating a negatively skewed distribution of real GDP. A key parameter in our quantitative exercises is the elasticity of substitution between inputs. We use an elasticity of substitution between inputs σ of 0.55 from [Fujiy et al. \(2022\)](#) for both calibrations.¹²

5.1 Intersectoral linkages and skewness across countries


We use the OECD input-output data for the 46 countries in our sample for the year 1995 to calibrate the model input-output shares Ω_{ij} , labor shares Ω_{if} , and consumption shares b_i . We follow [Baqae and Farhi \(2019\)](#) and assume that sectoral productivity A_i follows a log normal distribution with mean $-\Sigma_{ii}/2$ and standard deviation Σ_{ii} . For simplicity, we assume $\Sigma_{ii} = 12\%$ for all i . We obtain the model-implied skewness of log real GDP using the global solution of the model and simulating 5,000 draws of productivity. [Figure 13](#) depicts the skewness of log real GDP across countries implied by the model. There are two observations that are consistent with the empirical evidence in section 2. The model is able to deliver a negative skewness for almost all countries and the implied skewness shows significant heterogeneity. However, the model falls short in replicating the level of the skewness. This is not surprising given that we are not targetting the level and that our calibration assumes common volatility of productivity shocks across sectors and countries. Hence, we are not leveraging the potential heterogeneity in cross-country sectoral productivity and sectoral elasticities. Indeed, Chile’s skewness in this calibration is -0.023, while the firm-to-firm network calibration in the next section is able to generate a skewness of -0.3, which is more in line with the observed in [Figure 1](#).

5.2 Firm-to-firm network in Chile

We construct our firm-to-firm production network (Ω) using the detailed transaction data from Chile used in section 3. We also calculate value-added input shares a (capital and labor). Our calibration assumes that the steady state of the economy is described by the input-output shares and value-added input shares in 2019q2. Hence, an element Ω_{ij} is the ratio between intermediate inputs that firm i spends on firm j ’s output, as a fraction of firm i ’s total sales. The vector of value-added input shares is one minus the share of intermediate inputs in gross output. The vector of consumption shares \mathbf{b} is assumed to be symmetric for

¹²The authors’ estimate for India of the elasticity between inputs, during COVID-19, lies in the range of the estimates from [Boehm et al. \(2019\)](#) and [Atalay \(2017\)](#). Although [Miranda-Pinto \(2021\)](#) and [Miranda-Pinto and Young \(2021\)](#) find substantial sectoral heterogeneity in production elasticities, in order to focus on the role of networks and complementarities we assume homogenous elasticities.

Figure 13. Skewness of log real GDP (model)




Note: This figure plots the model implied skewness of countries' log real GDP using 5,000 draws from the model. Shocks to sectoral productivity are iid log normal with a standard deviation of 12%.

all sectors $1/N$. We make this decision due to data limitations and to focus on the role of the production network.

Our sample of firms is substantially smaller than the sample of firms we had in previous sections. To be consistent with our model (no entry/exit and exogenous linkages), we choose the network of firms that display active linkages and positive sales throughout the period 2019q2-2020q2. We also keep firms with labor productivity data for at least 8 quarters. Therefore, our final sample entails $N = 16,255$ firms.

We calibrate firm-level productivity using data on firm-level revenue labor productivity $LP_{it} = \frac{P_{it}Q_{it}}{E_{it}}$, where $P_{it}Q_{it}$ and E_{it} are, respectively, total sales and total employment of firm i at time t . We compute changes in productivity relative to the previous year's quarter. For example, the percent change in labor productivity during COVID-19 is $\Delta \log A_{i,2020q2} = \log LP_{i,2020q2} - \log LP_{i,2019q2}$. Therefore, we map our model to the data through the evolution of firm-level productivity. Our first goal is to investigate whether the model is able to generate the procyclical skewness of output growth we observe in the

Figure 14. Model Implied Relationship Production Network Density and Skewness




Note: This figure plots the residualized skewness of log real GDP simulated from the model using 5,000 draws, and the residualized network density in 1995. These are residualized using the following controls: average intermediate input share, the skewness of the weighted outdegree, and the skewness of the weighted indegree.

data. Figure 15 plots the model-implied cross sectional distribution of output growth pre COVID-19 (2020q1) and during COVID-19 (2020q2). The cross-sectional distribution of output growth becomes substantially more asymmetric during COVID-19. While output growth skewness in 2020q1 was 0.04, it declines to -0.77 during 2020q2. This result is not driven by the skewness of the shock to productivity but entirely due to the mechanism we highlight in the paper: large negative shocks are further amplified by complementarities in production and the network structure. Indeed, as observed in Table 7, during 2020q2, the average percent change in productivity is -0.04 (compared to 0.05 in 2020q1) and the skewness of cross-sectional productivity growth is -0.10 (compared to -0.09 in 2020q1).

We now investigate the role of firm-to-firm linkages in amplifying the decline in output growth during COVID-19. To do so, we study the ability of the model in generating the empirical pattern between log degrees and output growth previously documented in Figure 9 from estimating Equation 3. Figure 16 plots the model implied coefficient $\beta(t)$ in Equation 3 for different quarters in 2019 and 2020. We also plot in the same figure the coefficients and confidence intervals of the empirical estimates of $\beta(t)$. Our results show a pattern similar to

Figure 15. Model implied distribution of output growth distribution




Note: This figure plots the kernel density of output growth from the model calibrated to 2020q1 (pre COVID-19) and 2020q2 (COVID-19). Each quarter in the model corresponds to a different level of firm-level productivity, calibrated from the data.

that in the data. More interconnected firms saw larger declines in output during COVID-19 and also recovered faster. During other quarters, when the size of the shocks is smaller, the relationship between output growth and degrees vanishes, which emphasizes the role of non-linearities in the model.

Finally, we study the ability of the model in generating aggregate skewness. To do so, we use the time series of firm-level productivity to measure firm-level volatility of shocks. We follow [Baqae and Farhi \(2019\)](#) and assume that firm-level productivity is iid and log-normally distributed, with mean $-\varsigma_i/2$ and standard deviation ς_i . We measure the skewness of log real GDP from $S = 10$ simulations of $T = 100$ periods each.¹³ The average skewness over the simulations is -0.31 , which is significantly larger than the one implied by the industry-to-industry calibration (-0.023) for Chile, and much closer to that in Figure 1.

¹³The solution of the model entails inverting a square matrix of dimension $N \approx 17,000$, implying that each simulation takes a considerable amount of time.

Figure 16. Coefficient of regressing output growth against log degrees



Note: This figure plots the OLS estimated $\beta(t)$ from $d \log q_i(t) = \alpha + \beta(t) \log degree_i + \gamma(t) \log sales_i + \epsilon_i(t)$, using the model implied $d \log q_i$. Each quarter in the model corresponds to a different level of firm-level productivity, calibrated from the data.

6 Conclusion

We showed that denser networks are related to business cycle asymmetries in the data – across countries, sectors, or firms, entities with more connections experience more negatively-skewed distributions of economic output. In our model, this correlation is driven by the concavity of aggregate output with respect to productivity, which complements existing results on the sources of skewed business cycles (such as financial constraints) and highlights the importance of solving models globally.

While our model is efficient, our results have policy implications that we intend to explore in future work. For example, frictions at the sectoral level can amplify sectoral shocks inefficiently, as in [Bigio and La'O \(2020\)](#) and [Miranda-Pinto and Young \(2021\)](#). The gains of industrial policies in such environments, that reallocate inputs across sectors will hinge on how connected the network is (see [Liu, 2019](#)), and therefore also whether that network structure amplifies or dampens negative shocks. Since negative skewness imposes larger costs of fluctuations on households, understanding its source is important for assessing the welfare costs of cycles as well.

References

- Acemoglu, D. and Azar, P. D. (2020). Endogenous production networks. *Econometrica*, 88(1):33–82.
- Acemoglu, D., Carvalho, V. M., Ozdaglar, A., and Tahbaz-Salehi, A. (2012). The network origins of aggregate fluctuations. *Econometrica*, 80(5):1977–2016.
- Albagli, E., Fernandez, A., Guerra-Salas, J., and Huneus, F. (2021). Anatomy of firms’ margins of adjustment: Evidence from the covid-19 pandemic. Technical report, Mimeo.
- Atalay, E. (2017). How important are sectoral shocks? *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*, 9(4):254–80.
- Baqae, D. R. and Farhi, E. (2019). The macroeconomic impact of microeconomic shocks: Beyond hulten’s theorem. *Econometrica*, 87(4):1155–1203.
- Bigio, S. and La’O, J. (2020). Distortions in Production Networks*. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 135(4):2187–2253.
- Boehm, C. E., Flaaen, A., and Pandalai-Nayar, N. (2019). Input linkages and the transmission of shocks: Firm-level evidence from the 2011 tōhoku earthquake. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 101(1):60–75.
- Carvalho, V. M., Nirei, M., Saito, Y. U., and Tahbaz-Salehi, A. (2020). Supply Chain Disruptions: Evidence from the Great East Japan Earthquake*. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 136(2):1255–1321.
- Carvalho, V. M., Nirei, M., Saito, Y. U., and Tahbaz-Salehi, A. (2021). Supply chain disruptions: Evidence from the great east japan earthquake. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 136(2):1255–1321.
- Dew-Becker, I. (2022). Tail risk in production networks. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Domar, E. D. (1961). On the measurement of technological change. *The Economic Journal*, 71(284):709–729.
- Fujiy, B. C., Ghose, D., and Khanna, G. (2022). Production networks and firm-level elasticities of substitution. Technical report, Technical report, Working Paper.

- Herskovic, B. (2018). Networks in production: Asset pricing implications. *The Journal of Finance*, 73(4):1785–1818.
- Hulten, C. R. (1978). Growth accounting with intermediate inputs. *The Review of Economic Studies*, 45(3):511–518.
- Jensen, H., Petrella, I., Ravn, S. H., and Santoro, E. (2020). Leverage and deepening business-cycle skewness. *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*, 12(1):245–81.
- Liu, E. (2019). Industrial policies in production networks. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 134(4):1883–1948.
- Miranda-Pinto, J. (2021). Production network structure, service share, and aggregate volatility. *Review of Economic Dynamics*, 39:146–173.
- Miranda-Pinto, J. and Young, E. R. (2021). Flexibility and frictions in multisector models. *Forthcoming, AEJ: Macro*.
- Miranda-Pinto, J. and Zhang, G. (2020). Trade credit and sectoral comovement during the great recession. Technical report, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
- Ordonez, G. (2013). The asymmetric effects of financial frictions. *Journal of Political Economy*, 121(5):844–895.
- Salgado, S., Guvenen, F., and Bloom, N. (2019). Skewed business cycles. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.

Appendix

6.1 Additional Tables

Table 5. Cross-country relationship between real GDP growth skewness and network density

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)
	Skewness	Skewness
Density 1995	-3.127*** (0.743)	-3.073*** (0.880)
Observations	46	46
R-squared	0.221	0.269
Controls	No	Yes

Note: This table reports the OLS coefficient of running a regression between real GDP growth skewness as dependent variable. Column 1 uses network density in 1995 as independent variable. Column 2 uses the following controls: GDP per capita in 1985, the volatility of the cyclical component of GDP growth, skewness of the outdegree and indegree distribution in 1995.

Table 6. Sales Growth Volatility and Network Degrees

	<i>Dep. Var: Standard Deviation Sales Growth</i>					
	Negative Skewness			Positive Skewness		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Log degree 1st	-0.089*** (0.001)	-0.076*** (0.001)	-0.055*** (0.001)	-0.087*** (0.001)	-0.077*** (0.001)	-0.058*** (0.001)
Observations	36,534	34,216	34,209	32,309	29,841	29,834
R-squared	0.115	0.115	0.343	0.123	0.126	0.357
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Sector FE	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

Note: This table reports the OLS coefficient of a regression in which the dependent variable is the standard deviation of sales growth and the independent variable is log degree. Controls include log sales, intermediate input share, and export share. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 7. Annual labor productivity growth

	2019q2	2019q3	2019q4	2020q1	2020q2	2020q3	2020q4
Mean	0.01	0.04	0.02	0.05	-0.04	0.07	0.11
Median	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.05	-0.03	0.07	0.11
St. Dev	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.28	0.35	0.35	0.32
Skewness	-0.04	-0.09	-0.06	-0.09	-0.10	-0.18	-0.15
N	16,938	16,938	16,938	16,938	16,938	16,938	16,938

Note: This table presents the descriptive statistics of annual labor revenue labor productivity growth at different quarters. The sample of firms corresponds to that used in section 5 for our firm-to-firm network calibration.