The Stars are Down:
Preliminary Remarks toward Theorizing Capitalism and "Enchantment"

Draft Paper. Please get permission before citing.

Jason Ānanda Josephson Storm
jaj1@williams.edu

We live in a world in which: Walmart sells "Sage Spirit-Smudge Wands" and clothing chains like Urban Outfitters sell "healing crystals" and tarot cards. You can go on Ebay.com right now and pay an Australian "white witch" to perform a ritual to summon a djinn and bind it to an object of your choice.[1] Meanwhile, coffee shops and co-ops throughout the United States and much of Western Europe display flyers advertising "palm readers," "energy balancing," and "chakra work." Moreover, even if you ignore the Harry Potter craze and other fictionalized depictions of wizards, ghosts, and witches, studies of British and American reading habits suggest that "New Age" print culture is incredibly lucrative with "non-fiction books" about magic, guardian angels, and near-death experiences frequently appearing in the upper echelons of Amazon's best-seller lists (as Owen Davies has observed, "[Magical] Grimoires have never been more easily available").[2] Astrological horoscopes continue to be a regular feature of many newspapers.[3] Furthermore, the last fifteen years have seen a proliferation of "reality" television series that claim to report evidence for ghosts, psychics, extraterrestrials, monsters, curses, and even miracles. At the very least, it would seem contemporary consumers are willing to flirt with the existence of spirits and psychical powers, and that magic itself has been fully commercialized.

If this comes as anything of a surprise, it is because there is a long history of imagining that the philosophy of history pointed toward a different end. Indeed, until recently, the academy was long dominated by a particular settled view on the relationship between capitalism and "enchantment." Scholars shared what amounted to a consensus that capitalism was itself basically disenchanting. A range of theorists have argued that modernity meant that magic, religion, and some sense of cosmic significance had been replaced by technology, calculation, and bureaucratic protocol. Recast, modernity itself was regularly associated with the rise of instrumental reason and the embrace of a worldview governed by mechanistic theories that had no room for the supernatural or magical thinking more broadly.[4] Not to confuse the issue, but sociologists in particular often saw modernity in terms of a broader trend toward secularization which was often taken to mean that religion was doomed to lose its significance as societies became more advanced. Disenchantment was typically supposed to be one of either the causes or symptoms of this broader trajectory.[5]

In summary, insofar as capitalism was itself supposed to be one of the central vectors of modernization, it was often argued that the calculating logics of the market, the orderly necessities of industrial production, and the rise of a global system of commodity exchange with its universal notion of economic value, implied a corresponding decline in enchantment.

This view was amplified by classical and neoclassical economists (and economic historians trained in their idioms), who typically presumed that: A) the foundation of economics was "rational choice theory" which meant that individual human behavior was fundamentally instrumentally rational (at least in terms of ends-means utility maximization); and B) that the market was basically a rational system of knowledge exchange, such that capitalism was itself supposed to represent the epitome of collective rationality.[6] "Superstitions" and magical thinking

were often seen as irrational obstacles to both economic development and modernization, and the more capitalist/modern a society got the more it was supposed to be rationalized and therefore the more that it was supposed to be disenchanted.

Contemporary theorists now generally know better. Support for the classical secularization thesis has withered in the face of widely publicized religious revivals, especially in the United States, South Asia, and the Islamicate world. Sociologists, instead of describing an opposition between capitalism and religion, increasingly frame their work in terms of a "religious marketplace."[7] Meanwhile, rational choice theory has suffered from psychological critiques of human reasoning and the onslaught of unpredicted economic booms and busts, and, while the issue is still controversial, economists have increasingly abandoned classical theories of individual rationality in favor of behavioral economics and various accounts of "predictable irrationality."[8] A parallel trend in the academic study of religion by scholars such as Jeffrey Kripal and myself (and many others), as well as new work by anthropologists like John and Jean Comaroff, Birgit Meyer, and Aihwa Ong (among many others), has provided increasing evidence against the assumption that modernization means disenchantment.[9]

More specifically, capitalism itself is increasingly understood in terms of a new kind of culture industry, designed to commodify and mass-produce new forms of "enchantment."[10] Sometimes this is described not as a feature of capitalism itself, but rather an expression of its late stage. For instance, the contemporary sociologist George Ritzer has argued that the current iteration of globalization has produced "cathedrals of consumption" (like Disneyland and megamalls) in order to "enchant" consumers into making even more purchases.[11] All that is to say, a number of contemporary theorists have repudiated the old narrative and now suggest that

capitalism itself has a much more complicated relationship to rationality, religion, and enchantment.

But there are a number of unsettled questions. As the workshop's organizers—Astrid Van den Bossche and Anat Rosenberg—asked in the email prompt that hooked me into this conference:

> "We ask what enchantment is, and how it is researched in different fields. In particular:
>
> *- What does enchantment mean in theories of modern religion, of magic, or of other belief systems or ontologies, and which phenomena, therefore, should be considered part of it?*
>
> *- Is enchantment theorized and investigated as a structural or as an individual phenomenon?*
>
> *- Is enchantment treated as a continuous phenomenon (ongoing enchantment), as a new phenomenon (re-enchantment that followed disenchantment), or as historically-specific constellations that change across time and space?"*

This draft paper is an attempt to take a first pass at addressing these great questions. I will start from the most metalevel with a discussion of the use of analytical concepts and their function in the social sciences. Then I will begin the process of applying the resulting conceptual work to the question of enchantment (also building off of my previous work on disenchantment). The nature of capitalism will only be touched on, but perhaps a follow up paper (or expansion of this one) will do more to put these two specific subjects together.

1- What are analytical concepts (like "enchantment" and "capitalism") for?

The contemporary Dutch scholar Rens Bod has argued the human sciences can be characterized in terms of "the quest for patterns in humanistic material on the basis of methodical principles."[12] I think this is roughly correct, as far as it goes. Much of what we think of as "analytical concepts" or theories are assertions about patterns, which are necessarily rooted in judgements of similarity and difference. But this opens up a particular problem that has been the bane of many theoretical programs across the disciplines, namely that pattern recognition alone doesn't tell us how and where patterns apply.

At bare minimum, an analytical concept is supposed to describe a perceived similarity across a set of specific instances. But as WATANABE Satoshi **渡辺慧** and others have pointed out—everything is similar to everything else in some respect.[13] A skull is like the moon in that they are both material objects, vaguely spherical, appear to be the same shade of gray in certain light, and both are referred to in the same Octavio Paz poem.[14] It would be a mistake, however, to conclude anything significant about this resemblance. Any arbitrarily determined set of objects is going to have some properties in common, but this does not mean that they are part of a natural grouping or kind.[15]

Furthermore, even if all members of a given set share a common quality or property (*tertium comparationis*) that would not imply that this similarity was itself significant or defining. For instance, to evoke a famous example from Wittgenstein, games are activities, but being an activity is not determinant as it captures more than "games." Even if all games are activities, not all activities are games. Hence games cannot be defined in terms of all being activities. On a

sufficiently high level of abstraction, one will always be able to find some common denominator to a predetermined list, but that is not sufficient to justify it as the defining feature of a given concept.[16] Indeed, the common quality of a given set is often the product of a pre-established comparative judgement, not the reverse.

Comparative judgments of similarity also vary based on the circumstances and purposes of the comparison. Take sorting luggage at the airport: from a pilot's perspective bags are more similar the closer they are in weight; from a fashionista's perspective the most similar bags might be those that share a color or brand; a baggage handler tasked with stacking bags might emphasize similarity by shape; from a given passenger's perspective the most similar bags are the ones she owns, and so on. Similarity is not an absolute property of a set of objects, nor is it an innate clustering of qualities. Judgements of similarity tend to have as much to do with one's perspective, purpose, and perhaps prior linguistic categories, as anything else.

Moreover, following Aristotle, many philosophers have argued that observed similarities alone do not provide an explanation—in essence to observe "that something is so" does not tell us "why it is so"—and lacking this, why we are limited in the kind of generalizations or knowledge we can produce about a subject. A project that amounts to the statement all "red" things are "red" has not contributed much knowledge. Similarity without an underlying cause is not much more than a weak analogy. This has direct implications on how we construct analytical concepts.

Before we get to those, I want to push back against the partisans of otherness, and add the observation that difference is no more meaningful than similarity. Everything is also different from everything else in some respect. To evoke a Buddhist philosophical observation, even the "same" person is different at different time-slices (e.g., my daughter at birth had different

constituent mass, personality, size-shape, and many other properties than she does today as a three-year old). Assessments of difference are no less comparisons and hence fall victim to the same set of problems around generalizability that plagued judgements of similarity. So the formulation of analytical concepts are less than they appear, as there is no particular reason to stake too much on either similarity or difference. They don't tell when a given member of a category (e.g., a given 'enchantment) is going to exhibit whatever properties we think we are tracking.

I go into a lot more detail about this in my 2021 book, but in brief stronger generalizations (which are really abductive inferences) are those that present a hypothesis about the relationship between the observations and the cause of those observations, which in turn necessitates a theory about the degree to which the sample is representative.[17] We can do a lot better at understanding generalizing about which previously unobserved "crows will be black" if we have a theory that provides a causal explanation behind the coloring of crows.

Part of the problem with exactly such generalizations in the humanities and social sciences is that our basic objects of study lack the kind of concretely stable properties that would make for ready generalizations. In theory, if you've sampled one helium atom, you can roughly extrapolate the properties of all helium atoms in the known universe. But even many case studies of "magic" will not tell us anything about unobserved examples of "magic" on their own. In summary, apparent similarity or difference might be a good starting place for research, but it doesn't tell us very much on its own.

A further problem is that the social sphere poses a particular set of challenges toward regular study. I lay these out in much greater detail elsewhere, but in brief, that social phenomena are heterogenous and subject to constant variation and transformation. As Charles Taylor

argued, the success of "the natural sciences is bound up with the fact that all states of the system, past and future, can be described in the same range of concepts," but the human sciences address "open system[s]" and we cannot shield a certain domain of human events" from any other. Hence, the human world consists of constantly chaotic and interlocking systems. Moreover, "conceptual innovation . . . in turn alters human reality," leading to "radically unpredictable events." In summary, Taylor argues that it is hard to produce analytical concepts or even generalizations about society because it is constantly in the process of changing. [18]

Insights like Taylor's have often been taken to suggest that the systematic study of culture and society is impossible, but this analysis of their findings is wrong—we can actually come to understand a social world in motion. To do so, we first need to reject the idea that the social world consists in clearly delineated categories, describable by means of necessarily and sufficient condition definitions, and consisting in roughly fixed cross-cultural and cross-temporal constellations. Succinctly put, the whole investigative apparatus associated with the classical natural sciences is fundamentally unsuitable to the human sciences. Attempts to make the human sciences more like physics in this respect are basically doomed to failure. We have to reject the search for essences and essentialized definitions. It is as though we have been looking for objects while we should have been looking for processes. Recast, many of the deconstructive criticisms of the disciplinary master categories amount to identifying errors stemming from reification, atemporality, and misplaced concreteness—in other words, faults rooted in misidentifying the processual nature of their subject matter.

Accordingly in Storm 2021, I argue for a "Process Social Ontology" a fancy phrase for what amounts to a fundamental reorientation toward the domain of the human sciences in terms of processes. While few would dispute the processual aspect of society, the prevalent forms of

analyzing human affairs are often geared toward substance thinking rather than process thinking. We frequently refer to "capitalism" or "modernity" as if they were bounded objects with distinct borders and even as though they were subjects, rather than dynamic processes. Our major terminology for the disciplinary master categories is still caught up in substance-like language, such as nouns like *enchantment* and *magic*, and we pose substance-type questions of them, asking for instance "is X enchantment?" But when approaching our subject in this manner, our basic questions often amount to category errors.

Processual kinds are change, definitionally. Thinking about our work in terms of an analysis of heterogenous and changing but nonetheless roughly describable processes, permits to both grant the critique of the categories and produce new forms of analysis. We may draw generalizations while simultaneously acknowledging that we are discussing processes in flux, and that whatever we say today can and will certainly alter in the future. Nonetheless, our observations may be very useful—they can help us obtain a more accurate image of the stage of unfolding we are currently in, as well as those that have gone before. Let me approach this differently.

To return to what I was arguing earlier about how we formulate better analytical concepts this means that in an unfolding social domain we don't just need to understand the properties of a social kind but also the processes that anchor those properties. Put differently, in order to do to rise to the level of explanation we need to specify common properties *and* the causal, anchoring processes that have produced those properties.

It might seem that given the processual nature of the social world that it is impossible to reach any form of knowledge. But I will argue that as long as the world is changing slower than our knowledge of it, we can in fact attain at least certain forms of provisional knowledge. This

shouldn't seem especially baffling. In order language, we frequently make references to things like churches, scientists, and so on and we often do so to make (better or worse) generalizations. For this reason, as part of the process social ontology, I posit a notion of temporary zones of stability called "social kinds." Succinctly put, *social kinds* are socially constructed (or mind-dependent), dynamic clusters of properties, which are demarcated by the causal processes that anchor the relevant clusters. Social kinds tend to be high-entropic or varied both temporally and spatially (hence tend to be historically contingent); their properties emerge via their relationships to other social kinds; and social kinds crosscut each other so that the same entity can be the intersection of different kinds.

The other point I want to emphasize is that social kinds are not identical to the terms we have for them. In other words, social kinds exceed their reference, and research in the human sciences often proceeds by discovering hitherto unknown properties of particular social kinds. For example, I can competently discuss "credit unions" without knowing exactly what makes a credit union different from a bank, and so on. It might even turn out that "credit unions" have unanticipated properties that no one knows about (e.g., if credit unions turn out to be better at surviving financial crashes than regular banks). Moreover, disciplines frequently refer to what amounts to the same social kind in differing terminology. Moreover, shared terms can mask significant conceptual divisions (e.g., we don't all mean the same thing or same set of things with the term "enchantment.") All that is to say, terms factor into social kinds but are not identical to them.

Elsewhere, I dedicate many pages to discussing these features of social kinds and how they should be studied. But here I want to focus attention in the idea of anchoring processes,

these anchoring processes turn out to be key in formulating "analytical concepts" or we might say in making productive generalizations about the objects of our analysis and ordinary language.

These anchoring processes are also important because, since I am presuming change and difference, relative stability and similarity become the things to be explained. Put differently, we need an account of the multiple distinctive, causal, anchoring, or stabilization *processes* that give social kinds their shared properties. These processes are the reason there is any stability at in in the social world. The reduplication of process language in this section is completely intentional. Social kinds are processes that require other processes as catalysts. In Storm 2021 I discuss three extensive, if often interwoven, types of anchoring processes: *dynamic-nominalist*, *mimetic*, and *ergonic*. But I do not mean this list to be exhaustive.

First, *dynamic-nominalist*. This kind of anchoring processes will probably seem the most familiar to historians and other scholars of religion. The philosopher Ian Hacking describes "interactive kinds" as coming into being via what he calls a "process [of] dynamic nominalism, because it so strongly connects what comes into existence with the historical dynamics of naming and the subsequent use of name [sic]" (Hacking 2002, 26). To translate Hacking's insight into the idiom presented here, some social kinds share properties/capacities because of the way they have been named or classified. Hence, this is a way to be one level more specific about what I have referred to as elsewhere as classificatory social construction. A lot of the conversation about social construction (or Foucauldian genealogy) has assumed that most social kinds come into being via "discourse" or classification. This broadly genealogical or discourse history vantage toward our subject is probably broadly familiar to historians. I think this is good as far as it goes and indeed many social kinds (e.g., citizen) seem to come to share specific properties primarily because of dynamic-nominalist processes.

But we have to add an important expansion on this insight, because it is generally not the act of classifying alone that produces similarities. To imagine social kinds are merely the product of a scholar's pen is to give us too much power and to mistake social construction with idealist voluntarism. We rarely speak new things into being by words alone. Often social kinds are produced by overwriting existing differences with new meaningful distinctions. Moreover, for the social kind to take hold, there has to be role adoption or enforcement processes to stabilize the capacity/property clusters.

To explain, the mechanism Hacking described in his discussion of interactive kinds was feedback loops or role adoption in which people can "become aware of how they are classified and modify their behavior accordingly" (Hacking 1999, 32). This is an important insight and it seems to fit the descriptions of some of the properties of human social kinds. As Kwame Anthony Appiah observed about social identities: "Once labels are applied to people, ideas about people who fit the label come to have social and psychological effects. In particular these ideas shape the way people conceive of themselves and their projects" (Appiah 2005, 66). There are a number of social kinds that come to share properties in this way, but pure feedback between the classification and the recognition of such is only be a weak anchoring process because it relies on agents adopting a classification of themselves and getting caught in the relevant feedback loop.

This does not describe the limit of *dynamic-nominalist* processes. In the case of many of the kinds in the human sciences we are most interested in, they have come to share the properties/capacities they do because of specific classificatory processes that have become entangled with mechanisms of enforcement (cultural, social, institutional, legal and so on). Examples are bountiful: legal processes that confer particular capacities on certain groups (such as the ability to vote) which have built-in mechanisms to attempt to ensure compliance;

boundary policing that goes on in academic disciplines; social norms of shaming or reciprocity that encourage or prevent certain kinds of behaviors; tax codes that provide religious exemptions to organizations that take on properties, and so on.

Second, ***mimetic processes***. The idea for these anchoring processes is drawn from the work of Ruth Millikan. She refers to "historical kinds," by which she means those natural kinds that have shared properties (or stable differences) because of historical copying processes often combined with a consistent environment that tends to stabilize or limit variation (Millikan 2017). We might think of biological heredity which combined with mutations produces a limited range of variation with property clusters evolving over time, but constrained by a physical environment that tends to render non-viable certain forms of radical mutation. Restated, mimetic processes are the anchoring processes that come from repeated copying under environmental constraint. These are different from dynamic nominalist processes because they do not require classification. Pre-Anthropocene animal species shared features not because of any classification system (except perhaps their own), but because of the processes of genetic inheritance. By way of another example, a given craftsperson does not have to know that something was called or classified as a hammer in order to produce a working copy.

Millikan explicitly argues that many kinds of interest to the human sciences "such as ethnic, social, economic, and vocational groups" are best understood as sharing traits because of mimetic processes. This is due to the fact that "Members of these groups are likely to act similarly in certain ways and to have attitudes in common as a result of similar training handed down from person to person (reproduction or copying), as a result of custom (more copying), as a result either of natural human dispositions or social pressures to conform to role models (copying again)" (Millikan 2006, 22). Many social kinds share properties because of reduplication

processes combined with social pressures toward conformity. Indeed, a long list of philosophers have seen the human predisposition to imitation or mimesis as fundamental to both learning and to birth of culture more generally (see Storm 2021).

Millikan allows us to explain the clustering of properties at an even finer grained level of detail. For instance, all American Starbuck's franchises may share a certain cluster of properties as part of being jointly classified as coffee shops (e.g., they serve coffee), but they share even more features in common (e.g., branding, menus, types of leather chairs) because they have all been copied from a shared prototype. There is nothing in the name "coffee shop" that specifies décor or categorizing sizes of beverages as either Short, Tall, Grande, Venti and Trenta. But these can be explained in part by way of reduplication processes protected by copyright and trademark laws and variation intended to copy the associations while not violating those same laws.

Finally, ***ergonic convergence***. Sometimes kinds share properties through a process of selection or design intended to fulfill a certain function. Of the three types of anchoring processes discussed in this section, ergonic convergence has the greatest potential for misuse (in part as it is too easy to retroactively define functions). But when used very judicially it has value.

This is meant in part to cover an insight emerging from Herbert Simon and others (Simon 1996) that artifacts are best understood in terms of their purpose or teleology. Think of an electric hot water heater.[19] All such heaters contain a thermostat that switches off the current before the water begins to boil. But there are many different ways of putting physical components together to make a thermostat from bimetallic strips, to mercury bulbs, to expanding gases, to thermocouples. Each of these utilizes a totally different physical mechanism to produce the result. So why do these very different physical components all produce the same effect? Because they were designed to fulfill a common function. Restated, the fact that that hot water heater

thermostats share the tendency to shut off the current before the water boils is because they were selected for that function. In other words, if you know that something is a thermostat you can produce more robust generalizations about it than you could merely knowing the material out of which it has been composed.

Another example is the spear, which seems to have been developed independently not just by different human societies but by chimpanzees as well. While types of spears may have been produced by mimetic processes, the parallel convergence on making pointy sticks is not an example of classificatory or mimetic processes, but rather ergonic convergence. There is a simple physics (P = F/A, pressure is determined by force over area) that basically defines the core of what makes a good spear and trial and error will lead toward a convergence on a similar object, given similar material limitations). This also why certain kinds of artifacts and social kinds exhibit what amounts to Weberian rationalization (e.g., there is a tendency for "armies" to get better at fighting).

One could add that sometimes ergonic convergences emerge because of the ideological, economic, and institutional functions they fulfill. For example, (especially Marxist) philosophers of art (like my mother) have noted different art movements converged on similar forms because they were directed toward fulfilling this intersection of needs or "cultural niches."[20] In other words, there may be economic, ideological or institutional pressures that encourage convergent properties. There are reasons advertising art has tended to converged on certain representational techniques. Restated social kinds with independent origins can converge because they have been constructed to satisfy similar needs (practical, ideological, economic, etc). But we have to be very very careful about providing accounts of convergent functions in these respects.

This is because social kinds do not fill a common function. There is not one single need that motivates all enchantment or all art. More than a century of scholars searching for such have failed. For this reason, we have to be careful to avoid the older pitfalls of heavy-handed functionalist theorizing. There is a long history of functionalism in anthropology, psychology, and sociology. In the hands of conservative thinkers, sociological functionalism amounted to the claim that an institution or social kind exists because of its benefit to society. Similar arguments are have been restaged by evolutionary psychologists who often use natural selection to justify the claim that particular social organizations or cultural forms are innate because they contribute to the survival of the species (or did at some imaginary dawn of human origins). As contemporary philosopher of biology Alan Garfinkel has observed "many of these "human nature" explanations are like explaining the existence of restaurants by saying that people have to eat. We can grant that it is human nature that people have to eat, but, we want to ask, why should that necessitate restaurants?"[21] Restated, although eating serves a common biological function, restaurants are underdetermined by this function. So identifying an ergonic function is often only partially explanatory.

Moreover, in biology, convergent evolution is believed to produce analogues not homologues. In other words, the wings of a butterfly and a bird are similar by analogy not identity. But social kinds can merge in a way that unrelated biological species cannot. Still, I would argue that ergonic convergence does not necessitate identity. So even when ergonic convergence has been demonstrated, it does not mean necessarily that one is talking about the same kind. This means that ergonic convergence is a weak source of potential generalizations, especially when we are talking about things like convergence on economic or ideological niches. That different monarchical societies might converge on similar structures for the legimitazation

of sovereignty does not mean that these structures are generalizable. The suggest analogy rather than identity.

Again, I want to emphasize that these anchoring processes are often entwined in any given case. But thinking in terms of these kinds and how they have been entwined nonetheless has explanatory value. For instance, when ergonic convergence becomes entangled with dynamic-nominalism, it can exhibit what is known as Goodhart's law, often summarized as "when a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure." In other words, when classification and teleological function get enmeshed, the social kind in question tends to exhibit rationalization toward the measure, which then means that the measure itself is no longer valuable for its original purpose.

The following section begins the work of applying these insights to the study of enchantment. It builds off of my previous work on disenchantment but there is still a long way to go.

2- "Enchantment" as a Process Social Kind

In many respects my 2017 monograph was a study of "disenchantment" in dynamic nominalist terms (with the caveat that as any good Derridean knows opposing binaries are often asymmetrical). To catch up those readers who are unfamiliar with my book, *The Myth of Disenchantment* was rooted in the following observation: Many theorists have argued that what makes the modern world "modern" is that people no longer believe in spirits, myth, or magic—in this sense we are "disenchanted." However, every day new proof arises that "modern" thinkers do in fact believe in magic and in spirits, and they have done so throughout history. According to a range of anthropological and sociological evidence, which I discuss in the book, the majority of

people living in Europe and North America believe (to varying degrees) in the following: spirits, witches, psychical powers, magic, astrology, and demons. Scholars have known this was true of much of the rest of the globe, but have overlooked its continued presence in the West.

So my book set out to answer the question: Where did this notion of de-spiritualized modernity come from? In other words, how did this mistaken belief set in? To explain, I traced the history of the idea that modernity means disenchantment in the birth of various intellectual disciplines, namely: philosophy, anthropology, sociology, folklore, psychoanalysis, and religious studies. In so doing, I discovered that the majority of theorists who gave the idea of disenchantment its canonical formulations were living in Britain, France, or Germany in a period in which *spiritualism* (séances and table turning), *theosophy*, and *magical societies* like the Golden Dawn were taking place as massive cross-cultural movements and, as I show from archival research into these theorists' diaries, letters, and so on, these occult movements entered directly into the lives and beliefs of the very theorists of disenchantment themselves.

As a dynamic-nominalist history of disenchantment, the book set out not by presuming a content to the terms "disenchantment" or "enchantment" but by looking at the various things my sources (and their contemporary interlocutors) described as "disenchantment" starting off from Horkheimer and Adorno's *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (*Dialektik der Aufklärung*, 1944 revised 1947) and by working backward. In doing so, it had two main threads:

First, it provided a genealogy of the notion of "disenchantment" itself. The surprise is that centuries before sociologists and anthropologists theorized the disenchantment or de-spiritualization of the world, there were folk tales and legends about the departure of the fairies or the vanishing of magic; these stories might be said to be the "beginning of the myth"—but they did not deny the existence of either magic or fairies, but rather said that that they were harder to

find than they once were. Magic, once more prominent, had become much scarcer. For instance, Chaucer, in *The Tale of the Wyf of Bathe* (ca. 1380–1400) already says that the land was once full of fairy enchantment, but by the fourteenth century, nobody could see the elves anymore.

By way of another example, in the German folklore collection, *Norddeutsche Sagen, Märchen und Gebräuche* collected by Adalbert Kuhn and Friedrich Leberecht Wilhelm Schwartz in 1839-1849 preserves the following fragment:

> Now there is no more magic (*Zauberei*) or witchcraft (*Hexerei*). This is because the *Sixth and Seventh Books of Moses* cannot be used any longer. It was these books that meticulously inscribed and recorded all witchcraft, magic, and incantations. These two books are sealed in Wittenberg and they are exhibited as curiosities, but cannot be borrowed.

To paraphrase: magic—which once ruled the land—is gone. The true spell-books are imprisoned in Wittenberg, a city famous for its connection to Luther and the Reformation. The basic structure of this folktale is not unique. We often associate folktales with enchantment. They often recount stories of fairies or witches or sorcerous curses. But there are also tales like the one above that depict disenchantment. Indeed, for more than a thousand years, spellbooks (such as *The 6th and 7th Books of Moses*, an eighteenth-century text purporting to be written by Moses) often claimed to be recovering vanished or forgotten magical arts. This rhetorical move is part of what gives these books their power. The myth that the spells were scarce or had vanished was part of what made them all the more appealing. Many tales begin from the premise that "once upon a time, magic was once a mighty force in the world, but not anymore," only to then stage some version of magic's return. It's a storytelling move that was then picked up on by scientists and philosophers who formulated the idea that modernity was disenchanted. Moreover, as I argue in *The Myth of Disenchantment*, the gods, spirits, or fairies have been disappearing since at least

Chaucer and arguably since Plutarch (who, it is worth noting, was writing before the scientific revolution, much less before any widespread belief in the power of technology). In this respect, magic is constantly vanishing, even as magicians have claimed to recover it. In sum, disenchantment is actually part of the trope of magic itself. Rather there is basically no enchantment without disenchantment.

"Folkloric disenchantment"—far from having evaporated—is still common today in the writings of contemporary self-described magicians, shamans, and witches. But we also find its analogue in academic disciplines. In this academic version of the myth, nostalgia for vanished magic has been replaced by the idea that a scientific worldview has stepped in to replace more primitive folk belief systems.

In the book, I trace the formation of this particular philosophy of history basically from 18th century German Romanticism down to the present, touching on the contributions and variations to this theoretical framing by a host of significant theorists (from Schiller to J.G. Frazer to Freud to Max Weber and many more). I demonstrate various lines of influence, but I also show how each theorist developed different notions of disenchantment.

Second, one of the key insights of this historical investigation was how reliant this discursive schema was on a putative opposition between "religion" "magic" and "science." This trinary was something I had been preoccupied with for a long time.

Since 2012, I had been working to challenge the putative binary between religion and science by introducing a third term—"superstition"—into the model. Succinctly put, since the formation of the contemporary world-system "superstition" (often paradigmatically identified with "magic") was often seen as both the false double of "religion" and a crucial enemy of scientific truth.

By way of explanation, genealogists of "religion" have located the category's formation in two key binaries. Peter Harrison and others have argued that the categories "religion" and "science" were discursively formulated in messy, opposition to each other.[22] Serge Margel and Michel de Certeau have emphasized the dialectic between "religion" and "superstition"—on top of which, Michel de Certeau has noted that science formulates through rhetorical opposition to superstition.[23] Insofar as the secular claims to be a political instantiation of scientific modernity, it too produces "superstition" as its opposite. In summary, different scholars have focused on the historical construction of the ideas of religion, science, and superstition and in each cased emphasized that the categories are historically contingent and formulated in a binary opposition. Storms has suggested that in some respects all of these scholars are right, but they have each only described part of the system.

In *The Invention of Religion in Japan* (Josephson 2012) and *The Myth of Disenchantment: Magic, Modernity and the Human Sciences* (Josephson-Storm 2017), I attempted an intervention in this line of theorizing by suggesting the value of looking at it in terms of a trinary system. Instead of binaries, I argued that early modern European thinkers producing (and then globalizing largely colonially) a historically contingent trinary formation in which religion is negated by superstition, which is in turn negated by science.[24]

A key result of my research (more evident perhaps in my first book than my second for space reasons) was that defining the categories of "religion," "science" and "magic" was typically a politically charged, boundary- drawing exercise that extensively reclassified inherited materials. This differentiation was not essential but part of the formation of the nation state, many which have historically come to vest significant energy (legal, institutional, financial) in differentiating these categories.

I argued, for instance, “religion” in its contemporary formulation is largely a diplomatic and legal category and not just an academic or ethnographic one and it is these legal processes that do much to anchor its attributes and police its boundaries. This means that we are able to make more robust generalizations about “religion” only in the contemporary period once those classifications and legal mechanisms have been brought into place. There is a lot more to be said here. However, I argued that most entities labeled as “religions” only share abilities with other category members as a result of dynamic-nominalist anchoring processes, as an examination of this topic indicates. (Most of their internal features are shared in common owing to mimetic processes.) Various entities are designated as "religions" by being named or categorized as such by internal diplomacy, domestic legislation, scholars, and so on. This is not a teleological or transhistorical process, but one that arose from a certain logic at a specific time in Western Christendom, and its globalization was inherently selective and, to some degree, arbitrary. Furthermore, rather than being affected by unidirectional force or hegemony, it was negotiated. And there must be multiple incentives or enforcement mechanisms in place to encourage the categorization to take hold. (One could say similar things about “science”).[25]

It was my further contention that tracing the genealogy of the notion of a conflict between “religion” and “science” provides clues to both the appearance and occlusion of notions of “enchantment.” While I explain disenchantment on many levels, I suggested that one of the factors that renders magic both attractive and repellant is the reification of the putative binary conflict between “religion” and “science,” and the development of a “third term” (superstition, magic, and so on) that suggests either where they overlap or where they cancel-out (Josephson-Storm 2017, 13).

Looking at in terms of the philosophy of history, European thinkers often characterized modernity in terms of a rejection of "superstition" or in terms of a grand civilizational progress from "magic" to "religion" to "science." Restated, especially following the work of J.G. Frazer, many theorists not only often presumed the incompatibility between magic, religion, and science; but they also often historicized and spatialized these categories. It was argued that an age of magic had given way to religion which would in then give way ultimately to science. But despite this notion of a grand historical trajectory, I argued that belief in magic never vanished, not even within the heartland of industrialized Western Europe and America (I'll (perhaps) explain this more in my presentation).

But this schema was globalized insofar as Europeans often regarded their non-European contemporaries as "backward" for their belief in magic or superstitions (even as many Europeans themselves believed in spiritualism, ghosts, witches, and the like). This paradoxical emphasis on how modernity *should* be disenchanted even as belief in enchantment proliferated is what I refer to (and elaborate) as "the myth of disenchantment."

In my 2017 book I summarized:

> *"The myth of disenchantment has two contradictory functions. On the one hand, it serves as a regime of truth, submerging the paradigm of modernity deeper into the core of the human sciences and producing various attempts (legal, pedagogical, colonial) to disabuse the other of superstitious thought. On the other hand, it is self-refuting, producing the very thing it describes as endangered, animating occult revivals, paranormal investigations, and new attempts to spiritualize the sciences. For this reason, it meets the needs of different constituencies, including those who want to banish magic and those who aspire to reinvigorate it"* (Storm 2017, 309-310).

Restated, once "religion" and "science" are formulated as opposing discursive terrains, religion-science hybrids become both threatening and appealing. They are appealing because they suggest

the possibility of healing the two (notionally) opposed domains of religion and science. They are threatening because they suggest pre-hybrid and therefore supposedly premodern systems.

*

In summary, studying "enchantment" as a dynamic-nominalist kind would necessitate tracing discourse. In *The Myth of Disenchantment*, I argued that most European theorists inherited a kind vestigial notion of paganism as the paradigmatic form of enchantment.[26] This meant that when they were talking about such, they often had in mind belief in "magic," "spirits," or "myth." Each of these categories could be broken down and problematized but one advantage of a discourse analysis model (familiar to many historians) would be that we need only report what our objects of study themselves refer to with these categories (or which are polemically labeled as such by their contemporaries). The other point of this is that "enchantment" seems to be a weakly anchored insofar as many incompatible things have been meant by the term.

Even so I would push against the assumption of much of discourse history that merely confines itself to the tracing of language and power. The exclusive focus on language is why genealogy tends to reproduce canon. But because we now know that social kinds are not reducible to the terms for them, we can be more sophisticated. We can begin our research into a given social kind by exploding it in order to try to see what it has been hiding (I'll return to this below). We can go beyond the canon to let voices speak that have otherwise been silenced or ignored. We can also recognize the materialization of "enchantment" in the object world. In not just words but artifacts, like magic wands, crystal balls, healing ointments, and so on.

Further, genealogy gains most of its force by showing discontinuity, rupture, variation, and change. Yet, as I have argued, variation and change are the norm in the social world. Social kinds are process kinds. So we must presume discontinuity and difference. The oddity is any

similarity or stability at all. For this reason, we need to focus on just on discourse or abstractly presumed systems of power, but on concrete institutions, funding sources, law codes, and so on that cause the category in question to share properties insofar as it does. Language itself is less important than how it relates to enforcement and role adoption. For metamodern process kind analysis to take place, the thing that needs to be explained is not discontinuity, rupture, or change, but why any properties should stabilize at all. Thus, it is the mirror image of a Foucauldian genealogy.

The other point I want to make before moving forward is that discourse history often has a problem with translation or cross-cultural comparison. If, for instance, as I have argued elsewhere the main thing that causes "religions" to share properties is that they have been categorized as "religions" by modern nation states, this means that there is no way to generalize about properties of "religion" in premodern cultures that lack that conceptual reference (e.g., insofar as it is a dynamic-nominalist kind, there were no medieval religions).

3- Beyond (or Behind) Discourse-Analysis

To return to a point I made in the last section, discourse analysis (and even material culture analysis) is not all there is. As I remarked, because kinds exceed their reference, there is a way to look behind dynamic-nominalist kinds. In this section, I want to begin to be concrete about what this might entail.

People frequently refer to social kinds. Our everyday discussions are peppered with topics such as taxi drivers, medicine, vaccines, McDonalds, and so on. We appear to be good enough at this that, at least on the surface, we have shared topics of discussion, even if we do not share

notions or definitions (and indeed, most people when pressed cannot provide definitions for most of their vocabulary).

We can get by without really sharing concepts in part because our collective environment is doing some of the heavy lifting for us. Although reference is not the entirety of meaning, I do not need to know the properties of copper or taxi drivers to refer to either, because both kinds surpass their reference. This is probably uncontroversial in regard to copper, but the term “taxi driver” is also an attempt to capture a kind—that is to say, a cluster of properties—that encapsulates more than just the term. Many social kinds are interactive, which implies that our communal (rather than individual) notions of "taxi driver" eventually change the attributes of the kind. But social kinds do not emerge merely via the process of being labeled. I can coin a new term, but it will not be enough to anchor a stable social kind, at least not without a lot more effort from others. So we don't have to worry about the subjectivity of my idea of "taxi driver" as long as I am learning the kind’s features empirically rather than simply intuiting what the term means. All this suggests that we do not need to limit ourselves to the self-reporting of our sources.

To clarify what I mean, if discourse analysis is perhaps the dominant mode of intellectual inquiry in many areas of the academy it is not the only option. For instance, the vast majority of historians of capitalism do not engage in a discourse history of the term. There is probably a good reason for this. “Capitalism” entered the English language in 1872 to describe preexisting phenomena and would lose much of its bite where we to demand that we only use the term to refer to those cultures that had a concept or term for capitalism (or perhaps enshrined such in legal codes etcetera). While I think there is a good case to be made that developing a concept of capitalism might tend to transform the economy thus referred to appreciable ways, it would be a mistake to presume that this was necessary.

I'll perhaps expand on this in a subsequent essay, but economic historians have tended to see capitalism as itself emerging due to a set of preexisting economic needs or demands. In other words, they have typically tended to think of capitalism as what I refer to as an ergonic kind. Some cautions are now in order.

First, scholars writing about capitalism often talk past each other because they have different (and not explicit) ideas about what capitalism entails and what its features are. For instance, is capitalism primarily to be understood in terms of the emerge of an exchange economy and the commodity form? Or is it primarily about capital accumulation and the birth of a capitalist class? Or the advent of wage-labor? Or the rise of the limited liability company? Or is it the result of a particular iteration of the world-system that emerged in the 18th century in Europe and then came to circle the globe? One can find these and many more in the secondary literature. While these are often entangled, especially when theorists are less explicit about what they have in mind and what causes them to cluster together, this leads toward superficial and unproductive disputes.

Part of the issue is that there are multiple "social kinds" covered by terms such as "capitalism" and "enchantment." The issue is not finding the correct single set of properties that describes capitalism, but rather noting that there are a set of different ways (or even things) we might call capitalism and making sure we are not talking past each other. This is not merely a problem of theorizing capitalism. As I observed in *Metamodernism*, people frequently have verbal disagreements over social kinds because they are unaware that shared terminology masks extremely divergent concepts. There is a lot of evidence that even native speakers of the same language frequently use terms in overlapping but not identical ways. Furthermore, people frequently misunderstand how social kinds work in practice. For these reasons, the prevalent

approach in many of the human sciences of limiting a topic to what a certain group of interlocutors say about it (e.g., "magic" is whatever people think it is) is likely to lead to issues because of the diversity of possible meanings of that term even synchronically within a single language. The problem is amplified when trying to get behind specific terms because of many possible social kinds a given word could reference.

In that monograph, I outline a series of strategies for getting around these problems. But rather than getting bogged down here with another theoretical exposition, I want to suggest that there is no "capitalism" simpliciter, no "enchantment" simpliciter. So the question we want to ask is not "does capitalism produce enchantment?" but rather does "capitalism (described in terms of X) produce enchantment (described in terms of Y) in context C?" With this caveat in mind, let me begin extending this toward theorizing "enchantment."

Tentative Conclusion: Bringing the Stars down Earth or first steps toward an analysis of capitalism and "enchantment"

For non-specialists in other parts of the academy, the German critical theorist, Theodor Adorno is probably most famous for his co-authorship of *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (*Dialektik der Aufklärung*, 1947) with fellow Frankfurt School sociologist Max Horkheimer. It was perhaps this work more than any other that popularized the idea that the ascendancy of enlightenment was explicitly keyed to the "disenchantment of the world," which they suggest first and foremost meant "the extirpation of animism" and the end of belief in magic, spirits, and demons. As Horkheimer and Adorno argue, "the mind, conquering superstition, [was supposed] to rule over disenchanted nature." In summary, magic and spirits had to go if the world was to be amenable to systematic and rational interpretation.

But superficial readers who have tended to struggle against the tide of disenchantment by reference to *Dialectic of Enlightenment* have tended to miss the latter part of the argument, which suggested that there had been a "regression" to myth and magic in not just fascist politics but under the influence of capitalistic commodification itself.[27] For this reason, scholars who have tended to see Adorno in particular as a critic of disenchantment have had trouble squaring their account with those instances in which he was clearly acting as a disenchanter himself. Perhaps the most important of these was his "Theses against Occultism" (*Thesen gegen den Okkultismus*, 1951), which was one of the earliest philosophically respectable (albeit ultimately misguided) attempts to argue that occult belief was in some sense responsible for the rise of Nazism. (Perhaps an ironic point for a thinker like Adorno, who as I have shown elsewhere, drew on occult sources in his own letters and even published works including the *Dialektik der Aufklärung*).

But for our purposes the most relevant work of Adorno's is a set of writings about the *Los Angeles Times* astrology column—titled "The Stars down to Earth: A Study in Secondary Superstition" that he undertook while living in Beverly Hills in 1952-1953. This comparatively understudied work is relevant for us for two purposes—it helps us make sense of Adorno's own seemingly contradictory orientation toward (dis)enchantment; and more importantly, it is one of the few works that more or less subjects to analysis the dual abstractions—capitalism and enchantment—central to this group. In the first instance, since our primary subject is not Adorno, I'll just note that goes some distance toward suggesting that what he had a problem with was not primarily the occult itself but rather "the commercialized occult."[28] But more importantly it explicates his early claim that "By its regression to magic under late capitalism, thought is assimilated to late capitalist forms."[29]

While I would strongly reject the explicit periodization of his work and the idea that "magic" represents a regression to older or more infantile ways of thinking, there are a few insights worth retaining from his essay.

First, the condition of belief is itself less relevant to "enchantment" than it might appear. As Adorno argues, "The fact that people do not "believe in" astrology no more prevents them from attending to [an astrology] column than the fact that they do not "believe in" advertising prevents them from functioning as consumers." This squares with something I have been arguing for a long time that while many scholars tend to assume that belief is binary — either you believe in ghosts or you don't; that does not fit the anthropological evidence. By way of illustration, in a classic ethnography of French witchcraft belief, Jeanne Favret-Saada provides a examples of French farmers repeatedly stating things like "I don't believe in witches, but…", and then going on to act in every way as if witches exist.[30] Similarly, when I was doing fieldwork in Japan I encountered a contemporary Japanese expression '*hanshin-hangi*' 半信半疑 (half-belief, half-doubt) that describes a common attitude toward ghosts and magical-charms that is neither fully believing nor fully doubting, which captures this ambiguity nicely. Furthermore, if I ask my students if they *believe* in talismans they often answer in the negative, but if I ask them if they *have* good luck charms, they often say that they do and that these charms are very important to them. Hence, it would seem they have talismans that they don't "believe" in, but act like they do (Limited ethnographic work on this subject suggests my students are alone in this regard).[31] Although Adorno sometimes suggested this was a new phenomenon, I have argued that it is the binary notion of "belief" that is a product of recent history.[32] All that said, the other insight Adorno provides is that astrology and other forms of "magic" are often not so much believed in as commodified and consumed.

Second, Adorno observes that "In fact, the occult as such plays only a marginal role in systems such as organized astrology." Paraphrased, astrology as commercialized has very little relationship to previous notions of astrology. As contemporary historian Anthony Grafton has noted, "In the Renaissance…[astrologers] had to plot the positions of the sun, the moon, the five planets, and the head and tail of the dragon (the points where the moon's path, projected out onto the heavens, intersected that of the sun) for the time in question" But today, "Modern newspaper horoscopes—what are far more primitive than ancient or Renaissance genitures—are composed as if it were simple to determine which celestial influences would dominate the life and activities of a client at a given moment."[33] In other words, contemporary astrology is in certain respects less coherent, less evidentiary, and perhaps (although the term is loaded) less "rational" than older forms.

Third, Adorno argues that people read astrology columns for basic psychological advice and order "to learn from occult signs what to expect and do." Although more research could be done on the subject, the importance of this point is that astrology has been commodified in part because it fulfills real needs in the minds of its consumers.

Fourth, despite some notion of "magic" as a rejection of modernity or rationality, "supposedly irrational and magical forebodings are translated into the advice of being sensible. The stars are invoked in order to reinforce the harmless, beneficial but trivial admonition: "Drive carefully!"" In this respect, Adorno argues that in practice astrological horoscopes work to reinforce the status quo and the consumer mindset of late-stage capitalism.

Finally, Adorno underscores the point that "astrology as such is treated as something established and socially recognized, an uncontroversial element of our culture." Indeed, even in 2020, it has been claimed that 70 million Americans read horoscopes daily and slightly more

robust evidence suggests that 25% of Americans surveyed agree with the statement "that the positions of the stars and the planets affect our daily lives."[34] Moreover, while astrology has had its ups and downs in popularity, I'll note that it has not made a grand resurgence lately (famously Nancy Reagan publicly consulted an astrologer in the 1980s). All that is to say, astrology would seem to be yet another example of "enchantment" in plain sight.

A lot more could be said about Adorno's essay, but I want to draw together these insights with those earlier to begin to address the questions that Astrid and Anat posed at the outset.

The first takeaway from this material is deflationary. There is no single notion of "enchantment" and starting off from different cases or presumed attributes will tend to result in different claims. Adorno despite being heavily influenced by Max Weber has something different in mind. My other article in this workshop elaborates further, but in brief, I reconstruct Weber's account of "the disenchanting of the world" to include 5 levels: *1. Metaphysical realism* (the belief that the world is what it is and does not represent anything else) 2. *Ontological homogeneity* (the belief that there are no truly extramundane objects or people) 3. *Ethical predeterminism* (the belief that God has already decided each individual's soteriological fate) or *value nihilism* (the excision of value from the world of fact) 4. *Epistemic overconfidence* (the belief that everything in the material world is in principle knowable by means of intellectualization/theoretical rationality) 5. *The construction and rationalization of the magic sphere.*

To get to enchantment, it might seem all we need to do is invert these. If we did so it might look something like this. 1. *Metaphysical symbolism* (the belief that world is full of meaningful signs) 2. *Ontological heterogeneity* (the belief that there are at least some extraordinary objects or people)3. *Ethical realism* (the belief that there are real values in the

world) 4. *Epistemic skepticism* (the belief that knowledge is in some principle impossible) 5. *The construction and rationalization of the magic sphere* (no inversion necessary). To these we could add Adorno and Horkheimer's notion of enchantment as *animism* and *belief in the magical power of rituals*. Other thinkers, especially in the Anglophone world, have tended to connected "enchantment" to *a sense of wonder* (this is because the German *Entzauberung* is literally *de-magic-ing*); and so on. But taken together these are actually incompatible.

All told, they suggest that "enchantment" is not one social kind. There is no particular anchoring process that would cause these attributes to come together into one property-cluster. This is perhaps a technical way of saying that while often taken together there is no reason for these particular attributes to imply one phenomenon. For instance, metaphysical realism is frequently rejected by both religious believers and intellectual skeptics. But one could embrace wonder as both a realist (e.g., scientific accounts of wonder) or an ant-realist. Furthermore, in current Euro-American society, we have everything from fetishized celebrity goods to haunted houses, so charisma and even extramundane objects/people are far from extinct, but they do not seem to be extinct for necessarily the same reasons people challenge metaphysical realism. Epistemic overconfidence in the United States has faded in the face of right- and left-wing criticism (against climate change and vaccines and so on). Both skeptical philosophers and some Christian theologians tend to promote various forms of epistemic skepticism. It seems a stretch to portray Foucault as an enchanter. Popular confidence in technology is mostly unfettered, yet science is constantly criticized in the public realm. I am more sensitive to the issue of value nihilism in the academy, but it is a mistake to believe that it describes even the majority of European or American mentalities. Moreover, these attributes don't fulfill the same needs

(psychological, existential), suggesting that there is not one univocal reason for these attributes to cooccur.

Second, fortunately, we have another option. As a modest proposal, I think we should depart from a dynamic-nominalist approach to "enchantment," but rather than limiting ourselves to the plane of intertextuality we should start from this notion and work to see what the concept is hiding. To put it as plainly as possible, we should begin with things classified as "magic," "superstition," or "enchantment" (in the period and language in question), then trace their properties and come up with an account of what causal processes beyond, or in addition to, their classification might be anchoring those properties. We should ask what is/was at stake in classifying something as "magic" both for scholars and for our research subjects (for example, calling something "magical thinking" is often a form of dismissal, just as labelling a subaltern belief or practice "magic" was part of the logic of colonization). We could also trace the social function of objects that are sold as "magical" and so on.

In a similar vein, we should investigate the disparity between the manifest concepts (i.e., the overlap in what individuals say the terms mean) and the operating features of the social kinds (i.e., how the kind or kinds referred to by the term actually work in practice). We could also explore the ergonic functions on which those classified as magic converge, especially when subject to the economic forces of the contemporary capitalist system (restated, what kinds of magic books and services do people purchase, and why?)

I have argued for a long time that the construction of "magic" ("superstition") emerged from the logics of the formulation of an incomplete binary between "religion" and "science" and functions to describe the contested ground between those terrains (and how they are constituted by exclusion). This has both had a repressive function (pushing magic out of certain arenas) and

also worked to make things flagged as magic more appealing. This latter, one could argue, has led toward the partial formulation of something like a what a Weberian would call "the magic sphere." One way to go beyond the dynamic-nominalist account would be to explore the formation of this domain and look at the teleological and commercial pressures on it.

Yet there is necessarily more than one "magic sphere." In my Weber essay, I gesture at what the construction and rationalization of one particular magic sphere might look like in regard to fortunetelling, looking at the discursive statements of fortune tellers, the laws around fortunetelling in different places/periods, the professionalization of fortune tellers, and the economic realities of fortune. These all function as concrete ways to get beyond discourse to see how particular anchoring processes and needs affect the formation of a particular social kind.

Such theoretical posits complement the work that Owen Davies has done on "cunning-folk" in British history as a description of one particularly important kind of "enchanter." Although lacking the same specific theoretical apparatus and points of emphasis, he goes some distance toward discussing cunning-folk and the law, the professionalization of cunning-folk, the services that cunning-folk provided, and so on (if you haven't read his 2007 work on the subject, it is stellar).[35]

In a very different context, in her 2016 work LaShawn Harris demonstrated the importance of Black women "who identified as clairvoyants, crystal ball gazers, tarot card readers, hypnotists, numerologists, and magical healers" and traced their role in the underground economy of contemporary Harlem.[36] Although only a chapter of Harris's book, this research also addressed services, relevant laws, and economic realities. There has been similar work in different places and periods, but to my mind no one has yet put them together with a set of broader theoretical posits.[37]

Finally, although in this paper I've been primarily suspending the notion of enchantment rather than capitalism, greater specificity about what we mean by the latter would help focus future inquiries. That said, several divergent theories of "capitalism" have seen it reach its earliest manifestation in the European domination of the world economy.[38] If we take this world-system to be even a key aspect of the formation of modern capitalism, then it would seem that the current economic order spread at the same time as the discursive globalization of "enchantment" and the relegation by Euro-American powers of the rest of the globe to both economic and discursive domination. We might then speculate about the entanglements this implies. For instance, it would be worth tracing in further detail how the rejection of the commodity form in the part of non-Europeans was itself often regarded as a sign of "superstition," backwardness or "magical thinking," even as "magic" itself was being commodified within the core of the global economy. (I hope to explore this more in a further paper.) In this respect, studying both the globalization of capitalism and (dis)enchantment should be able to illuminate our analysis of both.

All that is to say, while enchantment is not a single category with a common essence, advancing these modest theoretical proposals could allow us to bring "enchantment" down to earth.

Notes are incomplete. The title of this article is a gesture to Adorno and a nod to a fictional Nirvana song leaking in from a parallel universe in Brian K. Vaughan's *Ex Machina*.

[1] See**,** Jason Ānanda Josephson Storm. "Against Disenchantment" *Aeon*, 2019.

[2] Davies, Owen. *Grimoires: A History of Magic Books* (Oxford University Press, 2009).

[3] Horoscopes can be found in: *Chicago Sun Times, New York Post, Washington Post, Daily Mail*, *The Sun*, etc.

[4] See Jason Ānanda Josephson Storm, *The Myth of Disenchantment: Magic, Modernity and the Birth of the Human Sciences* (University of Chicago Press, 2017).

[5] See ibid; and Storm, Jason Ānanda Josephson. "The superstition, secularism, and religion trinary: Or re-theorizing secularism." *Method & Theory in the Study of Religion* 30, no. 1 (2018): 1-20.

[6] See famously, Hayek, F. A. "The Use of Knowledge in Society." *The American Economic Review* 35, no. 4 (1945): 519–30. But for other analyses, see Fukuyama, Francis. "Still disenchanted? The modernity of postindustrial capitalism." In *The Economic Sociology of Capitalism*, pp. 75-89. Princeton University Press, 2021.

[7] Stark, Rodney, and William Sims Bainbridge. *The future of religion*. (University of California Press, 1985).
[8] Anderson, E. "Beyond Homo Economicus." Philosophy and Public Affairs 29 (2000): 170-200.
[9] The list is far from complete. For a great survey see Storm 2017 esp 323-325.
[10] Discussed in greater detail in Storm 2017.
[11] Ritzer, George. *Enchanting a Disenchanted World* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press, 1999).
[12] (Bod 2014, 7).
[13] This and much of the rest of this section appear in greater detail in Storm 2021. See WATANABE Satoshi. *Knowing and Guessing* (New York: Wiley, 1969), 376.
[14] Octavio Paz, *The Collected Poems of Octavio Paz, 1957-1987* (New York: New Directions, 1991), 429.
[15] Quine 1969, Watanabe 1969.
[16] See Forster 2010, 69.
[17] Jason Ānanda Josephson Storm, *Metamodernism: The Future of Theory* (University of Chicago, 2021).
[18] See Storm 2021, 88-90.
[19] **These few paragraphs are basically lifted from my Metamodernism book. I'll paraphrase in subsequent drafts.**
[20] Susan Josephson, *From Idolatry to Advertising* (New York: Routledge, 1996).
[21] Alan Garfinkel, *Forms of Explanation: Structures of Inquiry in Social Science* (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1981), 129.
[22] Peter Harrison, *The Territories of Science and Religion* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015).
[23] See Michel de Certeau, « What We Do When We Believe » ; Serge Margel, *Superstition: L'anthropologie du religieux en terre de chrétienté*.
[24] See Jason Ānanda Josephson [Storm], *The Invention of Religion in Japan* (University of Chicago Press, 2012) and Storm 2017. Some of what follows appears in both.
[25] See Storm "The Myths of Modern Science" under consideration.
[26] Also building off of the work of Wouter Hanegraaff.
[27] See Michael Löwy and Robert Sayre, *Romanticism against the Tide of Modernity*.
[28] Nederman, "Adorno's Critique of Astrology and the Occult." For more analysis and evidence, see Storm 2017.
[29] From *Theses gegen Okkultismus*.
[30] Jeanne Favret-Saada, *Les mots, la mort, les sorts'* (Paris: Gallimard, 1977)
[31] See George Gmelch and Richard Felson, "Can a Lucky Charm Get You through Organic Chemistry?" Psychology Today (December 1980), 75–78.
[32] Storm, "The Enchanted World Today"
[33] Grafton, Anthony. *Cardano's cosmos*, 26, 25.
[34] Stierwalt, S. "Is Astrology Real? Here's What Science Says." *Scientific American* (2020).
[35] Davies, Owen. *Popular magic: cunning-folk in English history*. A&C Black, 2007.
[36] Harris, LaShawn. *Sex workers, psychics, and numbers runners: Black women in New York City's underground economy*. University of Illinois Press, 2016.
[37] For other examples, see Weaver, Karol. *Medical Revolutionaries: The Enslaved Healers of Eighteenth Century Saint Domingue;* Jean Comaroff and John L. Comaroff, "Occult Economies and the Violence of Abstraction:" Leonard, "African Traditional Healers: The Economics of Healing," Voeks, "African Medicine and Magic in the Americas".
[38] See: Cox, Oliver C. *Capitalism as a System*; Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Capitalist World-Economy*; Pomeranz, Kenneth, *The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy*,