

Cryptography

Michele Laurenti

January 17, 2017

Abstract

Notes taken during the Cryptography lectures held by Daniele Venturi (<http://danieleventuri.altervista.org/crypto.shtml>) in fall 2016 at Sapienza.

Contents

1	Introduction	1
1.1	Perfect secrecy	1
	One Time Pad	3
1.2	Authentication	4
1.3	Randomness Extraction	6
2	Computational Cryptography	7
2.1	One Way Functions	7
2.2	Computational Indistinguishability	8
2.3	Pseudo Random Generators	9
2.4	Hard Core Predicates	10
2.5	Symmetric Key Encryption Schemes	12
2.6	Chosen Plaintext Attacks and Pseudo Random Functions	14
2.7	Computationally Secure MACs	17
2.8	Domain Extension	18
2.9	Chosen Cyphertext Attacks and Authenticated Encryption	22
2.10	Pseudo Random Permutations	24
	Domain Extension for Pseudo Random Permutations	26
2.11	Collision Resistant Hash Functions	27
2.12	Claw-Free Permutations	30
2.13	Random Oracle Model	31
2.14	Number Theory	31
	Elliptic Curves	34
	Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange	35
	Pseudo Random Generators	35

Pseudo Random Functions (PRFs): Naor-Reingold	36
Number Theoretic Claw-Free Permutation	36
2.15 Public Key Encryption	37
ElGamal PKE	38
2.16 Factoring Assumption and RSA	39
2.17 Trapdoor Permutation from Factoring	42
2.18 Cramer-Shoup Encryption (1998)	44
Real Cramer-Shoup	47
2.19 Signature Schemes	49
2.20 Waters Signature Scheme	49
List of Definitions	53
List of Constructions	54
Acronyms	55




Figure 1: Message exchange between A and B using symmetric encryption. E is the eavesdropper.

1 Introduction

Solomon,
I'm concerned about security; I think, when we email each other,
we should use some sort of code.

Confidentiality is our goal. We want to encrypt and decrypt a (plaintext) message m , using a key, to obtain a cyphertext c . As per Kirkoff's principle, only the key is secret.

Our encryption schemes have the following syntax:

$$\Pi = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}).$$

A and B , the actors of our communication exchange (fig. 1), share k , the key, taken from some key space \mathcal{K} . The elements of our encryption scheme play the following roles:

1. Gen outputs a random key from the key space \mathcal{K} , and we write this as $k \leftarrow \$\text{Gen}$;
2. $\text{Enc} : \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathcal{C}$ is the encryption function, mapping a key and a message to a cyphertext;
3. $\text{Dec} : \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{C} \rightarrow \mathcal{M}$ is the decryption function, mapping a key and a cyphertext to a message.

We expect an encryption scheme to be at least correct:

$$\forall k \in \mathcal{K}, \forall m \in \mathcal{M}. \text{Dec}(k, \text{Enc}(k, m)) = m.$$

1.1 Perfect secrecy

Shannon defined “perfect secrecy”, *i.e.*, the fact that the cyphertext carries no information about the plaintext.

Definition 1 (Perfect secrecy). Let M be a Random Variable (RV) over \mathcal{M} , and K be a uniform distribution over \mathcal{K} .

(Enc, Dec) has perfect secrecy if

$$\forall M, \forall m \in \mathcal{M}, c \in \mathcal{C}. \Pr [M = m] = \Pr [M = m | C = c]$$

where $C = \text{Enc}(k, m)$ is a third RV. \diamond

We have equivalent definitions for perfect secrecy.

Theorem 1. *The following definitions are equivalent:*

1. *definition 1;*
2. *M and C are independent;*
3. $\forall m, m' \in \mathcal{M}, \forall c \in \mathcal{C}$

$$\Pr [\text{Enc}(k, m) = c] = \Pr [\text{Enc}(k, m') = c]$$

where k is a random key in \mathcal{K} chosen with uniform probability. \diamond

Proof of theorem 1. First, we show that 1 implies 2.

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr [M = m] &= \Pr [M = m | C = c] \\ &= \frac{\Pr [M = m \wedge C = c]}{\Pr [C = c]} && \text{(by Bayes)} \\ &\implies \\ \Pr [M = m] \Pr [C = c] &= \Pr [M = m \wedge C = c] \end{aligned}$$

which is the definition of independence.

Now we show that 2 implies 3. Fix $m \in \mathcal{M}$ and $c \in \mathcal{C}$.

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr [\text{Enc}(k, m) = c] &= \Pr [\text{Enc}(k, M) = c | M = m] && \text{(we fixed } m) \\ &= \Pr [C = c | M = m] && \text{(definition of the RV } C) \\ &= \Pr [C = c]. && \text{(by 2)} \end{aligned}$$

Since m is arbitrary, we can do the same for m' , and obtain

$$\Pr [\text{Enc}(k, m') = c] = \Pr [C = c]$$

which gives us 3.

Now we want to show that 3 implies 1. Take any $c \in \mathcal{C}$.

$$\begin{aligned}
\Pr[C = c] &= \sum_{m' \in \mathcal{M}} \Pr[C = c \wedge M = m'] \\
&= \sum_{m' \in \mathcal{M}} \Pr[C = c | M = m'] \Pr[M = m'] && \text{(by Bayes)} \\
&= \sum_{m' \in \mathcal{M}} \Pr[\text{Enc}(k, M) = c | M = m'] \Pr[M = m'] \\
&= \sum_{m' \in \mathcal{M}} \Pr[\text{Enc}(k, m') = c] \Pr[M = m'] \\
&= \Pr[\text{Enc}(k, m) = c] \underbrace{\sum_{m' \in \mathcal{M}} \Pr[M = m']}_1 \\
&\quad \text{(Enc is independent of } M, \text{ so we take it out)} \\
&= \Pr[\text{Enc}(k, M) = c | M = m] = \Pr[C = c | M = m].
\end{aligned}$$

We are left to show that $\Pr[M = m] = \Pr[M = m | C = c]$, but this is easy with Bayes. \square

One Time Pad

Now we'll see a perfect encryption scheme, the One Time Pad (OTP). The message space, the cyphertext space, and the key space are all the same, *i.e.*, $\mathcal{M} = \mathcal{K} = \mathcal{C} = \{0, 1\}^l$, with $l \in \mathbb{N}^+$.

Encryption and decryption use the xor operation:

- $\text{Enc}(k, m) = k \oplus m = c$;
- $\text{Dec}(k, c) = c \oplus k = (k \oplus m) \oplus k = m$.

Seeing that this is correct is immediate.

This can actually be done in any finite abelian group $(\mathbb{G}, +)$, where you just do $k + m$ to encode and $c - k$ to decode.

Theorem 2. *OTP is perfectly secure.* \diamond

Proof of theorem 2. Fix $m \in \mathcal{M}, c \in \mathcal{C}$, and choose a random key.

$$\Pr[\text{Enc}(k, m) = c] = \Pr[k = c - m] = \frac{1}{|\mathbb{G}|}.$$

This is true for any m , so we are done. \square

OTP has two problems:

1. the key is long (as long as the message);




Figure 2: Message exchange between A and B using symmetric authentication. E is the eavesdropper.

2. we can't reuse the key:

$$\begin{aligned} c &= k + m \\ c' &= k + m' \end{aligned} \implies c - c' = m - m' \implies m' = m - (c - c').$$

Theorem 3 (Shannon, 1949). *In any perfectly secure encryption scheme the size of the key space is at least as large as the size of the message space, i.e., $|\mathcal{K}| \geq |\mathcal{M}|$.* \diamond

Proof of theorem 3. Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that $|\mathcal{K}| < |\mathcal{M}|$. Fix M to be the uniform distribution over \mathcal{M} , which we can do as perfect secrecy works for any distribution. Take a cyphertext $c \in \mathcal{C}$ such that $\Pr[C = c] > 0$, i.e., $\exists m, k$ such that $\text{Enc}(k, m) = c$.

Consider $\mathcal{M}' = \{\text{Dec}(k, c) : k \in \mathcal{K}\}$, the set of all messages decrypted from c using any key. Clearly, $|\mathcal{M}'| \leq |\mathcal{K}| < |\mathcal{M}|$, so $\exists m' \in \mathcal{M}$ such that $m' \notin \mathcal{M}'$. This means that

$$\Pr[M = m'] = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{M}|} \neq \Pr[M = m' | C = c] = 0$$

in contradiction with perfect secrecy. \square

In the rest of the course we will forget about perfect secrecy, and strive for computational security, i.e., bound the computational power of the adversary.

1.2 Authentication

The aim of authentication is to avoid tampering of E with the messages exchanged between A and B (fig. 2).

A Message Authentication Code (MAC) is defined as a tuple $\Pi = (\text{Gen}, \text{Mac}, \text{Vrfy})$, where:

- Gen , as usual, outputs a random key from some key space \mathcal{K} ;
- $\text{Mac} : \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \Phi$ maps a key and a message to an authenticator in some authenticator space Φ ;
- $\text{Vrfy} : \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{M} \times \Phi \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ verifies the authenticator.

As usual, we expect a MAC to be correct, *i.e.*,

$$\forall m \in \mathcal{M}, \forall k \in \mathcal{K}. \text{Vrfy}(k, m, \text{Mac}(k, m)) = 1.$$

If the Mac function is deterministic, then it must be that $\text{Vrfy}(k, m, \phi) = 1$ if and only if $\text{Mac}(k, m) = \phi$.

Security for MACs is that *forgery* must be hard: you can't come up with an authenticator for a message if you don't know the key.

Definition 2 (Information theoretic MAC). $(\text{Mac}, \text{Vrfy})$ has ε -statistical security if for all (possibly unbounded) adversary \mathcal{A} , for all $m \in \mathcal{M}$,

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} \text{Vrfy}(k, m', \phi') = 1 \wedge m' \neq m : \\ \begin{array}{l} k \leftarrow \text{sKeyGen}; \\ \phi = \text{Mac}(k, m); \\ (m', \phi') \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(m, \phi) \end{array} \end{array} \right] \leq \varepsilon$$

i.e., the adversary forges a (m', ϕ') that verifies with key k with low probability, even if it knows a valid pair (m, ϕ) . \diamond

As an exercise, prove that the above is impossible if $\varepsilon = 0$.

Information theoretic security is also called unconditional security. Later we'll see *conditional* security, based on computational assumptions.

Definition 3 (Pairwise independence). Given a family $\mathcal{H} = \{h_k : \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \Phi\}_{k \in \mathcal{K}}$ of functions, we say that \mathcal{H} is pairwise independent if for all distinct m, m' we have that $(h_k(m), h_k(m')) \in \Phi^2$ is uniform over the choice of $k \leftarrow \mathcal{K}$. \diamond

We show straight away a construction of a pairwise independent family of function.

Construction 1 (Pairwise independent function). Let p be a prime, the functions in our family \mathcal{H} are defined as

$$h_{a,b}(m) = am + b \pmod{p}$$

with $\mathcal{K} = \mathbb{Z}_p^2$, and with $\mathcal{M} = \Phi = \mathbb{Z}_p$. \diamond

Theorem 4. *Construction 1 is pairwise independent.* \diamond

Proof of theorem 4. For any m, m', ϕ, ϕ' , we want to find the value of

$$\Pr [am + b = \phi \wedge am' + b = \phi']$$

for $a, b \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^2$. This is the same as

$$\Pr_{a,b} \left[\begin{pmatrix} m & 1 \\ m' & 1 \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} a \\ b \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} \phi \\ \phi' \end{pmatrix} \right] = \Pr_{a,b} \left[\begin{pmatrix} a \\ b \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} m & 1 \\ m' & 1 \end{pmatrix}^{-1} \begin{pmatrix} \phi \\ \phi' \end{pmatrix} \right] = \frac{1}{|\Phi|^2}.$$

This is true since $\begin{pmatrix} m & 1 \\ m' & 1 \end{pmatrix}^{-1} \begin{pmatrix} \phi \\ \phi' \end{pmatrix}$ is just a couple of (constant) numbers, so the probability of choosing (a, b) such that they equal the constant is just $\frac{1}{|\Phi|^2}$. \square

If h_k is part of a pairwise independent family of functions, then $\text{Mac}(k, m) = h_k(m)$, and $\text{Vrfy}(k, m, \phi)$ is simply computing $h_k(m)$ and comparing it with ϕ , *i.e.*,

$$\text{Vrfy}(k, m, \phi) = 1 \iff h_k(m) = \phi.$$

We now prove that this is an information theoretic MAC.

Theorem 5. *Any pairwise independent function is $\frac{1}{|\Phi|}$ -statistical secure.* \diamond

Proof of theorem 5. Take any two distinct m, m' , and two ϕ, ϕ' . We show that the probability that $\text{Mac}(k, m') = \phi'$ is exponentially small.

$$\Pr_k [\text{Mac}(k, m) = \phi] = \Pr_k [h_k(m) = \phi] = \frac{1}{|\Phi|}.$$

Now look at the joint probabilities:

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr_k [\text{Mac}(k, m) = \phi \wedge \text{Mac}(k, m') = \phi'] &= \Pr_k [h_k(m) = \phi \wedge h_k(m') = \phi'] \\ &\quad \text{(by definition)} \\ &= \frac{1}{|\Phi|^2} = \frac{1}{|\Phi|} \cdot \frac{1}{|\Phi|}. \end{aligned}$$

The last steps come from the fact that h_k is pairwise independent. To see that the construction is $\frac{1}{|\Phi|}$ -statistical secure:

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr_k [\text{Mac}(k, m') = \phi' | \text{Mac}(k, m) = \phi] &= \Pr_k [h_k(m') = \phi' | h_k(m) = \phi] \\ &= \frac{\Pr_k [h_k(m) = \phi \wedge h_k(m') = \phi']}{\Pr_k [h_k(m) = \phi]} \\ &= \frac{1}{|\Phi|}. \end{aligned}$$

□

Note that Construction 1 ($h_k(m) = am + b \pmod{p}$) is insecure if the same key $k = (a, b)$ is used for two messages.

Theorem 6. *Any t -time $2^{-\lambda}$ -statistically secure MAC has key of size $(t + 1)\lambda$.* \diamond

1.3 Randomness Extraction

X is a random source (possibly not uniform). $\text{Ext}(X) = Y$ is a uniform RV.

First, let's see a construction for a binary RV. Let B be a RV such that $\Pr[B = 1] = p$ and $\Pr[B = 0] = 1 - p$, with $p \neq 1 - p$. We take two samples, B_1 and B_2 from B , and we want to obtain an unbiased RV B' .

1. Take two samples, $b_1 \leftarrow \$B_1$ and $b_2 \leftarrow \$B_2$;
2. if $b_1 = b_2$, sample again;
3. if $(b_1 = 1 \wedge b_2 = 0)$, output 1; if $(b_1 = 0 \wedge b_2 = 1)$, output 0.

It's easy to verify that B' is uniform:

$$\begin{aligned}\Pr[B' = 1] &= \Pr[B_1 = 1 \wedge B_2 = 0] = p(1 - p) \\ \Pr[B' = 0] &= \Pr[B_1 = 0 \wedge B_2 = 1] = (1 - p)p.\end{aligned}$$

How many trials do we have to make before outputting something? $2(1 - p)p$ is the probability that we output something. The probability that we don't output anything for n steps is thus $(1 - 2(1 - p)p)^n$.

Something is missing here on randomness extraction and min-entropy.

2 Computational Cryptography

Some details should be added on negligible functions.

To introduce computational cryptography we first have to define a computational model. We assume the adversary is efficient, *i.e.*, it is a Probabilistic Polynomial Time (PPT) adversary.

We want that the probability of success of the adversary is tiny, *i.e.*, negligible for some $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$. A function $\varepsilon : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is negligible if $\forall c > 0. \exists n_0$ such that $\forall n > n_0. \varepsilon(n) < n^{-c}$.

We rely on computational assumptions, *i.e.*, in tasks believed to be hard for any efficient adversary. In this setting we make conditional statements, *i.e.*, if a certain assumption holds then a certain crypto-scheme is secure.

2.1 One Way Functions

A simple computational assumption is the existence of One Way Functions (OWFs), *i.e.*, functions for which is hard to compute the inverse.

Definition 4 (One Way Function). A function $f : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^*$ is a OWF if $f(x)$ can be computed in polynomial time for all x and for all PPT adversaries \mathcal{A} it holds that

$$\Pr[f(x') = y : x \leftarrow \$\{0, 1\}^*; y = f(x); x' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda, y)] \leq \varepsilon(\lambda). \quad \diamond$$

The 1^λ given to the adversary \mathcal{A} is there to highlight the fact that \mathcal{A} is polynomial in the length of the input (λ).

Russel Impagliazzo proved that OWFs are equivalent to One Way Puzzles, *i.e.*, couples (Pgen, Pver) where $\text{Pgen}(1^\lambda) \rightarrow (y, x)$ gives us a puzzle (y) and a solution to it (x), while $\text{Pver}(x, y) \rightarrow 0/1$ verifies if x is a solution of y .

Another object of interest in this classification are average hard NP-puzzles, for which you can only get an instance, *i.e.*, $\text{Pgen}(1^\lambda) \rightarrow y$.

Impagliazzo says we live in one of five worlds:

1. Algorithmica, where $P = NP$;
2. Heuristica, where there are no average hard NP-puzzles, *i.e.*, problems without solution;
3. Pessiland, where you have average hard NP-puzzles;
4. Minicrypt, where you have OWF, one-way NP-puzzles, but no Public Key Cryptography (PKC);
5. Cryptomania, where you have both OWF and PKC.

We'll stay in Minicrypt for now.

OWF are hard to invert on average. Two examples:

- factoring the product of two large prime numbers;
- compute the discrete logarithm, *i.e.*, take a finite group (\mathbb{G}, \cdot) , and compute $y = g^x$ for some $g \in \mathbb{G}$. The find $x = \log_g(y)$. This is hard to compute in some groups, *e.g.*, \mathbb{Z}_p^* .

2.2 Computational Indistinguishability

Definition 5 (Distribution Ensemble). A distribution ensemble $\mathcal{X} = \{X_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ is a sequence of distributions X_i over some space $\{0, 1\}^\lambda$. \diamond

Definition 6 (Computational Indistinguishability). Two distribution ensembles \mathcal{X}_λ and \mathcal{Y}_λ are computationally indistinguishable, written as $\mathcal{X}_\lambda \approx_c \mathcal{Y}_\lambda$, if for all PPT distinguishers \mathcal{D} it holds that

$$\left| \Pr[\mathcal{D}(\mathcal{X}_\lambda) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{D}(\mathcal{Y}_\lambda) = 1] \right| \leq \varepsilon(\lambda).$$

\diamond

Lemma 1 (Reduction). If $\mathcal{X} \approx_c \mathcal{Y}$, then for all PPT functions f , $f(\mathcal{X}) \approx_c f(\mathcal{Y})$. \diamond

Proof of lemma 1. Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that $\exists f$ such that $f(\mathcal{X}) \not\approx_c f(\mathcal{Y})$: then we can distinguish \mathcal{X} and \mathcal{Y} . Since $f(\mathcal{X}) \not\approx_c f(\mathcal{Y})$, then $\exists p = \text{poly}(\lambda), \mathcal{D}$ such that, for infinitely many λ s

$$\left| \Pr[\mathcal{D}(f(\mathcal{X}_\lambda)) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{D}(f(\mathcal{Y}_\lambda)) = 1] \right| \geq \frac{1}{p(\lambda)}.$$

\mathcal{D} distinguishes \mathcal{X}_λ and \mathcal{Y}_λ with non-negligible probability. Consider the following \mathcal{D}' , which is given

$$z = \begin{cases} x \leftarrow \mathcal{X}_\lambda; \\ y \leftarrow \mathcal{Y}_\lambda. \end{cases}$$

\mathcal{D}' runs $\mathcal{D}(f(z))$ and outputs whatever it outputs, and has the same probability of distinguishing \mathcal{X} and \mathcal{Y} of \mathcal{D} , in contradiction with the fact that $\mathcal{X} \approx_c \mathcal{Y}$. \square

Now we show that computational indistinguishability is transitive.

Lemma 2 (Hybrid Argument). *Let $\mathcal{X} = \{X_\lambda\}$, $\mathcal{Y} = \{Y_\lambda\}$, $\mathcal{Z} = \{Z_\lambda\}$ be distribution ensembles. If $\mathcal{X}_\lambda \approx_c \mathcal{Y}_\lambda$ and $\mathcal{Y}_\lambda \approx_c \mathcal{Z}_\lambda$, then $\mathcal{X}_\lambda \approx_c \mathcal{Z}_\lambda$. \diamond*

Proof of lemma 2. This follows from the triangular inequality.

$$\begin{aligned} \left| \Pr[\mathcal{D}(\mathcal{X}_\lambda) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{D}(\mathcal{Z}_\lambda) = 1] \right| &= \left| \Pr[\mathcal{D}(\mathcal{X}_\lambda) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{D}(\mathcal{Y}_\lambda) = 1] \right. \\ &\quad \left. + \Pr[\mathcal{D}(\mathcal{Y}_\lambda) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{D}(\mathcal{Z}_\lambda) = 1] \right| \\ &\leq \left| \Pr[\mathcal{D}(\mathcal{X}_\lambda) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{D}(\mathcal{Y}_\lambda) = 1] \right| \\ &\quad + \left| \Pr[\mathcal{D}(\mathcal{Y}_\lambda) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{D}(\mathcal{Z}_\lambda) = 1] \right| \\ &\leq 2\varepsilon(\lambda). \end{aligned} \quad (\text{negligible})$$

\square

We often prove $\mathcal{X} \approx_c \mathcal{Y}$ by defining a sequence $\mathcal{H}_0, \mathcal{H}_1, \dots, \mathcal{H}_t$ of distributions ensembles such that $\mathcal{H}_0 \equiv \mathcal{X}$ and $\mathcal{H}_t \equiv \mathcal{Y}$, and that for all i , $\mathcal{H}_i \approx_c \mathcal{H}_{i+1}$.

2.3 Pseudo Random Generators

Let's see our first cryptographic primitive. Pseudo Random Generators (PRGs) take in input a random seed and generate pseudo random sequences with some stretch, *i.e.*, output longer than input, and indistinguishable from a true random sequence.

Definition 7 (Pseudo Random Generator). A function $\mathcal{G} : \{0, 1\}^\lambda \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{\lambda+l(\lambda)}$ is a PRG if and only if

1. \mathcal{G} is computable in polynomial time;




Figure 3: Extending a PRG with 1 bit stretch to a PRG with l bit stretch.

2. $|\mathcal{G}(s)| = \lambda + l(\lambda)$ for all $s \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda$;
3. $\mathcal{G}(\mathcal{U}_\lambda) \approx_c \mathcal{U}_{\lambda+l(\lambda)}$.

◇

Theorem 7. *If \exists PRG with 1 bit of stretch, then \exists PRG with $l(\lambda)$ bits of stretch, with $l(\lambda) = \text{poly}(\lambda)$.*

◇

Proof of theorem 7. We'll prove this just for some fixed constant $l(\lambda) = l \in \mathbb{N}$.

First, let's look at the construction (fig. 3). We replicate our PRG \mathcal{G} with 1 bit stretch l times. The PRG \mathcal{G}^l that we define takes in input $s \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda$, computes $(s_1, b_1) = \mathcal{G}(s)$, where $s_1 \in \{0, 1\}^l$ and $b_1 \in \{0, 1\}$, outputs b_1 and feeds s_1 to the second copy of PRG \mathcal{G} , and so on until the l -th PRG.

To show that our construction is a PRG, we define l hybrids, with $\mathcal{H}_0^\lambda \equiv \mathcal{G}^l(\mathcal{U}_\lambda)$, where $\mathcal{G}^l : \{0, 1\}^\lambda \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{\lambda+l}$ is our proposed construction, and \mathcal{H}_i^λ takes $b_1, \dots, b_i \leftarrow \mathcal{S}\{0, 1\}$, $s_i \leftarrow \mathcal{S}\{0, 1\}^\lambda$, and outputs (b_1, \dots, b_i, s_l) , where $s_l \in \{0, 1\}^{\lambda+l-i}$ is $s_l = \mathcal{G}^{l-i}(s_i)$, i.e., the output of our construction restricted to $l-i$ units.

\mathcal{H}_l^λ takes $b_1, \dots, b_l \leftarrow \mathcal{S}\{0, 1\}$ and $s_l \leftarrow \mathcal{S}\{0, 1\}^l$ and outputs (b_1, \dots, b_l, s_l) directly.

We need to show that $\mathcal{H}_i^\lambda \approx_c \mathcal{H}_{i+1}^\lambda$. To do so, fix some i . The only difference between the two hybrids is that s_{i+1}, b_{i+1} are pseudo random in \mathcal{H}_i^λ , and are truly random in $\mathcal{H}_{i+1}^\lambda$. All bits before them are truly random, all bits after are pseudo random.

Assume these two hybrids are distinguishable, then we can break the PRG. Consider the PPT function f_i defined by $f(s_{i+1}, b_{i+1}) = (b_1, \dots, b_l, s_l)$ such that $b_1, \dots, b_i \leftarrow \mathcal{S}\{0, 1\}$ and, for all $j \in [i+1, l]$ $(b_j, s_j) = \mathcal{G}(s_{j-1})$.

By the security of PRGs we have that $\mathcal{G}(\mathcal{U}_\lambda) \approx_c \mathcal{U}_{\lambda+1}$. By reduction, we also have that $f(\mathcal{G}(\mathcal{U}_\lambda)) \approx_c f(\mathcal{U}_{\lambda+1})$. Thus, $\mathcal{H}_i^\lambda \approx_c \mathcal{H}_{i+1}^\lambda$. □

2.4 Hard Core Predicates

Definition 8 (Hard Core Predicate - I). A polynomial time function $h : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ is *hard core* for $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ if for all PPT adversaries \mathcal{A}

$$\Pr[\mathcal{A}(f(x)) = h(x) : x \leftarrow \mathcal{S}\{0, 1\}^n] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon(\lambda).$$

◇

The $\frac{1}{2}$ in the upper bound tells us that the adversary can't do better than guessing.

Definition 9 (Hard Core Predicate - II). A polynomial time function $h : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ is *hard core* for $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ if for all PPT adversaries \mathcal{A}

$$\left| \Pr \left[\begin{array}{c} \mathcal{A}(f(x), h(x)) = 1 : \\ x \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n \end{array} \right] - \Pr \left[\begin{array}{c} \mathcal{A}(f(x), b) = 1 : \\ x \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n; \\ b \leftarrow \{0, 1\} \end{array} \right] \right| \leq \varepsilon(\lambda).$$

◇

Theorem 8. *Definition 8 and definition 9 are equivalent.*

◇

Proof of this theorem is left as exercise.

Luckily for us, every OWF has a Hard Core Predicate (HCP). There isn't a single HCP h for all OWFs f . Suppose \exists such h , then take f and let $f'(x) = h(x) || f(x)$. Then, if $f'(x) = y || b$ for some x , it will always be that $h(x) = b$.

But, given a OWF, we can create a new OWF for which h is hard core.

Theorem 9 (Goldreich-Levin (GL), 1983). *Let $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ be a OWF, and define $g(x, r) = f(x) || r$ for $r \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n$. Then g is a OWF, and*

$$h(x, r) = \langle x, r \rangle = \sum_{i=1}^n x_i \cdot r_i \pmod{2}$$

is hardcore for g .

◇

Definition 10 (One Way Permutation). We say that $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ is a One Way Permutation (OWP) if f is a OWF, $\forall x. |x| = |f(x)|$, and for all distinct $x, x'. f(x) \neq f(x')$.

◇

Corollary 1. *Let f be a OWP, and consider $g : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ from the GL theorem. Then $\mathcal{G}(s) = (g(s), h(s))$ is a PRG with stretch 1.*

◇

Proof of corollary 1.

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{G}(\mathcal{U}_{2n}) &= (g(x, r), h(x, r)) \\ &= (f(x) || r, \langle x, r \rangle) \\ &\approx_c (f(x) || r, b) \\ &\approx_c \mathcal{U}_{2n+1}. \end{aligned} \tag{GL}$$

□

UNCLEAR

Assume instead f is a OWF, and that is 1-to-1 (injective). Consider $\mathcal{X} = g^m(\bar{x}) = (g(x_1), h(x_1), \dots, g(x_m), h(x_m))$, where $x_1, \dots, x_m \in \{0, 1\}^n$ (i.e., $\bar{x} \in \{0, 1\}^{nm}$). You can construct a PRG from a OWF as shown by H.I.L.L.

Fact 1. \mathcal{X} is indistinguishable from \mathcal{X}' such that $\mathcal{H}_\infty(\mathcal{X}') \geq k = n \cdot m + m$, since f is injective. \diamond

Now $\mathcal{G}(s, \bar{x}) = (s, \text{Ext}(s, g^m(\bar{x})))$ where $\text{Ext} : \{0, 1\}^d \times \{0, 1\}^{nm} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^l$, and $l = nm + 1$. This works for $m = \omega(\log(n))$. You get extraction error $\varepsilon \approx 2^{-m}$.

2.5 Symmetric Key Encryption Schemes

We call $\Pi = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ a Symmetric Key Encryption (SKE) scheme.

- Gen outputs a key $k \leftarrow \mathcal{K}$;
- $\text{Enc}(k, m) = c$ for some $m \in \mathcal{M}$, $c \in \mathcal{C}$;
- $\text{Dec}(k, c) = m$.

As usual, we want Π to be correct.

We want to introduce computational security: a bounded adversary can not gain information on the message given the cyphertext.

Definition 11 (One time security). A SKE scheme $\Pi = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ has one time computational security if for all PPT adversaries $\mathcal{A} \ni$ a negligible function ε such that

$$\left| \Pr [\mathcal{G}_{\Pi, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{one time}}(\lambda, 0) = 1] - \Pr [\mathcal{G}_{\Pi, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{one time}}(\lambda, 1) = 1] \right| \leq \varepsilon(\lambda)$$

where $\mathcal{G}_{\Pi, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{one time}}(\lambda, b)$ is the following “game” (or experiment):

1. pick $k \leftarrow \mathcal{K}$;
2. \mathcal{A} outputs two messages $(m_0, m_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda)$ where $m_0, m_1 \in \mathcal{M}$ and $|m_0| = |m_1|$;
3. $\xrightarrow{\$} \text{Enc}(k, m_b)$ with b input of the experiment;
4. output $b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda, c)$, i.e., the adversary tries to guess which message was encrypted. \diamond

Let's look at a construction.

Construction 2 (SKE scheme from PRG). Let $\mathcal{G} : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^l$ be a PRG. Set $\mathcal{K} = \{0,1\}^n$, and $\mathcal{M} = \mathcal{C} = \{0,1\}^l$. Define $\text{Enc}(k, m) = \mathcal{G}(k) \oplus m$ and $\text{Dec}(k, c) = \mathcal{G}(k) \oplus c$. \diamond

Theorem 10. *If \mathcal{G} is a PRG, the SKE in Construction 2 is one-time computationally secure.* \diamond

Proof of theorem 10. Consider the following experiments:

- $\mathcal{H}_0(\lambda, b)$ is like $\mathcal{G}_{\Pi, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{one time}}$:
 1. $k \leftarrow \mathcal{K}$;
 2. $(m_0, m_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda)$;
 3. $c = \mathcal{G}(k) \oplus m_b$;
 4. $b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda, c)$.
- $\mathcal{H}_1(\lambda, b)$ replaces \mathcal{G} with something truly random:
 1. $(m_0, m_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda)$;
 2. $r \leftarrow \mathcal{K}$;
 3. $c = r \oplus m_b$, basically like One Time Pad (OTP);
 4. $b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda, c)$.
- $\mathcal{H}_2(\lambda)$ is just randomness:
 1. $(m_0, m_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda)$;
 2. $c \leftarrow \mathcal{K}$;
 3. $b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda, c)$.

First, we show that $\mathcal{H}_0(\lambda, b) \approx_c \mathcal{H}_1(\lambda, b)$, for $b \in \{0,1\}$. Fix some value for b , and assume exists a PPT distinguisher \mathcal{D} between $\mathcal{H}_0(\lambda, b)$ and $\mathcal{H}_1(\lambda, b)$: we then can construct a distinguisher \mathcal{D}' for the PRG.

\mathcal{D}' , on input z , which can be either $\mathcal{G}(k)$ for some $k \leftarrow \mathcal{K}$, or directly $z \leftarrow \mathcal{K}$, does the following:

- get $(m_0, m_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{D}(1^\lambda)$;
- feed $z \oplus m_b$ to \mathcal{D} ;
- output the result of \mathcal{D} .

Now, we show that $\mathcal{H}_1(\lambda, b) \approx_c \mathcal{H}_2(\lambda, b)$, for $b \in \{0,1\}$. By perfect secrecy of OTP we have that $(m_0 \oplus r) \approx z \approx (m_1 \oplus r)$, so $\mathcal{H}_1(\lambda, 0) \approx_c \mathcal{H}_2(\lambda) \approx_c \mathcal{H}_1(\lambda, 1)$. \square

Corollary 2. *One-time computationally secure SKE schemes are in Minicrypt.* \diamond

This scheme is not secure if the adversary knows a (m_1, c_1) pair, and we reuse the key. Take any m, c , then $c \oplus c_1 = m \oplus m_1$, and you can find m . This is called a Chosen Plaintext Attack (CPA), something we will defined shortly using a Pseudo Random Function (PRF).

2.6 Chosen Plaintext Attacks and Pseudo Random Functions

Definition 12 (Pseudo Random Function). Let $\mathcal{F} = \{F_k : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^l\}$ be a family of functions, for $k \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda$. Consider the following two experiments:

- $\mathcal{G}_{\mathcal{F}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{real}}(\lambda)$, defined as:
 1. $k \leftarrow \mathcal{S}\{0, 1\}^\lambda$;
 2. $b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{F_k(\cdot)}(1^\lambda)$, where \mathcal{A} can query an oracle for values of $F_k(\cdot)$, without knowing k .
- $\mathcal{G}_{\mathcal{F}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{rand}}(\lambda)$, defined as:
 1. $R \leftarrow \mathcal{SR}(n \rightarrow l)$, *i.e.*, a function R is chosen at random from all functions from $\{0, 1\}^n$ to $\{0, 1\}^l$;
 2. $b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{R(\cdot)}(1^\lambda)$, where \mathcal{A} can query an oracle for values of $R(\cdot)$.

The family \mathcal{F} of functions is a PRF family if for all PPT adversaries $\mathcal{A} \exists$ a negligible function ε such that

$$\left| \Pr [\mathcal{G}_{\mathcal{F}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{real}}(\lambda) = 1] - \Pr [\mathcal{G}_{\mathcal{F}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{rand}}(\lambda) = 1] \right| \leq \varepsilon(\lambda). \quad \diamond$$

To introduce CPAs and CPA-secure SKE schemes, we first introduce the game of CPA. As usual, a SKE scheme is a tuple $\Pi = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$.

Definition 13 (CPA-secure SKE scheme). Let $\Pi = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ be a SKE scheme, and consider the game $\mathcal{G}_{\Pi, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{cpa}}(\lambda, b)$, defined as:

1. $k \leftarrow \mathcal{S}\{0, 1\}^\lambda$;
2. $(m_0, m_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\text{Enc}(k, \cdot)}(1^\lambda)$. \mathcal{A} is given access to an oracle for $\text{Enc}(k, \cdot)$, so she knows some (m, c) couples, with $c = \text{Enc}(k, m)$;
3. $c \leftarrow \text{Enc}(k, m_b)$;
4. $b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\text{Enc}(k, \cdot)}(1^\lambda, c)$.

Π is CPA-secure if for all PPT adversaries \mathcal{A}

$$\mathcal{G}_{\Pi, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{cpa}}(\lambda, 0) \approx_c \mathcal{G}_{\Pi, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{cpa}}(\lambda, 1). \quad \diamond$$

Deterministic schemes cannot achieve this, *i.e.*, when Enc is deterministic the adversary could cipher m_0 and then compare c to $\text{Enc}(k, m_0)$, and output 0 if and only if $c = \text{Enc}(k, m_0)$.

Let's construct a CPA-secure SKE scheme using PRFs.

Construction 3 (SKE scheme from PRF). Let \mathcal{F} be a PRF, we define the following SKE scheme $\Pi = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$:

- Gen takes $k \leftarrow \mathcal{S}\{0, 1\}^\lambda$;
- $\text{Enc}(k, m) = (r, F_k(r) \oplus m)$, with $r \leftarrow \mathcal{S}\{0, 1\}^n$. Note that, since $F_k : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^l$, we have that $\mathcal{M} = \{0, 1\}^l$ and $\mathcal{C} = \{0, 1\}^{n+l}$;
- $\text{Dec}(k, (c_1, c_2)) = F_k(c_1) \oplus c_2$. \diamond

Our construction is both one time computationally secure, and secure against CPAs.

Theorem 11. *If \mathcal{F} is a PRF, Construction 3 is CPA-secure.* \diamond

Proof of theorem 11. First, we define the experiment $\mathcal{H}_0(\lambda, b) \equiv \mathcal{G}_{\Pi, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{cpa}}(\lambda, b)$ as follows:

1. $k \leftarrow \mathcal{S}\{0, 1\}^\lambda$;
2. $(m_0, m_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\text{Enc}(k, \cdot)}(1^\lambda)$;
3. $c^* \leftarrow (r^*, F_k(r^*) \oplus m_b)$, where $r^* \leftarrow \mathcal{S}\{0, 1\}^n$;
4. output $b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\text{Enc}(k, \cdot)}(1^\lambda, c^*)$.

Note that in the CPA game the adversary has access to an encryption oracle using the chosen key.

Now, for the first hybrid $\mathcal{H}_1(\lambda, b)$, where we sample a random function R in place of F_k :

1. $R \leftarrow \mathcal{SR}(n \rightarrow l)$;
2. $(m_0, m_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\text{Enc}(R, \cdot)}(1^\lambda)$, where now $\text{Enc}(R, m) = (r, R(r) \oplus m)$ for some random r ;
3. $c^* \leftarrow (r^*, R(r^*) \oplus m_b)$, where $r^* \leftarrow \mathcal{S}\{0, 1\}^n$;
4. output $b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\text{Enc}(R, \cdot)}(1^\lambda, c^*)$.

Our first claim is that $\mathcal{H}_0(\lambda, b) \approx_c \mathcal{H}_1(\lambda, b)$ for $b \in \{0, 1\}$. As usual, we assume that exists an adversary \mathcal{A} which can distinguish the experiments, *i.e.*, that can distinguish the oracles, and use \mathcal{A} to create \mathcal{A}_{PRF} that breaks the PRF.

\mathcal{A}_{PRF} has access to some oracle $O(\cdot)$, with is one of two possibilities:

$$O(x) = \begin{cases} F_k(x) & \text{for } k \leftarrow \mathcal{S}\{0, 1\}^\lambda \\ R(x) & \text{for } R \leftarrow \mathcal{SR}(n \rightarrow l). \end{cases}$$

\mathcal{A} gives \mathcal{A}_{PRF} some message m . \mathcal{A}_{PRF} picks $r \leftarrow \mathcal{S}\{0, 1\}^n$, and queries $O(r)$ to get $z \in \{0, 1\}^l$. Then it gives $(r, z \oplus m)$ to \mathcal{A} . This is repeated as long as \mathcal{A} asks for encryption queries.

Then \mathcal{A} gives to \mathcal{A}_{PRF} (m_0, m_1) , which repeats the same procedure using m_0 as a message (to distinguish $\mathcal{H}_0(\lambda, 0)$ from $\mathcal{H}_1(\lambda, 0)$) to compute c^* . \mathcal{A} ,




Figure 4: First two levels of a GGM tree.

after receiving c^* , asks some more encryption queries, and then outputs b' . If $b' = 1$, \mathcal{A}_{PRF} says $R(\cdot)$, otherwise it says $F_k(\cdot)$.

Now for the third experiment, $\mathcal{H}_2(\lambda)$, which uses $\text{Enc}(m) = (r_1, r_2)$ with $(r_1, r_2) \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{n+l}$, i.e., it outputs just randomness.

Our second claim is that $\mathcal{H}_1(\lambda, b) \approx_c \mathcal{H}_2(\lambda)$ for $b \in \{0, 1\}$. To see this, note that \mathcal{H}_1 and \mathcal{H}_2 are identical as long as collisions don't happen when choosing the r s. It suffices for us to show that collisions happen with small probability.

Call $E_{i,j}$ the event “random r_i collides with random r_j ”. The event of a collision is thus $E = \bigvee_{i,j} E_{i,j}$, and its probability can be upper bounded as follows:

$$\Pr[E] = \sum_{i,j} \Pr[E_{i,j}] = \sum_{i,j} \text{Coll}(\mathcal{U}_n) \leq \binom{q}{2} 2^{-n} \leq \frac{q^2}{2^n}$$

where q is the (polynomial) number of queries that the adversary does, and $\text{Coll}(\mathcal{U}_n)$ is the probability of a collision when using a uniform distribution, which is 2^{-n} . \square

Theorem 12 (GGM, 1982). *PRFs can be constructed from PRGs.* \diamond

Corollary 3. *PRFs are in Minicrypt.* \diamond

Construction 4 (GGM tree). Assume we have a length doubling PRG $\mathcal{G} : \{0, 1\}^\lambda \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{2\lambda}$. We say that $\mathcal{G}(x) \triangleq (\mathcal{G}_0(x), \mathcal{G}_1(x))$ to distinguish the first λ bits from the second λ bits.

Now, to build the PRF we construct a Goldreich-Goldwasser-Micali (GGM) tree (fig. 4) starting with a key $k \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda$. On input $x = (x_1, \dots, x_n) \in \{0, 1\}^n$, with n being the height of the tree, the PRF picks a path in the tree:

$$F_k(x) = \mathcal{G}_{x_n}(\dots \mathcal{G}_{x_1}(k) \dots).$$

\diamond

Lemma 3. Let $\mathcal{G} : \{0, 1\}^\lambda \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{2\lambda}$ be a PRG. Then for all $t(\lambda) = \text{poly}(\lambda)$ we have that

$$(\mathcal{G}(k_1), \dots, \mathcal{G}(k_t)) \approx_c \underbrace{(\mathcal{U}_{2\lambda}, \dots, \mathcal{U}_{2\lambda})}_{t \text{ times}}. \quad \diamond$$

Proof of lemma 3. We define t hybrids, where $\mathcal{H}_i(\lambda)$ is defined as

$$\mathcal{H}_i(\lambda) = (\mathcal{G}(k_1), \dots, \mathcal{G}(k_{t-i}), \underbrace{\mathcal{U}_{2\lambda}, \dots, \mathcal{U}_{2\lambda}}_{i \text{ times}})$$

thus $\mathcal{H}_0(\lambda) = (\mathcal{G}(k_1), \dots, \mathcal{G}(k_t))$ and $\mathcal{H}_t(\lambda) = (\mathcal{U}_{2\lambda}, \dots, \mathcal{U}_{2\lambda})$. To prove that $\mathcal{H}_1(\lambda) \approx_c \mathcal{H}_t(\lambda)$, we show that for any i it holds that $\mathcal{H}_i(\lambda) \approx_c \mathcal{H}_{i+1}(\lambda)$. This relies on the fact that $\mathcal{G}(k_{t-i}) \approx_c \mathcal{U}_{2\lambda}$: assume that exists a distinguisher \mathcal{D} for $\mathcal{H}_i(\lambda)$ and $\mathcal{H}_{i+1}(\lambda)$, we then break the PRG.

We build \mathcal{D}' , which takes in input some z from either $\mathcal{G}(k_{t-i})$ or $\mathcal{U}_{2\lambda}$. \mathcal{D}' takes $k_1, \dots, k_{t-(i+1)} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda$, and feeds $(\mathcal{G}(k_1), \dots, \mathcal{G}(k_{t-(i+1)}), z, \mathcal{U}_{2\lambda}, \dots, \mathcal{U}_{2\lambda})$ to \mathcal{D} , and returns whatever it returns. \square

Proof that Construction 4 is a PRF. We'll define a series of hybrids to show that the GGM tree is a PRF. $\mathcal{H}_0(\lambda) \equiv$ our GGM tree.

$\mathcal{H}_i(\lambda)$, for $i \in [1, n]$, will replace the tree up to depth i with a true random function. $\mathcal{H}_i(\lambda)$ initially has two empty arrays T_1 and T_2 . On input $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$, it checks if $\bar{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_i) \in T_1$. If not, $\mathcal{H}_i(\lambda)$ picks $k_{\bar{x}} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ and adds \bar{x} to T_1 and $k_{\bar{x}}$ to T_2 . If $\bar{x} \in T_1$, it just retrieves $k_{\bar{x}}$ from T_2 . Then $\mathcal{H}_i(\lambda)$ outputs the following:

$$\mathcal{G}_{x_n}(\mathcal{G}_{x_{n-1}}(\dots \mathcal{G}_{x_{i+1}}(k_{\bar{x}}) \dots)).$$

If $i = 0$ we have that $\bar{x} = \perp$ and that $k_{\perp} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda$, so $\mathcal{H}_0(\lambda) \equiv$ the GGM tree. On the other hand, if $i = n$, each input x leads to a random output, so $\mathcal{H}_n(\lambda)$ is just a true random function.

Assume now that exists an adversary \mathcal{A} capable of telling apart $\mathcal{H}_i(\lambda)$ from $\mathcal{H}_{i+1}(\lambda)$, we could break the PRG. \square

2.7 Computationally Secure MACs

A computationally secure Message Authentication Code (MAC) should be hard to forge, even if you see polynomially many authenticated messages.

Definition 14 (UFCMA MAC). Let $\Pi = (\text{Gen}, \text{Mac}, \text{Vrfy})$ be a MAC, and consider the game $\mathcal{G}_{\Pi, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ufcma}}(\lambda)$ defined as:

1. pick $k \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda$;
2. $(m^*, \phi^*) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\text{Mac}(k, \cdot)}(1^\lambda)$, where the adversary can query an authentication oracle;
3. output 1 if $\text{Vrfy}(k, (m^*, \phi^*)) = 1$ and m^* is “fresh”, *i.e.*, it was never queried to Mac.

We say that Π is Unforgeable Chosen Message Attack (UFCMA) if for all PPT adversaries \mathcal{A} it holds that

$$\Pr [\mathcal{G}_{\Pi, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ufcma}}(\lambda) = 1] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

◇

As a matter of fact, any PRF is a MAC.

Construction 5 (MAC from PRF). Let $\mathcal{F} = \{F_k : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^l\}_{k \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda}$ be a PRF family, and let $\mathcal{K} = \{0, 1\}^\lambda$. Define $\text{Mac}(k, m) = F_k(m)$. ◇

Theorem 13. *If \mathcal{F} is a PRF, the MAC shown in Construction 5 is UFCMA.* ◇

Proof of theorem 13. Consider the game $\mathcal{H}(\lambda)$ where:

1. $R \leftarrow \mathcal{R}(n \rightarrow l)$ is a random function;
2. $(m^*, \phi^*) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{R(\cdot)}(1^\lambda)$;
3. output 1 if $R(m^*) = \phi^*$ and m^* is “fresh”.

Our first claim is that $\mathcal{H}(\lambda) \approx_c \mathcal{G}_{\Pi, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ufcma}}(\lambda)$ for all PPT adversaries \mathcal{A} . Assume not, then \exists a distinguisher \mathcal{D} for $\mathcal{H}(\lambda)$ and $\mathcal{G}_{\Pi, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ufcma}}(\lambda)$, and we can construct a distinguisher \mathcal{D}' for the PRF. \mathcal{D}' has access to an oracle $O(\cdot)$ which is either $F_k(\cdot)$ for some random k , or $R(\cdot)$ for some random function R . \mathcal{D}' feeds a game to \mathcal{D} using $O(\cdot)$.

Our second claim is that $\Pr [\mathcal{H}(\lambda) = 1] \leq 2^{-\lambda}$, since $R(\cdot)$ is random and the only way to predict it is by guessing. □

Up to this point we have shown that OWF, PRG, PRF and MAC are all in Minicrypt.

2.8 Domain Extension

We look now at domain extension. Suppose we have a PRF family $\mathcal{F} = \{F_k : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^l\}$ as above, and we have a message $m = m_1 || \dots || m_t$, with $m_i \in \{0, 1\}^n$, and with t being the number of blocks of m .

Let's look at some constructions that won't work.

1. $\phi = \text{Mac}\left(k, \bigoplus_{i=1}^t m_i\right)$ does not work, since with $m = m_1 || m_2$ we could swap the bits in position i of m_1 and m_2 and have the same authenticator;
2. $\phi_i = \text{Mac}(k, m_i)$ and $\phi = \phi_1 || \dots || \phi_t$ does not work, since we could rearrange the blocks of the authenticator and of the message and still get a valid couple. *i.e.*, take $m' = m_1 || m_3 || m_2$ and $\phi' = \phi_1 || \phi_3 || \phi_2$;

3. $\phi_i = \text{Mac}(k, \langle i \rangle || m_i)$ and $\phi = \phi_1 || \dots || \phi_t$, where $\langle i \rangle$ is the binary representation of integer i , does not work, since we could cut and paste blocks from different message/authenticator couples and to get a fresh valid couple.

Now, for the real one. To extend the domain of a PRF \mathcal{F} we need a function $h : \{0, 1\}^{nt} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ for which is hard to find a collision, *i.e.*, two distinct messages m', m'' such that $h(m') = h(m'')$. To do this, we introduce Collision Resistant Hash Functions (CRHs), an object found in Cryptomania. We add a key to the hash function.

Definition 15 (Universal Hash Function). The family of functions $\mathcal{H} = \{h_s : \{0, 1\}^N \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n\}_{s \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda}$ is universal (as in Universal Hash Function (UHF)) if for all distinct x, x' we have that

$$\Pr_{s \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda} [h_s(x) = h_s(x')] \leq \varepsilon.$$

Two cases are possible, depending on what ε is:

- if $\varepsilon = 2^{-n}$, then \mathcal{H} is said to be Perfect Universal (PU);
- if $\varepsilon = \text{negl}(\lambda)$, with $\lambda = |s|$, then \mathcal{H} is said to be Almost Universal (AU). \diamond

With UHF we can extend the domain of a PRF.

Theorem 14. *If \mathcal{F} is a PRF and \mathcal{H} is a AU family of hash functions, then $\mathcal{F}(\mathcal{H})$, defined as*

$$\mathcal{F}(\mathcal{H}) = \{F_k(h_s(\cdot)) : \{0, 1\}^N \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^l\}_{k'=(k,s)}$$

is a PRF. \diamond

Proof of theorem 14. Consider the following games:

- $\mathcal{G}_{\mathcal{F}(\mathcal{H}), \mathcal{A}}^{\text{real}}(\lambda)$, defined as:
 1. $k \leftarrow \mathcal{S}\{0, 1\}^\lambda$, $s \leftarrow \mathcal{S}\{0, 1\}^\lambda$;
 2. $b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{F_k(h_s(\cdot))}(1^\lambda)$.
- $\mathcal{G}_{\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{rand}}(\lambda)$, defined as:
 1. $\bar{R} \leftarrow \mathcal{R}(N \rightarrow l)$;
 2. $b \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\bar{R}(\cdot)}(1^\lambda)$.

Consider also the hybrid $H_{\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{H}, \mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$:

1. $s \leftarrow \mathcal{S}\{0, 1\}^\lambda$;
2. $R \leftarrow \mathcal{R}(n \rightarrow l)$;

3. $b \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{R(h_s(\cdot))}(1^\lambda)$.

The first claim, *i.e.*, that $\mathcal{G}_{\mathcal{F}(\mathcal{H}), \mathcal{A}}^{\text{real}}(\lambda) \approx_c H_{\mathbb{S}, \mathcal{H}, \mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$, is left as exercise.

The second claim is that $H_{\mathbb{S}, \mathcal{H}, \mathcal{A}}(\lambda) \approx_c \mathcal{G}_{\mathbb{S}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{rand}}(\lambda)$. Assume the adversary asks q distinct queries. Consider the event $E = \exists (x_i, x_j)$ such that $h_s(x_i) = h_s(x_j)$ with $i \neq j$, and with $i, j \leq q$. If E doesn't happen, $H_{\mathbb{S}, \mathcal{H}, \mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$ and $\mathcal{G}_{\mathbb{S}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{rand}}(\lambda)$ are the same. This event is the same as getting first all the inputs that the adversary wants to try, and then sampling $s \leftarrow \mathbb{S}\{0, 1\}^\lambda$, so its probability can be bounded as

$$\Pr[E] = \Pr[\exists i, j : h_s(x_i) = h_s(x_j)] \leq \binom{q}{2} \varepsilon \leq q^2 \varepsilon. \quad \square$$

Now, let's look at a construction.

Construction 6 (UHF with Galois field). Let \mathbb{F} be a finite field, such as the Galois field over 2^n . In the Galois field, a bit string represents the coefficients of a polynomial of degree $n - 1$. Addition is the usual, while for multiplication an irreducible polynomial $p(x)$ of degree n is fixed, and the operation is carried out modulo $p(x)$.

We pick $s \in \mathbb{F}$, and $x = x_1 || \dots || x_t$ with $x_i \in \mathbb{F}$ for all i . The hash function is defined as

$$h_s(x) = h_s(x_1 || \dots || x_t) = \sum_{i=1}^t x_i \cdot s^{i-1} = Q_x(s).$$

A collision is two distinct x, x' such that

$$Q_x(s) = Q_{x'}(s) \iff Q_{x-x'}(s) = 0 \iff \sum_{i=1}^t (x_i - x'_i) s^{i-1} = 0.$$

This means that s is a root of $Q_{x-x'}$. So the probability of a collision is:

$$\Pr[h_s(x) = h_s(x')] = \frac{t-1}{|\mathbb{F}|} = \frac{t-1}{2^n}. \quad (\text{negligible})$$

◇

We now look at a computational variant of hash functions. We want hash functions for which collisions are difficult to find for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , *i.e.*, families of functions such that

$$\Pr_s [h_s(x) = h_s(x') : (x, x') \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda)] \leq \varepsilon.$$

We want to use some PRF family \mathcal{F} to define \mathcal{H} . Enter Cypher Block Chain (CBC)-MAC (fig. 5). CBC-MAC is defined as

$$h_s(x_1, \dots, x_t) = F_s(x_t \oplus F_s(x_{t-1} \oplus \dots \oplus F_s(x_1)) \dots).$$




Figure 5: Construction of the CBC-MAC.

Theorem 15. *CBC-MAC is a computationally secure AU hash function if \mathcal{F} is a PRF.* \diamond

There's also the encrypted CBC-MAC, *i.e.*, $F_k(\text{CBC-MAC}(s, x))$.

Theorem 16. *CBC-MAC is a PRF.* \diamond

Theorem 17. *CBC-MAC is AU.* \diamond

CBC-MAC is insecure with variable length messages.

XOR-MAC is defined as follows: take η , a random value (nonce), and output $(\eta, F_k(\eta) \oplus h_s(x))$. Note that here the input is shrunk to the output size of the PRF, while before we shrunk to the input size of the PRF.

Suppose the adversary is given a pair $(m, (\eta, v))$ from a XOR-MAC. She could try to output $(m', (\eta, v \oplus a))$, trying to guess an a such that $h_s(m) \oplus a = h_s(m')$, so that this is still a valid tag. If a is hard to find (as should be), we have “almost xor universality”. Almost universality is the special case where $a = 0$.

From a PRF family we can get a MAC for Fixed Input Length (FIL) messages (a FIL-MAC). Table 1 compares the constructions we have seen earlier for FIL-MACs and Variable Input Length (VIL)-MACs.

CBC-MAC cannot be extended securely to VIL. As an example, take

$$\text{CBC-MAC}(m_1 || \dots || m_t) = F_k(m_t \oplus \dots \oplus F_k(m_1) \dots). \quad (1)$$

If we have (m_1, ϕ_1) , with $\phi_1 = F_k(m_1)$. We could then take $m_2 = m_1 || \phi_1 \oplus m_1$, and ϕ_1 would be a valid authenticator for m_2 :

$$\text{CBC-MAC}(m_2) = F_k(m_1 \oplus \phi_1 \oplus F_k(m_1)) = F_k(m_1 \oplus \cancel{\phi_1} \oplus \cancel{\phi_1}) = F_k(m_1) = \phi_1.$$

	FIL-PRF	FIL-MAC	VIL-MAC
$\mathcal{F}(\mathcal{H})$	✓	✓	
CBC-MAC		✓	
E-CBC-MAC	✓	✓	✓
XOR-MAC		✓	✓

Table 1: Constructions for FIL-PRF, FIL-MAC, and VIL-MAC.

2.9 Chosen Cyphertext Attacks and Authenticated Encryption

In Chosen Cyphertext Attack (CCA) security, the adversary is allowed to choose the cyphertext, and to see its decryption.

Definition 16 (CCA-security). Let $\Pi = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ be a SKE scheme, and consider the following game $\mathcal{G}_{\Pi, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{cca}}(\lambda, b)$:

1. $k \leftarrow \mathcal{S}\{0, 1\}^\lambda$;
2. $(m_0, m_1) \leftarrow A^{\text{Enc}(k, \cdot), \text{Dec}(k, \cdot)}(1^\lambda)$;
3. $c \leftarrow \text{Enc}(k, m_b)$;
4. $b' \leftarrow A^{\text{Enc}(k, \cdot), \text{Dec}^*(k, \cdot)}(1^\lambda, c)$ where Dec^* does not accept c .

Π is CCA-secure if for all PPT adversaries \mathcal{A} we have that

$$\mathcal{G}_{\Pi, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{cca}}(\lambda, 0) \approx_c \mathcal{G}_{\Pi, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{cca}}(\lambda, 1). \quad \diamond$$

CCA-security implies a property called *malleability*: if you change a bit the cyphertext you don't get similar messages.

Claim 1. *The SKE scheme consisting of $\text{Enc}(k, m) = (r, F_k(r) \oplus m)$ (for random r) and $\text{Dec}(k, (c_1, c_2)) = F_k(c_1) \oplus c_2 = m$ is not CCA-secure.* \diamond

Proof of Claim 1. 1. Output $m_0 = 0^n$ and $m_1 = 1^n$;

2. get $c = (c_1, c_2) = (r, F_k(r) \oplus m_b)$;
3. let $c'_2 = c_2 \oplus 10^{n-1}$;
4. query $\text{Dec}(k, (c_1, c'_2))$ (which is different from c);
5. if you get 10^{n-1} , output 0, else output 1.

This always works:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Dec}(k, (c_1, c'_2)) &= F_k(c_1) \oplus c'_2 = \overbrace{F_k(c_1) \oplus c_2}^{m_b} \oplus 10^{n-1} \\ &= m_b \oplus 10^{n-1} = 10^{n-1} \iff m_b = 0^n. \end{aligned}$$

□

We'll build now Authenticated Encryption. It's both CPA and Integrity (of cyphertext) (INT), *i.e.*, it's hard for the adversary to generate a valid cyphertext not queried to the encryption oracle.

As an exercise, formalise the fact that CPA and INT imply CCA, *i.e.*, reduce CCA to CPA.

Any CPA-secure encryption scheme, together with a MAC, gives you CCA security. This is called an encrypted MAC.

Construction 7 (Encrypted MAC). Consider the encryption scheme $\Pi_1 = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$, with key space \mathcal{K}_1 , and the MAC $\Pi_2 = (\text{Gen}, \text{Mac}, \text{Vrfy})$, with key space \mathcal{K}_2 . We build the encryption scheme $\Pi' = (\text{Gen}', \text{Enc}', \text{Dec}')$, with key space $\mathcal{K}' = \mathcal{K}_1 \times \mathcal{K}_2$ as follows:

1. $\text{Enc}'(k', m) = (c, \phi) = c'$, with $c \leftarrow \text{Enc}(k_1, m)$ and $\phi \leftarrow \text{Mac}(k_2, c)$;
2. $\text{Dec}'(k', (c, \phi))$ checks if $\text{Mac}(k_2, c) = \phi$: if not, it outputs \perp , else it outputs $\text{Dec}(k_1, c)$. \diamond

Theorem 18. *If Π_1 is CPA-secure and Π_2 is strongly UFCMA-secure, then Π' is CPA and INT.* \diamond

I don't know what I wrote here?

Strong UFCMA security means you output (m^*, ϕ^*) where the couple was never asked. So if you know (m, ϕ) , you can output (m, ϕ') .

Proof of theorem 18. We need to show that Π' is both CPA and INT.

1. The proof for CPA is just a reduction to the CPA-security of Π_1 . Assume \mathcal{A}' breaks CPA-security of Π' , we can construct \mathcal{A}_1 which breaks CPA of Π_1 .

\mathcal{A}_1 picks a key to impersonate the MAC, then for each message m gets its encryption c from Π_1 , and then does Mac of c to get the authenticator ϕ . Then it returns (c, ϕ) to \mathcal{A}' . When it receives m_0, m_1 from \mathcal{A}' , it receives c^* from Π_1 , computes its Mac, and gives the result to \mathcal{A}' . Then it outputs whatever \mathcal{A}' outputs.

2. For INT, assume \mathcal{A}'' breaking INT of Π' , we can build \mathcal{A}_2 which breaks INT of Π_2 .

We ask \mathcal{A}_2 the encryption of m . \mathcal{A}_2 picks a key k , computes $\text{Enc}(k, m) = c$, and gives c to the $\text{Mac}(\cdot)$ oracle. Then it gives (c, ϕ) to \mathcal{A}'' . Later on, \mathcal{A}'' gives \mathcal{A}_2 some (c^*, ϕ^*) , which is a valid validator if Π' is not INT, so \mathcal{A}_2 has broken Π_2 . \square

The approach to CCA consisting of Encrypt-then-MAC works. Other approaches don't work in general:




Figure 6: The Feistel permutation.

- Encrypt-and-MAC, which is what Secure Shell (SSH) does, *i.e.*, $c \leftarrow \text{Enc}(k_c, m)$ and $\phi \leftarrow \text{Mac}(k_s, m)$;
- MAC-then-Encrypt, which is what Transport Layer Security (TLS) does, *i.e.*, $\phi \leftarrow \text{Mac}(k_s, m)$ and $c \leftarrow \text{Enc}(k_c, m || \phi)$.

2.10 Pseudo Random Permutations

Block cyphers are Pseudo Random Permutations (PRPs), a function family that is a PRF but also a permutation. A PRP family cannot be distinguished from a true permutation. For a *strong* PRP family, the adversary has access to the inverse of the permutation. From PRFs we can build both PRPs and strong PRPs.

Definition 17 (Feistel function). Let $F : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$, then the Feistel function (fig. 6) is defined as

$$\psi_F(\underbrace{x, y}_{2n}) = (y, x \oplus F(y)) = (\underbrace{x', y'}_{2n}). \quad \diamond$$

It's easy to see that the Feistel function is invertible:

$$\psi_F^{-1}(x', y') = (F(x') \oplus y', x') = (\cancel{F(\cancel{y'})} \oplus \cancel{F(\cancel{y'})} \oplus x, y) = (x, y).$$

We can “cascade” several Feistel functions, to create a Feistel network. Take F_1, \dots, F_l , and define the following function:

$$\psi_{\mathcal{F}}[l](x, y) = \psi_{F_l}(\psi_{F_{l-1}}(\dots \psi_{F_1}(x, y) \dots))$$

and its inverse:

$$\psi_{\mathcal{F}}^{-1}[l](x', y') = \psi_{F_1}^{-1}(\dots \psi_{F_{l-1}}^{-1}(\psi_{F_l}^{-1}(x', y')) \dots).$$

Theorem 19 (Luby-Rackoff). *If $\mathcal{F} = \{F_k : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n\}_{k \in \{0,1\}^\lambda}$ is a PRF, then $\psi_{\mathcal{F}}[3]$ is a PRP and $\psi_{\mathcal{F}}[4]$ is a strong PRP.* \diamond

We will prove only that $\psi_{\mathcal{F}}[3]$ is a PRP.

Theorem 20. *If \mathcal{F} is a PRF, $\psi_{\mathcal{F}}[3]$ is a PRP.* \diamond

Recall that

$$\psi_{\mathcal{F}}[3] = \psi_{F_{k_3}}(\psi_{F_{k_2}}(\psi_{F_{k_1}}(x, y))).$$

Proof of theorem 20. Consider these experiments:

$$\begin{aligned} H_0 : (x, y) &\xrightarrow{\psi_{F_{k_1}}} (x_1, y_1) \xrightarrow{\psi_{F_{k_2}}} (x_2, y_2) \xrightarrow{\psi_{F_{k_3}}} (x_3, y_3) \\ H_1 : (x, y) &\xrightarrow{\psi_{R_1}} (x_1, y_1) \xrightarrow{\psi_{R_2}} (x_2, y_2) \xrightarrow{\psi_{R_3}} (x_3, y_3). \end{aligned}$$

H_2 is just like H_1 , but we stop if y_1 “collides”. A collision happens when we have $(x, y) \rightarrow (x_1 = y, y_1 = x \oplus R_1(y))$, and $y_1 = y$.

In H_3 we replace $y_2 = R_2(y_1) \oplus x_1$ with $y_2 \leftarrow \mathcal{S}\{0,1\}^n$, and set $x_2 = y_1$.

In H_4 we replace $y_3 = R_3(y_2) \oplus x_2$ with $y_3 \leftarrow \mathcal{S}\{0,1\}^n$, and set $x_3 = y_2$.

In H_5 we directly map $(x, y) \xrightarrow{\bar{R}} (x_3, y_3)$, with $\bar{R} \leftarrow \mathcal{R}(2n \rightarrow 2n)$ being a random permutation.

First claim: $H_0 \approx_c H_1$, since we replaced the PRF with truly random functions. The proof is the usual proof by hybrids.

Second claim: $H_1 \approx_c H_2$. Consider the event E of a collision, defined as “ $\exists (x, y) \neq (x', y')$ such that $x \oplus R_1(y) = x' \oplus R_1(y')$, i.e., $x \oplus x' = R_1(y) \oplus R_1(y')$ ”. If $y = y'$, there can’t be a collision, so we can assume that $y \neq y'$. So the probability of a collision is:

$$\Pr[E] = \Pr[R_1(y) \oplus R_1(y') = x \oplus x'] \leq 2^{-n}.$$

Third claim: $H_2 \approx_c H_3$. In H_2 , y_1 is just a stream of independent values. Since y_1 never collides and R_2 is random, all $R_2(y_1)$ are uniform and independent, and so is $y_2 = R_2(y_1) \oplus x_1$.

Fourth claim: $H_3 \approx_c H_4$. Now y_3 is random, and $x_3 = y_2$. It suffices that y_2 never collides, since $R_3(y_2)$ is a sequence of one time pad keys.

$$\Pr[y_2 \text{ collides}] \leq \binom{q}{2} 2^{-n}.$$

Fifth claim: $H_4 \approx_c H_5$. Just notice that H_4 is simply a random function from $2n$ bits to $2n$ bits, and H_5 is a random permutation. They can only be distinguished if there is a collision in H_4 , which again has negligible probability. \square

A strong PRP P leads to CCA security with the following construction:

- $\text{Enc}(k, m) = P(k, m || r)$, with $m, r \in \{0,1\}^n$;
- $\text{Dec}(k, c) = P^{-1}(k, c)$ and take the first n bits.

Domain Extension for Pseudo Random Permutations

Assume we have a message $m = m_1 || \dots || m_t$, with $m_i \in \{0, 1\}^n$, and you are given a PRP from n bits to n bits.

- One natural thing to do is Electronic Code Book (ECB). Let $c = c_1 || \dots || c_t$ with $c_i = P_k(m_i)$. This is very fast, parallelisable, but insecure (since it's deterministic).
- Cypher Feed Back (CFB): sample c_0 at random, then let $c_i = P_k(c_{i-1}) \oplus m_i$. This is CPA secure and parallelisable for decryption (but not for encryption).
- CBC: sample c_0 at random, then let $c_i = P_k(c_{i-1} \oplus m_i)$. This is also CPA secure. Note that if you output all c_i this does not work as a MAC (recall that CBC-MAC outputs just c_t).
- Counter (CTR)-mode: sample $r \leftarrow \mathcal{S}[N]$, with $N = 2^n$. Let $c_i = P_k(r + i - 1 \bmod N) \oplus m_i$, and output $c_0 || c_1 || \dots || c_t$ with $c_0 = r$. For decryption, compute $m_i = P_k(c_0 + i - 1 \bmod N) \oplus c_i$.

Theorem 21. *If \mathcal{F} is a PRF family, then CTR-mode is CPA-secure for VIL.* \diamond

Proof of theorem 21. Consider the game $H_0(\lambda, b)$, defined as:

1. $k \leftarrow \mathcal{S}\{0, 1\}^\lambda$;
2. the adversary asks encryption queries, for messages $m = m_1 || \dots || m_t$:
 - $c_0 = r \leftarrow \mathcal{S}[N]$ (with $N = 2^n$);
 - $c_i = F_k(r + i - 1 \bmod N) \oplus m_i$;
 - output $c_0 || c_1 || \dots || c_t$.
3. challenge: the adversary gives (m_0^*, m_1^*) , and take $m_b^* = m_{b_1}^* || \dots || m_{b_t}^*$ (both messages have the same length);
4. compute c^* from m_b^* and output to adversary;
5. adversary asks more encryption queries, then it outputs b' .

We want to show that $H_0(\lambda, 0) \approx_c H_1(\lambda, 1)$.

First, we define the hybrid $H_1(\lambda, b)$ which samples $R \leftarrow \mathcal{SR}(n \rightarrow n)$ and uses $R(\cdot)$ in place of $F_k(\cdot)$. The proof that $H_0(\lambda, b) \approx_c H_1(\lambda, b)$ is a usual proof by reduction to security of the PRF. Assume there exists a distinguisher \mathcal{D} for H_0 and H_1 , we build a distinguisher \mathcal{D}' for the PRF, which has access to some oracle that is either $F_k(\cdot)$ or $R(\cdot)$ for random R . \mathcal{D}' plays the game defined above with \mathcal{D} using the oracle, and outputs whatever it outputs, thus distinguishing the PRF.

Now consider the hybrid $H_2(\lambda)$, which outputs a uniformly random challenge ciphertext $c^* \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{n(t+1)}$. We claim that $H_1(\lambda, b) \approx_s H_2(\lambda)$ for $b \in \{0,1\}$, *i.e.*, they are statistically indistinguishable: we accept unbounded adversaries that can only ask a polynomial number of queries.

Consider c^* , and the values of $R(r^*), R(r^*+1), \dots, R(r^*+t^*-1)$. Then, consider the i -th encryption query, c^i , and the values of $R(r_i), R(r_i+1), \dots, R(r_i+t_i-1)$. If $R(r_i+j)$ is always different from $R(r^*+j')$ for any j' , this is basically OTP. So, calling E the event “ $\exists j_1, j_2$ such that $R(r_i+j_1) = R(r^*+j_2)$ ”, it suffices to show that $\Pr[E] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

Assume there are q queries, and fix a maximum length t of the queried messages, and let E_i , for $i \in [q]$, be the event of an overlap happening at query i . Clearly $\Pr[E] \leq \sum_{i=1}^q \Pr[E_i]$. For E_i to happen, we must have that $r^* - t + 1 \leq r_i \leq r^* + t - 1$ (this is not tight!). So the size of the interval in which r_i must be is $2t - 1$. Then, $\Pr[E_i] = \frac{2t-1}{2^n}$, and $\Pr[E] \leq q \frac{2t-1}{2^n}$, which is negligible. \square

2.11 Collision Resistant Hash Functions

When we saw domain extensions for PRFs, we showed that $\mathcal{F}(\mathcal{H})$ is a PRF if \mathcal{F} is a PRF and \mathcal{H} is AU. This doesn't work for MACs: to extend the domain of a MAC we need CRHs.

A hash function is used to compress l bits into n bits, with $n \ll l$. A family of hash functions is defined as $\mathcal{H} = \{H_s : \{0,1\}^l \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n\}_{s \in \{0,1\}^\lambda}$. AU means that it's hard to find a collision for an adversary that does not know s . Collision resistance means that it's hard to find a collision even if the adversary knows s .

Definition 18 (Collision Resistant Hash Function). Let $\mathcal{H} = \{h_s : \{0,1\}^l \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n\}_{s \in \{0,1\}^\lambda}$ be a family of functions, and consider the game $\mathcal{G}_{\mathcal{H}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{CR}}(\lambda)$, defined as

1. $s \leftarrow \{0,1\}^\lambda$;
2. $(x, x') \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda, s)$;
3. output 1 if $x \neq x' \wedge h_s(x) = h_s(x')$.

\mathcal{H} is a CRH if for all PPT adversaries \mathcal{A} there is a negligible function $\varepsilon(\lambda)$ such that

$$\Pr[\mathcal{G}_{\mathcal{H}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{CR}}(\lambda) = 1] \leq \varepsilon(\lambda). \quad \diamond$$

We'll show how to construct CRHs in two steps.

1. Start with a compression function $h_s : \{0,1\}^{2n} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$ and obtain a domain extension, *i.e.*, a function $h'_s : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$.
2. Build a Collision Resistant (CR) compression function.




Figure 7: The Merkle-Damgard Collision Resistant Hash Function.

There are two famous constructions.

Construction 8 (Merkle-Damgard). It goes from tn bits to n bits, for fixed t . Let $m = x_1 || \dots || x_t$, and define intermediate outputs y_i for $i \in [0, t]$. We define $y_0 = 0^n$, and $y_i = h_s(x_i || y_{i-1})$ (fig. 7). The output is $y = y_t$. \diamond

Construction 9 (Merkle tree). It goes from $2^d n$ bits to n bits, with d being the height of the tree. \diamond

With the Merkle tree one could give a partially hashed version of a file.

Theorem 22. *Merkle-Damgard (MD) (Construction 8) is a CRH $\mathcal{H}' = \{h'_s : \{0, 1\}^{tn} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n\}$ if the function $\mathcal{H} = \{h_s : \{0, 1\}^{2n} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n\}$ is CR.* \diamond

Proof of theorem 22. Let \mathcal{A}' be an adversary capable of outputting $x \neq x'$ such that $h'_s(x) = h'_s(x')$. Then we can construct \mathcal{A} breaking \mathcal{H} (which is CR).

If $h'_s(x) = h'_s(x')$ but $x \neq x'$, there must be some $j \in [1, t]$ (with $x = x_1 || \dots || x_t$ and $x' = x'_1 || \dots || x'_t$) such that $(x_j, y_{j-1}) \neq (x'_j, y'_{j-1})$, but after that they are equal. Then $h_s(x_j, y_{j-1}) = h_s(x'_j, y'_{j-1})$, which is a collision. \square

Construction 10 (Strengthened Merkle-Damgard). Strengthened MD is defined as

$$h'_s(x_1 || \dots || x_t) = h_s(\langle t \rangle || h_s(x_t || \dots || h_s(x_1 || 0^n) \dots)). \quad \diamond$$

With the strengthened MD we have suffix-free messages, which give us a VIL MD.

Theorem 23. *Strengthened MD (Construction 10) is CR.* \diamond

Proof of theorem 23. Assume there is a collision $x = x_1 || \dots || x_t \neq x' = x'_1 || \dots || x'_{t'}$, i.e., they are such that $h'_s(x) = h'_s(x')$. Two cases are possible:

1. if $t = t'$, we have already shown this in the proof of theorem 22;
2. if $t \neq t'$, the collision is on $h_s(\langle t \rangle || y_t)$ and $h_s(\langle t' \rangle || y'_{t'})$. \square

Construction 11 (Davies-Meyer). $\mathcal{H}_E(s, x) = E_s(x) \oplus x$ where $E_{(\cdot)}(\cdot)$ is a block cypher. \diamond

For this construction to be CR, it should be hard to find $(x, s) \neq (x', s')$ such that $E_s(x) \oplus x = E_{s'}(x') \oplus x'$.

There's something strange going on: a block cypher is a PRP, and OWF give us PRP, but we know that it's impossible to get CRH from OWF. Furthermore, this is actually insecure for concrete PRPs. Let E be a PRP, and define E' such that $E'(0^n, 0^n) = 0^n$ and $E'(1^n, 1^n) = 1^n$, and otherwise $E'(x) = E(x)$. This is still a PRP, but $E'(0^n, 0^n) \oplus 0^n = E'(1^n, 1^n) \oplus 1^n$.

We must assume that we have no bad keys. This is called the Ideal Cypher Model (ICM).

In the ICM, one has a truly random permutation $E_{(\cdot)}(\cdot)$ for all keys. When the adversary asks for (s_1, x_1) , choose random $y_1 \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ and set $E_{s_1}(x_1) = y_1$. On later query (s_1, x_i) , pick $y_i \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n \setminus \bigcup_{j=1}^i \{y_j\}$, and set $E_{s_1}(x_i) = y_i$.

Theorem 24. *Davies-Meyer is CR in ICM.* \diamond

Proof of theorem 24. As usual, we consider a series of experiments.

$$H_0(\lambda) \equiv \mathcal{G}_{\text{DM}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{CR}}(\lambda).$$

\mathcal{A} makes two types of queries: forward queries, in the form (s, x) , to get $E_s(x)$, and backward queries, in the form (s, y) , to get $E_s^{-1}(y)$. Imagine of keeping the value of $z = x \oplus y$.

Now, we define $H_1(\lambda)$: after picking y for some (s, x) , we don't remove y from the range (and the same for backward queries).

The first claim is that, assuming \mathcal{A} asks q queries,

$$\left| \Pr[H_0(\lambda) = 1] - \Pr[H_1(\lambda) = 1] \right| \leq \frac{q^2}{2} 2^{-n}.$$

To verify this, note that H_0 and H_1 are distinguishable if and only if a collision happens in $E_s(\cdot)$ or in $E_s^{-1}(\cdot)$.

$H_2(\lambda)$: check for collisions in $z = x \oplus y$. If not all z values are distinct, abort.

The second claim is that

$$\left| \Pr[H_1(\lambda) = 1] - \Pr[H_2(\lambda) = 1] \right| \leq \frac{q^2}{2} 2^{-n}.$$

Verification is as usual.

$H_3(\lambda)$: when \mathcal{A} outputs $(x, s), (x', s')$ collision, check that (x, s, y, z) and (x', s', y', z') are in the table. If not, define the entries.

Third claim:

$$\left| \Pr[H_2(\lambda) = 1] - \Pr[H_3(\lambda) = 1] \right| \leq \frac{4q}{2^n}.$$

y can collide with q values, with probability $\frac{q}{2^n}$. The same goes for z, y', z' , so we get $\frac{4q}{2^n}$.

$H_4(\lambda)$: there are no collisions on z . $\Pr[H_4(\lambda) = 1] = 0$ since $(x, s, y, z), (x', s', y', z') \implies z \neq z'$.

$H_3 \approx_c H_4$, and we're done. \square

2.12 Claw-Free Permutations

We introduce a new assumption: Claw-Free Permutations (CFPs). A claw is a pair of functions (f_1, f_0) and two values (x_1, x_0) such that $f_1(x_1) = f_0(x_0)$, with $f_1 \neq f_0$.

Definition 19 (Claw-Free Permutation). A CFP is a tuple $\Pi = (\text{Gen}, f_0, f_1)$ where $pk \leftarrow \text{sGen}(1^\lambda)$ defines a domain \mathcal{X}_{pk} , and $f_0(pk, \cdot)$ and $f_1(pk, \cdot)$ are permutations over \mathcal{X}_{pk} .

Consider the game $\mathcal{G}_{\Pi, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{CF}}(\lambda)$, defined as:

1. $pk \leftarrow \text{sGen}(1^\lambda)$;
2. $(x_0, x_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(pk)$;
3. output 1 $\iff f_0(pk, x_0) = f_1(pk, x_1)$.

Π is claw-free if for all PPT adversaries \mathcal{A}

$$\Pr [\mathcal{G}_{\Pi, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{CF}}(\lambda) = 1] \leq \varepsilon(\lambda). \quad \diamond$$

We can now define a CR compression function.

Construction 12 (CR Compression Function from CFP). Let $\Pi = (\text{Gen}, f_0, f_1)$, and assume $\mathcal{X}_{pk} = \{0, 1\}^n$, and let $m \in \{0, 1\}^l$. Define H_{pk} as:

$$H_{pk}(x||m) = f_{m_l}(f_{m_{l-1}}(\cdots f_{m_1}(x) \cdots)).$$

\diamond

Theorem 25. *If Π is a CFP, H_{pk} (Construction 12) is collision resistant.* \diamond

Proof of theorem 25. Assume \mathcal{H} is not CR, we can then find a collision for Π , i.e., we find $(x, m) \neq (x', m')$ such that $H_{pk}(x||m) = H_{pk}(x'||m')$.

Two cases are possible:

1. $m = m'$, so the sequence of permutations is the same, and also x and x' must be the same.

$$\begin{aligned} x &= f_{m_1}^{-1}(\cdots f_{m_l}^{-1}(y) \cdots), \\ x' &= f_{m'_1}^{-1}(\cdots f_{m'_l}^{-1}(y) \cdots). \end{aligned}$$

2. $m \neq m'$, then $\exists i$ such that $m_i \neq m'_i$, and

$$\begin{aligned} m &= m_l \dots m_i \dots m_1, \\ m' &= m_l \dots m'_i \dots m'_1 \end{aligned}$$

i.e., m and m' are equal from index $i + 1$ to l .

Assume, without loss of generality, that $m_i = 0$ and $m'_i = 1$. Since from $i + 1$ we apply the same sequence of permutations, the collision must be on i . Consider

$$\begin{aligned} y' &= f_{m_{i+1}}^{-1}(\dots f_{m_i}^{-1}(y) \dots), \\ x_0 &= f_{m_{i-1}}(\dots f_{m_1}(x) \dots), \\ x_1 &= f_{m'_{i-1}}(\dots f_{m'_1}(x) \dots). \end{aligned}$$

x_0 and x_1 are a claw, since $f_0(x_0) = y' = f_1(x_1)$. \square

2.13 Random Oracle Model

The Random Oracle (RO) is an ideal hash function. The only way to compute the hash is to query the oracle. The adversary is given $\text{RO}(\cdot) \leftarrow \mathcal{R}(l \rightarrow m)$.

With RO we can do

- CRH: define $H^{\text{RO}}(x) = \text{RO}(x)$;
- PRG: $G^{\text{RO}}(x) = \text{RO}(x||0)||\text{RO}(x||1)$;
- PRF: $F^{\text{RO}}(x) = \text{RO}(k||x) = \text{Mac}^{\text{RO}}(k, x)$.

The last one is not secure with a real hash function.

2.14 Number Theory

We use modular arithmetic, with modulus some n , in $(\mathbb{Z}_n, +, \cdot)$.

$(\mathbb{Z}_n, +)$ is a group, *i.e.*, it has an identity (or null) element, it's closed, commutative, associative, and has an inverse for each element. (\mathbb{Z}_n, \cdot) is not a group, as you don't have an inverse for everyone.

Lemma 4. *If $\gcd(a, n) > 1$, a is not invertible in (\mathbb{Z}_n, \cdot) .* \diamond

Proof of lemma 4. We can write $a = b \cdot q + (a \bmod b)$. Assume a is invertible, then $a \cdot b = q \cdot n + 1$. But then $\gcd(a, n)$ divides $a \cdot b - q \cdot n = 1$, which is a contradiction. \square

Operations in \mathbb{Z}_n (at least multiplication and addition) are efficient. The inverse of an element can be computed with the euclidean algorithm.

Lemma 5. *Let a, b such that $a \geq b > 0$, then*

$$\gcd(a, b) = \gcd(b, a \bmod b). \quad \diamond$$

Proof of lemma 5. It suffices to show that a common divisor of a and b also divides $a \bmod b$, and that a common divisor of b and $a \bmod b$ also divides a .

Write $a = q \cdot b + a \bmod b$.

For the first implication, a common divisor of a and b divides $a - q \cdot b = a \bmod b$.

For the second implication, a common divisor of b and $a \bmod b$ divides $b \cdot q + a \bmod b = a$. \square

Theorem 26. *Given a, b we can compute $\gcd(a, b)$ in polynomial time in $\max\{\|a\|, \|b\|\}$. Also, we can find u, v such that $a \cdot u + b \cdot v = \gcd(a, b)$. \diamond*

Proof of theorem 26. We can use lemma 5 recursively:

$$\begin{aligned} a &= b \cdot q_1 + r_1 & (0 \leq r_1 < b) \\ \gcd(a, b) &= \gcd(b, r_1) & (r_1 = a \bmod b) \\ b &= r_1 \cdot q_2 + r_2 & (0 \leq r_2 < r_1) \\ \gcd(b, r_1) &= \gcd(r_1, r_2) & (r_2 = b \bmod r_1) \\ &\dots \\ r_i &= r_{i-1} \cdot q_{i+1} + r_{i+1}. \end{aligned}$$

Repeat until $r_{t+1} = 0$, we then have that $\gcd(a, b) = r_t$.

We prove that $r_{i+2} \leq \frac{r_i}{2}$ for all $0 \leq i \leq t-2$. Clearly, $r_{i+1} < r_i$. If we have that $r_{i+1} \leq \frac{r_i}{2}$, then it's trivial. If $r_{i+1} > \frac{r_i}{2}$, then

$$r_{i+2} = r_i \bmod r_{i+1} = r_i - q_{i+2}r_{i+1} < r_i - r_{i-1} < r_i - \frac{r_i}{2} = \frac{r_i}{2}. \quad \square$$

Take $a \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ such that $\gcd(a, n) = 1$, then there are u, v such that $a \cdot u + n \cdot v = \gcd(a, n) = 1$. But then $a \cdot u \equiv 1 \bmod n$, so u is the inverse of a .

Another operation in \mathbb{Z}_n is modular exponentiation, i.e., $a^b \bmod n$. The square and multiply algorithm is polynomial.

Write b in binary, as $b_t b_{t-1} \dots b_0$, so $b \in \{0, 1\}^{t+1}$. Since $b = \sum_{i=0}^t b_i \cdot 2^i$, we can write

$$a^b = a^{\sum_{i=0}^t 2^i b_i} = \prod_{i=0}^t a^{2^i b_i} = \prod_{i=0}^t \left(a^{2^i}\right)^{b_i} = a^{b_0} (a^2)^{b_1} (a^4)^{b_2} \dots (a^{2^t})^{b_t}.$$

We have t multiplications and t squares, so modular exponentiation happens in polynomial time.

Theorem 27 (Prime Number Theorem).

$$\Pi(x) = \text{"\# of primes } \leq x" \geq \frac{x}{3 \log_2(x)}$$

which is roughly $\frac{x}{\log(x)}$. \diamond

Theorem 27 means that

$$\Pr[x \text{ is prime} : x \leftarrow \mathbb{S}2^{\lambda-1}] \geq \frac{\frac{2^\lambda - 1}{3 \log_2(2^\lambda - 1)}}{2^{\lambda-1}} \approx \frac{1}{3\lambda}.$$

Furthermore, primality testing can be done efficiently.

Theorem 28 (Miller-Rabin '80s, Agrawal-Kayal-Saxena '02). *You can test in polynomial time if x is prime.* \diamond

We can sample $x \leftarrow \$2^\lambda - 1$, test primality, and eventually resample.

$$\Pr[\text{no output after } t \text{ samples}] \leq \left(1 - \frac{1}{3\lambda}\right)^t \leq \left(\frac{1}{e}\right)^\lambda \in \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

for $t = 3\lambda^2$, since $\left(1 - \frac{1}{x}\right)^x \leq \frac{1}{e}$.

Now, for some new number theoretic assumptions.

Assumption. Integer factorisation of the product of two λ -bit primes is a OWF. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) recommendation is $\lambda \approx 2048$.

We need cyclic groups.

Theorem 29 (Lagrange). *If H is a subgroup of G , then $|H| \mid |G|$.* \diamond

We define the order of a to be the minimum i such that $a^i \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$.

Consider \mathbb{Z}_n . Note that $|\mathbb{Z}_n| = n$. We define

$$\mathbb{Z}_n^* = \{a \in \mathbb{Z}_n : a \text{ is invertible}\} = \{a \in \mathbb{Z}_n : \gcd(a, n) = 1\}.$$

$|\mathbb{Z}_n^*| \triangleq \varphi(n)$. If n is a prime p , then $\mathbb{Z}_p^* = \{1, 2, \dots, p-1\}$, and $|\mathbb{Z}_p^*| = \varphi(p) = p-1$.

Corollary 4. *For all $a \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$, we have*

$$1. a^b = a^{b \bmod \varphi(n)} \pmod{n};$$

$$2. a^{\varphi(n)} = 1 \pmod{n};$$

$$3. a^{p-1} = 1 \pmod{p}.$$

\diamond

(\mathbb{Z}_p^*, \cdot) is cyclic, i.e., \exists a generator g such that

$$\mathbb{Z}_p^* = \langle g \rangle = \{g^0, g^1, \dots, g^{p-2}\}.$$

Can we find a generator for \mathbb{Z}_p^* ? We can do it if we know a factorisation of $p-1 = \prod_{i=1}^t p_i^{\alpha_i}$. Since $p_i \geq 2$, we have that $2^t \leq p < 2^{\lambda+1}$, thus $t \leq \lambda$. The algorithm requires t steps.

By theorem 29 we know that the order of any $y \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ divides $p-1$. Thus y is not a generator $\iff \exists 1 \leq i \leq t$ such that

$$y^{\frac{p-1}{p_i}} \equiv q \pmod{p}.$$

If this is the case, y is a generator of a subgroup of \mathbb{Z}_p^* . This leads us to the next computational assumption.

Assumption The Discrete Log (DL) problem, that is finding x given $g^x \in \mathbb{G}$, is hard, *i.e.*, for all PPT \mathcal{A} ,

$$\Pr \left[y = g^{x'} : \begin{array}{l} (\mathbb{G}, g, q) \leftarrow \text{GroupGen}(1^\lambda); x \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q; \\ y = g^x; x' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(y, \mathbb{G}, g, q, 1^\lambda) \end{array} \right] \leq \varepsilon(\lambda).$$

Elliptic Curves

\mathbb{G} is a group of points over some cubic curve modulo p , *i.e.*,

$$y = x^3 + ax^2 + bx + c \pmod{p}.$$

We can define an operation $+$ that makes \mathbb{G} a group.

$(\mathbb{G}, g, q) \leftarrow \text{GroupGen}(1^\lambda)$, and take as an example $\mathbb{G} = \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ with \cdot operation (multiplication). $q = p - 1$. Take $y \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$, we have that $y = g^x$ for $x \in \mathbb{Z}_{p-1}$.

In the general case, we have $y \in \mathbb{G}$, and that $y = g^x$ for $x \in \mathbb{Z}_q$. q is the order of the group, while g is a generator for \mathbb{G} . Since $y = g^x$ we have that $\log_g(y) = x$ in \mathbb{G} .

\mathbb{Z}_p^* is a special case, since modular exponentiation is a OWP.

Definition 20 (Computational Diffie-Hellman). Intuitively, given (g, g^x, g^y) , it's hard to find g^{xy} . Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) holds in \mathbb{G} if \forall PPT \mathcal{A} we have

$$\Pr \left[z = g^{xy} : \begin{array}{l} \text{params} = (\mathbb{G}, g, q); x, y \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q; \\ z \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{params}, g^x, g^y) \end{array} \right] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda). \quad \diamond$$

Observation 1. $CDH \implies DL$. \diamond

Proof of Observation 1. Assume not, then DL does not hold if CDH holds. But if we can compute $y = \log_g(g^y)$, then it's easy to find $g^{xy} = (g^x)^y$. \square

Whether $DL \implies CDH$ or not is not known.

Definition 21 (Decisional Diffie-Hellman). Intuitively,

$$\underbrace{(g, g^x, g^y, g^{xy})}_{\text{DDH tuple}} \approx_c \underbrace{(g, g^x, g^y, g^z)}_{\text{non-DDH tuple}}.$$

Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) holds in \mathbb{G} if for all PPT \mathcal{A}

$$\left| \Pr_{x, y \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q} [\mathcal{A}(1^\lambda, (\mathbb{G}, g, q), g, g^x, g^y, g^{xy}) = 1] - \Pr_{x, y, z \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q} [\mathcal{A}(1^\lambda, (\mathbb{G}, g, q), g, g^x, g^y, g^z) = 1] \right| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

\diamond

Observation 2. $CDH \implies DDH$ is true. $DDH \implies CDH$ maybe is not true. \diamond

Proposition 1. *DDH does not hold in \mathbb{Z}_p^* .* \diamond

Proof of proposition 1. Consider the set

$$\mathbb{QR}_p = \{y \in \mathbb{Z}_p^* : y = x^2, x \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*\} = \{y = g^z : z \text{ even}\}.$$

We can test if $y \in \mathbb{QR}_p$ by checking if $y^{\frac{p-1}{2}} \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$, because if $y = g^{2z'}$ then $y^{\frac{p-1}{2}} \equiv (g^{p-1})^{z'} \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$. If not, then it must be that $y = 2z' + 1$, and as such

$$y^{\frac{p-1}{2}} \equiv (g^{p-1})^{z'} \cdot g^{\frac{p-1}{2}} \equiv -1 \pmod{p}.$$

Clearly,

$$g^{xy} \in \mathbb{QR}_p \iff g^x \in \mathbb{QR}_p \vee g^y \in \mathbb{QR}_p.$$

Thus $g^{xy} \in \mathbb{QR}_p$ with probability $\frac{3}{4}$, but $g^z \in \mathbb{QR}_p$ only with probability $\frac{1}{2}$. So we have a distinguisher.

$\mathcal{A}_{\text{DDH}}(g, g^x, g^y, g^z)$ outputs 1 if g^x or g^y are in \mathbb{QR}_p , but $g^z \notin \mathbb{QR}_p$, and 0 otherwise. \mathcal{A}_{DDH} distinguishes with probability greater than $\frac{3}{8}$. \square

This result can be improved by returning 0 if and only if g^x, g^y and g^z are compatible with \mathbb{QR}_p considerations, obtaining a distinguisher operating with probability $\frac{1}{2}$.

If we take $\mathbb{G} = \mathbb{QR}_p$, with $q = \frac{p-1}{2}$, and where both q and p are prime (Sophie Germain primes), maybe DDH holds there. This is not always true.

Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange

Take $(\mathbb{G}, g, q) \leftarrow \text{GroupGen}(1^\lambda)$. Alice samples $x \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$, and sends $\mathcal{X} = g^x$ to Bob. Bob samples $y \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$, and sends $\mathcal{Y} = g^y$ to Alice. Alice computes $\mathcal{K}_A = \mathcal{Y}^x$, Bob computes $\mathcal{K}_B = \mathcal{X}^y$. It's easy to see that $\mathcal{K}_A = \mathcal{K}_B$.

CDH implies that an adversary can't compute the key. DDH implies that the keys are indistinguishable from random.

This is not secure against man in the middle attacks. Authentication would be needed, an initial fixed key.

Pseudo Random Generators

$(\mathbb{G}, g, q) \leftarrow \text{GroupGen}(1^\lambda)$, $x, y \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$. From DDH we know that

$$G_{g,q}(x, y) = (g^x, g^y, g^{xy}) \approx_c \mathcal{U}_{\mathbb{G}^3}$$

so we have a PRG $G_{g,q} : \mathbb{Z}_q^2 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}^3$.

Construction 13 (PRG from DDH). We can construct directly from DDH a PRG with polynomial stretch

$$\mathcal{G}_{g,q} : \mathbb{Z}_p^{l+1} \rightarrow \mathbb{G}^{2l+1}$$

defined as

$$G_{g,q}(x, y_1, \dots, y_l) = (g^x, g^{y_1}, g^{xy_1}, \dots, g^{y_l}, g^{xy_l}).$$

\diamond

Theorem 30. *If DDH holds, Construction 13 is a PRG.* \diamond

Proof of theorem 30. Using the standard hybrid argument, since DDH is ε -hard, we would use l hybrids, obtaining that the above PRG is $(\varepsilon \cdot l)$ -secure. This proof is not tight, and we want to make a tight one.

We make a direct reduction to DDH. Let \mathcal{A}_{DDH} be an adversary who is given (g, g^x, g^y, g^z) with $z = \beta + xy$, where β is either 0 (so that is a DDH tuple) or $\beta \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$ (non-DDH tuple).

We want to prove that

$$(g^x, g^{y_1}, g^{x y_1}, \dots, g^{y_l}, g^{x y_l}) \approx_c (g^x, g^y, g^z, \dots)$$

by generating exactly the first if the tuple is DDH, and exactly the other one if the tuple is not DDH.

For $j \in [l]$, pick $u_j, v_j \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$, and define $g^{y_j} = (g^y)^{u_j} \cdot g^{v_j}$, and $g^{z_j} = (g^z)^{u_j} \cdot (g^x)^{v_j}$. \mathcal{A}_{DDH} returns the same as

$$\mathcal{A}_{\text{PRG}}(g^x, g^{y_1}, g^{z_1}, \dots, g^{y_l}, g^{z_l}).$$

This trick generates many tuples in the correct way: just look at the exponents.

$$\begin{aligned} y_j &= u_j \cdot y + v_j \\ z_j &= u_j \cdot z + v_j \cdot x = u_j \cdot \beta + u_j \cdot x \cdot y + v_j \cdot x \\ &= u_j \cdot \beta + x \cdot (u_j \cdot y + v_j) = u_j \cdot \beta + x \cdot y_j \end{aligned}$$

which is either sampled random from \mathbb{Z}_q if $\beta \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$, or xy_j if $\beta = 0$, with $y_j \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$. So breaking the PRG is equivalent to breaking DDH, since \mathcal{A}_{DDH} can perfectly simulate the PRG, query \mathcal{A}_{PRG} and break DDH. \square

PRFs: Naor-Reingold

Construction 14 (Naor-Reingold). $(\mathbb{G}, g, q) \leftarrow \text{GroupGen}(1^\lambda)$.

$$\mathcal{F}_{\text{NR}} = \{F_{q,g,\bar{a}} : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{G}\}_{\bar{a} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n+1}}.$$

\bar{a} is a vector of exponents.

$$F_{q,g,\bar{a}}(x_1, \dots, x_n) = (g^{a_0})^{\sum_{i=1}^n a_i x_i}. \quad \diamond$$

DDH $\implies \mathcal{F}_{\text{NR}}$ is a PRF. The proof can be sketched in a similar way as the proof for GGM. Note that this is like an optimised version of GGM.

Number Theoretic Claw-Free Permutation

Construction 15 (Number Theoretic CFP). 1. $params = (\mathbb{G}, g, q) \leftarrow \text{GroupGen}(1^\lambda)$;

2. $y \leftarrow \mathbb{S}\mathbb{G}$, $pk = (params, y)$;

3. define $f = (f_0, f_1)$, with:

$$\begin{aligned} f_0(pk, x_0) &= g^{x_0}, \\ f_1(pk, x_1) &= y \cdot g^{x_1}. \end{aligned}$$

◇

$\mathbb{G} = \mathbb{Z}_p^*$, $q = p - 1$, $\mathcal{X}_{pk} = \mathbb{Z}_q$. Let (x_0, x_1) be a claw, i.e., $f_0(pk, x_0) = f_1(pk, x_1)$. Then

$$g^{x_0} = y \cdot g^{x_1} \implies y = g^{x_0 - x_1} \implies x_0 - x_1 = \log_g(y).$$

Theorem 31. *Under DL Construction 15 is a CFP.*

◇

Proof of theorem 31. It's a simple simulation. □

$$\mathcal{H}_{pk}(x||m) = f_{m_l}(\dots f_{m_1}(x) \dots).$$

If $l = 1$, $\mathcal{H}_{pk}(x||b) = f_b(pk, m) = y^b g^x$. Collision means $(x, b) \neq (x', b')$ such that $y^b g^x = y^{b'} g^{x'}$. Clearly

$$b \neq b' \implies y^{b-b'} = g^{x'-x} \implies y = g^{(x'-x)(b-b')^{-1}}.$$

Take $\mathbb{G} = \mathbb{QR}_p$, $p = 2q + 1$, with p and q primes. Then $\exists(b - b')^{-1}$.

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{H}_{pk}(x_1, x_2) &= y^{x_1} g^{x_2} \\ \mathcal{H}_{pk} : \mathbb{Z}_q^2 &\rightarrow \mathbb{G}. \end{aligned}$$

2.15 Public Key Encryption

There's also a thing called *Hybrid Encryption*: encrypt key k with pk , then use k for something like Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).

Definition 22 (Public Key Encryption Scheme). A Public Key Encryption (PKE) scheme is a tuple $\Pi = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$, where

1. $(pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{sGen}(1^\lambda)$;
2. $\text{Enc}(pk, m) = c$;
3. $\text{Dec}(sk, c) = m$.

◇

We require correctness from a PKE scheme:

$$\Pr [\text{Dec}(sk, \text{Enc}(pk, m)) = m : (pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{sGen}(1^\lambda)] = 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

Now we define games for CPA, CCA1, CCA2 for PKE.

Definition 23 (Chosen Plaintext Attack for PKE). $\mathcal{G}_{\mathcal{A},\Pi}^{\text{CPAone-time}}(\lambda, b)$:

1. $(pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{\$Gen}(1^\lambda)$;
2. $(m_0, m_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda, pk)$;
3. $c \leftarrow \text{Enc}(pk, m_b)$;
4. $b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(pk, c)$. \diamond

Definition 24 (Chosen Cyphertext Attack 1 for PKE). $\mathcal{G}_{\mathcal{A},\Pi}^{\text{CCA1}}(\lambda, b)$:

1. $(pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{\$Gen}(1^\lambda)$;
2. $(m_0, m_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\text{Dec}(sk, \cdot)}(1^\lambda, pk)$;
3. $c \leftarrow \text{Enc}(pk, m_b)$;
4. $b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(pk, c)$. \diamond

Definition 25 (Chosen Cyphertext Attack 2 for PKE). $\mathcal{G}_{\mathcal{A},\Pi}^{\text{CCA2}}(\lambda, b)$:

1. $(pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{\$Gen}(1^\lambda)$;
2. $(m_0, m_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\text{Dec}(sk, \cdot)}(1^\lambda, pk)$;
3. $c \leftarrow \text{Enc}(pk, m_b)$;
4. $b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\text{Dec}^*(sk, \cdot)}(pk, c)$, where $\text{Dec}^*(sk, c')$ outputs 1 if $c' = c$, and $\text{Dec}(sk, c')$ otherwise. \diamond

For $r \in \{\text{CPA}, \text{CCA1}, \text{CCA2}\}$ we say that Π is SUCCESS if \forall PPT \mathcal{A}

$$\mathcal{G}_{\Pi, \mathcal{A}}^r(\lambda, 0) \approx_c \mathcal{G}_{\Pi, \mathcal{A}}^r(\lambda, 1).$$

In CCA-1 no decryption queries can be made after receiving the cyphertext, while in CCA-2 decryption queries can be made for cyphertexts different from the challenge cyphertext.

$$\text{CCA-2} \implies \text{CCA-1} \implies \text{CPA}.$$

The other way around is not true in general.

ElGamal PKE

Construction 16 (ElGamal). • $(\mathbb{G}, g, q) \leftarrow \text{GroupGen}(1^\lambda)$, $x \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$, $h = g^x$, $pk = g$, $sk = x$. Public keys = $\langle \mathbb{G}, q, g, h \rangle$;

• $\text{Enc}(pk, m, r)$: $r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$, $c = (c_1, c_2) = (g^r, h^r \cdot m)$;

• $\text{Dec}(sk, (c_1, c_2)) = \frac{c_2}{c_1^x}$.

Note that

$$\frac{c_2}{c_1^x} = \frac{h^r \cdot m}{(g^r)^x} = m. \quad \diamond$$

Theorem 32. *Under DDH, ElGamal (Construction 16) is CPA-secure.* \diamond

Proof of theorem 32. Let $H_0(\lambda, b) = \mathcal{G}_{\Pi, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{CPA}}(\lambda, b)$. Then, let

$$H_1(\lambda, b) : \text{ElGamal} \left(\begin{array}{l} r, z \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q; c = (g^r, g^z \cdot m_b); \\ b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(h, (c_1, c_2)) \end{array} \right)$$

i.e., we multiply the message for g^z for random z .

First we claim that $\forall b \in \{0, 1\}$, $H_0(\lambda, b) \approx_c H_1(\lambda, b)$. To verify it, note that $(g^x, g^r, g^{xr}) \approx_c (g^x, g^y, g^z)$ by DDH. Assume \mathcal{A}_{H_0, H_1} distinguishes the two, then \mathcal{A}_{DDH} , on input (g^x, g^r, g^z) , with z either random or equal to $x \cdot r$, can forward $h = g^x$ to \mathcal{A}_{H_0, H_1} , receives the two messages m_0 and m_1 , and return her $(g^r, g^z \cdot m_0)$, and output whatever \mathcal{A}_{H_0, H_1} outputs.

The second claim is that $H_1(\lambda, 0) \approx_c H_1(\lambda, 1)$. Since g^z is random, so $g^z \cdot m_b$ is random, and hides b . \square

A few properties of ElGamal:

1. homomorphic: given $pk, (c_1, c_2), (c'_1, c'_2)$, with $(c_1, c_2) = \text{Enc}(pk, m)$ and $(c'_1, c'_2) = \text{Enc}(pk, m')$, note that

$$(c_1 \cdot c'_1, c_2 \cdot c'_2) = (g^{r+r'}, h^{r+r'}(m \cdot m')) = \text{Enc}(pk, m \cdot m', r + r');$$

2. blindness: given $c = (c_1, c_2) = (g^r, h^r \cdot m)$, compute $m' \cdot c_2 = h^r(m \cdot m')$. You have that $(c_1, m' \cdot c_2) = \text{Enc}(pk, m \cdot m', r)$;
3. re-randomisability: given a cyphertext $c = (c_1, c_2)$ you can always re-randomise it. Take $r' \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$, and compute

$$(g^{r'} \cdot c_1, h^{r'} \cdot c_2) = \text{Enc}(pk, m, r + r').$$

Property 2 implies that ElGamal is not CCA-2 secure: take (c_1, c_2) challenge, ask for $\text{Dec}(sk, (c_1, c_2 \cdot m'))$, and look if the result is $m_0 \cdot m'$ or $m_1 \cdot m'$.

Something cool comes from property 1: fully homomorphic encryption. You can compute the encryption of the product of two messages.

What if we could do it for every function? Assume having $c = \text{Enc}(pk, m)$, and to have some function $\text{Eval}(pk, c, f)$ which outputs $c' = \text{Enc}(pk, f(m))$. If you are in a group, it suffices to have addition and multiplication. You could build a client/server architecture, where the client C wants to compute $f(x)$ without sharing x . Then C computes $c = \text{FHECPK}(x)$, sends c, f to the server S , and obtains $c' = \text{FHCPK}(f(x))$.

2.16 Factoring Assumption and RSA

The factoring assumption will lead us to Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA). But first, we introduce Trapdoor Permutations (TDPs), which can give us PKE.

Definition 26 (Trapdoor Permutation). A TDP is a tuple (Gen, f, f^{-1}) , where:

1. $(pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{\$Gen}(1^\lambda)$ on some efficiently sampleable domain \mathcal{X}_{pk} ;
2. $f(pk, x) = y$ is a permutation over \mathcal{X}_{pk} ;
3. $f^{-1}(sk, y) = x$ is the trapdoor.

A TDP has two properties:

1. correctness:

$$\forall x \in \mathcal{X}_{pk}. f^{-1}(sk, f(pk, x)) = x;$$

2. one-way: for all PPT \mathcal{A} ,

$$\Pr \left[x' = x : \begin{array}{l} (pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{\$Gen}(1^\lambda); x \leftarrow \text{\$X}_{pk}; \\ y = f(pk, x); x' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(pk, y) \end{array} \right] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda). \quad \diamond$$

Basically, we are able to invert f if we have sk . Note that f is deterministic! We don't get PKE directly.

The problem is that randomness is missing. Recall hardcore functions.

Construction 17 (PKE scheme from TDP). Take (Gen, f, f^{-1}) , and let $h(\cdot)$ be hardcore for f . Then do the following:

1. $(pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{\$Gen}(1^\lambda)$;
2. $\text{Enc}(pk, m) = (f(pk, r), h(r) \oplus m) = (c_1, c_2)$ for $r \leftarrow \text{\$X}_{pk}$;
3. $\text{Dec}(sk, (c_1, c_2)) = h(f^{-1}(sk, c_1)) \oplus c_2 = m$.

◇

Theorem 33. *If (Gen, f, f^{-1}) is a TDP and $h(\cdot)$ is hardcore for $f(\cdot)$, then the PKE in Construction 17 is CPA-secure.* ◇

Since $(f(pk, r), h(r)) \approx_c (f(pk, r), \mathcal{U})$, this works. How many bits can we encrypt?

We know from theorem 9 that we have at least a bit, for any TDP. This can be extended to $O(\log(n))$ bits for any TDP. For specific TDPs we can get some $\Omega(\lambda)$, like for factoring, RSA, DL. From a RO one can get anything in $\{0, 1\}^*$.

Let's now look at modular operations modulo n (not necessarily prime). For example, take $m = p \cdot q$ with p, q primes.

Theorem 34 (Chinese Remainder Theorem). *Let n_1, \dots, n_k be pairwise coprime numbers, and any a_1, \dots, a_k such that $1 \leq a_i \leq n_i$ for all $i \in [k]$. Then $\exists! x$ such that $0 \leq x < n = \prod_{i=1}^k n_i$ and such that $x \equiv a_i \pmod{n_i}$ for all $i \in [k]$.* ◇

Special case: when $k = 2$, $n_1 = p$ and $n_2 = q$ are primes, and $n = p \cdot q$. Take any $x \in \mathbb{Z}_n$. To x correspond $x_p \equiv x \pmod p$ and $x_q \equiv x \pmod q$. This is a bijection: in fact, $\mathbb{Z}_n \simeq \mathbb{Z}_p \times \mathbb{Z}_q$ (i.e., they are isomorphic).

Now, let's look at $f_e(x) = x^e \pmod n$, for $0 \leq x < n$. Recall that $\mathbb{Z}_n^* = \{x \in \mathbb{Z}_n : \gcd(x, n) = 1\}$, and that $\#\mathbb{Z}_n^* = (p-1)(q-1) = \phi(n)$.

Fact 2. *If $\gcd(e, \phi(n)) = 1$, then $f_e(\cdot)$ is a permutation over \mathbb{Z}_n^* .* \diamond

We can indeed invert it. Since $\gcd(e, \phi(n)) = 1$, then $\exists d$ such that $d \cdot e = 1 \pmod{\phi(n)}$. Consider $f_d^{-1}(x) = x^d \pmod n$.

$$\begin{aligned} f_d^{-1}(f_e(m)) &= f_e(m)^d \pmod n \\ &= (m^e)^d \pmod n \\ &= m^{e \cdot d} \pmod n. \end{aligned}$$

Since $d \cdot e \equiv 1 \pmod{\phi(n)}$, then $d \cdot e = t \cdot \phi(n) + 1$ for some t .

$$m^{e \cdot d} = m^{t\phi(n)+1} = m \cdot (\underbrace{m^{\phi(n)}}_{1 \pmod n})^t = m \pmod n.$$

Assumption $(\text{Gen}_{\text{RSA}}, f_{\text{RSA}}, f_{\text{RSA}}^{-1})$ is a TDP.

- $(n, d, e) \leftarrow \text{\$Gen}_{\text{RSA}}(1^\lambda)$ with $n = p \cdot q$ and $e \cdot d \equiv 1 \pmod{\phi(n)}$. $(n, e) = pk$, $(n, d) = sk$;
- $f_{\text{RSA}}(e, x) = x^e \pmod n$;
- $f_{\text{RSA}}^{-1}(d, y) = y^d \pmod n$.

We have seen that this is correct. The RSA assumption is that, for all PPT \mathcal{A} ,

$$\Pr \left[x = x' : \begin{array}{l} (n, d, e) \leftarrow \text{\$Gen}_{\text{RSA}}(1^\lambda); \\ x \leftarrow \text{\$Z}_n^*; y = x^e; x' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(e, n, y) \end{array} \right] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

Under this assumption, we have a 1-bit hardcore predicate, so a 1-bit PKE. This is a different assumption than factoring. If you can factor n you can compute $\phi(n)$ and thus d . RSA implies factoring, but the other way around is not known.

Textbook RSA, i.e., using $(\text{Gen}_{\text{RSA}}, f_{\text{RSA}}, f_{\text{RSA}}^{-1})$ as is does not work: it's deterministic! To do RSA encryption in practice pick $r \leftarrow \text{\$}\{0, 1\}^t$ and define $\text{Enc}(e, m) = (\hat{m})^e \pmod n$, where $\hat{m} = r || m$.

- This is insecure if t is $O(\log(\lambda))$.
- If $m \in \{0, 1\}$, this is secure under RSA.
- If t is between $\log(\lambda)$ and $|m|$, we don't actually know.

It's proven to be CCA-secure in the RO model.




Figure 8: Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding.

Construction 18 (OAEP - PKCS#1 V.2). Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP), shown in fig. 8. This is basically a 2-Feistel (G, H) , with G, H hash functions.

- $\lambda_0, \lambda_1 \in \mathbb{N}^+$;
- $m' = m \parallel 0^{\lambda_1}, r \leftarrow \mathcal{R}\{0, 1\}^{\lambda_0}$;
- $s = m' \oplus G(r), t = r \oplus H(s)$;
- $\hat{m} = s \parallel t$;
- $\text{Enc}(pk, m) = \hat{m}^e$. \diamond

Theorem 35. *OAEP (Construction 18) is CCA-2 secure under RSA in the RO model.* \diamond

2.17 Trapdoor Permutation from Factoring

Let's see how to build a TDP from factoring. We've seen that $f_e(x) = x^e \bmod n$ is a TDP. What about $e = 2$? We have $n = p \cdot q$ and $e \cdot d \equiv 1 \bmod \phi(n)$,

but for $e = 2$, $f_2(x) = x^2 \pmod n$ is not a permutation, since the image of $f_2(\cdot)$ is $\mathbb{QR}_n = \{y : y = x^2 \pmod n \text{ for some } x \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*\}$, and $\mathbb{QR}_n \subset \mathbb{Z}_n^*$.

For some p and some n , $f_2(\cdot)$ is actually a permutation. By the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) (theorem 34), $x \mapsto (x_p, x_q)$ with $x_p \equiv x \pmod p$ and $x_q \equiv x \pmod q$. Let us look at $f(x) = x^2 \pmod p$.

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{Z}_p^* &= \{g^0, g^1, \dots, g^{(\frac{p-1}{2})-1}, g^{\frac{p-1}{2}}, \dots, g^{p-2}\} \\ \mathbb{QR}_p &= \{g^0, g^2, \dots, g^{p-3}, g^0, \dots\}\end{aligned}$$

In \mathbb{QR}_p are only even powers of the generator. This means that $|QR| = \frac{p-1}{2}$. Note also that, since $g^{p-1} \equiv g^0 \equiv 1 \pmod p$, we have that $g^{\frac{p-1}{2}} \equiv -1 \pmod p$. There is an easy way to check if a number is a square modulo p .

Fix $p, q \equiv 3 \pmod 4$, so $p, q \equiv 4t + 3$ for some $t \in \mathbb{N}^+$. Consider $n = p \cdot q$, also called a Bloom integer. If this condition is met, squaring is a TDP modulo n .

Let $y = x^2 \pmod p$, $x = y^{t+1} \pmod p$. $(y^{t+1})^2 = y^{2t+2}$. Now, since $p = 4t + 3$,

$$2t + 2 = \frac{4t + 3 - 3}{2} + 2 = \frac{p - 3}{2} + 2 = \frac{p + 1}{2} = \frac{p - 1}{2} + 1.$$

Now,

$$y^{2t+2} = y^{\frac{p-1}{2}+1} = y^{\frac{p-1}{2}} \cdot y = 1 \cdot y = y.$$

So, $x = \pm y^{t+1} \pmod p$. Note that $-1 = g^{\frac{p-1}{2}} \notin \mathbb{QR}_p$, because $p = 4t + 3 \implies \frac{p-1}{2} = \frac{4t+2}{2} = 2t + 1$, which is odd, and thus -1 is not a square.

Now, let's look at $f_{\text{RABIN}}(x) = x^2 \pmod n$ (quadratic residue modulo n , which is in \mathbb{QR}_p).

$$x^2 \mapsto (x_p^2, x_q^2).$$

Note that $f_{\text{RABIN}}^{-1}(y)$ is one of the following:

$$\{(x_p, x_q), (-x_p, x_q), (x_p, -x_q), (-x_p, -x_q)\}.$$

But doing this without knowing p and q is not easy. One can show that $y \in \mathbb{QR}_n \iff x_p^2 \in \mathbb{QR}_n, x_q^2 \in \mathbb{QR}_n$. Then it's easy to see that just one of the above pre-images is a square modulo n , and this is because only one between x_p and $-x_p$ is a square (and same goes for $x_q, -x_q$).

$$|\mathbb{QR}_n| = \frac{\phi(n)}{4}.$$

With p, q you can invert $f_{\text{RABIN}}(x) = x^2 = y \pmod n$, without them it's hard as factoring.

Lemma 6. *Given x, z such that $x^2 = z^2 = y \pmod n$, and $x \neq \pm z$, we can factor n .* \diamond

Proof of lemma 6. Recall that $f^{-1}(y) \in \{(\pm x_p, \pm x_q)\}$. Thus, if $x = (x_p, x_q)$, then $z \neq (-x_p, -x_q)$, and as such $x + z \in \{(2x_p, 0), (0, 2x_q)\}$.

Assume $x + z = (2x_p, 0)$. Then $x + z = 0 \pmod{q}$, but $x + z \neq 0 \pmod{p}$. This means that $\gcd(x + z, n) = q$, i.e., $x + z$ is a multiple of q , which is a divisor of n . After finding q , we can find $p = \frac{n}{q}$. Done. \square

Theorem 36. *Under factoring over Bloom integers, f_{RABIN} is a TDP.* \diamond

Proof of theorem 36. Assume not, then $\exists \mathcal{A}$ and some $p(\lambda) \in \text{poly}(\lambda)$ such that

$$\Pr \left[z^2 = y : \begin{array}{l} (p, q, n) \leftarrow \text{\$Gen}(1^\lambda); x \leftarrow \text{\$QR}_n; \\ y = x^2 \pmod{n}; z \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(y, n) \end{array} \right] \geq \frac{1}{p(\lambda)}.$$

x is taken from QR_n because f_{RABIN} is a permutation over QR_n . Consider $\mathcal{A}^1(n)$, trying to factor n . She chooses x , and lets $y = x^2 \pmod{n}$. Then she runs $\mathcal{A}(y, n)$ to get z . If $z \neq \pm x$, which happens with probability $\frac{1}{2}$, \mathcal{A}^1 can factor n , with probability $\frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{1}{p(\lambda)}$. \square

2.18 Cramer-Shoup Encryption (1998)

We will build a simplified version that is CCA-1. We call it Cramer-Shoup (CS) lite.

Construction 19 (Cramer-Shoup lite). Consider $\Pi = (\text{KGen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$, where

- $\text{KGen}(1^\lambda)$: $(\mathbb{G}, g, q) \leftarrow \text{GroupGen}(1^\lambda)$, then let $g_1 = g$, take $\alpha \leftarrow \text{\$Z}_q$, and let $g_2 = g_1^\alpha$. With high probability g_2 is a generator. Now pick $x_1, x_2, y_1, y_2 \leftarrow \text{\$Z}_q$. Let $h_1 = g_1^{x_1} \cdot g_2^{y_1}$ and $h_2 = g_1^{x_2} \cdot g_2^{y_2}$. Then, $pk = (h_1, h_2, g_1, g_2)$ and $sk = (x_1, y_1, x_2, y_2)$;
- $\text{Enc}(pk, m)$: pick $r \leftarrow \text{\$Z}_q$, and output

$$c = (g_1^r, g_2^r, h_1^r \cdot m, h_2^r) = (c_1, c_2, c_3, c_4).$$

$c_4 = h_2^r$ serves the purpose to ensure that the message is correct;

- $\text{Dec}(sk, (c_1, c_2, c_3, c_4))$: if $c_4 \neq c_1^{x_2} \cdot c_2^{y_2}$, return \perp ; else, return

$$\frac{c_3}{c_1^{x_1} \cdot c_2^{y_1}}.$$

To verify correctness of the construction:

$$\begin{aligned} c_4 &= h_2^r = (g_1^{x_2} \cdot g_2^{y_2})^r = (g_1^r)^{x_2} \cdot (g_2^r)^{y_2} = c_1^{x_2} \cdot c_2^{y_2}, \\ c_3 &= h_1^r \cdot m = (g_1^{x_1} \cdot g_2^{y_1})^r \cdot m = (g_1^r)^{x_1} \cdot (g_2^r)^{y_1} \cdot m = (c_1)^{x_1} \cdot (c_2)^{y_1} \cdot m. \end{aligned}$$

\diamond

Theorem 37. *Under DDH, CS-lite is CCA-1 secure.* \diamond

Proof of theorem 37. Start with $H_0(\lambda, b) = \mathcal{G}_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi}^{\text{CCA1}}(\lambda, b)$, where $H_0(\lambda, b)$:

1. $(\mathbb{G}, g, q) \leftarrow \text{GroupGen}(1^\lambda)$, $x_1, x_2, y_1, y_2 \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$, $g_1 = g$, $g_2 = g_1^\alpha$, $h_1 = g_1^{x_1} \cdot g_2^{y_1}$, $h_2 = g_1^{x_2} \cdot g_2^{y_2}$, $pk = (g_1, g_2, h_1, h_2)$, $sk = (x_1, y_1, x_2, y_2)$;
2. $(m_0^*, m_1^*) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\text{Dec}(sk, \cdot)}(1^\lambda, pk)$, where you pick $r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$, and let

$$c^* = (g_1^r, g_2^r, h_1^r \cdot m_b, h_2^r) = (c_1^*, c_2^*, c_3^*, c_4^*);$$

3. $b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(pk, c^*)$.

Now consider $H_1(\lambda, b)$, that changes just the way the cyphertext is computed. Pick $r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$, and let $g_3 = g_1^r$, $g_4 = g_3^\alpha = g_2^r$. Then

$$c^* = (g_3, g_4, g_3^{x_1} \cdot g_4^{y_1} \cdot m_b, g_3^{x_2} \cdot g_4^{y_2}).$$

Clearly, $H_0(\lambda, b) \equiv H_1(\lambda, b)$. Just look at c^* :

$$c^* = (g_1^r, g_2^r, \underbrace{(g_1^r)^{x_1} \cdot (g_2^r)^{y_1}}_{h_1^r} \cdot m_b, \underbrace{(g_1^r)^{x_2} \cdot (g_2^r)^{y_2}}_{h_2^r}).$$

Now, we define $H_2(\lambda, b)$, where instead of using g_4 we use $g_1^{r'} = g_2^{r''}$ for some random r', r'' . The next claim is that $H_1(\lambda, b) \approx_c H_2(\lambda, b)$, by reduction to the DDH.

To finish the proof, we introduce a lemma and two technical claims, that imply the theorem.

Lemma 7. *b is information theoretically hidden in $H_2(\lambda, b)$ for all \mathcal{A} asking $t = \text{poly}(\lambda)$ Dec queries.* \diamond

Proof of lemma 7. Remember that $g_3 = g_1^r$ and that $g_4 = g_2^{r'}$, and that $g_2 = g_1^\alpha$. For the proof we assume that $\alpha \neq 0$ and that $r \neq r'$.

From $h_1 = g_1^{x_1} \cdot g_2^{y_1}$, \mathcal{A} knows that

$$\log_{g_1}(h_1) = x_1 + y_1 \log_{g_1}(g_2) = x_1 + \alpha y_1 \pmod{q}. \quad (2)$$

There are q possible pairs (x_1, y_1) .

We say that query $c = (c_1, c_2, c_3, c_4)$ is legal if $c_1 = g_1^{r'}$ and $c_2 = g_2^{r''}$, or equivalently if $\log_{g_1}(c_1) = \log_{g_2}(c_2)$.

By Claim 1 and Claim 2, before getting c^* , \mathcal{A} knows only that (x_1, x_2) satisfy eq. (2).

$$c^* = (g_3, g_4, g_3^{x_1} \cdot g_4^{y_1} \cdot m_b, g_3^{x_2} \cdot g_4^{y_2}).$$

We want to show that $g_3^{x_1} \cdot g_4^{y_1}$ is uniform by \mathcal{A} point of view. Fix an arbitrary h in \mathbb{G} . If $h = g_3^{x_1} \cdot g_4^{y_1}$, then

$$\log_{g_1}(h) = x_1 \log_{g_1}(g_3) + y_1 \log_{g_1}(g_4).$$

Here $g_3 = g_1^r$ and $g_4 = g_2^{r'}$, thus

$$\log_{g_1}(h) = x_1 r + \alpha y_1 r'. \quad (3)$$

Equation (2) and eq. (3) are independent: consider the system of equations

$$\underbrace{\begin{pmatrix} 1 & \alpha \\ r & \alpha r' \end{pmatrix}}_B \begin{pmatrix} x_1 \\ y_1 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} \log_{g_1}(h_1) \\ \log_{g_1}(h) \end{pmatrix}$$

$\det(B) = \alpha r' - \alpha r \neq 0$ since $\alpha \neq 0$ and $r \neq r'$.

Since h is arbitrary,

$$\Pr[g_3^{x_1} \cdot g_4^{y_1} = h] = \frac{1}{|\mathbb{G}|}.$$

$g_3^{x_1} \cdot g_4^{y_1}$ is uniform, and thus the message is hidden. \square

Claim 2. \mathcal{A} obtains additional info about x_1, y_1 only if it ever makes a Dec query for $c = (c_1, c_2, c_3, c_4)$ such that

- $\log_{g_1}(c_1) \neq \log_{g_2}(c_2)$, i.e., it's illegal;
- $\text{Dec}(sk, c) \neq \perp$. \diamond

Proof of Claim 2. If $\text{Dec}(sk, c) = \perp$, then $c_4 \neq c_1^{x_2} \cdot c_2^{y_2}$. You learn nothing about x_1, y_1 if you make this query.

Assume it's not \perp , but the query is legal. \mathcal{A} learns that

$$\begin{aligned} m &= \frac{c_3}{c_1^{x_1} \cdot c_2^{y_1}} \\ \implies \\ \log_{g_1}(m) &= \log_{g_1}(c_3) - x_1 \log_{g_1}(c_1) - y_1 \log_{g_1}(c_2) \\ &= \log_{g_1}(c_3) - r''x_1 - r''y_1\alpha. \end{aligned}$$

Look at the determinant of

$$\begin{pmatrix} 1 & \alpha \\ -r'' & -\alpha r'' \end{pmatrix}$$

which is $-\alpha r'' + \alpha r'' = 0$. This does not tell us anything, so the only way to learn something is a query that is not \perp and that is illegal. \square

Claim 3.

$$\Pr[\mathcal{A} \text{ makes illegal Dec query } c \text{ for which } \text{Dec}(c) \neq \perp] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

\diamond

Proof of Claim 3. Assume $c = (c_1, c_2, c_3, c_4)$ is illegal, i.e.,

$$r_1 = \log_{g_1}(c_1) \neq \log_{g_2}(c_2) = r_2.$$

For c to be not rejected, we need that $c_4 = c_1^{x_2} \cdot c_2^{y_2}$. \mathcal{A} knows that

$$\log_{g_1}(h_2) = x_2 + \alpha y_2 \pmod{q}. \quad (4)$$

Fix arbitrary $c_4 \in \mathbb{G}$. We need that $c_4 = c_1^{x_2} \cdot c_2^{y_2}$.

\mathcal{A} also knows that

$$\log_{g_1}(c_4) = x_2 \log_{g_1}(c_1) + y_2 \log_{g_1}(c_2) = x_2 r_1 + y_2 r_2 \alpha.$$

These, too, are independent, since $\det \begin{pmatrix} 1 & \alpha \\ r_1 & r_2 \alpha \end{pmatrix} = \alpha(r_2 - r_1) \neq 0$. For the first query, \mathcal{A} can guess c_4 with probability less than or equal to $\frac{1}{q}$.

But if the query is rejected, \mathcal{A} has excluded one pair. At query $i+1$, \mathcal{A} can guess c_4 with probability $\frac{1}{q-i}$. The probability that $\exists i$ such that the $(i+1)$ -th query is not rejected is less than or equal to

$$\sum_{i=0}^{p-1} \Pr[i\text{-th query is not rejected}] \leq \frac{p}{q-p} = \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

with $\lambda \approx \log(q)$. □

Since Claim 2 and Claim 3 imply lemma 7, and that in turn implies the thesis, we are done. □

Let's see where the proof breaks for CCA-2. After having $c^* = (c_1^*, c_2^*, c_3^*, c_4^*)$, \mathcal{A} knows that

$$\log_{g_1}(c_4^*) = x_2 \log_{g_1}(g_3) + y_2 \log_{g_1}(g_4).$$

This is independent of eq. (4), and \mathcal{A} can recover x_2, y_2 . \mathcal{A} constructs

$$c = (g_1^{r_1}, g_2^{r_2}, c_3, (g_1^{r_1})^{x_2}, (g_2^{r_2})^{y_2}).$$

\mathcal{A} learns $m = \frac{c_3}{c_1^{x_1} \cdot c_2^{y_1}}$, and can recover x_1, y_1 and decrypt to find b .

$$\log_{g_1}\left(\frac{c_3}{m}\right) = x_1 r_1 + \alpha y_1 r_2.$$

Real Cramer-Shoup

Construction 20 (Cramer-Shoup). Consider the CS PKE scheme $\Pi = (\text{KGen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$, where

- $\text{KGen}(1^\lambda)$:
 1. $(\mathbb{G}, g, q) \leftarrow \text{GroupGen}(1^\lambda)$;
 2. let $g_1 = g$, take $\alpha \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$, and let $g_2 = g_1^\alpha$;
 3. let $\mathcal{H} : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$ be a CRH;
 4. pick $x_1, x_2, y_1, y_2, x_3, y_3 \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$;
 5. let $h_i = g_1^{x_i} \cdot g_2^{y_i}$, for $i \in \{1, 2, 3\}$;

6. $pk = (g_1, g_2, h_1, h_2, h_3)$, $sk = (x_1, x_2, x_3, y_1, y_2, y_3)$;

- $\text{Enc}(pk, m)$: pick $r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$, and output

$$c = \left(g_1^r, g_2^r, h_1^r \cdot m, \left(h_2 \cdot h_3^\beta \right)^r \right) = (c_1, c_2, c_3, c_4)$$

where $\beta = \mathcal{H}(c_1, c_2, c_3)$.

- $\text{Dec}(sk, (c_1, c_2, c_3, c_4))$: check that

$$c_1^{x_2 + \beta x_3} \cdot c_2^{y_2 + \beta y_3} = c_4.$$

If not, output \perp . Otherwise, output

$$m = \frac{c_3}{c_1^{x_1} \cdot c_2^{y_1}}.$$

Correctness:

$$\begin{aligned} c_1^{x_2 + \beta x_3} \cdot c_2^{y_2 + \beta y_3} &= (g_1^r)^{x_2} \cdot (g_1^r)^{\beta x_3} \cdot (g_2^r)^{y_2} \cdot (g_2^r)^{\beta y_3} \\ &= (g_1^{x_2} \cdot g_2^{y_2})^r \cdot (g_1^{x_3} \cdot g_2^{y_3})^{\beta r} \\ &= h_2^r \cdot h_3^{\beta r} = \left(h_2 \cdot h_3^\beta \right)^r. \end{aligned}$$

◇

The proof of CCA-2 security looks much similar to the proof for CCA-1 security of CS lite (theorem 37).

Theorem 38. *The CS PKE scheme (Construction 20) is CCA-2 under DDH.*

◇

Proof of theorem 38. Start with $(g, g^\alpha, g^r, g^{\alpha r})$.

$$c^* = \left(g^r, g^{\alpha r}, g^{x_1 \alpha r} \cdot g^{y_1 \alpha r} \cdot m, \left(g^{x_2} \cdot g^{x_3} \cdot g^{\alpha \beta y_2} \cdot g^{\alpha \beta y_3} \right)^r \right).$$

These have the same distribution, so the first tuple is indistinguishable from $(g, g^\alpha, g^r, g^{\alpha r'})$. The first hybrid uses the DDH tuple, the second uses the non-DDH tuple.

From the pk , \mathcal{A} knows that

$$\begin{aligned} \log_{g_1}(h_2) &= x_2 + \alpha y_2, \\ \log_{g_1}(h_3) &= x_3 + \alpha y_3. \end{aligned}$$

Let's analyse the probability of rejecting illegal queries. Let $g_3 = g_1^r$, and let $g_4 = g_2^{r'}$, with $r \neq r'$. Given c^* , \mathcal{A} knows that

$$\log_{g_1}(c_4^*) = (x_2 + \beta^* x_3)r + (y_2 + \beta^* y_3)\alpha r'.$$

Take arbitrary $c = (c_1, c_2, c_3, c_4) \neq c^*$, and assume c is illegal, *i.e.*, $\log_{g_1}(c_1) \neq \log_{g_2}(c_2)$. Three cases are possible:

1. $(c_1, c_2, c_3) = (c_1^*, c_2^*, c_3^*)$, but $c_4 \neq c_4^*$. It's impossible, so it's always rejected;
2. $(c_1, c_2, c_3) \neq (c_1^*, c_2^*, c_3^*)$, but

$$\mathcal{H}(c_1, c_2, c_3) = \beta = \beta^* = \mathcal{H}(c_1^*, c_2^*, c_3^*).$$

It's impossible (highly unlikely) by CRH;

3. as before, $(c_1, c_2, c_3) \neq (c_1^*, c_2^*, c_3^*)$ and $\beta \neq \beta^*$. □

2.19 Signature Schemes

We are still inside Public Key Cryptography, but we stop with encryption, and instead look at a new primitive: Signature Schemes (SSs). Basically, it's a primitive just like MAC, but this time without the two parties sharing a secret.

A big difference between MAC and SS is that in SS the signature is publicly verifiable. What we want from a SS is that it is hard to forge a message together with a valid signature.

Definition 27 (Signature Scheme). A SS is a tuple $\Pi = (\text{KGen}, \text{Sign}, \text{Vrfy})$ where

- $\text{KGen}(1^\lambda) \rightarrow (pk, sk)$;
- $\text{Sign}(sk, m) \rightarrow \sigma$, with $m \in \mathcal{M}_{pk}$ (the message space could depend on the public key pk);
- $\text{Vrfy}(pk, (m, \sigma)) \rightarrow 0/1$.

As usual, we want correctness, *i.e.*, for all (pk, sk) output of KGen, for all $m \in \mathcal{M}_{pk}$,

$$\Pr[\text{Vrfy}(pk, (m, \text{Sign}(sk, m))) = 1] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

Sometimes “bad things” happen, and the signature does not work: hence the probability. ◇

Definition 28 (UFCMA for SSs). ◇

2.20 Waters Signature Scheme

CDH in bilinear groups.

Definition 29 (Bilinear Group). $(\mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, q, g, \hat{e}) \leftarrow \text{Bilin}(1^\lambda)$.

1. \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T are groups of order q with some efficient operation “ \cdot ”. T stands for target;
2. g is a generator of \mathbb{G} ;

3. $\hat{e} : \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{G} \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_T$ is a bilinear map, *i.e.*,

a) bilinearity: $\forall g, h \in \mathbb{G}, \forall a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_q$,

$$\hat{e}(g^a, h^b) = \hat{e}(g, h)^{ab};$$

b) non-degeneracy: $\hat{e}(g, g) \neq 1$ for generator g . \diamond

Observation 3. *They are pairing on elliptic curves and CDH is believed to hold in such groups. DDH comes easy in \mathbb{G} with a bilinear map.* \diamond

Construction 21 (Waters Signature Scheme). Consider $\Pi = (\text{KeyGen}, \text{Sign}, \text{Vrfy})$, where

- $\text{KeyGen}(1^\lambda)$: $params = (\mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, q, g, \hat{e}) \leftarrow \text{sBilin}(1^\lambda)$, $a \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$, $g_1 = g^a$, $g_2, \mu_1, \dots, \mu_k \leftarrow \mathbb{G}$; $pk = (params, g_1, g_2, \mu_0, \dots, \mu_k)$, $sk = g_2^a$.
- $\text{Sign}(sk, m)$: let $m = (m[1], \dots, m[k]) \in \{0, 1\}^k$, and $\alpha(m) = \alpha_{\mu_0, \dots, \mu_k}(m) = \mu_0 \prod_{i=1}^k \mu_i^{m[i]}$. Pick $r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$, output $\sigma = (g_2^a \cdot \alpha(m)^r, g^r) = (\sigma_1, \sigma_2)$;
- $\text{Vrfy}(pk, (m, (\sigma_1, \sigma_2)))$: check that $\hat{e}(g, \sigma_1) = \hat{e}(\sigma_2, \alpha(m)) \cdot \hat{e}(g_1, g_2)$.

Correctness:

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{e}(g, \sigma_1) &= \hat{e}(g, g_2^a \cdot \alpha(m)^r) = \hat{e}(g, g_2^a) \cdot \hat{e}(g, \alpha(m)^r) \\ &= \hat{e}(g^a, g_2) \cdot \hat{e}(g^r, \alpha(m)) = \hat{e}(g_1, g_2) \cdot \hat{e}(\sigma_2, \alpha(m)). \end{aligned}$$

Security: partitioning argument. $\mathcal{M} = \{0, 1\}^k$, and X is some auxiliary information. Given X , one can simulate signature on $m \in \mathcal{M}_1^X$ and moreover with high probability all queries will belong to \mathcal{M}_1^X . Forgery will be in \mathcal{M}_2^X which will allow to break CDH. \diamond

Theorem 39. *Under CDH, Waters Signature Scheme (WSS) is UFCMA.* \diamond

Proof of theorem 39. Let \mathcal{A} be a PPT adversary capable of breaking WSS with probability greater than $\frac{1}{p(\lambda)}$, with $p(\lambda) \in \text{poly}(\lambda)$. Consider the adversary \mathcal{B} given $params = (\mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, q, g, \hat{e})$, $g_1 = g^a$, $g_2 = g^b$, and which wants to compute g^{ab} . $\mathcal{B}(params, g_1, g_2)$:

1. set $l = kq_s$, with q_s being the number of queries ($<< q$);
2. pick $x_0 \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$ and $x_1, \dots, x_k \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$ integers, and $y_0, \dots, y_k \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$;
3. set $\mu_i = g_2^{x_i} g^{y_i}$ for all $i \in [k]$, and define the functions

$$\begin{aligned} \beta(m) &= x_0 + \sum_{i=1}^k m[i]x_i, \\ \gamma(m) &= y_0 + \sum_{i=1}^k m[i]y_i; \end{aligned}$$

4. run $\mathcal{A}(params, g_1, g_2, \mu_0, \dots, \mu_k)$;
5. upon a query $m \in \{0, 1\}^k$ from \mathcal{A} :
 - if $\beta = \beta(m) = 0 \pmod q$, abort;
 - else $\gamma = \gamma(m)$, $r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$, and output

$$\sigma = (\sigma_1, \sigma_2) = (g_2^{\beta r} \cdot g^{\gamma r} \cdot g_1^{-\gamma \beta^{-1}}, g^r \cdot g_1^{-\beta^{-1}});$$

6. when \mathcal{A} outputs $(m^*, (\sigma_1^*, \sigma_2^*))$:
 - if $\beta(m^*) \neq 0 \pmod q$, abort;
 - else output

$$\frac{\sigma_1^*}{(\sigma_2^*)^{\gamma(m^*)}}.$$

If $\beta(m) \neq 0$, \mathcal{B} aborts on output, but answers queries. If $\beta(m) = 0$, \mathcal{B} aborts on queries, but outputs result.

Public key has random distribution as desired: perfect simulation of pk .

Conditioning on \mathcal{B} not aborting, the following two holds:

1. signature answers have the right distribution;
2. \mathcal{B} breaks CDH.

To verify point 1: $a = \log_g(g_1)$, $b = \log_g(g_2)$. A signature σ on m is $\sigma = (\sigma_1, \sigma_2) = (g_2^a \cdot \alpha(m)^{\bar{r}}, g^{\bar{r}})$ for random $\bar{r} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$. Take now $\bar{r} = r - \alpha\beta^{-1}$ and let $\beta = \beta(m)$, $\gamma = \gamma(m)$.

$$\alpha(m) = \mu_0 \prod_{i=1}^k \mu_i^{m[i]} = g_2^{x_0} g^{y_0} \prod_{i=1}^k (g_2^{x_i} g^{y_i})^{m[i]} = g_2^\beta g^\gamma.$$

$$\begin{aligned} \sigma_1 &= g_2^a \cdot \alpha(m)^{\bar{r}} = g_2^a \cdot \alpha(m)^{r - \alpha\beta^{-1}} \\ &= g_2^a \cdot g_2^{\beta r} \cdot g^{\gamma r} \cdot g_2^{-\alpha} \cdot g^{-\alpha\gamma\beta^{-1}} = g_2^{\beta r} \cdot g^{\gamma r} \cdot g_1^{-\gamma\beta^{-1}} \\ \sigma_2 &= g^{\bar{r}} = g^r \cdot g^{-\alpha\beta^{-1}} = g^r \cdot g_1^{-\beta^{-1}} \end{aligned}$$

Since $\bar{r} = r - \alpha\beta^{-1}$ is random, we get the same distribution.

To verify point 2: let (σ_1^*, σ_2^*) be the forgery such that $\beta(m^*) = 0 \pmod q$.

$$\frac{\hat{e}(g, \sigma_1^*)}{\hat{e}(\sigma_2^*, \alpha(m^*))} = \hat{e}(g_1, g_2)$$

because it's valid. Since $\hat{e}(g_1, g_2) = \hat{e}(g, g)^{ab}$ we have

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{e}(g, g)^{ab} &= \frac{\hat{e}(g, \sigma_1^*)}{\hat{e}(\sigma_2^*, \alpha(m^*))} = \frac{\hat{e}(g, \sigma_1^*)}{\hat{e}(\sigma_2^*, \underbrace{g_1^{\beta(m^*)}}_1 \cdot g^{\gamma(m^*)})} = \frac{\hat{e}(g, \sigma_1^*)}{\hat{e}((\sigma_2^*)^{\gamma(m^*)}, g)} \\ &\implies \hat{e}(g, g^{ab}) = \hat{e}\left(g, \frac{\sigma_1^*}{(\sigma_2^*)^{\gamma(m^*)}}\right) \implies g^{ab} = \frac{\sigma_1^*}{(\sigma_2^*)^{\gamma(m^*)}} \end{aligned}$$

Next, we claim that \mathcal{B} aborts with negligible probability.

To verify it, we see that \mathcal{B} aborts if the following happens:

$$E = \beta(m^*) \neq 0 \vee (\beta(m^*) = 0 \wedge \beta(m_1) = 0) \vee \dots \vee (\beta(m^*) = 0 \wedge \beta(m_{q_s}) = 0).$$

Since $|\beta(m)| \leq kl$ by definition of $\beta(\cdot) \implies |\beta(m)| < q \implies$ we drop the modulus. By the union bound

$$\Pr[E] \leq \Pr[\beta(m^*) \neq 0] + \sum_{i=1}^{q_s} \Pr[\beta(m^*) = 0 \wedge \beta(m_i) = 0].$$

- Fix x_1, \dots, x_k and m^* , there is a single x_0 such that $\beta(m^*) = 0$, thus

$$\Pr[\beta(m^*) \neq 0] = \frac{kl}{kl+1};$$

- fix $i \in [q_s]$, and let $\bar{m} = m_i$. Since $m^* \neq m_i$, $\exists j : m^*[j] \neq \bar{m}[j]$. Assume without loss of generality that $m^*[j] = 1 \wedge \bar{m}[j] = 0$. Given arbitrary $x_1, \dots, x_{j-1}, x_{j+1}, \dots, x_k$ then

$$(\beta(m^*) = \wedge \beta(\bar{m}) = 0) \iff \begin{cases} x_0 + x_j = -\sum_{i \neq j} x_i m^*[i] \\ x_0 = -\sum_{i \neq j} x_i \bar{m}[i] \end{cases}$$

$\exists!$ solution.

$$\Pr[\beta(m^*) = 0 \wedge \beta(m_i) = 0] = \frac{1}{kl+1} \cdot \frac{1}{l+1}.$$

So the probability of aborting is:

$$\Pr[E] \leq \frac{kl}{kl+1} + q_s \cdot \frac{1}{kl+1} \cdot \frac{1}{l+1}$$

which gives us the probability of not aborting:

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[\bar{E}] &\geq 1 - \frac{kl}{kl+1} - q_s \cdot \frac{1}{kl+1} \cdot \frac{1}{l+1} \\ &= \frac{1}{kl+1} \left(\mathcal{K} + 1 - \mathcal{K} - \frac{q_s}{l+1} \right) = \frac{1}{kl+1} \left(1 - \frac{q_s}{l+1} \right) \quad (l = kq_s) \\ &= \frac{1}{kl+1} \left(1 - \frac{l}{(l+1)k} \right) \geq \frac{1}{4kq_s+2} = \frac{1}{p'(\lambda)} \end{aligned}$$

with $p'(\lambda) \in \text{poly}(\lambda)$.

Finally, the probability that \mathcal{B} breaks CDH:

$$\Pr[\mathcal{B} \text{ breaks CDH}] = \underbrace{\frac{1}{p(\lambda)}}_{\text{breaks WSS}} \cdot \underbrace{\frac{1}{p'(\lambda)}}_{\text{not abort}} \in \text{poly}(\lambda)$$

□

List of Definitions

Perfect secrecy	1
Information theoretic MAC	5
Pairwise independence	5
One Way Function	7
Distribution Ensemble	8
Computational Indistinguishability	8
Pseudo Random Generator	9
Hard Core Predicate - I	10
Hard Core Predicate - II	11
One Way Permutation	11
One time security	12
Pseudo Random Function	14
CPA-secure SKE scheme	14
UFCMA MAC	17
Universal Hash Function	19
CCA-security	22
Feistel function	24
Collision Resistant Hash Function	27
Claw-Free Permutation	30
Computational Diffie-Hellman	34
Decisional Diffie-Hellman	34
Public Key Encryption Scheme	37
Chosen Plaintext Attack for PKE	38
Chosen Cyphertext Attack 1 for PKE	38
Chosen Cyphertext Attack 2 for PKE	38
Trapdoor Permutation	40
Signature Scheme	49
UFCMA for SSs	49
Bilinear Group	49

List of Constructions

Pairwise independent function	5
SKE scheme from PRG	13
SKE scheme from PRF	14
GGM tree	16
MAC from PRF	18
UHF with Galois field	20
Encrypted MAC	23
Merkle-Damgard	28
Merkle tree	28
Strengthened Merkle-Damgard	28
Davies-Meyer	28
CR Compression Function from CFP	30
PRG from DDH	35
Naor-Reingold	36
Number Theoretic CFP	36
ElGamal	38
PKE scheme from TDP	40
OAEP - PKCS#1 V.2	42
Cramer-Shoup lite	44
Cramer-Shoup	47
Waters Signature Scheme	50

Acronyms

AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
AU	Almost Universal
DL	Discrete Log
CBC	Cypher Block Chain
CCA	Chosen Cyphertext Attack
CDH	Computational Diffie-Hellman
CFB	Cypher Feed Back
CFP	Claw-Free Permutation
CPA	Chosen Plaintext Attack
CR	Collision Resistant
CRH	Collision Resistant Hash Function
CRT	Chinese Remainder Theorem
CS	Cramer-Shoup
CTR	Counter
DDH	Decisional Diffie-Hellman
DH	Diffie-Hellman
ECB	Electronic Code Book
FIL	Fixed Input Length
GGM	Goldreich-Goldwasser-Micali
GL	Goldreich-Levin
HCP	Hard Core Predicate
ICM	Ideal Cypher Model
INT	Integrity (of cyphertext)
MAC	Message Authentication Code
MD	Merkle-Damgard
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
OAEP	Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding

OTP One Time Pad
OWF One Way Function
OWP One Way Permutation
PKC Public Key Cryptography
PKE Public Key Encryption
PPT Probabilistic Polynomial Time
PRF Pseudo Random Function
PRG Pseudo Random Generator
PRP Pseudo Random Permutation
PU Perfect Universal
RO Random Oracle
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman
RV Random Variable
SKE Symmetric Key Encryption
SS Signature Scheme
SSH Secure Shell
TDP Trapdoor Permutation
TLS Transport Layer Security
UFCMA Unforgeable Chosen Message Attack
UHF Universal Hash Function
VIL Variable Input Length
WSS Waters Signature Scheme