Intro. to Computer Security: Exercise 3

Deadline: 19/2/2016 (Friday) 12:00pm noon

Protocol Analysis 1

This exercise looks at protocol analysis. You have to analyse two key establishment protocols and find attacks against them. These protocols are running on port 11337 and port 11338 on the VM. You must implement your attacks against the VM and finally you should suggest fixes for the protocols.

2 Protocol 1

In this protocol, a client C and server S share a symmetric key K_{cs} , this key is only known to the server and client. This long term key is used to set up a session key, and this session key is then used by the server to send a secret value to the client:

- 1. $C \rightarrow S$: "Connect Protocol 1"

- 2. $S \rightarrow C$: $\{N_s\}_{Kcs}$ 3. $C \rightarrow S$: $\{N_c\}_{Kcs}$ 4. $S \rightarrow C$: $\{N_c, N_s\}_{(Ns \oplus Nc)}$ 5. $C \rightarrow S$: $\{N_s, N_c\}_{(Ns \oplus Nc)}$ 6. $S \rightarrow C$: $\{Secret Value\}_{(Ns \oplus Nc)}$

The client starts a run of the protocol by sending the bytes of the ASCII for "Connect Protocol 1" to the server. The server then generates a nonce and sends it to the client encrypted with the key K_{cs} . The client must reply with a challenge of it's own for the server: the nonce N_c encrypted with the key K_{cs} . The session key is the xor of the two nonces. The encryption used is 128-bit AES in ECB mode with PKCS5 padding and the nonces are 128 bits. You can find the code for the server, for this exercise and the next (minus the key and the secretValue) in the charlie account, using the password charlie99.

The idea of this protocol is that only the server and the client know the key K_{cs} , so only they know the nonces, which in turn should mean that only the client and server can know the session key. Step 4 and 5 let the client and the server prove to each other that they know the key, with the aim of providing mutual belief in the session key $(Ns \oplus Nc)$. Unfortunately this protocol has a security flaw and does not achieve these aims.

2.1 The Exercise, Part 1

1. Analyse this protocol and find an attack that will let you learn the secret value from the server without having to know the key K_{cs} . Write down your attack against the protocol in Alice and Bob notation and describe each of the steps.

[3 marks]

2. Implement your attack in Java and run it against the server running on the VM. I recommend looking at the server code to understand how to write your attack code. The secret value will include a token that you must submit to the website.

[4 marks]

3 Protocol 2

In this protocol, as above, a client C and a server S share a symmetric key K_{cs} , this key is only known to the server and client. This long term key is used to set up a session key, this session key is then used by the server to send a secret value to the client:

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1. C \to S: g^x

2. S \to C: g^y

3. C \to S: \{N_c\}_{g^{xy}}

4. S \to C: \{\{N_c + 1\}_{Kcs}, N_s\}_{g^{xy}}

5. C \to S: \{\{N_s + 1\}_{Kcs}\}_{g^{xy}}

6. S \to C: \{\text{Secret Value}\}_{g^{xy}}
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In this protocol, the client and the server use Diffie-Hellman to set up a key based on g^{xy} . They check who is on the other end of this channel by exchanging nonce challenges. The idea here is that, given that only the server and the client know the key K_{cs} , then, given the challenge N_c , only the server can produce $\{N_c+1\}_{K_{cs}}$ and given the challenge N_s , only the client can produce $\{N_s+1\}_{K_{cs}}$. However the protocol is flawed and an attacker can learn the secret value without knowing the key K_{cs} .

The encryption used is 128-bit AES in ECB mode with PKCS5 padding and the nonces are ints. g^x and g^y are sent as public key certificates; as these get vary in length, the length of the certificates are sent as an int before the certificates. Only the first 128-bits of g^{xy} are used to make the AES key. You can find the code for the server (minus the key and the secretValue) in the charlie account. The values of p and q for Diffie-Hellman can be found in the server code.

The idea here is that only the server and the client know the key K_{cs} so only they know the nonces which in turn should mean that only the client and server can know the session key. Step 4 and 5 let the client and the server prove to each other that they know the key, with the aim of providing mutual belief in the key. Unfortunately this protocol has a security flaw and does not achieve these aims.

3.1 The Exercise, Part 2

1. Analyse this protocol and find an attack that will let you learn the secretValue from the server without having to know the key K_{cs} (N.B. as you cannot observe any traffic from the client this cannot be a man in the middle attack). Write down your attack against the protocol in Alice and Bob notation and describe the steps.

[3 marks]

2. Implement your attack in Java and run it against the server running on the VM. I recommend looking at the server code to understand how to write your attack. The secret value will give you a token that you must submit to the token submission website.

[4 marks]

4 Submission

Submit your work via Canvas. Your answers to 1.1 and 2.1 should submitted as answers to the Canvas Quiz for this exercise. Your answers to 1.2 and 2.2 should be uploaded as well commented and correctly indented Java files. This exercise is worth 20% of your total coursework mark, so 4% of your total module mark.

Getting Help

For the protocol analysis part of this exercise, I strongly recommend reading the paper: "Prudent Engineering Practice for Cryptographic Protocols" by Martin Abadi and Roger Needham (http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~tpc/cwi/Teaching/Papers/11principles.pdf). I recommend looking at the server code in detail and making sure that you understand every line before writing your attack code. You may also find it helpful to try writing your own client and run the server code on your own machine, with a key and secret value you know. You can also come to my office hour 11:00 until 13:00 Tuesday, with questions and to get extra help with the exercise.