

An Isabelle/HOL Framework for Synthetic Completeness Proofs

CPP 2025 - 2025-01-21

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Motivation

- We have a new and exciting logic

$$A \vdash \varphi$$

- We want to prove completeness

$$\Gamma \models \varphi \implies \Gamma \vdash \varphi$$

where $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$ means $A \vdash \varphi$ for some list of elements A from Γ

- We want the computer to help us prove it

??

Strategy

- Cf. R. M. Smullyan [1]
- Assume φ is valid under Γ but has no derivation

$$\Gamma \models \varphi, \quad \Gamma \not\vdash \varphi$$

- Then $\neg\varphi, \Gamma$ is *consistent*

$$\neg\varphi, \Gamma \not\vdash \perp$$

- *Lindenbaum's lemma* gives us a *maximal consistent, witnessed set* S

- $\Gamma \subseteq S$
- $\varphi \notin S \implies \varphi, S$ inconsistent
- $\exists\varphi \in S \implies \varphi(t) \in S$, for some t

(whatever $\exists\varphi$ means)

Strategy (ii)

- We prove a *truth lemma* for such MCSs S

$$\varphi \in S \iff S \models \varphi$$

- But $\neg\varphi, \Gamma \subseteq S$, so

$$S \models \neg\varphi, \Gamma$$

- This contradicts the initial assumption

$$\Gamma \models \varphi$$

- So we must have a derivation

$$\Gamma \vdash \varphi$$

Desiderata

- Prove Lindenbaum's lemma *once*
 - subsets preserve consistency,
 - inconsistencies are finite,
 - witnesses preserve consistency
- *Reflect* proof rules in MCSs
 - $A \vdash \top \implies \top \in S$
- Split the truth lemma in syntactic and semantics parts
 - MCSs are *saturated*
 - $(\exists \varphi) \in S \iff \exists x. (\varphi(x) \in S)$
 - Saturated sets are models
 - Proved by Isabelle/HOL automation

Lindenbaum

Lindenbaum's Lemma

- Transfinite proof adapted from C. C. Chang and H. J. Keisler [2]
 - Generalise from first-order logic
 - Formalize in higher-order logic instead of set theory
 - Without expanding the language (now a type)
 - Formalization inspired by S. Berghofer [3]
- Abstract consistency predicates over formulas $\langle 'a \rangle$:

```
locale MCS_Base =  
  fixes consistent ::  $\langle 'a \text{ set} \Rightarrow \text{bool} \rangle$   
  assumes consistent_hereditary:  
     $\langle \wedge S \ S'. \text{consistent } S \Rightarrow S' \subseteq S \Rightarrow \text{consistent } S' \rangle$   
  and inconsistent_finite:  
     $\langle \wedge S. \neg \text{consistent } S \Rightarrow \exists S' \subseteq S. \text{finite } S' \wedge \neg \text{consistent } S' \rangle$ 
```

Witnesses

- Abstract witness and params functions over parameters $\langle 'i \rangle$:

```
locale MCS_Witness = MCS_Base consistent
  for consistent ::  $\langle 'a \text{ set} \Rightarrow \text{bool} \rangle$  +

  fixes witness ::  $\langle 'a \Rightarrow 'a \text{ set} \Rightarrow 'a \text{ set} \rangle$ 
    and params ::  $\langle 'a \Rightarrow 'i \text{ set} \rangle$ 

  assumes finite_params:
     $\langle \lambda p. \text{finite } (\text{params } p) \rangle$ 
    and finite_witness_params:
     $\langle \lambda p \ S. \text{finite } (\bigcup q \in \text{witness } p \ S. \text{params } q) \rangle$ 
    and consistent_witness:
     $\langle \lambda p \ S. \text{consistent } (\{p\} \cup S)$ 
       $\Rightarrow \text{infinite } (\text{UNIV} - (\bigcup q \in S. \text{params } q))$ 
       $\Rightarrow \text{consistent } (\{p\} \cup S \cup \text{witness } p \ S) \rangle$ 
```


Maximal Consistent, Witnessed Sets

- Every consistent formula is included

definition maximal :: $\langle 'a \text{ set} \Rightarrow \text{bool} \rangle$ where
 $\langle \text{maximal } S \equiv \forall p. \text{consistent } (\{p\} \cup S) \rightarrow p \in S \rangle$

- Every included formula has its witnesses included

definition witnessed :: $\langle 'a \text{ set} \Rightarrow \text{bool} \rangle$ where
 $\langle \text{witnessed } S \equiv \forall p \in S. \exists S'. \text{witness } p \ S' \subseteq S \rangle$

- Convenient abbreviation

abbreviation MCS :: $\langle 'a \text{ set} \Rightarrow \text{bool} \rangle$ where
 $\langle \text{MCS } S \equiv \text{consistent } S \wedge \text{maximal } S \wedge \text{witnessed } S \rangle$

Lindenbaum Extension

- Extend a consistent set by formulas one-by-one
 - Assume an infinite cardinal order on the formulas

fixes $r :: \langle 'a \text{ rel} \rangle$

assumes $\text{Cinfinite_r}: \langle \text{Cinfinite } r \rangle$

- Add formula (and witnesses) exactly when consistency is preserved

definition $\text{extend} :: \langle 'a \text{ set} \Rightarrow 'a \Rightarrow 'a \text{ set} \rangle$ **where**

$\langle \text{extend } S \ a \equiv \text{worecZSL } r \ S \ \text{extendS } \text{extendL } a \rangle$

$\langle \text{extendS } a \ \text{prev} \equiv$

$\text{if consistent } (\{a\} \cup \text{prev}) \text{ then } \{a\} \cup \text{prev} \cup \text{witness } a \ \text{prev} \text{ else prev} \rangle$

$\langle \text{extendL } \text{rec } a \equiv \bigcup b \in \text{underS } r \ a. \ \text{rec } b \rangle$

Properties

- The union is an MCS

definition `Extend :: <'a set \Rightarrow 'a set> where`
`<Extend S \equiv \bigcup a \in Field r. extend S a>`

- Proofs follow C. C. Chang and H. J. Keisler [2]
 - Inconsistencies are finite
 - Assume at least as many unused parameters as formulas

theorem `MCS_Extend:`

`assumes <consistent S> <|UNIV :: 'a set| \leq o |UNIV - paramss S|>`
`shows <MCS (Extend S)>`

- Sublocales give us the witness-free cases for free

sublocale `MCS_No_Witness_UNIV \subseteq MCS_Witness_UNIV` consistent `< λ _. {}> < λ _. {}>`

Example (i)

- Given a natural deduction system for first-order logic:

inductive Calculus :: $\langle ('f, 'p) \text{ fm list} \Rightarrow ('f, 'p) \text{ fm} \Rightarrow \text{bool} \rangle (\dots)$ **where**

- Assm: $\langle p \in \text{set } A \Rightarrow A \vdash_3 p \rangle$
- FlsE: $\langle A \vdash_3 \perp \Rightarrow A \vdash_3 p \rangle$
- ImpI: $\langle p \# A \vdash_3 q \Rightarrow A \vdash_3 p \rightarrow q \rangle$
- ImpE: $\langle A \vdash_3 p \rightarrow q \Rightarrow A \vdash_3 p \Rightarrow A \vdash_3 q \rangle$
- ExiI: $\langle A \vdash_3 \langle t \rangle p \Rightarrow A \vdash_3 \exists p \rangle$
- ExiE: $\langle A \vdash_3 \exists p \Rightarrow a \notin \text{params}(\text{set } (p \# q \# A)) \Rightarrow \langle *a \rangle p \# A \vdash_3 q \Rightarrow A \vdash_3 q \rangle$
- Clas: $\langle (p \rightarrow q) \# A \vdash_3 p \Rightarrow A \vdash_3 p \rangle$

- Consistency means falsity is underivable:

definition consistent :: $\langle ('f, 'p) \text{ fm set} \Rightarrow \text{bool} \rangle$ **where**
 $\langle \text{consistent } S \equiv \forall A. \text{ set } A \subseteq S \rightarrow \neg A \vdash_3 \perp \rangle$

Example (ii)

- Existentials are witnessed by fresh parameters:

```
fun witness :: <('f, 'p) fm  $\Rightarrow$  ('f, 'p) fm set  $\Rightarrow$  ('f, 'p) fm set> where  
  <witness ( $\exists p$ ) S = (let a = SOME a. a  $\notin$  params ({p}  $\cup$  S) in {(*a)p})>  
| <witness _ _ = {}>
```

- Building an MCS requires proving six goals (only no. 5 non-trivial):

goal (6 subgoals):

1. $\langle \Lambda S S'. \text{consistent } S \Rightarrow S' \subseteq S \Rightarrow \text{consistent } S' \rangle$
2. $\langle \Lambda S. \neg \text{consistent } S \Rightarrow \exists S' \subseteq S. \text{finite } S' \wedge \neg \text{consistent } S' \rangle$
3. $\langle \Lambda p. \text{finite } (\text{params_fm } p) \rangle$
4. $\langle \Lambda p S. \text{finite } (\text{params } (\text{witness } p S)) \rangle$
5. $\langle \Lambda p S. \text{consistent } (\{p\} \cup S) \Rightarrow \text{infinite } (\text{UNIV} - \text{params } S) \Rightarrow \text{consistent } (\{p\} \cup S \cup \text{witness } p S) \rangle$
6. $\langle \text{infinite UNIV} \rangle$

Reflection

MCSs and Proof Rules

- The proof system is deliberately abstract
 - Let us make some assumptions
- Say we can derive and rearrange assumptions

```
fixes derive :: <'fm list  $\Rightarrow$  'fm  $\Rightarrow$  bool> (infix < $\vdash$ > 50)
assumes derive_assm: < $\forall A\ p. p \in \text{set } A \Rightarrow A \vdash p$ >
and derive_set: < $\forall A\ B\ r. A \vdash r \Rightarrow \text{set } A = \text{set } B \Rightarrow B \vdash r$ >
```

- Say consistency means something is underivable

```
assumes consistent_underivable:
  < $\forall S. \text{consistent } S \leftrightarrow (\forall A. \text{set } A \subseteq S \rightarrow (\exists q. \neg A \vdash q))$ >
```

Absence

- This tells us about MCS *absence*:
 - A formula is excluded exactly when inclusion is *explosive*

theorem MCS_explode:

assumes <consistent S > <maximal S >

shows < $p \notin S \leftrightarrow (\exists A. \text{set } A \subseteq S \wedge (\forall q. p \# A \vdash q))$ >

- if $p \notin S$,
 - p, S is inconsistent by maximality,
 - assuming p would be explosive. \Downarrow
- if having p is explosive,
 - p, S is inconsistent
 - $p \in S$ would contradict assumption. \Downarrow

Presence

- Say we also have a general cut principle:

assumes derive_cut: $\langle \forall A\ B\ p\ q. A \vdash p \implies p \# B \vdash q \implies A @ B \vdash q \rangle$

- This tells us about MCS *presence*:
 - A formula is included exactly when it can be derived

theorem MCS_derive:

assumes $\langle \text{consistent } S \rangle$ $\langle \text{maximal } S \rangle$

shows $\langle p \in S \iff (\exists A. \text{ set } A \subseteq S \wedge A \vdash p) \rangle$

- if $p \in S$, we derive it as an assumption
- if $A \vdash p$, then $p \in S$ follows by maximality, given p, S consistent
 - assume p, B explosive (B from S), then A, B explosive by cut,
 - but A, B are from consistent S . \downarrow

Reflecting Falsity

- Assume a concrete piece of syntax with a concrete proof rule:

```
fixes bot :: 'fm (<⊥>)  
assumes botE: <⋀A p. A ⊢ ⊥ ⇒ A ⊢ p>
```

- Then we can mirror this in any MCS:

corollary MCS_botE:

```
assumes <consistent S> <maximal S>  
  and <⊥ ∈ S>  
shows <p ∈ S>
```

- If $\perp \in S$,
 - $A \vdash \perp$ by *presence*,
 - $A \vdash p$ by the elimination rule,
 - $p \in S$ by *presence*.

Reflecting Negation

- Assume more concrete syntax and proof rules:

fixes not :: $\langle 'fm \Rightarrow 'fm \rangle$ ($\langle \neg \rangle$)

assumes notI: $\langle \forall A\ p.\ p \# A \vdash \perp \Rightarrow A \vdash \neg p \rangle$

and notE: $\langle \forall A\ p.\ A \vdash p \Rightarrow A \vdash \neg p \Rightarrow A \vdash \perp \rangle$

- We can mirror these too:

corollary MCS_not_xor:

assumes $\langle \text{consistent } S \rangle$ $\langle \text{maximal } S \rangle$

shows $\langle p \in S \leftrightarrow \neg p \notin S \rangle$

- if $p \in S$ and $\neg p \in S$, then, as above, $\perp \in S$ by the elimination rule. \Downarrow
- if $\neg p \notin S$ and $p \notin S$, then p, A explosive by *absence*, so $p, A \vdash \perp$,
 - $A \vdash \neg p$, by the introduction rule,
 - $\neg p \in S$, by *presence*. \Downarrow

Reflecting Quantifiers

- Assume an existential quantifier with a method of instantiation:

```
fixes exi :: <'fm  $\Rightarrow$  'fm> (< $\exists$ >)
  and inst :: <'t  $\Rightarrow$  'fm  $\Rightarrow$  'fm> (<(_)>)
assumes
  exi_witness: < $\wedge S\ S'\ p.\ \text{MCS } S \Rightarrow \text{witness } (\exists p)\ S' \subseteq S \Rightarrow \exists t.\ \langle t \rangle p \in S$ > and
  exiI: < $\wedge A\ p\ t.\ A \vdash \langle t \rangle p \Rightarrow A \vdash \exists p$ >
```

- We can lift this too:

```
corollary MCS_exi:
  assumes <consistent S> <maximal S> <witnessed S>
  shows < $\exists p \in S \leftrightarrow (\exists t.\ \langle t \rangle p \in S)$ >
```

- if $\exists p \in S$, then the Lindenbaum construction gives us $p(t) \in S$.
- if $p(t) \in S$, then *presence* + introduction rule gives us $\exists p \in S$.

Example

- With *absence* and *presence* we can move between proof system and MCS
 - The framework provides some existing results
 - Users can prove their own in the same way
- Flexible enough for hybrid logic global modality **A**
 - $M, - \models \mathbf{A}p \iff \forall w. M, w \models p$
 - Calculus labels formulas with world-naming nominals (i, p)
 - Treat as a universal quantifier
 - Formation preserves context: $\langle \lambda(i, p). (i, \mathbf{A} p) \rangle$
 - Instantiation switches world: $\langle \lambda k (i, p). (k, p) \rangle$
 - Reflection yields $(i, \mathbf{A}p) \in S \iff \forall k. ((k, p) \in S)$

Truth Lemma

Generalized Semantics

- We need a syntax-independent handle on sub-formulas

Take your semantics

$$M \models (\varphi \wedge \psi) \longleftrightarrow M \models \varphi \text{ and } M \models \psi$$

Abstract the recursion

$$M \llbracket \models \rrbracket (\varphi \wedge \psi) \longleftrightarrow M \models \varphi \text{ and } M \models \psi$$

Plug in arbitrary relation

$$M \llbracket \mathcal{R} \rrbracket (\varphi \wedge \psi) \longleftrightarrow \mathcal{R}(M, \varphi) \text{ and } \mathcal{R}(M, \psi)$$

- Now — $\llbracket \mathcal{R} \rrbracket$ — applies \mathcal{R} with respect to the semantics

Calculating Saturated Set Clauses

- Add our MCS S to the mix:

$$\mathcal{R}(S)(-, \varphi) \equiv \varphi \in S$$

- We can write the truth lemma clause abstractly:

$$(\varphi \wedge \psi) \in S \longleftrightarrow \varphi \in S \text{ and } \psi \in S$$

$$\mathcal{R}(S)(M, \varphi \wedge \psi) \longleftrightarrow \mathcal{R}(S)(M, \varphi) \text{ and } \mathcal{R}(S)(M, \psi)$$

$$\mathcal{R}(S)(M, \varphi \wedge \psi) \longleftrightarrow M \llbracket \mathcal{R}(S) \rrbracket (\varphi \wedge \psi)$$

- In general:

$$\mathcal{R}(S)(M, \varphi) \longleftrightarrow M \llbracket \mathcal{R}(S) \rrbracket \varphi$$

What is this M Doing Here

- This is too naive

$$\mathcal{R}(S)(-, \varphi) \equiv \varphi \in S$$

- For first-order logic
 - Account for *quantifiers*
 - $\mathcal{R}(S)(M, \varphi) \equiv M(\varphi) \in S$
 - $\forall p \in S \longleftrightarrow \forall t. (p(t) \in S)$ (rather than ... $\forall t. (p \in S)$)
- For hybrid logic
 - Account for *current world*
 - $\mathcal{R}(S)(M, \varphi) \equiv (M_i, \varphi) \in S$
 - $(i, \Diamond p) \in S \longleftrightarrow \exists k. ((k, p) \in S)$ (rather than ... $\exists k. ((i, p) \in S)$)

Abstract Saturation

- In the abstract

```
locale Truth_Base =  
  fixes semics :: <'model  $\Rightarrow$  ('model  $\Rightarrow$  'fm  $\Rightarrow$  bool)  $\Rightarrow$  'fm  $\Rightarrow$  bool> (<(_  $\llbracket$  _  $\rrbracket$  _)>)  
    and semantics :: <'model  $\Rightarrow$  'fm  $\Rightarrow$  bool> (infix  $\models$  50)  
    and  $\mathcal{M}$  :: <'a set  $\Rightarrow$  'model set>  
    and  $\mathcal{R}$  :: <'a set  $\Rightarrow$  'model  $\Rightarrow$  'fm  $\Rightarrow$  bool>
```

- The generalization is faithful

```
assumes semics_semantics: < $M \models p \iff M \llbracket (\models) \rrbracket p$ >
```

- The equation from before (allowing multiple models per MCS)

```
abbreviation saturated :: <'a set  $\Rightarrow$  bool> where  
  <saturated  $S \equiv \forall p. \forall M \in \mathcal{M}(S). M \llbracket \mathcal{R}(S) \rrbracket p \iff \mathcal{R}(S) M p$ >
```

Carving the Truth Lemma in Two

- Saturated sets model their members and MCS are saturated

assumes saturated_semantics:

$\langle \wedge S \ M \ p. \text{ saturated } S \implies M \in \mathbb{M}(S) \implies M \models p \iff R(S) \ M \ p \rangle$

and MCS_saturated:

$\langle \wedge S. \text{ MCS } S \implies \text{ saturated } S \rangle$

- Therefore, MCSs model their members

theorem truth_lemma:

assumes $\langle \text{MCS } S \rangle \ \langle M \in \mathbb{M}(S) \rangle$

shows $\langle M \models p \iff R(S) \ M \ p \rangle$

- Isabelle/HOL generates the concrete proof obligations
 - Factors out semantic part for the automation
 - Leaves the syntactic part related to reflection

All Together Now

- First-order logic
 - Saturation asks: $(\exists p) \in S \longleftrightarrow \exists t. (p(t) \in S)$
 - Reflection gave: $(\exists p) \in S \longleftrightarrow \exists t. (p(t) \in S)$
- Global modality
 - Saturation asks: $([i], \mathbf{A}p) \in S \longleftrightarrow \forall k. (([k], p) \in S)$
 - Reflection gave: $(i, \mathbf{A}p) \in S \longleftrightarrow \forall k. ((k, p) \in S)$
 - **sledgehammer** deals with equivalence classes
- Satisfaction operator
 - Saturation asks: $([i], @_k p) \in S \longleftrightarrow (([k], p) \in S)$
 - Reflection gave ??
 - **sledgehammer** finds a proof with *absence*, *presence* and proof rules

In Summary

- Framework helps:
 - Build MCSs
 - Reflect proof system in MCSs
 - Carve up the truth lemma
- Artifact [4] includes strong completeness for
 - Propositional sequent calculus and tableau
 - Axiomatic modal logic
 - Natural deduction systems for first-order logic and hybrid logic
- Limitations
 - Compactness
 - To go beyond MCSs: general cut

Related and Future Work

- J. C. Blanchette, A. Popescu, and D. Traytel [5] mechanize an analytic framework
 - abstract derivation trees instead of MCSs
 - more operational perspective with possible prover generation
- M. Petria [6] uses category theory to abstract over syntax and semantics
 - assume compactness and cut, and build MCSs
 - not mechanized
- M. Fitting [7] uses *consistency properties* to abstract over proof systems
 - This specifies the *reflected proof rules* up front
 - S. Berghofer [3] mechanized completeness for a concrete first-order logic
 - I am working on a generalization using Smullyan's uniform notation [1]
 - works for strong hybrid logic

Abridged Bibliography

- [1] R. M. Smullyan, *First-Order Logic*. Mineola, New York: Dover Publications, 1995.
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