

Abstract Consistency Properties for Hybrid Logic

Smullyan's Unifying Principle in Isabelle/HOL

**Logic: from Arthur Prior to Computation
and Cognition**

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Asta Halkjær From, University of Copenhagen

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Concrete Consistency

Concrete Consistency

- We have a concrete language

$$\varphi := p \mid \neg\varphi \mid \varphi \wedge \varphi \mid \varphi \rightarrow \varphi \mid \forall x. \varphi(x) \mid \exists x. \varphi(x) \mid \dots$$

- We have a concrete calculus with concrete proof rules:

$$\frac{\varphi \in \Gamma}{\Gamma \vdash \varphi} \text{Assm}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash \varphi \quad \Gamma \vdash \psi}{\Gamma \vdash \varphi \wedge \psi} \wedge\text{I}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \psi \quad \Gamma \vdash \varphi}{\Gamma \vdash \psi} \rightarrow\text{E}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash \forall x. \varphi(x)}{\Gamma \vdash \varphi(t)} \forall\text{E}$$

- A set Γ is consistent wrt. \vdash (concretely) when we cannot derive a contradiction from it (e.g. $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$ and $\Gamma \vdash \neg\varphi$).

Concrete Maximal Consistency

- A consistent set Γ is a maximally consistent set (MCS) when it contains every formula consistent with it:

if $\Gamma \subseteq \Delta$ and Δ consistent, then $\Gamma = \Delta$

- We can build an MCS by trying to add every formula and taking the union $\Delta = \bigcup_i \Delta_i$ (Lindenbaum-Tarski):

$$\Delta_0 = \Gamma$$

$$\Delta_{i+1} = \{\varphi_i, \psi(a)\} \cup \Delta_i \text{ if consistent and } \varphi_i = \exists x. \psi(x)$$

$$\Delta_{i+1} = \{\varphi_i\} \cup \Delta_i \quad \text{otherwise if consistent}$$

$$\Delta_{i+1} = \Delta_i \quad \text{otherwise}$$

Concrete MCS Properties

- Our MCS Γ has properties corresponding to our calculus:

if $\varphi \in \Gamma$ and $\psi \in \Gamma$ then $\varphi \wedge \psi \in \Gamma$

if $\varphi \rightarrow \psi \in \Gamma$ and $\varphi \in \Gamma$ then $\psi \in \Gamma$

if $\forall x. \varphi(x) \in \Gamma$ then $\varphi(t) \in \Gamma$ for all t

- Think: if we can derive φ from formulas in Γ , then $\varphi \in \Gamma$
- We can prove completeness by building a model over Γ .
- Note: There are some nuances here with respect to the *cut* rule and *upwards* and *downwards saturation*.

Abstract Consistency — Smullyan

Abstract Consistency

- *What if we start from the properties instead of the calculus?*
- We still have a concrete language (of quantification theory)

$$\varphi := p \mid \neg\varphi \mid \varphi \wedge \varphi \mid \varphi \rightarrow \varphi \mid \forall x. \varphi(x) \mid \exists x. \varphi(x) \mid \dots$$

- Characterize it with *Smullyan's uniform notation*:
 - *Conjunctive, disjunctive, universal and existential* kinds.

$$\alpha \quad \varphi \wedge \psi : \alpha_1 = \varphi, \alpha_2 = \psi \quad \neg(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) : \alpha_1 = \varphi, \alpha_2 = \neg\psi$$

$$\beta \quad \varphi \rightarrow \psi : \beta_1 = \neg\varphi, \beta_2 = \psi \quad \neg(\varphi \wedge \psi) : \beta_1 = \neg\varphi, \beta_2 = \neg\psi$$

$$\gamma \quad \forall x. \varphi(x) : \gamma(t) = \varphi(t) \quad \neg(\exists x. \varphi(x)) : \gamma(t) = \neg\varphi(t)$$

$$\delta \quad \exists x. \varphi(x) : \delta(t) = \varphi(t) \quad \neg(\forall x. \varphi(x)) : \delta(t) = \neg\varphi(t)$$

Consistency Property

- A family of sets C is a (first-order) *consistency property* when all sets $S \in C$ obey:

conflict for all p , not both $p \in S$ and $\neg p \in S$

banned $\perp \notin S$ (and $\neg\top \notin S$)

double neg. if $\neg\neg\varphi \in S$ then $\{\varphi\} \cup S \in C$

alpha if $\alpha \in S$ then $\{\alpha_1, \alpha_2\} \cup S \in C$

beta if $\beta \in S$ then $\{\beta_1\} \cup S \in C$ or $\{\beta_2\} \cup S \in C$

gamma if $\gamma \in S$ then $\{\gamma(t)\} \cup S \in C$

for every (closed term) t (...)

delta_E if $\delta \in S$ then $\{\delta(a)\} \cup S \in C$ for some a (...)

- Think: we have *evidence* for every member formula.

Maximal Element?

- Set theory: under the axiom of choice, *finite character* of a family of sets C guarantees a maximal member wrt. \subseteq :

$\langle \text{finite_char } C \equiv$
 $\forall S. S \in C \leftrightarrow (\forall S' \subseteq S. \text{finite } S' \rightarrow S' \in C) \rangle$

- Problem: imposing finite character might break **delta_E**.
 - Exercise for the reader.
- Solution: interpret it universally rather than existentially.

delta_A if $\delta \in S$ then $\{\delta(a)\} \cup S \in C$ for every *new* a (...)

- How do we recover **delta_E**? Manually!
 - As earlier in the Lindenbaum-Tarski construction.

Maximal Element!

1. Take our consistency property C
 2. Impose finite character to obtain $C^* \supseteq C$
 3. Any consistent set $\Gamma \in C$, has an MCS $\Delta \supseteq \Gamma \in C^*$
 4. (Add witnesses manually when constructing Δ)
- Our MCS has *Hintikka* properties by construction
 - Each condition on the family of sets gives the maximal element a corresponding property.
 - E.g. for **alpha**: if $\alpha \in \Delta$, then $\alpha_1 \in \Delta$ and $\alpha_2 \in \Delta$
 - So we can prove *model existence* in the abstract:
 - For any consistency property C and set $S \in C$, we can build a model that satisfies all formulas $\varphi \in S$.

But Why?

Gödel's completeness theorem concrete consistency constitutes a consistency property.

Gentzen's Hauptsatz our consistency property has the sub-formula property, so we get cut-elimination for free

Compactness theorem the sets where every finite subset is satisfiable constitute a consistency property

Downward Löwenheim-Skolem the satisfiable sets constitute a consistency property, and the domain of our model is countable

Craig's interpolation theorem the sets with an interpolant-free partition constitute a consistency pro...

Abstracter Consistency — Fitting

The Core of the Argument

- *What if we take a different language?*
- Fitting applied consistency properties to both term-modal logic and intuitionistic logic:

modal if $\langle t \rangle \varphi \in S$ then $\{\varphi\} \cup S^{[t]} \in C$

- What matters is that the conditions on our consistency property respect *Fitting's three-step recipe*:
 1. Subset close the family
 2. Satisfy **delta**_A via parameter substitutions
 3. Impose finite character
- Guarantees a maximal element for model existence.

Abstract Abstract
Consistency — From

Abstract Abstract Consistency

- *What if we take any consistency kind.*
- There are two types:
 - Wits W :
 - W : witnesses a (δ -)formula using a given parameter.
 - Cond $P H$:
 - P : relates formulas (e.g. α) with their consistency conditions (e.g. $\lambda C S. \{\alpha_1, \alpha_2\} \cup S \in C$).
 - H : gives the corresponding Hintikka property.
- We carve out those that respect *Fitting's three-step recipe*.
- We get the ingredients for model existence without fixing a calculus, a consistency property *or even a language*.

In Isabelle/HOL

The Params locale defines parameter substitutions.

```
locale Consistency_Kind = Params map_fm params_fm
  for map_fm :: <('x  $\Rightarrow$  'x)  $\Rightarrow$  'fm  $\Rightarrow$  'fm>
  and params_fm :: <'fm  $\Rightarrow$  'x set> +
  fixes K :: <('x, 'fm) kind>
  assumes respects_close:
    < $\bigwedge C. \text{sat}_E K C \Rightarrow \text{sat}_E K (\text{close } C)$ >
  and respects_alt:
    < $\bigwedge C. \text{sat}_E K C \Rightarrow \text{subset\_closed } C \Rightarrow \text{sat}_A K$ 
    (mk_alt_consistency C)>
  and respects_fin:
    < $\bigwedge C. \text{subset\_closed } C \Rightarrow \text{sat}_A K C \Rightarrow \text{sat}_A K$ 
    (mk_finite_char C)>
  and hintikka:
    < $\bigwedge C S. \text{sat}_E K C \Rightarrow S \in C \Rightarrow \text{maximal } C S \Rightarrow \text{sat}_H K S$ >
```

Pre-Defined Kinds

- For a user-given predicate \approx we can define the following:
 - (Under some natural conditions on each \approx .)

Confl $\langle ps \approx_x qs \implies \text{cond } ps$
 $(\lambda_ S. \text{ set } qs \cap S = \{\}) \rangle$

Alpha $\langle ps \approx_\alpha qs \implies \text{cond } ps$
 $(\lambda C S. \text{ set } qs \cup S \in C) \rangle$

Beta $\langle ps \approx_\beta qs \implies \text{cond } ps$
 $(\lambda C S. \exists q \in \text{ set } qs. \{q\} \cup S \in C) \rangle$

Gamma $\langle ps \approx_\gamma (F, qs) \implies \text{cond } ps$
 $(\lambda C S. \forall t \in F S. \text{ set } (qs \ t) \cup S \in C) \rangle$

Modal $\langle ps \approx_\square (F, qs) \implies \text{cond } ps$
 $(\lambda C S. \text{ set } qs \cup F S \in C) \rangle$

Application:
“Bounded” First-Order Logic

Restricted Instantiation

- Consider first-order logic with the following sort of rule:

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash \forall x. \varphi(x) \quad t \text{ is a sub-term of } \Gamma, \varphi}{\Gamma \vdash \varphi(t)} \forall E$$

- Can we give an easy semantic proof?
- Make use of the ability to bound our **gamma** kind:

- ▶ $\langle [\perp] \approx_x [\perp] \rangle$
- ▶ $\langle [\neg (\cdot P \text{ ts})] \approx_x [\cdot P \text{ ts}] \rangle$
- ▶ $\langle [\neg (p \rightarrow q)] \approx_\alpha [p, \neg q] \rangle$
- ▶ $\langle [p \rightarrow q] \approx_\beta [\neg p, q] \rangle$
- ▶ $\langle [\forall p] \approx_\gamma (\text{terms}, \lambda t. [\langle t \rangle p]) \rangle$
- ▶ $\langle \delta (\neg \forall p) \ x = [\neg \langle *x \rangle p] \rangle$

Completeness

- The framework says we can extend a consistent set to an MCS with Hintikka properties corresponding to our consistency property.
- Build a Herbrand model with a domain of sub-terms.
- Prove a truth lemma by induction on the size of the member formula
 - The Hintikka properties discharge each case.
- Result: A proof of completeness in Isabelle/HOL for a natural deduction system with the restricted proof rule.
 - (and also a mechanized proof of compactness.)

Application: Second-Order Logic

Scaling Up

- Joint work with Anders Schlichtkrull, Aalborg University Copenhagen.
- Quantify over functions and predicates besides terms.
- **gammas** for different quantifiers at different types:
 - ▶ $\langle [\forall p] \rightsquigarrow_{\forall} (\lambda t. [\langle t/\theta \rangle p]) \rangle$
 - ▶ $\langle [\forall_P p] \rightsquigarrow_{\forall_P} (\lambda s. [\langle s/\theta \rangle_P p]) \rangle$
 - ▶ $\langle [\forall_F p] \rightsquigarrow_{\forall_F} (\lambda s. [\langle s/\theta \rangle_F p]) \rangle$
- Each **gamma** can only instantiate with one type of term
 - ▶ compose our consistency property of multiple **gammas**.
- Mechanized completeness as before.

Application: Prior's Ideal Language

Very Strong Hybrid Logic

- Based on work by Blackburn, Braüner and Kofod.

$$p := \bullet i \mid \cdot P \mid \neg p \mid p \wedge p \mid \Box p \\ \mid @i p \mid A p \mid \downarrow p \mid \forall p$$

- Easy to express semantics in Isabelle/HOL:
 - $\langle (M, _) \models A p \iff (\forall v \in \mathcal{W} M. (M, v) \models p) \rangle$
 - $\langle (M, w) \models \downarrow p \iff (M(\mathcal{N} := (w \gg \mathcal{N} M)), w) \models p \rangle$
 - ...
- Propositional quantification over *admissible* propositions:
 - $\langle (M, w) \models \forall p \iff (\forall P \in \Pi M. (M(\mathcal{B} := (P \gg \mathcal{B} M)), w) \models p) \rangle$
- This quantification gives some second-order expressivity.

Conflicts and Disjunctives

- *Can we fit this very strong hybrid logic into our setup?*
- *What properties do we need in order to build a model?*
- We label formulas by pairing them with a nominal: (i, φ)
 - φ holds at the world denoted by i .
 - (I need to see what happens if I just write $@_i\varphi$ instead.)
- Conflicts are natural:
 - $\langle [(i, \neg \bullet P)] \sim_x [(i, \bullet P)] \rangle$
 - $\langle [(i, \neg \bullet k)] \sim_x [(i, \bullet k)] \rangle$
- We only have one disjunctive condition:
 - $\langle [(i, \neg (p \wedge q))] \sim_\beta [(i, \neg p), (i, \neg q)] \rangle$

Conjunctives

- We have many conjunctive conditions.
 - ▶ $\langle [(i, \neg \neg p)] \sim_{\alpha} [(i, p)] \rangle$
 - ▶ $\langle [(i, p \wedge q)] \sim_{\alpha} [(i, p), (i, q)] \rangle$
- We can express nominal symmetry and transitivity.
 - ▶ $\langle [(i, \bullet k)] \sim_{\alpha} [(k, \bullet i)] \rangle$
 - ▶ $\langle [(i, \bullet k), (i, p)] \sim_{\alpha} [(k, p)] \rangle$
- Satisfaction operators and downarrow binders fit right in:
 - ▶ $\langle [(i, @k p)] \sim_{\alpha} [(k, p)] \rangle$
 - ▶ $\langle [(i, \neg @k p)] \sim_{\alpha} [(k, \neg p)] \rangle$
 - ▶ $\langle [(i, \downarrow p)] \sim_{\alpha} [(i, \langle i \rangle_i p)] \rangle$
 - ▶ $\langle [(i, \neg \downarrow p)] \sim_{\alpha} [(i, \neg \langle i \rangle_i p)] \rangle$

Conjunctives and Universals

- The box modality is truly *local*:
 - $\langle [(i, \Box p), (i, \Diamond(\bullet k))] \sim_{\alpha} [(k, p)] \rangle$
- The global modality is truly *universal*:
 - $\langle [(i, \mathbf{A} p)] \sim_{\gamma i} (\lambda k. [(k, p)]) \rangle$
- We want nominal reflexivity *unconditionally*:
 - $\langle [] \sim_{\gamma i} (\lambda i. [(i, \bullet i)]) \rangle$
- Limit propositional quantification to *soft-qdf* formulas:
 - $\langle [(i, \mathbf{V} p)] \sim_{\gamma p} (\lambda _. \{q. \text{softqdf } q\}, \lambda q. [(i, \langle q \rangle_p p)]) \rangle$
 - These correspond to *admissible* propositions.
 - The Isabelle/HOL mechanization helped clarify this.

Existentials and Completeness

- Finally, we have witnesses for existential formulas:
 - ▶ $\langle \delta (i, \neg \Box p) \ k = [(\Box k, \neg p), (i, \Diamond (\bullet (\Box k)))] \rangle$
 - ▶ $\langle \delta (i, \neg A p) \ k = [(\Box k, \neg p)] \rangle$
 - ▶ $\langle \delta (i, \neg \forall p) \ P = [(i, \neg \langle \bullet (\Box P) \rangle_p p)] \rangle$
- From this consistency property, we get MCSs with corresponding Hintikka properties.
- Completeness a la Blackburn, Braüner and Kofod
 - ▶ But for a natural deduction system.
 - ▶ With equivalence classes of nominals as worlds.
 - ▶ Without tweaking the Lindenbaum-Tarski construction.

Conclusion

So What?

- Consistency properties are *expressive*.
- They provide a declarative interface for building MCSs.
 - No need to tweak the Lindenbaum-Tarski enumeration of consistent sets for each and every new logic.
 - Simply write down a consistency property.
- How lucky did we get?
 - Can we handle higher-order logic?
 - Can we handle more exotic non-classical logics?
 - We derived the pre-defined kinds.
 - We did not bake them in from the beginning.
- (How much could we do in a constructive meta-logic?)