

	Realism/ National Interest	Bureaucratic Politics	Domestic Politics	
			Diversionary Incentive	Public Opinion
Associated Readings	Rice (2000)	Allison & Halperin (1972)	Russett (1990)	Zaller (1994) – Elite Leadership Etman & Page (1994) – Media Coverage Cook (1994) – Newsbeats Shapiro & Page (1988) – Rational Public
Why did the United States use force (or not)?	National interest (or lack thereof)  [How does this affect the credibility of military threats?]	Support (or opposition) of key bureaucratic actors who may have different interests/views of the national interest, which may limit the options available.	Poor economic performance in the lead up to election leads the President to use force abroad to generate a “rally around the flag” effect—that is, a boost in popularity—to win the election.	Bottom-up: Public demand (or lack thereof) and electoral connection  Top-down: (In)Ability of President to “manufacture”/ignore support for intervention
What explains the size of force and strategy employed?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Interests at stake</li> <li>Relative power of adversaries</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Military doctrine</li> <li>Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)</li> <li>Organizational Culture</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Domestic tolerance for mobilization and casualties (war fatigue)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Domestic tolerance for mobilization and casualties (war fatigue)</li> </ul>
What explains the outcome of conflict?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Relative power of adversaries</li> <li>Relative resolve of adversaries</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Appropriateness of available strategies</li> <li>Ability to learn/adapt</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Domestic support</li> <li>Appropriateness of politically viable strategies</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Domestic support</li> <li>Appropriateness of politically viable strategies</li> </ul>
Limitations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>National interests are indeterminate as a guide to policy (how to achieve goals/make tradeoffs?)</li> <li>Concerns for leadership and credibility rapidly expand policies that can be justified as part of the national interest</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Even within organizations, there are often heterogeneous preferences.</li> <li>Ex: See Lecture 2 Slides comparing opinions of military and civilian elite.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Risky strategy – rallies do not always occur following use of force abroad, particularly when there is high polarization.</li> <li>Worry about war fatigue following the rally</li> <li>Still need to be able to justify use of force to public to get the rally</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Bottom-up model: To what extent can the executive manufacture public opinion? [Dominance of news coverage, etc.]</li> <li>Top-down model: What extent of coordination among elites to expect? How will this effect public opinion and could it change over time in war?</li> </ul>
Key questions to answer when using this model	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What does the U.S. see as its national interest?</li> <li>Why is this in the U.S. national interest?</li> <li>For Syria case, how would have Obama been able to overcome domestic opposition?</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Who plays? Whose interests and behaviors affect gov’t’s decisions?</li> <li>What are the players’ stands? What interests and perceptions lead to this stand?</li> <li>How are these stands aggregated to yield decisions?</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What conditions are giving rise to President’s desire to boost public support through military action?</li> <li>Why is military action abroad suited to achieve this goal? Were other policy options available?</li> <li>For Syria case, what is the role of domestic opposition?</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>How does public opinion influence foreign policy? What mechanism seems to be at play (ex ante preference representation, ex post accountability, etc.)?</li> <li>Are leaders reacting or anticipating public opinion?</li> </ol>
Possible Types of Evidence:  <u>Note:</u> This is by no means a comprehensive list.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Agreement among elites about goals (not necessarily means) of intervention</li> <li>Clear statements of security interests at stake by not intervening (credibility on line, etc.)</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Degree of elite consensus – particularly among White House, State Department, and Pentagon</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Timing in relation to election</li> <li>Approval rating</li> <li>Level of polarization</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Degree of elite consensus – Congress and White House, State Department, Pentagon</li> <li>Media Coverage and Public Opinion</li> <li>Responsiveness of elites to public opinion.</li> </ol>