

## Introduction to IR Notes

### Introduction

The goal of the course is to provide a way of *thinking* about international politics. Our course is organized around puzzles. Puzzles are observations about the world that demand an explanation.

**Theory: A logically consistent set of statements that explains a phenomenon of interest**

Theories provide answers to puzzles by specifying factors that play a role in causing the events we try to understand and how those factors fit together.

1. Theories help description by identifying which factors are and are not important
2. Theories offer predictions about the world by specifying how a change in one factor will lead to changes in behavior and outcomes
3. Theories help prescribe policy responses (sometimes) by identifying what has to be changed to foster different outcomes

In IR, these theories are often probabilistic claims about the world.

### The framework or the 3I

**Interests: What actors want to achieve through political action; their preferences over the outcomes that might result from their political choices**

**Interactions: The ways in which the choices of two or more actors combine to produce political outcomes**

**Institutions: Sets of rules (known and shared by the community) that structure interactions in specific ways**

To apply the framework, we first think about the relevant political actors and what interests they may have. Then we think about the choices of actions or strategies they can take and how that strategic interaction influences outcomes. Finally, we think about what institutions, if any, might exist to govern behavior.

*Question: Are the actors always the same across issue areas? Think about how we may want to consider different actors when considering why nations go to war.*

*A: No, actors are contingent on the puzzle we are trying to explain. States may be preferable when considering the international threat environment. Leaders may be preferable when thinking about individual incentives to fight (Goemans and Chiozza, 2004).*

The main interactions we focus on are bargaining and cooperation

**Bargaining: An interaction in which two or more actors must choose outcomes that make one better off at the expense of another. Bargaining is redistributive; it involves allocating a fixed sum of value between different actors**

**Cooperation: An interaction in which two or more actors adopt policies that make at least one actor better off relative to the status quo without making the others worse off.**

*Question: What are the differences between a bargaining and cooperation problem?*

*A: In a bargaining problem, the goal of the actors is to achieve the best outcome possible at the (possible) expense of the other side without necessarily shared interests. In a cooperation problem, actors with similar interests try to coordinate to achieve a common objective. As a simplifying assumption, bargaining occurs when actors are in conflict, cooperation occurs when actors would like to work together. Bargaining situations are zero-sum games. Cooperation games are positive-sum games.*

### Levels of Analysis

Interactions of importance occur at three levels

1. The international level. Representatives of states with different interests interact with one another, sometimes in the context of international institutions, such as the UN or WTO

2. The domestic level. Subnational actors with different interests interact within a domestic institution to determine the country's foreign policy choices
3. The transnational level. Groups whose members span borders pursue their interests by trying to influence both domestic and international policy choices

### **The 'Isms**

Our class generally rejects the isms paradigms in favor of the 3I paradigm. Nevertheless, consult Table A on page xxxii for a breakdown of the three major schools of thought within the 3I framework

**Anarchy: The absence of a central authority with the ability to make and enforce laws that bind all actors**

To review, the goal of the course is to provide a framework for thinking about international politics. There are not obviously correct answers to puzzles. Whenever we encounter a puzzle in this course (and hopefully afterward) think in terms of three questions:

1. Whose interests did that outcome serve?
2. Why were the actors of relevance to the puzzle not able to cooperate to achieve something better?
3. How might new institutions be created, or existing institutions be reformed, to achieve a better outcome in the future?

### **Chapter 1: What Shaped Our World? A Historical Introduction**

Puzzle: How has conflict among nations ebbed and flowed over the centuries? When and how have war or peace, prosperity or stagnation, prevailed?

#### **The Emergence of International Relations: The Mercantilist Era**

The world as a meaningful political and economic unit emerged after 1500. Prior to this most major societies existed in practical or complete isolation from all but those on immediate borders

**Mercantilism: An economic doctrine based on a belief that military power and economic influence complemented each other; applied especially to colonial empires in the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries. Mercantilist policies favored the mother country over its colonies and competitors. The principal mechanism for mercantilism was the establishment of monopolies that controlled trade and other economic activity.**

European Rulers had two main interests:

1. Ensure their own political and military power
2. Access to markets and resources in other parts of the world

*Question: What was the most costly restriction for US colonies? Why was this restriction a problem for colonial welfare?*

*A: Enumeration, or the restriction on goods such that they could only be exported to Britain. This burden fell disproportionately on tobacco and rice planters in Virginia and South Carolina and merchants and craftsmen in New England. These were the principal supporters of independence.*

**Peace of Westphalia: The settlement that ended the Thirty Years' War in 1648; often said to have created the modern state system because it included a general recognition of the principles of sovereignty and nonintervention**

**Sovereignty: The expectation that states have legal and political supremacy within their territorial boundaries**

**Hegemony: The predominance of one nation-state over others**

*Question: Using the framework of the book, explain how Europe came to dominate world politics?*

*Interests: European states wanted to strengthen economies and societies relative to other European states*

*Interactions: Industrialization in Europe widened the wealth gap between Europe and the rest of the world. Technological advances, particularly in weaponry, gave Europeans the ability to control others even with smaller absolute armed forces.*

*Institutions: European powers used mercantilist policies to rule colonies for the interests of the European state, not the colonies.*

### **The Pax Britannica**

Between 1815-1914 relations between European powers became more stable. They had common interests in protecting ruling regimes from new political pressures. European rulers were fearful of revolution, which helped them overcome political differences. British hegemony proved a stabilizing force because Britain's naval dominance and desires to prevent any one country in Europe from dominating the continent acted to maintain a balance of power.

The economic interests of major powers led to the desire for more open trade and a reversal of mercantilist policies. Colonial imperialism continued, but more so as a way to establish military supremacy than a purely economic transactional system.

**Gold Standard: The monetary system in which countries tie their currencies to gold at a legally fixed price**

### **The Thirty Years' Crisis/World War 1/World War 2**

The rise of Germany changed the balance of power in Europe. Germany's population and economy became the largest in Europe. Late to the race for colonies, German expansion desires turned internal to Europe. The balancing and intertwining alliances in response laid the groundwork for World War 1

*Question: Following World War 1, what created great resentment in Germany, and why?*

*A: Treaty of Versailles. The treaty imposed payments of reparations from Germany to other powers, notably France. The economic depressions caused in parts by this treaty fermented negative sentiments in Germany that were captured and used to advance the Nazi Party*

### **The Cold War**

**NATO: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, An alliance formed in 1949 among the US, Canada, and most of the states of Western Europe in response to the threat posed by the Soviet Union. The alliances require its members to consider an attack on any one of them as an attack on all (Article 5)**

**Bretton Woods System: The economic order negotiated among allied nations at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire in 1944, which led to a series of cooperative arrangements involving a commitment to relatively low barriers to international trade and investment**

**Warsaw Pact: A military alliance formed in 1955 to bring together the Soviet Union and its Cold War allies in Eastern Europe and elsewhere; dissolved on March 31, 1991, as the Cold War ended**

The defining feature of military relations between the two superpowers was the development of nuclear weapons

*Question: What impact did nuclear weapons have on military relations?*

*A: As neither the US or the USSR had a monopoly on nuclear weapons, the relative arsenals and second-strike capability meant that war between the US and USSR was unlikely. Instead, both*

*nations could only influence the affairs in other states via proxy conflicts. E.g., Iran 1953, Guatemala 1954, DR 1962, Chile 1972, Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968, Afghanistan 1979*  
**Decolonization: The process of shedding colonial possessions, especially during the rapid end of the European empires in Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean between the 1940s and 1960s**

These notes do not cover the more recent historical overview since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Generally, the world has become more interconnected through regional and global free trade agreements. Globalization is now at a level not seen since the beginning of the 20th century. Military conflict is less likely to be major warfare between states and more likely to be internal to states and between states and non-state actors such as the Islamic State.

### **Interests, Interactions, and Institutions in Conflict**

Conflict and cooperation among nations have ebbed and flowed over time. Explaining these ebbs and flows is the principal purpose of the study of IR. Explanations should focus on understanding how the interests of the world's countries lead the world's nations to interact with one another and with what effect. Institutions arise from and mediate these interactions.

## **Chapter 2: Understanding Interests, Interactions, and Institutions**

The Puzzle: What explains the patterns of world politics? Why do interests, interactions, and institutions matter international relations?

In this chapter, we look more deeply at our theoretical framework for analyzing the puzzle: the 3Is

### **Interests: What do Actors Want from Politics**

**Interests: What actors want to achieve through political action; their preferences over the outcomes that might result from their political choices. They determine how actors rank different outcomes from most to least preferred. These are the fundamental building blocks of any political analysis**

*Q: What is a common interest that we attribute to states?*

*A: States are interested in survival (an assumption), so a common interest that we attribute is states have an interest in preventing attacks on their territories and citizens. You may think of others. Often, analysts group interests into three categories: power or security, economic welfare, and ideological goals*

**Actor: The basic unit for the analysis of international politics; can be either individuals or groups of people with common interests**

**State: A central authority with the ability to make and enforce laws, rules, and decisions within a specified territory**

**Sovereignty: The expectation that states have legal and political supremacy within their territorial borders**

**Anarchy: The absence of a central authority with the ability to make and enforce laws that bind all actors**

**National Interest: Interests attributed to the state itself, usually security and power. Note that this definition assumes that the state is a unitary actor**

We can use the concept of state in two different ways: States can be unitary actors in their own right or states can serve as shorthand for the set of national leaders acting in the name of their countries. In the latter, leaders may act on behalf of (potentially multiple) domestic constituencies' interests.

It will be useful to consult and memorize Table 2.1 on page 50 for a breakdown of Key Categories of Actors and Interests in World Politics

### **The Rise of the State**

*Q: What are the key components of sovereignty?*

*A: There are four core elements. 1) The sovereign possesses ultimate authority over the people and territory of a given realm. 2) Other states and/or political actors are excluding from exercising political authority over a sovereign people in the territory. 3) Sovereignty is indivisible 4) All sovereign units are formally equal or have the same legal status*

### **Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want**

**Interaction: The ways in which the choices of two or more actors combine to produce political outcomes**

*Q: What makes an interaction strategic?*

*A: An interaction where each actor's decision (strategy) depends on the actions and decisions of others*

*Q: What are the two assumptions made for studying interactions?*

*A: Actors behave with the intention of producing the desired result. Actors adopt strategies according to what they believe to be the interests and likely actions of others. We will often use the phrase "Best Response" to describe these strategies*

### **Cooperation and Bargaining**

**Cooperation: An interaction in which two or more actors adopt policies that make at least one actor better off relative to the status quo without making others worse off.**

**Pareto Frontier: The possible divisions of the maximum feasible benefit of cooperation**

**Bargaining: An interaction in which two or more actors must choose outcomes that make one better off at the expense of another. Bargaining is redistributive: it involves allocating a fixed sum of value between different actors**

### **When Can Actors Cooperate?**

Thinking back to our framework, the most important reason why actors fail to cooperate is divergent interests. There are situations where even if there is a collective advantage to cooperation, individual actors have an incentive to adopt an uncooperative strategy that undermines the collective goal.

**Coordination: A type of cooperative interaction in which actors benefit from all making the same choices and subsequently have no incentive not to comply**

**Collaboration: A type of cooperative interaction in which actors gain from working together but nonetheless have an incentive not to comply with any agreement**

*Q: What kind of cooperation interaction describes the reason why FIFA referees must be fluent in English?*

*A: Coordination. Here the key question is to pick a language that everyone can speak. Once the language is decided, there's no incentive to switch to something else (at least for some limited time horizons).*

**Public Goods: Products that are nonexcludable and nonrival in consumption, such as national defense**

**Collective Action Problems: Obstacles to cooperation that occur when actors have incentives to collaborate, but each acts with the expectation that others will pay the costs of cooperation**

**Free Ride: Failing to contribute to a public good while benefiting from the contributions of others**



*Q: Using terms for the chapter, layout the 3Is for a group homework project for which all group members receive a single grade. What are the major challenges?*

*A: A group is a collection of individuals. Each individual is an actor. This is a cooperation problem, specifically a collaboration problem. The grade is a public good because group members cannot exclude any other group member from sharing in the final grade, and one member getting a grade does not prevent another from getting the same grade (e.g., the number of grades are not affected). The collective action problem is that cooperation by all leads to the best grade, but every individual has an incentive to defect and not put forth full effort (free ride). If group members could create an institution to punish defection, they would be more likely to see effort from all.*

**Privileged Group:** Members who receive benefits from the public good sufficient to offset the entire costs of providing it. These groups provide the public good despite free-riding by others

**Iteration:** Repeated interaction with the same partners

**Linkage:** The linking of cooperation on one issue to interactions on a second issue

*Q: What is the conceptual difference between iteration and linkage?*

*A: Iteration enables actors to punish defectors by withholding gains from future cooperation whereas linkage enables actors to withhold cooperation on other issues of potential cooperation*

**Who Wins and Who Loses in Bargaining**

**Power:** The ability of A to make B do something that B would otherwise not do; the ability of A to get B to make concessions without A having to make concessions

**Reversion Outcome:** The outcome that occurs when no bargain is reached. Actors with more power tend to be more comfortable with the reversion outcome

**Coercion:** A strategy of imposing or threatening to impose costs on other actors in order to induce a change in their behavior

*Q: How might we measure states' coercive ability?*

*A: Usually, coercive ability is measured from material capabilities and economic strength. Scholars often look at military personnel and technical acumen as well as economic resources such as natural resources. Coercive ability can also be the ability to bear the costs of conflict if bargaining breaks down.*

**Outside Option:** The alternative(s) to bargaining with a specific actor.

If an actor can bargain with multiple other actors, the reversion outcome is the next-best alternative for the party with the outside option. An actor with an attractive alternative can walk away from the bargain more easily than an actor without one.

**Agenda Setting:** Actions taken before during bargaining that make the reversion outcome more favorable for one actor

**Institutions: Do Rules Matter in World Politics**

**Institution:** A set(s) of rules known and shared by the community of interest that structure interactions in specific ways

*Q: What is the primary way that institutions affect cooperation?*

*A: Enforcement, or imposing punishment on actors who refuse to cooperate*

*Q: How do international institutions facilitate cooperation? Provide as many ways as possible*

*A: There are at least four: setting standard of behaviors, monitoring and verifying compliance to the regime, reducing costs of joint decision making, resolving disputes. Institutions rarely if ever do all four*

Clear standards of behavior are critical for determining whether an actor has violated an agreement.

### **Who Do Institutions Benefit?**

Institutions may make actors collectively better off, but they rarely benefit everyone equally. The extent to which an institution benefits one actor relative to others is described as the policy bias. As a result, institutions are both a shaper of politics because they can facilitate cooperation and production of political action because actors bargain over their creation and policy bias.

### **Why Follow the Rules**

Actors comply with institutions for two reasons:

1. Actors comply with rules for the broader cooperation they facilitate even though the outcome of those particular rules is biased against them. The value of cooperation created by the institution outweighs the costs of a relatively disadvantageous bargain
2. Actors comply because institutions are often in place and cheaper to use even if the institution is biased, and creating a new institution would be more expensive even if the new institution would better reflect actors' interests.

### **Review**

Interests are the fundamental building blocks of politics. Explanations of international politics begin by specifying relevant actors and their interests

Cooperation is a type of interaction involving two or more actors working together to achieve a preferred outcome. Successful cooperation depends on the number and relative sizes of actors involved, the number of interactions among the actors, and the accuracy of the information they possess

Bargaining is a type of interaction involving the distribution of a fixed value. If one actor gets more, some other actors necessarily get less. Outcomes depend on what will happen in the event no bargain is reached, or the reversion outcome.

Institutions are sets of rules. Actors comply with institutions because institutions facilitate cooperation and lower the cost of joint decision making in the pursuit of valued goals

Institutions bias policy outcomes. Rules restrain what actors can and cannot do, and thus they make some outcomes more or less likely. Actors struggle over institutions in efforts to shift policy towards outcomes they prefer

### **A Primer on Game Theory**

Game theory is a tool for analyzing strategic interactions. In our class, we focus on three classes of games:

Prisoner's Dilemma: Dominant strategy is to defect no matter what the other player does

Stag Hunt: Multiple pure strategies for cooperation. It is preferable for both sides to match with the other

Chicken: Multiple pure strategies. The goal here is not to match with your opponent.

### **Chapter 3: Why Are there Wars?**

The Puzzle: War is an extremely costly way for states to settle their disputes. Given the human and material costs of military conflict, why do states sometimes wage war rather than resolving their disputes through negotiations?

**War: An event involving the organized use of military force by at least two parties that reaches a minimum threshold of severity**

**Interstate War: A war in which the main participants are states**

**Civil War: A war in which the main participants are within the same state, such as the government and a rebel group**

*Q: What does not qualify as a war*

*A: unorganized violence such as large scale rioting, events that do not have at least two parties such as mass killings against civilian victims, military force that does not meet an appropriate violent threshold such as border skirmishes*

**Security Dilemma: A dilemma that arises when efforts that states make to defend themselves cause other states to feel less secure; can lead to arms races and war because of the fear of being attacked**

*Q: Why is anarchy not a sufficient reason to see war?*

*A: Anarchy may make states worried about other states causing a security dilemma, but war still imposes costs on states that they could negotiate over. In effect, war is ex-post inefficient, so the puzzle is why states cannot avoid it and find a more efficient distribution.*

**Interests at War: What do States Fight Over?**

Remember that the 3Is starts with the premise that states have interests. War is no different. Wars are not fought for their own sake, but rather to obtain something of value.

*Q: What kinds of goods do states fight over?*

*A: Territory, which might contribute to the value of a state from resources or might have strategic or ideological value. War can also arise from state policies when states enact a policy that benefits one state but harms the interests of another. States also fight over regime type or the composition of another country's government. This is, in some sense, a conflict over state policy.*

**Bargaining and War**

Conflicting interests are a necessary but not sufficient condition for wars to happen. Strategic interaction (the second part of our framework) matters as well. Because states cannot appeal to an institution when they have policy disagreements, they must settle conflicting interests through bargaining. This is why anarchy is important in international politics. There is no overarching institution that can resolve disputes.

It is extremely valuable to understand the Model shown on pages 100-101

**Crisis Bargaining: A bargaining interaction in which at least one actor threatens to use force in the event that its demands are not met**

**Coercive Diplomacy: The use of threats to advance specific demands in a bargaining interaction**

Since war imposes costs on both sides, there exists a set of deals that both sides would prefer.

**Bargaining Range: The set of deals that both parties in a bargaining interaction prefer over the reversion outcome. When the reversion outcome is war, the bargaining range is the set of deals that both sides prefer over war**

**Compellence and Deterrence: Varieties of Coercive Bargaining**

**Compellence: An effort to change the status quo through the threat of force. The goal of a compellent threat is to coerce another actor into making a concession or changing a policy. Threats of this form are "Give me y, or else" or "Stop doing y, or else."**

**Deterrence: An effort to preserve the status quo through the use of force. These threats take the form of "Don't do x, or else."**

*Q: What is the difference between general and extended deterrence?*

*A: General deterrence are efforts taken by a state to prevent attacks on its own interests and territory. Extended deterrence are when states seek to protect allies by extending protection to another state.*

**Do Wars Happen by Mistake? War from Incomplete Information**



Incomplete information can affect state decision-making and lead to war by 1. states may mistakenly yield too little or not at all. Bargaining breaks down because at least one state feels that it can achieve more by fighting. 2. states may demand too much under the mistaken belief that the other side will cave in. In either case, even though there is an efficient settlement that both sides prefer to war, uncertainty about the other's willingness to fight prevents such a settlement from being reached.

Note that this is a commitment problem because states always have an incentive to bluff their intentions and no credible way of revealing their true preferences.

**Incomplete Information: A situation in which actors in a strategic interaction lack information about other actors' interests and/or capabilities**

**Resolve: The willingness of an actor to endure costs in order to acquire a particular good**

**Risk-return trade-off: In crisis bargaining, the trade-off between trying to get a better deal and trying to avoid war**

**Incentives to Misrepresent and the Problem of Credibility**

**Credibility: A threat that the recipient believes will be carried out. A credible commitment is a commitment or promise that the recipient believes will be honored**

States may have an interest in communicating their hidden information, but because of the incentives to misrepresents there might not be a credible way to do this

Credibility is difficult to achieve because carrying through on threats is costly. A state may say that it will wage war if its demands are not met, but the costs of war might be so high that it would not make sense to fulfill the threat if called. Second, each state wants to get the best deal possible, so they always have incentives to misrepresent their private information in order to secure a better deal than they would if they told the truth.

**Communicating Resolve: The Language of Coercion**

For threats to be credible, they have to impose a cost on the sender in such a way that the sender would only make the threat if it intended to carry out the threat.

*Q: What are the three mechanisms by which states can make their threats credible? Explain each one. What is the major downside of each strategy?*

*A: Brinksmanship, tying hands, paying for power. All of them leave something to chance and create the potential for accidental conflict*

**Brinksmanship: A strategy in which adversaries take actions that increase the risk of accidental war, with the hope that the other will "blink" first and make concessions. The idea is that as tensions rise, so does the risk of accidents. The only actor who would be willing to court this risk would be one who was serious with their threats**

**Tying Hands: States make threats in ways that would make backing down difficult. The difficulty is often attributed to audience costs that states would pay. An audience cost is a negative repercussion for failing to follow through on a threat or to honor a commitment. Audience costs can be imposed by international audiences or domestic audiences.**

**Paying for Power: A state takes costly steps to increase its capabilities, such as mobilizing and deploying a large military force that costs lots of resources. Paying for power can decrease the costs associated with carrying out a threat and/or signal that this issue is one that the threatening state cares a lot about.**

**Can an Adversary Be Trusted to Honor a Deal? War from Commitment Problems**

A credible commitment is when an actor assures the other side that it will not threaten force to revise terms of a deal. A commitment problem arises when an actor can not make that promise in

a believable manner. Such problems are especially common in the absence of enforceable institutions such as courts.

Commitment problems are clearest in bargains that can serve as a source of future bargaining power. A state cannot credibly commit not to use its future strength to renegotiate terms of the deal when it is in a stronger position in the future. A state may decide that it is preferable to fight today than wait until its adversary is much stronger.

*Q: Using the language of commitment problems, explain why Iran has no incentive to give up its nuclear program?*

*A: Iran sees the nuclear program as a counterweight against American power. If Iran dismantles its nuclear program, the US could press its strength advantage in the future to get concessions on other issues. The US also does not have the ability to credibly promise not to overthrow the Iranian regime because of long-running hostility between the two regimes.*

It would be good to understand Figure 3.3 on page 121 about bargaining and shifting power. If the balance of capabilities between two actors is anticipated to change because of factors external to the bargaining process, then both sides will realize that the stronger actor in the future will not be satisfied by any deal today and will demand a new deal in the new bargaining range. The other actor who will be weak in the future will prefer to fight today than face worse terms in the future

**Preventive war: a war fought with the intention of preventing an adversary from becoming stronger in the future. Preventive wars arise because a state whose power is increasing cannot commit not to exploit that power in the future**

**First-strike advantage: The situation that arises when military technology, strategies, and/or geography give a significant advantage to whichever actor attacks first in a conflict. Unless a state can credibly promise not to attack first, there is a danger that bargaining will break down because there is no overlap in the bargaining range. As a result, even though there is a set of deals that both states prefer, no deal is preferable to both possible attacks.**

**Preemptive war: A war fought with the anticipation that an attack by the other side is imminent.**

*Q: What is the difference between preventive and preemptive war?*

*A: Timing. Preemption is a response to an imminent threat when there is an existing first-strike advantage. Prevention is a response to anticipated changes in the distribution of power that might result in a worse threat environment in the future.*

**Indivisible Good: A good that cannot be divided without diminishing its value. Examples include holy sites and strategically essential territory. Control of the state may also be indivisible if there is no institutional mechanism to change power over time.**

**Has war become Obsolete?**

*Q: What is the logic for why war happens?*

*A: States have conflicting interests over a contentious issue, and bargaining may fail even though there exists a peaceful resolution that is preferred by both states because of commitment or information problems.*

An implication of the reason for war is that if interests change such that there is a decrease in the value of goods being bargained over, an increase in the costs of war leading to changing interactions between states, or the growth of institutions that solve commitment and information problems, then war should become less likely

*Q: What are some reasons that war may have become less likely in the modern era?*

*A: States are satisfied with territorial division in the status quo, and other conflicting interests can be better results through peaceful means. Changes in weapons technology, such as the advent of nuclear weapons, have greatly increased the cost of war. Institutions such as countries with democratic systems may make war less desirable as a mechanism to resolve conflicts.*

### **Review**

States may have conflicting interests over goods, but because war is costly, a peaceful settlement that all sides prefer to war generally exists. War occurs when the bargaining interaction fails to reach such a deal because states cannot credibly commit to reveal private information or maintain the terms of the agreement

States may be unable to reach negotiated settlements when they are uncertain about one another's willingness and ability to wage war

The decline in interstate war following WW2 coincides with a decrease in states' interest in territorial conquest, an increase in the cost of war, and the spread of domestic and international institutions that resolve commitment problems

## **Chapter 4: Domestic Politics and War**

Puzzle: War is costly for states, but what if there are actors within the state such as politicians, businesses, or the military who see war as beneficial and who expect to pay few or none of its costs? Do states fight wars to satisfy influential domestic interests?

### **Whose Interests Count in Matters of War and Peace**

It is useful to distinguish between general and narrow interests. A general interest is something that most, if not all, actors within a country share. Narrow interests are held by a relatively small number of actors within a country.

*Q: Discuss explanations for conflict from a general interest and narrow interest category?*

*A: Using the case of oil from the textbook, a country may have a strong interest in protecting oil because it is vital for modern military planning. A narrow interest might focus on how certain influential constituencies benefit from oil production (oil companies) who are major donors to politicians.*

### **Interaction, Institutions, and Influence**

Within a country, domestic institutions help determine who runs the government, how decisions are made, and how disputes are resolved. They also determine how much power an individual leader has to make decisions

We organize domestic interests around three types of actors:

1. Leaders who make foreign policy decisions. These individuals matter most because they have the authority to make decisions about foreign policy
2. Organized groups with sufficient resources and information to influence the decisions of the leader. Two groups matter the most:

**Bureaucracy: The collection of organizations including the military and diplomatic corps and intelligence agencies that carry out most tasks of governance within the state**

**Interest Groups: Groups of individuals with common interests that organize to influence public policy in a manner that benefits their members**

3. The general public whose influence varies widely depending on the domestic institution at hand.

### **Do Politicians Spark Wars Abroad in Order to Hold on to Power at Home?**

Leaders have a desire to stay in power, which means they have to be responsive to the interests of those who control their political fate. These may be any of the actors we previously discussed.

Strategic politicians can use their control of policy to shape their political environment rather than simply respond to it. A common argument about war is that leaders sometimes use force abroad to enhance their grip on power at home

**Rally effect: The tendency for people to become more supportive of their country's government in response to dramatic international events such as crises or war**

**Diversionary incentive: The incentive that state leaders have to start international crises in order to rally public support at home**

*Q: Using the Falkland Islands War as an example, explain why Argentine and British leaders had a diversionary incentive to fight a war.*

*A: Both countries were experiencing economic crises. International conflict can serve as a diversion by refocusing on a conflict instead of problems that might drag down their support, such as economic troubles. War also increases the attachment of citizens to the government in power. The Argentinian junta may have gambled on British leniency when attacking the Falklands. The junta's failure to take into account Thatcher's similar domestic situation meant that Britain responded instead of backing down.*

**Do Leaders "Wag the Dog"?**

We do not have systematic evidence that "gambling for resurrection" is a routine strategy used by leaders. The relationship depends on a number of factors, which suggests that some kinds of governments are more sensitive to certain kinds of economic conditions at certain times. It may also be the case that leaders fight when they are in a relatively strong position. In our framework, we can use the fact that war is costly to help explain this dilemma. Leaders must believe the benefits of war are large relative to costs in order to eliminate the possibility of a peaceful bargain. This must be true for both sides because, on the other side, the weaker side would accept a deal within the bargaining range.

Domestic political costs may be too high. As a result, we might not see leaders regularly gambling for resurrection.

**Do Countries Fight Wars to Satisfy the Military or Special Interest Groups**

**Military-industrial Complex: An alliance between military leaders and the industries that benefit from international conflict, such as arms manufacturers**

While the ultimate decision to wage war may lie with leaders, the actual machinery of war and peace is shaped by an extensive bureaucracy that includes the military, diplomats, and intelligence agencies. Each of these agents may care about what is best for the country, but they also may care about their personal resources, control, and influence in government. As a result, they may push for policies that boost their own status or fit their own worldview.

**Interest Groups: Economic and Ethnic Lobbies**

Interest groups that have access to the government may also be able to influence foreign policy. Companies with large stakes (such as United Fruit) or interest groups that organize around politically powerful ethnic groups. Group members who are motivated by ethnic attachment or ideological interests to support or oppose a particular policy.

The policies that groups propose does not have to be pro-war. Economic actors who depend on friendly relations with other countries may strongly oppose bellicose policies. Here in our framework of the 3Is, there may be strategic interaction between domestic actors who have divergent interests

*Q: Why might a small group have an easier time getting their policy preferences heard than larger groups?*

*A: Small groups with influence are able to solve collective action problems related to coordination that bigger groups cannot. A small group, such as the military, is able and willing to intervene in state decision making and also can capture a higher benefit per capita, making it easier to deal with coordination challenges. Small groups of voters, such as the Cuban American lobby, may have outsized influence if they can coordinate in a critical battleground state, such as Florida.*

*Q: Why should we not assume all wars are caused by interest group explanations?*

*A: Lack of evidence of the counterfactual outcome. Most foreign policy decisions bestow benefits on some groups that are also generally decisions we might expect states to make. Second, many foreign policy decisions have competing groups. The existence of opposing groups makes it harder for any one group to capture the state's foreign policy. Third, war requires the cooperation of multiple states. Interest groups may push for war, but the other state may back down.*

### **How Do Domestic Interests Affect International Bargaining?**

Domestic interests affect the likelihood of international conflict by determining the extent of the state's ambitions. By influencing the costs and benefits of conflict, interests can widen or narrow the number of acceptable bargains for an actor, and interest groups can affect the size of demands that the state will make and the risks it is willing to run.

Note that even though interest groups can change the acceptability of some status quo bargains, they might not remove all of them. Absent information or commitment problems, there is no reason why a shift from a dove to a hawk should by itself lead to war. What it does do is narrow the number of acceptable status quo bargains for at least one side.

*Q: What is a reason why actors may want war in such a way as to constrain the bargaining space?*

*A: Actors may stand to benefit from a war but cannot derive benefits from a negotiated settlement. In this case, peace is costly for these interests. If the net benefits of war are high enough to offset both states' costs of war, then we may see war because acceptable bargains can no longer be reached.*

### **Why Don't Democracies Fight one Another?**

**Democratic Peace: The observation that there are few if any, clear cases of war between mature democratic states**

Note the number of caveats in this definition. It depends on how we define democracy, how we define mature, and what constitutes a war. Note also that the definition does not say democracies are more peaceful in general. Overall, war participation for democracies is roughly the same as that of nondemocratic states.

**Democracy: A political system in which candidates compete for political office through frequent, fair elections in which a sizable portion of the adult population can vote. Liberal democracies are those in which there are protections for individuals' civil liberties and political rights**

**Autocracy: A political system in which an individual or small group exercises power with few constraints and no meaningful competition or participation by the general public**

Both types of governments are examples of domestic institutions. In our framework, institutions can mediate interests and interactions by setting the rules of the game. Domestic institutions determine the relationship between the leadership and the people and help determine the extent to which citizens' interests matter when it comes to war and peace.

Domestic institutions can affect the likelihood of war by:



1. Influencing the interests of states and their leaders. In this view, democracies align leaders more with citizens and make those in power-sensitive to the costs that their decisions impose on others through the mechanism of accountability

**Accountability: The ability to punish or reward leaders for the decisions they make, as when frequent, fair elections enable voters to hold elected officials responsible for their actions by granting or withholding access to political office**

*Q: How can autocratic leaders be held accountable for their actions?*

*A: Autocratic leaders cannot rule alone and are in some way responsible to a ruling coalition whose support is necessary for the leader to remain in power. Autocrats need to prioritize policies that keep those in the coalition satisfied, and/or take action such that the coalition shrinks down as in a full cult of personality.*

*Q: How does accountability explain the democratic peace? What is one caution when assuming the democratic leaders care more about the costs of war than autocratic governments?*

*A: Increases in the cost of war diminishes a state's willingness to enter into violent conflict to contest the status quo. Democratic leaders who are more aligned with the general costs of war will be likely to start wars in general and only start wars when the odds of winning are sufficiently high. In two democratic states, the odds that leaders of both states would find war profitable enough to fight instead of settle are low. A caution to this argument is that autocratic leaders often face much higher costs of losing a conflict (death, torture, coups) than democratic leaders, so it is possible that an autocrat pays great attention to the costs of war.*

2. Influencing the bargaining interaction between and among countries

Democratic political systems may be more able to overcome information problems because they are more transparent than nondemocratic systems. Leaders in democracies may also find it easier to tie their hands and signal their resolve in a credible manner because leaders expect to lose domestic political support for failing to follow through. Public threats by democracies are, therefore, more costly to make than by nondemocratic leaders.

**Does Democracy Cause Peace?**

*Q: If democracies do not fight each other, should democracies intervene in other states to push for democratic regimes?*

*A: Probably not if that's the sole reason. The Democratic peace observation is only for mature democratic states. Weak democratic states are often war-prone. More generally, it is possible that the mature democratic states themselves arise from a selection process that is not well understood. Merely changing a regime to a democracy does not then mean less fighting. It could mean much more. The relationship's selection may be driven by economic development.*

*Consolidated democracies emerge in states that are wealthier, and those states have more interest in peace to preserve economic interests. Second, it might be the case that peace causes mature democracy. Third, it may be the case that the democratic peace is really just a carryover of shared strategic interests between these countries. Making new democracies might not mean that those democracies share the same interests, thus creating situations for conflict and crisis bargaining.*

**Review**

There may be actors within a state who perceive high benefits from war and expect to pay little or no costs. Under some conditions, narrow interests will see war as beneficial because they receive lots of benefits and pay little.

Narrow interests have a variety of institutional and organizational advantages that make it possible for them to exert more influence than the general population

Hawkish interests are not usually sufficient on their hand to see war. Their main effect is to increase the aggression and demands of a state's foreign policy and scope of the state's ambition, which creates more opportunities for conflicts of interest.

Democratic political institutions may diminish the influence of hawkish interests, increase the cost of war borne by political leaders, or change the bargaining interaction in a way that makes a peaceful settlement more likely

### **Chapter 5: International Institutions and War**

**Puzzle:** In a well-governed country, the police prevent and punish acts of violence between individuals. Where are the police in international politics? Why is it so hard for the international community to prevent and punish acts of aggression?

#### **Alliances: Why Promise to Fight Someone Else's War?**

**Alliance:** An institution that helps its members cooperate militarily in the event of a war.

Alliances specify standards of behavior and the rules of the game for cooperation militarily.

They may include provisions for monitoring and verifying member compliance and codify bargains between members to settle distributional issues. NATO, for example, has a rule that countries must spend at least 2% of their GDP on defense

Alliances can be offensive or defensive. Offensive alliances are agreements between states to join one another to attack a third state. Defensive alliances are pledge by states to come to each other's aid in the event that either state is attacked.

#### **Interests and Alliances**

Alliances form when states have compatible interests that provide the basis for cooperation

*Q: What kind of cooperative interaction is an alliance?*

*A: Collaboration. Alliances are agreements made because of mutual interests, but there are always incentives for one state to not comply with its obligations and bear costs on behalf of another state.*

**Balance of Power:** A situation in which the military capabilities of two states or groups of states are roughly equal

**Bandwagon:** A strategy in which states join forces with the strong side in a conflict

*Q: Why does balance of power theory not account for all alliance formation?*

*A: Balance of power does not account for all alliance formation because sometimes weaker states bandwagon with stronger states. States can also choose between many potential partners in order to balance the capabilities of a strong state, and so may join into alliances for ideological and not pure military power reasons. Finally, not all states provoke balancing responses.*

#### **Alliances and Interstate Bargaining**

Review Figure 5.2 on page 194

The possibility of intervention by an ally influences international bargaining by changing the likely outcome and costs of war for each side

*Q: What happens if not all states involved in crisis bargaining believe that there will be foreign intervention?*

*A: If parties to a dispute have different information about what a third-party will do, there will be greater uncertainty, which increases the probability of a bargaining failure and, therefore, conflict.*

Alliances face the same credibility problems as other kinds of signals. Just because a state has an interest in the outcome of an ally's bargain does not ensure that the state will fight with that ally

in the event of war. There are no external mechanisms to compel states to fulfill their alliance obligations.

### **How Do Alliances Establish Credibility?**

Alliances must accomplish two key tasks. They must make it more likely that allies will fight on one another's behalf than they would in the absence of an alliance. This can be accomplished by decreasing the costs of fighting, increasing the benefits of fighting, and/or increasing the costs of not fighting (or abandoning the ally). Second, alliances must do things in a way that leads adversaries to believe that the allies will indeed fight together.

Alliances may engage in joint military exercises or military planning to reduce the costs of fighting. NATO goes so far as to make all allied weapon systems interoperable. Allies can increase the costs of abandonment by making the signing of a treaty costly. For example, states have public signing ceremonies to signal alliances in part to hurt the reputation of a state that abandoned its obligations in the future.

### **Why Aren't Alliance Commitments Ironclad?**

Alliances present a moral hazard problem. If an alliance successfully increases the cost of fighting for other states, members within the alliance may become more risk-seeking in demands with other states. Alliances increase the possibility that one state will be dragged into a conflict that it values less than the status quo. States seek to avoid the problem of entrapment by limiting their commitments or leaving some purposely ambiguous

**Entrapment: The risk of being dragged into an unwanted war because of the opportunistic actions of an ally**

*Q: What is the major trade-off in alliance formation?*

*A: Credibility and control. Credibility requires ironclad promises, which increase the possibility of risky behavior by allies. Control reduces the risk of allies entrapping their partners but does so at the cost of ambiguity, which reduces the credibility of the alliance.*

The success or failure of an alliance depends on:

1. The strength of the interests that brought allies together
2. The ability of the alliance to alter its members' preferences so that in the event of war, fighting is preferable to abandonment
3. The effectiveness of the alliance in convincing an adversary of this threat
4. The ability of the partners to limit the risk of entrapment

**Chain Ganging: The actions of a small number of states drag all of their allies to war**

*Q: What made the post World War II system more stable than the Pre-World War I system?*

*A: The diplomatic features of the world were different. In the Cold War, the world was dominated by two superpowers, which meant less scope for miscalculation because any conflict depended on the choice of fewer actors. In the run-up to WWI, there were several major powers in competition that were highly contingent on their allies. Second, neither superpower would be as threatened by a loss of an ally as the states of Europe were before 1914. In essence, the marginal cost of losing an ally was smaller. Cold War Alliances were also highly institutionalized, which increased the credibility of commitments in the eyes of adversaries.*

**Collective Security: When can the UN keep the Peace?**

Prior to the UN, there was an attempt to create a collective security organization called the League of Nations, which effectively died in 1939 with the onset of WW2

**Collective Security Organization: A Broad-based institution that promotes peace and security among its members. Examples include the UN and the League of Nations**

Collective security organizations form under the presumption that all states have a common interest in preventing war and aggression, regardless of who the perpetrator and victim are. Their primary purpose is to ensure that changes to the status quo happen peacefully. The collective response of members is intended to deter would-be aggressors in the first place, and in the event deterrence fails, ensures that those who are in the wrong are punished and do not gain from war. Collective security organizations work by trying to ensure the status quo stays peaceful. If the mechanism is triggered by an act of state aggression against another, then all members of the organization are called on to act against the state. Note that this has expanded to include actions committed within a state, which violates the norm of sovereignty.

**Humanitarian Intervention: Interventions designed to relieve humanitarian crises stemming from civil conflicts or large-scale human rights abuses, including genocide**

*Q: How do collective security organizations influence crisis bargaining?*

*A: The prospect of outside involvement by the CSO can make change the likely outcome of the interaction between bargaining actors. Second, outsiders can help resolve the commitment problems identified by enforcing what would otherwise by an incredible commitment by one actor not to exploit its power against another. Third, CSOs can serve as neutral observers or peacekeepers, which diminishes the first strike advantage in a crisis-bargaining scenario.*

**Collective Security Dilemmas**

CSOs face a collective action problem and a joint decision-making problem.

CSOs do not have the authority to compel their members to provide security. Thus they are dependent on members to provide public goods. As such, CSOs face a free-rider problem like any other public goods provision problem.

CSOs face a joint decision-making problem because members of the organization need to be able to determine which acts constitute a threat to the community, who are the aggressors, and what the appropriate response should be by the CSO. These determinations are not always straightforward, and members can disagree. Determining whether a given act merits a response is complicated by the interests of states in the organization.

**Institutional Response to the Challenges of Collective Security**

**Security Council (UNSC): The main governing body of the UN, which has the authority to identify threats to international peace and security and to prescribe the organization's response including military or economic sanctions**

**Permanent Five (P5): The five permanent members of the UNSC: The US, Britain, France, China, and Russia**

**Veto Power: The ability to prevent the passage of a measure through a unilateral act, such as a single negative vote**

*Q: Since P5 members have veto power, define the term that factors into the UNSC decision-making and what that means for its decisions?*

*A: Policy bias. The UNSC is unlikely to take on a mission for which the P5 states have strongly divergent interests. P5 policy bias introduces a bias towards inaction.*

**What Does the UN do?**

**Peace-enforcement operation: A military operation in which force is used to make and/or enforce peace among warring parties that have not agreed to end their fighting**

**Peacekeeping operation: An operation in which troops and observers are deployed to monitor a cease-fire or peace agreement**

**Review**

Alliances form when states have compatible interests that lead them to cooperate militarily. Alliances are institutions created between or among states to facilitate cooperation for the purpose of influencing outcomes of disputes with outsiders.

Alliances are successful at deterring or fighting off challenges when allies have a strong interest in coming to assist in the event of war and when allies are able to signal this interest to the opponent in a credible manner.

Collective security organizations form around a common interest which all states are presumed to share in promoting peace. Their primary role is to facilitate collective action within the international community so states can respond effectively to prevent or stop the violence. CSOs are successful when leading states perceive common and compelling interests in stopping an act of aggression. They fail with leading states that have conflicting interests in the outcome of a dispute or too little interest in the manner to justify the cost of the intervention.

### **Chapter 6: Violence by Nonstate Actors, Civil War and Terrorism**

**The Puzzle:** A great deal of politically motivated violence in the contemporary world is committed by or directed against nonstate actors, particularly rebel groups engaged in civil wars or terrorist networks. Why do some individuals and groups resort to violence against their governments or unarmed citizens?

#### **The Relationship between Civil War and Terrorism**

**Civil War:** A war in which the main participants are within the same state, such as the government and a rebel group. Civil wars require some minimum lethality threshold, and casualties must be incurred by all sides. One-sided killings are therefore not included in this category

**Terrorism:** The use or threatened use of violence against noncombatant targets by individuals or nonstate groups for political ends

*Q: Civil War and Terrorism are not synonymous, but share what underlying commonalities?*

*A: Both employ the use of violence for political goals by nonstate actors who face the same fundamental problem of how to organize and mobilize individuals and resources to engage in violence when they do not have the legitimate use of coercive force. As a result, rebel groups and terrorists are almost always weaker than their adversary and so employ asymmetric tactics.*

**Asymmetric Warfare:** Armed conflict between actors with highly unequal military capabilities such as when rebel groups or terrorists fight strong states

#### **Why Does War Occur Within States?**

At the root of all civil wars is a conflict of interest between the government and a subset of its population. These are generally classified as either grievances or greed.

*Q: Describe the difference between Greed and Grievance motivations for civil war.*

*A: Grievances arise when the policies of the government discriminate against members of a particular group, such as repressing their language or culture or denying access to infrastructure. Greed is a group's desire to control more of the country's economic resources, such as having a greater share of profits from natural resource extraction or privileged access to jobs and government largesse.*

Mobilization may be easier for groups to organize around certain kinds of interests. Individuals with strong religious, ethnic solidarity or ideological beliefs that lead them to contribute to a cause as beneficial in its own right or make them more trustworthy of related individuals will be less inclined to free ride on group claims and easier to mobilize.

*Q: What country-level features are associated with increased risk of armed opposition?*



*A: Political institutions that do not allow peaceful redress of grievances and do not have strong repressive capacity, low overall wealth because richer states may be more likely to be able to afford repression, and poor geography, especially mountainous regions or rough terrain that make it easier for rebels to hide. Countries with large populations may provide more people available for recruitment.*

Rebel groups may also obtain resources from foreign countries with an interest in their cause. Foreign nations may intervene directly or indirectly to help groups who share their interests or a related factor such as ethnic kinship.

**Proxy Wars: Conflicts in which two opposing states "fight" by supporting opposite sides in a war such as the government and rebels in a third state**

*Q: What requirements need to exist for civil violence to occur?*

*A: There are groups of people within a country motivated to put their interests in conflict with a government. Those people cannot pursue those interests through regular political institutions, and those people can overcome their resource endowments, which may include foreign support, overcome collective action problems to recruit enough fighters, and purchase enough weapons to pose a threat.*

**Civil War as a Bargaining Failure**

Civil wars may arise if the information on the capabilities and resolve of each side is hard to obtain the size and effectiveness of rebel groups, particularly. However, since war can remove uncertainty, most scholars tend to not find information asymmetries as the best motivator for civil war.

Civil wars present strong commitment problems, especially long civil wars because anticipated changes to the relative power of two sides can generate incentives for preventive war. When power changes, the rising actor cannot credibly commit to not exploiting its power in the future to revise a deal made today. Changes in the power of rebels and government can arise regularly, so any concessions made today will be difficult to commit to keeping when power changes.

*Q: Why do combatants sharing the same territory in a civil war create a commitment problem?*

*A: Once the conflict is settled, one side is unable to retain coercive power. Once one side demobilizes and disarms, they cannot be sure that the other side will abide by the terms of their agreement absent third-party enforcement.*

Rebel organizations can have a hard time controlling their members who may splinter and continue fighting.

Indivisibility may play a large role if countries consider their entire territory indivisible.

Separatist conflicts that are conceded to by governments may encourage other groups to mobilize to seek their own territory.

**Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: The Strategies of Civil War**

**Insurgency: A military strategy in which small, often lightly armed units engage in hit-and-run attacks against military, government, and civilian targets.**

Insurgency is well-suited for groups that are small and weak relative to their adversary, what we might think of asymmetric conflict. Insurgency seeks to impose costs on the government in order to induce concessions to the group.

*Q: What is the purpose of COIN doctrine?*

*A: COIN doctrine seeks to defeat an insurgency by giving the population an interest in the survival of the government, increasing the rebels' collective action problems, and eliminating their informational advantage.*

**What Can be Done about Civil War?**

International institutions can help prevent or end civil war in several ways. First, they can influence the bargaining between the government and domestic opposition in ways that increase the chances for peaceful outcomes. Institutions can resolve commitment problems over disarmament by credibly guaranteeing their safety and reintegration into society.

### **Terrorism: Why Kill Civilians?**

Terrorists can be treated as rational in our framework. They may not share similar preferences as the rest of society, but if they act on those preferences in a purposive manner with a complete and transitive ranking (or what we could assume as such), they can be treated as rational actors.

*Q: What are the two ways in which terrorist organizations are weak? How does this affect their ability to be successful?*

*A: They are weak relative to the states they seek to coerce, and they are weak relative to the demands that they make. Weak groups make the problem of recruitment greater because they have a smaller pool of motivated individuals from which to draw. They also must resort to alternative sources of funding, such as criminal behavior, which has a higher risk.*

**Extremists: Actors whose interests are not widely shared by others: individuals or groups that are politically weak relative to the demands they make**

### **Terrorism as a Bargaining Failure**

Terrorists may simply make demands that cannot be met by a state under any circumstance, but what separates terrorists from other mass murderers is that their violence is instrumental to a political objective.

Terrorists have private information about their capabilities, and revealing this information in advance would undermine their effectiveness. Consequently, it is difficult to find a bargain that is mutually preferred by both sides to a conflict. Terrorists also cannot credibly commit to not attacking in the future to achieve future objectives, and states cannot credibly commit to stop fighting terrorists else they deal with new demands from other groups.

### **Strategies of Terrorist Violence**

*Q: Who are the audiences for terrorism?*

*A: The government and population of the target state and the home population or the people on whose behalf terrorists claim to act.*

**Coercion: A strategy of imposing or threatening to impose costs on other actors in order to induce a change in their behavior**

**Provocation: A strategy of terrorist attacks intended to provoke the target government into making a disproportionate response that alienates moderates in the terrorists' home society or in sympathetic audiences**

**Spoiling: A strategy of terrorist attacks intended to sabotage a prospective peace between the target and moderate leadership from the terrorists' home society**

**Outbidding: A strategy of terrorist attacks designed to demonstrate superior capability and commitment relative to other groups devoted to the same cause**

### **Review**

Civil conflict can arise when individuals have interests that conflict with those of the central government, leading to demands for concessions over territory, policy, or government composition. Whether a rebel group can overcome collective action dilemmas depends on its own resources, the capacity of the government and the willingness of foreign states to assist. Bargaining between government and rebel groups can lead to war as a result of information problems, commitment problems, and issue indivisibilities. Particularly severe commitment problems often make civil wars hard to resolve in the event of no outright victory by one side.

Domestic institutions that provide peaceful methods for addressing groups interests and international institutions that facilitate collective efforts to stabilize conflict-ridden countries hold some promise for preventing or ending civil conflicts

International terrorist organizations are composed of relatively small numbers of extreme individuals. Their weakness relative to their goals and relative to their demands drives their strategy of attacking softer targets and organize in loose networks that are hard to root out Rebel groups and terrorist groups employ strategies of violence intended to coerce targets and address the group's collective action issues by attracting supporters. Efforts to defeat these groups require strategies that take account of their effect on noncombatants.

## **Chapter 7: International Trade**

**Puzzle:** Virtually all economic analysis concludes that trade is economically beneficial. Why then, does every country restrict trade in some way? Why have policies toward trade varied so much from country to country and over time?

### **What's so Good about Trade?**

Trade between countries allows them to realize the benefits of specialization. Division of labor between countries allows for comparative advantage

**Comparative advantage:** The ability of a country or firm to produce a particular good or service more efficiently than the other goods or services that it can produce, such that its resources are most efficiently employed in this activity. The comparison is to the efficiency of other economic activities that the actor might undertake given all the products it can produce not to the efficiency of other countries or firms

**Absolute advantage:** The ability of a country or firm to produce more of a particular good or service than other countries or firms do with the same amount of effort and resources

**Why do countries trade what they trade?**

**Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory:** The theory that a country will export goods that make intensive use of the factors of production in which it is well endowed. For example, a labor-rich country will export goods that make intensive use of labor. Factors include land, labor, capital, and human capital.

**Trade Restrictions are the Rule, not the Exception**

**Protectionism:** The imposition of barriers to restrict imports

**Trade barriers:** Government limitations on the international exchange of goods. Examples include tariffs, quantitative restrictions (quotas), import licenses, requirements that governments buy only domestically produced goods, and health and safety standards that discriminate against foreign goods

**Tariff:** A tax imposed on imports. Tariffs raise the domestic price of an import and may be applied for the purpose of protecting domestic producers from foreign competition

**Quota:** Quantitative restriction. A limit placed on the amount of a particular good that is allowed to be imported

**Nontariff barriers to trade:** Obstacles to imports other than tariffs (trade taxes). Examples include restrictions on the number of products that can be imported, regulations that favor domestic over imported products, and other measures that discriminate against foreign goods or services.

### **The Domestic Political Economy of Protection**

There are benefits and costs to trade barriers. Virtually all tools of trade protection make imports more expensive, which allows domestic producers to sell more of their products, to raise prices, or both. This is a direct cost to consumers of the protected good.

*Q: What is the redistributive effect of trade protection?*

*A: Producers gain and consumers lose. Income is redistributed from domestic consumers to the protected domestic industry. Trade protection also introduces economic distortions and inefficiencies and leads consumers to consume less of those goods that protection has made artificially expensive.*

### **Winners and Losers in International Trade**

Three actors stand to lose from trade protection. Consumers of the imported good who have to pay higher prices. Exporters who worry that the barriers might provoke retaliation in foreign markets. Citizens, in general, may punish politicians for the costs that protection imposes on them

*Q: Explain the three leading theories of trade-policy interests.*

*A: Stolper-Samuelson's approach emphasizes the interest of broad factors of production. Trade under this theory affects broad factors of production. The Ricardo-Viner approach emphasizes specific actors of the economy. A firm based approach is that trade-policy focuses on individual firms.*

**Stolper-Samuelson Theorem: The theorem that protection benefits the scarce factor of production. This view flows from the Heckscher-Ohlin theory: If a country imports goods that make intensive use of its scarce factor, then limiting imports will help that factor. So in a labor-scarce country, labor benefits from protection and losses from trade liberalization.**  
**Ricardo-Viner model: A model of trade relations that emphasizes the sector in which factors of production are employed rather than the nature of the factor itself. This differentiates it from the Heckscher-Ohlin theory, for which the nature of the factor is the prime consideration.**

### **Domestic Institutions and Trade Policy**

Economic interests organize themselves differently in different societies, but in general narrow interests will be able to be more successful at getting their preferred policies because larger, diffuse groups face collective action challenges. If an organization is broad-based, it is more likely to ignore the demands of specific groups or industries. In contrast, interests that are organized into narrower groups are more likely to pursue the particular goals of such interests

*Q: How can domestic political institutions affect trade policy?*

*A: Politicians with local concerns tend to be more responsive to local interest groups. Nationally elected politicians have less interest in catering to local concerns. This suggests that institutional focus will matter in determining who gains and who loses from trade policy*

### **The International Political Economy of Trade**

Country trade policy depends on the actions of other countries. While countries can pursue unilateral policy, the success of these policies depends on the policies of other nations.

International economic conditions can affect what and how trade-policy is made in a nation.

Thinking about our framework, countries may have different interests in trade policy and interact with one another. This creates a cooperation and a bargaining setting for trade policy. It can be difficult for countries to cooperate even though there is a mutually beneficial outcome where both trade according to their comparative advantage.

*Q: How can international trade overcome problems of strategic interaction?*

*A: Small numbers make it easier for governments to monitor each other's behavior. Privileged groups (e.g., NAFTA) will find it easier to monitor and enforce trade agreements than very large groups. Information and transparency through institutions can facilitate cooperation. Repeated interactions between states also encourage cooperation because the shadow of the future is long,*

*and countries could punish each other for cheating on terms of agreements. Countries can link concessions in one area to concessions in another area, making it more likely that they can reach an acceptable deal for both sides.*

### **International Institutions in International Trade**

**Reciprocity:** In international trade negotiations, a mutual agreement to lower tariffs and other barriers to trade. Reciprocity involves an implicit or explicit arrangement to exchange trade-policy concessions with another.

**Most favored nation status (MFN):** A status established by most modern trade agreements that guarantee that the signatories will extend to each other any favorable trading terms offered in agreements with third-parties.

**World Trade Organization (WTO):** An institution created in 1995 to succeed the GATT and to govern international trade relations. The WTO encourages and polices the multilateral reduction of barriers to trade, and it oversees the resolution of trade disputes.

**General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT):** An international institution created in 1947 in which member countries committed to reduce barriers to trade and to provide similar trading conditions to all other members. Replaced by the WTO.

*Q: How does the WTO monitor a country's compliance? What is the benefit of monitoring?*

*A: The WTO members must report actions taken to restrict trade as well as RTAs. Second, countries that believe that foreign exporters or importers are not complying with the rules can file a complaint with the WTO, which will adjudicate. Monitoring is helpful because it provides information about cooperation to all parties, providing some assurance that cooperation is being kept.*

**Regional trade agreements: RTAs** agreements among three or more countries in a region to reduce barriers to trade among themselves

### **Explaining Trends and Patterns in International Trade**

It would be generally helpful to review pp. 330-336

#### **Review**

Economists are virtually unanimous in concluding that international trade brings important benefits and that reducing trade barriers is good for a nation's economy.

Trade may be beneficial for a country in general but harm the interests of groups and individuals within a society. Trade creates both winners and losers as well as different domestic interests. The nature of a country's economy determines which groups have an interest in expanding or restricting trade with the rest of the world. National political institutions set the rules of engagement for these interactions.

The politics of international trade also involves strategic interaction among national governments. Governments can face difficult problems of bargaining and cooperation, which sometimes lead to trade conflicts among nations.

The institutions of the international trading system can facilitate cooperation among governments as they confront the demands of both their own constituents and foreign counterparts.

While these notes do not delve into it, the review of comparative advantage from pp. 340-347 is helpful for knowledge solidification.

### **Chapter 8: International Financial Relations**

**Puzzle:** Every year, approximately \$5 trillion is invested abroad. Why is so much money invested in foreign countries? Why do relations between foreign investors and the countries in which they invest often become hostile and politically controversial?

#### **How and Why Do People Invest Overseas?**



There are two broad categories of foreign investment

**Portfolio Investment:** Investments in a foreign country via the purchase of stocks, bonds, or other financial instruments. Portfolio investors do not exercise managerial control of the foreign operation. A substantial portion of this sovereign lending or loans from private financial institutions in one country to sovereign governments in other countries.

**Foreign Direct Investment:** Investment in a foreign country via the acquisition of a local facility or the establishment of a new facility. Direct investors maintain managerial control of the foreign operation.

*Q: Why do investors make foreign investments?*

*A: Investors want to make money. Investing in capital-poor environments provide a higher rate of return than investing in capital-rich environments. Investors may also prefer to invest in low-risk instruments in rich countries because there is a high likelihood they will recoup their investment with interest.*

### **What's the Problem with Foreign Investment?**

Foreign investment has benefits, such as increased capital to expand businesses and investment to finance a project to spur development while foreign investors get higher profits than are available at home. Conflict arises because both sides may have different interests. Foreign countries would rather pay less than they owe, while foreign investors want to bring home high profits. Domestic interests may also play a role as the cost of foreign investment often does not go to those who benefit from FDI.

Concessional finance is less controversial and smaller than other parts of international finance. Concessional finance is money lent to developing countries by government and intergovernmental organizations, usually at below-market interest rates.

**World Bank:** An important international institution that provides loans at below-market interest rates to developing countries, typically to enable them to carry out development projects.

### **Why is International Finance Controversial?**

There is nothing in principle controversial about lending and borrowing as it is a normal economic transaction. Controversy can arise when lenders and debtors disagree about the terms of paying back the investment.

Governments in debt attempt to service their debt by slashing services and raising taxes and interest rates, which typically weaken the domestic economy in order to allow the government to continue paying debt services to foreign creditors. Austerity measures are often imposed during recessions.

**Recession:** A sharp slowdown in the rate of economic growth and economic activity

**Depression:** A severe downturn in the business cycle, typically associated with a major decline in economic activity, production, and investment: a severe contraction of credit and sustained high unemployment

**Default:** Fail to make payments on a debt

### **Debtor and Creditor Interactions**

*Q: Explain the primary interests of debtors and creditors in a conflict?*

*A: For a debtor, making prompt and full debt payments means restraining consumption and increasing taxes, which imposes domestic costs. They would prefer to reduce the demands on their citizens. Creditors' profits depend on debt service payments received, and the reduction of payments means fewer profits. Debtors always have the threat of default, while creditors can cut off debtors from future lending and credit markets.*

**Austerity:** The application of policies to reduce consumption, typically by cutting government spending, raising taxes, and restricting wages.

#### **Institutions of International Finance**

**Bank for International Settlements: BIS,** one of the oldest international financial organizations, created in 1930. Its members include the world's principal central banks, and under its auspices, they attempt to cooperate in the financial realm.

**International Monetary Fund: IMF,** a major international economic institution that was established in 1944 to manage international monetary relations and that has gradually reoriented itself to focus on the international financial system, especially debt and currency crises.

#### **Foreign Direct Investment: What Role do Multinational Corporations play?**

**Multinational corporation:** An enterprise that operates in a number of countries, with production or service facilities outside its country of origin

*Q: Why might a corporation want to become multinational?*

*A: Corporations may want to establish overseas affiliates to gain access to local markets or take advantage of local resources (e.g., labor) in situations where doing so through trade is unattractive. For a country's part, multinational corporations can provide investment, managerial, technological, and marketing skills that may not be available in the domestic market.*

There are no effective international institutions associated with FDI. Partly, this is because there are few widely accepted global concerns associated with FDI like there are with international finance. Cooperation among countries bargaining with MNCs is also less. Individual countries that wish to regulate MNCs can do so within their own existing institutions.

**Bilateral Investment Treaty:** An agreement between two countries about the conditions for private investment across borders. Most of these treaties include provisions to protect an investment from government discrimination or expropriation without compensations as well as mechanisms to resolve disputes.

#### **International Migration: What happens when people rather than capital move across borders?**

*Q: Why does labor migrate from one country to another?*

*A: Labor, like capital, responds to differential rates of returns. Higher wages in rich countries attract workers from poorer countries in both skilled and unskilled labor. Countries with abundant unskilled labor will export it while countries that are labor scarce will import it.*

Reading the Explaining Public Opinion on Immigration would be helpful

*Q: How does immigration benefit receiving countries?*

*A: Employers gain from the lower wages they can pay. The economy as a whole profits from having a larger labor force and lower costs of production. Note, though, that the lowering of wages can create tension because it also lowers the wage paid to native workers who compete with immigrants.*

#### **Review**

Many actors in borrowing nations value access to foreign funds. There are conflicting interests because other domestic actors resent the constraints and burdens that foreign investment can impose on debtors. Similar tensions can exist within lending nations about investing abroad versus at home.

At the international level, both lenders and borrowers have a common interest in sustaining capital flows but may enter into conflict usually over how the benefits from the loans or investments will be divided

Lenders and borrowers and investors and recipients bargain over the investments that tie them together. There is frequent disagreement over debt payment and profit payments.

International financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank play major roles in managing the problem of investment and debt in the international system. Some analysts believe that these institutions contribute to the cooperative resolution of financial problems while others think that they take unfair advantage of struggling debtor nations.

## **Chapter 9: International Monetary Relations**

**Puzzle:** In the absence of global governance, how are international currencies supplied, and international monetary relations regulated?

### **What are Exchange Rates, and Why do They Matter?**

**Exchange rate:** the price at which one currency is exchanged for another.

**Appreciate:** In terms of a currency, to increase in value relative to other currencies.

**Depreciate:** In terms of a currency, to decrease in value relative to other currencies.

**devalue:** To reduce the value of one currency relative to other currencies

**Monetary Policy:** An important tool of national governments to influence broad macroeconomic conditions such as unemployment, inflation, and economic growth.

**Typically, governments alter their monetary policies by changing national interest rates or exchange rates**

**Central Bank:** The institution that regulates monetary conditions in an economy, typically be affecting interest rates and the quality of money in circulation

*Q: Why would lowering interest rates stimulate demand for a country's products in the world market?*

*A: Lowering interest rates means that the currency depreciates relative to other currencies. The weaker currency makes local goods cheaper to foreigners, which increases the demand for exports. It also makes foreign goods more expensive to local residents, which helps domestic producers. A weakness is that money is now less valuable, so consumers in a nation can buy less with the same amount.*

### **Allowing the Exchange Rate to Change**

*Q: Describe the difference between a fixed and floating exchange rate.*

*A: A fixed exchange rate is an exchange rate policy under which a government commits itself to keep its currency at or around a specific value relative to another currency or a commodity, such as gold. A floating exchange rate is an exchange rate policy under which a government permits its currency to be traded on the open market with direct government intervention.*

**Gold standard:** The monetary system that prevailed between 1914 and the 1970s in which countries tied their currencies to gold at a legally fixed price

**Adjustable peg:** A monetary system of fixed but adjustable rates. Governments are expected to keep their currencies fixed for extended periods but are permitted to adjust the exchange rate from time to time as economic conditions change.

### **Who Cares about Exchange Rates and Why?**

Governments must decide what to do with their currency. Fixed exchange rates provide stability and predictability, which facilitates international trade, investment, finance, migration, and travel. The cost is that a government is committed to maintaining its currency's value regardless of economic conditions, which can be very costly. Domestic producers may want a change

because a fixed exchange rate can make it more difficult to sell their products as the domestic currency is more expensive relative to other currencies.

### **International Politics and International Monetary Relations**

For the international community to work well, there must be a system that ensures some predictability to currency values so that people can reasonably expect that the currency they earn today will be worth something in the future. Because there is no global institution to manage currency policy (e.g., like a central bank), a functioning order requires conscious efforts by individual states to alter policies, contribute funds to stabilize currencies, or otherwise help sustain the system.

**International Monetary Regime: A formal or informal arrangement among governments to govern relations among their currencies; the agreement is shared by most countries in the world economy**

*Q: What are the two principles of an international monetary regime?*

*A: First, a regime makes clear whether currency values should float, be fixed, or a hybrid of the two. Second, there must be agreement about whether there will be a mutually accepted benchmark against which values are measured, such as a gold standard or paper-backed standard.*

### **What happens when currencies collapse?**

Currency crises usually result when government exchange-rate commitments are not fully credible. Private economic actors do not believe the promises of a government with respect to its exchange rate, so they react in ways that cause a major crisis.

*Q: Describe the path of a typical currency crisis.*

*A: A government commits itself to a particular fixed exchange rate. Over time, the government faces economic or political incentives to stop maintaining the fixed rate. People begin to lose faith in the government's commitment to the exchange rate policy, which gives investors a strong reason to sell the nation's currency. As doubts about the government's credibility grow, more people exchange the currency for a different, more reliable currency. Eventually, the government runs out of resources (including the time to stabilize) and is forced to devalue the currency. A drop in the currency for a country with substantial foreign debts means that those debts become substantially more expensive, and the local economy is hit with austerity measures.*

Currency crises can spill over into other countries and can lead to global recessions.

### **Review**

There are many contending interests over monetary affairs within countries, which leads to domestic conflict over the appropriate currency policy to pursue

Although every country can set current policy as it wants, the fact that exchange rates value currencies relative to one another means that outcomes are the product of interactions among countries' policies. As a result, countries may have reasons to cooperate with one another to create arrangements that are mutually beneficial.

Everyone has an interest in a functioning international monetary system, but different arrangements provide different policy bias which benefits some actors more than others. This creates an area for conflict about how such a system should be organized and about the burdens and benefits to be distributed among countries.

International monetary institutions can create rules that facilitate cooperation in international monetary policy, like any other institution.

## **Chapter 10: Development, Causes of the Wealth and Poverty of Nations**

Puzzle: Why are some countries rich and others poor? How do international politics and economics affect development?

**If Everyone Wants Development, why is it so hard to achieve?**

**Less Developed countries: LDC, countries at a relatively low level of economic development**

*Q: Identify and describe the major domestic variables used to explain why development is difficult to achieve.*

*A: Political geography, domestic factors that affect the domestic political economy, and domestic institutions. Geography and disease environments, along with the distance to major markets, provide a development disadvantage because they are less conducive to urbanization and industrialization than temperate zones. A weakness of this approach is that there is a good deal of variation between countries with similar geographies. Domestic factors can prevent governments from credibly committing to provide essential public goods like infrastructure and the protection of property rights, which inhibits the ability of domestic producers to take advantage of economic opportunities. Governments may be dependent on actors who engage in economic sectors that would be threatened by the growth of more modern economies. Domestic institutions might be biased against participation and serve to restrict broad-based participation in economic growth.*

**Infrastructure: Basic structures necessary for social activity, such as transportation and telecommunications networks and power and water supply.**

**How do Rich Countries affect the Developing World?**

Colonialism in places where the interests of colonizers and colonized conflicted institutionalized relationships in which the interests of the colonies were secondary to those of the colonizer. Preferential policies were intended in part to benefit residents of the colonizer and to deny the benefit to real or potential enemies in other environments.

*Q: Explain the thesis of Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson's argument about the impact of colonialism on subsequent development.*

*A: Countries and regions of the world were divided into extractive and inclusive institutions. In places where the climate was such that Europeans could live easily, settlers set up an institution that enforced the rule of law and encouraged investment. These institutions persisted, and the result was successful future development. In places where the disease environment was high, or it was otherwise difficult to settle, Europeans set up extractive institutions with the intent of moving resources to the metropole. These institutions persisted after colonialism and impeded successful development.*

**How does the international economy affect LDCs?**

**Primary products: Raw materials and agricultural products, typically unprocessed or only slightly processed. The primary sectors are distinguished from secondary sectors (industry) and tertiary sectors (services).**

**Oligopoly: A situation in which a market or industry is dominated by a few firms.**

**Terms of trade: The relationship between a country's export prices and its import prices**

*Q: Given our framework, why does the relative weakness of LDCs help to explain why they may be biased against in the international economy?*

*A: The bargaining range for successful deals is influenced by a country's relative power.*

*Countries with weaker economies have less influence on patterns of international trade. Rich countries make policies to benefit their own interests, knowing that they can derive a policy bias*



*from cooperative institutions. Poorer countries still benefit (otherwise, there would be no reason to cooperate) but do so in a less beneficial way than they might with more power.*

### **Development Policies and Development Politics**

**Import-substitution industrialization: ISI**, a set of policies pursued by most developing countries from the 1930s through the 1980s to reduce imports and encourage domestic manufacturing often through trade barriers, subsidies to manufacturing, and state ownership of basic industries

**Export-oriented industrialization: EOI**, a set of policies originally pursued in the late 1960s by several East Asian countries to spur manufacturing for export often through subsidies and incentives for export production.

**Washington Consensus:** An array of policy recommendations generally advocated by developed-country economists and policymakers starting in the 1980s, including trade liberalization, privatization, openness to foreign investment, and restrictive monetary and fiscal policy.

**Group of 77:** A coalition of developing countries in the UN formed in 1964 with 77 members that seeks changes to the international economic order to favor the developing world. It has grown to over 130 members but retains its original name.

**Commodity cartels:** Associations of producers of commodities (raw materials and agricultural products) that restrict world supply and thereby cause the price of the goods to rise

### **Review**

While everyone prefers more development and wealth to fewer individuals and groups within countries may have conflicting interests with respect to development policy. The pursuit of private interests by powerful groups can impede the adoption of measures that would spur economic growth.

Domestic social and political institutions can have a major impact on how conflicts of interests affect development. They can empower or overcome special interest groups that stand in the way of development. Institutions can facilitate or impede the ability of actors to cooperate to promote government policies conducive to economic growth.

Rich and poor nations have common interests in accelerating the economic growth of the developing world, but there are many sources for conflict because rich nations support policies that benefit their polities while harming LDCs.

Successful economic growth requires that a country overcome both domestic and international obstacles posed by interests and institutions that are detrimental to development.

### **Chapter 11: International Law and Norms**

**Puzzle:** In a world of sovereign states, how can the international community constrain states' actions? When and why do states do what is "right"?

#### **What is International Law?**

**International law:** A body of rules that binds states and other agents in world politics and is considered to have the status of law

*Q: What determines the key parts of the definition of international law?*

*A: International law is a body of rules linked together in a common logical structure, not simply an ad hoc list of rules issued or even enforced by some authority. The primary unifying principle in the international community is sovereignty. Second, a body of rules must have the status of law by including both primary and secondary rules. Primary rules are the negative and positive*

rules regulating behavior. Secondary rules are akin to a constitution that structure the making of other rules.

### **How is International Law made?**

*Q: What are the two principles for making international law?*

*A: Customary international law: which develops slowly over time as states recognize practices as appropriate and correct, for example, diplomatic immunity. The second mechanism is international treaties, which are negotiated and then ratified by states. Agreements differ in their obligations, precision, and delegation.*

**Obligation:** The degree to which states are legally bound by an international rule. High-obligation rules must be performed in good faith and, if breached, require reparations to the injured party.

**Precision:** The degree to which international legal obligations are fully specified. More precise rules narrow the scope for reasonable interpretation.

**Delegation:** The degree to which third parties, such as courts, arbitrators, or mediators, are given authority to implement, interpret, and apply international legal rules; to resolve disputes over the rules, and to make additional rules.

*Q: What is the difference between hard law and soft law?*

*A: Hard law is obligatory, precisely defined, and delegates substantial authority to third parties, usually international courts. Soft law is aspirational, ambiguous, and does not delegate significant powers to third parties. Countries often adopt soft law because it is easier to achieve in bargaining, is more flexible, so better to deal with uncertain futures, infringes less on state authority, and facilitates compromise.*

### **Does International Law Matter?**

Skeptical observers view international law as a reflection of states' interests. First law is seldom precise enough to deal with every possible interaction between actors. The malleability of international law that is soft can justify whatever states want to do, and so is, therefore, a weak constraint on action. Second, international law is the byproduct of state interests and interactions, including the degree to which the rules are written across our three dimensions of obligations, precision, and delegation. Countries only sign laws that they want to take anyway. International law is followed because of the very real and important benefits of cooperation that it enables. International law is an institution, so it can set standards of behavior and help verify compliance through its rulemaking structures.

*Q: How might international law alter actors' interests?*

*A: There are a variety of ways, but one, in particular, is that international law creates compliance constituencies who benefit when their governments follow international law. Since these constituencies have a strong interest in compliance, they can lobby governments to follow their obligations.*

### **What are International Norms?**

**Norms:** Standards of behavior for actors with a given identity; norms define what actions are "right" or appropriate under particular circumstances.

*Q: What are the three types of norms? Give an example of each.*

*A: Constitutive norms, those norms that define who is a legitimate or appropriate actor in a given set of circumstances. Examples include states having flags and national anthems. Procedural norms, which define how decisions involving multiple actors, should be made. Examples include consultation of important actors in international financial institutions.*

*Regulative norms govern the behavior of actors in their interactions with other actors. Examples include responsibility to protect.*

Norms can and often do conflict. The tension between norms creates opportunities for actors to interpret rules selectively for their own advantage.

### **How Are International Norms Created?**

Norms require a sufficient amount of support from the actors who will need to abide by them.

Norms typically begin with norm entrepreneurs

**Norm Entrepreneurs: Individuals or groups that seek to advance principled standards of behavior for states and other actors**

Once norms are adopted, supporters of those norms then hold their governments accountable to acceptable standards of international behavior.

**Transnational advocacy network: TAN, a set of individuals and non-governmental organizations acting in pursuit of a normative objective**

*Q: Explain the norm life cycle model.*

*A: The norm life cycle model is a three-stage model of how norms diffuse within a population and achieve a taken-for-granted status. First, norm entrepreneurs actively work to convince a critical mass of other individuals in other states to embrace their beliefs. In the second stage, there is a norm cascade as the number of adherents passes a tipping point beyond which the idea gains sufficient support that it becomes a nearly universal standard of behavior to which others can be held accountable. In the third stage, norms are internalized and become so widely accepted that they acquire a taken-for-granted quality that makes conformity almost automatic.*

### **Do Norms matter?**

Norms constrain states and other actors in two ways: they redefine interests, and they change interactions. Isolating the effects is difficult because individuals and state perception of interests make the selection problem of interests more acute. If norms shape interests, distinguishing the independent effect of norms on the action is nearly impossible.

**Boomerang model: A process through which NGOs in one state are able to activate transnational linkages to bring pressure from other states on their own governments**

### **Review**

International law and norms are institutions that seek to shape how states understand their interests and to constrain the ways in which they interact

States create and abide by international law because of the cooperation it enables. Although states are typically dependent on "self-help" for enforcement, the benefits of cooperation to states are often large enough that international laws are self-enforcing or in the interests of states to follow willingly.

International norms affect world politics by changing how individuals and states conceive of their interests and appropriate actions in their interactions with other states.

TANs have an important effect on world politics by promoting normative values. TANs also alter interactions between states and facilitate cooperation by providing information about international agreements and monitoring compliance.

### **Chapter 12: Human Rights**

Puzzle: Why do states undertake costly actions to protect the human rights of people outside their borders? In light of the widespread support for the principle of human rights, why has the movement to protect those rights not been even more successful?

### **What are International Human Rights?**

**Human rights:** the rights possessed by all individuals by virtue of being human, regardless of their status as citizens of particular states or members of a group or organization.

**Universal Declaration of Human Rights:** UDHR, a declaration adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948 that defines a common standard of achievement for all peoples and forms the foundation of modern human rights law.

**International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:** The agreement, completed in 1966 and in force from 1976 that details the basic civil and political rights of individuals and nations. The ICCPR and ICESR together are known as the twin covenants.

**International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights:** The agreement completed in 1966 and in force from 1976 that specifies the basic economic social and cultural rights of individuals and nations.

**International Bill of Rights:** The UDHR, ICCPR, and ICESCR collectively. Together these three agreements form the core of the international human rights regime.

**Are Some Rights More Important than Others?**

**Nonderogable rights:** Rights that cannot be suspended for any reason including at times of public emergency

**Prisoners of Conscience:** Individuals imprisoned solely because of the peaceful expression of their beliefs. The term was coined by Amnesty International.

*Q: What is one way we can determine which human rights are important to states?*

*A: Like any interest, we can determine the extent that a state cares about human rights by how much it is willing to pay to enforce them. Economic sanctions, a common tool to punish violators of human rights, inflict costs on states that impose them as well because they are no longer able to access certain markets that have been cut off and must pay to monitor and enforce the sanctions.*

**Why do Individuals and States Care about the Human Rights of others?**

States violate human rights for many reasons. Some violations arise from a lack of state capacity. States may also violate human rights in defense of their national security or preserve domestic rule.

*Q: Why are overt acts of human rights abuses more likely in multiparty dictatorships?*

*A: In single-party or personalist dictatorships, political opponents are sufficiently repressed that human rights violations are less necessary. The state might use torture if it believes it to be in its interest, but opponents are already sufficiently deterred from challenging the government. In multiparty dictatorships, the political opposition remains visible and viable, especially if the dictator needs a large ruling coalition, so the state is more likely to use torture to suppress opponents to stay in power.*

**Why Do States Sign Human Rights Agreements?**

States sign human rights agreements if they are in their interests. This might come from domestic actors that have a moral certitude towards human rights, or in states that seek to commit to a new path to democracy credibly. There may be self-interest for states to sign human rights agreements to receive concessions in other negotiations.

**What Can Lead to Better Protection of International Human Rights?**

*Q: What is the challenge in enforcing human rights?*

*A: There are many, but the key here is that enforcement of human rights is a collective action problem. The gains from human rights are small or nonexistent, meaning that states have few incentives to bear high costs for enforcing the law. States that violate the law also have no interest in enforcing the law against themselves.*

*Q: When are states more likely to take action to enforce human rights obligations?*

*A: States are most likely when states face domestic pressure to do something to stop human rights abuses by powerful domestic constituencies. Demands for action are more likely when these groups are better informed about abuses in other countries, meaning that TANS can play a role in human rights enforcement by providing information. Second, states are more likely to act when doing so serves their larger geopolitical interests. Third, states are more likely to enforce human rights obligations when the gap between the principle of sovereignty and international human rights law can be bridged.*

**Will Protection of Human Rights improve in the future?**

**Lustration:** The government policy of limiting members of the previous regime from serving in political, bureaucratic, or sometimes even civil positions.

**Individual Petition:** A right that permits individuals to petition appropriate international legal bodies directly if they believe a state has violated their rights.

**International Criminal Court: ICC,** A court of last resort for human rights cases that possess jurisdiction only if the accused is a national of a state party, the crime took place on the territory of a state party, or the UN Security Council has referred the case to the prosecutor.

**Review**

International human rights law is an institution created by and largely reflecting the political norms of Western, liberal democracies. The norms embodied in human rights laws remain controversial and have not yet been internalized in many societies and governments. There is some evidence that international human rights law is improving practice in specific contexts. Individuals and states have an interest in international human rights, and thus they undertake costly acts to punish states that violate the rights of their citizens. These interests are rarely strong enough to compel states to pay high costs for the protection of vulnerable individuals and groups outside their own borders.

States that violate human rights reason that in their interactions with other states will probably not face serious consequences for their behavior and, therefore, can freely abuse individuals and groups. Although international human rights law does appear to promote improved practices, it remains of only limited effectiveness in altering the actions of states.

**Chapter 13: The Global Environment**

**Puzzle:** Nearly everyone wants a cleaner and healthier environment. Why, then, is it so hard to cooperate internationally to protect the environment?

**Why are good intentions not good enough?**

**Global climate change:** Human-induced change in the environment, especially from the emissions of greenhouse gases leading to higher temperatures around the globe.

**UNFCCC:** United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, an international agreement enacted in 1992 and entered into force in 1994 that provides an overall framework for intergovernmental efforts on climate change.

**Paris Agreement:** An agreement negotiated under the UNFCCC in 2015, signed by 197 countries, and entered into force in 2016. It was the first agreement to require commitments for the control of greenhouse gas emissions from all signatories.

**Tragedy of the commons:** A problem that occurs when a resource is open to all, without limit. No one has an incentive to conserve because others would use the resource in the meantime, so the resource suffers degradation.



*Q: Define public goods. Explain why the tragedy of the commons makes the environment difficult to protect.*

*A: Public goods are goods that are nonexcludable and nonrival in consumption, such as clean air or water. The tragedy of the commons is that individually no one has an incentive to change their behavior for preservation, meaning that the environment suffers long term degradation.*

**Common pool resources:** Goods that are available to everyone, but such that one user's consumption of the good reduces the amount available for others. Common-pool resources are rival but nonexcludable.

**Nonexcludable goods:** Goods that, if available to be consumed by one actor, cannot be prevented from being consumed by other actors as well.

**Nonrival goods:** Goods for which consumption by one actor does not diminish the quantity available for others.

**Club goods:** A good that is excludable but nonrival.

**Kyoto Protocol:** An amendment to the UNFCCC adopted in 1997 and entered into force in 2005 that established specific targets for reducing emissions of carbon and five other greenhouse gases through 2020.

**Solving Collective Action Problems**

*Q: Define the five factors that affect cooperation?*

*A: Group size, the larger the group of actors, the more likely that free-riding will occur. Complexity of the problem, the more complex an issue, the harder it is to achieve cooperation. Repeated interaction, groups that regularly interact (iteration), or frequently on other issues (linkage) will be able to induce greater contributions from one another through strategies of reciprocal punishment in which contributor sanction noncontributors by withholding future cooperation. Joint products, when public goods come bundled with private goods. The larger the benefit to private goods, the less free riding. Fifth, privileged groups that comprise a small number of actors may receive sufficient benefit from the good to provide it themselves.*

**Cap-and-trade system:** A system that sets limits on emissions, which are then lowered over time to reduce pollutants released into the atmosphere. Firms can sell "credits" when they emit less than their allocation or must buy from others when they emit more than their allocation.

**Nationally Determined Contribution:** The commitment that each party to the Paris Agreement makes as to how they will contribute to reducing the threat of global warming. Why do Polluters usually win?

**Externalities:** Costs or benefits for stakeholders other than the actor undertaking an action. When an externality exists, the decision-maker does not bear all the costs or reap all the gains from his or her action.

*Q: Define an externality and explain how externalities exist between countries in the case of environmental degradation.*

*A: Externalities: Costs or benefits for stakeholders other than the actor undertaking an action. When an externality exists, the decision-maker does not bear all the costs or reap all the gains from his or her action. Countries that release pollutants in the air affect the atmosphere for at least neighboring countries and potentially the globe. Here, an actor that is not taking action is still affected by the actions of another.*

It would be advantageous to read pp 566-567

*Q: Using the case of oil tankers, explain why clarity and transparency in standards and verification matter for institutional success.*

*A: After a tanker delivers a cargo of crude oil, it must deal with the remaining tons left on board. Oil tankers were intentionally discharging approximately one million tons of oil into the ocean annually. The first standards permitted tankers to continue cleaning their tanks with seawater but mandated that the discharges be a small number of parts per million. Cleaning the tanks with seawater usually took place on the open ocean, which is far from observation, so captains could pollute with impunity. In 1978 countries adopted new standards that required tankers to use new technologies that were easily observable and verifiable. The ease of verification forced high rates of compliance.*

### **Review**

Despite common interests in the quality of the environment, the interactions of individuals as well as of countries suffer from problems of collective action and free riding. This is especially true for public goods and common-pool resources. The result is less overall environmental cooperation than individuals and even countries themselves collectively desire.

Small groups of actors, one of whom is substantially larger than the others and all of whom frequently interact on multiple issues, are most likely to cooperate effectively on issues relating to the international environment.

Distributional conflicts within and between countries can impede progress in mitigating harmful environmental practices. Individuals, groups, and states have conflicting interests over who bears the costs of policy change. How environmental policies distribute these costs affects how likely actors are to cooperate successfully on issues relating to the environment.

International institutions facilitate environmental cooperation primarily by enhancing information and verifying compliance. There is now a wide range of agreements covering many environmental problems. TANs and other NGOs now play an essential role in monitoring compliance with environmental agreements. These accords, however, can only be as effective as the underlying cooperation between countries permits.

### **Chapter 14: Challenges to the Global Order**

Puzzle: In the coming decades, the international system will face challenges from actors seeking weapons of mass destruction, the rise of a new superpower in Asia, and growing opposition to economic globalization. Can political science tell us what the future will hold?

#### **The Postwar Order and its challenges**

*Q: Informally define the postwar order*

*A: The developments that took place in the aftermath of World War II and then expanded following the end of the Cold War. Its primary components were the proliferation of multilateral institutions, the growth of international economic exchange, the spread of democratic institutions, and the emergence of the United States as the lead actor in world affairs.*

*Q: Who are the actors with the greatest incentives to change the postwar order?*

*A: States and groups whose interests conflict with those of the US and its allies and those who see US military dominance as a core threat to their interests. Second, states who were relatively weak when the postwar order was constructed and now want to revisit institutions now that these countries are stronger to alter existing bargains. Third, groups whose interests have been harmed by globalization. This includes many domestic actors in LDCs as well as workers in certain sectors of the developed world's economies.*

#### **Can the spread of WMDs be Stopped?**

Nine states are known to possess nuclear weapons (US, Russia, Great Britain, France, China, Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea).

*Q: Why might nuclear weapons be a force for peace?*

*A: Thinking of war as a bargaining process, nuclear weapons alter the bargaining range of deals that both sides prefer over war. A state should prefer any deal, even one in which it receives nothing over nuclear war. Nuclear weapons can create a situation of mutual dependence in which neither side would contemplate an attack on the other, forcing them to resolve their disputes in other ways. Note that this argument hinges on neither side being able to wipe out the other's weapons in a first strike, that leaders are rational, and that attacks are verifiable and attributable to an actor.*

*Q: If nuclear weapons promote peace, why do states push to reduce proliferation?*

*A: Nuclear weapons influence the distribution of power among states, which can harm the current interests of other states even if it never leads to war. Second, states that acquire weapons may not be able to meet the requirements for deterrence, which makes them highly unstable. Third, the spread of WMD increases the risk of proliferation to terrorist organizations, and there is doubt whether the language of deterrence works in the same way against a nonstate actor.*

### **Will China and the United States Fight for Global Leadership?**

*Q: Why does a rising power increase the possibility for conflict in a system?*

*A: A large shift in relative military power makes a rising state more powerful, which means it expects to do better in the event of war and so bargains harder to change the status quo. Bargains that were acceptable when the state was relatively weak are no longer satisfactory. More importantly, the rising power cannot commit not to revise deals in the future, which provides an incentive for the declining state to start a conflict in a situation where it is still relatively stronger.*

*Q: Given the logic of the previous question, why do interactions with rising powers and current leaders often end peacefully?*

*A: If the costs of conflict are large enough, a deal may be found that both sides prefer over war now and after the power shift. The deal gives both states more than their current and future values for war. In this case, the costs of war relative to the value of the good are too high. Additionally, the value of the good in a dispute might be low in an absolute sense, so states are unwilling to enter into conflict because the net value of war is negative.*

### **Review**

The postwar order--the institutions and pattern of interactions that developed after WW2--generated a number of benefits including economic development, increased trade and financial flows, the spread of democracy, and the decline of interstate war. Actors that see this order as hostile to their interests or seek greater power within it will pose significant challenges in the coming decades.

States and terrorist organizations hostile to the US and its allies see WMDs as a way to counter US military superiority. As a result, there will be a growing conflict between actors who want WMDs and those who would be harmed by proliferation. Whether the spread of WMD can be slowed depends on whether the latter actors can find a way through cooperation, coercion, or institutions to alter the interests of potential proliferators.

The rise of China as a global power may lead to increased conflict between China and the US. Whether this dynamic will lead to war depends on the interests that prevail in both countries and on whether international and domestic institutions can make China a partner rather than a rival of the US.

Globalization creates winners and losers and increases the potential for political conflict within and among countries. Those who have experienced economic and noneconomic losses from the cross-border movements of goods, capital, and people form a potent opposition to globalization.

and the economic institutions that have promoted it. The rise of populist resistance in the US and Europe presents a direct challenge to the postwar order from within the states that constructed it.