



Penpie

Security Audit Report

November 18, 2025

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# 1 | Introduction

## 1.1 About Penpie

Penpie is a DeFi platform integrated with Pendle Finance, offering users boosted rewards and governance participation without the need to lock their own PENDLE token. Penpie enhances yield across Pendle Finance's liquidity pools by locking PENDLE to gain vePendle. Additionally, users can lock PNP token on Penpie to gain v1PNP, which allows them to participate in Pendle Finance's governance and earn passive income through revenue sharing.

## 1.2 Source Code

The audit is conducted based on the following Git repository:

- <https://github.com/magpiexyz/penpie-contracts.git>
- Commit ID: f5a6682

And this is the final version representing all fixes implemented for the issues identified in the audit:

- <https://github.com/magpiexyz/penpie-contracts.git>
- Commit ID: 1845069

Note that this audit will cover the following contracts:

- MasterPenpie.sol, VLPenpie.sol, BuyBackBurnProvider.sol
- ARBReward.sol, BaseRewardPoolV2.sol, mPendleSVBaseRewarder.sol
- v1PenpieBaseRewarder.sol, PenpieReceiptToken.sol, PendleMarketDepositHelper.sol
- PendleStaking.sol, PendleStakingBaseUpg.sol, PendleStakingBaseUpgBNB.sol
- PendleStakingSideChain.sol, PendleStakingSideChainBNB.sol, SmartPendleConvert.sol

- 
- `mPendleConvertor.sol`, `mPendleConvertorBaseUpg.sol`, `mPendleConvertorSideChain.sol`
  - `mPendleSV.sol`, `zapInAndOutHelper.sol`, `PendleVoteManagerBaseUpg.sol`
  - `PendleVoteManagerMainChain.sol`, `PendleVoteManagerSideChain.sol`, `PenpieBribeManager.sol`
  - `PenpieBribeRewardDistributor.sol`, `ManualCompound.sol`, `PendleRushV6.sol`
  - `PendleRushV7.sol`, `mPendleOFT.sol`, and `PenpieOFT.sol`.

### 1.3 Revision History

Version	Date	Content	Final Commit
V1.0	September 9, 2024	Initial Audit	fc860a8
V1.1	November 3, 2024	<a href="#">PR#192</a>	1c52d05
V1.2	November 4, 2024	<a href="#">PR#193</a>	b36ac15
V1.3	November 10, 2024	<a href="#">PR#188</a>	951f931
V1.4	November 16, 2024	<a href="#">PR#195</a>	8630d0e
V1.5	December 19, 2024	<a href="#">PR#194</a>	5dcfd27
V1.6	January 8, 2025	<a href="#">PR#216</a>	24e4dee
V1.7	January 21, 2025	<a href="#">PR#223</a>	36a428b
V1.8	February 5, 2025	<a href="#">PR#226</a>	0978edd
V1.9	March 12, 2025	<a href="#">PR#232</a>	5711e80
V1.10	April 22, 2025	<a href="#">PR#229</a>	da9ec9d
V1.11	June 2, 2025	<a href="#">PR#239</a>	c665fb2
V1.12	August 18, 2025	<a href="#">PR#257</a>	b205936
V1.13	November 17, 2025	<a href="#">PR#288</a>	44c1ac9

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## 2 | Overall Assessment

This report has been compiled to identify issues and vulnerabilities within the `Penpie` protocol. Throughout this audit, we identified a total of 7 issues spanning various severity levels. By employing auxiliary tool techniques to supplement our thorough manual code review, we have discovered the following findings.

Severity	Count	Acknowledged	Won't Do	Addressed
Critical	-	-	-	-
High	-	-	-	-
Medium	5	1	-	4
Low	2	1	-	1
Informational	-	-	-	-
Undetermined	-	-	-	-
Total	7	2	-	5

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## 3 | Vulnerability Summary

### 3.1 Overview

Click on an issue to jump to it, or scroll down to see them all.

- [M-1](#) [Revisited Logic of ETHZapper::swapExactTokensToETH\(\)](#)
- [M-2](#) [Possible Reward Token Loss in ManualCompound::compound\(\)](#)
- [M-3](#) [Improper initializer\(\) Use in BNBPadding::\\_BNBPadding\\_init\(\)](#)
- [M-4](#) [Potential Risks Associated with Centralization](#)
- [M-5](#) [Improper ETH Handling in PenpieAutoMarketManager](#)
- [L-1](#) [Array Out-of-Bounds in vIPenpieBaseRewarder::rewardTokenInfosWithBribe\(\)](#)
- [L-2](#) [Revisited Slippage Control in PendleRush6::\\_ZapInmPendleToMarket\(\)](#)

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## 3.2 Security Level Reference

In web3 smart contract audits, vulnerabilities are typically classified into different severity levels based on the potential impact they can have on the security and functionality of the contract. Here are the definitions for critical-severity, high-severity, medium-severity, and low-severity vulnerabilities:

Severity	Description
C-X (Critical)	A severe security flaw with immediate and significant negative consequences. It poses high risks, such as unauthorized access, financial losses, or complete disruption of functionality. Requires immediate attention and remediation.
H-X (High)	Significant security issues that can lead to substantial risks. Although not as severe as critical vulnerabilities, they can still result in unauthorized access, manipulation of contract state, or financial losses. Prompt remediation is necessary.
M-X (Medium)	Moderately impactful security weaknesses that require attention and remediation. They may lead to limited unauthorized access, minor financial losses, or potential disruptions to functionality.
L-X (Low)	Minor security issues with limited impact. While they may not pose significant risks, it is still recommended to address them to maintain a robust and secure smart contract.
I-X (Informational)	Warnings and things to keep in mind when operating the protocol. No immediate action required.
U-X (Undetermined)	Identified security flaw requiring further investigation. Severity and impact need to be determined. Additional assessment and analysis are necessary.

## 3.3 Vulnerability Details

### 3.3.1 [M-1] Revisited Logic of swapExactTokensToETH()

Target	Category	IMPACT	LIKELIHOOD	STATUS
ETHZapper.sol	Business Logic	Medium	Medium	<a href="#">Addressed</a>

The `ETHZapper::swapExactTokensToETH()` function is designed to swap a specified amount of `tokenIn` for native token (e.g., ETH). While examining the current implementation, we identify a vulnerability in the internal `_swapForEthUsingPancakeV2()` function called inside the `ETHZapper::swapExactTokensToETH()` function (line 72). It uses `getAmountsOut()` (line 86) to calculate the amount of swapped-out ETH based on the current state of the liquidity pool, making it vulnerable to front-running attacks. As a result, users may receive significantly less ETH than expected when `swapTokensForExactETH()` is executed (line 92). This flaw exposes users to potential asset loss due to insufficient slippage protection and the risk of price manipulation.

#### ETHZapper::swapExactTokensToETH()

```
55 function swapExactTokensToETH(  
56     address tokenIn,  
57     uint tokenAmountIn,  
58     uint256 _amountOutMin,  
59     address amountReciever  
60 ) external {  
61     if(fromTokenToDex[tokenIn] == 0) revert TokenNotSupported();  
62     if(tokenAmountIn == 0) revert IsTokenAmountZero();  
63     if(amountReciever == ADDRESS_ZERO) revert IsZeroAddressReciever();  
  
65     IERC20(tokenIn).safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), tokenAmountIn);  
  
67     if (fromTokenToDex[tokenIn] == BALANCERV2) {  
68         _swapUsingBalancerV2(tokenIn, NATIVE, tokenAmountIn, _amountOutMin,  
69             amountReciever);  
69     } else if (fromTokenToDex[tokenIn] == CAMELOTV2) {  
70         _swapUsingCamelotV2(tokenIn, WETH, tokenAmountIn, _amountOutMin,  
71             amountReciever);  
71     } else if (fromTokenToDex[tokenIn] == PANCAKEV3) {  
72         _swapForEthUsingPancakeV2(tokenIn, WETH, tokenAmountIn, amountReciever);  
73     }  
74 }  
  
76 function _swapForEthUsingPancakeV2(  
77     address tokenIn,  
78     address tokenOut,  
79     uint tokenAmountIn,  
80     address amountReciever
```



```

81 ) internal {
82     address[] memory path = new address[](2);
83     path[0] = tokenIn;
84     path[1] = tokenOut;

86     uint[] memory amounts = pancakeRouter.getAmountsOut(
87         tokenAmountIn, path
88     );

90     IERC20(tokenIn).safeApprove(address(pancakeRouter), tokenAmountIn);

92     pancakeRouter.swapTokensForExactETH(
93         amounts[1],
94         type(uint256).max,
95         path,
96         amountReceiver,
97         block.timestamp + 1000
98     );
99 }

```

**Remediation** Apply effective slippage control inside the `_swapForEthUsingPancakeV2()` function.

### 3.3.2 [M-2] Possible Reward Token Loss in compound()

Target	Category	IMPACT	LIKELIHOOD	STATUS
ManualCompound.sol	Business Logic	Medium	Medium	<a href="#">Addressed</a>

The `compound()` function is designed to claim user rewards from `MasterPenpie` and re-compound them accordingly. While examining its implementation, we identify two potential scenarios that may result in reward tokens being left in the `ManualCompound` contract.

- If `isClaimPNP` is set to true but the `_rewards` array does not include the PNP token, the claimed PNP token will remain in the contract.
- If one of the reward tokens is configured to be compoundable, but it is neither `PENDLE` nor `PNP`, the reward token will also be left in the contract.

These issues can lead to rewards being left in the contract, preventing users from receiving their full expected rewards.

#### ManualCompound::compound()

```

215 function compound(
216     address[] memory _lps,
217     address[] memory _rewards,

```

```

218     bytes[] memory _kyBarExectCallData,
219     address[] memory baseTokens,
220     uint256[] memory compoundingMode,
221     pendleDexApproxParams memory _pdexparams,
222     bool isClaimPNP
223 ) external {
224     ...
225     masterPenpie.multicclaimOnBehalf(
226         _lps,
227         _rewards,
228         msg.sender,
229         isClaimPNP
230     );
231
232     for (uint256 i; i < _lps.length;i++) {
233
234         for (uint j; j < _rewards[i].length;j++) {
235
236             address _rewardTokenAddress = _rewards[i][j];
237             uint256 receivedBalance = IERC20(_rewardTokenAddress).balanceOf(
238                 address(this)
239             );
240
241             if(receivedBalance == 0) continue;
242
243             if (!compoundableRewards[_rewardTokenAddress]) {
244                 IERC20(_rewardTokenAddress).safeTransfer(
245                     msg.sender,
246                     receivedBalance
247                 );
248                 continue;
249             }
250
251             if (_rewardTokenAddress == PENDLE) {
252                 ...
253             }
254             else if (_rewardTokenAddress == PENPIE) {
255                 ...
256             }
257         }
258     }
259
260     if(userTotalPendleRewardToConvertMpendle != 0) _convertToMPendle(
        userTotalPendleRewardToConvertMpendle);
261     if(userTotalPendleRewardToSendBack != 0 ) IERC20(PENDLE).safeTransfer( msg.
        sender, userTotalPendleRewardToSendBack );
262
263     emit Compounded(msg.sender, _lps.length, _rewards.length);
264 }

```

---

**Remediation** Improve the implementation of the `compound()` function to ensure that all reward tokens are either compounded or transferred appropriately.

### 3.3.3 [M-3] Improper `initializer()` Use in `_BNBPadding_init()`

Target	Category	IMPACT	LIKELIHOOD	STATUS
BNBPadding.sol	Business Logic	High	Low	<a href="#">Addressed</a>

While reviewing the implementation of the BNBPadding contract, we identify a vulnerability caused by the incorrect use of the `initializer()` modifier in the `_BNBPadding_init()` function. In earlier versions of OpenZeppelin, the `initializer()` modifier was functional in sub-level initialization functions. However, starting from OpenZeppelin version 4.4, this usage leads to a revert, as `initializer()` is intended exclusively for top-level initialization. The correct modifier for sub-level initialization functions like `_BNBPadding_init()` is `onlyInitializing()`. This mistake can cause failures during contract deployment or upgrades. Additionally, it is critical to maintain consistent use of the same OpenZeppelin version throughout the protocol to prevent potential storage conflicts and initialization issues.

#### PendleStakingSideChainBNB::\_PendleStakingSideChain\_init()

```
24 function _PendleStakingSideChain_init(  
25     address _pendle,  
26     address _WETH,  
27     address _vePendle,  
28     address _distributorETH,  
29     address _pendleRouter,  
30     address _masterPenpie  
31 ) public initializer {  
32     _BNBPadding_init();  
33     ...  
34 }
```

#### BNBPadding::\_BNBPadding\_init()

```
16 function _BNBPadding_init() public initializer {  
17     __Ownable_init();  
18     __ReentrancyGuard_init();  
19     __Pausable_init();  
20 }
```

**Remediation** Replace `initializer()` with `onlyInitializing()` in sub-initialization functions.

### 3.3.4 [M-4] Potential Risks Associated with Centralization

Target	Category	IMPACT	LIKELIHOOD	STATUS
Multiple Contracts	Security	High	Low	Acknowledged

In the Penpie protocol, the existence of a series of privileged accounts introduces centralization risks, as they hold significant control and authority over critical operations governing the protocol. In the following, we show the representative function potentially affected by the privileges associated with the privileged accounts.

#### Examples of Privileged Operations

```
881 function setPoolManagerStatus(  
882     address _account,  
883     bool _allowedManager  
884 ) external onlyOwner {  
885     PoolManagers[_account] = _allowedManager;  
  
887     emit PoolManagerStatus(_account, PoolManagers[_account]);  
888 }  
  
890 function setPenpie(address _penpieOFT) external onlyOwner {  
891     if (address(penpieOFT) != address(0)) revert PenpieOFTSetAlready();  
  
893     if (!Address.isContract(_penpieOFT)) revert MustBeContract();  
  
895     penpieOFT = IERC20(_penpieOFT);  
896     emit PenpieOFTSet(_penpieOFT);  
897 }  
  
899 function updateAllowedPauser(address _pauser, bool _allowed) external onlyOwner {  
900     allowedPauser[_pauser] = _allowed;  
  
902     emit UpdatePauserStatus(_pauser, _allowed);  
903 }  
  
905 function setCompounder(address _compounder)  
906     external  
907     onlyOwner  
908 {  
909     address oldCompounder = compounder;  
910     compounder = _compounder;  
911     emit CompounderUpdated(compounder, oldCompounder);  
912 }  
  
914 function setVlPenpie(address _vlPenpie) external onlyOwner {  
915     address oldvlPenpie = address(vlPenpie);  
916     vlPenpie = IVLPenpie(_vlPenpie);
```

```

917     emit VLPenpieUpdated(address(vlPenpie), oldvlPenpie);
918 }

920 function setMPendleSV(address _mPendleSV)
921     external
922     onlyOwner
923 {
924     address oldMPendleSV = mPendleSV;
925     mPendleSV = _mPendleSV;
926     emit mPendleSVUpdated(_mPendleSV, oldMPendleSV);
927 }

```

**Remediation** To mitigate the identified issue, it is recommended to introduce multi-sig mechanism to undertake the role of the privileged accounts. Moreover, it is advisable to implement timelocks to govern all modifications to the privileged operations.

**Response By Team** This issue has been confirmed by the team. The multi-sig mechanism will be used to mitigate this issue.

### 3.3.5 [M-5] Improper ETH Handling in PenpieAutoMarketManager

Target	Category	IMPACT	LIKELIHOOD	STATUS
PenpieAutoMarketManager.sol	Business Logic	Low	High	<a href="#">Addressed</a>

In the PenpieAutoMarketManager contract, the depositWithPenpieLP() function calls PenpieAutoMarket(autoMarketAddress).harvestReward(false) (line 241). This in turn invokes harvestReward(), which ultimately triggers IPendleStaking(pendleStaking).harvestMarketReward(pendleMarket, msg.sender, 0). During this process, ETH is sent directly to msg.sender, i.e., the PenpieAutoMarketManager contract itself. However, since the contract does not implement a payable fallback or receive function, it cannot accept ETH transfers. As a result, any execution of depositWithPenpieLP() will revert.

#### PenpieAutoMarketManager::depositWithPenpieLP()

```

231 function depositWithPenpieLP(address autoMarketAddress, uint256 lpAmount)
232     external nonReentrant onlyValidAutoMarket(autoMarketAddress) {
233     if (lpAmount == 0) revert InvalidAmount();

234     (address receiptToken, , ) = getAutoMarketInfo(autoMarketAddress);

235     // Transfer receipt tokens from user to this contract
236     IERC20(receiptToken).safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), lpAmount);

237     // Harvest if enough time has passed since last harvest to maximize user

```

```

        value
240    // This ensures the user gets the most accurate share calculation
241    PenpieAutoMarket(autoMarketAddress).harvestReward(false);

243    ...
244 }

```

#### PenpieAutoMarket::harvestReward()

```

93 function harvestReward(bool force) public nonReentrant {
94     // First, claim rewards from masterPenpie using multicclaim
95     address[] memory stakingTokens = new address[](1);
96     stakingTokens[0] = pendleMarket; // Use the pendle token as the staking
        token

98     if (block.timestamp - lastHarvestTime > IPenpieAutoMarketManager(manager).
        harvestCoolDown() force) {
99         IPendleStaking(pendleStaking).harvestMarketReward(pendleMarket, msg.
            sender, 0);

101         IMasterPenpie(masterPenpie).multicclaim(stakingTokens);

103         lastHarvestTime = block.timestamp;
104     }
105 }

```

**Remediation** Ensure that PenpieAutoMarketManager can safely receive ETH, either by implementing a receive() or fallback() function marked payable.

### 3.3.6 [L-1] Array Out-of-Bounds in rewardTokenInfosWithBribe()

Target	Category	IMPACT	LIKELIHOOD	STATUS
v1PenpieBaseRewarder.sol	Business Logic	Medium	Medium	<a href="#">Addressed</a>

In the v1PenpieBaseRewarder::rewardTokenInfosWithBribe() function, the second `for` loop incorrectly accesses the `claimable` array using the index `i` (lines 239/241), which ranges from `rewardTokens.length` to `rewardTokensLength`. This leads to an out-of-bounds access when `i` exceeds the bounds of the `claimable` array, potentially causing the function to revert or return invalid data. The correct index for accessing the `claimable` array should be `i - rewardTokens.length`, ensuring proper alignment and preventing overflow issues.

#### vIPenpieBaseRewarder::rewardTokenInfosWithBribe()

```
217 function rewardTokenInfosWithBribe(  
218     IBribeRewardDistributor.Claim[] calldata _proof  
219 )  
220     external  
221     view  
222     returns (  
223         address[] memory bonusTokenAddresses,  
224         string[] memory bonusTokenSymbols  
225     )  
226 {  
227     IBribeRewardDistributor.Claimable[] memory claimable =  
228         bribeRewardDistributor.getClaimable(_proof);  
229     uint256 rewardTokensLength = rewardTokens.length + claimable.length;  
230     bonusTokenAddresses = new address[](rewardTokensLength);  
231     bonusTokenSymbols = new string[](rewardTokensLength);  
232     for (uint256 i; i < rewardTokens.length; i++) {  
233         bonusTokenAddresses[i] = rewardTokens[i];  
234         bonusTokenSymbols[i] = IERC20Metadata(  
235             address(bonusTokenAddresses[i])  
236         ).symbol();  
237     }  
238     for (uint256 i = rewardTokens.length; i < rewardTokensLength; i++) {  
239         bonusTokenAddresses[i] = claimable[i].token;  
240         bonusTokenSymbols[i] = IERC20Metadata(  
241             address(claimable[i].token)  
242         ).symbol();  
243     }  
244 }
```

**Remediation** Improve the implementation of the `rewardTokenInfosWithBribe()` function as above-mentioned.

### 3.3.7 [L-2] Revisited Slippage Control in `_ZapInmPendleToMarket()`

Target	Category	IMPACT	LIKELIHOOD	STATUS
PendleRush6.sol ManualCompound.sol	Coding Practices	Low	Low	Acknowledged

The `PendleRush6::_ZapInmPendleToMarket()` function facilitates providing liquidity to Pendle Finance in return for LP token, which is subsequently deposited into `Penpie` for yield generation. Upon reviewing the current implementation, we identify a vulnerability stemming from the absence of slippage control during the call to the `addLiquiditySingleToken()` (line 293) function. This lack of slippage control exposes the transaction to potential front-running attacks, potentially leading to unfavorable

execution or reduced returns for users.

#### PendleRush6::\_ZapInmPendleToMarket()

```
286 function _ZapInmPendleToMarket(  
287     uint256 mPendleAmount,  
288     pendleDexApproxParams memory _pdexparams  
289 ) internal {  
290     IERC20(mPENDLE).safeApprove(address(pendleRouter), 0);  
291     IERC20(mPENDLE).safeApprove(address(pendleRouter), mPendleAmount);  
  
293     (uint256 netLpOut, ) = pendleRouter.addLiquiditySingleToken(  
294         address(this),  
295         mPendleMarket,  
296         type(uint256).min,  
297         IPendleRouter.ApproxParams(  
298             _pdexparams.guessMin,  
299             _pdexparams.guessMax,  
300             _pdexparams.guessOffChain,  
301             _pdexparams.maxIteration,  
302             _pdexparams.eps  
303         ),  
304         IPendleRouter.TokenInput(  
305             mPENDLE,  
306             mPendleAmount,  
307             mPENDLE,  
308             address(0),  
309             address(0),  
310             IPendleRouter.SwapData(IPendleRouter.SwapType.NONE, address(0), "0x",  
311                 false)  
312         )  
313     );  
314     IERC20(mPendleMarket).safeApprove(pendleStaking, netLpOut);  
315     IPendleMarketDepositHelper(pendleMarketDepositHelper).depositMarketFor(  
316         mPendleMarket,  
317         msg.sender,  
318         netLpOut  
319     );  
  
320     emit mPendleLiquidateToMarket(msg.sender, mPendleAmount);  
321 }
```

**Remediation** Apply necessary slippage control in the PendleRush6::\_ZapInmPendleToMarket() and ManualCompound::\_ZapInToPendleMarket() functions.

**Response By Team** This issue has been confirmed by the team.



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## 4 | Appendix

### 4.1 About AstraSec

AstraSec is a blockchain security company that serves to provide high-quality auditing services for blockchain-based protocols. With a team of blockchain specialists, AstraSec maintains a strong commitment to excellence and client satisfaction. The audit team members have extensive audit experience for various famous DeFi projects. AstraSec's comprehensive approach and deep blockchain understanding make it a trusted partner for the clients.

### 4.2 Disclaimer

The information provided in this audit report is for reference only and does not constitute any legal, financial, or investment advice. Any views, suggestions, or conclusions in the audit report are based on the limited information and conditions obtained during the audit process and may be subject to unknown risks and uncertainties. While we make every effort to ensure the accuracy and completeness of the audit report, we are not responsible for any errors or omissions in the report.

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