



A Framework for Fairness in Two-Sided Marketplaces

Kinjal Basu, Cyrus DiCiccio, Heloise Logan, Noureddine El Karoui
LinkedIn Corporation


Presented by:
Omid Memarrast

Outline

- Introduction
- Background
- Two-Sided Fair Marketplace
- Experiments
- Conclusion

Motivation

Suggestions: **one gender!**



Job Seeker Example



Search for CEO in a search engine

Singh, Ashudeep, and Thorsten Joachims. "Fairness of exposure in rankings." *Proceedings of the 24th ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery & Data Mining*. 2018.

Introduction

Recommender systems

Single-sided

members viewing:

- Items
- Products
- Jobs
- Movies
- Restaurants

Two-sided member-to-member marketplace

when members can serve multiple functions:

- feed ranking
- people or friend recommendations
- search systems
- recruiters searching for job candidates

Introduction

Goal:

Guarantee that the rankings are fair
to:

- The *source* members initiating the queries
- The *destination* members who are being returned by the query


How?

- Define a *multi-session utility* and add fairness constraints for *destination members* across multiple sessions
- Add fairness constraints for *source* members
- Scale for *large-scale* recommender systems by using a duality idea

People You May Know (Linkedin)

Suggestions: **one gender!**

- PYMK is a Member-Member Marketplace
- Fairness based on **Gender** attribute (Similar setting for IM, FM)
- Destination Side Fairness
 - Directly observable by members
- Source Side Fairness
 - Unobservable by individual members
 - Can be exposed if audited



Source: Member who looks at ranking

Destination: Members being ranked

A General Framework

Fairness of Exposure in Rankings

Ashudeep Singh

Cornell University

Ithaca, NY

ashudeep@cs.cornell.edu

Thorsten Joachims

Cornell University

Ithaca, NY

tj@cs.cornell.edu

$$\text{ABSTI} \mathbf{P} = \operatorname{argmax}_{\mathbf{P}} \mathbf{u}^T \mathbf{P} \mathbf{v}$$

Ranking
transition
jobs, job
is a substi-
not only
to our
y jobs for
selves is
not good
disturb

(expected utility)

$$\text{s.t. } \mathbf{1}^T \mathbf{P} = \mathbf{1}^T \quad (\text{sum of probabilities for each position})$$

$$\mathbf{P} \mathbf{1} = \mathbf{1} \quad (\text{sum of probabilities for each document})$$

$$0 \leq P_{i,j} \leq 1 \quad (\text{valid probability})$$

\mathbf{P} is fair (fairness constraints)

ob seek-
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elevance,
, relevance,
relevance,
relevance,
relevance,

Preliminaries

Probabilistic Rankings

$P_{i,j}$: the probability that ranking R places item **i** at rank **j**

P forms a doubly stochastic matrix of size $N \times N$

$$P = \begin{bmatrix} 0.4 & 0.5 & 0.1 \\ 0.3 & 0.3 & 0.4 \\ 0.3 & 0.2 & 0.5 \end{bmatrix}$$

Birkhoff-von Neumann (BvN) decomposition:

doubly **stochastic matrix** into a convex sum of **permutation matrices**

$$\mathbf{A} = \theta_1 \mathbf{A}_1 + \theta_2 \mathbf{A}_2 + \cdots + \theta_n \mathbf{A}_n$$

$$\mathbf{R}' = \begin{vmatrix} 0 & 0.4 & 0.2 & 0.4 \\ 0.4 & 0.4 & 0 & 0.2 \\ 0.4 & 0.2 & 0.4 & 0 \\ 0.2 & 0 & 0.4 & 0.4 \end{vmatrix} = 0.4 \begin{vmatrix} 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{vmatrix} + 0.4 \begin{vmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \end{vmatrix}$$

$$+ 0.2 \begin{vmatrix} 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \end{vmatrix}$$

Preliminaries

Probabilistic Rankings

Expected utility for a probabilistic ranking:

Rewrite it as a matrix product:

Discounted Cumulative Gain (DCG) can be represented in this format:

P is a doubly stochastic matrix of size $N \times N$

$$\mathbf{v}_j = \frac{1}{\log(1+j)}$$

$$U(P|q) = \sum_{d_i \in \mathcal{D}} \sum_{j=1}^N P_{i,j} u(d_i|q) v(j)$$

$$U(P|q) = \mathbf{u}^T \mathbf{P} \mathbf{v}$$

$$DCG(r|q) = \sum_{u \in \mathcal{U}} P(u|q) \sum_{d \in \mathcal{D}} \frac{2^{\text{rel}(d|u,q)} - 1}{\log(1 + \text{rank}(d|r))}$$

Optimizing Fair Rankings via Linear Programming

- maximizing **source side** utility
- fairness constraints on the **destination** members.
- Solve problem **per session!**

$P(i, j)$: probability of showing the i -th destination member in the j -th slot

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{P} = \operatorname{argmax}_{\mathbf{P}} \quad & \mathbf{u}^T \mathbf{P} \mathbf{v} && \text{(expected utility)} \\ \text{s.t. } \mathbf{1}^T \mathbf{P} = \mathbf{1}^T & \quad \text{(sum of probabilities for each position)} \\ \mathbf{P} \mathbf{1} = \mathbf{1} & \quad \text{(sum of probabilities for each document)} \\ 0 \leq \mathbf{P}_{i,j} \leq 1 & \quad \text{(valid probability)} \\ \mathbf{P} \text{ is fair} & \quad \text{(fairness constraints)} \end{aligned}$$

Fairness Measures

- Destination Side Metrics

- Demographic Parity (Equality of Exposure)
 - Average exposure of the groups are equal in each query.

$$\text{Exposure}(G_0|P) = \text{Exposure}(G_1|P)$$

- Disparate Treatment

- Average exposure of the groups proportional to their utility are equal in each query.

$$\frac{\text{Exposure}(G_0|P)}{\text{U}(G_0|q)} = \frac{\text{Exposure}(G_1|P)}{\text{U}(G_1|q)}$$

- Disparate Impact

- Average impact (eg CTR) of the groups proportional to their utility are equal in query

$$\frac{\text{CTR}(G_0|P)}{\text{U}(G_0|q)} = \frac{\text{CTR}(G_1|P)}{\text{U}(G_1|q)}$$

Position Bias

$$v_j = \frac{1}{\log(1+j)}$$

Demographic Parity

Avg Exposure for a group

$$\text{Exposure}(G_k | P) = \frac{1}{|G_k|} \sum_{d_i \in G_k} \text{Exposure}(d_i | P)$$

Exposure for a member

$$\text{Exposure}(d_i | P) = \sum_{j=1}^N P_{i,j} v_j$$

Average exposure of the groups are equal in each query.

$$\text{Exposure}(G_0 | P) = \text{Exposure}(G_1 | P)$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \frac{1}{|G_0|} \sum_{d_i \in G_0} \sum_{j=1}^N P_{i,j} v_j = \frac{1}{|G_1|} \sum_{d_i \in G_1} \sum_{j=1}^N P_{i,j} v_j$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \sum_{d_i \in \mathcal{D}} \sum_{j=1}^N \left(\frac{\mathbb{1}_{d_i \in G_0}}{|G_0|} - \frac{\mathbb{1}_{d_i \in G_1}}{|G_1|} \right) P_{i,j} v_j = 0$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \mathbf{f}^T P \mathbf{v} = 0$$

$$\text{(with } f_i = \frac{\mathbb{1}_{d_i \in G_0}}{|G_0|} - \frac{\mathbb{1}_{d_i \in G_1}}{|G_1|} \text{)}$$

Disparate Treatment

$$\text{Exposure}(G_k | \mathbf{P}) = \frac{1}{|G_k|} \sum_{d_i \in G_k} \text{Exposure}(d_i | \mathbf{P})$$

Average exposure of the groups proportional to their utility are equal in each query.

$$U(G_k | q) = \frac{1}{|G_k|} \sum_{d_i \in G_k} \mathbf{u}_i$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \frac{\text{Exposure}(G_0 | \mathbf{P})}{U(G_0 | q)} = \frac{\text{Exposure}(G_1 | \mathbf{P})}{U(G_1 | q)} \\
 \Leftrightarrow & \frac{\frac{1}{|G_0|} \sum_{d_i \in G_0} \sum_{j=1}^N \mathbf{P}_{i,j} \mathbf{v}_j}{U(G_0 | q)} = \frac{\frac{1}{|G_1|} \sum_{d_i \in G_1} \sum_{j=1}^N \mathbf{P}_{i,j} \mathbf{v}_j}{U(G_1 | q)} \\
 \Leftrightarrow & \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N \left(\frac{\mathbb{1}_{d_i \in G_0}}{|G_0| U(G_0 | q)} - \frac{\mathbb{1}_{d_i \in G_1}}{|G_1| U(G_1 | q)} \right) \mathbf{P}_{i,j} \mathbf{v}_j = 0 \\
 \Leftrightarrow & \mathbf{f}^T P \mathbf{v} = 0 \quad (\text{with } \mathbf{f}_i = \left(\frac{\mathbb{1}_{d_i \in G_0}}{|G_0| U(G_0 | q)} - \frac{\mathbb{1}_{d_i \in G_1}}{|G_1| U(G_1 | q)} \right))
 \end{aligned}$$

Disparate Impact

$$\begin{aligned}
 P(\text{click on document } i) &= P(\text{examining } i) \times P(i \text{ is relevant}) \\
 &= \text{Exposure}(d_i | \mathbf{P}) \times P(i \text{ is relevant}) \\
 &= \left(\sum_{j=1}^N \mathbf{P}_{i,j} \mathbf{v}_j \right) \times \mathbf{u}_i
 \end{aligned}$$

Average impact (e.g. CTR) of the groups proportional to their utility are equal in query

$$\text{CTR}(G_k | \mathbf{P}) = \frac{1}{|G_k|} \sum_{i \in G_k} \sum_{j=1}^N \mathbf{P}_{i,j} \mathbf{u}_i \mathbf{v}_j$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 \frac{\text{CTR}(G_0 | \mathbf{P})}{\text{U}(G_0 | q)} &= \frac{\text{CTR}(G_1 | \mathbf{P})}{\text{U}(G_1 | q)} \\
 \Leftrightarrow \frac{\frac{1}{|G_0|} \sum_{i \in G_0} \sum_{j=1}^N \mathbf{P}_{i,j} \mathbf{u}_i \mathbf{v}_j}{\text{U}(G_0 | q)} &= \frac{\frac{1}{|G_1|} \sum_{i \in G_1} \sum_{j=1}^N \mathbf{P}_{i,j} \mathbf{u}_i \mathbf{v}_j}{\text{U}(G_1 | q)} \\
 \Leftrightarrow \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N \left(\frac{\mathbb{1}_{d_i \in G_0}}{|G_0| \text{U}(G_0 | q)} - \frac{\mathbb{1}_{d_i \in G_1}}{|G_1| \text{U}(G_1 | q)} \right) \mathbf{u}_i \mathbf{P}_{i,j} \mathbf{v}_j &= 0 \\
 \Leftrightarrow \mathbf{f}^T P \mathbf{v} &= 0 \quad (\text{with } \mathbf{f}_i = \left(\frac{\mathbb{1}_{d_i \in G_0}}{|G_0| \text{U}(G_0 | q)} - \frac{\mathbb{1}_{d_i \in G_1}}{|G_1| \text{U}(G_1 | q)} \right) \mathbf{u}_i)
 \end{aligned}$$

Two-sided Fair Marketplace

optimization-based framework

- maximizing source side utility
- maintaining fairness constraints on the destination members.
- post-processing
- Detailed Design

Expanded framework

- Fairness constraints for destination members at **multiple sessions** by considering the multi-session utility
- Adding fairness constraints for **source members**
- Post-processing
- Detailed Design

Maximize $u_s^\top P_s v$

Subject to $1^\top P_s = 1$, $P_s 1 \leq 1$,

$0 \leq P_s(d, r) \leq 1$,

$$f_{k,k'}^\top P_s w = 0$$

$$\tilde{u}_s P_s w = c$$

Destination Side Fairness

Multi-Session Fairness

Two-Sided Fair Marketplace

A Post-Processesing approach:

- Operates on the final ranking with fairness constraints
(very generally applicable)
- Agnostic to the underlying model architecture
- Suitable for large-scale recommender systems

Two-sided Fair Marketplace

Most recommender systems:

maximizing source side utility

$$U_q^{\text{source}}(s) = \sum_{d=1}^{D_q} \sum_{r=1}^m u_{s,d}^q P_s^q(d, r) v_r = u_s^\top P_s v$$

$P(d, r)$: probability of showing the d-th destination member in the r-th slot for source s and query q

Expanded Framework:

Destination side utility

1. much harder to tackle
2. depends of different queries arising from different sources

$$U_q^{\text{dest}}(s, d) = u_{s,d}^q \sum_r P_s^q(d, r) \cdot v_r = u_{s,d}^q P_s^q(d, \cdot) v$$

Destination Side Utility

expected utility a destination member d receives

average cumulative utility for group G at time t

incremental utility

equality of average incremental utility across groups
(Multi-session Dest-side Fairness)

$$U^{\text{dest}}(d)[T] = \sum_{i=1}^N \rho^{T-t_i} U_{q_{t_i}}^{\text{dest}}(s_{t_i}, d)$$

ρ is an appropriately chosen discount rate

$$\mu_{G_k}[t] = \frac{1}{|G_k|} \sum_{\substack{d \in G_k \\ \text{gender group}}} U^{\text{dest}}(d)[t]$$

$$\Delta \mu_{G_k}[T] = \mu_{G_k}[T] - \mu_{G_k}[t]$$

$$\Delta \mu_{G_k}[T] = \Delta \mu_{G_{k'}}[T]$$

Multi-session Destination Side Fairness Constraint

$$\Delta\mu_{G_k}[T] = \Delta\mu_{G_{k'}}[T]$$

We can rewrite it as:

$$u_{s,d}^q \left(\frac{\mathbb{1}_{d \in G_k}}{|G_k|} - \frac{\mathbb{1}_{d \in G_{k'}}}{|G_{k'}|} \right)$$

$$\tilde{u}_s P_s w = c$$

$$c = (1 - \rho^{T-t})(\mu_{G_k}[t] - \mu_{G_{k'}}[t])$$

Two-sided Fair Marketplace Optimization Details

Optimization problem with multi-session Fairness:

$$\text{Maximize } u_s^\top P_s v$$

$$\text{Subject to } 1^\top P_s = 1, \quad P_s 1 \leq 1, \quad 0 \leq P_s(d, r) \leq 1, \quad f_{k,k'}^\top P_s w = 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \tilde{u}_s P_s w = c$$

Vectorized form:

$$\text{Max } p^\top (u \cdot v)$$

$$\text{s.t. } p^\top (f_{k,k'} \cdot v) = 0, \quad p^\top (\tilde{u} \cdot v) = c, \quad [I_m : I_m : \cdots : I_m]p = 1 \quad \text{and} \quad p_d \in T_m \quad \forall d \in M$$

Add a regularizer + better format

$$\text{Maximize } p^\top (u \cdot v) + \frac{\gamma}{2} p^\top p \quad \text{subject to} \quad Ap \leq b \quad \text{and} \quad p_d \in T_m \quad \forall d \in M$$

Two-sided Fair Marketplace Optimization Details

$$\text{Maximize } p^\top(u \cdot v) + \frac{\gamma}{2} p^\top p \quad \text{subject to } Ap \leq b \quad \text{and} \quad p_d \in T_m \quad \forall d \in M$$

- Solve the optimization problem
- Obtain the dual variables $(\lambda_1, \lambda_2, \eta)$
- Obtain the primal solution from duals
(Drastically reduces the latency cost)

$$\hat{p}_d(\lambda_1, \lambda_2, \eta) = \Pi_{T_m} \left(\frac{1}{\gamma} \{(u \cdot v)_d - \lambda_1 (f_{k,k'} \cdot v)_d - \lambda_2 (\tilde{u} \cdot v)_d - \eta\} \right)$$

Extension to Source Side Fairness

ensuring that they receive comparable expected utility across groups over multiple sessions.

$$\mathbb{E}[U^{\text{source}}(G_k, T)] = \sum_{i: t_i \leq T} \rho^{T-t_i} U_{q_i}^{\text{source}}(s_i) = \sum_{i: t_i \leq T} \rho^{T-t_i} u_{s_i}^\top P_{s_i} v$$

$$\mathbb{E}[U^{\text{source}}(G_k, T + \delta)] = \mathbb{E}[U^{\text{source}}(G_{k'}, T + \delta)]$$

$$u_s^\top P_s v = \mathbb{E}[U^{\text{source}}(G_{k'}, T + \delta)] - \rho^\delta \mathbb{E}[U^{\text{source}}(G_k, T)]$$

since the ranking algorithms are by default trying to optimize the source side utility, it is unlikely that a group of source members would be consistently achieving poorer utility in a well-functioning system

Extension to Source Side Fairness

ensuring that they receive comparable expected utility across groups over multiple sessions.

$$\text{Minimize } \sum_{k' \neq k} |u_s^\top P_s v - c_{k,k'}|$$

$$\text{Subject to } 1^\top P_s = 1, \quad P_s 1 \leq 1, \quad 0 \leq P_s(d, r) \leq 1, \quad f_{k,k'}^\top P_s w = 0, \quad \tilde{u}_s P_s w = c$$

$$c_{k,k'} = \mathbb{E}[U^{\text{source}}(G_{k'}, T + \delta)] - \rho^\delta \mathbb{E}[U^{\text{source}}(G_k, T)]$$

since the ranking algorithms are by default trying to optimize the source side utility, it is unlikely that a group of source members would be consistently achieving poorer utility in a well-functioning system

Experiments (Simulation Setup)

- A graph to represent connections between members
- Standard undirected graph, not bipartite
- A_t is the adjacency matrix at time t

$$\text{Aff}_{\text{Graph}}(i, j) = A_t^2(i, j)$$


$$\text{Aff}_{\text{member}}(i, j) = -\|X_i - X_j\|_2$$

- Graph Evolution

A vertex i is picked at random.

For each other vertex j , a “model” score $s(i, j)$ is computed as

$$s(i, j) = p(G_i, G_j) \exp(\lambda \text{Aff}_{\text{Graph}}(i, j)) \exp(\mu \text{Aff}_{\text{member}}(i, j))$$



Experiments

Fairness adjustments:

1. No fairness adjustment in the ranking (**noReranker**)
2. Equality of opportunity, using the primal for destination side fairness (**primal**)
3. Equality of opportunity, using the dual method for destination side fairness (**dualNoDynamic**)
4. Multi-Session destination utility adjustment via the dual (**dualWithDynamic**).

Simulation Details:
1000 members and 1000 iterations

Experiments (Simulation Results)

Settings	Method	ΔDP	$\Delta DP $	Ratio of Source Utility	% Total Destination Utility
$m = 10$ $t = 50$ <small>rate of dual refresh</small>	noReranker	-0.0216	0.1964	0.5100	0.7051
	primal	0.0179	0.1671	0.5024	0.5371
	dualNoDynamic	0.0055	0.2125	0.5100	0.5860
	dualWithDynamic	0.0249	0.2008	0.5100	0.5706
$m = 20$ $t = 50$	noReranker	-0.0072	0.1182	0.5100	0.7059
	primal	0.0109	0.1002	0.5023	0.5269
	dualNoDynamic	0.0122	0.1090	0.5099	0.5536
	dualWithDynamic	0.0155	0.1099	0.5099	0.5371
$m = 20$ $t = 20$	noReranker	-0.0072	0.1182	0.5100	0.7059
	primal	0.0109	0.1002	0.5023	0.5269
	dualNoDynamic	0.0177	0.1105	0.5099	0.5210
	dualWithDynamic	0.0185	0.1090	0.5099	0.5166

Adding fairness re-rankers:

- help rebalance destination utility (last column)
- not significantly altering source utility metrics (see the 5th column)

Conclusion (My Thoughts)

1. Novel Idea by Designing multi-session dest-side utility
Enables introducing multi-session dest-side utility and source-side utility
2. Using dual trick makes it flexible for large-scale implementation
3. Evaluation on only one fairness constraint (Demographic Parity)
Since utility is available in test time Disparate Treatment could be evaluated too.
4. Does not provide different trade-offs between Utility and Fairness
5. Evaluation needed on Real-world Large-Scale data

Thank you